possessed direct observation on it all around from Guillemont on the
southeast to High Wood on the northwest. He could bring a concentric
fire of artillery, to bear not only on the wood and village, but also on
the confined space behind, through which ran the French communications
as well as ours, where great numbers of guns, besides ammunition and
impediments of all sorts, had necessarily to be crowded together. Having
been in occupation of this ground for nearly two years, he knew every
foot of it, and could not fail to appreciate the possibilities of
causing us heavy loss there by indirect artillery fire; while it was
evident that, if he could drive in the salient in our line and so gain
direct observation on the ground behind, our position in that area would
become very uncomfortable.
[Sidenote: Confidence in the troops]
If there had not been good grounds for confidence that the enemy was not
capable of driving from this position troops who had shown themselves
able to wrest it from him, the situation would have been an anxious one.
In any case it was clear that the first requirement at the moment was
that our right flank, and the French troops in extension of it, should
swing up into line with our centre. To effect this, however, strong
enemy positions had to be captured both by ourselves and by our allies.
[Sidenote: Plateau from Delville Wood to Morval]
[Sidenote: New enemy defenses.]
From Delville Wood the main plateau extends for 4,000 yards
east-northeast to Les Boeufs and Morval, and for about the same distance
southeastward to Leuze and Bouleau Woods, which stand above and about
1,000 yards to the west of Combles. To bring my right up into line with
the rest of my front it was necessary to capture Guillemont, Falfemont
Farm, and Leuze Wood, and then Ginchy and Bouleau Woods. These
localities were naturally very strong, and they had been elaborately
fortified. The enemy's main second-line system of defense ran in front
of them from Waterlot Farm, which was already in our hands,
southeastward to Falfemont Farm, and thence southward to the Somme. The
importance of holding us back in this area could not escape the enemy's
notice, and he had dug and wired many new trenches, both in front of and
behind his original lines. He had also brought up fresh troops, and
there was no possibility of taking him by surprise.
[Sidenote: Rain and unfavorable ground.]
[Sidenote: Constant haze.]
The task before us was, therefore, a very difficult one and entailed a
real trial of strength between the opposing forces. At this juncture its
difficulties were increased by unfavorable weather. The nature of the
ground limited the possibility of direct observation of our artillery
fire, and we were consequently much dependent on observation from the
air. As in that element we had attained almost complete superiority, all
that we required was a clear atmosphere; but with this we were not
favored for several weeks. We had rather more rain than is usual in July
and August, and even when no rain fell there was an almost constant haze
and frequent low clouds.
[Sidenote: British and French must advance together.]
[Sidenote: Positions the French must capture.]
In swinging up my own right it was very important that the French line
north of the Somme should be advanced at the same time in close
combination with the movement of the British troops. The line of
demarkation agreed on between the French commander and myself ran from
Maltz Horn Farm due eastward to the Combles Valley and then
northeastward up that valley to a point midway between Sailly-Saillisel
and Morval. These two villages had been fixed upon as objectives,
respectively, of the French left and of my right. In order to advance in
co-operation with my right, and eventually to reach Sailly-Saillisel,
our allies had still to fight their way up that portion of the main
ridge which lies between the Combles Valley on the west and the River
Tortille on the east. To do so they had to capture, in the first place,
the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le Forest, Rancourt, and
Fregicourt, besides many woods and strong systems of trenches. As the
high ground on each side of the Combles Valley commands the slopes of
the ridge on the opposite side, it was essential that the advance of the
two armies should be simultaneous and made in the closest co-operation.
This was fully recognized by both armies, and our plans were made
accordingly.
[Sidenote: A pause necessary.]
To carry out the necessary preparations to deal with the difficult
situation outlined above a short pause was necessary, to enable tired
troops to be relieved and guns to be moved forward; while at the same
time old communications had to be improved and new ones made.
Intrenchments against probable counterattacks could not be neglected,
and fresh dispositions of troops were required for the new attacks to be
directed eastward.
[Sidenote: Pressure on whole front.]
It was also necessary to continue such pressure on the rest of our
front, not only on the Ancre, but further south, as would make it
impossible for the enemy to devote himself entirely to resisting the
advance between Delville Wood and the Somme. In addition, it was
desirable further to secure our hold on the main ridge west of Delville
Wood by gaining more ground to our front in that direction. Orders were
therefore issued in accordance with the general considerations explained
above, and, without relaxing pressure along the enemy's front from
Delville Wood to the west, preparations for an attack on Guillemont were
pushed on.
[Sidenote: Enemy counterattack on Delville Wood.]
During the afternoon of July 18, 1916, the enemy developed his expected
counterattack against Delville Wood, after heavy preliminary shelling.
By sheer weight of numbers, and at very heavy cost, he forced his way
through the northern and northeastern portion of the wood and into the
northern half of Longueval, which our troops had cleared only that
morning. In the southeast corner of the wood he was held up by a gallant
defense, and further south three attacks on our positions in Waterlot
Farm failed.
[Sidenote: Progress bought by hard fighting.]
[Sidenote: Enemy in great strength.]
This enemy attack on Delville Wood marked the commencement of the long,
closely contested struggle which was not finally decided in our favor
till the fall of Guillemont on September 3, 1916, a decision which was
confirmed by the capture of Ginchy six days later. Considerable gains
were indeed made during this period, but progress was slow, and bought
only by hard fighting. A footing was established in High Wood on July
20, 1916, and our line linked up thence with Longueval. A subsequent
advance by the Fourth Army on July 23, 1916, on a wide front from
Guillemont to Pozieres found the enemy in great strength all along the
line, with machine guns and forward troops in shell holes and newly
constructed trenches well in front of his main defenses. Although ground
was won, the strength of the resistance experienced showed that the
hostile troops had recovered from their previous confusion sufficiently
to necessitate long and careful preparation before further successes on
any great scale could be secured.
[Sidenote: Two powerful counterattacks.]
An assault delivered simultaneously on this date by General Gough's army
against Pozieres gained considerable results, and by the morning of July
25, 1916, the whole of that village was carried, including the cemetery,
and important progress was made along the enemy's trenches to the
northeast. That evening, after heavy artillery preparation, the enemy
launched two more powerful counterattacks, the one directed against our
new position in and around High Wood and the other delivered from the
northwest of Delville Wood. Both attacks were completely broken up with
very heavy losses to the enemy.
[Sidenote: Delville Wood recovered.]
On July 27, 1916, the remainder of Delville Wood was recovered, and two
days later the northern portion of Longueval and the orchards were
cleared of the enemy, after severe fighting, in which our own and the
enemy's artillery were very active.
[Sidenote: Fighting at Guillemont.]
On July 30, 1916, the village of Guillemont and Falfemont Farm to the
southeast were attacked, in conjunction with a French attack north of
the Somme. A battalion entered Guillemont, and part of it passed
through to the far side; but as the battalions on either flank did not
reach their objectives, it was obliged to fall back, after holding out
for some hours on the western edge of the village. In a subsequent local
attack on August 7, 1916, our troops again entered Guillemont, but were
again compelled to fall back owing to the failure of a simultaneous
effort against the enemy's trenches on the flanks of the village.
[Sidenote: Dominating enemy positions.]
[Sidenote: Series of French and British attacks.]
The ground to the south of Guillemont was dominated by the enemy's
positions in and about that village. It was therefore hoped that these
positions might be captured first, before an advance to the south of
them in the direction of Falfemont Farm was pushed further forward. It
had now become evident, however, that Guillemont could not be captured
as an isolated enterprise without very heavy loss, and, accordingly,
arrangements were made with the French Army on our immediate right for a
series of combined attacks, to be delivered in progressive stages, which
should embrace Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood, and
Ginchy.
[Sidenote: Attacks and counterattacks.]
An attempt on August 16, 1916, to carry out the first stage of the
prearranged scheme met with only partial success, and two days later,
after a preliminary bombardment lasting thirty-six hours, a larger
combined attack was undertaken. In spite of a number of enemy
counterattacks the most violent of which leveled at the point of
junction of the British with the French, succeeded in forcing our allies
and ourselves back from a part of the ground won--very valuable progress
was made, and our troops established themselves in the outskirts of
Guillemont village and occupied Guillemont Station. A violent
counterattack on Guillemont Station was repulsed on August 23, 1916, and
next day further important progress was made on a wide front north and
east of Delville Wood.
[Sidenote: Advance by bombing and sapping.]
[Sidenote: Progress near Thiepval.]
Apart from the operations already described, others of a minor
character, yet involving much fierce and obstinate fighting, continued
during this period on the fronts of both the British armies. Our lines
were pushed forward wherever possible by means of local attacks and by
bombing and sapping, and the enemy was driven out of various forward
positions from which he might hamper our progress. By these means many
gains were made which, though small in themselves, in the aggregate
represented very considerable advances. In this way our line was brought
to the crest of the ridge above Martinpuich, and Pozieres Windmill and
the high ground north of the village were secured, and with them
observation over Martinpuich and Courcelette and the enemy's gun
positions in their neighborhood and around Le Sars. At a later date our
troops reached the defenses of Mouquet Farm, northwest of Pozieres, and
made progress in the enemy's trenches south of Thiepval. The enemy's
counter-attacks were incessant and frequently of great violence, but
they were made in vain and at heavy cost to him. The fierceness of the
fighting can be gathered from the fact that one regiment of the German
Guards Reserve Corps which had been in the Thiepval salient opposite
Mouquet Farm is known to have lost 1,400 men in fifteen days.
[Sidenote: A general attack.]
The first two days of September, 1916, on both army fronts were spent in
preparation for a more general attack, which the gradual progress made
during the preceding month had placed us in a position to undertake. Our
assault was delivered at 12 noon on September 3, 1916, on a front
extending from our extreme right to the third enemy trenches on the
right bank of the Ancre, north of Hamel. Our allies attacked
simultaneously on our right.
[Sidenote: Guillemont stormed.]
[Sidenote: Counterattacks on Guillemont.]
Guillemont was stormed and at once consolidated, and our troops pushed
on unchecked to Ginchy and the line of the road running south to Wedge
Wood. Ginchy was also seized, but here, in the afternoon, we were very
strongly counterattacked. For three days the tide of attack and
counterattack swayed backward and forward among the ruined houses of the
village, till, in the end, for three days more the greater part of it
remained in the enemy's possession. Three counterattacks made on the
evening of September 3, 1916, against our troops in Guillemont all
failed, with considerable loss to the enemy. We also gained ground north
of Delville Wood and in High Wood, though here an enemy counterattack
recovered part of the ground won.
On the front of General Gough's army, though the enemy suffered heavy
losses in personnel, our gain in ground was slight.
[Sidenote: British assault on Falfemont Farm.]
In order to keep touch with the French who were attacking on our right
the assault on Falfemont Farm on September 3, 1916, was delivered three
hours before the opening of the main assault. In the impetus of their
first rush our troops reached the farm, but could not hold it.
Nevertheless, they pushed on to the north of it, and on September 4,
1916, delivered a series of fresh assaults upon it from the west and
north.
[Sidenote: Leuze Wood cleared.]
Ultimately this strongly fortified position was occupied piece by piece,
and by the morning of September 5, 1916, the whole of it was in our
possession. Meanwhile further progress had been made to the northeast of
the farm, where considerable initiative was shown by the local
commanders. By the evening of the same day our troops were established
strongly in Leuze Wood, which on the following day was finally cleared
of the enemy.
[Sidenote: Advance on the right.]
[Sidenote: Enemy's barrier broken.]
In spite of the fact that most of Ginchy and of High Wood remained in
the enemy's hands, very noteworthy progress had been made in the course
of these four days' operations, exceeding anything that had been
achieved since July 14, 1916. Our right was advanced on a front of
nearly two miles to an average depth of nearly one mile, penetrating the
enemy's original second line of defense on this front, and capturing
strongly fortified positions at Falfemont Farm, Leuze Wood, Guillemont,
and southeast of Delville Wood, where reached the western outskirts of
Ginchy. More important than this gain in territory was the fact that the
barrier which for seven weeks the enemy had maintained against our
further advance had at last been broken. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken
and many machine guns captured or destroyed in the course of the
fighting.
Preparations for a further attack upon Ginchy continued without
intermission, and at 4.45 p.m. on September 9, 1916, the attack was
reopened on the whole of the Fourth Army front. At Ginchy and to the
north of Leuze Wood it met with almost immediate success. On the right
the enemy's line was seized over a front of more than 1,000 yards from
the southwest corner of Bouleau Woods, in a northwesterly direction, to
a point just south of the Guillemont-Morval tramway. Our troops again
forced their way into Ginchy, and passing beyond it carried the line of
enemy trenches to the east. Further progress was made east of Delville
Wood and south and east of High Wood.
[Sidenote: German prisoners taken.]
Over 500 prisoners were taken in the operations of September 9, 1916,
and following days, making the total since July 1, 1916, over 17,000.
[Sidenote: French progress.]
Meanwhile the French had made great progress on our right, bringing
their line forward to Louage Wood (just south of Combles)--Le
Forest-Clery-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. The weak salient in the
allied line had therefore disappeared and we had gained the front
required for further operations.
[Sidenote: Ability of new armies.]
[Sidenote: Depth of enemy fortifications.]
[Sidenote: Failure of counterattacks.]
Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded by the results
described of the ability of our new armies, not only to rush the enemy's
strongest defenses, as had been accomplished on July 1 and 14, 1916, but
also to wear down and break his power of resistance by a steady,
relentless pressure, as they had done during the weeks of this fierce
and protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the preparations
made for our assault on July 1, 1916, had been long and elaborate; but
though the enemy knew that an attack was coming, it would seem that he
considered the troops already on the spot, secure in their apparently
impregnable defenses, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that
assault, combined with the vigor and determination with which our troops
pressed their advantage, and followed by the successful night attack of
July 14, 1916, all served to awaken him to a fuller realization of his
danger. The great depth of his system of fortification, to which
reference has been made, gave him time to reorganize his defeated
troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more guns. Yet in
spite of this, he was still pushed back, steadily and continuously.
Trench after trench and strong point after strong point were wrested
from him. The great majority of his frequent counterattacks failed
completely, with heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary local
success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from the ground
they had for the moment regained.
The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably, but the
effort had cost him dear; and the comparative collapse of his resistance
during the last few days of the struggle justified the belief that in
the long run decisive victory would lie with our troops, who had
displayed such fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance
and resolution.
[Sidenote: Mouquet Farm in hands of British.]
Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main ridge on a front
of some 9,000 yards, from Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm,
was now in our hands, and with it the advantage of observation over the
slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze
Wood, we were firmly established on the main ridge, while further east,
across the Combles Valley, the French were advancing victoriously on our
right. But though the centre of our line was well placed, on our flanks
there was still difficult ground to be won.
[Sidenote: High ground from Ginchy to Morval.]
From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northward for 2,000 yards,
and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly 4,000 yards. Near the
eastern extremity of this spur stands the village of Morval commanding a
wide field of view and fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right
was still 2,000 yards from its objective at this village, and between
lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles Valley, completely
commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not only from its head
northeast of Ginchy, but also from the high ground east of the Combles
Valley, which looks directly into it.
[Sidenote: The French near Combles.]
Up this high ground beyond the Combles Valley the French were working
their way toward their objective at Sailly-Saillisel, situated due east
of Morval, and standing at the same level. Between these two villages
the ground falls away to the head of the Combles Valley, which runs
thence in a southwesterly direction. In the bottom of this valley lies
the small town of Combles, then well fortified and strongly held, though
dominated by my right at Leuze Wood and by the French left on the
opposite heights. It had been agreed between the French and myself that
an assault on Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be
rendered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges above it on
either side.
[Sidenote: Difficulties in way of French advance.]
The capture of Morval from the south presented a very difficult problem,
while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at that time some 3,000 yards to
the north of the French left, was in some respects even more difficult.
The line of the French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the
extensive and strongly fortified Wood of St. Pierre Vaast on the one
side, and on the other by the Combles Valley, which, with the branches
running out from it and the slopes each side, is completely commanded,
as has been pointed out, by the heights bounding the valley on the east
and west.
[Sidenote: Close cooperation necessary on right.]
On my right flank, therefore, the progress of the French and British
forces was still interdependent, and the closest cooperation continued
to be necessary in order to gain the further ground required to enable
my centre to advance on a sufficiently wide front. To cope with such a
situation unity of command is usually essential, but in this case the
cordial good feeling between the allied armies, and the earnest desire
of each to assist the other, proved equally effective, and removed all
difficulties.
[Sidenote: Enemy defense on main ridge over Thiepval.]
On my left flank the front of General Gough's army bent back from the
main ridge near Mouquet Farm down a spur descending southwestward, and
then crossed a broad valley to the Wonderwork, a strong point situated
in the enemy's front-line system near the southern end of the spur on
the higher slopes of which Thiepval stands. Opposite this part of our
line we had still to carry the enemy's original defenses on the main
ridge above Thiepval, and in the village itself, defenses which may
fairly be described as being as nearly impregnable as nature, art, and
the unstinted labor of nearly two years could make them.
[Sidenote: British advance on Thiepval defenses.]
[Sidenote: Positions might be rushed.]
Our advance on Thiepval and on the defenses above it had been carried
out up to this date, in accordance with my instructions given on July 3,
1916, by a slow and methodical progression, in which great skill and
much patience and endurance had been displayed with entirely
satisfactory results. General Gough's army had, in fact, acted most
successfully in the required manner as a pivot to the remainder of the
attack. The Thiepval defenses were known to be exceptionally strong, and
as immediate possession of them was not necessary to the development of
my plans after July 1, 1916, there had been no need to incur the heavy
casualties to be expected in an attempt to rush them. The time was now
approaching, although it had not yet arrived, when their capture would
become necessary; but from the positions we had now reached and those
which we expected shortly to obtain, I had no doubt that they could be
rushed when required without undue loss. An important part of the
remaining positions required for my assault on them was now won by a
highly successful enterprise carried out on the evening of September 14,
1916, by which the Wonderwork was stormed.
[Sidenote: Plan of combined attack.]
[Sidenote: Main effort against Rancourt and Fregicourt.]
The general plan of the combined allied attack which was opened on
September 15 was to pivot on the high ground south of the Ancre and
north of the Albert-Bapaume road, while the Fourth Army devoted its
whole effort to the rearmost of the enemy's original systems of defense
between Morval and Le Sars. Should our success in this direction warrant
it I made arrangements to enable me to extend the left of the attack to
embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As soon as our
advance on this front had reached the Morval line, the time would have
arrived to bring forward my left across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile on
my right our allies arranged to continue the line of advance in close
co-operation with me from the Somme to the slopes above Combles, but
directing their main effort northward against the villages of Rancourt
and Fregicourt, so as to complete the isolation of Combles and open the
way for their attack upon Sailly-Saillisel.