A methodical bombardment was commenced at 6 a.m. on September 12, 1916,

and was continued steadily and uninterruptedly till the moment of

attack.

[Sidenote: Bombardment and infantry assault.]

At 6.20 a.m. on September 15, 1916 the infantry assault commenced, and

at the same moment the bombardment became intense. Our new heavily

armored cars, known as "tanks," now brought into action for the first

time, successfully co-operated with the infantry, and, coming as a

surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down

their resistance.

[Sidenote: Tanks enter Flers.]

[Sidenote: High Wood carried.]

[Sidenote: Capture of the Quadrilateral.]

The advance met with immediate success on almost the whole of the front

attacked. At 8.40 a.m. "tanks" were seen to be entering Flers, followed

by large numbers of troops. Fighting continued in Flers for some time,

but by 10 a.m. our troops had reached the north side of the village, and

by midday had occupied the enemy's trenches for some distance beyond. On

our right our line was advanced to within assaulting distance of the

strong line of defense running before Morval, Les Boeufs, and

Gueudecourt, and on our left High Wood was at last carried after many

hours of very severe fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking

battalions. Our success made it possible to carry out during the

afternoon that part of the plan which provided for the capture of

Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of the day both these

villages were in our hands. On September 18, 1916, the work of this day

was completed by the capture of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold

which had hitherto blocked the progress of our right toward Morval.

Further progress was also made between Flers and Martinpuich.

[Sidenote: Results of four days' fighting.]

The result of the fighting of September 15, 1916, and following days was

a gain more considerable than any which had attended our arms in the

course of a single operation since the commencement of the offensive. In

the course of one day's fighting we had broken through two of the

enemy's main defensive systems and had advanced on a front of over six

miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course of this advance we

had taken three large villages, each powerfully organized for prolonged

resistance. Two of these villages had been carried by assault with short

preparation in the course of a few hours' fighting. All this had been

accomplished with a small number of casualties in comparison with the

troops employed, and in spite of the fact that, as was afterward

discovered, the attack did not come as a complete surprise to the enemy.

[Sidenote: Prisoners taken.]

The total number of prisoners taken by us in these operations since

their commencement on the evening of September 14, 1916, amounted at

this date to over 4,000, including 127 officers.

[Sidenote: General attack launched.]

[Sidenote: Objectives taken.]

Preparations for our further advance were again hindered by bad weather,

but at 12.35 p.m. on September 25, 1916, after a bombardment commenced

early in the morning of the 24th, a general attack by the Allies was

launched on the whole front between the Somme and Martinpuich. The

objectives on the British front included the villages of Morval, Les

Boeufs, and Gueudecourt, and a belt of country about 1,000 yards deep

curving round the north of Flers to a point midway between that village

and Martinpuich. By nightfall the whole of these objectives were in our

hands, with the exception of the village of Gueudecourt, before which

our troops met with very serious resistance from a party of the enemy in

a section of his fourth main system of defense.

[Sidenote: French take Rancourt.]

[Sidenote: Combles occupied.]

On our right our allies carried the village of Rancourt, and advanced

their line to the outskirts of Fregicourt, capturing that village also

during the night and early morning. Combles was therefore nearly

surrounded by the allied forces, and in the early morning of September

26, 1916, the village was occupied simultaneously by the allied forces,

the British to the north and the French to the south of the railway. The

capture of Combles in this inexpensive fashion represented a not

inconsiderable tactical success. Though lying in a hollow, the village

was very strongly fortified, and possessed, in addition to the works

which the enemy had constructed, exceptionally large cellars and

galleries, at a great depth under ground, sufficient to give effectual

shelter to troops and material under the heaviest bombardment. Great

quantities of stores and ammunition of all sorts were found in these

cellars when the village was taken.

[Sidenote: Gueudecourt carried.]

[Sidenote: Few casualties.]

On the same day Gueudecourt was carried, after the protecting trench to

the west had been captured in a somewhat interesting fashion. In the

early morning a "tank" started down the portion of the trench held by

the enemy from the northwest, firing its machine guns and followed by

bombers. The enemy could not escape, as we held the trench at the

southern end. At the same time an aeroplane flew down the length of the

trench, also firing a machine gun at the enemy holding it. These then

waved white handkerchiefs in token of surrender, and when this was

reported by the aeroplane the infantry accepted the surrender of the

garrison. By 8.30 a.m. the whole trench had been cleared, great numbers

of the enemy had been killed, and 8 officers and 362 of the ranks made

prisoners. Our total casualties amounted to five.

[Sidenote: Tactical value of the main ridge.]

The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our advance to the stage

at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval should be taken, in order

to bring our left flank into line and establish it on the main ridge

above that village, the possession of which would be of considerable

tactical value in future operations.

[Sidenote: New attack on Thiepval.]

Accordingly at 12.25 p.m. on September 26, 1916, before the enemy had

been given time to recover from the blow struck by the Fourth Army, a

general attack was launched against Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge. The

objective consisted of the whole of the high ground still remaining in

enemy hands extending over a front of some 3,000 yards north and east of

Thiepval, and including, in addition to that fortress, the Zollern

Redoubt, the Stuff Redoubt, and the Schwaben Redoubt, with the

connecting lines of trenches.

[Sidenote: Strong enemy resistance.]

The attack was a brilliant success. On the right our troops reached the

system of enemy trenches which formed their objectives without great

difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works to the north of it the

enemy's resistance was more desperate. Three waves of our attacking

troops carried the outer defenses of Mouquet Farm, and, pushing on,

entered Zollern Redoubt, which they stormed and consolidated. In the

strong point formed by the buildings of the farm itself, the enemy

garrison, securely posted in deep cellars, held out until 6 p.m., when

their last defenses were forced by a working party of a pioneer

battalion acting on its own initiative.

[Sidenote: Thiepval taken.]

On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in which "tanks" again gave

valuable assistance to our troops, continued in Thiepval during that day

and the following night, but by 8.30 a.m. on September 27, 1916 the

whole of the village of Thiepval was in our hands.

[Sidenote: Prisoners.]

Some 2,300 prisoners were taken in the course of the fighting on the

Thiepval Ridge on these and the subsequent days, bringing the total

number of prisoners taken in the battle area in the operations of

September 14-30, 1916, to nearly 10,000. In the same period we had

captured 27 guns, over 200 machine guns, and some 40 trench mortars.

[Sidenote: Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts.]

On the same date the south and west sides of Stuff Redoubt were carried

by our troops, together with the length of trench connecting that strong

point with Schwaben Redoubt to the west and also the greater part of the

enemy's defensive line eastward along the northern slopes of the ridge.

Schwaben Redoubt was assaulted during the afternoon, and in spite of

counterattacks, delivered by strong enemy reenforcements, we captured

the whole of the southern face of the redoubt and pushed out patrols to

the northern face and toward St. Pierre Divion.

Our line was also advanced north of Courcelette, while on the Fourth

Army front a further portion of the enemy's fourth-system of defense

northwest of Gueudecourt was carried on a front of a mile. Between these

two points the enemy fell back upon his defenses running in front of

Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Le Sars, and on the afternoon and evening of

September 27, 1916, our troops were able to make a very considerable

advance in this area without encountering serious opposition until

within a few hundred yards of this line. The ground thus occupied

extended to a depth of from 500 to 600 yards on a front of nearly two

miles between the Bazentin-le-Petit, Lingy, Thilloy, and Albert-Bapaume

roads.

[Sidenote: Destremont Farm carried.]

Destremont Farm, southwest of Le Sars, was carried by a single company

on September 29, 1916, and on the afternoon of October 1, 1916, a

successful attack was launched against Eaucourt l'Abbaye and the enemy

defenses to the east and west of it, comprising a total front of about

3,000 yards. Our artillery barrage was extremely accurate, and

contributed greatly to the success of the attack. Bomb fighting

continued among the buildings during the next two days, but by the

evening of October 3 the whole of Eaucourt l'Abbaye was in our hands.

[Sidenote: Fourth Army attacks.]

At the end of September, 1916, I had handed over Morval to the French,

in order to facilitate their attacks on Sailly-Saillisel, and on October

7, 1916, after a postponement rendered necessary by three days'

continuous rain, our allies made a considerable advance in the direction

of the latter village. On the same day the Fourth Army attacked along

the whole front from Les Boeufs to Destremont Farm in support of the

operations of our allies.

[Sidenote: Enemy's trenches east of Gueudecourt taken.]

The village of Le Sars was captured, together with the quarry to the

northwest, while considerable progress was made at other points along

the front attacked. In particular, to the east of Gueudecourt, the

enemy's trenches were carried on a breadth of some 2,000 yards, and a

footing gained on the crest of the long spur which screens the defenses

of Le Transloy from the southwest. Nearly 1,000 prisoners were secured

by the Fourth Army in the course of these operations.

With the exception of his positions in the neighborhood of

Sailly-Saillisel, and his scanty foothold on the northern crest of the

high ground above Thiepval, the enemy had now been driven from the whole

of the ridge lying between the Tortille and the Ancre.

[Sidenote: Germans make repeated counterattacks.]

[Sidenote: British situation satisfactory.]

Possession of the northwestern portion of the ridge north of the latter

village carried with it observation over the valley of the Ancre between

Miraumont and Hamel and the spurs and valleys held by the enemy on the

right bank of the river. The Germans, therefore, made desperate efforts

to cling to their last remaining trenches in this area, and in the

course of the three weeks following our advance made repeated

counterattacks at heavy cost in the vain hope of recovering the ground

they had lost. During this period our gains in the neighborhood of Stuff

and Schwaben Redoubts were gradually increased and secured in readiness

for future operations; and I was quite confident of the ability of our

troops, not only to repulse the enemy's attacks, but to clear him

entirely from his last positions on the ridge whenever it should suit my

plans to do so. I was, therefore, well content with the situation on

this flank.

Along the centre of our line from Gueudecourt to the west of Le Sars

similar considerations applied. As we were already well down the forward

slopes of the ridge on his front, it was for the time being inadvisable

to make any serious advance. Pending developments elsewhere all that was

necessary or indeed desirable was to carry on local operations to

improve our positions and to keep the enemy fully employed.

[Sidenote: Strong enemy positions in eastern flank.]

[Sidenote: Enemy resistance weakens.]

On our eastern flank, on the other hand, it was important to gain

ground. Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches

covering the villages of Le Transloy and Beaulencourt and the town of

Bapaume; but, although he was digging with feverish haste, he had not

yet been able to create any very formidable defenses behind this line.

In this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at which a

successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield much greater

results than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the troops

opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of our recent

operations, and there was no reason to suppose that the effort required

would not be within our powers.

[Sidenote: Necessity to gain spur and heights.]

The last completed system of defense, before Le Transloy, was flanked to

the south by the enemy's positions at Sailly-Saillisel, and screened to

the west by the spur lying between Le Transloy and Les Boeufs. A

necessary preliminary, therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure

the spur and the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground

at this latter village would at once give a far better command over the

ground to the north and northwest, secure the flank of our operations

toward Le Transloy, and deprive the enemy of observation over the allied

communications in the Combles Valley. In view of the enemy's efforts to

construct new systems of defense behind the Le Transloy spur, was

extended and secured time in dealing with the situation.

[Sidenote: Rain and fog a hindrance.]

Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavorable weather set in and

continued with scarcely a break during the remainder of October and the

early part of November. Poor visibility seriously interfered with the

work of our artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily dug

trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep mud. The

country roads, broken by countless shell craters, that cross the deep

stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly became almost impassable,

making the supply of food, stores, and ammunition a serious problem.

These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent

that it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the rapidity

necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of the advantages we

had gained.

[Sidenote: Enemy has time to reorganize.]

None the less, my right flank continued to assist the operations of our

allies against Saillisel, and attacks were made to this end, whenever a

slight improvement in the weather made the co-operation of artillery and

infantry at all possible. The delay in our advance, however, though

unavoidable, had given the enemy time to reorganize and rally his

troops. His resistance again became stubborn and he seized every

favorable opportunity for counterattacks. Trenches changed hands with

great frequency, the conditions of ground making it difficult to renew

exhausted supplies of bombs and ammunition, or to consolidate the ground

won, and so rendering it an easier matter to take a battered trench than

to hold it.

[Sidenote: French take Sailly-Saillisel.]

On September 12 and 18, 1916, further gains were made to the east of the

Les Boeufs-Gueudecourt line and east of Le Sars, and some hundreds of

prisoners were taken. On these dates, despite all the difficulties of

ground, the French first reached and then captured the villages of

Sailly-Saillisel, but the moment for decisive action was rapidly passing

away, while the weather showed no signs of improvement. By this time,

too, the ground had already become so bad that nothing less than a

prolonged period of drying weather, which at that season of the year was

most unlikely to occur, would suit our purpose.

[Sidenote: New line established.]

In these circumstances, while continuing to do all that was possible to

improve my position on my right flank, I determined to press on with

preparations for the exploitation of the favorable local situation on my

left flank. At midday on October 21, 1916, during a short spell of fine,

cold weather, the line of Regina Trench and Stuff Trench, from the west

Courcelette-Pys road westward to Schwaben Redoubt, was attacked with

complete success. Assisted by an excellent artillery preparation and

barrage, our infantry carried the whole of their objectives very quickly

and with remarkably little loss, and our new line was firmly established

in spite of the enemy's shell fire. Over one thousand prisoners were

taken in the course of the day's fighting, a figure only slightly

exceeded by our casualties.

[Sidenote: Part of Regina trench carried.]

On October 23, 1916, and again on November 5, 1916, while awaiting

better weather for further operations on the Ancre, our attacks on the

enemy's positions to the east of Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt were

renewed, in conjunction with French operations against the

Sailly-Saillisel heights and St. Pierre Vaast Wood. Considerable further

progress was achieved. Our footing at the crest of Le Transloy Spur was

extended and secured, and the much-contested tangle of trenches at our

junction with the French left at last passed definitely into our

possession. Many smaller gains were made in this neighborhood by local

assaults during these days, in spite of the difficult conditions of the

ground. In particular, on November 10, 1916, after a day of improved

weather, the portion of Regina Trench lying to the east of the

Courcelette-Pys road was carried on a front of about one thousand yards.

[Sidenote: Enemy losses.]

Throughout these operations the enemy's counterattacks were very

numerous and determined, succeeding indeed in the evening of October 23,

1916, in regaining a portion of the ground east of Le Sars taken from

him by our attack on that day. On all other occasions his attacks were

broken by our artillery or infantry and the losses incurred by him in

these attempts, made frequently with considerable effectives, were

undoubtedly very severe.

[Sidenote: Preparations for attack on the Ancre.]

On November 9, 1916, the long-continued bad weather took a turn for the

better, and thereafter remained dry and cold, with frosty nights and

misty mornings, for some days. Final preparations were therefore pushed

on for the attack on the Ancre, though, as the ground was still very bad

in places, it was necessary to limit the operations to what it would be

reasonably possible to consolidate and hold under the existing

conditions.

[Sidenote: Permanent line of enemy fortifications.]

The enemy's defenses in this area were already extremely formidable when

they resisted our assault on July 1, 1916, and the succeeding period of

four months had been spent in improving and adding to them in the light

of the experience he had gained in the course of our attacks further

south. The hamlet of St. Pierre Divion and the villages of

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre and Beaumont Hamel, like the rest of the villages

forming part of the enemy's original front in this district, were

evidently intended by him to form a permanent line of fortifications,

while he developed his offensive elsewhere. Realizing that his position

in them had become a dangerous one, the enemy had multiplied the number

of his guns covering this part of his line, and at the end of October

introduced an additional division on his front between Grandcourt and

Hebuterne.

[Sidenote: Barrage to cover infantry.]

At 5 o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1916, the special

bombardment preliminary to the attack was commenced. It continued with

bursts of great intensity until 5.45 o'clock on the morning of November

13, 1916, when it developed into a very effective barrage covering the

assaulting infantry.

[Sidenote: St. Pierre Divion taken.]

At that hour our troops advanced on the enemy's position through dense

fog, and rapidly entered his first-line trenches on almost the whole

front attacked, from east of Schwaben Redoubt to the north of Serre.

South of the Ancre, where our assault was directed northward against the

enemy's trenches on the northern slopes of the Thiepval Ridge, it met

with a success altogether remarkable for rapidity of execution and

lightness of cost. By 7.20 a.m. our objectives east of St. Pierre Divion

had been captured, and the Germans in and about that hamlet were hemmed

in between our troops and the river. Many of the enemy were driven into

their dugouts and surrendered, and at 9 a.m. the number of prisoners was

actually greater than the attacking force. St. Pierre Divion soon fell,

and in this area nearly 1,400 prisoners were taken by a single division

at the expense of less than 600 casualties. The rest of our forces

operating south of the Ancre attained their objectives with equal

completeness and success.

[Sidenote: Objectives reached on right bank of Ancre.]

North of the river the struggle was more severe, but very satisfactory

results were achieved. Though parties of the enemy held out for some

hours during the day in strong points at various places along his first

line and in Beaumont Hamel, the main attack pushed on. The troops

attacking close to the right bank of the Ancre reached their second

objectives to the west and northwest of Beaucourt during the morning,

and held on there for the remainder of the day and night, though

practically isolated from the rest of our attacking troops. Their

tenacity was of the utmost value, and contributed very largely to the

success of the operations. At nightfall our troops were established on

the western outskirts of Beaucourt, in touch with our forces south of

the river, and held a line along the station road from the Ancre toward

Beaumont Hamel, where we occupied the village. Further north the

enemy's first-line system for a distance of about half a mile beyond

Beaumont Hamel was also in our hands. Still further north--opposite

Serre--the ground was so heavy that it became necessary to abandon the

attack at an early stage, although, despite all difficulties, our troops

had in places reached the enemy's trenches in the course of their

assault.

[Sidenote: Beaumont carried.]

Next morning, at an early hour, the attack was renewed between Beaucourt

and the top of the spur just north of Beaumont Hamel. The whole of

Beaumont was carried, and our line extended to the northwest along the

Beaucourt road across the southern end of the Beaumont Hamel spur. The

number of our prisoners steadily rose, and during this and the

succeeding days our front was carried forward eastward and northward up

the slopes of the Beaumont Hamel spur.

[Sidenote: Allies command Ancre Valley.]

The results of this attack were very satisfactory, especially as before

its completion bad weather had set in again. We had secured the command

of the Ancre Valley on both banks of the river at the point where it

entered the enemy's lines, and, without great cost to ourselves, losses

had been inflicted on the enemy which he himself admitted to be

considerable. Our final total of prisoners taken in these operations,

and their development during the subsequent days, exceeded 7,200,

including 149 officers.

[Sidenote: Enemy kept on alert.]

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