THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE.
When we survey the actual course of God's Providence, by which the
eternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried into effect, we discern
immediately a marked difference between _two great classes of events_.
The one comprehends a multitude of events which are so regular, stable,
and constant, that we feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their
invariable recurrence, in the same circumstances in which they have been
observed; they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at least an
established law. The other comprehends a different set of events, which
are so irregular and variable that they occur quite unexpectedly, and
cannot be reduced to any rule of rational computation; they
appear,--perhaps from our ignorance,--to be purely accidental or
fortuitous.
In exact accordance with this difference between the two great classes
of Providential events, there is a similar difference in our _internal
views or sentiments_ in regard to them. We are conscious of two totally
dissimilar feelings in contemplating them respectively. We have a
feeling of certainty, confidence, or assurance in regard to the one; and
a feeling of uncertainty, anxiety, and helplessness in regard to the
other; while for an intermediate class of events, there is also an
intermediate state of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and
absolute doubt, arising from the various degrees of _probability_ that
may seem to belong to them. These are at once natural and legitimate
sentiments in the circumstances in which we are placed; for
unquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is fitted to
produce and cherish them all; and when they are combined,--especially
when they are duly proportioned, in the case of any individual, they
induce a habit or frame of mind most favorable to the recognition of
God's Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us
with a sense both of our _dependence_ on His supreme will, and of our
_duty to be diligent_ in the use of all appointed means. But when
_either_ of the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the
sentiments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be a
tendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Providence, towards
one or other of two opposite extremes:--the extreme, on the one hand, of
resolving all events into results of physical agencies and mechanical
laws, acting with the blind force of "destiny," and leaving no room for
the interposition of an intelligent Moral Ruler; and the extreme, on the
other hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous
influences, equally exempt from His control. The _former_ is the theory
of "Fate," the _latter_ is the theory of "Chance;" and both are equally
opposed to the doctrine which affirms the eternal purpose and the actual
providence of an omniscient and all-controlling Mind.
It matters little, with reference to our present purpose, whether or not
every department of Nature be supposed to be equally subject to "natural
laws;" for even were it so, still if these laws were either in part
unknown and undiscoverable by us, or so related to each other that the
results of their manifold possible combinations could not be calculated
or reckoned on by human wisdom or foresight, ample room would be left
for the exercise of _diligence_ within the limits of our ascertained
knowledge, and yet for a sense of _dependence_ on a power which we feel
ourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On the ground of
analogy, we think it highly probable that every department of Nature
_is_ subject to regular and stable laws; and on the same ground we may
anticipate that, in the progressive advance of human knowledge, many new
fields will yet be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But
suppose every law were discovered,--suppose, even, that every individual
event should be shown to depend on some natural cause, there would still
remain at least _two_ considerations which should remind us of our
_dependence_. The first is our ignorance of the whole combination of
causes which may at any time be brought into action, and of the results
which may flow from them in circumstances such as we can neither foresee
nor provide against. The second is our ignorance, equally unavoidable
and profound, of the intelligent and voluntary agencies which may be at
work, modifying, disposing, and directing that combination of causes, so
as to accomplish the purposes of the Omniscient Mind. Our want of
knowledge in either case is a reason for uncertainty; and our
uncertainty in regard to events in which we may be deeply concerned is
fitted to teach us our dependence on a higher Power. Let it not be
thought, however, that our argument for God's Providence is drawn merely
from man's _ignorance_, or that its strength must diminish in proportion
as his knowledge of Nature is extended; on the contrary, it rests on the
assumption that _man knows enough to be aware that he cannot know all_,
and that as long as he is not omniscient, he must be dependent on Him
who alone "knows the end from the beginning," and "who ruleth among the
armies of heaven" as well as "among the inhabitants of this earth."
It is in the invariable combination and marvellous mutual adjustment of
these two elements,--the regular and the variable, the constant and the
casual, the certain and the uncertain,--that we best discern the wisdom
of that vast scheme of Providence, which is designed at once to secure
our _diligence in the use of means_, and to impress us with a sense of
our _dependence on a higher Power_. And the same remark may be equally
applicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to the revealed constitution of things,
since Scripture itself exhibits certain definite truths surrounded with
a margin of mystery like "lights shining in a dark place;" and while it
prescribes and encourages diligence in the use of means, teaches us at
the same time our dependence on the Divine blessing which alone can
render our efforts effectual. Both elements, therefore, must be taken
into account and kept steadily in view, if we would form a comprehensive
conception of the method of the Divine government, or a correct estimate
of the wisdom with which it is adapted to the case of created and
dependent, but intelligent, active, and responsible beings. But when the
one is either dissevered from the other, or viewed apart and exclusively
by itself, when the mind dwells on either, to the neglect of what is
equally a part of the same comprehensive scheme, then we are in danger
of adopting a partial and one-sided view of Providence, and of lapsing
into one or other of the opposite extremes,--the theory of "Chance" or
the theory of "Fate."
A few remarks on each of these theories may be neither unseasonable nor
useless, if they serve to illustrate the different kinds of Atheism
which have sprung from them, and to place in a clear and strong light
the radical difference which subsists between both, and the doctrine of
Providence, as it is taught and exemplified in Scripture.
1. The theory of "Chance," which was once the stronghold of Atheism, is
now all but abandoned by speculative thinkers, and exists only, if at
all, in the vague beliefs of uneducated and unreflecting men. This
result has been brought about, not so much by the Metaphysical or even
the Theological considerations which were urged against the theory, as
by the steady advance of Science, and the slow but progressive growth of
a belief in "law" and "order" as existing in every department of
Nature. It has been undeniably the effect of scientific inquiry to
banish the idea of Chance, at least from as much of the domain as has
been successfully explored, and to afford a strong presumption that the
same result would follow were our researches extended beyond the limits
within which they are yet confined. To this extent there is truth in the
reasonings of M. Comte as applied to _Chance_, while they have no
validity or value as applied to _Providence_; and we deem it a noble
tribute to Science when it can be said of her with truth, that she has
been an effective auxiliary to Religion in overthrowing the once vaunted
empire of that blind power.
At one time some ascribed all the works both of Creation and Providence
to Chance, and spoke of a fortuitous concourse of _atoms_ in the one
case, and of a fortuitous concurrence of _events_ in the other. The
Atomic theory, which, as a mere physiological hypothesis, is far from
being necessarily Atheistic, and which has been adopted and defended by
such writers as Gassendus and Dr. Goode,[217] was applied by Epicurus
and Lucretius to account for the fortuitous origin of existing beings,
and also for the fortuitous course of human affairs. No one now, in the
present advanced state of science, would seriously propose to account
either for the creation of the world, or for the events of the world's
history, by ascribing them to the operation of Chance; the current is
flowing in another direction; it has set in, like a returning tide,
towards the universal recognition of "general laws" and "natural
causes," such as, from their invariable regularity and uniformity, are
utterly exclusive of everything like chance or accident in any
department of Nature. Instead of ascribing the creation of the world to
a fortuitous concourse of atoms, modern speculation would refer it to "a
law of development" such as is able of itself to insure the production
of astral systems in the firmament, and also of vegetable and animal
races on the earth, without any direct or immediate interposition of a
higher power; and instead of ascribing the events of history and the
"progress" of humanity to a fortuitous or accidental origin, modern
speculation would refer them to "a law of social or historical
development," such as makes every succeeding state the natural, and,
indeed, necessary product of a prior one, and places the whole order of
sequences--whether physical, moral, political, or religious--under the
government of "natural law," as contradistinguished from that of a
"supernatural will." There is thus a manifest tendency to resile from
the old theory of Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law,
Order, or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between the
two contrasted systems; and yet the difference may be, after all, more
seeming than real: for both the old doctrine of "chance" and the new
theory of "development" are compelled to assume certain conditions or
qualities as belonging to the primordial elements of matter, without
which it is felt that neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory
account of the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party
spoke more of "Chance," the other speaks more of "Law;" but both were
compelled to feel that neither Chance nor Law could _of themselves_
account for the established order of Nature, without presupposing
certain conditions, adjustments, and dispositions of matter, such as
could only be satisfactorily explained by ascribing them to a wise,
foreseeing, and designing Mind.
In the present state of philosophical speculation, which evinces so
strong a tendency to reduce everything to the dominion of "Law," it may
seem unnecessary to refer to the doctrine of "Chance" at all; but
believing as we do that there are, and ever must be, certain events in
the course of life, and certain facts in the complex experience of man,
which will irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine
is theoretically disowned, we think it right to lay down a distinct and
definite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly
established, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious in the
doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true
and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual
scheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to
state and prepared to establish is this: That, with reference to God, as
an omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as
"Chance;" while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may
be fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of causes, but as
depending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint
operation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited
intelligence.
This position consists of _two_ parts. It affirms that with reference to
God and His omniscient knowledge, there can be nothing that is
fortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, with reference to man
and all created intelligences, that there may, or even must, be much
uncertainty in regard to the products of natural causes, especially when
they act in combination, and come into play in circumstances which we
cannot foresee or control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental,
or unexpected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing
Intelligence. The first part of the position is proved by the general
evidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, and especially an
unerring prescience, to the Divine Mind; and it cannot be denied,
without virtually ascribing _ignorance_ to God. The second part of the
position is established by some of the most familiar facts of
experience. We know and feel that however certain all events are to the
omniscient knowledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely beyond
the reach of our limited foresight; and this because they are either
dependent on individual causes which are unknown to us, or on a
combination of various causes, too complex to admit of any rational
computation in regard to their results.
The "calculation of chances" has been reduced to something like
scientific accuracy;[218] and it has been applied, with beneficial
effect, to the insurance of life and property on land and at sea. Even
the casual events of human history may be said, in a certain sense, to
be governed by fixed laws. The _aggregate result_ in such cases may be
tolerably certain, while the _individual cases_ are very much the
reverse; and hence human wisdom, proceeding on a well-ascertained body
of _statistics_, may construct a scheme for securing some against the
evils to which they would otherwise have been liable, by means of the
sacrifices of others, who would not have been in fact, although they
might have been, for ought they know, liable to the same. But what is
this, if it be not a practical acknowledgement of the uncertainty in
which all are placed in regard to some of the most important interests
of the present life? or how can it be said that chance or accident is
altogether, and in every sense, exploded, when large bodies of men are
found to combine, and that, too, at a considerable personal sacrifice,
for the express purpose of protecting themselves, so far as they can,
from the hazards to which they are individually exposed?
In the sense above explained, we cannot consent to discard "Chance"
altogether, either at the bidding of those who resolve everything into
"natural laws," or even in deference to the authority of others who
ascribe all events to Divine Providence. It may be true that all events,
however apparently casual or fortuitous, are governed by "natural laws;"
it may be equally true that all events are determined, directed, or
controlled by Divine Providence: but as long as some events depend on
causes which are certainly known, and other events on causes which are
not known, or on a combination of causes whose results cannot be
foreseen, so long will there be room for the distinction between the
_regular_ and the _accidental_ phenomena of human experience. This
distinction, indeed, is explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; for
while it speaks of all events as being infallibly known to God, it
speaks of some events that are _accidental_ with reference to man.[219]
The unknown, unforeseen, and unexpected incidents of life, which
constitute all that is apparently casual or accidental, may be, and we
believe they are, really subject both to natural laws and to God's
providential will; but they are removed far beyond our comprehension or
control; and being so, they are admirably fitted, as a part of the
complex scheme of His natural and moral government, to serve one of the
most important practical ends for which it is designed, by impressing us
with a sense of constant dependence on a higher Power, and of dutiful
subjection to a superior Will.
But while, in this sense and to this extent, the doctrine of "Chance" is
retained, it must be utterly rejected as a means of accounting either
for the creation or government of the world. For, on the supposition of
a Supreme Being, there can be no _chance_ with reference to Him; and
without such a supposition, we cannot account for the regularity which
prevails in the course of Nature, and which indicates a presiding
Intelligence and a controlling Will. . 2. But this very regularity of
Nature, when viewed apart from the cross accidents of life, is apt to
engender the opposite idea of "Fate" or "Destiny," as if all events were
determined by laws alike necessary and invariable, inherent in the
constitution of Nature, and independent of the concurrence or the
control of the Divine will. We are not sure, indeed, that the idea of
Fate or Destiny is suggested solely, or even mainly, by the regular
sequences of the natural world; we rather think that it is more
frequently derived from those unexpected and crushing calamities which
occur in spite of every precaution of human foresight and prudence, and
that thus it may be identified, in a great measure, with the doctrine of
Chance, or, at least, the one may run into and blend with the other. But
if any attempt were made to establish it by proof, recourse would be had
to the established order and regular sequences of Nature, as affording
its most plausible verification, although they afford no real sanction
to it, in so far as it differs from the Christian doctrine of
Providence.
Dr. Cudworth discusses this subject at great length, and makes mention
of _three_ distinct forms of Fatalism. The first, which is variously
designated as the Democritic, the Physiological, or the Atheistic Fate,
is that which teaches the material or physical necessity of all things,
and ascribes all natural phenomena to the mechanical laws of matter and
motion. The second, which is described as a species of Divine or
Theistic Fate, is that which admits the existence and agency of God, but
teaches that He both _decrees_ and _does_, _purposes_ and _performs_ all
things, whether good or evil, as if He were the only real agent in the
universe, or as if He had no moral character, and were, as Cudworth
graphically expresses it, "_mere arbitrary will omnipotent_:" this he
describes as a "Divine Fate immoral and violent." The third, which is
also designated as a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which
recognizes both the existence of God, and the agency of other beings in
Nature, together with the radical distinction between moral good and
evil, but teaches that men are so far under necessity as to be incapable
of moral and responsible action, and unfit subjects of praise or blame,
of reward or punishment: this he describes as "Divine Fate moral and
natural." These _three_ are all justly held to be erroneous or defective
views of the Divine government, and, as such, they are strenuously and
successfully opposed.[220]
But there is room for a _fourth_ doctrine, which may be designated as
the Christian doctrine of Providence, and which combines in itself all
the great fundamental truths for which Dr. Cudworth contends, while it
leaves open, or, at least, does not necessarily determine, some of the
collateral questions on which he might have differed from many of its
defenders. This doctrine affirms, first, the existence and attributes of
God, as a holy and righteous Moral Governor; secondly, the real
existence and actual operation of "second causes," distinct from, but
not independent of, "the First Cause;" thirdly, the operation of these
causes according to their several natures, so that, under God's
Providence, events fall out "either necessarily, freely, or
contingently," according to the kind of intermediate agency by which
they are brought to pass; and, fourthly, that in the case of intelligent
and moral agents, ample room is left for responsible action, and for the
consequent sentence of praise or blame, reward or punishment,
notwithstanding the eternal decree of God, and the constant control
which He exercises over all His creatures and all their actions. These
four positions may be all harmoniously combined in one self-consistent
and comprehensive statement; and, in point of fact, they are all
included in the Christian doctrine of Providence, as that has been
usually explained and defended by the various sections of the Catholic
Church. Not one of them is omitted or denied.[221] They seem fairly to
meet, or rather fully to exhaust, the demands of Dr. Cudworth himself,
when he says: "These three things are, as we conceive, the fundamentals
or essentials of true religion, first, that all things in the world do
not float without a head or governor, but that there is a God, an
omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all; secondly, that this
God being essentially good and just, there is something in its own
nature immutably and eternally just and unjust, and not by arbitrary
will, law, and command only; and lastly, that there is something [Greek:
eph' hêmin], or that we are _so far forth_ principals or masters of our
own actions as to be _accountable_ to justice for them, or to make us
guilty or blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment
accordingly." All these fundamentals of true religion are explicitly
recognized in the Christian doctrine of Providence, which stands out,
therefore, in striking contrast with the Atheistic, and even Theistic,
theories of Fate which he condemns; and they are as zealously maintained
(whether with the same _consistency_ is a different question) by
Edwards, Chalmers, and Woods, on the one side, as they ever were by
Cudworth, Clarke, and Tappan, on the other.
It may be said, however, that the doctrine of Providence, especially
when taught in connection with that of Predestination, does unavoidably
imply some kind of _necessity_, incompatible with free moral agency, and
that, to all practical intents, it amounts substantially to Fate or
Destiny. But we are prepared to show that there is neither the same kind
of _necessity_ in the one scheme which is implied in the other, nor the
same reason for denying moral and responsible agency in the case of
intelligent beings. In doing so, we must carefully discriminate, in the
first instance, between the various senses in which the term _necessity_
is used. Dr. Waterland has given a comprehensive division of "necessity"
into _four_ kinds, denominated respectively, the Logical, the Moral, the
Physical, and the Metaphysical.
"Logical necessity" exists wherever the contrary of what is affirmed
would imply a contradiction; and in this sense we call it _a necessary
truth_ that two and two make four, that a whole is greater than any of
its parts, and that a circle neither is nor can be a square. It amounts
to nothing more than the affirmation, that the same idea or thing _is
what it is_; and it relates solely to the connection between one idea
and another, or between one proposition and another, or between subject
and predicate. This is "logical necessity;" we cannot, with our present
laws of thought, conceive the thing to be otherwise without implying a
contradiction.
"Moral necessity," again, denotes a connection, not between one idea and
another, or between the subject and predicate of a proposition, but
between _means_ and _ends_. It is not necessary absolutely that any man
should continue to live; but it is necessary _morally_ that, if he would
continue to live, he should eat and sleep, food and rest being,
according to the established constitution of Nature, a _necessary
condition_ or indispensable means for the support of life. There is in
like manner a "moral necessity" that we should be virtuous and obedient,
if we would be truly happy, virtue and obedience being, according to the
established constitution of Nature, an indispensable means of true and
permanent happiness. This is "moral necessity" which has reference
solely to the connection between _means_ and _ends_, but that
connection, being ordained, is immutable and invariable.
"Physical necessity," again, exists wherever there is either a causal
connection between antecedents and consequents in the material world, or
even a coactive and compulsory constraint in the moral world. It is
physically necessary that fire should burn substances that are
combustible, that water and other fluids should flow down a declivity,
and rise again but only to a certain level; and there is the like kind
of necessity, wherever a moral agent is forced to act under irresistible
compulsion,--as when the assassin seizes hold of another's arm, and
thrusting a deadly weapon into his hand, directs it, by his own
overmastering will, to the brain or heart of his victim. In this latter
case, the unwilling instrument of his revenge or malice is not held to
be the guilty party, but the more powerful agent by whom that instrument
was employed. This is "physical necessity," which relates solely to the
connection between cause and effect in the material world, and, in the
moral, to the compulsory action of one agent on another.
"Metaphysical necessity," again, can be predicated of God only, and
denotes the peculiar property or prerogative of His being, as existing
necessarily, immutably, and eternally, or, to use a scholastic phrase,
the necessary connection in His case between _essence_ and _existence_.
Omitting the _last_, which does not fall properly within the limits of
our present inquiry, we may say with regard to _the three first_, that
each of them may exist, and that each of them does really operate, in
the present constitution of Nature. We are subject, unquestionably, to
certain "laws of thought," which we can neither repeal nor resist, and
which impose upon us a logical necessity to conceive, to reason, and to
infer, not according to our own whim or caprice, but according to
established rules. We are equally subject to certain "conditions of
existence,"--arising partly from our own constitution, partly from the
constitution of external objects and the relations subsisting between
the two,--which lay us under a moral necessity of using suitable means
for the accomplishment of our purposes and plans. And we are still
further subject to "physical necessity," in so far as our material frame
is liable to be affected by external influences, and even our muscular
powers may be overmastered and subordinated by a more vigorous or
resolute will than our own. These _three_ kinds of "necessity" exist;
they are all constituent parts of that vast scheme of government under
which we are placed; and the question arises, Whether, when the
existence of these necessary laws is admitted, we can still maintain the
doctrine which affirms the providential government of God and the moral
agency of man; or whether we must not resolve the whole series of
events, both in the natural and moral worlds, into the blind and
inexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate?
We answer, first, that there is nothing in any one of these three kinds
of necessity, nor in all of them combined, which, when rightly
understood, should either exclude the idea of Divine Providence, or
impair our sense of moral and responsible agency. We may not be _so_
free, nor so totally exempt from the operation of established laws, as
some of the advocates of human liberty have supposed: but we may be free
enough, notwithstanding, to be regarded and treated as moral and
accountable beings. We may be subject to certain "laws of thought," and
yet may be responsible for our opinions and beliefs, in so far as these
depend on our voluntary acts, on our attention or inattention to the
truth and its evidence, on our use or neglect of the appropriate means,
on our love or our hatred to the light. And so we may be subject to
certain other laws, in various departments of our complex experience,
without being either restrained or impelled by such external coaction as
alone can exempt creatures, constituted as we know and feel ourselves to
be, from the righteous retributions of God.
We answer, secondly, that the doctrine of Providence, even when it is
combined with that of Predestination, represents all events as "falling
out according to the nature of second causes, necessarily, contingently,
or freely;" nay, as falling out so "that no violence is offered to the
will of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes
taken away, but rather established." It follows that if there be either
on earth or in heaven any free cause, or any moral and responsible
agent, his nature is not changed, nor is the character of his agency
altered, by that providential government which God exercises over all
His creatures and all their actions; he still continues to develop,
within certain limits imposed by unalterable laws, his own proper
individuality, or his personal character, in its relation to the law and
government of God.
We answer, thirdly, that the moral and responsible agency of man cannot
be justly held to be incompatible with the Providence and Supremacy of
God, unless it can be shown that, in the exercise of the latter, God
acts in the way of physical coaction or irresistible constraint, and
further, that man is not only controlled and governed in his actions,
but compelled to act in opposition to his own will. But no enlightened
advocate either of Providence or Predestination will affirm that there
is any "physical necessity," imposed by the Divine will, which
constrains men to commit sin, or that God is "the author of sin." "Let
no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be
tempted of evil, neither tempteth He any man. But every man is tempted,
when he is drawn away of his own lusts and enticed."[222]
We answer, fourthly, that when a "moral necessity" or _moral inability_
is spoken of by divines as making sin certain and inevitable in the case
of man, we must carefully distinguish between the _constitution_ and the
_state_ of human nature,--its constitution as it was originally created,
and its state as it at present exists. There might be nothing in the
original constitution of human nature which could interfere in any way
with the freedom of man as an intelligent, moral, and responsible being;
and yet, in consequence of the introduction of sin, his state may now be
so far changed as to have become a state of moral bondage. But the
constitution of his nature, in virtue of which he was at the first, and
must ever continue to be, a moral and accountable being, remains
unreversed; from being holy, he has become depraved, but he has not
ceased to be a subject of moral government, and the evils that are
incident to his present position must be ascribed, not to God's
_creative will_, but, in the first instance, to man's voluntary
disobedience, and, in the second, to a Divine _judicial sentence_
following thereupon.
And finally, we answer that the theory which ascribes all events, both
in the natural and moral worlds, to the blind and inexorable dominion of
Destiny or Fate, leaves altogether unexplained many of the most certain
and familiar facts of human experience. There are two large classes of
facts which no theory of Fate can possibly explain. The first comprises
all those manifest indications of provident forethought, intelligent
design, and moral purpose, which appear in the course of Nature, and
which cannot be _accounted for_ by a blind, unintelligent, undesigning
cause. The second comprises all those facts of consciousness which bear
witness to the moral nature and responsible agency of man, as the
subject of a government which rewards and punishes his actions, in some
measure, even here, and which irresistibly suggests the idea of a future
reckoning and retribution. These two classes of facts must either be
ignored, or left as insoluble, by any theory which advocates blind Fate
or Destiny, in opposition to the overruling Providence and moral
government of God.
These answers are sufficient, if not to remove all mystery from the
methods of the Divine administration (for who would undertake to fathom
the counsels of Him "whose judgments are unsearchable and His ways past
finding out?"), yet to show at least that a Divine Providence is more
credible in itself, and better supported by evidence, than any theory of
Destiny or Fate; that the facts to which the latter appeals may be
explained consistently with the former, while the facts on which the
former is founded must either be left altogether out of view, or at
least left unexplained, if the doctrine of Fate be substituted for that
of Providence.
We have thus far compared the two theories of Chance and Fate, by which
some have attempted to explain the system of the universe, and have
contrasted both with the Christian doctrine of Providence. On a review
of the whole discussion, we think it must be evident that the latter
combines whatever is true and valuable in each of these opposite
theories, while it eliminates and rejects whatever is unsound or noxious
in either. It may seem strange that we should speak as if anything,
either true or valuable, could be involved in the theories of Chance and
Destiny; and, unquestionably, considered as theories designed to explain
the system of the world, and to supersede the doctrine of Providence,
they are, in all their distinctive peculiarities, utterly false and
worthless. But it seldom, if ever, happens that any theory obtains a
wide-spread and permanent influence, which does not stand connected with
some _partial truth_, or which cannot appeal to some _apparent natural
evidence_. We have already seen that there are two distinct classes of
events in Nature, and two corresponding classes of sentiments and
feelings in the human mind; that the latter point, respectively, to the
constant and the variable, the certain and the doubtful, the causal and
the casual; and that were either of the two to acquire an absolute
ascendancy over us, it would naturally lead to one or other of two
opposite extremes--the theory of Chance, or the theory of Fate. Now, the
doctrine of Providence takes account of _both_ these classes of
phenomena and feelings, so as to combine whatever is true and useful in
each of the two rival theories, while it strikes out and rejects
whatever is false in either, by placing all things under the government
and control of a living, intelligent, personal God.
It is scarcely necessary to add that the views and sentiments which the
Christian doctrine of Providence inspires are widely different from
those which must be generated by a belief either in Chance or in Fate,
as the supreme arbiter of our destiny. The doctrine which teaches us to
look up and to say, with childlike confidence, "Our FATHER which art in
heaven," is worth more than all the philosophy in the world! Could we
only realize it as a truth, and have habitual recourse to it in all our
anxieties and straits, we should feel that, if it be a deeply serious
and solemn fact that "the Lord reigneth," it is also, to all his
trusting and obedient children, alike cheering and consolatory; and he
who can relish the sweetness of our Lord's words when he spake of "the
birds of the air" and the "flowers of the field," will see at once that
Stoicism is immeasurably inferior, both as a philosophy and a faith, to
Christian Theism.[223]
FOOTNOTES:
[217] DR. CUDWORTH, "Intellectual System," I. 75, 82, 106, 151; II. 77,
334. GASSENDI, "Syntagma." DR. J. M. GOODE, "Lucretius," Preface.
[218] LA PLACE, "Des Probabilities."
[219] Eccles. 9: 11; Luke 10: 31; Deut. 19: 5
[220] DR. CUDWORTH, "Intellectual System," I. 33. American Edition.
[221] DR. JOHN COLLINGES, "On Providence." Dr. Price, "Dissertations."
SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, "De Providentia Dei." DR. CHARNOCK, "On Providence."
[222] James 1: 13, 14. See M'LAURIN'S profound discourse on this text.
[223] MICHELET has presented a graphic portrait of a Stoic:--"L'individu
sous la forme du Stoicisme,--ramassé soi,--appuyé sur soi,--ne demandant
rien aux dieux,--ne les accusant point,--_ne daignant pas même les
nier_."--"_Introduction à l'Historie Universelle_."