resistance on the general line of the Wadi Sukereir, with centre about
El Kustineh; the Hebron group, after an ineffective demonstration in the
direction of Arak el Menshiye on the 10th, retired north-east and
prolonged the enemy's line towards Beit Jibrin. Royal Flying Corps
reports indicated the total hostile forces opposed to us on this line at
about 15,000; and this increased resistance, coupled with the capture of
prisoners from almost every unit of the Turkish force, tended to show
that we were no longer opposed to rearguards, but that all the remainder
of the Turkish Army which could be induced to fight was making a last
effort to arrest our pursuit south of the important Junction Station.
[Sidenote: Troops suffer from thirst.]
In these circumstances our progress on the 10th and 11th was slow; the
troops suffered considerably from thirst (a hot, exhausting wind blew
during these two days), and our supply difficulties were great; but by
the evening of the 11th favorable positions had been reached for a
combined attack.
[Sidenote: Forces far from their railhead.]
[Sidenote: Water supply slow to obtain.]
The 12th was spent in preparations for the attack, which was ordered to
be begun early on the morning of the 13th, on the enemy's position
covering Junction Station. Our forces were now operating at a distance
of some 35 miles in advance of their railhead, and the bringing up and
distribution of supplies and ammunition formed a difficult problem. The
routes north of the Wadi Hesi were found to be hard and good going,
though there were some difficult Wadi crossings, but the main road
through Gaza and as far as Beit Hanun was sandy and difficult. The
supply of water in the area of operations, though good and plentiful in
most of the villages, lies mainly in wells 100 feet or more below the
surface, and in these circumstances a rapid supply and distribution was
almost impossible. Great credit is due to all concerned that these
difficulties were overcome and that it was found possible not only to
supply the troops already in the line, but to bring up two heavy
batteries to support the attack.
[Sidenote: The enemy's position from El Kubeibeh to Beit Jibrin.]
The situation on the morning of November 13 was that the enemy had
strung out his force (amounting probably to no more than 20,000 rifles
in all) on a front of 20 miles, from El Kubeibeh on the north to about
Beit Jibrin to the south. The right half of his line ran roughly
parallel to and only about 5 miles in front of the Ramleh-Junction
Station railway, his main line of supply from the north, and his right
flank was already almost turned. This position had been dictated to him
by the rapidity of our movement along the coast, and the determination
with which his rearguards on this flank had been pressed.
The advanced guard of the 52nd (Lowland) Division had forced its way
almost to Burkah on the 11th, on which day also some mounted troops
pushed across the Nahr Sukereir at Jisr Esdud, where they held a
bridge-head. During the 12th the Yeomanry pushed north up the left bank
of the Nahr Suhereir, and eventually seized Tel-el-Murreh on the right
bank near the mouth.
[Sidenote: One part of enemy retires north, the other east.]
The enemy's army had now been broken into two separate parts, which
retired north and east respectively, and were reported to consist of
small scattered groups rather than formed bodies of any size.
In fifteen days our force had advanced sixty miles on its right and
about forty on its left. It had driven a Turkish Army of nine Infantry
Divisions and one Cavalry Division out of a position in which it had
been entrenched for six months, and had pursued it, giving battle
whenever it attempted to stand, and inflicting on it losses amounting
probably to nearly two-thirds of the enemy's original effectives. Over
9,000 prisoners, about eighty guns, more than 100 machine guns, and very
large quantities of ammunition and other stores had been captured.
[Sidenote: Capture of Junction Station.]
After the capture of Junction Station on the morning of the 14th, our
troops secured a position covering the station, while the Australian
mounted troops reached Kezaze that same evening.
[Sidenote: Turks fight New Zealand Mounted Rifles.]
The mounted troops pressed on towards Ramleh and Ludd. On the right
Naaneh was attacked and captured in the morning, while on the left the
New Zealand Mounted Rifles had a smart engagement at Ayun Kara (six
miles south of Jaffa). Here the Turks made a determined counter-attack
and got to within fifteen yards of our line. A bayonet attack drove them
back with heavy loss.
Flanking the advance along the railway to Ramleh and covering the main
road from Ramleh to Jerusalem, a ridge stands up prominently out of the
low foot hills surrounding it. This is the site of the ancient Gezer,
near which the village of Abu Shusheh now stands. A hostile rearguard
had established itself on this feature. It was captured on the morning
of the 15th in a brilliant attack by mounted troops, who galloped up the
ridge from the south. A gun and 360 prisoners were taken in this affair.
[Sidenote: Mounted troops reach Ramleh and Ludd. Jaffa taken.]
By the evening of the 15th the mounted troops had occupied Ramleh and
Ludd, and had pushed patrols to within a short distance of Jaffa. At
Ludd 300 prisoners were taken, and five destroyed aeroplanes and a
quantity of abandoned war material were found at Ramleh and Ludd.
Jaffa was occupied without opposition on the evening of the 16th.
The situation was now as follows:
[Sidenote: Airmen report enemy likely to leave Jerusalem.]
The enemy's army, cut in two by our capture of Junction Station, had
retired partly east into the mountains towards Jerusalem and partly
north along the plain. The nearest line on which these two portions
could re-unite was the line Tul Keram-Nablus. Reports from the Royal
Flying Corps indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy
to evacuate Jerusalem and withdraw to reorganize on this line.
On our side the mounted troops had been marching and fighting
continuously since October 31, and had advanced a distance of
seventy-five miles, measured in a straight line from Asluj to Jaffa. The
troops, after their heavy fighting at Gaza, had advanced in nine days a
distance of about forty miles, with two severe engagements and continual
advanced guard fighting. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had covered
sixty-nine miles in this period.
[Sidenote: Railway is being extended.]
The railway was being pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and every
opportunity was taken of landing stores at points along the coast. The
landing of stores was dependent on a continuance of favorable weather,
and might at any moment be stopped for several days together.
[Sidenote: One good road from Nablus to Jerusalem.]
A pause was therefore necessary to await the progress of railway
construction, but before our position in the plain could be considered
secure it was essential to obtain a hold of the one good road which
traverses the Judaean range from north to south, from Nablus to
Jerusalem.
[Sidenote: Road damaged in several places.]
[Sidenote: Water supply scanty.]
On our intended line of advance only one good road, the main
Jaffa-Jerusalem road, traversed the hills from east to west. For nearly
four miles, between Bab el Wad (two and one-half miles east of Latron)
and Saris, this road passes through a narrow defile, and it had been
damaged by the Turks in several places. The other roads were mere tracks
on the side of the hill or up the stony beds of wadis, and were
impracticable for wheeled transport without improvement. Throughout
these hills the water supply was scanty without development.
On November 17 the Yeomanry had commenced to move from Ramleh through
the hills direct on Bireh by Annabeh, Berfilya and Beit ur el Tahta
(Lower Bethoron). By the evening of November 18 one portion of the
Yeomanry had reached the last-named place, while another portion had
occupied Shilta. The route had been found impossible for wheels beyond
Annabeh.
[Sidenote: Infantry begins its advance.]
[Sidenote: Attempt to avoid fighting near Jerusalem.]
On the 19th the Infantry commenced its advance. One portion was to
advance up the main road as far as Kuryet el Enab, with its right flank
protected by Australian mounted troops. From that place, in order to
avoid any fighting in the close vicinity of the Holy City, it was to
strike north towards Bireh by a track leading through Biddu. The
remainder of the infantry was to advance through Berfilya to Beit Likia
and Beit Dukka and thence support the movement of the other portion.
[Sidenote: Saris defended by rearguards.]
After capturing Latron and Amnas on the morning of the 19th, the
remainder of the day was spent in clearing the defile up to Saris, which
was defended by hostile rearguards.
On the 20th Kuryet el Enab was captured with the bayonet in the face of
organized opposition, while Beit Dukka was also captured. On the same
day the Yeomanry got to within four miles of the Nablus-Jerusalem road,
but were stopped by strong opposition about Beitunia.
[Sidenote: Difficult advance of infantry and Yeomanry.]
On the 21st a body of infantry moved north-east by a track from Kuryet
el Enab through Biddu and Kolundia towards Bireh. The track was found
impassable for wheels, and was under hostile shell-fire. Progress was
slow, but by evening the ridge on which stands Neby Samwil was secured.
A further body of troops was left at Kuryet el Enab to cover the flank
and demonstrate along the main Jerusalem road. It drove hostile parties
from Kostul, two and one-half miles east of Kuryet el Enab, and secured
this ridge.
By the afternoon of the 21st advanced parties of Yeomanry were within
two miles of the road and an attack was being delivered on Beitunia by
other mounted troops.
[Sidenote: Period of organization and preparation necessary.]
The positions reached on the evening of the 21st practically marked the
limit of progress in this first attempt to gain the Nablus-Jerusalem
road. The Yeomanry were heavily counter-attacked and fell back, after
bitter fighting, on Beit ur el Foka (Upper Bethoron). During the 22nd
the enemy made two counter-attacks on the Neby Samwil ridge, which were
repulsed. Determined and gallant attacks were made on the 23rd and on
the 24th on the strong positions to the west of the road held by the
enemy, who had brought up reinforcements and numerous machine-guns, and
could support his infantry by artillery fire from guns placed in
positions along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could
not be brought up to give adequate support to our infantry. Both attacks
failed, and it was evident that a period of preparation and organization
would be necessary before an attack could be delivered in sufficient
strength to drive the enemy from his positions west of the road.
Orders were accordingly issued to consolidate the positions gained and
prepare for relief.
[Sidenote: Position for final attack is won.]
Though these troops had failed to reach their final objectives, they had
achieved invaluable results. The narrow passes from the plain to the
plateau of the Judaean range have seldom been forced, and have been fatal
to many invading armies. Had the attempt not been made at once, or had
it been pressed with less determination, the enemy would have had time
to reorganize his defences in the passes lower down, and the conquest of
the plateau would then have been slow, costly, and precarious. As it
was, positions had been won from which the final attack could be
prepared and delivered with good prospects of success.
By December 4 all reliefs were complete, and a line was held from Kustul
by the Neby Samwil ridge, Beit Izza, and Beit Dukka, to Beit ur el
Tahta.
[Sidenote: Severe local fighting.]
[Sidenote: Enemy pierces outposts near Jaffa.]
[Sidenote: Attacks costly to Turks.]
During this period attacks by the enemy along the whole line led to
severe local fighting. On November 25 our advanced posts north of the
river Auja were driven back across the river. From the 27th to the 30th
the enemy delivered a series of attacks directed especially against the
high ground north and north-east of Jaffa, the left flank of our
position in the hills from Beit ur el Foka to El Burj, and the Neby
Samwil ridge. An attack on the night of the 29th succeeded in
penetrating our outpost line north-east of Jaffa, but next morning the
whole hostile detachment, numbering 150, was surrounded and captured by
Australian Light Horse. On the 30th a similar fate befell a battalion
which attacked near El Burj; a counter-attack by Australian Light Horse
took 220 prisoners and practically destroyed the attacking battalion.
There was particularly heavy fighting between El Burj and Beit ur el
Foka, but the Yeomanry and Scottish troops successfully resisted all
attacks and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. At Beit ur el Foka one
company took 300 prisoners. All efforts by the enemy to drive us off the
Neby Samwil ridge were completely repulsed. These attacks cost the Turks
very dearly. We took 750 prisoners between November 27 and 30, and the
enemy's losses in killed and wounded were undoubtedly heavy. His attacks
in no way affected our positions nor impeded the progress of our
preparations.
[Sidenote: Improvement of roads and water supply.]
Favored by a continuance of fine weather, preparations for a fresh
advance against the Turkish positions west and south of Jerusalem
proceeded rapidly. Existing roads and tracks were improved and new ones
constructed to enable heavy and field artillery to be placed in position
and ammunition and supplies brought up. The water supply was also
developed.
[Sidenote: Advances of British troops.]
The date for the attack was fixed as December 8. Welsh troops, with a
Cavalry regiment attached, had advanced from their positions north of
Beersheba up the Hebron-Jerusalem road on the 4th. No opposition was
met, and by the evening of the 6th the head of this column was ten miles
north of Hebron. The Infantry were directed to reach the Bethlehem-Beit
Jala area by the 7th, and the line Surbahir-Sherafat (about three miles
south of Jerusalem) by dawn on the 8th, and no troops were to enter
Jerusalem during this operation.
It was recognized that the troops on the extreme right might be delayed
on the 7th and fail to reach the positions assigned to them by dawn on
the 8th. Arrangements were therefore made to protect the right flank
west of Jerusalem, in case such delay occurred.
[Sidenote: Three days of rain make roads almost impassable.]
On the 7th the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost
continuous. The hills were covered with mist at frequent intervals,
rendering observation from the air and visual signalling impossible. A
more serious effect of the rain was to jeopardize the supply
arrangements by rendering the roads almost impassable--quite impassable,
indeed, for mechanical transport and camels in many places.
[Sidenote: Artillery support difficult.]
The troops moved into positions of assembly by night, and, assaulting at
dawn on the 8th, soon carried their first objectives. They then pressed
steadily forward. The mere physical difficulty of climbing the steep and
rocky hillsides and crossing the deep valleys would have sufficed to
render progress slow, and the opposition encountered was considerable.
Artillery support was soon difficult, owing to the length of the advance
and the difficulty of moving guns forward. But by about noon London
troops had already advanced over two miles, and were swinging north-east
to gain the Nablus-Jerusalem road; while the Yeomanry had captured the
Beit Iksa spur, and were preparing for a further advance.
[Sidenote: Enemy defences west of Jerusalem captured.]
As the right column had been delayed and was still some distance south
of Jerusalem, it was necessary for the London troops to throw back their
right and form a defensive flank facing east towards Jerusalem, from the
western outskirts of which considerable rifle and artillery fire was
being experienced. This delayed the advance, and early in the afternoon
it was decided to consolidate the line gained and resume the advance
next day, when the right column would be in a position to exert its
pressure. By nightfall our line ran from Neby Samwil to the east of Beit
Iksa, through Lifta to a point about one and one-half miles west of
Jerusalem, whence it was thrown back facing east. All the enemy's
prepared defences west and north-west of Jerusalem had been captured,
and our troops were within a short distance of the Nablus-Jerusalem
road.
[Sidenote: Operations isolate Jerusalem.]
Next morning the advance was resumed. The Turks had withdrawn during the
night, and the London troops and Yeomanry, driving back rearguards,
occupied a line across the Nablus-Jerusalem road four miles north of
Jerusalem, while Welsh troops occupied a position east of Jerusalem
across the Jericho road. These operations isolated Jerusalem, and at
about noon the enemy sent out a _parlementaire_ and surrendered the
city.
At noon on the 11th I made my official entry into Jerusalem.
* * * * *
There were many encounters between American ships and German submarines
in the months of 1917, following the Declaration of War. Official
accounts of the most important of these encounters are given in the
following pages.
AMERICAN SHIPS AND GERMAN SUBMARINES
FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS
[Sidenote: The destroyer _Cassin_ sights a submarine.]
On October 15, 1917, the U. S. destroyer _Cassin_ was patrolling off the
south coast of Ireland; when about 20 miles south of Mine Head, at 1.30
p. m., a submarine was sighted by the lookout aloft four or five miles
away, about two points on the port bow. The submarine at this time was
awash and was made out by officers of the watch and the quartermaster of
the watch, but three minutes later submerged.
The _Cassin_, which was making 15 knots, continued on its course until
near the position where the submarine had disappeared. When last seen
the submarine was heading in a south-easterly direction, and when the
destroyer reached the point of disappearance the course was changed, as
it was thought the vessel would make a decided change of course after
submerging. At this time the commanding officer, the executive officer,
engineer officer, officer of the watch, and the junior watch officer
were all on the bridge searching for the submarine.
[Sidenote: Torpedo sighted running at high speed.]
[Sidenote: Torpedo strikes destroyer and depth charges also explode.]
At about 1.57 p. m. the commanding officer sighted a torpedo apparently
shortly after it had been fired, running near the surface and in a
direction that was estimated would make a hit either in the engine or
fire room. When first seen the torpedo was between three or four hundred
yards from the ship, and the wake could be followed on the other side
for about 400 yards. The torpedo was running at high speed, at least 35
knots. The _Cassin_ was maneuvering to dodge the torpedo, double
emergency full speed ahead having been signaled from the engine room and
the rudder put hard left as soon as the torpedo was sighted. It looked
for the moment as though the torpedo would pass astern. When about
fifteen or twenty feet away the torpedo porpoised, completely leaving
the water and shearing to the left. Before again taking the water the
torpedo hit the ship well aft on the port side about frame 163 and above
the water line. Almost immediately after the explosion of the torpedo
the depth charges, located on the stern and ready for firing, exploded.
There were two distinct explosions in quick succession after the torpedo
hit.
[Sidenote: Ingram's sacrifice saves his comrades.]
But one life was lost. Osmond K. Ingram, gunner's mate first class, was
cleaning the muzzle of No. 4 gun, target practice being just over when
the attack occurred. With rare presence of mind, realizing that the
torpedo was about to strike the part of the ship where the depth charges
were stored and that the setting off of these explosives might sink the
ship, Ingram, immediately seeing the danger, ran aft to strip these
charges and throw them overboard. He was blown to pieces when the
torpedo struck. Thus Ingram sacrificed his life in performing a duty
which he believed would save his ship and the lives of the officers and
men on board.
Nine members of the crew received minor injuries.
After the ship was hit, the crew was kept at general quarters.
[Sidenote: Port engine still workable.]
The executive officer and engineer officer inspected the parts of the
ship that were damaged, and those adjacent to the damage. It was found
that the engine and fire rooms and after magazine were intact and that
the engines could be worked; but that the ship could not be steered,
the rudder having been blown off and the stern blown to starboard. The
ship continued to turn to starboard in a circle. In an effort to put the
ship on a course by the use of the engines, something carried away which
put the starboard engine out of commission. The port engine was kept
going at slow speed. The ship, being absolutely unmanageable, sometimes
turned in a circle and at times held an approximate course for several
minutes.
[Sidenote: Radio officers improvise temporary wireless.]
Immediately after the ship was torpedoed the radio was out of
commission. The radio officer and radio electrician chief managed to
improvise a temporary auxiliary antenna. The generators were out of
commission for a short time after the explosion, the ship being in
darkness below.
When this vessel was torpedoed, there was another United States
destroyer, name unknown, within signal distance. She had acknowledged
our call by searchlight before we were torpedoed. After being torpedoed,
an attempt was made to signal her by searchlight, flag, and whistle, and
the distress signal was hoisted. Apparently through a misunderstanding
she steamed away and was lost sight of.
[Sidenote: Another submarine fight.]
At about 2.30 p. m., when we were in approximately the same position as
when torpedoed, a submarine conning tower was sighted on port beam,
distant about 1,500 yards, ship still circling under port engine. Opened
fire with No. 2 gun, firing four rounds. Submarine submerged and was not
seen again. Two shots came very close to submarine.
[Sidenote: American and British vessels stand by.]
At 3.50 p. m., U. S. S. _Porter_ stood by. At 4.25 p. m., wreckage which
was hanging to stern dropped off. At dark stopped port engine and
drifted. At about 9 p. m., H. M. S. _Jessamine_ and H. M. S. _Tamarisk_
stood by. H. M. S. _Jessamine_ signalled she would stand by until
morning and then take us in tow. At this time sea was very rough, wind
about six or seven and increasing.
[Sidenote: Attempts to tow the _Cassin_ fail.]
H. M. S. _Tamarisk_ prepared to take us in tow and made one attempt
after another to get a line to us. Finally, about 2.10 a. m., October
16, the _Tamarisk_ lowered a boat in rough sea and sent grass line by
means of which our eight-inch hawser was sent over to her. At about 2.30
a. m. _Tamarisk_ started towing us to Queenstown, speed about four
knots, this vessel towing well on starboard quarter of _Tamarisk_, due
to condition of stern described above. At 3.25 hawser parted.
[Sidenote: The _Tamarisk_ succeeds in getting out a line.]
Between this time and 10.37 a. m., when a towing line was received from
H. M. S. _Snowdrop_, various attempts were made by the _Tamarisk_ and
two trawlers and a tug to tow the _Cassin_. An eleven-inch towing hawser
from the _Tamarisk_ parted. All ships, except her, lost the _Cassin_
during the night. The _Cassin_ was drifting rapidly on a lee shore, and
had it not been for the _Tamarisk_ getting out a line in the early
morning, the vessel would have undoubtedly grounded on Hook Point, as it
is extremely doubtful if her anchors would have held.