THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
GOD.
"The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External
Objects,"[194]--such is the title of a popular, and, in some respects,
instructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an
endowment, extensive circulation among the reading class of artisans and
tradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and illustrated by numerous facts
in Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the
capacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it
should have exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The
character of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or
irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial
discussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us that "'The Constitution
of Man' not only admits the existence of God, but is throughout devoted
to the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real,
practical, and intelligible government of this world, rewarding virtue
with physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and
suffering." On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of
doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the
charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the organs of avowed
Atheism,[195] his favorite arguments in support of "government by
natural law" have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by
others, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Providence
and the efficacy of Prayer.
We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one point of
the relation subsisting between "the Constitution of Man and External
Objects,"--that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly
instructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter
forgetfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his
attempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly
alien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the
relation between the constitution of man and external objects, he had
nothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive
doctrine respecting the relation between the constitution of man and the
government of God, and, least of all, with the _revealed_ doctrines of a
special Providence, of a fall into a state of sin, of death as its
wages, and of "spiritual influences" by which the ruin occasioned by the
fall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the
professed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a
way that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his
readers in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the
Christian faith. It has received this significant testimony, "'Combe's
Constitution of Man' would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the
banks of the Ganges."[196]
There are _two points_, especially, on which he comes more directly into
collision with our present argument:
1. He speaks as if God governed the universe _only_ by "natural laws,"
so as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence.
2. He speaks as if the "physical and organic" laws of Nature possessed
the same authority and imposed the same obligation as the "moral" laws
of Conscience and Revelation; and as if the breach or neglect of the
former were _punishable_ in the same sense, and for the same reason, as
the transgression of the latter.
Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total
exclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the
eternal under the Divine government, we hold these _two_ to be the
capital defects of his treatise; and it may be useful, in the present
state of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them.
In regard to the _first_, we need not repeat what we have already
explicitly declared, that God does govern the world _in part_ by means
of "natural laws" and "second causes;" but, not content with this
concession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He governed the world _only_ by these
means, to the exclusion of everything like a "special Providence," or
"Divine influences." It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in
his illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes
apparent. Thus he speaks of "the most pious and benevolent missionaries
sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an
unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law,
without their destruction being averted by their morality;" and, on the
other hand, of "the greatest monsters of iniquity" embarking in a
staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning "in circumstances exactly
similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom." Thus,
again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the
neglect of "organic laws," and as resulting from it so necessarily that
they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he
illustrates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer
Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197] It cannot
be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God
governed the world _only_ by natural laws; and that he does not
recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves
all events into the operation of these "laws."
Now, there are evidently _two_ suppositions that may be entertained on
this subject: either, that God orders _all_ events to fall out according
to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes;" or, that while He
_generally_ makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence,
He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and
immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign
will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible
alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first
sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the
other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend.
Even on the first supposition,--that God orders _all_ events to fall out
according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes,"--there
might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for
the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer;
for it should never be forgotten that, among the "second causes" created
and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those
that are purely physical,--there are intelligent beings, belonging both
to the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we
know to the contrary, as "ministers in fulfilling His will," and whose
agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established
order of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's
own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and
directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or
reverse any "natural law." And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use
of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of
the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for
the accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,--that
while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His
Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing
directly and immediately when He sees cause,--the doctrine of a special
Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is
at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed
believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a
supernatural effect of "Divine influence," can consistently deny God's
direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to
admit it at least on _two_ great occasions, namely, the Creation of the
world, and the promulgation of His revealed will.
In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system,
it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly
to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he
speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the same
_authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of
Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former
were _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the
transgression of the latter.
The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the
relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of
man;" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws,
as _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In illustrating
the relation between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man,"
he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less
than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: "The
peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic,
and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires
obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards
obedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in
proportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance
with _all_ of these Divine institutions." In regard to these "natural
laws,"--including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the
moral,--_four_ positions are laid down: first, that they are independent
of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them
is followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal
and invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the
"constitution of man."[198]
Now, in this theory of "natural laws," especially as it is applied to
the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be _three_ radical
defects:
1. Mr. Combe speaks of _obedience_ and _disobedience_ to the "physical
and organic" laws, as if they _could_ be obeyed or disobeyed in the same
sense and in the same way as the "moral" laws, and as if they imposed an
obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly
considered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws
of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the former _may_,
the latter _cannot_, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that
while the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by
every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience
at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises
not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation
of a _moral law belonging to our own nature_, which prescribes
_prudence_ as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the
circumstances in which we are placed.
That the "physical and organic" laws cannot be broken or violated in the
same sense in which the "moral law" may be transgressed, is evident from
the simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it
possible, _would be not a sin, but a miracle_! And that these laws
impose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because
we hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the
operation of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of
another, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of
Chemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aëronaut inflates his
balloon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the
ship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled
with air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on
its surface, each is attempting to counteract the law of gravitation by
the application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of
their _disobeying_ God in thus availing themselves of one physical agent
to counterpoise another. The "moral law," however, cannot be treated in
the same way, and that simply because it is generically different.
It is true, that _indirectly_ the laws of Nature, when known, may and
ought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any
obligation imposed _by them_ on our conscience, but solely by virtue of
that law of _moral prudence_ which springs from conscience itself, and
which teaches us that we _ought_ so to act with reference to outward
objects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness,
and the welfare of our fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder
than to confound _the laws of natural objects_ with _the law of human
conduct_; and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed himself
to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the "natural
laws," there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly
distinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the
laws which belong to the constitution of natural objects, and which
regulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there
are, in the words of a late sagacious layman, "_rules_ which the
intellect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own
conduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the
phenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former;
and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together....
The true state of the case is this,--it is for our interest to study
these natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as
far as we know them; and in doing so, we _obey_, not those laws of
Nature, physical and organic, but the laws of _prudence and good sense_,
arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties."[199]
Another acute writer,[200] who states the substance of the argument in
very few words, has shown that the theory of "natural laws," as taught
by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: "It is _true_,
first, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects;
in other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess were
_given_ them, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the
constitutions of physical objects are _definite_,--that is, they are
distinct, individual, and incapable of transmutation _by natural
causes_; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary
their constitutions. But it is _not true_, first, that any mode of
action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is
the will of God that that object should _now_ present that mode of
action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to
vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the
constitution of physical objects." He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's
principle of "natural laws" being all equally Divine institutions which
must be _obeyed_, "human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing
affair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive
contradictions;" that "the very same act is required by one law, and
forbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;" and that "we
sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws." He
concludes that "physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of
human conduct;" that "these we always must obey, and those we may
often, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;" and that "by
commingling distinct classes of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces
into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity."
2. Another radical defect in this theory of "natural laws" consists in
its representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them as
_punishments_ in the same sense in which moral delinquencies are said to
be followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which is
totally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions
of mankind. Mr. Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of
"natural laws" requires _obedience_ to itself, and that each, in its own
specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives,
as one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries
sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but embarking in an
unsound ship, and being drowned _by disobeying a "natural law;"_ as
another, the case of "a child or an aged person, stumbling into the
fire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it;" as
another, the case of "an ignorant child, groping about for something to
eat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and
dying;" and as another, the case of "a slater slipping from the roof of
a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge having given way
as he walked upright along it."[201] In all these cases, the accident or
misfortune which befalls the individual is represented as the
_punishment_ connected with the neglect or transgression of a "natural
law," just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the
punishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly
drinks laudanum is _punished with death_, in the same sense, and for the
same reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the
blood of a fellow-creature; and the poor slater who misses his foot,
and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, is _punished with
death_, just as a man would be who threw himself over _with the
intention_ of committing suicide! Surely there is some grave error
here,--an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and
one that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously
constructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a
suspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr.
Scott, it is only where "the law is previously known"--and not only so,
but where the "circumstances which determine the effect might be
foreseen"--that "the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly
be termed _rewards and punishments_;" for "these have reference to the
state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished; it is the
intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body,
that is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy,
in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment." And as the theory is
thus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of
man a kind of obedience which it is _impossible_ for him to render,
since _all_ the laws of Nature, and _all_ the states of particular
things at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many,
nor even by the philosophic few. The philosopher, not less than the
peasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam engine, or the
unsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that,
too, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr.
Combe's theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be a
man of science, if he would avoid _sin_ and _punishment_; and yet,
unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present
state of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less
enlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbors.
These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in "The
Reasoner," who blames Mr. Combe for complicating his argument
unnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who
thinks that the doctrine of "natural laws" can only be consistently
maintained on the ground of Atheism. "If the system of Nature," he says,
"be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or
all-perfect Creator,--merely as an isolated system of facts,--no
comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the
system of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause,
a combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered
at for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature
excites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution....
The assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the
laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous
results. First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an
offence against the supposed Divine Legislator, which, to a pious and
conscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse.... Again,
under this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust,
oppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that
compel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are obliged to
pursue some unwholesome employment which injures their health and
shortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident,
as when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or
where a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save
another person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to
represent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for an act
of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the
laws of God the Divine Legislator, is to violate all our notions of
justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent
the Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive.... Again, if
all suffering, however unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a
punishment from the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or
remove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the
Divine authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had
inflicted; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of human
laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from
punishment."[202]
3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe's theory of "natural
laws," that he represents the _distinct existence and independent action
of these laws_ as "the key to the Divine government," as the one
principle which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts
satisfactorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. We
cannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that
constitution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and
importance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily
governed. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except
perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go
far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But "natural
laws"--whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether
considered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related
and interdependent--cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine
government, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must
rise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the
Divine administration: we must consider, not merely _the independent
operation_ of the several classes of "natural laws," but also their
_mutual relations_, as distinct but connected parts of one vast system,
in which the "physical and organic" laws are made subordinate and
subservient to the "moral," under the superintendence of that Supreme
Intelligence which makes the things that are "seen and temporal" to
minister to those things which are "unseen and eternal;" we must
carefully discriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere
"natural government" which is common to man with the inferior and
irresponsible creation, and the higher "moral government" which is
peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know
how far--the reality of both being admitted--the former is auxiliary or
subservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is
fitted to generate that frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of
truth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of
moral discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of
this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for
the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to
the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to
talk only of "natural laws," or even of their "independent action" in
such a case, to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too
as the transgressor of a wise and salutary "natural law" which
establishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system:
for, grant that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would
result from its abolition, grant even that it acts independently of any
other law, physical or moral, still the profounder question remains,
whether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the
operation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can
properly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice? and
whether a theory of this kind can afford "a key to the government of
God?"
Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. Combe's theory
of "natural laws." We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the
most recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not
original, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his
obligations in this respect to a manuscript work of Dr. Spurzheim,
entitled, "A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;" and he refers, somewhat
incidentally, to Volney's "Law of Nature," published originally as a
Catechism, and afterwards reprinted under the title, "La Loi Naturelle;
_ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale_." The same theory, in substance,
had been broached in the "Systême de la Nature," and _there_ it was
applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable
treatise. But it may be said to have been _methodized_ by Volney; and in
his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular
instruction.[203] There is a striking resemblance between his
speculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence
of God; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the substitution of
"natural laws." The "law of Nature" is defined as "the constant order by
which _God_ governs the world," and is represented as the most universal
"rule of action." That law is supposed to be a command or a prohibition
to act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction of
_reward and punishment_. After giving several examples of "natural
laws," which are all merely _general facts_ or the generalized results
of experience, he describes man's relation to these laws almost in the
words of Mr. Combe. "Since all these, and similar facts," he says, "are
unchangeable, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true
laws to which he must conform, with the express clause of a _penalty
attached to their infraction_, or of a benefit attached to their
observance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if
he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the
elements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or
to touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air without
being suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he
receives for each of these infractions of the 'natural laws' a corporeal
_punishment_, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, on
the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their
exact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and
make it as happy as it can be."
This code of "natural laws" is then described by Volney as possessing no
fewer than _ten_ peculiar characteristics, which give it a decided
preëminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,--as
being _primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable,
just, peaceful, beneficial_, and alone _sufficient_. But it is so only
when viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of
morals with which it is avowedly associated. For when morals are
described as a mere physical science, founded on man's organization, his
interests and passions,--when the treatise, according to its _second_
title, is professedly an attempt to expound the _physical principles of
morals_,--and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of
Ethics are rigorously reduced to _one_, namely, the principle of
self-preservation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions
of pleasure and pain,--it is not wonderful that, _for such an end_, the
"natural laws" might be held sufficient: but it is wonderful that any
mind capable of a moment's reflection should not have perceived that, in
such a system, the cardinal idea of _Deity_ is altogether omitted, or
left unaccounted for, in the case of Man, and that no attempt is made to
explain or to account for anything that is properly _moral_ in the
government of God.
* * * * *
On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that
the existence of natural laws is not necessarily exclusive of a
superintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford
some of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as
a scheme of _provision_ or as a system of _government_, Divine
Providence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one
aspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls
and overrules all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will.
Considered as a scheme of government, it is either _natural_ or _moral_.
To the former, all created beings without exception are subject; to the
latter, only some orders of being,--such, namely, as are intelligent,
voluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, constituted as he
is, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all
combined; and he is subject, therefore, both to a _natural_ government,
which is common to him with all other material and organized beings, and
also to a _moral_ government, which is peculiar to himself as a free and
accountable agent. The _natural_ government of God extends to all his
creatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its
reality is proved, first, by the _laws_ to which all created things are
subject, and which they have no power to alter or resist; secondly, by
the _final causes_ or beneficial ends which are obviously contemplated
in the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually
served by them; and, thirdly, by the _necessary dependence_ of all
created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the
commencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural
government of God, which extends to _all_ His creatures, does not
exhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a
scheme of _moral_ government, adapted to the nature, and designed for
the regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects.
And the reality of a moral government may be proved, _first_, by the
_moral faculty_, which is a constituent part of human nature, and which
makes man "a law to himself;" _secondly_, by the _essential nature_ of
virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or
painful; _thirdly_, by the _natural consequences_ of our actions, which
indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and,
_fourthly_, by the _moral atmosphere_ in which we are placed, as being
members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong
is universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or
censure. By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a
scheme both of _natural_ and _moral_ government,--two aspects of the
same system which are _equally real_, yet _widely different_. But the
distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical
difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each
other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the
same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating;
they come into contact at many points, and _the natural is made
subordinate and subservient to the moral_. For there is a beautiful
gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical
laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the
physical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical,
organic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the
intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the
spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, "The natural and
moral constitution and government of the world are _so connected_ as to
make up together but _one scheme_; and it is highly probable that the
first is formed and carried on merely in _subserviency to the latter_,
as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for
minds."[204]
Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of
men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established
between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the
invariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the
lower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine
government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason
discernible, _à priori_, why pain should be the accompaniment or
consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations
which have been established, in the natural constitution of things,
between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the _reality_
of a moral government, but of the _subordination_ of physical and
organic agencies to its great designs.
This relation between the _natural_ and the _moral_ government of God is
admirably illustrated by Bishop Warburton: "The application of _natural
events_ to _moral government_, in the common course of Providence,
connects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world
with that of Creator and Preserver of the material.... The doctrine of
the _preëstablished harmony_,--the direction of natural events to moral
government,--obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies
us that there is but _one_ governor of both systems, but that both
systems are conducted by _one_ scheme of Providence. To form the
constitution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or
suspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of
ages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contribute to the
preservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods
of time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may
serve as instruments for the government of the moral world: for example,
that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all
the flourishing works of rural industry,--that warring elements, in the
suited order of _natural_ government, should depopulate and tear in
pieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments when _moral_
government required a warning and example to be held out to a careless
world,--is giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of
God's goodness and justice.... When He made the world, the free
determinations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws
physical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere
repentance in the _moral_ world should be sure to avert an impending
desolation in the _natural_, not by any present alteration or suspension
of its established laws, but by originally adjusting all their
operations to all the foreseen circumstances of moral agency."[205]
Viewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully adapted to
the constitution of human nature, since it affords as much _certainty_
in regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for
forethought, prudence, and diligence in the use of means, and yet leaves
so much remaining _uncertainty_ in regard to other things as should
impress us with a sense of constant _dependence_ on Him "in whom we
live, and move, and have our being." The constitution of Nature and the
course of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach
these _two_ lessons,--first, of _diligence_ in the use of means, and,
secondly, of _dependence_ on a Higher Power: for there is sufficient
_regularity_ in the course of events to encourage human industry in
every department of labor; and yet there is as much _uncertainty_,
arising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of
human knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter
helplessness. The wisdom of God in the government of the world may be
equally manifested in the _regular order_ which He has established, and
which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on
as a ground of hopeful activity; and in the _apparent casualty_ and
_inscrutable mystery_ of many things which can neither be divined by
human wisdom, nor controlled by human power. It matters not whether the
remaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some classes of events
not being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws,
and the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is
certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in
the experience of every creature not possessed of omniscient knowledge,
these two elements are and must be combined,--such a measure of
_certainty_ as should encourage industry in the use of means, and such
a measure of remaining _uncertainty_ as should keep them mindful that
they are not, and never can be, independent of God.