THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER.
The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of
Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings,
the mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject,
would seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this
obligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a
practical testimony alike to man's _dependence_ and to God's _dominion_.
Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is
capable of rendering to God as the sole object of religious worship; and
it implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and
prerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually
described[206] as consisting, first, in "adoration,"--in which we
express our sense of His rightful supremacy and absolute perfection, and
do homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in
"thanksgiving,"--in which we express our sense of gratitude for all His
kindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has
bestowed; thirdly, in "confession,"--in which we express our sense of
sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral
Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in "petition,"--in which we express
our sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage
to Him as the "Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and
perfect gift." Of these, the _three first_ are so evidently reasonable
and becoming, so necessarily involved in the simplest idea which we can
form of our relations to God and of the obligations which result from
them, that few, if any, of those who admit the existence and providence
of the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are
appropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or
the duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious
worship. But in regard to the _fourth_, which, if it be not the most
sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of
devotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged,
which do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of
Prayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds,
would soon lead to the practical neglect of _all_ religious worship. The
practice of offering up "petitions" either for ourselves or others, with
the view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal or
spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an
unphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or
the preordained sequences of events. The supposition of its "efficacy"
has been represented as a flagrant instance of superstitious ignorance,
worthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy,
derogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held,
indeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting
evil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and
useful, by reason of the wholesome _reflex influence_ which it is fitted
to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recommended the
continuance of the practice on this ground, as if men, once convinced of
its utter inefficacy, _would_ or _could_ continue, with any fervency, to
offer up their requests to God, merely for the sake of impressing their
own minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are
told that David Hume, "after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leechman,
in which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it
expressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with great justice, that
'we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and
entreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.'"
This intermediate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are
shut up to one or other of two alternatives: either there _is_ an
"efficacy" in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good,
such as may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our
requests unto God; or, there _is no_ such efficacy in it, and no reason
why it should be observed by any of God's intelligent creatures, whether
on earth or in heaven.
The principles which are applicable to the decision of this important
question may be best explained, after adverting briefly to some of the
particular objections which have been urged against the "efficacy of
prayer." Several of these objections evidently proceed on an erroneous
view of the nature and object of prayer. When it is said, for example,
that God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the
wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a
great and important truth,--a truth which was explicitly recognized by
our Lord when He said, "Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have
need of before ye ask Him;" but that truth is grievously misapplied when
it is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or
ineffectual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of
prayer is _to inform God of what He did not know before_, and that His
omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or
angels must needs be unavailing. When it is said, _again_, that God
being immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the
"petitions" of His creatures, this objection, like the former one,
involves a great and important truth,--a truth which is also explicitly
recognized in Scripture when it is said that "He is without variableness
or the least shadow of turning;" but this truth, too, is grievously
misapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in
prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations
must be invariably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creatures
_in other respects_, as that they must be the same whether men do or do
not pray; or, that His procedure as a Moral Governor has no reference
whatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the
words of Dr. Price, "God's unchangeableness, when considered in relation
to the exertion of His attributes in the government of the world,
consists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and
circumstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His
conduct according to the various actions, characters and dispositions of
beings. If, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the
suppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would
in truth infer _changeableness_ in Him would be, not His regarding and
answering it, but His _not_ doing this."[207] When it is said, _again_,
that there can be no "efficacy in prayer," because there is an
established constitution and regular course of Nature, by which all
events, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and
which cannot be altered or modified without _a miracle_, this objection,
like each of the two former, involves an important truth,--a truth which
is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it speaks of "the
ordinances of the heavens and the earth," and of the peculiar laws and
properties of all created things; but this truth is also grievously
misapplied when it is directed to prove that God's will has no efficient
control over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal
by which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In all
these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent
error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition
in regard to the nature and object of prayer.
For this reason, we shall endeavor to separate the truth from the error,
and to lay down a few positions which may be established both by reason
and Scripture, and which will be sufficient to show that the doctrine
which affirms the efficacy of prayer is not only credible, but true.
1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak of it, as
denoting "petition" or "supplication," consists in offering up "the
desires of the heart to God for things agreeable to His will." It is not
a mere formal, outward homage, such as might be rendered by words, or
ceremonies; it is a spiritual service, in which the mind and heart of
man come into immediate converse with God Himself. It is offered to Him
personally, as to the invisible but ever-present "Searcher of hearts,"
who "hears the _desire_ of the humble," and whose "ear is attentive to
the voice of their supplications." This implies the recognition of His
omnipresence and omniscience, but these perfections of His nature do not
supersede the expression of our desires in prayer, just because prayer
is designed, not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of
dependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us in every
time of need. Our petitions, too, are always bounded within certain
limits, and subject to at least one indispensable condition; they are
offered only "for things agreeable to His will;" and when our own will
is thus, in the very act of prayer, expressly subordinated to that which
is alone unerring and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful
sovereignty and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable
with the presumption of dictating to God the course of procedure which
He should pursue towards us. We are protected, too, against the evils
which our own _errors in prayer_ might otherwise entail on us, for "we
know not what things to pray for as we ought;" and we have an infallible
security that, in the best and highest sense,--that which is most in
accordance with our real welfare,--our prayers _must_ be answered,
since our wills are resolved into His will; and His will, being
omnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any of its designs. Our
assurance of the certain efficacy of our prayers is so much the greater,
in proportion as we have reason to believe that the things for which we
pray are agreeable to His will; and hence we are more confident in
asking spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be
always agreeable to His will and conducive to our own welfare, while the
latter may, or may not, be good for us in our present circumstances, and
must be left at the sovereign disposal of Him who knows what is in man,
and what is best for each of His children.
2. Considering the relation in which we stand to God as His creatures
and subjects, it is natural, fit, and proper that _we_ should make known
our requests to Him, and supplicate the aids both of His providence and
grace; and if it be _our duty_ to pray, it is reasonable to believe that
God will have some respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with
us; in other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make a
difference between the godly and the ungodly, the men who do, and the
men who do not, pray.
In this position it is assumed that there are certain relations, natural
or revealed, subsisting betwixt us and God, in virtue of which it is our
duty to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, by supplicating the
aids of His providence and grace. That such relations do subsist between
God and man, is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation;
and they cannot be discerned or realized without immediately suggesting
the idea of certain corresponding obligations and duties. Every one
whose conscience has not been utterly seared must instinctively feel the
force of that appeal, "If I be a Father, where is mine honor? and if I
be a Master, where is my fear?" For, considering God in the very
simplest aspect of His character as the Creator and Governor of the
world, He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our
being, as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor, as our
supreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge; and these _natural relations_,
apart altogether from the _supernatural_ which are revealed in
Scripture, are sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for "the duty of
prayer" in the case of every intelligent being who is capable of knowing
God, and acknowledging his dependence on the Divine will. In such a
case, prayer is felt to be a natural, fit, and becoming expression of
what is known to be true, and what _ought_, as a matter of duty, to be
practically avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer; and in its
real design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its noblest
vindication. The object of prayer is, neither to _inform_ God, as if he
were not omniscient, nor to alter His eternal purposes, as if He were
not unchangeable, nor to unsettle the established course of Nature, as
if He were not "a God of order;" but simply to acknowledge His
_dominion_ and our _dependence_, and to obtain from Him, in the way of
His own appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need.
It is not unreasonable to believe that God, as the Governor of the
world, will have some regard to the dispositions and actions of His
responsible creatures, as a reason for dealing differently with those
who own, and those who disown, His supremacy; and that He may require
the use of certain means, such as the exercise of prayer, with the view
of our obtaining from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves,
the blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need.
For if we really be the creatures of God, and, as such, dependent on His
providential bounty, and subject to His righteous government, it is
self-evidently natural and right that we should, as intelligent and
responsible beings, acknowledge His supreme dominion and our absolute
dependence by supplicating the aids both of His providence and grace.
This is _our duty_, considering the relations which He sustains towards
us; and if it be fit and proper that we should pray to God, if it be,
in our circumstances, a duty which we owe to Him, then it is most
reasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in God to have
some respect to our prayers, and to deal with us differently according
as we either observe or neglect this religious duty.
Prayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct aspects: either
as _a duty_, the observance or neglect of which must be followed, under
a system of moral government, with different results; or simply as _a
means_, the use of which is productive of certain effects which are made
to depend on this special instrumentality. And in either view, its
"efficacy" may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to
vindicate the use of _all other means_, and to enforce the observance of
_all other duties_, in connection with the system of the Divine
government.
3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is
founded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes and the faithfulness
of the Divine promises. God's purposes are justly held, in all other
cases, to include the _means_ as well as the _ends_; and they are often
fulfilled through the instrumentality of "second causes." His purpose to
provide for the wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the
harvest which is the result, but also to the agricultural labor by
which, instrumentally, the harvest is prepared. May not "prayer" be also
_a means_ ordained by God in the original constitution of the world, a
means towards certain ends which are made dependent on its use? If it be
such a means, then its "efficacy" is established, in the only sense in
which we are concerned to contend for it; while it is shown to be _no
more inconsistent_ with the immutability of the Divine purposes, than
any other system of _means or instruments_ that may be employed as
subordinate agencies in the government of the world. This important view
is strikingly illustrated in Scripture. For some of the _purposes_ of
God, which might have been undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature,
are there explicitly declared; nay, they are thrown into the form of
express _promises_, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly
pledged; and yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded by
these promises, is rather stimulated and encouraged by them; and the
believer pleads with increased fervor and confidence when he simply
converts _God's promises into his own petitions_. He feels that in doing
so he is taking God at his word; and that his own prayer, in so far as
it is warranted by His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than
God's faithfulness can fail.
Thus Daniel "understood by books the number of the years whereof the
word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that He would accomplish
_seventy_ years in the desolation of Jerusalem." He knew the Lord's
promise, and that the time for its fulfilment was at hand; yet so far
from regarding either the immutability of the Divine _purpose_, or even
the infallible certainty of the Divine _promise_, as a reason for
neglecting prayer, as if that exercise were superfluous or vain, he was
stimulated and encouraged to pray just because "he knew the word of the
Lord."--"And I set my face," he says, "unto the Lord God, to seek by
prayer and supplications, with fasting, sackcloth, and ashes;" and I
prayed unto the Lord my God, and said, "O Lord! hear; O Lord! forgive; O
Lord! hearken and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God!"[208]
Thus, _again_, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises to
His ancient people, assuring them that "He would sprinkle clean water
upon them, and give them a new heart and a right spirit," it is added,
"I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel to do it for
them."[209] Thus, _again_, when the Saviour himself gave to His
disciples that promise, which is emphatically called "the promise of
the Father," assuring them that they should be "baptized with the Holy
Ghost not many days hence," and directing them to "wait at Jerusalem
until they should be endued with power from above," the apostles, so far
from regarding that "promise" as superseding the exercise of "prayer,"
betook themselves immediately to an upper room, and "all continued with
one accord in prayer and supplication;" and, at the appointed time,
God's promise was fulfilled, and their prayer answered, when "they were
all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as
the Spirit gave them utterance." These examples are abundantly
sufficient to show that prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is
founded on, the immutability of the Divine _purposes_, and the
faithfulness of the Divine _promises_.
4. Our next position is, that _the method_ in which God answers the
prayers of His people may be, in many respects, mysterious or even
inscrutable; but no objection to "the efficacy of prayer," which is
founded on our ignorance of His infinite resources, can have any weight,
especially when there are _several hypothetical solutions_, any one of
which is sufficient to neutralize its force.
An omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, presiding over the
affairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and governor of all
things, may well be conceived to have infinite resources at His
command,--such as we can never fully estimate,--by which he can give
effect to prayer in ways that may be to us inscrutable. But our
ignorance of the _mode_ is no reason for doubting the _reality_ of His
interposition in answer to prayer; and even if we were unable to decide
on the comparative merits of the various explanations of it which have
been proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once
conceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as a
hypothetical explanation, to neutralize every adverse presumption,
should be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or conclusive
objection can be urged against it. Dr. Chalmers has frequently
illustrated the legitimate and important uses of "hypothetical
solutions" in Theology; and has conclusively shown that even where they
leave us at a loss to determine which of various methods of solving a
difficulty is the truest or the best, they yet serve a great purpose, if
they merely neutralize an objection, by showing that the difficulty in
question _might_ be satisfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge
more extensive or more precise.[210] Now, with regard to "the efficacy
of prayer," there are _four_ distinct solutions, or rather _four_
different methods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is
sufficient to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We
shall not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in
detail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing that there
are several methods of accounting for "the efficacy of prayer" in
perfect consistency with the established order of Nature.
The first is the theory of those who hold that there _is the same
relation between prayer and the answer to prayer_ as between _cause and
effect in any other sequence of Nature_. Prayer is supposed to be the
cause, and the answer the effect; and this by an invariable law,
established in the original constitution, and manifested in the uniform
course, of the world. To this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer when
he says, that "the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces _a
new sequence_ to the notice of the mind," that "it may add another law
of Nature to those which have been formerly observed," and that "the
general truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in
the same circumstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is
one of those influential circumstances by which the result is liable to
be modified."[211] Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the
administration of His providential government, God has respect to the
prayers of men as a consideration which affects their relation to Him
and His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable as any
other law of Nature, the principle that is involved in this solution may
be admitted as sound and valid; but if it be further meant, that prayer
and the answer to prayer are _in all respects_ similar to any other
instance of cause and effect, it must be remembered that the answer is
not the effect of the prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the
effect of the Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr.
M'Cosh--whether _causality_ can properly be ascribed to our prayers with
reference to the Divine will?--would claim our serious consideration.
But in the former sense, as implying nothing more than that, in the
original constitution and the ordinary course of Providence, the same
effect is given to our prayers as to _any other moral cause or
condition_, it seems to be exempt from all reasonable objection, and to
afford a sufficient explanation of the difficulty.
The second "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that while
God, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the
known or discoverable sequences of the natural world, yet His
interference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take
place at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the
limits of our experience and observation; and thus "the answer to prayer
may be effectually given without any infringement on the known
regularities of Nature." Dr. Chalmers adverts to this second solution in
replying to an objection which might possibly be raised against the
first, namely, that "we see no evidence of the constancy of visible
nature giving way to that invisible agency, the interposition of which
it is the express object of prayer to obtain;" and he suggests that, in
the vast scale of natural sequences, which constitute one connected
chain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be
given "either at a higher or a lower place in the progression," and
that if it be supposed to be "given far enough back," it might originate
a new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since
it occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation. This
solution we hold to be not so much an effective argument in favor of the
efficacy of prayer, as a conclusive answer to a particular objection
against it. It is sufficient to show that, with our very limited
knowledge, we act presumptuously in deciding against the possibility of
an answer to prayer such as _may_ leave the established course of Nature
unaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for supposing that
the responsive touch _can only_ be given at a point to which our
knowledge does not extend, or that, were our knowledge extended, we
would have less difficulty in admitting it _there_, than in holding it
to be possible at any lower term in the scale of sequences.
The third "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that a
Divine answer to prayer may be conveyed through _the ministry of
angels_, or the agency of intelligent, voluntary, and active beings,
employed by God, in subordination to His Providence, for the
accomplishment of His great designs. The existence of such an order, or
rather hierarchy, of created intelligences is clearly revealed in
Scripture; and it is rendered credible, or even probable, by _the
analogy of Nature_, since we observe on earth a regular gradation of
animal life from the insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose
that the gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the
animal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their existence,
their _active agency_ also, as "ministers fulfilling His will," as
"ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs
of salvation," is explicitly and frequently declared as well as
exemplified in Scripture; and this, too, would be, on the supposition of
their existence, in strict accordance with _the analogy of Nature_,
which shows that the lower orders of being are placed under the care
and control of the higher. Mr. Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent
reference, in his Theological treatises, to _the ministry of angels_, as
subordinate agents, through whose instrumentality many of the designs of
Providence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards enlarges on
the same theme.[212]
The fourth "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that God
has so arranged His Providence from the beginning as to provide for
particular events as well as for general results, and especially to
provide an answer to the prayers of His intelligent creatures. This
solution is more general than any of the _three_ former, and may even be
comprehensive of them all. It regards prayer as an element which was
taken into account at the original constitution of the world, and for
which an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or of
angelic agency, employed for this express end by the omniscient
foreknowledge and wisdom of God. It is the solution that has obtained
the sanction of some of the highest names in Science and Theology.
"I begin," says Euler, "with considering an objection which almost all
the Philosophical Systems have started against prayer. Religion
prescribes this as our duty, with an assurance that God will hear and
answer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the
precepts which He hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand,
instructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the
course of Nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers
can effect no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God
should be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers.
This objection has the greater weight, that Religion itself teaches the
doctrine of God's having established the course of all events, and that
nothing can come to pass but what God foresaw from all eternity. Is it
credible, say the objectors, that God should think of altering this
settled course, in compliance with any prayers which men might address
to Him? But I remark, _first_, that when God established the course of
the universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pass in it,
He paid attention to _all the circumstances_ which should accompany each
event, and, particularly, to _the dispositions, desires, and prayers_ of
every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was
disposed _in perfect harmony_ with all these circumstances. When,
therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that
prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies
arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the
accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events.
It is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a
miracle."[213]
"It is not impossible," says Dr. Wollaston, "that such laws of Nature,
and such a series of causes and effects, may be originally designed that
not only general provisions may be made for the several species of
beings, but even _particular cases_, at least many of them, may also be
provided for, without innovations or alterations in the course of
Nature. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all
things to come are, as it were, comprehended under one view, estimated
and laid together: but when I consider what a mass of wonders the
universe is in other regards, what a Being God is, incomprehensibly
great and perfect, that He cannot be ignorant of anything, no not of the
future wants and deportments of particular men, and that all things
which derive from Him, as their First Cause, must do this so as to be
consistent with one another, and in such a manner as to make one compact
system, befitting so great an Author; when I consider this, I cannot
deny such an adjustment of things to be within His power. The order of
events, proceeding from the settlement of Nature, may be as compatible
with the due and reasonable success of _my endeavors and prayers_ (as
inconsiderable a part of the world as I am) as with any other thing or
phenomena how great soever.... And thus the _prayers_ which good men
offer to the all-knowing God, and the _neglects_ of others, may find
fitting effects, already _forecasted_ in the course of Nature, which
possibly may be extended to the _labors_ of men and their _behavior_ in
general."[214]
"If ever there was a future event," says Dr. Gordon, "which might have
been reckoned on with absolute certainty, and one, therefore, in the
accomplishment of which it might appear that _prayer_ could have no room
or efficacy, it was just the restoration of the Jewish captives to the
land and city of their fathers. And yet, so far from supposing that
there was no place for prayer to occupy, among the various means that
were employed to bring about that event, it was just his firm belief in
the nearness and certainty of it that set Daniel upon fervent and
persevering supplications for its accomplishment.... With regard to the
rank which Daniel's prayer occupied among the various means or agencies
that were to be employed in bringing about the object of it, he had good
reason to believe that it was neither without a definite place, nor in
itself devoid of efficacy.... He had been honored to vindicate the power
and assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the wisdom of his
counsels and the weight of his personal character, he had paved the way
for that decision in favor of the people of God to which the King of
Persia was soon to be brought; and the whole business of his active and
most laborious life was made to bear on the interests and the liberation
of his afflicted brethren. And if God had thus assigned to _the outward
actions_ of His servant an important place in carrying into effect His
thoughts of peace towards his penitent people, is it conceivable that He
had no place in that scheme for _the holy and spiritual_ efforts of the
same servant? or that the aspirations of a sanctified spirit, the
travailing of a soul intent upon the accomplishment of the Divine will
and the manifestation of the Divine glory, should be less efficient or
less essential in the execution of the Divine counsels, than the outward
and ordinary agency of human actions? The whole tenor and the most
explicit declarations of Scripture stand opposed to such a supposition;
nor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difficulty in
conceiving that it must be so. The agency of _prayer_ is, indeed, a less
obvious and palpable thing than that outward coöperation whereby mankind
are rendered subservient to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes.
But is it not an agency of an unspeakably loftier character? Is it not
the coöperation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the Divine
image, and at the moment acting in unison with the Divine will? Is it
not befitting the character of God to set upon that coöperation a
special mark of His holy approbation, by assigning to it a more elevated
place among the secondary causes which He is pleased to employ? And must
there not be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of His
administration, for fulfilling the special promise of His word, 'The
Lord is nigh to all that call upon Him, to all that call upon him in
truth.'"[215]
"We should blush," says Bishop Warburton, "to be thought so uninstructed
in the nature of _prayer_, as to fancy that it can work any temporary
change in the dispositions of the Deity, who is 'the same yesterday,
to-day, and forever.' Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God, _in
the chain of causes and effects_, which not only sustains each system,
but connects them all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived,
that the temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert
evil, by means of that 'preëstablished harmony' which He hath willed to
exist between _moral actions_ and _natural events_."
"But should some frigid skeptic, therefore, dare
To doubt the all-prevailing power of prayer;
As if 'twere ours, with impious zeal, to try
To shake the purposes of Deity;
Pause, cold philosopher, nor snatch away
The last, the best, the wretched's surest stay.
Look round on life, and trace its checkered plan,
The griefs, the joys, the hopes, the fears of man;
Tell me, if each deliverance, each success,
Each transient golden dream of happiness,
Each palm that genius in the race acquires,
Each thrilling rapture virtuous pride inspires,
Tell me, if each and all were not combined
In the great purpose of the Eternal Mind?
* * * * *
Thus while we humbly own the vast decree,
Formed in the bosom of Eternity,
And know all secondary causes tend
Each to contribute to one mighty end;
Yet while these causes firmly fixed remain--
Links quite unbroken in the endless chain,
So that could one be snapped, the whole must fail,
And wide confusion o'er the world prevail;
Why may not our petitions, which arise
In humble adoration to the skies,
Be foreordained the causes, whence shall flow
Our purest pleasures in this vale of woe?
Not that they move the purpose that hath stood
By time unchanged, immeasurably good,
_But that the event and prayer alike may be
United objects of the same decree._"[216]
On the whole, we feel ourselves warranted, and even constrained, to
conclude that the theory of "government by natural law" is defective in
so far as it excludes the superintendence and control of God over all
the events of human life, and that neither the existence of second
causes nor the operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence
in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.
FOOTNOTES:
[181] CICERO, "De Naturâ Deorum," lib. I. c. 44.
[182] HOWE, "Works," I. 104. CUDWORTH, "Intellectual System," I. 120,
144.
[183] M. COMTE, "Cours," VI. 149, 247, 295. SPINOZA, "Tractatus
Theol.-politicus," pp. 57, 102, 122, 144, 150, 319.
[184] DR. CHANNING, "Memoirs," II. 439. ROBT. BOYLE, "Free Inquiry into
the Notion of Nature," p. 7.
[185] PROFESSOR SEDGWICK, "Discourse," fifth edition, p. CLIII. MR.
COMBE, "Constitution of Man," p. 417.
[186] Proverbs 6: 27; Psalm 68: 2; 83: 14; James 3: 12; Matthew 7: 16;
Proverbs 8: 29; Job 38: 11, 33; Psalm 119: 90; Jeremiah 31: 35; 33: 25.
[187] DR. M'COSH, "On the Divine Government," pp. 126, 129, 149.
[188] "Westminster Confession," c. v., § II., III.
[189] M. COMTE, "Cours," IV. 663, 669; V. 259, 277; VI. 702, 780. J. S.
MILL, "Logic," I. 397, 417, 422; II. 109, 471. LEWES, "Biographical
History," I. 14; III. 55; IV. 9, 42.
[190] DR. REID, "Essays," III. 44. DR. M'COSH, "Divine Government," 88,
91, 111, 114.
[191] SIR JOHN HERSCHELL, "Address to the British Association," 1845.
[192] DR. THOS. BROWN, "Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 86. DR. THOS.
REID, "Essays," I. 136. PIERRE POIRET, "De Deo, Anima, et Malo."
[193] DR. THOMAS BROWN, "Essay on Cause and Effect," pp. 74, 83, 93,
108, 191.
[194] GEORGE COMBE, ESQ.
[195] "Reasoner," XII. 21, 23.
[196] HOLYOAKE, "Grant and Holyoake's Discussion," p. 40.
[197] GEORGE COMBE, "Constitution of Man," pp. 150, 155, 163, 165, 234,
343, 358.
[198] MR. COMBE, "Constitution of Man," VI., IX., 25, 39, 41.
[199] MR. SCOTT, "Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture," pp. 82, 97.
[200] CITIZEN KENNEDY, "Nature and Revelation Harmonious," pp. 70, 122,
124, 131.
[201] MR. COMBE, "Constitution of Man," pp. 25, 53, 306, 364.
[202] F. B. BARTON, "The Reasoner," XI. 24, 373.
[203] VOLNEY, "La Loi Naturelle," which has been translated, and is
usually appended to his "Ruins of Empires."
[204] BUTLER'S "Analogy," p. 1. c. 7.
[205] WARBURTON'S "Works," X. p. 8.
[206] DR. PRICE'S "Dissertations," p. 198.
[207] DR. PRICE, "Dissertations," pp. 208, 219.
[208] Daniel 9: 2, 19.
[209] Ezekiel 36: 37.
[210] DR. CHALMERS, "Works," II. 286.
[211] Ibid., 325.
[212] HON. ROB. BOYLE, "Theolog. Works," II. 96, III. 230. PRESIDENT
EDWARDS, "Works," X. 1.
[213] EULER, "Letters to a German Princess," I. 271.
[214] DR. WOLLASTON, "Religion of Nature," p. 103.
[215] DR. ROBT. GORDON, "Sermons," p. 369.
[216] It is with melancholy pleasure that the author recalls and
reproduces, after an interval of thirty years, the lines of his early
college companion,--WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT,--a young man of high promise,
removed, like his distinguished fellow-student, ROBERT POLLOCK, by what
might seem a premature death, but for the prospect of immortality.