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MODERN ATHEISM

UNDER ITS FORMS OF

PANTHEISM, MATERIALISM, SECULARISM,

DEVELOPMENT, AND NATURAL LAWS.

BY

JAMES BUCHANAN, D. D., LL. D.,

DIVINITY PROFESSOR IN "THE NEW COLLEGE," EDINBURGH, AND AUTHOR

OF "THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT," ETC.

BOSTON:

_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,

59 WASHINGTON STREET.

NEW YORK: SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,

CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.

1857.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by

_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of

Massachusetts.

Electro-Stereotyped by

_G. J. STILES & COMPANY_,

23 Congress Street, Boston.

PREFATORY NOTE.

The contents of this volume originally constituted about one half of a

work, entitled "Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, in their

Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence."

Simultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, the five

principal chapters in this volume were published separately, accompanied

with the announcement that _each was complete in itself_. The hint thus

given by the author, has been acted upon by the present publishers. On

examining the whole work, it was found to be divided into four Sections.

Of these, the third was devoted exclusively to "_Modern Atheism_." It

embraced the five chapters already alluded to, together with a general

introduction and four shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a

complete treatise by itself; and it is now presented to the American

public in the conviction that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the

present state of religious opinion in this country.

The author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free Church

of Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of Apologetic Theology

in the New College, Edinburgh; and, on the death of Dr. Chalmers, in

1847, he was translated to the Chair of Systematic Theology thus made

vacant. In the former position, it became his duty to prepare a complete

course of Lectures on Natural Religion. His work on "Faith in God," &c.,

contains, in an altered form, adapted to general readers, the substance

of those Lectures.

Respecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in the

highest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, in the

_Edinburgh Witness_: "It is one of, at once, the most readable and

solid which we have ever perused;" and the _News of the Churches_, the

organ of the Free Church, describes it as "a work of which nothing less

can be said than that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument,

it fixes irreversibly the name of its author as a leading classic in the

Christian literature of Britain." An American critic says: "His succinct

analysis of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism

are admirable, and his criticisms on their doctrines original and

profound; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith against

philosophical objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer.

Clear, vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly

vanquishes all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never

understating their views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in

all their force and _crushing_ them." Another critic says: "It is a

great argument for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its

strength, order, and beauty.... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious,

and every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the

subject.... The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding it as 'the

most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day,' Dr.

Buchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the task of

exposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza's system is

beautifully clear."

The reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these encomiums.

Hugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has exactly

described the two leading characteristics of "Modern Atheism," by the

phrase "readable and solid." Every one who begins the book will find

himself drawn strongly onward to the end; and no one can rise from its

perusal without a conviction that it contains a weight of argument

against _all_ the forms of Atheism such as never before has been

combined in one book.

Should the reception of this volume by the public furnish sufficient

encouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the

remainder of the work ("Faith in God," &c.), in uniform style.

BOSTON, _December_, 1856.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION, 9

CHAPTER I.

MODERN ATHEISM, 15

CHAPTER II.

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, 45

SECTION I.

THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"THE VESTIGES," 47

SECTION II.

THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"TELLIAMED,"

--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY, 61

SECTION III.

THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,--AUGUSTE COMTE, 84

SECTION IV.

THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT,--J. H. NEWMAN, 116

CHAPTER III.

THEORIES OF PANTHEISM, 129

SECTION I.

THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA, 142

SECTION II.

MATERIAL PANTHEISM, 161

SECTION III.

IDEAL PANTHEISM, 167

CHAPTER IV.

THEORIES OF MATERIALISM, 189

SECTION I.

DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM, 192

SECTION II.

PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM, 207

SECTION III.

RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY, 235

CHAPTER V.

THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS,--VOLNEY,--COMBE, 249

SECTION I.

THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, 252

SECTION II.

THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN ITS RELATION TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 254

SECTION III.

THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, 283

CHAPTER VI.

THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 303

CHAPTER VII.

THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, 323

CHAPTER VIII.

THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM, 333

CHAPTER IX.

THEORY OF SECULARISM, 361

INTRODUCTION.

A Treatise on the Being and Perfections of God, as the Creator and

Governor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to the exigencies of

modern society, unless it be framed with express reference to the

existing forms of unbelief, and the prevailing tendencies both of

philosophical thought and of popular opinion. It is quite possible,

indeed, to construct a scheme of evidence on this subject out of the

ample materials which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering

into any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Metaphysical,

which have been raised respecting it. But this method, although it might

be sufficient for many, perhaps for most, of our readers--for all,

indeed, who come to the study of the subject with reflective but

unsophisticated minds--could scarcely be expected to meet the case or to

satisfy the wants of those who stand most in need of instruction; the

men, and especially the young men, in all educated communities, who,

imbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and instructed,

more or less fully, in the principles of modern science, have been led,

under the influence of certain celebrated names, to adopt opinions which

prevent them from seriously considering any theological question, and to

regard the whole subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as

one that lies beyond the possible range of science,--the only

legitimate domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither

few nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to neutralize

those adverse presumptions or "prejudicate opinions," which prevent them

from considering the evidence to which Theism appeals, and to review the

various theories from which they spring, so as to show that they afford

no valid reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging

that it is not fit _to go to proof_. It is true that we must ultimately

rely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that body of

natural and historical evidence, which depends little, if at all, on any

of the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, or even on any of the

discoveries of Physical Science; but it is equally true that the

evidence, however conclusive in itself, cannot be expected to produce

conviction unless it be candidly examined and weighed; and if there be

anything in the existing state of public opinion which leads men to

regard the whole subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of

it as a problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology

as a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to examine the

grounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so as to counteract

their influence, and to refute those theories which prevent men from

judging of the evidence as they would on any other topic of Inductive

Inquiry. In adopting this course, we are only following the footsteps of

the profound author of the "Analogy," who finding it, he knew not how,

"to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so

much as a subject of inquiry," set himself, in the first instance, to

prove "that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in

it;"--this preliminary proof being designed to neutralize objections,

and to disburden the subject of all adverse presumptions, so as to be

judged on its own proper and independent merits. We are imitating, too,

the example of another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought

that "Apologists had paid too little attention to the _prejudices_ of

their opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing their

object at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct evidence,

forgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the human mind very

nearly inaccessible to both evidence and argument."[1]

If this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is peculiarly so in

the present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and are even avowed by

men of high philosophical repute, which formally exclude Theology from

the domain of human thought, and represent it as utterly inaccessible to

the human faculties. They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth,

but of its very possibility. They place it among the dreams of the

past--with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the

phantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, not only

that Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead or dying, but

that Theology of every kind, even the simplest and purest form of

Theism, must speedily vanish from the earth. Admitting that the

religious element was necessarily developed in the infancy of the

species, and that its influence was alike inevitable and salutary during

the world's minority, when it was placed provisionally "under tutors and

governors," they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which

suited them in earlier times, and that now they must "put away childish

things." That such sentiments have been publicly avowed, that they have

been proclaimed as the scientific results of speculative thought, and

that they have been widely circulated in the vehicles both of

philosophic discussion and of popular literature, will be proved by

evidence, equally sad and conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the

meantime we refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so

far as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless

they be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate such a

prejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether Natural or

Revealed, as may be expected, especially in the case of young,

inexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them from entertaining the

subject at all, or examining, with serious and candid interest, any kind

or amount of evidence that might be adduced in regard to it. For this

reason, we propose to review the various Theories or Systems which may

be said to embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our

opponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their favorite

speculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and this, not for the

purpose of proving our fundamental position, for that must rest on its

proper and independent evidence, but simply with the view of

neutralizing the adverse presumptions which prevent many from

considering its claims, and proving that it is a subject that demands

and deserves their serious and sustained attention.

Taking a comprehensive view of European Science and Literature during

the last half century, we may discern the great currents, or chief

tendencies, of speculative thought, in so far as it bears on the

evidences and doctrines of Religion, in several distinct but closely

related systems of opinion, which, whether considered severally or

collectively, must exert, in proportion to their prevalence, a powerful

influence on the side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally

into _two_ great classes, according as they relate to the _substance_ or

to the _evidence_ of Theism, to the _truths_ which it involves, or the

_proofs_ to which it appeals. The interval between the first and second

French Revolutions may be regarded as the season during which the

theories to which we refer were progressively developed, and ultimately

consolidated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may have

existed before, and traces of them may be detected in the literature of

the ancient world, and even in the writings of mediæval times; nay, it

might not be too much to affirm that in the systems of Oriental

Superstition, and in the Schools of Grecian Skepticism, several of them

were more fully taught in early times than they have yet been in Modern

Europe, and that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them

in a shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been poor

and meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts of

unenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism can rival that of

Sextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, French or German, can be said

to equal the mystic dreams of the Vedanta School? What godless theory of

Natural Law can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in

the poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems have been

revived even amidst the light of the nineteenth century, and prevail to

an extent that may seem to justify the apprehension, frequently

expressed on the Continent of late years, of the restoration of a sort

of Semi-Paganism in Modern Europe; and it is still necessary, therefore,

for the defence of a pure Theism, to reëxamine those ancient forms of

error which have reäppeared on the scene after it might have been

supposed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity with

which they cleave to the human mind, and their perpetual recurrence at

intervals along the whole course of the world's history, show that there

must be something in the wants, or at least in the weaknesses of our

nature, which induces men to tolerate and even to embrace them. But the

chief danger, as we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly

organized, theories that have only recently received their full

development in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute

the peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with the era

of Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by Newton, Leibnitz, and

their successors, have at length issued in the construction of a solid

fabric of Science. To Theism there is no danger in Science, in so far as

it is true, for all truth is self-consistent and harmonious; but there

may be much danger in the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in

which it is applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the

doctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an antagonist,

to Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a plea for Atheism; and

even in the hands of Combe an argument against a special Providence and

the efficacy of prayer. Here the danger is the greater just by reason of

the acknowledged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy;

for its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so

generally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as

incompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society will soon

find itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And this is the fearful

issue to which the more recent schools of speculation are manifestly

tending. The first French Revolution was brought about by the labors of

men who fought against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the

banner of Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was

consummated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Atheistic

philosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has given place to the

school of Comte and Leroux. The difference between the two indicates a

rapid and alarming advance. It may not be apparent at first sight, or on

a superficial survey; but it will become evident to any one who compares

the two French Encyclopædias, which may be regarded as the exponents of

the reigning philosophy of the two great revolutionary eras. The first,

the Encyclopedie of D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign

and extirpate Christianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural

Theology; the second, the "Nouvelle Encyclopedie" of Pierre Leroux and

his coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the

dethronement of God!

FOOTNOTES:

[1] BISHOP BUTLER, "Analogy," Preface, p. II.

DR. INGLIS, "Vindication of the Christian Faith," p. VI.

MODERN ATHEISM.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF ATHEISM.

Before entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to which it

appeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflections on ATHEISM

itself, its generic nature and specific varieties, its causes and

springs, whether permanent or occasional, and its moral and social

influence, as illustrated alike by individual experience and by public

history.

By Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads men either to

_doubt_ or to _deny_ the Existence, Providence, and Government of a

living, personal, and holy God, as the Creator and Lord of the world. In

its practical aspect, it is that state of mind which leads them to

_forget_, _disown_, or _disobey_ Him.

We are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, _Whether

Atheism be a real or even a possible thing?_ a question which was wont

to be discussed by divines under the head, _an dentur Athei?_[2] and

which has recently been revived by the strong protestations of some

philosophic writers, who deny not only the existence, but the very

possibility of Atheism. On this point the policy which infidels have

pursued has been widely different at different times. On some occasions,

they have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as their

own adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual classes, as

well as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in order to impress the

public mind with the conviction that belief in God is neither natural

nor universal; at other times, they have sought to allay the prejudice

which avowed Atheism seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that

had been imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for

the Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations involve a

disbelief in God. In following these opposite courses at different

times, they have been actuated by a politic regard to the exigencies of

their wretched cause, and have alternately adopted the one or the other,

just as it might seem, in existing circumstances, to be more expedient

either to brave or to conciliate public opinion. It is incumbent,

therefore, on every enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise

a prudent discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard

equally against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent,

or of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it difficult to

discover a safe middle path between the opposite extremes: it is only

necessary to define, in the first instance, what we mean when we speak

of Theism or Atheism respectively, and then to ascertain, in the second

place, whether any, and what, parties have avowed principles which

should fairly serve to connect them with the one system or with the

other. A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature

of Atheism is indispensable; for without this, we shall be liable, on

the one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many who are not justly

chargeable with it--a fault which should be most carefully avoided;[3]

and equally liable, on the other hand, to the danger of overlooking the

wide gulf which separates Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from

Atheism. There is much room for the exercise both of Christian candor

and of critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the

characters of men from the opinions which they hold, when these

opinions relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral

topics, more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently

necessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between

systems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those

particular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes been applied

in support of Atheism, but which may, nevertheless, be held by some

_salvâ fide_, and without conscious, still less avowed, Infidelity. And

hence Buddæus and other divines have carefully distinguished between the

radical principles or grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are

often, but not invariably, associated with it.[4]

But it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, to admit a

mere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient disproof of Atheism,

without inquiring what conception is entertained of His nature and

perfections; whether He be conceived of as different from, or identical

with, Nature; as a living, personal, and intelligent Being, distinct

from the universe, or as the mere sum of existing things; as a free

Creator and Moral Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate.

These are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious

detriment to the cause of religion. A few examples will suffice to prove

our assertion. M. Cousin contends that _Atheism is impossible_, and

assigns no other reason for his conviction than this,--that the

existence of God is necessarily implied in every affirmation, and may be

logically deduced from the premises on which that affirmation

depends.[5] His reasoning may possibly be quite conclusive _in point of

logic_, in so far as it is an attempt to show that the existence of God

_ought_ to be deduced from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot

be held conclusive as to _the matter of fact_, that there is no Atheism

in the world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and

acknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible from,

their conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to affirm that

"every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;" nay, he advances

further, and adds that even when the sage "denies the existence of God,

still his words imply the idea of God, and that belief in God remains

unconsciously at the bottom of his heart." Surely the denial or the

doubt of God's existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that

Atheism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate

exercise of speech.

Yet the bold paradox of COUSIN was neither an original discovery nor an

unprecedented delusion. It was taught, in a different form, but with

equal confidence, by several writers belonging to the era of the first

French Revolution. Thus HELVETIUS, in his work on MAN, says expressly:

"There is no man of understanding who does not acknowledge _an active

power in Nature; there is, therefore, no Atheist_. He is not an Atheist

who says that _motion is God_; because, in fact, motion is

incomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, since it does not

manifest itself but by its effects, and because by it all things are

performed in the universe. He is not an Atheist who says, on the

contrary, that _motion is not God_, because motion is not a being, but a

mode of being. They are not Atheists who maintain that motion is

essential to matter, and regard it as the invisible and moving force

that spreads itself through all its parts," "as the universal soul of

matter, and the divinity that alone penetrates its substance. Are the

philosophers of this last opinion Atheists? No; they equally acknowledge

an unknown force in the universe. Are even those who have no ideas of

God Atheists? No; because then all men would be so, because no one has a

clear idea of the Divinity."[6]

A more recent writer, the ABBÉ LAMENNAIS, is equally explicit, and very

much for the same reasons: "The Atheist himself has his own notion of

God, only he transfers it from the Creator to the creation; he ascribes

to finite, relative, and contingent being the properties of the

necessary Being; he confounds the work with the workman. Matter being,

according to him, eternal, is endowed with certain primitive,

unchangeable properties, which, having their own reason in themselves,

are themselves the reasons of all successive phenomena;" and "it matters

little whether he rejects the _name_ of God or not," or "whether he has,

or has not, an explicit knowledge of Him;" he cannot but acknowledge an

eternal First Cause.[7] And so a whole host of Pantheistic Spiritualists

will indignantly disclaim the imputation of Atheism, and even attempt to

vindicate Spinoza himself from the odious charge.[8] Nay, some of the

grossest Materialists, such as Atkinson and Martineau, while they

explicitly deny the existence of a living personal God, will affirm that

Pantheism is not Atheism.[9] Now, unquestionably, if by Theism we mean

nothing more than the recognition of an active power in nature,--such a

power as may or may not be identified with motion, and as may be

designated indifferently as the Divinity, or as the Soul of the

world,--the possibility of Atheism may be effectually excluded; but this

only serves to show the indispensable necessity of a correct definition

of the terms which are employed in this discussion, since it is

perfectly manifest that they are not used in the same sense by the

contending parties, and that consequently the disputants are not arguing

about the same thing. For Pantheism, whatever form it may assume, and

whatever language it may adopt, can be regarded in no other light than

as a system of Atheism, by all who have any definite conception of what

is meant when we either affirm or deny the existence and government of a

living, intelligent, personal God.

As Atheism has appeared in several distinct forms, it is necessary to

consider both its _generic nature_ and its _specific varieties_. It may

be defined, generally, as that state of mind which involves either _the

denial_ or _the doubt_ of the existence and government of God as an

all-perfect Being, distinct from the created universe; or which leads to

the habitual forgetfulness and wilful neglect of His claims as our

Creator, Preserver, and Lord. This state of mind, whether evinced by

words or by actions, contains in it the essence of Atheism, and it is

recognized in Scripture, in each of its two aspects, as an evil alike

natural and prevalent. The words of the Psalmist, "The fool hath said in

his heart, No God,"[10] whether they be interpreted as the expression of

an _opinion_ or of a _wish_, indicate in either case the existence of

that state of mind which has just been described, and which may issue

either in practical or speculative Atheism, according to the temperament

of individual minds, and the influences which are brought to bear upon

them. The same inspired writer has said,[11] that "The wicked through

the pride of his countenance will not seek after God; God is not in all

his thoughts;"--"He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten; He

hideth his face; He will never see it."--"Wherefore doth the wicked

contemn God? he hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it;" And

these words exhibit a graphic delineation, of that state of mind in

which occasional thoughts of God are neutralized by habitual unbelief,

and the warnings of conscience silenced by the denial of a supreme moral

government. In like manner, when the apostle tells the Ephesian converts

that at one time "they were _without God_ in the world,"[12] and the

Galatians, that "when they knew not God, they did service unto them

which by nature are no gods;" when he further speaks of some as "lovers

of pleasures more than lovers of God," as "having a form of godliness,

but denying the power thereof," as "professing that they know God, but

_in works denying Him_;"[13]--in all these statements we see the generic

nature of that ungodliness which cleaves as an inveterate disease to our

fallen nature, and which, whether it appears only in the form of

practical unbelief and habitual forgetfulness, or assumes the more

daring aspect of avowed infidelity, contains in it the essence of

Atheism.

While such is its _generic nature_, we must further discriminate between

its specific varieties; for it does not always wear the same aspect, or

rest on the same grounds. It may be divided, first of all, into

_speculative_ and _practical_ Atheism: the former implying a denial, or

a doubt of the existence and government of God, either openly avowed or

secretly cherished; while the latter is perfectly compatible with a

nominal religious profession, and consists in the habitual forgetfulness

of God and of the duties which arise out of His relation to us as His

creatures and subjects. Speculative Atheism is comparatively rare;

Practical Atheism is widely prevalent, and may be justly regarded as the

grand parent sin, the universal characteristic of fallen humanity.[14]

It is not Atheism in profession, it is Atheism in practice. Those who

are chargeable with it may "profess that they _know_ God, but in works

they _deny_ Him." As distinguished from theoretical or speculative

Atheism, it is fitly termed _ungodliness_. It does not necessarily imply

either the denial or the doubt of the existence or government of God,

but consists mainly in the forgetfulness of His character and claims.

Speculative Atheism always implies habitual ungodliness; but the latter

may exist where the former has never been embraced, and has even been

openly and sincerely disclaimed. Yet such is the _connection_ between

the two, that Speculative Atheism invariably presupposes and perpetuates

practical ungodliness; and that the latter has also a tendency to

produce the former, since the habitual disregard of God in the practical

conduct of life indicates a state of mind in which men are peculiarly

exposed to the seductions of infidelity and prone to yield to them,

especially in seasons of revolutionary excitement or of prevailing

epidemic unbelief. It would be wrong to rank every ungodly man among

professed or even conscious Atheists, for he may never have denied or

even doubted the existence and government of God; yet it were equally

wrong to represent or treat him as a true believer, since he shows that,

practically, "God is not in all his thoughts;" and hence the necessity

of our _first_ distinction between [Transcriber's note: Original had

"beetween"] _theoretical_ or _speculative_, and _practical_ or

_habitual_ Atheism.

Speculative Atheism, again, is either _dogmatic_ or _skeptical_. It is

_dogmatic_, when it amounts to an affirmation, either that there is no

God, or that the question of his existence is necessarily insoluble by

the human faculties. Atheism has been distinguished from Anti-theism;

and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of

God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is

founded on the difference between _unbelief_ and _disbelief_;[15] and

its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between

dogmatic and skeptical Atheism. But Anti-theism is maintained, in the

strictest sense of the term, where it is affirmed either that there is

no God, or that the existence of the Supreme Being _cannot_ in any

circumstances become an object of human knowledge. In each of these

forms, Atheism is dogmatic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies

the possibility of His being known. But there is also a _skeptical_

Atheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is no God,

or that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded by the limitations of

human reason, but contents itself with saying, "_non-liquet_,"--_i.e._,

with denying the sufficiency of the evidence. It answers every appeal to

that evidence by saying that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds

of some, it does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for

this reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. These

two forms of Atheism--the Dogmatic and the Skeptical--are widely different

from each other; they rest on distinct grounds, and they require, therefore,

to be discussed separately, each on its own peculiar and independent merits.

The Dogmatic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed

merely against his skeptical ally; for, strong in his own position and

confident in his ability to maintain it, he is conscious of no

speculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly believes.

The Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the arguments which are

directed against a Dogmatic System such as he utterly disclaims; he is

equally unwilling to affirm either that there is, or that there is not,

a God: he takes refuge in doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny;

his only plea is, the want or the weakness of evidence on either side.

From this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative

Atheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them on its own

merits; and yet, although theoretically they may be easily

distinguished, it will be found that practically they are often

conjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate between the two, and

shift its ground by betaking itself alternately to the one or the

other, according to the exigencies of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic

Atheist with the unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would

require nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God,

and he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he cannot prove

his negative conclusion, but will add that he is not bound to do so, and

that all that can be reasonably required of him is to show that the

evidence adduced on the opposite side is insufficient to establish the

Divine existence, or that the phenomena which supply that evidence may

be as well, or more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail,

in like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth that,

even on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume or to act upon

the assumption, that _there is no God_, since the result of his

reasonings is _doubt_ merely, and such doubt as implies that there _may

be_ a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he will probably defer to it so far

as to admit that this is the only logical result of his system, but will

add that, where there is no conclusive evidence on either side, there

can be no moral obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living

"without God in the world." It will be found, too, that, distinct as

these two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they have

often been made to rest on a common ground, and the self-same arguments

have been adduced in support of both. Thus the doctrine of Materialism,

the theory of Development, and the system of Natural Laws, have all been

applied by the Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence

and government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of Nature

may be accounted for without the supposition of a Supreme Mind; while

the very same doctrines or theories have been also applied by the

Skeptical Atheist to justify, not his _denial_, but his _doubt_, and to

vindicate his verdict of "_non-liquet_" on the evidence adduced. And as

the same arguments are often employed by both parties in support of

their respective views, so they make use, for the most part, of the

same objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it would

be impossible, and even were it possible it would be superfluous, to

attempt a formal refutation of either, without discussing those more

general principles which are applicable to both. For this reason, we

propose to examine in the sequel the various theories which have been

applied in support alike of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to

illustrate the grounds that are common to both, while we consider also

the distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particularly

the grounds of Religious Skepticism.

Besides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism,

we must consider the difference between _the four great leading systems_

which have been applied to account for the existing order of Nature,

without the recognition of a living, intelligent, personal God. There

are many specific varieties of Atheism; but, ultimately, they may be

reduced to _four_ classes. The _first_ system assumes and asserts the

eternal existence of THE COSMOS; that is, of the present order of

Nature, with all its laws and processes, its tribes and races, whether

of vegetable or animal life; and affirms that the world, as now

constituted, never had a beginning, and that it will never have an end.

This has been called the Aristotelian Hypothesis, because Aristotle,

while he spoke of a Supreme Mind or Reason, maintained not only the

eternity of matter, but also the eternity of "substantial forms and

qualities."

The _second_ system affirms, not the eternal existence of THE

COSMOS,--for the commencement of the existing order of Nature is

admitted to be comparatively recent,--but the eternal existence of

Matter and Motion; and attempts to account for the origin of the world

and of the races by which it is peopled, either by ascribing it, with

Epicurus, to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or, with more modern

Speculatists, to a law of progressive development. This has been called

the Epicurean Hypothesis, because Epicurus, while nominally admitting

the existence of God, denied the creation of the world, and ascribed its

origin to atoms supposed to have been endued with motion or certain

inherent properties and powers, and to have been self-existent and

eternal.

The _third_ system affirms the coëxistence and coëternity of God and the

World; and, while it admits a distinction between the two, represents

them as so closely and necessarily conjoined, that God can be regarded

only as the Soul of the World,--superior to matter, as soul is to body,

but neither anterior to it, nor independent of it, and subject, as

matter itself is, to the laws of necessity and fate. This has been

called the Stoical System; since the Stoics, notwithstanding all their

sublime moral speculations and their frequent recognition of God, taught

that God sustains the same relation to the World as the soul of man does

to his body.

The _fourth_ system denies the distinction between God and the World,

and affirms that all is God, and God is all; that there exists only _one

substance_ in the Universe, of which all existing beings are only so

many modes or manifestations; that these beings proceed from that _one_

substance, not by creation, but by emanation; that when they disappear,

they are not destroyed, but reäbsorbed; and that thus, through endless

cycles of change, of reproduction and decay, it is one and the same

eternal being that is continually modified and manifested. This has been

called the Pantheistic Hypothesis, and it is exemplified, on a large

scale, in the speculations of the Brahmins in India, and, in Europe, in

those of Spinoza and his numerous followers.

If this be a correct analysis of Speculative Atheism, in so far as it

assumes a positive or dogmatic shape, we have only to conjoin with it

the peculiar characteristics of that which is merely Skeptical, and we

shall obtain a comprehensive view of the whole subject, which may serve

as a useful guide in the selection and treatment of the topics which

demand our chief attention in the prosecution of this inquiry.

It is necessary, however, in discussing this subject, to bear in mind

that there is a wide difference between Systems of Atheism, such as we

have briefly described, and certain doctrines which have sometimes been

associated with it, or even applied in its support or vindication. These

doctrines may have been connected, historically, with the promulgation

and defence of atheistic views; they may even seem to have a tendency

adverse to the evidence or truths of Christian Theism; but they must not

on that account be summarily characterized as atheistic, nor must those

who have at any time maintained them be forthwith classed among avowed

infidels.[16] The doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, which in the

hands of Jonathan Edwards was applied, whether consistently or

otherwise, in illustration and defence of Christian truth, became in the

hands of Collins and Godwin an associate and ally of anti-Christian

error; the doctrine of the natural Mortality of the Soul, which in the

hands of Dodwell was applied, whether consistently or otherwise, to

vindicate the peculiar privileges of the Christian Covenant, has often

been applied by infidels as a weapon of assault against the fundamental

articles of Natural Religion itself; the doctrine of Materialism, which

in the hands of Priestly was maintained, whether consistently or

otherwise, in connection with an avowed belief in God as the Creator and

Governor of the world, became in the hands of Baron D'Holbach and his

associates the corner-stone of the atheistic "System of Nature;" the

doctrine of "Natural Laws," which in the hands of Bishop Butler is so

powerfully applied in proof of a system of Divine Government, has become

in the hands of Mr. Combe a plausible pretext for denying a special

Providence and the efficacy of prayer; and the mere fact that these

doctrines have been applied to such different and even opposite uses, is

a sufficient proof of itself that they are not in their own nature

essentially atheistic, and that they should be carefully discriminated

from the systems with which they have been occasionally associated. We

are not entitled to identify them with Atheism, in the case of those by

whom Atheism is explicitly disclaimed; and yet there may be such an

apparent connection between the two, and such a tendency in the human

mind to pass from the one to the other, as may afford a sufficient

reason for examining these cognate doctrines, each on its proper merits,

for defining the sense in which they should be severally understood, for

estimating the evidence which may be adduced for or against them

individually, and for showing in what way, and to what extent, they may

have a legitimate bearing on the grounds of our Theistic belief. For

this reason, we shall bring under review, not only several systems of

avowed Atheism, but also various theories, not necessarily atheistic,

which have been applied to the support and defence of Atheism, and which

have a tendency, as thus applied, to induce an irreligious frame of

mind.

The _causes and springs of Atheism_ may easily be distinguished from

_the reasons_ on which it is founded. In the present state of human

nature, there is _a permanent cause_ which is abundantly sufficient to

account for this species of unbelief, notwithstanding all the evidence

which Nature affords of the being, perfections, and providence of God.

Our Lord explained in a single sentence the whole Philosophy of

Unbelief, when he said that "men loved the darkness rather than the

light, because their deeds are evil; for whoso doeth evil hateth the

light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved."

No thoughtful man can seriously reflect on his own conscious experience,

without discovering, in the disordered state of his moral nature, a

reason which sufficiently explains his natural aversion from God; he

finds _there_ an evidence, which he can neither overlook nor deny, of

his own personal turpitude and guilt; he is self-convinced and

self-condemned at the bar of his own conscience; he remembers with

remorse and shame many cases of actual transgression in which he

resisted the dictates of reason, and resigned himself to the dominion of

evil passions; and when, with these convictions and feelings, he is

asked to conceive of God as a living, personal Being, everywhere

present, beholding the evil and the good, whose "eyes are as a flame of

fire," and can discern "the very thoughts and intents of the heart;"

when he conceives of such a Being as his Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge,

as one who demands the homage of the heart and the obedience of the

life, and who has power to enforce His rightful claims by the sanctions

of reward and punishment, he will be sensible, in the first instance, of

an instinctive disposition to recoil from the contemplation of his

character, and a strong desire to deny, or at least to forget, His

claims; and just in proportion as the idea of God becomes more vivid, or

is more frequently presented to his mind, it will become the more

intolerable, insomuch that he will be tempted either to banish the

subject altogether from his thoughts, or, if he cannot succeed in this,

to alter and modify his view of the Divine character so as to bring it

into accordance with his own wishes, and to obtain some relief from the

fears and forebodings which it would otherwise awaken in his mind. If he

should succeed in this attempt, he will fall into one or other of two

opposite states of mind, which, however apparently different, do

nevertheless spring from the same latent source,--a state _of security_,

or a state of _servitude_. In the former, he either forgets God

altogether,--"God is not in all his thoughts;" or he conceives of Him as

"one like unto himself," indulgent to sin, and neither strict to mark

nor just to punish it: in the latter, he either "remembers God and is

troubled," or, if he would allay the remorse and forebodings of an

uneasy conscience, he has recourse to penance and mortification, to

painful sacrifices and ritual observances, in the hope, that by these he

may propitiate an offended Deity. In the one case, the conflict ends in

practical Atheism, in the other, in abject Superstition. And these two,

Atheism and Superstition, however different and even opposite they may

seem to be, are really offshoots from the same corrupt root,--"the evil

heart of unbelief which departeth from the living God." In the case of

the great majority of mankind, who are little addicted to speculative

inquiry, or to serious thought of any kind, it may be safely affirmed

that, in the absence of Revelation, they will inevitably fall into one

or other of these two extremes, or rather, that they will oscillate

alternately between the two,--in seasons of ease and prosperity living

"without God in the world," and in seasons of distress or danger

betaking themselves for relief to the rites of a superstitious worship.

The apostle describes at once the secret cause and the successive steps

of this sad degeneracy, when, speaking of the Gentiles, he says that

"when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were

thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart

was darkened; professing themselves wise, they became fools, and changed

the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to

corruptible man."--"And even as they did not like to retain God in their

knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind."[17] The secret cause

of all these evils was a latent "enmity against God,"--"they did not

_like_ to retain God in their knowledge." From this proceeded, in the

first instance, a _practical habit_ of Atheism,--"they glorified him not

as God, neither were thankful;" and from hence proceeded, in the second

instance, the gross superstition of _Polytheistic belief and

worship_,--"they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an

image made like to corruptible man,"--"they changed the truth of God

into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the

Creator, who is blessed forever."

But, while practical Atheism and blind Superstition are the two extremes

which divide among them the great majority of mankind, there have always

been some more thoughtful and inquiring spirits, who have sought to

penetrate the mysteries of their being, and to account for the present

order of things. They have asked, and have attempted to answer, such

questions as these: What are we? what was our origin? what is our

destination? Whence came this stupendous fabric of Nature? Is it

self-existent and eternal? or did it come into being at some definite

time? If not eternal, how was it produced? by chance or by design? by

inevitable fate or by spontaneous will? Whence the order which pervades

it, and the beauty by which it is adorned? Whence, above all, the evil,

moral and physical, by which it is disfigured and cursed? And, in reply

to these thoughtful questionings, various theories have been invented to

account for the existing order of things, while not a few of the most

daring thinkers have abandoned the subject in despair, and, holding it

to be an insoluble problem, have resigned themselves to the cheerless

gloom of Skepticism. In reviewing all these speculations and theories,

we must bear in mind that their authors and advocates, although more

thoughtful and inquisitive than the great majority of mankind, were

equally subject to the same corrupting influence,--"the evil heart of

unbelief,"--and that the same cause which produced practical Atheism in

some, and abject Superstition in others, may also have operated, but

more insidiously, in producing Speculative Infidelity in the minds of

those who are more addicted to abstruse philosophical inquiries. We must

seek to get down to the root of the evil, if we would suggest or apply

an effectual remedy; we must not deal with the symptoms merely, but

search for and probe the seat of the disease; and if that be the

disordered state of our moral nature, which gives rise to fears and

forebodings as often as we think of God, no remedy will be effectual

which does not remove our distrust, suspicion, and jealousy; and no

argument, however conclusive, will have any practical power which does

not present such views of God as to make him an object of confidence,

and trust, and love. It is of vast importance that this fundamental

truth should be kept steadily in view; for, as the disordered state of

our moral nature is the rudimental source both of practical Atheism and

of popular Superstition, so it is also the prolific parent of

Speculative Infidelity in every variety of form: and as long as the

remedy is not applied to the root of the disease, the Atheist, if forced

to relinquish one theory, will only betake himself to another, and after

having gone the round of them all, will rather throw himself into the

vortex of utter and hopeless skepticism, than acknowledge a God whom he

cannot love, a Judge whom he cannot but dread. Christianity alone can

supply an effectual remedy, and it is such a remedy as is fitted to cure

alike the habitual ungodliness, the abject superstition, and the

speculative infidelity, which have all sprung from the same prolific

source. It exhibits such a view of the character and will of God as may

relieve us from the fears and forebodings of guilt, and, by revealing a

divine method of reconciliation, may place us in a position the most

favorable for a calm and dispassionate consideration of the natural

evidence in favor of His Being, Perfections, and Moral Government.

But, while the grand parent cause of all Atheism--whether practical or

speculative, dogmatic or skeptical--is to be found in the disordered

state of our own moral nature, there are other subordinate causes in

operation, which may be regarded either as _incidental occasions_, or as

_plausible pretexts_, for this form of unbelief. The internal causes are

the primary and most powerful; but there are external influences which

coöperate with these, and serve to stimulate and strengthen them. Among

the incidental occasions of Atheism, we might mention a defective,

because irreligious, education in early life, the influence of ungodly

example and profane converse, and the authority of a few great names in

literature or science which have become associated with the cause of

Infidelity; and among the plausible pretexts for Atheism we might

mention the inconsistencies of professed believers and especially of the

clergy, the divided state of the religious world, as indicated by the

multiplicity of sects, the bitterness of religious controversy, the

supposed opposition of the Church to the progress of science and the

extension of civil and religious liberty, and the gross superstitions

which have been incorporated with Christianity itself in some of the

oldest and most powerful states of Europe. These and similar topics may

be justly said to be the "loci communes of Atheism," and they are often

employed in eloquent declamation or indignant invective, so as to make a

much deeper impression, especially on young and ardent minds, than their

intrinsic weight or real argumentative value can either justify or

explain. Infidel writers have not been slow to avail themselves of these

pretexts for unbelief, in regard alike to Natural and Revealed Religion;

and have artfully identified Religion with Superstition, and

Christianity with Popery, as if there were no consistent or tenable

medium between the two. And, perhaps, of all the incidental occasions or

external inducements to Atheism, none has exerted so much influence over

reflecting minds as the wide-spread prevalence of Superstition; for

never was Atheism more general among the cultivated classes in ancient

times than in the States of Greece, whose hospitable Pantheon enclosed

the gods of all nations, and whose inhabitants were "exceedingly given

to idolatry;" and nowhere, in modern times, has Atheism been more

explicitly avowed or more zealously propagated than in those countries

of Europe which are most thoroughly subjugated to the superstitions of

the Papacy. In the graphic words of Robert Hall, "Infidelity was bred in

the stagnant marshes of corrupted Christianity."[18]

Having described the nature, evinced the reality, and referred to the

permanent and occasional causes of Atheism, we may briefly advert to

_its moral and social influence_. On this point three distinct questions

have been raised: _First_, whether Atheism be conducive to personal

happiness? _Secondly_, whether it be compatible with pure morality and

virtue? and, _thirdly_, whether it be consistent with social well-being,

with the authority of the laws, and the safety or comfort of the

community? In considering these questions, it is necessary to remember

that in no age, and in no region of the world, has Speculative Atheism

been universal, or even so prevalent as to exhibit on a large scale a

full development of its legitimate results. It has always been in a

minority, and has been continually checked, modified and controlled, by

the prevailing beliefs of society; and, whether these beliefs were

purely religious or grossly superstitious, they have exerted a powerful

influence in counteracting the native tendencies of atheistic

speculation. "The effects of Atheism," as Mr. Estlin justly observes,

"we have not yet in any great degree experienced, as the mental habits

of those who hold it in speculation were in general formed, before they

had adopted their present principles, by the imperceptible influence of

that religion which they now traduce."[19] Perhaps the nearest approach

to a state of prevailing Atheism which has ever been exhibited in the

history of the world, is to be found in France at the era of the first

Revolution, when Christianity was publicly abjured, and the goddess of

Reason substituted for the God of the Bible. But that even this fearful

outburst of impiety did not proceed from the universal prevalence of

Speculative Atheism among the great body of the people; that there still

existed in the heart of society some germs of religious feeling, and

certain instinctive or traditionary beliefs which operated as a

restraint and check even during that season of revolutionary frenzy, is

sufficiently evinced by the reaction which speedily occurred in the

public mind, and which restored Catholicism itself, as if by magic, to

its wonted supremacy; while the anti-social tendency of Atheism, in so

far as it did prevail, was strikingly attested by the fact, that the

leading actors in that fearful drama found themselves compelled to

provide for the public safety by restoring at least the forms of

religious worship, and to acknowledge that "if there were no God, it

would be necessary to invent one."--"The true light," says the eloquent

Robert Hall, "in which the French Revolution ought to be contemplated is

that of a grand experiment on human nature." "God permitted the trial to

be made. In one country, and that the centre of Christendom, Revelation

underwent a total eclipse, while Atheism, performing on a darkened

theatre its strange and fearful tragedy, confounded the first elements

of society, blended every age, rank, and sex, in indiscriminate

proscription and massacre, and convulsed all Europe to its centre, that

the imperishable memorial of these events might teach the last

generations of mankind to consider Religion as the pillar of society,

the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has

power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his

rights; to the laborious the reward of their industry, to the rich the

enjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honors,

and to princes the stability of their thrones."[20]

In the case of individuals holding atheistic opinions, but living in the

midst of Christian society, the full influence of these opinions cannot

be felt, nor their effects fully developed, in the presence of those

restraints and checks which are imposed by the religious beliefs and

observances of others. We cannot estimate their influence either on the

personal happiness, or the moral character, or the social welfare of

men, without taking this circumstance into account. To arrive at even a

tolerable approximation to a correct judgment, we must endeavor to

conceive of Atheism as prevailing universally in the community, as

emancipated from all restraint, and free to develop itself without let

or hindrance of any kind, as tolerated by law, and sanctioned by public

opinion, and unopposed by any remaining forms either of domestic piety

or of public worship, as reigning supreme in every heart, and as forming

the creed of every household; and thus conceiving of it as an

inveterate, universal epidemic, we are then to inquire whether, and on

what conditions, society would in such a case be possible, and how far

the prevalence of Atheism might be expected to affect the morals and

welfare of mankind.

The question has been raised whether Atheism might not be more conducive

than religion to _the personal happiness of individuals_; and some, who

have confounded Religion with Superstition, have not hesitated to answer

that question in the affirmative. The conviction that there is no God,

and no moral government, and no state of future retribution, could it

only be steadfastly and invariably maintained, might serve, it has been

thought, to relieve the mind of many forebodings and fears which disturb

its peace, and, if it could not ensure perfect happiness, might act at

least as an opiate or sedative to a restless and uneasy conscience. In

the opinion of Epicurus and Lucretius, tranquillity of mind was the

grand practical benefit of that unbelief which they sought to inculcate

respecting the doctrine of Providence and Immortality. They frequently

affirmed that _fear_ generated superstition, and that superstition, in

its turn, deepened and perpetuated the fear from which it sprung; that

the minds of men must necessarily be overcast with anxiety and gloom as

long as they continued to believe in a moral government and a future

state; and that the only sovereign and effectual antidote to

superstitious terror is the spirit of philosophical unbelief. Similar

views are perpetually repeated in the eloquent but declamatory pages of

"The System of Nature." But the remedy proposed seems to be subject to

grave suspicion, as one that may be utterly powerless, or at the best,

exceedingly precarious; for, first of all, the fears which are supposed

to have generated Religion must have been anterior to it, and must have

arisen from some natural cause, which will continue to operate even

after Religion has been disowned. They spring, in fact, necessarily out

of our present condition as dependent, responsible, and dying creatures;

and they can neither be prevented nor cured by the mere negations of

Atheism; we can only be raised above their depressing influence by a

rational belief and well-grounded trust in the being and character of

God. Again, if the denial of a Providence and of a future state might

serve, were it associated with a full assurance of certainty, to relieve

us from _the fear_ of retribution hereafter, it must equally destroy

_all hope_ of immortality, and reduce us to the dreary prospect of

annihilation at death,--a prospect from which the soul of man

instinctively recoils, and by which his whole life would be embittered

just in proportion as he became more thoughtful and reflective. Unbelief

can operate as a sedative to fear only in so far as it is habitual,

uniform, undisturbed by any inward misgivings or apparent uncertainty;

but, in the case of men not utterly thoughtless or insensible, it is

rarely, if ever, found to possess this character. It is often shaken,

and always liable to be disquieted, by occasional convictions, which no

amount of vigilance can ward off, and no strength of resolution repress.

It is maintained only by a painful and sustained conflict, which is but

ill-concealed by the vehemence of its protestations, and often

significantly indicated by the very extravagance of its zeal. Add to

this, that Atheism itself affords no guarantee against future suffering.

It may deny a Providence here and a judgment hereafter, it may even deny

a future state of conscious existence, and take refuge in the hope of

annihilation that it may escape from the dread prospect of retribution;

but it cannot affirm the _impossibility_, it can only doubt the

_certainty_ of these things; and in their bare possibility there is

enough at once to impose an obligation to serious inquiry, and to

occasion the deepest anxiety, especially in seasons of affliction or

danger, which awaken reflective thought. "_Atheism_," said the acute but

skeptical Bayle, "_does not shelter us from the fear of eternal

suffering_." But, even if it did, what influence would it exert on our

present happiness? Would it not limit our enjoyments, by confining our

views within the narrow range of things seen and temporal? Would it not

deprive us of the loftiest hopes? Would it not repress our highest

aspirations, by interdicting the contemplation of the noblest Object of

thought, the Ideal Standard of truth and excellence, the Moral Glory of

the Universe? Would it not diminish the pleasure which we derive even

from earthly objects, and aggravate the bitterness of every trial? How

wretched must be the condition of those who are "proud of being the

offspring of chance, in love with universal disorder, whose happiness is

involved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, and

who are at ease only because they suppose themselves _inhabitants of a

forsaken and fatherless world_!"[21] "No one in creation," said Jean

Paul, "is so alone as the denier of God: he mourns, with an orphaned

heart that has lost its great Father, by the corpse of Nature which no

World-Spirit moves and holds together, and which grows in its grave; and

he mourns by that corpse till he himself crumble off from it. The whole

world lies before him, like the Egyptian Sphynx of stone, half-buried in

the sand; and the All is the cold iron mask of a formless Eternity."[22]

But the malign influence of Atheism on personal happiness will become

more apparent, if we consider its tendency to affect the _moral springs

of action_, on which happiness mainly depends. The question whether

Atheism be compatible with moral virtue, or whether an Atheist may be a

virtuous man, is one of those that can only be answered by

discriminating aright between the different senses of the same term. In

the Christian sense of virtue, which comprehends the duties of both

tables of the Law, and includes the love of God as well as of man, it is

clear that the Atheist cannot be reputed virtuous, since he wants that

which is declared to be the radical principle of obedience, the very

spirit and substance of true morality. But, in the worldly sense of the

term, as denoting the decent observance of _relative_ duty, it is

possible that he may be so far influenced by considerations of prudence

or policy, or even by certain natural instincts and affections, as to be

just in his dealings, faithful to his word, courteous in his manners,

and obedient to the laws. But this secular, prudential morality, is as

precarious in its practical influence as it is defective in its radical

principle. Atheism saps and undermines the very foundation of Ethics.

The only law which it can recognize (if that can be called a law in any

sense which is not conceived of as the expression of a Supreme Will) is,

either the greatest happiness of the individual, or the greatest

happiness of the greatest number; but, whether it assumes the form of

_Felicitarian_ or of _Utilitarian_ calculation, it degenerates into a

process of arithmetic, and is no longer a code of morals. The

fundamental idea of DUTY is awanting, and can only be supplied from a

source which the Atheist ignores. By denying the existence of God, he

robs the universe of its highest glory, obliterates the idea of perfect

wisdom and goodness, and leaves nothing better and holier as an object

of thought than the qualities and relations of earthly things. He

degrades human nature, by doing what he can to sever the tie which binds

man to his Maker, and which connects the earth with Heaven. He

circumscribes his prospects within the narrow range of "things seen and

temporal," and thus removes every stimulus to dignity of sentiment, and

every incentive to elevation of character. His wretched creed (if a

series of cold negations may be called a creed) must be fatal to every

disinterested and heroic virtue; let it prevail, and the spirit of

self-sacrifice will give place to Epicurean indulgence, and the age of

martyrdom will return no more. Substitute Nature, or even Humanity, for

God, and the eternal standard of truth and holiness and goodness being

superseded, every moral sentiment will be blighted and obscured.

Conscience has a relation to God similar to that which a chronometer

bears to the sun. Blot the sun from the sky, and the chronometer is

useless; deny God, and conscience is powerless. And the vices which, if

not subdued, were yet curbed and restrained by the overawing sense of an

unseen omnipresent Power, will burst forth with devastating fury,

snapping asunder the feebler fetters of human law, and overleaping the

barriers of selfish prudence itself; vanity and pride, ambition and

covetousness, sensual indulgence and ferocious cruelty, will rise into

the ascendancy, and establish their dark throne on the ruins of

Religion.

If such be the natural and legitimate effect of Atheism on the personal

happiness and moral character of individuals, we can be at no loss to

discover what must be its influence on society at large. For society is

composed of individuals, and its character and welfare depend on the

aggregate sentiments of its constituent members. The question whether

Atheism might not be consistent with social well-being, with the

continued authority of the laws, and the general comfort of the

community, is answered historically by the fact, that in modern France

the Reign of Atheism was the Reign of Terror, and that in ancient Rome

its prevalence was followed by such scenes of proscription,

confiscation, and blood, as were then unparalleled in the history of the

world. The truth is that, wherever Atheism prevails, GOVERNMENT BY LAW

must give place to GOVERNMENT BY FORCE; for law needs some auxiliary

sanction; and if it be deprived of the sanction of Religion, it must

have recourse, for its own preservation, and the prevention of utter

anarchy, to the brute power of the temporal sword. It is worse than

useless to discuss, in this connection, the question, revived by

Bayle,[23] whether Atheism or Superstition should be regarded as the

worst enemy to the Commonwealth, for it has no relevancy to our present

inquiry; we are not contending for either, we are objecting to both; and

we are under no necessity of choosing the least of two evils, when we

have the option of "pure and undefined Religion." But we may observe, in

passing, that, historically it has been found possible to keep society

together, and to maintain the authority of law with a greater or less

measure of civil liberty, where Superstition has been generally

prevalent; whereas there is no instance on record of anything

approaching to national Atheism, in which government by law was not

speedily superseded by anarchy and despotism. And the reason of this

difference may be that in every system of Superstition, whether it be a

corruption of Natural or of Revealed Religion, "some faint embers of

sacred truth remain unextinguished," some convictions which still

connect man with the spiritual and the eternal, and which are

sufficient, if not to enlighten and pacify the conscience, yet to keep

alive a sense of responsibility and a fear of retribution; "certain

sparks," as Hooker calls them, "of the light of truth intermingled with

the darkness of error," which may have served a good purpose in

maintaining civil virtue and social order, although these would have

been far better secured by the prevalence of a purer faith.

There are some circumstances, of a novel and unprecedented nature, which

impart a solemn interest to our present inquiry. At the beginning of the

present century, Robert Hall, referring to the unbelief which preceded

and accompanied the first outburst of the Revolution in France,

mentioned _three_ circumstances which appeared to him to be "equally new

and alarming." He regarded it as the first attempt which had ever been

witnessed on an extensive scale to establish the principles of Atheism,

as the first attempt to popularize these principles by means of a

literature addressed and adapted to the common people, and as the first

systematic attempt to undermine the foundations, and to innovate on the

very substance of Morals.[24] But if we compare the first with the new

Encyclopedie,--the former concocted by Voltaire, D'Alembert and Diderot,

the latter by Pierre Leroux and his associates,--we shall find that

Infidelity has assumed greater hardihood, and has appeared under less

restraint in recent than in former times; while the speculations of

Comte and Crousse are as thoroughly atheistic as those of D'Holbach

himself. For, however irreligious and profane Voltaire and his

associates might be, and however devoted to their avowed object of

crushing Christ and his cause, so significantly indicated by their motto

and watchword, "Ecrasez l'Infame;"[25] yet they continued, as a party,

to advocate Deism, and seemed at least to oppose the bolder speculations

of the author of the "Systeme de la Nature." Both Voltaire and

Frederick the Great wrote in reply to its atheistic tenets.[26] But now,

in France, these tenets are openly avowed and zealously propagated. Nor

is this fatal moral epidemic confined to our continental neighbors:

there is too much reason to fear that it has infected, to some extent,

the artisans of our own manufacturing towns, and even, in some quarters,

the inhabitants of our rural districts. The Communists of France have

their analogues in the Socialists of Britain; and the periodical press,

although for the most part sound, or at least innocuous, has lent its

aid to the dissemination of the grossest infidelity which the Continent

has produced. The "Leader" gives forth Lewes's version of Comte's

Philosophy; and the "Glasgow Mechanics' Journal," a digest of his Law of

Human Progress, which is essentially atheistic.[27] Nor is indigenous

Atheism wanting. Mr. Mackay in his "Progress of the Intellect," Atkinson

and Martineau in their "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and

Development," and Mr. G. Holyoake in "The Reasoner," have sufficiently

proved that if Atheism be an exotic, it is capable of taking root and

growing up in the land of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] BUDDÆI, "Theses Theologicæ de Atheismo et Superstitione," cap. I.

[3] J. C. WOLFIUS, "De Atheismi falso Suspectis."

[4] BUDDÆI, "Theses Theologicæ," cap. III., "De dogmatibus quæ cum

Atheismo conjuncta sunt, aut ad eum ducunt," p. 240.

[5] COUSIN, "Introduction Generale a l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I.

169:--"Que toute pensée implique une foi spontanée à Dieu, et qu'il n'y

a pas d'Atheisme naturel. Croit-il qu'il existe, par exemple? S'il croit

çela, çela me suffit,"--"il a donc foi au principe de la pensée;--or la

est Dieu,"--"Selon moi, toute parole prononcée avec confiance, n'est pas

moins qu'une profession de la foi a la pensée,--a la raison en

soi,--c'est a dire a Dieu."

[6] M. HELVETIUS, "Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and

Education: translated by W. Hooper, M. D.," I. 247.

[7] M. LAMENNAIS, "Esquisse d'une Philosophie," I. 95.

[8] "Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man."--NOVALIS, quoted in T. Carlyle's

Essays, II. 43.

[9] "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, by H. G.

ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU," p. 241.

[10] Psalm 14: 1; 53: 1.

[11] Psalm 10: 4, 11, 13.

[12] Eph. 2: 12, [Greek: Atheoi en tô kosmô].

[13] Gal. 4: 8; 2 Tim. 3: 4; Titus 1: 16.

[14] ESTLIN, "Discourse on Atheism," pp. 8, 19, 28. DR. CHALMERS,

"Institutes," I. 375.

[15] DR. CHALMERS, Works, "Natural Theology," I. 58. "The Reasoner,"

edited by HOLYOAKE, XI. 15, 232.

[16] ROBERT HALL'S Works, I. 58.

[17] Romans 1: 21, 28.

[18] HALL'S "Works," I. 128.

[19] ESTLIN'S "Discourse," p. 57.

[20] ROBERT HALL, "Modern Infidelity Considered," I. 38, 67.

[21] ROBERT HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 70.

[22] T. CARLYLE, "Essays," II. 142.

[23] P. BAYLE, "Pensées diverses Ecrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne a

l'Occasion de la _Comète_," 4 vols. Also his "Reponse aux Questions d'un

Provincial," II. 688, IV. 101, 112.

[24] HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 59, 64.

[25] ABBÉ [TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: ORIGINAL HAD "ABBE"] BARRUEL, "Memoires

pour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme," I. 31, 131, 135, 184, 357.

[26] ABBÉ BARRUEL, "Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme,"

I. 22, II. 190, 193.

[27] "The Leader;" a series of articles on Comte's Philosophy, by G. H.

LEWES, April 7, 10, 17, etc., etc., 1852.--"The Glasgow Mechanics'

Journal."

CHAPTER II.

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT.

There have been various applications of the general principle of

Development, by means of which an attempt has been made to explain the

origin of all things by Natural Laws, so as to exclude the necessity of

any Divine interposition, either for the creation of the world, or for

the introduction and establishment of Christianity itself. It has been

applied, first, to explain the origin of worlds and planetary systems,

by showing that, certain specified conditions being presupposed, there

are fixed mechanical laws which might sufficiently account for the

production of the earth and of the other planets and satellites of our

Solar System, without any special interposition of Divine power at the

commencement of the existing order of things. It has been applied,

secondly, to explain the origin of the various tribes or races of

vegetable and animal life, and especially the production of the human

race, by showing that the existing types may have sprung, by a process

of gradual development, from inferior races previously existing, and

that these again may have been produced by the action of chemical agents

in certain favorable conditions. It has been applied, thirdly, to

explain all the most important phenomena of Human History, and to

illustrate the law which is supposed to determine and regulate the

progressive course of civilization, so as to account, on natural

principles, for the origin and prevalence of the various forms of

Religion, and even for the introduction, in its appointed season, of

Christianity itself, without having recourse to anything so utterly

unphilosophical as the idea of a Divine Revelation, or the supposition

of supernatural agency. And it has been applied, fourthly, to explain

the order, and to vindicate the use, of those additions both to the

doctrines and rites of primitive Christianity, which Protestants have

denounced as _corruptions_, but which Popish and Tractarian writers

defend as _developments_, of the system that was originally deposited,

like a prolific germ or seed, in the bosom of the Catholic Church.

It is the more necessary to examine the various forms of this theory,

because unquestionably it can appeal to not a few _natural analogies_,

which may serve, on a superficial view, to give it the aspect of

verisimilitude. For many of the most signal works of God have been

manifestly framed on the principle of gradual growth, and matured by a

process of progressive development. We see in the natural world a small

seed deposited in the earth, which, under the agency of certain suitable

influences, germinates and springs up, producing first a tender shoot,

then a stem, and branches, and leaves, and blossoms, and fruit; and

every herb or tree, "having seed in itself," makes provision for the

repetition of the same process, and the perpetuation and indefinite

increase of its kind. The same law is observed in the animal kingdom,

where a continuous race is produced from a single pair. And even in the

supernatural scheme of Revelation itself, the truth was gradually

unfolded in a series of successive dispensations; the First Promise

being the germ, which expanded as the Church advanced, until it reached

its full development in the Scriptures of the New Testament. These and

similar instances may suffice to show that, both in the natural and

supernatural Providence of God, He has been pleased to act on the

principle of _gradual and progressive_, as contradistinguished from that

of _instant and perfect_ production; and they may seem, at first sight,

to afford some natural analogies in favor of the radical idea on which

the various modern Theories _of_ Development are based. In such

circumstances it would be an unwise and dangerous course either to

overlook the palpable facts which Nature and Revelation equally attest,

or to deny that they may afford signal manifestations of the manifold

wisdom of God. Nor is it necessary for any enlightened advocate of

Theism to betake himself to these expedients; he may freely admit the

existence of _such_ cases of gradual development, he may even appeal to

them as illustrative of the order of Nature, and the design which that

order displays; and the only question which he is at all concerned to

discuss amounts in substance to this: Whether the method of production

which is pursued in the _ordinary course_ of Nature can account for the

_original commencement_ of the present system of things?

But the state of the question, and the right application of the

argument, may be best illustrated by considering each of the _four_

forms of the theory separately and in succession.

SECTION I.

THEORY OF _COSMICAL_ DEVELOPMENT, OR OF THE PRODUCTION OF WORLDS AND

PLANETARY SYSTEMS BY NATURAL LAW.--"THE VESTIGES."

The doctrine of a Nebular Cosmogony was first suggested by some

observations of the elder Herschell on those cloud-like appearances

which may be discerned in various parts of the heavens by the aid of the

telescope, or even, in some cases, by the naked eye. It assumed a more

definite form in the hands of La Place, although even by him it was

offered, not as an ascertained discovery of science, but simply as a

hypothetical explanation of the way in which the production of the

planets and their satellites _might_ possibly be accounted for _by_ the

operation of the known laws of Nature.

The explanation of the whole theory may be best understood by dividing

it into two parts: the _first_ being that which attempts to account for

the formation of planets and satellites, _on the assumption of the

existence of a central sun_, and _of certain other specified

conditions_; the _second_ being that which undertakes to account for the

formation of the sun itself, on the assumption of the existence of _a

diffused nebulous matter_ in space, or, as it has been aptly called, "a

universal Fire-Mist."[28]

When the theory is limited to the explanation of the origin of the

planets and their satellites, the original condition of our solar system

is assumed to have been widely different from what it now is; the sun is

supposed to have existed for a time alone, to have revolved upon his

axis, and to have been surrounded with an atmosphere expanded by intense

heat, and extending far beyond the limits of our system as it now

exists. This solar atmosphere revolved, like the sun itself, around its

axis; but its heat, constantly radiated into sidereal space, gradually

diminished, and the atmosphere being contracted in proportion as it

cooled, the rapidity of its rotation was accelerated, until it reached

the point at which the central attraction was overcome by the

centrifugal force, and then a zone of vapor would be detached or thrown

off, which might either retain its form as a nebulous ring, like the

ring of Saturn, or first breaking into fragments, from some want of

continuity in its structure, and afterwards coalescing into one mass,

might be condensed into a planet as the vapor continued to cool. These

rings or planets, thus detached from the central atmospheric mass, would

continue to revolve, in virtue of the force originally impressed upon

them, and their motion would be nearly circular, in the same plane and

in the same direction with that of the sun. The first planet, so

formed, must have been that at the extreme limit of our solar system;

the second the next in point of remoteness from the centre, and so on;

each resulting from the operation of the same natural laws, and emerging

into distinct existence at that precise point in the gradual cooling and

contraction of the atmosphere at which the centrifugal became stronger

than the centripetal force. But each planet might also be subjected to

the same process of cooling and contracting, and might therefore throw

off, under the operation of the same mechanical laws, zones of vapor

more or less dense, which might consolidate into moons or satellites,

and which should also revolve, like the planets, round their primary.

Thus, Uranus has six satellites, and Saturn seven; while the latter has

also thrown off two zones so perfectly uniform in their internal

structure that they remain unbroken, and constitute a double ring around

the planet.

In this _first_ form of the theory, which assumes the existence of the

sun and its atmosphere, and the rotation of both round an axis, La Place

sought to give a scientific form to the speculations of Sir William

Herschell on the condensation of Nebulæ, by proving simply the

_dynamical possibility_ of the formation of a planetary system by such

means, according to the known laws of matter and motion; but he did not

affirm the scientific certainty of his conjecture, and far less the

actual production of the solar system in this way. He has been followed

by M. Comte, who has attempted to furnish, if not a complete

demonstration, at least a plausible mathematical verification, of the

hypothesis.[29] Utterly excluding all supernatural agency in the work of

creation, he equally excludes from the problem which he attempts to

solve, the origin of the sun and its atmosphere; and confining himself

to the task of accounting, in the way not of demonstrative certainty,

but merely of plausible hypothesis, for the formation of the planets and

satellites of our solar system, he conceives the theory of La Place to

be susceptible of such a numerical verification as is sufficient to give

it a high degree of verisimilitude. Assuming that the periodic time of

each planet must be equal to that of the portion of the solar atmosphere

of which it was formed at the era when it was thrown off, and combining

the theorems of Huygens on the measure of centrifugal forces with

Newton's law of gravitation, he establishes a simple equation between

the time of the rotation of each zone or section of the solar

atmosphere, and the distance of the corresponding planets. On applying

this equation to the various bodies of our system, he found that the

periodic time of the moon agrees, at least within the tenth of a day,

with the duration of the earth's revolution, when her atmosphere is

supposed to have extended to the moon; and that the periodic times of

the planets maintain a similar correspondence with what must have been

the duration of the solar revolution when they were severally thrown off

from its atmosphere. It is the less necessary, however, to enter on a

detailed exposition of his argument, because he admits that it can

afford at the utmost only a probable proof of an hypothesis; and

further, because it is expressly limited to the production of the

planets and their satellites, while not only is the existence of the

solar atmosphere presupposed, but also its existence in _a certain

state_, and with _several determinate conditions_; while no account

whatever is given of the origin either of the sun or its atmosphere, and

none of the laws or conditions on which the whole process of development

is confessedly dependent.

But the author of "The Vestiges" takes a much wider range, and attempts

a more arduous task. He seeks to account for the origin both of suns and

of solar systems by the agency of natural laws. Not content with the

more limited form of the theory, which M. Comte holds to be the only

legitimate or practical object of scientific treatment, he holds that

the origin of the sun itself, and the _forms_, the _positions_, the

_relations_, and the _motions_, of all the heavenly bodies, may be

accounted for by supposing a previous state of matter, fluid or

gasiform, subject only to the law of gravitation. The Nebular Cosmogony,

which is well characterized by himself as his "version of _the romance

of Nature_," is based on the assumption that "the nebulous matter of

space, previously to the formation of stellar and planetary bodies, must

have been a universal FIRE-MIST,"[30] in other words, a diffused

luminous vapor, intensely hot, which might be gradually condensed into a

fluid, and then into a solid state, by losing less or more of its heat.

The existence of such a luminous matter being assumed, and it being

further supposed that it was not entirely uniform or homogeneous, but

that it existed in various states of condensation, and that it had

"certain nuclei established in it which might become centres of

aggregation for the neighboring diffused matter,"--the author attempts

to show that on such centres a rotatory motion would be established

wherever, as was the most likely case, there was any obliquity in the

lines of direction in which the opposing currents met each other; that

this motion would increase as the agglomeration proceeded; that at

certain intervals the centrifugal force, acting on the remoter part of

the rotating mass, would overcome the agglomerating force; and that a

series of rings would thus be left apart, each possessing the motion

proper to itself at the crisis of separation. These, again, would only

continue in their annular form, if they were entirely uniform in their

internal structure. There being many chances against this, they would

probably break up in the first instance, and be thereafter "agglomerated

into one or several masses, which would become representatives of the

primary mass, and perhaps give rise to a progeny of inferior masses." In

support of this theory, reference is made to the existence, at the

present moment, of certain cloud-like nebulæ, or masses of diffused

luminous matter, exhibiting a variety of appearances, as if they were in

various degrees of condensation, and which are described as "solar

systems in the process of being formed" out of a previous condition of

matter. And the observations of M. Plateau, of Ghent, are adduced as

affording an experimental verification of some parts of the theory, and,

especially, as serving to explain the spherical form of the planets, the

flattening at the poles, and the swelling out at the equator.

It does not belong to our proper province, nor is it necessary for our

present purpose, to discuss the merits of this theory, considered as a

question of science. This has been already done, with various degrees of

ability, but with unwonted unanimity, by some of the ablest men of the

age,--by Whewell, Sedgwick and Mason, in England, by Sir David Brewster

and Mr. Miller, in Scotland, and by Professor Dod and President

Hitchcock, in America.[31] But, viewing it simply in its relation to the

Theistic argument, we conceive that the adverse presumption which it may

possibly generate in some minds against the evidence of Natural

Theology, will be effectually neutralized by establishing the following

positions:

That it is _a mere hypothesis_, and one which, from the very nature of

the case, is incapable of being proved by such evidence as is necessary

to establish _a matter of fact_.

That the progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to

verify and confirm, has served rather to disprove and invalidate the

fundamental assumption on which it rests.

That even were it admitted, either as a possible, or probable, or

certain explanation of the origin of the present planetary systems, it

would not necessarily destroy the evidence of Theology, nor establish on

its ruins the cause of Atheism.

Each of these positions may be conclusively established, and the three

combined constitute a complete answer to the theory of Development, in

so far as it has been applied in the support or defence of Atheism.

1. That it is a mere hypothesis or conjecture, designed, not to

establish the _historical fact_, but to explain merely the _dynamical

possibility_ of the production of the planetary bodies by the operation

of known natural laws, must be admitted, I think, even by its most

enthusiastic admirers. It might have seemed, indeed, to have something

like a basis of fact to rest upon, had the conception of the elder

Herschell been verified, when he announced the existence of a nebulous

fluid, capable of being distinguished, by certain well-defined marks,

from unresolved clusters of stars; but even then it presupposed so many

postulates, which could in no way be established by experimental or

historical evidence, that it could scarcely be regarded in any other

light than as an ingenious speculation or a splendid conjecture. For,

let it be considered, first of all, that the theory proceeds on the

assumption of the existence and wide diffusion of a nebulous fluid of

whose reality there is no actual proof; secondly, that it necessarily

requires, also, the supposed existence of certain favorable conditions;

and, thirdly, the operation of certain invariable laws; and it will be

manifest at once that it is purely hypothetical throughout, and that it

includes a variety of topics which never have been, and never can be

made the subjects of experimental verification. For it postulates, in

the words of an acute writer, "the establishment of nuclei in the body

of the elemental mass, as well as the action of heat on its substance,

and then seeks to explain the concentration of the nebulous particles

into these nuclei by the force of gravitation, the rotation of the

bodies so produced by the confluence of the nebulous fluid, the

separation of a portion of the outer surface of these revolving masses

in the form of rings, the disruption of these rings, and the subsequent

recomposition of their fragments into separate spheres, answering to the

planets and satellites of our system."[32] But even were the existence

of a nebulous fluid admitted, we have no access to know what was its

internal structure; we cannot determine whether it was uniform and

homogeneous throughout, or whether it contained nuclei which might

become centres of aggregation; we have no means of estimating the

intensity of the heat which belonged to it, or of calculating the

process by which it was dispersed, so as to occasion the condensation of

successive portions of the mass. No eye ever saw the separation of any

part of it in the form of a ring, or the disruption of that ring, or the

subsequent recomposition of its fragments into a solid sphere. And even

had all this been matter, not of mere conjecture, but of actual

observation, it would still have left much to be explained which can

only be accounted for by ascribing it to a designing Intelligent Cause.

2. The progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to verify,

has served rather to invalidate the fundamental assumption on which the

whole theory depends. That assumption was the existence of a Nebulous

Fluid or Fire-Mist, capable of being distinguished, by certain

characteristic marks, from unresolved nebulæ or clusters of stars. The

existence of any such fluid has become more and more doubtful, in

proportion as astronomers have been enabled, with the aid of larger and

better constructed telescopes, to resolve several nebulæ which had

previously defied the power of less perfect instruments. We do not

affirm that every cluster has been already resolved, nor is it necessary

for the purposes of our argument to suppose that, at any future time,

this stupendous achievement is likely to be effected; for it is a very

obvious consideration, that just in proportion as our telescopic powers

are enlarged so as to enable us to resolve many of the nearer nebulæ,

they must also bring within the range of our extended vision _others_

more remote and hitherto unperceived, which may continue to exhibit the

same cloud-like appearance as the former, until, by a new improvement of

the telescope, we may succeed in separating them into distinct stars;

and even then the march of discovery is not ended,--we may reasonably

expect that with every fresh increase of telescopic vision, new clusters

will be brought into view, and new clouds appear in the utmost verge of

the horizon. But, unquestionably, the progress which has already been

made in this direction affords a strong presumption in favor of the

idea, that the apparent nebulosity of those masses which still appear,

even to our best telescopes, as cloud-like vapors, is to be ascribed

rather to the imperfection of our instruments than to any difference

between them and such as have been already resolved. Sir John Herschell,

a high authority in such a case, tells us that "we have every reason to

believe, at least in the generality of cases, that a nebula is nothing

more than a cluster of stars."[33] Sir David Brewster is equally

explicit: "It was certainly a rash generalization to maintain that

nebulæ differed essentially from clusters of stars, because existing

telescopes could not resolve them. The very first application of Lord

Rosse's telescopes to the heavens overturned the hypothesis; and with

such unequivocal facts as that instrument has brought to light, we

regard it as a most unwarrantable assumption to suppose that there are

in the heavenly spaces any masses of matter different from solid bodies,

composing planetary systems."[34] And Professor Nichol, while he

gracefully acknowledges that he has "somewhat altered the views which he

formerly gave to the public, as the highest then known and generally

entertained, regarding the structure of the heavens," states, as the

result of more mature reflection, that "the supposed distribution of a

self-luminous fluid, in separate patches, through the heavens, has,

beyond all doubt, been proved fallacious by that most remarkable of

telescopic achievements,--the resolution of the great nebula in Orion

into a superb cluster of stars; and that this discovery necessitates

important changes in previous speculations on Cosmogony."[35]

In short, Lord Rosse's observations at Parsonstown have conclusively

proved that what appeared to be a nebula was in reality a cluster of

stars; and while they still leave many nebulæ unresolved, they afford a

strong warrant for believing that discoveries in the same direction

might be indefinitely extended in proportion to the increase of

telescopic power.

3. But even were the Nebular Hypothesis admitted, and were the Theory of

Development by Natural Laws conceived to afford a satisfactory

explanation of the origin of the planetary systems, it would not follow,

as a necessary consequence, that the peculiar evidence of Theism--that

on which it mainly depends, and to which it makes its most confident

appeal--would be thereby destroyed, or even diminished. The only

legitimate result of such a doctrine would seem to be, that we must

distinguish aright between a work of _Mediate_, and a work of

_Immediate_ Creation. In the Bible each of these is distinctly

recognized. We have a specimen of the one in the creation of the first

man by the direct agency of Divine power; we have a specimen of the

other in the creation, less direct but equally real, of all his natural

posterity, through the medium of ordinary generation. Men do not cease

to be the _creatures_ of God because they are born of their parents, in

virtue of that creative word, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish

the earth;" and hence children are admonished "to remember _their

Creator_ in the days of their youth."[36] The work of creation is

equally real and equally Divine, whether it be effected _mediately_ or

_immediately_, with or without the intervention of means, by the direct

and instantaneous exertion of Almighty power, or by the gradual and

successive operation of second causes acting according to established

laws. In the ordinary course of Providence, the method of mediate

production, gradual growth, and progressive development, may be observed

in innumerable instances; but it can never be justly held to exclude, or

even to obscure, the evidence of a presiding Intelligence and a

supernatural Power. On the contrary, it may serve rather to enhance that

evidence; since the very arrangements and provisions which have been

made with a view to the reproduction of every thing after its kind, may

bear on them the legible impress of a designing Mind and an ordaining

Will. Thus, year by year continually, the whole inhabitants of the world

are supported by the fruits of harvest, which are produced and matured

under the action of natural laws; yet every intelligent Theist ascribes

the result ultimately to the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and

sees in the very processes by which it is brought to pass some of the

most signal proofs of these Divine perfections.

Now, as this method is followed in the work of Providence, which may be,

and often has been, described as a _continuous creation,_ and yet has no

tendency to destroy, or even to diminish, the evidence of a presiding

Intelligence in Nature, so no good reason can be assigned why it _might_

not also have been adopted in the production of planets and astral

systems, if so it had seemed good to Supreme Wisdom. If this method was

adopted for the propagation of plants and animals, no reason can be

given why it might not also have been adopted for the production of

planets and moons; nor would it in the latter case, any more than in the

former, impair the evidence of God's creative wisdom and power. For,

suppose it be possible that, by a marvellous process of self-evolution,

the material elements of Nature might assume new forms, so as to

originate a succession of new worlds and new planetary systems, without

the _immediate_ or _direct_ interposition of a Supernatural Will;

suppose that the earth and the other bodies now belonging to our own

system, were generated out of a prior condition of matter, existing in a

gasiform state and diffused through space as a Fire-Mist, subject to the

ordinary action of heat and gravitation; suppose, in short, that there

were LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF WORLDS in the larger cycles of time,

just as there ARE LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS in the short ages

of terrestrial life;--would a provision for such a succession of

marvellous developments necessarily destroy, or even impair, the

evidence for the being and perfections of God? Does the generation of

the animated tribes diminish the evidence of design in the actual

constitution of the world? And why should a similar provision, if any

such were found to exist, for the generation of stars and systems, be

regarded in any other light than as an exhibition, on a still larger

scale, of "the manifold wisdom of God?"

Let it ever be remembered that the Theistic argument depends, not on

_the mode of production_, but on _the character of the resulting

product_. The world may have been produced mediately or immediately,

with or without the operation of natural laws; but if it exhibit such an

arrangement of parts, such an adaptation of means to ends, or such a

combination of collocations and adjustments, as enables us at once to

discern the distinctive marks of intelligent design, the evidence cannot

be diminished, it may even be possibly enhanced, by the method of

production. Provision is made, doubtless, for the growth and development

of the eye, the ear, and the hand, in the human foetus, and the

process by which they are gradually formed is regulated by natural laws.

But the resulting products are so exquisitely constructed, so admirably

adapted to the elements of nature, and so evidently designed for the

uses of life, that they irresistibly suggest the idea of wise and

benevolent contrivances; and this idea is as strong and clear as it

could have been had they been produced instantaneously by the _direct_

act of creative power. And so of the planets and astral systems: they

may have been generated, that is, produced, in a way of natural

development; yet the resulting products are such as to evince the

supreme wisdom and beneficence which presided over their formation. But

even this is not all. Let us suppose, further, that Philosophy may yet

reach its extreme, and, as we humbly conceive, unattainable limit; let

us suppose that it may succeed in decomposing all the chemical elements

now known, by resolving them into ONE primary basis; let us even suppose

that it may succeed in reducing all the subordinate laws of Nature into

ONE supreme and universal law; still the development of such a system as

we see around us out of such materials, and by such means, would not be

necessarily exclusive of the idea of God, but might afford evidence of a

Supreme Mind, creating, combining, and controlling all things for the

manifestation of His adorable perfections.

We have thus seen that the Theory of Cosmical Development is a mere

hypothesis, incapable of experimental or historical proof; that the

recent progress of scientific discovery has tended to disprove the

fundamental assumption on which it rests; and that, even were it

admitted as a possible, or, still more, as a plausible explanation of

the origin of planets and astral systems, it would not serve to destroy,

and scarcely, if at all, to diminish the evidence of Theism.

The last of these positions, if well established, might seem to

supersede the necessity of discussing the hypothesis at all in

connection with our present theme. But such a discussion of it as has

been offered may be useful to those--and they are not a few--who,

superficially acquainted with Science in its more popular form, are

exposed to the danger of being seduced by the authority of a few

distinguished names which have unfortunately become identified with the

cause of Atheism. For, while the author of "The Vestiges" repudiates the

atheistic conclusions which some have deduced from his hypothesis, M.

COMTE boldly avows his creed in the following revolting terms: "To minds

unacquainted with the study of the heavenly bodies, Astronomy has still

the reputation of being a science eminently religious, as if the famous

verse, 'Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei' ('The heavens declare the glory OF

GOD'), had preserved all its force." And, he adds, in a note, "At

present, to minds that have been early familiarized with the true

astronomical philosophy, the heavens declare _no other glory_ than that

of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all those who have contributed to the

establishment of their laws!" The _reader_ of these laws may become

illustrious, but the Maker of them must be utterly ignored!

SECTION II.

THEORY OF _PHYSIOLOGICAL_ DEVELOPMENT; OR THE PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLE

AND ANIMAL RACES BY NATURAL LAW.--"TELLIAMED."--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY.

The Theory of Development has been applied not only to explain the

origin of worlds and of astral systems in the sky, but also to account

for the origin of the various tribes of vegetable and animal life which

exist on the earth itself. There is nothing, indeed, in any of the

kingdoms of Nature that may not be included in it, since the formation

of all material bodies, organic or inorganic, is supposed to be

sufficiently accounted for by the sole action of Chemical or Mechanical

laws. The wide range of this theory is strikingly illustrated by the

words of one whose powers of observation have added some interesting

discoveries to Natural History, but whose speculations on the origin of

Nature resemble the distempered ravings of lunacy, rather than the

mature results of philosophic thought "Physio-philosophy has to show,"

says Dr. Oken, "how, and in accordance indeed with what laws, the

Material took its origin, and, therefore, how something took its

existence from nothing. It has to portray the first periods of _the

world's development from nothing_; how the elements and heavenly bodies

originated; in what method, _by self-evolution_ into higher and manifold

forms, they separated into minerals, became finally organic, and, in

man, attained self-consciousness.... Physio-philosophy is, therefore,

_the generative history of the world_; or, in general terms, the history

of Creation, a name under which it was taught by the most ancient

philosophers, namely, as Cosmogony. From its embracing the Universe, it

is plainly the Genesis of Moses!"[37]

It will be observed that this strange speculation goes far beyond the

comparatively modest conjecture of La Place. It postulates _nothing_,

and undertakes to account for _everything_. In flagrant opposition to

the old atheistic maxim, "Ex nihilo, nihil," it boldly affirms, "Ex

nihilo, omnia." It speaks, indeed, of "laws in accordance with which the

world took its origin;" but these laws must be as abstract as those of

Mathematics, since they existed before matter itself; nay, more

abstract, or, rather, more inconceivable still, since they existed, it

would seem, even before Mind! Dr. Oken attempts to explain the

production of the world from nothing by comparing it to the evolution of

Arithmetical and Mathematical Science, out of the fundamental conception

of _zero_! But, waiving this, we shall direct our attention to the only

points in this theory which, in the existing state of speculative

thought, can be held to have any practical interest in connection with

our great theme.

That theory attempts to account for the production both of the FLORA and

the FAUNA of the natural world by _the process of Development_ rather

than by _the miracle of Creation_. It proceeds on the assumption, akin

to that of Epicurus, that atoms or monads alone existed in the first

instance; and that from these were derived, under the action of natural

law and by a process of gradual development, all existing substances and

beings, whether organic or inorganic, mineral, vegetable, or animal. "No

organism has been created," says Dr. Oken, "of larger size than an

infusorial point. No organism is, nor ever has one been created, which

is not microscopic. Whatever is larger has not been created, but

developed. Man has not been created, but developed." On this fundamental

assumption the whole theory is based. But we must carefully distinguish

between the Atomic Theory and the application which is here made of it.

The recent discoveries of Chemistry, by which all material compounds

have been decomposed into their constituent elements, amounting to

little more than fifty substances, which are either the primary or the

proximate bases of all existing bodies, and the marvellous

transformations which these elementary principles undergo, in respect

alike of form, of density, of solidity, and of magnitude, under the

action of natural laws,--may serve to make it credible that there is no

_a priori_ impossibility in the assumption on which the Atomic Theory

depends. Had it been the will of God to call into being the various

vegetable and animal races in the way of gradual evolution out of these

primary monads, no enlightened Theist will presume to say that it was

either impossible, or inconsistent with His wisdom to do so. It must be

observed, however, that the natural analogies which have sometimes been

appealed to in support of this hypothesis, labor under a grievous defect

when they are applied to account for the origin of the existing races,

and that they are extended far beyond their legitimate limits when they

are supposed to prove that these races might begin to be without any

direct interposition of creative power. For, while the oak may spring

from an acorn, and the largest animal from a microscopic monad, yet

within the whole range of our experience both in the vegetable and

animal kingdoms, _the seed is produced by the organism_, and necessarily

presupposes it; whence it follows, either that there must have been an

eternal succession of organisms producing seed, and thereby perpetuating

the race, or if this be inconceivable, still more if it can be disproved

by geological or historical evidence, then that the analogy of our

present experience leads us up, not to "an infusorial point" or

"microscopic monad," but to a primary living organism as the

commencement of each existing tribe. In the words of Dr. Barclay, "It

will not be easy, on any principles exclusive of the vital, to answer

these questions, What was the origin of the first egg, or what was the

origin of the first bird? For where is the egg that comes not from a

bird, and where is the bird that comes not from an egg? To the mere

materialists, who exclude every species of vitality but that from

organism, this problem is nearly as embarrassing as the origin of the

Universe itself."[38]

If these views be correct, all the natural analogies would lead us to

acquiesce, as Dr. Barclay did, in the Mosaic narrative as the most

philosophical account of the commencement of the present order of

things. It traces up every race to a primary organism, endowed with

reproductive powers; for it tells us, in regard to the FLORA, that God

said, "Let the earth bring forth grass, _the herb yielding seed_, and

the fruit-tree yielding fruit _after his kind_, whose _seed is in

itself_, upon the earth; and it was so." And it tells us, with regard to

the FAUNA, that God said, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the

moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in

the open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and every

living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly,

_after their kind_, and every winged fowl _after his kind_. And God

blessed them, saying, _Be fruitful, and multiply_, and fill the waters

in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth."

Here the distinction between different genera and species, and the

provision that was made for the perpetuation of different races, are

prominently presented; while the production, in the first instance, not

of an "infusorial point" or "microscopic monad," but of a living

organism capable of multiplying its kind, is expressly declared; and

every race is traced up to that primary organism, in perfect consistency

with the only law, whether of vegetable or animal reproduction, which is

known to be in operation at the present day. And _this_ law of

reproduction, so far from being exclusive of a primary act of Creation,

seems to presuppose and require it; for there must be a living organism

before there can be vital transmission. But the theory of Physiological

Development proceeds on a totally different supposition,--a supposition

for the truth of which we have not only no historical evidence, but not

even the slightest _analogical presumption_, since we have no instance

of development anywhere except from a germ or seed, produced by an

organism preëxisting in a state of maturity.

But the exigencies of that theory demand a wide departure from all the

familiar lessons of experience; and hence recourse has been had to a

series of the wildest and most extravagant conjectures, such as may well

justify the opinion of those who have held that the creed of certain

philosophers makes a much larger demand on human credulity than that of

almost any section of the Christian Church. For, according to that

theory, the origin of the FLORA is first accounted for by the action of

some element--probably electricity--on a certain _mucus_, which is

supposed to be generated at those points where the ocean comes into

contact with the earth and air; that is, on the shore of the sea at low

water mark. MAILLET had broached the idea of the marine origin of all

our present "herbs, plants, roots, and grains,"[39] at a period when the

Universal Ocean, of which Leibnitz said so much, was still the creed of

some speculative minds; but it has been more recently revived, and

exhibited in greater detail, though not with stronger evidence, by some

writers of our own age. Thus Dr. Oken tells us that "all life is from

the sea;" that "when the sea organism, by self-elevation, succeeds in

attaining into form, there issues forth from it a higher organism;" and

that "the first organic forms, whether plants or animals, emerged from

the shallow parts of the sea." And so the author of "The Vestiges"

attempts to show that new races, both of plants and animals, marine and

terrestrial, may be accounted for, without any act of immediate

creation, by a change or transmutation of species resulting from the

agency of natural causes. "There is," as he tells us, "another set of

phenomena presented in the course of our history; the coming into

existence, namely, of a long suite of living things, vegetable and

animal, terminating in the families which we still see occupying the

surface. The question arises,--In what manner has this set of phenomena

originated? Can we touch at, and rest for a moment on, the possibility

of plants and animals having likewise been produced in the way of

Natural Law, thus assigning but one class of causes for everything

revealed to our sensual observation? Or are we at once to reject this

idea, and remain content either to suppose that creative power here

acted in a different way, or to believe, unexaminingly, that the inquiry

is one beyond our powers?"[40] In reply to these questions, he proceeds

to show that "there is a balance of probability from actual evidence in

favor of _an organic creation by law_," and that "in tracing the actual

history of organic beings upon the earth," as revealed by Geology, we

find that "these came not at once, as they might have been expected to

do if produced by some special act, or even some special interposition

of will, on the part of the Deity; they came in a long-continued

succession, in the order, as we shall afterwards see more convincingly,

of progressive organization, grade following grade, till, from an humble

starting-point in both kingdoms, the highest forms were realized." Such

is his general principle; and, without entering into the details, we may

sum up his general argument by saying, in the words of another,[41]

that, according to his theory, "dulse and hen-ware became, through a

very wonderful metamorphosis, cabbage and spinach; that kelp-weed and

tangle bourgeoned into oaks and willows; and that slack, rope-weed, and

green-raw, shot up into mangel-wurzel, rye-grass, and clover." So much

for the FLORA; and now for the _Fauna_, and the transition from the one

to the other. His views are thus exhibited by Sir David Brewster: "The

electric spark, escaping from the wild elements around it, struck life

into an elementary and reproductive germ, and sea-plants, the food of

animals, first decked the rude pavement of the ocean. The lichen and the

moss reared their tiny fronds on the first rocks that emerged from the

deep; land-plants, evolving the various forms of fruit and flower, next

arose,--the Upas and the bread-fruit tree, the gnarled oak and the lofty

cedar. Animal life appeared when the granary of nature was ready with

its supplies. A globule, having a new globule forming within itself,

which is the fundamental form of organic being, may be produced in

albumen by electricity; and as such globules may be identical with

living and reproductive cells, we have the earliest germ of organic

life, the first cause of all the species of animated nature which people

the earth, the ocean, and the air. Born of electricity and albumen, the

simple monad is the first living atom; the microscopic animalcules, the

snail, the worm, the reptile, the fish, the bird, and the quadruped, all

spring from its invisible loins. The human similitude at last appears in

the character of the monkey; the monkey rises into the baboon, the

baboon is exalted to the ourang-outang, and the chimpanzee, with a more

human toe and shorter arms, gives birth to man."[42]

The remarks which were offered, in the previous section, on Cosmical

Development, are equally applicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to this other

form of the doctrine of Creation by Natural Law. It might be shown, with

reference to the supposed generation of plants and animals, just as it

was then shown with reference to the generation of planets and astral

systems, first, that the theory rests upon a mere hypothesis, which is

utterly unsupported by experimental evidence; secondly, that the

progress of science has hitherto afforded no ground to believe that the

transmutation of species is provided for under the established

constitution of nature; and, thirdly, that even were the theory

admitted, it would not destroy the evidence of Theism, any more than the

propagation of plants and animals under the existing system, which, so

far from excluding or impairing, serves rather to enhance and illustrate

the proof of creative wisdom and power. In support of this last

position, we might adduce the testimony of the author of "The Vestiges"

himself; for, referring to the idea that "to presume a creation of

living beings by the intervention of law" is equivalent to "superseding

the whole doctrine of the Divine authorship of organic nature," he takes

occasion to say, "Were this true, it would form a most important

objection to the Law theory; but I think it is not only not true, but

the reverse of the truth. As formerly stated, the whole idea of law

relates only to the mode in which the Deity is pleased to manifest His

power in the natural world. It leaves the absolute fact of His

authorship of and supremacy over Nature precisely where it was." He

adds, in the words of Dr. Buckland, "Such an aboriginal constitution, so

far from superseding an Intelligent Agent, would only exalt our

conceptions of the consummate skill and power that could comprehend such

an infinity of future uses under future systems, in the original

groundwork of His Creation."[43]

But, without enlarging on those general considerations which were

formerly stated, and which admit of an easy and obvious application to

this _second_ form of the theory, we shall offer a few remarks bearing

directly on its distinctive peculiarities, and directed to the exposure

of its radical defects.

The theory rests on two very precarious foundations: the assumption of

_spontaneous generation_, on the one hand, and the assumption of a

_transmutation of species_ on the other. Each of these assumptions is

necessarily involved in any attempt to account for the origin of the

vegetable and animal races by natural law, without direct Divine

interposition. For if, after the first organism was brought into being,

the production of every subsequent type may be accounted for simply by a

transmutation of species, yet the production of the original organism

itself, or the first commencement of life in any form, must necessarily

be ascribed either to a creative act or to spontaneous generation. A new

product is supposed to have come into being, differing from any that

ever existed before it, in the possession of vital and reproductive

powers; and this product can only be ascribed, if Creation be denied, to

the spontaneous action of some element, such as Electricity, on mucus or

albumen. In this sense the doctrine of spontaneous generation seems to

be necessarily involved in the first step of the process of Development,

and is, indeed, indispensable, if any account is to be given of the

origin of vegetable and animal life; but in the subsequent steps of the

same process it is superseded by a supposed transmutation of species,

whereby a lower form of life is said to rise into a higher, and an

inferior passes into a more perfect organism.

But we have no experience either of spontaneous generation on the one

hand, or of a transmutation of species on the other. Observation has not

discovered, nor has history recorded, an authentic example of either. In

regard to the _first_, the author of "The Vestiges" anticipates this

objection, and attempts to answer it. The objection is, that "a

transition from the inorganic to the organic, such as we must suppose to

have taken place in the early geological ages, is no ordinary cognizable

fact of the present time upon earth; structure, form, life, _are never

seen_ to be imparted to the insensate elements; the production of the

humblest plant or animalcule, otherwise than as a repetition of some

parental form, is not one of the possibilities of science."[44] Such is

the objection; and how does he attempt to answer it? He endeavors to

show, first, that the work of creation having been _for the most part_

accomplished thousands of years ago, we have no reason to expect that

the origination of life and species should be _conspicuously

exemplified_ in the present day; secondly, that the comparative

infrequency, or even the entire absence, of such phenomena _now_ would

be no valid reason for believing that they have _never_ been exhibited

heretofore, if, on other grounds, the doctrine of 'natural creation' or

'life-creating laws' can be rendered probable; and, thirdly, that even

in our own times there ARE facts which seem to indicate the reality, or

at least the possibility, of "the primitive imparting of life and form

to inorganic elements."[45]

Now, to this elaborate argument in favor of _spontaneous generation,_ or

the production of life by natural law, we answer, in the first place,

that the mere fact of its being adduced in connection with the Theory of

Development affords a conclusive proof that it is indispensable to the

maintenance of that theory, that the hypothesis would be incomplete

without it, and that no account can be given of creation by the mere

doctrine of a _transmutation of species_. It is the more necessary to

make this remark, because not a few who embrace the latter doctrine

affect to disown the former, and seek to keep it out of view. But the

one is as necessary as the other to a complete theory of Natural

Development. The author of "The Vestiges" felt this, and virtually

acknowledges it when he undertakes the task of vindicating the

credibility of spontaneous generation. But we answer, in the second

place, that the method in which he performs his self-imposed task is

singularly curious, and not a little instructive. He had, it must be

owned, a difficult game to play. The general theory of "The Vestiges"

is founded on the fact that, in the ordinary course of Nature, the races

of plants and animals are perpetuated by propagation, according to

established Natural Laws,--a fact which might seem to afford a strong

analogical argument in favor of the supposition that the same order of

Nature is maintained also in the few apparently exceptional cases in

which, from our defective knowledge, we are unable to trace the

connection between the parent and the product. And yet the author

evinces no little anxiety to make out a case in favor of "a

non-generative origin of life even at the present day;" and he appeals

to a class of facts, confessedly obscure, which have not been, as he

thinks, satisfactorily accounted for by the law which usually regulates

the production of organic beings. He refers us to the speculations of

Dr. Allen Thomson on the primitive production of Infusoria,[46] to the

facts which modern science, aided by the microscope, has discovered

respecting the Entozoa, or the creatures which live within the bodies of

others, and, above all, to the experiments of Mr. Crosse and Mr. Weekes,

which seemed to result in the production of a small species of insect

(_Acarus Crossii_) from the action of a voltaic battery on a saturated

solution of the silicate of potash, or the nitrate of copper, or the

ferrocyanate of potassium. The reason of his anxiety to avail himself of

these cases is evident. The exigencies of his theory demanded a method

of accounting for the primary origin of life different from any that can

be found in the common process of propagation. He saw clearly enough

that his main argument, founded, as it was, on the law of hereditary

transmission, could not account for the production of the first

organism; and that, if he would avoid either the doctrine of _Immediate

Creation_, which is so offensive to him, or the idea of _Eternal

Generation_, which is utterly excluded by the clearest lessons of Fossil

Geology, he must have recourse to the hypothesis of _Spontaneous

Generation_. Hence he attempts to account for the commencement of new

species both of plants and animals, in the course of the world's

history, by a transmutation of species; while, for the origin of the

first species, he has recourse to the same law of Development, but

acting in widely different circumstances, and giving rise to what he

calls "aboriginal generation," whereby the inorganic passes into the

organic, and life, form, and structure, are imparted to hitherto inert

materials by the action of Electricity on mucus or albumen. To

accomplish this twofold purpose, he felt it necessary to insist, in the

first instance, on the ordinary law of generation as the established

order of _mediate_ creation; while he found it equally necessary, in the

second place, to insist on those apparently exceptional cases in which

the connection between the germ and the product has hitherto eluded

philosophical research,--and this for the purpose of showing that the

original production of plants and animals was _not similar_ to the

ordinary method of their propagation in any other respect than this,

that in both cases the result is brought about by Natural Laws, without

the direct interposition of any supernatural cause.

Now, in so far as his argument is founded on the principle of

analogy,--and it is on this principle that it proceeds throughout,--we

submit that it is radically vicious, and utterly inconclusive. For the

vast majority of cases in which the commencement of life and

organization falls under our notice being confessedly those, not of

primary production, but of mediate reproduction, it is reasonable to

believe that the same law governs all cases alike, whether we have been

able or not to trace the origin of life to the principle of propagation,

the few apparent exceptions being sufficiently accounted for by our

imperfect knowledge of the causes and conditions on which they depend.

Besides, the argument from analogy in favor of a primary production of

life by natural causes, in so far as it is founded on the present law

of hereditary transmission, is radically defective, since the two cases

are widely different; the one presupposing _a primary organism of the

same kind_, from which others are evolved by a law of natural

succession, the other exhibiting life as a new product, resulting not

from any prior organism, but from the action of _causes of a totally

different kind_, which are not known to be capable of giving birth

either to vegetable or animal organisms under the actual constitution of

Nature.

But suppose, even, that the _Acarus Crossii_ were admitted to be a real

product of Galvanic action on the silicate of potash, and an undeniable

instance of "a non-generative origin of life," how would the

illustrative example accord with the author's general theory? It might

afford a specimen of aboriginal production; but how would it fit in with

his favorite doctrine of _a gradual and progressive advancement_ from

the lower to the higher forms of organization? The _Acarus_, at first

supposed to be a new and hitherto unknown creature, is now acknowledged

to be one of a very familiar species,--a species which may have

deposited its ova, and propagated its kind, since the commencement of

the present order of things, and whose eggs might very well resist the

action even of nitrate of copper, since the creature itself could live

in that poisonous mixture. Moreover, it belongs, in point of

organization, to one of the highest orders of organisms; not to the

_radiata_, not to the _mollusca_, but to the highest type of the

_articulata_, the nearest to the _vertebrata_. Had it been a monad,--a

mere living cell,--which Galvanism evolved from the solution, and had

this primary product developed itself afterwards in various forms,

according to the ascending scale of a progressively improving

organization, it might have accorded admirably with the twofold doctrine

of spontaneous generation and transmutation of species; but,

unfortunately, the first process is so perfect, in the present instance,

as to leave little room for the second, and we are almost tempted to

hope that perhaps the clumsy and troublesome expedient of a

transmutation of species may yet be superseded by the discovery of some

method,--we know not what,--whereby not only the _articulata_, but the

_vertebrata_, and even Man himself, may be immediately produced by some

new combination of Nature's elemental laws![47]

We have given prominence, in the first instance, to the doctrine of

"spontaneous" or "aboriginal" production, because it constitutes an

indispensable part of the Theory of Development, and because we believe

that, were this clearly understood, that theory would soon sink into

general discredit or total oblivion, like the kindred speculations of

Anaximander and Anaxagoras, of the old Ionic School. The experiments of

Ehrenberg, instituted with the view of testing the doctrine of

spontaneous generation, may be said to have decided the whole question.

They did not succeed, indeed, in explaining every apparently exceptional

case, for some of the facts are still obscure, and will probably

continue to be so, notwithstanding every extension of microscopic power,

just as, in the analogous case of the Nebulæ, the increase of telescopic

power has enabled us to resolve not a few of them into clusters of

stars, while it has served to bring others yet unresolved within the

range of our vision. But they were sufficient, at least, to show that,

as far as our clear knowledge extends, the one uniform law, "_Omne vivum

ex ovo_," universally prevails, and that the whole analogy of Nature, in

so far as its constitution has been ascertained, is adverse to the

doctrine of spontaneous generation. Ehrenberg detected the minute germs

of vegetable mould, and the ova of some of the smallest animalcules; and

when it is considered that these germs and ova are so tenacious of

vitality that certain prolific seeds have come down to us from the age

of the Pharaohs in the wrappings of the Egyptian mummies,--that they are

widely diffused in the air and the waters, insomuch that no sooner does

a coral reef appear above the level of the sea than it is forthwith

covered with herbage by means of seeds wafted by the winds or deposited

by the waves,--and that it is almost impossible to exclude them by any

artificial expedient, since they are capable of resisting the action of

boiling water and even of alcohol itself,--it cannot, we think, be

denied that the few cases which still remain obscure or unexplained may

be, at least, _probably_ accounted for in accordance with the same

natural law which is found to be invariably established in every

department to which our clear knowledge extends.

In regard, again, to the supposed "transmutation of species," we are

equally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all experimental

evidence, and unsupported even by any natural analogy. As the doctrine

of spontaneous generation stands opposed to the maxim that _organic life

can be produced only by organic life_, so the doctrine of a

transmutation of species stands opposed to the equally certain maxim

that _like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms_.

Cuvier has demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles

preserved in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in

every, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand

years.[48] In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to change;

nay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the constitution of Nature

itself to prevent the possible confusion of races by promiscuous

intercourse, through that provision which renders the mule incapable of

reproduction. No plant has ever been found in a state of transition from

a lower to a higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of

the algæ being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial

vegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself into a

fish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising into a man.[49]

It is true, indeed, that "there is a capacity in all species to

accommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of external

circumstances, this extent varying greatly according to the species.

There may thus arise changes of appearance or structure, and some of

these changes are transmissible to the offspring; but the mutations thus

superinduced are _governed by constant laws and confined within certain

limits_. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not possible,

and the extreme limit of possible variation may usually be reached in a

short period of time; in short, species have a real existence in Nature,

and a transformation from one to another does not exist."[50]

The whole science of Natural History is based on the existence of

distinct species, capable of being discriminated from each other by

certain characteristic marks; and the whole art of the agriculturist and

the stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption of a law, invariable in its

operation, whereby "like produces like in the vegetable and animal

worlds." The instances to which the author of "The Vestiges" refers in

support of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to the copious

inductions to which they are opposed; and they may all be explained

consistently with the _law of variation within definite limits_, as

stated by Dr. Whewell, or by our ignorance of all the conditions

involved in each particular case. Nor is his argument founded on the

limited range of our observation, even with its singular illustration

derived from Mr. Babbage's calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in

the slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of these

inductions; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing more than an

appeal from what we do know to what we do not know, from knowledge to

ignorance, from the certainties of science to the mere possibilities of

conjecture, it has been well shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of

observation is not so limited as the author of "The Vestiges" would have

us to believe, since "_extent of space_ is, in a matter of this kind,

equivalent to _duration of time_. For, although no man has lived five

hundred years, so as to observe the gradual development of the oak from

the acorn in its various stages of progress, yet every man who can

survey five hundred yards of an English forest, can see the oak in every

stage of its growth, and need have no doubt as to the law of its

progressive development. And so, had there really been such a

transmutation of species as is contended for, we might expect to find,

somewhere on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and

continents, some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition

from the lower to the higher forms."

We are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. Babbage's

engine produces numbers according to a certain law up to a particular

point, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps even unaccountably, the law

of the series is changed, and the next term exhibits a striking

departure from the order previously followed; and so, it is argued, it

may be in nature. Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense

periods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable law;

but at a certain stage the order may change, and the next term in the

series may differ from all that went before it. The argument--if it can

be called an argument--amounts to this: Mr. Babbage's machine produces a

_series of numbers, and of numbers only_, but according to different

laws of succession; _ergo_, Nature may produce in the same way, and with

similar variations, _different races of plants and animals_. The

argument would have been perfect if the engine had produced _something

else than numbers_; if, as Professor Dod supposes, "while watching Mr.

Babbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution

of its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving

itself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of

a page of 'Paradise Lost,' or even of 'The Vestiges of Creation;'--in

such a case, there might have been something in the argument; but even

then, the withering question remains, Is there any man in his senses who

would not immediately conclude that _some new cause was now at work_?"

In short, in so far as the _facts of the case_ are concerned, there is

not only no known instance either of "spontaneous generation" or of

"transmutation of species," but there is not even any natural analogy

that can give the theory the slightest aspect of verisimilitude. The

author of "The Vestiges" thinks that a presumption in its favor may be

derived from "the analogy of the inorganic world,"--in other words, from

the supposed conversion of nebulæ into planets and astral systems by the

operation of natural causes; but this analogy has been conclusively set

aside by disproving the hypothesis on which it depends. He further

thinks that a favorable presumption may be derived from "the analogy of

the organic world,"--in other words, from the process of propagation by

which the races of plants and animals are perpetuated; but the

presumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is directly

opposed to his theory, since all the facts which come under our

cognizance in every department of Nature serve only to establish the two

great maxims of Natural History,--that _organic life can spring only

from organic life_, and that _like produces like, both in the vegetable

and animal world_.

If we have succeeded in disposing of _the facts of the case_, we shall

have little difficulty in exposing _the fallacy of the principles_ which

are involved in the author's speculations on this subject. It is of

fundamental importance, in this inquiry, to form a clear and correct

conception of the precise point at issue, and of the two alternatives

between which we are called to make our choice. It has been well said

that "the great antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are

simply the LAW of Development _versus_ the MIRACLE of Creation."[51] And

the author of "The Vestiges" virtually acknowledges this to be the real

state of the question, when he says that "if we can see no _natural_

origin for species, a _miraculous_ one must be admitted."[52] Now, the

grand alternative being Creation by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is,

Creation by a Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is

utterly presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the one as less

worthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, than the

other. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that the _natural_ ought

to be preferred to the _miraculous_ method of accounting for the origin

both of planets and of their inhabitants, for this among other reasons,

that the latter would be derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most

High. His words are remarkable: "The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar

or an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially to matter; He

causes, by the same majestic means, vast oceans to form and continents

to rise, and all the grand meteoric agencies to proceed in ceaseless

alternation, so as to fit the earth for a residence of organic beings.

But when, in the course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be

for the first time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of

the Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed

whenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced,--a new fiat for

fishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, taking up the

present views of Geologists as to species, such an event as the

commencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a few new nodulosites and

corrugations upon its shell, would, on this theory, require the

particular care of that same Almighty who willed at once the whole means

by which infinity was replenished with its worlds?" ... "Is it

conceivable, as a fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence,

that it should be constantly paying a special attention to the creation

of species, as they may be required in each situation throughout those

worlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant with our general

conception of the dignity, not to speak of the power, of the Great

Author?" ... "It would be distressing to be compelled to picture the

power of God as put forth _in any other manner_ than in those slow,

mysterious, universal laws which have so plainly an eternity to work

in."[53]

Such is the author's presumptuous decision on a matter which is far "too

high for him." We offer the following remarks upon it:

_First_ of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle of

absolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot but

acknowledge that _once_, at least, the power of God must have been put

forth _in another manner_ than "in those slow, mysterious, universal

laws" of which he speaks; and that, even if he could succeed in

disproving "repeated interferences of creative power," he could in

nowise dispense with a primitive act of direct, immediate, supernatural

creation, since he does not profess to believe in the eternal existence

of matter and its laws. We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent

acts of a continuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to

acknowledge a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case,

according to established natural laws; for he says expressly, "There

cannot be _an inherent intelligence in these laws_; the intelligence

appears _external to the laws_, something of which the laws are but as

the expression of the will and power. If this be admitted, the laws

cannot be regarded as primary or independent causes of the phenomena of

the physical world. We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature,--its

Author, its God." ... "When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak of

_the mode in which the Divine power is exercised_; it is but another

phrase for _the action of the ever-present and sustaining God_."[54] It

is admitted, then, _first_, that there must have been a primary act of

creation, in the highest and strictest sense, by a direct and immediate

interposition of Divine power, at the commencement of created existence;

and, _secondly_, that, even in the continuous work of creation, which is

supposed to have been subsequently carried on after the method of

development by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally

real, although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably

necessary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be

reasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of such a

being as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom and power of God

than the primordial production of "a universal Fire-Mist," or even of

"electricity and albumen?" or, will it be pretended that immediate

creation of molluscs as molluscs, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as

reptiles, would be less worthy of the great Author of Nature than the

establishment of a system which _must_ in due time give them birth, and

that, too, not without the concurrence and coöperation of the Divine

will; for "natural law is but another phrase for _the action_ of the

ever-present and sustaining God?"

But, while we hold that there is no good ground for an affirmative

answer to these questions, we would carefully guard against rushing to

the opposite extreme, and affirming, either that the production of new

races by the method of natural law was, on _a priori_ grounds,

impossible, or that God might not have adopted that method, had He so

pleased, in perfect consistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and

power. We see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of

Nature, so far as the production of _individuals_ is concerned; we see

not why a similar provision might not have been made for the production

of _genera and species_. In either way His power and His wisdom might

have been displayed. But, when we are told that the one is derogatory to

the Divine Majesty, and the other alone consistent with the loftiest

views of His perfections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that

is alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but conclusive

ground that we are in no degree competent judges of the best method

either of creating or of governing the world. Had we been asked to say

whether it was likely that, under the rule of infinite wisdom and

almighty power, certain insects, reptiles, and fishes, that are

unattractive to the eye, and loathsome to the fastidious taste of many,

could find a place at all among the works of God, we might have thought

it improbable that they should be created; but they exist

notwithstanding, and the fact of their existence is enough to silence

all our presumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less--it is much

more--presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they could not

have been brought into being, without disparagement to Divine wisdom,

otherwise than by the action of established laws, or by a process of

natural development; as if it were unworthy of God to _produce_ that for

whose production He confessedly did make _provision_.

But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of

such speculations to _exclude God from all real, active, and direct

connection with His works_. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we

shall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the

doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here

extended, by the author of "The Vestiges," so as to be exclusive also of

any direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other

than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter

and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the

action of these laws in the established order of Nature.

We have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in "The

Vestiges," is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author

professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic,

it might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered

simply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been

associated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid

proof for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought it

necessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science,

because, whatever may be its _professed aim_, its _practical tendency_

is unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will

be found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of

ardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an

article of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes,

tantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so

forcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the

Immortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying

distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be

materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of

development which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and

fishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a

diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,--we think that the Sensational

and Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a

tendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God,

as the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that

reverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character

alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a

formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be

practically atheistic, simply because it removed God from the active

superintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine

of a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the

words of Cicero, "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,--re sustulisse."[56]

And so, in "The Vestiges," Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural

Interposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the

stupendous work of Creation itself.

SECTION III.

THEORY OF _SOCIAL_ OR _HISTORICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--AUGUSTE COMTE.

It might have been thought that the principle of Development had

exhausted its powers, and achieved its highest triumphs, when it had

been applied successively to account, first, for the creation of planets

and astral systems, and, secondly, for the production of vegetable and

animal life; and that little could remain for it to do after it had

succeeded in tracing the genealogy of MAN back, in a direct line through

many generations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which was

diffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. But, on a

more careful study of its last and highest product,--MAN, with his

intellectual and moral nature, his religious beliefs, his social

history, and his immortal hopes,--it seemed as if there were still some

phenomena which remained to be accounted for, some facts of palpable

reality and great magnitude which had not yet been adequately explained.

The mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are

universally recognized and appealed to, the social institutions which

have been established, the religious beliefs and feelings which have

generally prevailed, and the rites of worship which have been observed

in all ages and climes, were so widely different from the phenomena of

mere vegetable or animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct

account of their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight,

how they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by which the

planets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of Divine supernatural

interposition. This Herculean task was fearlessly undertaken, however,

by M. AUGUSTE COMTE, and it has been elaborated with singular ability in

his ponderous work, the "Cours de Philosophie Positive."

M. Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy began to be delivered at Paris

in the winter of 1829-30, and was completed in its published form in

1842-43. It comprehends a general outline of all the branches of

Inductive Science, and of the relations which they bear to each other;

and they are expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and

forcible. He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a

philosophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, some

able allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The "System of Logic,"

by John Stuart Mill, and "The Biographical History of Philosophy," by

G. H. Lewes, are avowedly indebted to his speculations for some of their

most characteristic contents; while the outline of his theory has been

presented to the more popular class of readers in England through the

columns of "The Leader," and in Scotland through those of "The Glasgow

Mechanics' Journal."

It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present purpose, to

offer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion of his voluminous

work. I shall confine myself exclusively to those speculations which

bear, more or less directly, on the great cause of Natural and Revealed

Religion, selecting them from all the various parts of his work, and

exhibiting them, in one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of

absolute and avowed Atheism.

The fundamental idea of his system is a supposed "law of the development

of human thought," which regulates and determines the whole progress of

the species in the acquisition of knowledge. This law is announced with

the air of a man who has made a great discovery, and who is entitled, in

consequence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a

benefactor to the world. "I believe," he says, "that I have discovered a

grand fundamental law,"--"the fundamental law of the development of the

human mind;" ... "the grand law which I have indicated in the first part

of my system of Positive Politics, ... where I have divulged, for the

first time, the discovery of this law."[57] Now, what, it may be asked,

is this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to immortalize its

author and to enlighten the world? It is stated briefly in the _first_,

and illustrated at greater length in the _fourth_ and following volumes

of his work. The general outline of his theory is thus sketched: "That

law consists in this,--that each one of our leading conceptions, every

branch of our knowledge, passes successively through _three different

theoretic states_: the state theological or fictitious, the state

metaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. In other

words, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of

its researches, three methods of philosophizing, whose character is

essentially different, and even _radically opposed_: first, the

Theological method; then, the Metaphysical; and, last of all, the

Positive. Hence three systems of Philosophies, which _mutually exclude

each other_. The first is the necessary starting-point of the human

mind; the third is its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely

provisional, and destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage."[58]

These are the _three_ great stages through which the collective mind of

Humanity must necessarily pass in its progressive advancement towards a

perfect knowledge of truth; but of these three, the _first_, or the

Theological Epoch, is again subdivided, and exhibited as commencing with

Fetishism, then advancing to Polytheism, and finally consummated in

Monotheism.

FETISHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the Theological

Philosophy; and it is described as consisting in the ascription of a

life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own to every existing

object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or

artificial. It is traced to a primitive tendency, supposed to exist

equally in man and in the lower animals, to conceive of all external

objects as animated, and to ascribe to them the same, or similar, powers

and feelings with those which belong to the living tribes

themselves.[59] "Let an infant, for example, or a savage, on the one

hand, and, on the other hand, a dog or a monkey, behold a watch for the

first time, there will doubtless be no immediate profound difference,

unless in respect to the manner of representing it, between the

spontaneous conception which will represent to the one and the other

that admirable product of human industry as a sort of veritable animal,

having its own peculiar tastes and inclinations; whence results,

consequentially, in this respect, a Fetishism fundamentally common to

both, the former only having the exclusive privilege of being able

ultimately to get out of it." This instinctive and spontaneous

belief--the natural, and, indeed, the necessary result of a tendency

inherent in living beings--is conceived to have been an indispensable

and a most useful provision for the primeval state of man, and to have

exerted a highly salutary influence on the progressive development of

human thought. It is contrasted with the subsequent but more advanced

stage of Polytheism;[60] and the latter is held to denote a spontaneous

belief in supernatural beings, distinct from and even independent of

matter, since it is passively subject to their will; while the former

considers matter itself as animated, and has no idea of any higher or

more spiritual form of being. It is further supposed that idolatry,

properly so called, belongs to Fetishism only, and not at all to

Polytheism, for this singular, but not very conclusive reason, among

others, that if Polytheism be justly chargeable with idolatry because it

recognizes many wills superior to Nature and having power over it,

Catholicism would be equally liable to the same charge in respect of the

homage which it renders to saints and angels![61]

But Fetishism is only the initial step in the process of our

intellectual development; and it passes into Polytheism, not suddenly

and _per salium_, but slowly and gradually, through the intermediate

stage of "_Astrolatrie_," or the worship of the heavenly bodies. The

mind is imperceptibly divested of the idea that everything around it is

animated, and, by a process of real, but as yet imperfect

generalization, it rises from Fetishism to Polytheism; in which latter

system of belief an order of powers superior to Nature is recognized,

while as yet there is no conception of a supreme and all-perfect Mind.

The Polytheistic system, which prevailed so universally in the ancient

world, and which still prevails among Heathen nations, is supposed to

have been, not a _declension_ from a purer and better state, not a

_corruption_ either of natural or revealed religion, but _a step in

advance_ of the primary faith of mankind, a result of growing

intelligence, a vast and most beneficial change in the right direction.

It was the first great product of the metaphysical spirit, the result of

an early but imperfect generalization; it constituted the principal era

of the theological history of mankind; it was admirably adapted, and,

indeed, indispensably necessary, to the exigencies of society at the

time when it prevailed; it was more intensely religious than Monotheism

itself, since it brought man habitually into contact with a multitude of

gods, whose symbols were always present and visible to the eye, while it

exerted a wholesome influence on Science, on Poetry, on Industry, on

Morals, and, indeed, on the whole process of man's mental and social

development.[62]

But Polytheism, although indispensable and salutary as a provisional

belief, was not destined to be permanent; it was to be superseded in due

time, at least in the case of the _élite_ of humanity, by the higher and

still more abstract system of Monotheism, which is regarded as the

natural and inevitable product of human intelligence, independently of

all supernatural teaching, at a certain stage of its development. But

here, as in the former instance, the change is not effected suddenly;

the human mind advances gradually from Polytheism to Monotheism, through

the intermediate stage of the idea of Immutability or Destiny,--an idea

suggested partly by the study of the invariable order of Nature, and

partly by the irresistible domination of one great temporal power, such

as the iron empire of Rome.[63] Historically, indeed, Monotheism is said

to have spread in Europe through the Jews, who derived it from Egypt;

but it is added that, had there been no Jews, others would have given

birth to a system so necessary for the development of human thought. The

prevalence of Monotheism, for a limited time, was useful, and even

necessary, as the natural result of the great law of human progress,

and the indispensable precursor of a new and brighter era; but it was

temporary and provisional merely,--a stage in the onward march of

development, not the ultimate landing-place of human thought. It is

conceived to be radically incompatible with the recognition of

invariable natural laws, and even with the exercise of the industrial

arts.[64] It is, however, the last and highest form of the Theological

Philosophy; and, having reached this stage, the human mind necessarily

advances beyond it, until it arrives at a point where all theology

disappears, and where it is entirely and forever emancipated from all

the beliefs, the hopes, and the fears which have any reference to an

invisible spiritual world.

The ultimate goal of speculative thought is "the Positive Philosophy,"

which treats only of the Facts of Nature, and of their coördination

under general laws, to the utter exclusion of all supernatural powers,

and of all knowledge of causes, whether _efficient_ or _final_. But this

goal cannot be reached, it seems, by a sudden or abrupt transition from

the Theological to the Atheistic creed. There must be an intermediate

stage,--the era, in short, of Metaphysics,--during which the process of

Criticism will operate as a solvent on all previous beliefs, and by

producing Skepticism, in the first instance, in regard to all other

systems, will tend at length to concentrate the attention of mankind

exclusively on the truths of Inductive Science. The Metaphysical

Philosophy is held to be the necessary, but temporary stage of

transition from the theological to the positive method in science. It is

destined to supersede the one, and to introduce the other. It is

conceived to be equally at variance with both; and the era of its

ascendency is described as a critical, destructive, revolutionary age,

useful only as it delivers mankind from the shackles of former beliefs,

and prepares them for the adoption of a new and purely natural system

of thought. During this era of decomposition there will commence the

reconstruction of human opinion on new and more solid foundations; and

the transition from Monotheism to Positive Science will be the greatest

achievement of the race, greater far than the advancement from Fetishism

to Polytheism, or even from Polytheism to Monotheism itself. The

culminating point of human progress is absolute and universal

Atheism.[65]

Surely such a prospect may well arrest the most thoughtless, and prompt

them to inquire, with some measure of moral earnestness, What _is_ this

Positive Philosophy, this ultimate landing-place of human thought, this

final goal of human progress? Is it nothing else than the Inductive

Science of Bacon, but under a new and less attractive name? or is it a

philosophy radically different from it, and entitled, therefore, to be

regarded as an original method? The author tells us that he might have

called it "Natural Science," or "the Philosophy of Nature," since it

treats of Facts and their Laws; but that he had been induced to prefer

the distinctive title of _positive_, as one better fitted to mark the

contrast between it and the _negative_ character of those metaphysical

and theological systems which it is destined to supersede. And yet it

will be found that, in so far as it differs at all from the Inductive

Science of Bacon, it is purely _negative_, since its chief

characteristic is the negation of all Theology, and the entire exclusion

from the domain of human knowledge, of Causes, whether efficient or

final. It _adds_ nothing to the sum of human thought which might not be

reached by Bacon's method; it only _subtracts_ whatever has reference to

the Divine and Supernatural, and especially everything connected with

the theory of Causation. It makes no new contribution to the general

stock, unless, indeed, it be the hitherto unknown law of development

which is supposed to regulate and determine the progress of humanity

from primeval Fetishism to ultimate Atheism; and it takes away Theology,

with all its ennobling beliefs and blessed hopes, not by grappling with

and solving, but by merely discarding the problem both of the origin and

end of the world.

That this is a correct account of the new theory is evident from his own

words: "The fundamental character of the Positive Philosophy is, to

regard all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural _laws_, the

precise discovery of which, and their reduction to the least possible

number, is the end of all our efforts; while we regard the investigation

of what are called _causes_, whether first or final, as absolutely

_inaccessible and void of sense for us_." ... "We have no pretension to

expound the producing causes of the phenomena, for in that we can never

do more than push back the difficulty; we seek only to analyze with

exactitude the circumstances of their production, and to connect them

with one another by the normal relations of _succession and

similitude_."--"In the positive state of science, the human mind,

acknowledging the impossibility of obtaining absolute knowledge,

abandons the search after the _origin and destination_ of the universe,

and the knowledge of the secret _causes_ of phenomena."[66]

It is thus plainly announced that the Positive Philosophy is the science

of facts and their laws, exclusive of all reference to causes, efficient

or final; and it is even admitted that Theology could not be excluded,

were it deemed legitimate or possible for the human mind to investigate

the causes of phenomena.

Viewing the theory in this light, we submit the following remarks as a

sufficient antidote to this daring but impotent attempt to exclude

Theology from the domain of human knowledge.

1. It is worthy of notice how completely the Infidel party have shifted

their ground and changed their tactics since the era of the first French

Revolution; and how utterly inconsistent are the arguments of M. Comte

and the Positive School with those of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.

Formerly, Religion was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft; it was

supposed to have been invented by fraud, supported by falsehood, and

professed in hypocrisy; and the Church, but especially the hierarchy of

Rome, was the object of incessant ridicule or malignant abuse. But now,

Religion is discovered to be the natural, necessary, and salutary result

of the legitimate action of the human faculties in the earlier stages of

their development, the initial impellent of social progress, the

indispensable condition of advancing civilization; and, on the broad,

general principle that sincerity of conviction is essential to

wide-spread success, the theory which ascribes its origin to the fraud

or the policy, whether of kings, or priests, or fanatics, is scouted as

a mere delirium of Voltaire, or as one of those revolutionary prejudices

of his disastrous era which were alike irrational and injurious. And the

Church, so far from being ridiculed or maligned, is lauded above measure

as the highest extant product of _human_ wisdom; Catholicism is even

preferred to Christianity itself, as a manifest improvement on the more

primitive form of faith and worship; it is declared to be the

indispensable basis of the future reorganization of society, which, when

it shall have been freed from all theological influence, its only point

of weakness, will still survive, with its separate speculative class,

its imposing public forms, and its splendid hierarchy,--an Atheistic

society, but still Catholic and One.[67] The change, in this respect,

between the opinions which prevailed, respectively, at the era of the

_first_ and that of the _second_ Revolution, is at once striking and

instructive. It shows how variable and vacillating is the wretched creed

of Infidelity, and how the firm maintenance of truth will eventually

compel the homage, even where it may not succeed in carrying the

convictions, of speculative minds. That Religion in all its successive

forms, from the rudest Fetishism up to the sublimest Christian

Monotheism, has been the natural and genuine product of human

intelligence, working ever onward and upward to a still higher stage of

development,--that its existence was inevitable, and its influence, on

the whole, highly beneficial,--and that, even when it shall have passed

away, society will still be largely indebted to it for the impulse, yet

unspent, which it has imparted to the cause of civilization and

progress,--all this is admitted and even maintained by M. Comte, in

direct and often derisive opposition to the theorists who once ascribed

its origin to fraud, and its prevalence to priestcraft; nay, he elevates

it to the rank of a primordial and indispensable element of human

progress, a necessary and legitimate result of the great law of human

development. We know of no parallel instance of a change of opinion so

great and sudden, unless it be the marvellous transition of certain

modern Rationalists who were wont to ridicule the doctrine of the

Trinity as absurd and incomprehensible, but who have now arrived at the

conclusion that it is the fundamental law of human thought![68]

Still, with all this outward homage to Religion, considered as a mere

matter of history, the theory of M. Comte is essentially and even

avowedly Atheistic. It is mainly designed to account for the origin of

all Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, without having recourse to

the supposition either of the existence of God, or of his interposition

at any time in the affairs of men. He seems to have proposed to himself

a twofold object: _first_, to account for the prevalence of the various

forms of natural religion and superstition, without recognizing any

valid evidence for the existence of supernatural powers; and,

_secondly_, to account for the origin of Judaism and Christianity, or,

as he calls it, of Monotheism, without recognizing the reality of any

Divine Revelation. And he attempts to accomplish _both_ objects by means

of the same law--a law of development which, in primitive times,

produced Fetishism--which then produced Polytheism; then Monotheism;

then the Metaphysical transition era, during which all Theology is

undergoing a process of disintegration and decay; and, last of all (the

noblest, because the latest, birth of time), the Positive Philosophy,

under whose predicted ascendancy all Theology must die and be buried in

everlasting oblivion. His theory is not merely Anti-Protestant, although

it is bitterly so;[69] nor merely Anti-Christian, as opposed to all

Revelation; but it is Anti-Theological, as opposed to all Religion. It

proposes to eliminate Theology from the scheme of our knowledge, by

showing that it is utterly inaccessible to our faculties, and neither

necessary to society nor useful to morals.[70] It anticipates the time,

as being near at hand, when it shall have no existence, save on the

historic page.

2. This Atheistic theory rests entirely on a supposed discovery of M.

Comte,--the discovery of _a law of human development_, which serves at

once to account for the origin and prevalence of Theological beliefs in

the past, and to insure their utter disappearance in the future; a law

which, like the magician's wand, can raise the apparition, and then lay

it again! Now, of this law we affirm and undertake to prove that it is

_utterly groundless_; that it has no solid basis of evidence on which it

can be established; that it is contradicted by the history of the

world, and opposed to our own experience at the present day.

It can scarcely be imagined that a man accustomed, as M. Comte has been,

to the severe pursuits of Science, could give publicity to a law of this

kind, and claim the credit of a great original discovery, without having

some plausible reasons to plead for it; and he does assign certain

reasons for his belief, which are, it may be safely affirmed, as

frivolous and inconclusive as any that have ever been offered in support

of the most baseless revery. They may be reduced to THREE; the _first_,

derived from our cerebral organization; the _second_, from the history

of a certain portion of our species; the _third_, from the analogy of

our individual experience.[71]

He founds, in the first instance, on our _cerebral organization_. He is

an ardent admirer of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and has no scruple in

avowing himself a decided Materialist. It is unnecessary here to enter

on a discussion of Materialism, or even of Phrenology,--that will be

done hereafter; in the mean time it is enough merely to indicate the

fact that the theory proceeds on that ground, and then to inquire _how

the fundamental law of Development is deduced from it_. How does the

theory of Materialism, or even of Phrenology, were it assumed on the one

side and admitted on the other, contribute to the establishment or

verification of that law? Suppose it to be conceded that every mental

faculty or propensity has a distinct cerebral organ, or, more generally,

that the brain may be divided into three parts, representing,

respectively, the animal propensities, the more elevated sentiments, and

the intellectual faculties; could it be rationally inferred from this

concession that human nature must necessarily develop itself after a

certain order or method, and especially in the precise way that is

indicated in M. Comte's law? Would it prove that Man must needs pass,

in the process of his mental and social development, through _three_

distinct and successive stages,--the preparatory Theological state, the

transitory Metaphysical state, and the final Positive state? Would it

prove that Religion must first exist as Fetishism, then as Polytheism,

then as Monotheism, and thereafter disappear from the earth altogether

on the advent of M. Comte? He seems to think that there is a real

connection between the cerebral theory and his great fundamental law;

but it is not easy for a common reader to discern or to explain it.

Considering the cranium, according to what he conceives to be the true

anatomical theory, as simply a prolongation of the vertebral

column,--the primitive centre of the whole nervous system,--he argues

that the functions, intellectual and emotional, which are proper to the

upper and anterior parts of it, are less energetic than the animal

propensities, whose organs lie in the lower and posterior region, just

in proportion as they are further removed from the spine; and that, for

this reason, the latter must first come into action, then the

intermediate organs of sentiment, and, last of all, the intellectual

powers. And this doctrine he applies to the verification both of his

otherwise admirable classification of the Sciences, and of his far more

doubtful law of human development. We conceive that if it were

applicable at all to the problem of human progress, it might possibly be

applied to indicate the probable development of an _individual mind_, in

the successive stages of infancy, youth, and manhood; but that it does

not admit of the same application to _the history of the race_,

otherwise than by the aid of a very fanciful analogy. We have no faith

in the _a priori_ methods of constructing the chart of human history,

and tracing the necessary course of social progress, which have recently

become so popular in Germany and France. We cannot, with M. Comte,

undertake to solve the problem,--Given three lobes of the brain,

representing the propensities, affections, and intellectual powers, but

differing from each other in size and situation, what will be the future

history of the race,--religious, æsthetic, industrial, metaphysical,

social? We cannot, with M. Cousin, undertake to solve the

problem,--Given three terms, the finite, the infinite, and the relation

between the two, what will be the development of human thought, first,

in the experience of individuals, and, secondly, in the history of

society?[72] All such problems are too high for us. The history of the

human race must be ascertained from the authentic records and extant

monuments of the past, not constructed by theories, or divined by _a

priori_ speculations.

But M. Comte does appeal, in the second instance, to history in

confirmation of his views. He is far from affirming, however, that the

progress of the race, under the operation of his great law of

development, has been either uniform or invariable; on the contrary, he

admits, with regard to India, China, and other nations, comprising

probably the majority of mankind, whose state, intellectually and

socially, has been stationary for ages, that they afford little or no

evidence in support of his theory; and for this, among other reasons, he

confines himself to the history of what he calls the _élite_, or

advanced guard of humanity, and in this way makes it a very "_abstract_"

history indeed![73] Beginning with Greece, as the representative of

ancient civilization, and surveying the history of the Roman empire, and

of its successors in Western Europe, he endeavors to show that the

actual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with

his general law. He gives no historical evidence, however, of the

prevalence of Fetishism in primitive times; _that_ is an inference

merely, depending partly on his theory of cerebral organization, and

partly on the assumption that in the savage state, which is

gratuitously supposed to have been the primitive condition of man,

there must have been a tendency to regard every object, natural or

artificial, as endowed with life and intelligence. Polytheism, again, he

conceives to have been a step in advance, an improvement on the

preëxisting state of things, instead of being, as it really was, a

declension from a purer and better faith, an aberration from the light

of Nature, not less than from the lessons of Revelation. He conceives

Monotheism, whether as taught, to the Jews by Moses, or to the world at

large by Christ and his apostles, to have been the natural product of

man's unaided intelligence; and he assumes this, without making a single

reference to the supernatural events by which its publication, in either

instance, is said to have been accompanied, or to the sacred books in

which they are recorded; nay, he does not even name the Founder of the

Christian faith, otherwise than by describing him as "the founder, real

or imaginary, of this great religious system."[74]

In treating, again, of the Critical or destructive system of

Metaphysics, and of the Positive or reconstructive system of the New

Philosophy, he adduces no evidence to show that _the same element_ is

negatived by the one and restored by the other; on the contrary, were

his statement true in all respects, it would only serve to prove that

the Theological element, which is slowly dissipated by Metaphysics, is

formally and finally abjured by Positivism. He assumes and asserts, on

very insufficient grounds, that there is a real, radical, and necessary

contrariety between the facts and laws of Science and the first

principles of Theology, whether natural or revealed; and he anticipates,

therefore, that in proportion as Science advances, Theology must recede,

and ultimately quit the field. He ought to have known that there are

minds in every part of Europe as thoroughly scientific as his own, and

as deeply imbued with the spirit of modern Inductive Philosophy, who,

so far from seeing any discordance between the results of scientific

inquiry and the fundamental truths of Theology, are in the habit of

appealing to the former in proof or illustration of the latter; and who,

the further they advance in the study of the works of Nature, are only

the more confirmed in their belief of a Creative Intelligence and a

Governing Power. It may be that, in his own immediate circle at Paris,

there is a tendency towards Atheism; but, assuredly, no such tendency

exists in the highest and most scientific minds of modern Europe. The

faith of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Pascal,

in regard to the first principles of Theology, is still the prevailing

creed of the Sedgwicks, the Whewells, the Herschells, and the Brewsters

of the present day.

The only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that which, in our

apprehension, is the most likely to make some transient impression on

the popular mind, is his elaborate attempt to show, with regard to each

branch of Science, in detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy

in a cloud of superstition; and that just in proportion as the light

shone more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was

gradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, they were

all emancipated from their supposed connection with supernatural causes,

and reduced under fixed natural laws. Confounding Theology with

Superstition, or failing, at least, to discriminate duly between the

two, M. Comte draws a vivid picture of the successive inroads which

Science has made on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents

the one as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as the

darkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest rays gild only

the loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing brightness spreads over

the lowly valleys and penetrates the deepest recesses of nature, so

Theology gradually retires before the advance of Science, which first

conquers and brings under the rule of natural law the simplest and

least complicated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then

attacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology; and, last of

all, advances to the assault of the most difficult, such as Ethics and

Sociology; until, having emancipated each of them successively from

their previous connection with supernatural beliefs, it effects the

entire elimination of Theology, first from the philosophic, and

afterwards from the popular creed of mankind. M. Comte conceives that

the religious spirit has been steadily decreasing throughout the whole

course of human development, from the time when it was universal, in the

form of Fetishism, till it reached its most abstract, but least

influential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its decline

and fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the powerful solvent of a

Metaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and when its ultimate extinction

is certain under the action of Positive Science.

We deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the most plausible

part of his speculations; so plausible that, even where his reasonings

in support of it may fail to carry the full conviction of the

understanding, they may yet leave behind them a certain impression

unfavorable to faith in Divine things, since they appeal to many

palpable facts in the history of Science, too well attested to be

doubted, and too important to be overlooked. The theory itself--whatever

may be thought of the peculiar form which it has assumed in the hands of

M. Comte--cannot be regarded, in its main and essential features, as one

of his original discoveries; for the general idea on which it rests had

been announced with equal brevity and precision by the celebrated LA

PLACE: "Let us survey the history of the progress of the human mind and

of its errors; we shall there see _final causes constantly pushed back

to the boundaries of its knowledge_. These causes, which Newton pushed

back to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his time, placed

in the atmosphere to explain meteoric appearances. They are nothing

else, therefore, in the eyes of a philosopher, than _the expression of

our ignorance of the true causes_." Supposing this to be a correct

account of the fact, the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might

seem to follow very much as a matter of course,--the inference, viz.,

that in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in subjecting one

department of Nature after another to fixed and invariable laws,

Theology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, must necessarily recede

before it, and, at length, disappear altogether, when human knowledge

has reached its highest ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account

of the fact? Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less

generally admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those

sciences which have already reached their maturity, than in regard to

those other sciences which are still comparatively in their infancy? Or

is it true that it has lost instead of gaining ground by the progress of

scientific discovery, so as to occupy a narrower space and to hold a

more precarious footing, _now_, than it did in the earlier ages of

ignorance and superstition? Did Final Causes disappear from the view of

Newton when he discovered the law which regulates the movements of the

heavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when they surveyed

the human frame in the light of scientific anatomy? or Harvey, when,

impelled and guided by this doctrine as his governing principle, he

discovered the circulation of the blood? In what departments of Nature,

and in what branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the

Christian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order,

adaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very departments of

Nature whose laws have been most fully ascertained? in those very

branches of Science which have been most thoroughly matured? Did we

believe Comte and La Place, we should expect to find that the doctrine

of Final Causes and the science of Theology could now find no footing in

the domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in these

departments the phenomena have been reduced, by many successive

discoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they could only survive

for a brief time by taking refuge in the yet unconquered territory of

Meteorology, Biology, and Social Science. But is it so? Examine the

Series of Bridgewater Treatises, or any other recent philosophical

exposition of the Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent,

on the most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and

illustrations are derived almost entirely from _the more advanced

sciences_; and that, so far from receding or threatening to disappear,

Final Causes have only become more prominent and more striking in

proportion as inquiring men have succeeded in removing the vail from any

department of Nature.

It were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past many facts

which might seem to give a plausible aspect to the theory of M. Comte.

We might be told of the early history of Astronomy, when the astrologer

gazed upon the heavens with a superstitious eye, and spoke of the mystic

influence of the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the

calculation of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might

be told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails of

birds and animals, the _haruspex_ prognosticated the fate of empires and

the fortunes of battle. We might be told of the early history of

Chemistry, when alchemists sought in their concoctions a panacea for all

human evils, and in their crucibles an alkalest or universal menstruum.

We might be told of the early history of Zoölogy, when the augur watched

the flight, the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the

purposes of divination. We might be told of Aëromancy as the earliest

form of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest form of

Geology.[75] And we might be told of the popular superstitions which

lingered, till a very recent period, among the peasantry of our own

country, and which are now gradually disappearing in proportion as the

light of Religion and Science is diffused.[76] These facts, which appear

on the surface of human history, do unquestionably prove that _there has

been a process of gradual advancement_, by which each of the sciences

has been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed on a

more solid and enduring basis. But they prove nothing more than this:

they do _not_ prove that these sciences must ultimately supersede

Theology, or that they have a necessary tendency towards Atheism. On the

contrary, we hold that they afford a valid presumption from analogy on

the other side. For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law

of development which determines the progress of every other branch of

human knowledge, had become incorporated, in its earlier stages, with

many fond and foolish superstitions, the analogy of the other sciences

would lead us to conclude that, just as the reveries of Astrology had

passed away and given place to a solid system of Astronomy,--and as the

vain speculations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful

discoveries of Chemistry,--and as the arts of Augury and Divination had

finally issued in the inductive science of true Natural History,--so

Theology might also purge itself from the fond conceits which had been

for a time incorporated with it, and still survive, after all

superstition had passed away, as a sound and fruitful branch of the tree

of knowledge.

This is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte regards

Theology, He does not speak of it as _a distinct and independent

science_, but rather as _a method of Philosophy_, which has been applied

to the explanation of _all_ the departments of Nature; and, viewed in

this light, he objects to it on the ground that Positive Science

peremptorily demands the elimination of all causes, efficient and final,

and, consequently, the exclusion of all reference to God, or to any

supernatural power, in connection with the laws either of the material

or moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It is

assumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible with the

belief in supernatural powers, and that these laws must be invariable

and independent of any superior will. Hence the supposed antagonism

between Theology and Physical Science, which is strongly affirmed by M.

Comte[77]; as if the laws of Nature could not exist unless they were

independent of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not

be pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacrilegious

presumption. The laws for which he contends must have had no author to

establish, and can have no superior will to control them; they had no

beginning, and can have no end; they cannot be reversed, suspended, or

interfered with; they are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not

subordinate to God, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing

less than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as the

Democritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which consists in "the

material necessity of all things without a God."[78] Now, we have no

jealousy of natural laws. We believe in their existence; we believe,

also, in their regular operation in the ordinary course of Nature; but

we deny that they must needs be _independent_ of a supreme will, and

affirm that, being subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily

_invariable_. They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by

divines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense as to be

perfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primitive creation, and

also with the possibility of a subsequent miraculous interposition. The

Westminster Divines explicitly declare that "God, the First Cause, by

His providence, ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature

of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and

that "in His ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to

act without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[79] But M. Comte

will have no laws, however regular, unless they be also invariable, and

independent of any superior will. And, doubtless, if this were the sense

in which Science has established the doctrine of natural laws, it would

be at direct variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the

antagonism between the two might afford some ground for the belief that,

sooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But it is not the

existence of these natural laws, nor even their regular operation in the

common course of Providence, that is hostile to our religious

beliefs,--it is only the supposition that they are unoriginated,

independent, and invariable; and to assume this without proof, as if it

were a self-evident or axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of

historical deduction respecting either the past development or the

future prospects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole

question,--that we know of no parallel to it except in the kindred

speculations of Strauss, who assumes the same radical principle, and

gravely tells us that whatever is supernatural must needs be

unhistorical.[80]

There is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that there is any

necessary tendency in the recognition of established natural laws to

supersede Theology, or to introduce an era of universal Atheism. Some

such tendency might exist were these laws conceived of as necessary,

independent, and invariable. But this hypothesis, equally

unphilosophical and irreligious, is not and never has been maintained

by the great body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction

either between the established order of Nature and the supposition of

its Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and the

recognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor should it be

forgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in favor of Theism

depends not so much on _the mere laws_ as on _the dispositions and

adjustments_ that are observable in Nature.[81] There is, therefore, no

historical proof to establish the supposed law of human development, and

no rational ground to expect that the progress of Inductive Science will

ever supplant or supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although

a distinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range

that it gathers its proofs and illustrations from _every_ department of

Nature, and that, were it excluded from any one of these, it might, for

the same reason, be excluded from all the rest; but it is not true that

there is any real or necessary antagonism between the laws of Nature and

the prerogatives of God. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance

until _all_ the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be

reduced under so many general laws, even then Superstition might

disappear, but Theology would remain, and would only receive fresh

accessions of evidence and strength, in proportion as the wise order of

Nature is more fully unfolded, and its most hidden mysteries disclosed.

We scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to the argument

in favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on _the analogy of

individual experience_. It is a transparent fallacy. He tells us that

the race is, like an individual man, Religious in infancy, Metaphysical

in youth, and Positive--that is, Scientific, without being Religious--in

mature manhood.[82] Now, this analogical argument, to have any

legitimate weight, must proceed on the assumption of two facts. The

first is, that the law of individual development commences, in the case,

at least, of all who belong to the _élite_ of humanity, with Theology,

and terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that the individual is, in

this respect, the type or pattern of his race, and that the experience

of the one is only an outline in miniature of the history of the other.

It would be difficult, we think, to establish the truth of either of

these positions by evidence that could be satisfactory to any reflecting

mind. We cannot doubt, indeed, for experience amply attests, that the

religious sensibilities of childhood have often been sadly impaired in

the progress from youth to manhood, and that, after the tumultuous

excitements, whether of speculation or of passion, not a few have sought

a refuge from their fears in the cold negations of Atheism. But is this

the law of development and progress? Is it a law that is uniform and

invariable in its operation? Are there no instances of an opposite kind?

Are there no instances of men whose early religious culture had been

neglected, and who passed through youth without one serious thought of

God and their relation to Him, but who, as they advanced in years, began

to reflect and inquire, and ultimately attained to a firm religious

faith? If such diversities of individual experience are known to exist,

then clearly the result is not determined by any necessary or invariable

law of intellectual development; but must be ascribed to other causes,

chiefly of a moral and practical kind, which exert a powerful influence,

for good or evil, on every human mind. Montaigne speaks of an error

maintained by Plato, "that children and old people were most susceptible

of Religion, as if it sprung and derived its credit from our

weakness."[83] And we find M. Comte himself complaining, somewhat

bitterly, that his _quondam_ friend, the celebrated St. Simon, had

exhibited, as he advanced in years (_cette tendance banale vers une

vague religiosité_), a tendency towards something like Religion.[84]

Cases of this kind are utterly fatal to his supposed law of individual

development, and they must be equally fatal to his theory of the

progress of the human race.

Hitherto we have considered merely the reasons which M. Comte urges in

support of his theory, and have endeavored to show that they are utterly

incapable of establishing it as a valid scientific doctrine. It may be

useful, however, to advert, in conclusion, to some considerations which

afford decisive objections against it, arising from the testimony of

authentic history and the plainest principles of reason.

In so far as the testimony of history and tradition is concerned,

nothing can be more certain than that the progress of the race has

followed a very different course from that which M. Comte has traced out

for it by his grand fundamental law. The theory of a primitive state of

ignorance and barbarism, in which a rude Theology existed, in the form

of Fetishism, is opposed not more to the authority of Scripture, the

earliest record of our race, than to the unanimous voice of antiquity,

which attests the general belief of mankind in a primeval state of light

and innocence. There is a sad but striking contrast between the views

which are generally held by the Christian Theist, and those which are

avowed by M. Comte on this subject. The Christian Theist admits the

doctrine of a primeval Revelation and a pristine state of purity and

peace; M. Comte maintains the doctrine of a primitive barbarism and a

natural aboriginal Superstition. The Christian Theist believes in a fall

subsequent to the creation of man, and ascribes the ignorance and error,

the superstition and idolatry which ensued, to the perversion and abuse

of his intellectual and moral powers; M. Comte affirms that man did not

_fall_, that he did actually _rise_ by a process of slow but

progressive self-elevation, and that, in _advancing_ from Fetishism to

Polytheism, and from Polytheism to Monotheism, and from Monotheism to

Atheism, he has all along been determined by the law of his normal

development. In the view of the Christian Theist, Revelation was the sun

which shed its cheering rays on the first fathers of mankind, and which,

after having been obscured, for a time, by the clouds and darkness of

Superstition, shines out again, clear and strong, under the dispensation

of the Gospel; in the view of M. Comte, Science is the only sun that is

destined to enlighten the world,--a sun which has not yet fully risen,

but which has sent before, as the harbingers of its speedy advent, a few

scattered rays to gild the lofty mountain peaks, while all beneath is

still buried in Cimmerian darkness. The Christian Theist anticipates the

time when the true light which now shineth shall cover the whole earth;

M. Comte predicts its utter and final extinction, when Positive Science

shall have risen into the ascendant. His theory is contradicted by the

history of the past; let us hope that the events of the future will

equally belie his prediction. For Christianity is the only hope of the

world. The prospects of man would be dark indeed on the supposition of

its being abolished. "There might remain among a few of the more

enlightened some occasional glimpses of religious truth, as we find to

have been the case in the Pagan world; but the degradation of the great

mass of the people to that ignorance, and idolatry, and superstition,

out of which the Gospel had emancipated them, would be certain and

complete. This retrograde movement might be retarded by the advantages

which we have derived from that system, whose influence we should

continue to feel long after we had ceased to acknowledge the divinity of

its source. But these advantages would by degrees lose their efficacy,

even as mere matters of speculation, and give place to the workings of

fancy, and credulity, and corruption. A radiance might still glow on

the high places of the earth after the sun of Revelation had gone down;

and the brighter and the longer it had shone, the more gradual would be

the decay of that light and warmth which it had left behind it. But

every where there would be the sad tokens of a departed glory and of a

coming night. Twilight might be protracted through the course of many

generations, and still our unhappy race might be able to read, though

dimly, many of the wonders of the eternal Godhead, and to wind a dubious

way through the perils of the wilderness. But it would be twilight

still; shade would thicken after shade; every succeeding age would come

wrapped in a deeper and a deeper gloom; till, at last, that flood of

glory which the Gospel is now pouring upon the world would be lost and

buried in impenetrable darkness."[85]

M. Comte's theory is liable to another objection, the force of which he

seems, in some measure, although inadequately, to have felt and

acknowledged. The three states or stages, which he describes as

necessarily _successive_, are, in point of fact, _simultaneous_. They do

not mark so many different eras in the course of human progress,--they

denote the natural products of man's intelligence, the constituent

elements of his knowledge in _all_ states of society. The Theological,

the Metaphysical, and the Scientific elements have always coëxisted.

Diverse as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in

this,--they are all the natural and spontaneous products of man's

intelligent activity. That they were, to a certain extent,

_simultaneous_ at first, and that they are _simultaneous_ still, is

actually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, nevertheless, that

they are radically incompatible with each other;[86] and their

coexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious objection to his

fundamental law, which represents them not only as _necessarily

successive_, but also as _mutually exclusive_. The fact is admitted, and

that fact is fatal to his whole theory. For if the three methods have

coexisted hitherto, why may they not equally coexist hereafter? And what

ground is left for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, and

_must_ fall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man was able

from the beginning to observe, to compare, to abstract, and to

generalize, and if the fundamental laws of human thought have been ever

the same, it follows that there must have been a tendency, coeval with

the origin of the race, towards Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive

Speculation, and that the same tendency must continue as long as his

powers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be a _preponderance_,

more or less complete, of one of the three methods over the other two,

that we should be warranted in expecting, _even under the operation of

M. Comte's favorite law_; and yet he boldly proclaims the utter

exclusion of Metaphysics, and the entire and everlasting elimination of

Theology, as branches of human knowledge!

M. Comte's theory is still more vulnerable at another point. The

fundamental assumption on which it is based is utterly groundless. It

amounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, whether efficient or

final, is interdicted to man, and incapable of being reached by any

exertion of his faculties.[87] He tells us that Theology is impossible,

for this reason, that, in the view of the Positive Philosophy, all

knowledge of causes is absolutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology

is inevitable if we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or

more effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this

subject, than by showing that, if his general principle be conclusive

against the knowledge of God, it is equally conclusive against the

knowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir James Mackintosh

dealt with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, when, with admirable

practical sagacity, he said: "As those dictates of experience which

regulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which

attack them, in common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly

ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy

none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on

the same level with the maxims of life, the whole system of human

conviction must continue undisturbed.... Skepticism has practical

consequences of a very mischievous nature. This is because its

_universality_ is not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in

mind. If it were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual

antidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from which

weapons are taken to be employed against _some_ opinions, while it is

hidden from notice that the same weapons would equally cut down _every

other_ conviction. It is thus that Mr. Hume's _theory of causation_ is

used as an answer to arguments for the existence of the Deity, without

warning the reader that it would equally lead him to expect--that _the

sun will not rise to-morrow_."[88]

The exclusion of all knowledge of causes is so indispensable to M.

Comte's theory that he admits "the inevitable tendency of our

intelligence towards a philosophy radically Theological, as often as we

seek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into the intimate nature of the

phenomena."[89] The exclusion of such knowledge would, of course, be

fatal to Theology, since, without taking some account of causes,

efficient and final, we cannot rise to God as the author of the

universe. But did it never occur to M. Comte that the self-same

principle may possibly be destructive of his present, or, at least, of

his posthumous fame, as the author of the Positive Philosophy? For, if

we can know nothing of _efficient causes_, in what sense, or on what

ground, shall any one presume to ascribe the authorship of this system

to M. Comte? True, it may be said,--Here is an effect which exhibits

manifest signs of intelligence, order, and scientific skill; its parts

are regularly adjusted and all directed to a common end; and, reasoning

after the _teleological_ method, we must infer that it proceeded from a

very clever, but somewhat eccentric mind; but, unfortunately, _final

causes_ are as expressly interdicted as efficient ones; and, on the

principles of his own theory, the "Course of Positive Philosophy" can

never be warrantably ascribed to the authorship of M. Comte.

A still more serious objection to M. Comte's theory respecting the law

of human development arises from the false view which it exhibits of

_the nature and history of Truth_, considered as the object of human

knowledge. It is a favorite opinion with him, that man can have no

_absolute_ knowledge; that truth is not fixed, but fluctuating; that

what was believed in one age, and believed _necessarily_, according to

the fundamental laws of thought, is as necessarily disbelieved in the

next; and that there is no standard of truth at any time better or surer

than the public opinion, or general consent, of the most advanced

classes of society.[90] This theory of Truth, as necessarily mobile and

fluctuating, has a tendency, we think, to engender universal skepticism,

even when it is stated, with various important modifications, by such

writers as Lamennais and Morell; but, in the hands of M. Comte, it

becomes more dangerous still, since it represents the human race as

having been from the beginning, through a long series of ages, subject

to a law of development which not only _permitted_, but actually

_compelled_ them to believe a lie; and thus casts a dark shade of

suspicion both on the constitution of man and on the government of God.

Such a theory would seem also to preclude all rational calculations

respecting the future progress and prospects of the race. For what

ground can exist for any prognostication in regard to the ulterior

advancement or ultimate destiny of man, if it be true that, in his past

history, Fetishism has passed into Polytheism, and Polytheism into

Monotheism, without any extraneous instruction, and by the mere action

of those inherent laws to which humanity is subject? And, still more, if

it be further true that even now the human mind is in a state of

transition, passing through the crisis of Metaphysical doubt towards the

goal of Positive Atheism, who shall assure us that this will be its last

and final metamorphosis? It does appear to us to be one of the most

singular and perplexing anomalies of his elaborate system, that he can

dogmatize so confidently on the _terminus ad quem_ of human progress,

when from the _terminus a quo_ there has been, according to his own

account, a series of variations so wonderful, and a succession of states

so diverse and opposite, as those which he describes. And yet he

pronounces oracularly that Positive Science is the ultimate

landing-place of human thought, and that universal Atheism is the final

barrier which must needs close and terminate the long series of

developments.

We have spoken sternly of his system; we have no wish to speak harshly

of the man. Had we any disposition to do so, there is more than enough

in the personal explanation, prefixed to the closing volume of his work,

effectually to disarm us. We have too much sympathy with the trials of a

vigorous but eccentric mind, struggling in untoward circumstances, and

against an adverse tide, to maintain a position of honorable

independence, to say a word that could wound the feelings or injure the

prospects of a man of science. But it is not unkind to add that his life

might have been a more prosperous one had he devoted himself to the

pursuits of Science, without assailing the truths of Religion; and that

his fame would have been at once more extensive and more enduring had it

been left to repose on his Classification or Hierarchy of the Sciences,

without being associated with the more doubtful merits of his

fundamental law of Man's Development.

SECTION IV.

THEORY OF _ECCLESIASTICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--J. H. NEWMAN.

This particular phase of the general theory bears less directly on the

subject of our present inquiry than either of the _three_ which have

already passed under review, and yet it has recently been applied in

such a way as may entitle it to a passing notice.

For while the theory of Ecclesiastical Development has a _direct_

relation only to the question in regard to the Rule of Faith, it has

also an _indirect_ or _collateral_ relation to the truths of Natural as

well as of Revealed Religion; and this relation demands for it,

especially in the existing state of theological speculation, the earnest

attention of all who are concerned for the maintenance even of the

simplest and most elementary articles of Divine truth.

The most elaborate and systematic exposition of this theory is exhibited

in the "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, by JOHN HENRY

NEWMAN;" an Essay primarily directed to the discussion of the points of

difference between the Popish and the Protestant Churches, but which

will be found to have an important bearing, also, on some doctrines

which are common to both, and especially on the fundamental articles of

Natural Religion itself.

It is thus stated by Mr. Newman:[91] "That the increase and expansion of

the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations which have attended

the process in the case of individual writers and churches, are the

necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession

of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion;

that, from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full

comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and

most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by

inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the

recipients, but, as received and transmitted by minds not inspired, and

through media which were human, have required only the longer time and

deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called _the

Theory of Developments_."

It is further illustrated as follows: "It is sometimes said that the

stream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use may fairly be made of

this image, it does not apply to the history of a philosophy or sect,

which, on the contrary, is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when

its bed has become deep, and broad, and full. It necessarily rises out

of an existing state of things, and, for a time, savors of the soil. Its

vital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and

is employed in efforts after freedom, more vigorous and hopeful as its

years increase. Its beginnings are no measures of its capabilities, nor

of its scope. At first, no one knows what it is, or what it is worth. It

remains, perhaps, for a time, quiescent; it tries, as it were, its

limbs, and proves the ground under it, and feels its way. From time to

time it makes essays which fail, and are, in consequence, abandoned. It

seems in suspense which way to go; it wavers, and, at length, strikes

out in one definite direction. In time it enters upon strange territory;

points of controversy alter their bearing; parties rise and fall about

it; dangers and hopes appear in new relations, and old principles

reappear under new forms; it changes with them, in order to remain the

same. In a higher world it is otherwise; but here below _to live is to

change, and to be perfect is to have changed often_."[92]

In answer to the objection, "that inspired documents, such as the Holy

Scriptures, at once determine the doctrines which we should believe," it

is replied, "that they were intended to create an idea, and that idea is

not in the sacred text, but in the mind of the reader; and the question

is, whether that idea is communicated to him, in its completeness and

minute accuracy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and

intellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor could it

be maintained without extravagance that the letter of the New Testament,

or of any assignable number of books, comprises a delineation of all

possible forms which a Divine message will assume when submitted to a

multitude of minds."[93]

What relation, it may be asked, can this theory respecting the

development of revealed or Christian truth bear to the question of the

being and perfections of God? We answer, that it is founded on a general

philosophical principle which may affect the truths of natural as well

as those of revealed Religion; and that it is applied in such a way as

to show that, as it has already led to the worship of angels and saints,

so it may hereafter issue in the deification of Nature, which is

Pantheism, or in the separate worship of its component parts, which is

Polytheism; and, in either case, the personality and supremacy of the

one only, the living and the true God, would be effectually superseded,

if not explicitly denied.

But, is there any real danger of such a disastrous consummation? We

answer, that the mere coexistence of the theory of Ecclesiastical

Development with the infidel speculations on the doctrine of Human

Progress is of itself an ominous symptom; and, further, that the mutual

interchange of complimentary acknowledgments between the Infidel and

Popish parties is another, especially when both are found to coincide in

some of the main grounds of their opposition to Scripture as the supreme

rule of faith, and when the homage which the advocates of Development

render to the theory of progress is responded to by glowing eulogiums

from the infidel camp on the genius of Catholicism as the masterpiece of

human policy. But there are other grounds of apprehension, arising more

directly out of the very nature of the theory of Development itself.

That theory has been described by Dr. Brownson--himself a convert to

Catholicism--as the product of "a _school_ formed, at first, outside of

the Church, but now brought within her communion," and compared, in

regard to its dangerousness, with the speculations of Hermes and

Lamennais.[94] And a still more competent judge--Professor Sedgwick, of

Cambridge[95]--has characterized it as "a monstrous compound of Popery

and Pantheism," according to which "the Catholic faith is not a religion

revealed to us in the Sacred Books we call canonical, and in the works

of the Fathers which are supposed to contain the oral traditions of the

Apostles and their followers; but a new Pantheistic element is to be

fastened on the faith of men,--a principle of Development which may

overshadow both the _verbum Dei scriptum_ and the _verbum Dei non

scriptum_ of the Romish Church, and change both the form and substance

of primitive Christianity."

It is only justice to Mr. Newman to say that he appears to have been

aware of this possible objection to his theory, and that he makes an

attempt to obviate it. Speaking of the difficulty which the Church

experienced in keeping "Paganism out of her pale," he adverts to "the

_hazard which attended on the development_ of the Catholic ritual,--such

as the honors publicly assigned to saints and martyrs, the formal

veneration of their relics, and the usages and observances which

followed." And he asks: "What was to hinder the rise of a sort of

refined Pantheism, and the overthrow of Dogmatism _pari passu_ with the

multiplication of heavenly intercessors and patrons? If what is called

in reproach 'Saint-worship' resembled the Polytheism which it

supplanted, or was a corruption, how did Dogmatism survive? Dogmatism is

a religious profession of its own reality as contrasted with other

systems; but Polytheists are liberals, and hold that one religion is as

good as another. Yet the theological system was developing and

strengthening, as well as the monastic rule, all the while the ritual

was assimilating itself, as Protestants say, to the Paganism of former

ages."[96]

It seems to be admitted in these words, that, in the _past_ history of

the Church, the development of the Catholic ritual _was_ attended with

some danger of infection from Paganism or Pantheism; and there may be

equal reason to fear that, in the _future_ history of the Church, still

working on the principle of development, that danger may be very

considerably aggravated by the general prevalence of theories utterly

inconsistent with the faith of primitive times. What the Church has

already done in the exercise of her developing power may be only a

specimen of what she may hereafter accomplish. She has already

developed Christianity into a system which bears a striking resemblance

to Polytheism; she may yet develop it more fully, so as to bring it into

accordance with philosophical Pantheism; or, retaining both forms,--for

they are not necessarily exclusive of each other,--she may use the first

in dealing with the ignorant, and reserve the second as a sort of

esoteric doctrine for minds of higher culture. Nor let it be said that

we are either unjust or uncharitable towards the Romish Church, in

suggesting the possibility of some such development; for what she has

already done, and what she still claims the power of doing, afford very

sufficient ground for our remarks. When Dr. Conyers Middleton published

his celebrated "Letter from Rome," showing an exact conformity between

Popery and Paganism, and that "the religion of the present Romans is

derived from that of their Heathen ancestors," many liberal Catholics

resented the imputation as an insult to their faith; but now Mr. Newman

not only admits the fact that the Church did _assimilate_ its ritual to

the Paganism of former ages, but vindicates her right to do so, and

ascribes to her _a power of assimilation_ to which it seems impossible

to assign any limits. "There is, in truth," says this writer, "a certain

virtue or grace in the Gospel, which changes the quality of doctrines,

opinions, usages, actions, and personal characters, which become

incorporated with it, and makes them right and acceptable to its Divine

Author, when before they were either contrary to truth, or, at best, but

shadows of it."--"Confiding, then, in the power of Christianity to

resist the infection of evil, and to _transmute the very instruments and

appendages of demon worship to an Evangelical use_, ... the rulers of

the Church from early times were prepared, should the occasion arise, to

adopt, or imitate, or sanction _the existing rites and customs of the

populace_, as well as _the philosophy of the educated class_."--"The

Church can extract good from evil, or, at least, gets no harm from it.

She inherits the promise made to the disciples, that they should take

up serpents, and, if they drank any deadly thing, it should not hurt

them."--"It has borne, and can bear, principles or doctrines which, in

other systems of religion, quickly degenerate into _fanaticism or

infidelity_." This marvellous power of assimilation, which made "those

observances pious in Christianity" that were "superstitions in

Paganism," advanced, rapidly in its work, and successively introduced

the deification of man, the _cultus_ of angels and saints, and the

beatification of Mary as Queen of heaven and earth. The sanctification,

or rather _the deification of the nature of Man_, is one of these

developments. Christ "is in them, because He is in human nature; and He

communicates to them that nature, deified by becoming His, that it may

_deify_ them." The worship of saints is another of these developments:

"Those who are known to be God's adopted sons in Christ are fit objects

of worship on account of Him who is in them.... Worship is the necessary

correlative of glory; and, in the same sense in which created nature can

share in the Creator's incommunicable glory, do they also share in that

worship which is His property alone." But a "new sphere" was yet to be

discovered in the realms of light, to which the Church had not yet

assigned its inhabitant. "There was 'a wonder in heaven;' a throne was

seen, far above all created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title

archetypal; a crown bright as the morning star; a glory issuing from the

Eternal Throne; robes pure as the heavens; and a sceptre over all. And

who was the predestined heir of that Majesty? Who was that Wisdom, and

what was her name?--'the Mother of fair love, and fear, and holy hope,'

exalted like a palm-tree in Engaddi and a rose-plant in Jericho, created

from the beginning before the world in God's counsels, and 'in Jerusalem

was her power.' The vision is found in the Apocalypse, a Woman clothed

with the Sun, and the Moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of

twelve stars." The DEIFICATION of Mary is decreed. The doctrine of her

Immaculate Conception is a further _development_ at the present moment,

and who can tell what other developments may be in store for the future?

We advert to this form of the theory only in so far as it stands related

to our great theme,--the existence, perfections, and prerogatives of the

one only, the living and the true God; and it can scarcely be

questioned, we think, that it has already introduced doctrines and

practices into the Church which have a manifest tendency to obscure the

lustre and impair the evidence of some of the most fundamental articles

of Natural Religion. Let it still advance in the same direction, and who

shall assure us that it may not develop into still grosser idolatry, or

even into Pantheism? Why should it not develop, for example, into Sun

worship? "On the new system," says Professor Butler, "a modern growth of

Christian Guebres might make out no feeble case; the public religious

recognition of this great visible type of the True Light is but a fair

development of 'the typical principle;' the justifiable imitation of the

guilt of heathens in its adoration is but an instance of the

transforming powers of 'the sacramental principle;' while it requires

but the most moderate use of the great instrument of orthodoxy,

'mystical interpretation,' to find the duty hinted (clearly enough for

watchful faith, though obscurely to the blinded or undevout) in those

passages that speak of a 'tabernacle for the Sun,' or Deity itself being

'a Sun,' or the rising of 'the Sun of righteousness.'... Indeed, the

whole body of the righteous are promised to 'shine as the Sun' in the

heavenly kingdom,--an expression which, though it appear superficially

to refer to a period not yet arrived, the Church has correctively

developed into an assurance of their present beatification, and

consequent right to worship; while it must be at once manifest that, if

any representative emblem of the Deity may demand religious prostration

in our Churches, the analogous emblem of the 'deified,' in the great

temple of the Material Universe, may fairly expect a participation in

that honor. It is true there is an express command, 'Take heed lest,

when thou seest the Sun, ... thou shouldst be driven to worship them;'

but so there is a command, at least as distinct and imperative, against

the worship of _Images_, which, Mr. Newman instructs us, has been

repealed under the Gospel, and was never more than a mere Judaic

prohibition, 'intended for mere temporary observance in the

letter.'"[97]

If it be said that, in the case of the Church of Rome, there is not only

a process of development, but an infallible developing power, and that

this affords a guaranty, strong as the Divine promise itself, against

that risk of error which is attendant on the ordinary methods of human

teaching,--we answer, that this is a mere assumption, which requires to

be proved, and that it cannot be proved in the face of the facts which

attest the historical variations of the Romish Creed, as these are

admitted and defended by Mr. Newman himself. For some of these

variations are not consistent developments of the primitive articles of

faith, but involve either a corruption or a contradiction of these very

principles; and if her infallibility has not preserved her from the

deification of saints, what security have we that it will preserve her

from the deification of Nature? If it has already introduced a Christian

Polytheism, why may it not issue in a Christian Pantheism?

Admit the principle of development, and it may lead to the deification

of man, as well as to the worship of Mary; to a sacred Calendar of

Heroes, as well as of Saints.[98] It may terminate either in Infidelity

or in Superstition, according to the mental temperament of the

individual by whom it is adopted and applied. "An organ of

investigation being introduced, which may be employed for any purpose

indifferently, the tendency of such a theory of religious inquiry will

just tell according to the spirit in which it acts. A skeptic will

develop the principle into Infidelity, a believer into Superstition; but

the principle itself remains accurately the same in both."[99] The

connection between the theory of Ecclesiastical Development and the

infidel theory of Progress has not escaped the notice of many acute and

profound thinkers in recent times, nor the danger resulting from it to

the most fundamental articles of faith. "Modern Spiritualists tell us

that Christianity is a development, as the Papists also assert, and the

New Testament is its first and rudimentary product; only, unhappily, as

the development, it seems, may be things so different as Popery and

Infidelity, we are as far as ever from any criterium as to which, out of

the ten thousand possible developments, is the true; but it is a matter

of the less consequence, since it will, on such reasoning, be _always

something future_."[100] One of the most pernicious tenets of the

Neologists beyond the Rhine is thus expressed by themselves:

"Christianity renews itself in the human heart, and follows _the

development_ of the human mind, and invests itself with new forms of

thought and language, and adopts new systems of Church organization, to

which it gives expression and life." ... "But are these teachers the

_only_ destroyers of Faith and Morals? Are not _they_ also chargeable

with precisely the same offence who command us to submit implicitly to

the so-called divinely-inspired Spirit of '_one_ living Infallible

Judge' or 'Developing Power'? Can we have _fixed_ articles of faith and

morals in this system, any more than in the other? No. '_Unus utrisque

error, sed variis ill[=u]det partibus._' There is the same evil in both,

but it operates in different ways; in the former, every one develops

for himself; in the latter, the Pope develops for every one. You look

with fear on the progress of Rationalism; and what hope can any man

derive from that of Romanism?"[101]

* * * * *

We have examined, each on its own peculiar merits, the various forms of

the Theory of Development which have been propounded in modern times,

and applied to account for the origin of planets and astral systems, of

vegetable and animal races, and of the different successive systems of

human opinion and belief. We have found that, imposing as it may seem to

be, and high as its pretensions are, that theory has no claim to the

character of a scientific doctrine; that it is a mere hypothesis, and

nothing more; a speculative figment, which may be injurious to those who

thoughtlessly dally with it, but which can have no power to hurt any one

who will resolutely lay hold of it, and examine its claims.

"Gently, softly, touch a nettle,

And it stings you for your pains;

Grasp it, like a man of mettle,

And it soft as silk remains."

It is only necessary to add, that _the same general principle_ seems to

be involved in _all_ the forms of this theory,--the principle, namely,

that we are bound to account for the past _only_ by causes known to be

in actual operation at the present day. M. Comte lays it down in the

following terms: "Our conjectures on the origin, or formation of our

world should evidently be subjected to this indispensable

condition,--not to allow of the interposition of any other natural

agents than those whose influence we clearly discern in our ordinary

phenomena, and whose operations, _then_, would only be on a greater

scale. Without this rule, our work can have no truly scientific

character, and we shall fall into the inconvenience, so justly made a

ground of reproach to the greater number of geological hypotheses,--that

of introducing, for the purpose of explaining the ancient revolutions of

the globe, agencies which do not exist at the present day, and whose

influence it is impossible, for that very reason, to verify or even to

comprehend." The same principle is strongly stated, but with due

limitation, by Sir Charles Lyell, who insists on the explanation of all

terrestrial changes by _means of causes and according to laws known to

be in operation at the present day_: "During the progress of Geology,

there have been great fluctuations of opinion respecting the nature of

the causes to which all former changes in the earth's surface are

referable. The first observers conceived that the monuments which the

Geologist endeavors to decipher relate to a period when the physical

constitution of the earth differed entirely from the present, and that,

even after the creation of living beings, there have been causes in

action distinct in kind or degree from these now forming part of the

economy of nature. These views have been gradually modified, and some of

them entirely abandoned."[102]

The general principle which is involved in these and similar statements

may be perfectly sound, when it is applied merely to _natural events_,

occurring in the ordinary course, and according to the established

constitution of the material and moral world; but it is manifestly

inapplicable to _supernatural events_, such as the creation of the

world, or the revelation of Divine truth, since these events cannot be

accounted for by any known natural cause, and must be ascribed to the

immediate agency of a Higher Power. Without some such limitation, the

general principle cannot be admitted, since it would involve an

egregious fallacy. We must not limit Omnipotence by circumscribing the

range of its possible exercise within the narrow bounds of the existing

economy, or of our actual experience. We are not warranted to assume

that the origin of the world, on the one hand, or the establishment of

Christianity on the other, may be accounted for by _natural causes_

still known to be in actual operation. In regard to _natural events_ the

principle is sound, and it is rigorously adhered to by the expounder of

Natural Theology; in regard to _supernatural events_ it can have no

legitimate application, except in so far as it is combined with the

doctrine of efficient and final causes, which leads us up to the

recognition of a Higher Power. It might be safe and legitimate enough,

when we find a fossil organism imbedded in the earth, to ascribe its

production to the ordinary law of generation, even although we had not

witnessed the fact of its birth, provided the same species is known to

have existed previously; but when we find _new races_ coming into being,

for which the ordinary law of derivation cannot account, we are not at

liberty to apply the same rule to a case so essentially different, and

still less to postulate _a spontaneous generation_, or a _transmutation

of species_, for which we have no experience at all. In such a case, we

can only reason on the principle that _like_ effects must have _like_

causes, that marks of _design_ imply a _designing_ cause, and that

events which cannot be accounted for by _natural causes_ must be

ascribed to a Power distinct from nature, and superior to it. It is

manifestly unreasonable to assume that nothing can be brought to pass in

the Universe otherwise than by the operation of the same natural laws

which are now in action; or that, in the course of our limited and

partial experience, we must necessarily know all the agencies that may

have been at work during the long flow of time. And, in accordance with

these views, Sir Charles Lyell expressly limits the general principle to

_natural events_, and shows that "Geology differs as widely from

Cosmogony as speculations concerning the _Creation of Man_ differ from

his _History_."

FOOTNOTES:

[28] "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 17.

[29] AUGUSTE COMTE, "Cours de Philosophic Positive," II. 363, 376. The

merits of this attempt are very differently estimated by two competent

authorities; by PROFESSOR SEDGWICK in the "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p.

22; and by SIR DAVID BREWSTER in the "North British Review," No. 3, p.

476.

[30] "Vestiges," p. 11, 23.

[31] WHEWELL, "Indications of a Creator." SEDGWICK'S "Discourse," 5th

edition. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82. SIR D. BREWSTER, "North British

Review," No. 3. PROFESSOR DOD, "Princeton Theological Essays," second

series. H. MILLER, "Footprints of the Creator." T. MONCK MASON,

"Creation by the Immediate Agency of God."

[32] THOMAS MONCK MASON, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God, as

opposed to Creation by Natural Law; being a Refutation of 'The

Vestiges,'" &c., p. 34.

[33] SIR JOHN HERSCHELL, "Memoir on Nebulæ and Clusters of Stars,"

London Philosophical Transactions, 1833. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p.

19.

[34] "North British Review," No. 3, p. 477.

[35] PROFESSOR NICHOL, "The System of the World," Preface, VI., and 108.

[36] Ecclesiastes 12: 1.

[37] LORENZ OKEN, M. D., "Elements of Physio-philosophy,"--reprinted

(unfortunately) under the auspices of the Ray Society, London, 1847.

[38] DR. JOHN BARCLAY, "Inquiry concerning Life and Organization," pp.

33, 36. See also pp. 177, 235, 413, 526.

[39] "Telliamed; ou, Entretiens d'un Philosophe Indien avec un

Missionaire François, sur la Diminution de la Mer, la Formation de la

Terre, l'Origine de l'Homme," 2 vols., 1748.

[40] "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," 6th edition, p. 90.

[41] MR. HUGH MILLER, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 226.

[42] "North British Review," 1845, p. 483.

[43] "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 92.

[44] "The Vestiges," p. 104.

[45] Ibid.

[46] TODD, "Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology," article, Generation.

[47] MR. HUGH MILLER, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 233. T. MONCK

MASON, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God." "Princeton Theological

Essays," Second Series, p. 422.

[48] CUVIER, "Ossemens Fossiles," p. 61.

[49] MR. HUGH MILLER, "Footprints," p. 254.

[50] DR. WHEWELL'S "Indications," p. 54.

[51] "Footprints of the Creator," p. 19.

[52] "The Vestiges," p. 105.

[53] "The Vestiges," pp. 91, 96.

[54] "The Vestiges," p. 9.

[55] HUGH MILLER, "Footprints," pp. 13, 15. PROFESSOR DOD, "Princeton

Theological Essays," II. 432.

[56] CICERO, "De Naturâ Deorum," L. II.

[57] M. COMTE, "Cours de Philosophie Positive," I. 3, 6, 14; IV. viii.,

653, 656, 708, 711, 723; V. 1, 9.

[58] M. COMTE, "Cours de la Philosophie Positive," I. 3.

[59] Ibid., V. 30, 42, 50, 96, 98, 101.

[60] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 37, 75, 91, 101.

[61] Ibid., V. 58, 87, 94, 105, 125, 278.

[62] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 107, 115, 119, 124, 136, 148, 162, 167, 207,

224, 229.

[63] Ibid., V. 128, 164, 268, 279, 281, 290.

[64] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 297, 325, 461, 470; VI. 231.

[65] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 479, 487, 496, 505; VI. 2.

[66] COMTE, "Cours," I. 4, 10; IV. 664, 669, 676, 702.

[67] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 299, 326, 345; VI. 62, 72, 157, 234, 503,

864.

[68] ABBÉ MARET, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 218.

[69] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 327, 344, 369, 538, 582, 684; VI. 137.

[70] Ibid., V. 428, 597, 684, 836; VI. 419, 521, 860.

[71] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 44, 141; IV. 673; V. 45, 303.

[72] VICTOR COUSIN, "Introduction a l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I.

121. Ibid., "Cours de la Philosophie," III. 2, 464.

[73] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 3, 5, 22; VI. 32, 481.

[74] M. COMTE, "Cours," V. 382, "Premier fondateur, _réel ou ideal_, de

ce grand systéme religieux."

[75] "Encyc. Britan.," articles "Augury" and "Divination." DR. THOMSON'S

"History of Chemistry."

[76] MR. H. MILLER'S "Scenes and Legends of the North of Scotland."

[77] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 13; V. 461, 470; VI. 86, 126, 148.

[78] DR. CUDWORTH, "Intellectual System," I. 33.

[79] "Westminster Confession of Faith," chap. V. § 2, 3.

[80] STRAUSS, "Life of Jesus," I. 88. HENRY ROGERS, "Reason and Faith,"

Appendix, p. 96.

[81] DR. CHALMERS' Works, I. "Natural Theology."

[82] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 7.

[83] MONTAIGNE, "Apology for Raimond de Sebonde," Essays, II. 148.

[84] COMTE, "Cours," VI., Preface, IX.

[85] DR. ANDREW THOMSON, "Sermons on Infidelity," p. 62.

[86] M. COMTE, "Cours," IV. 709: "Je puis affirmer n'avoir jamais trouvé

d'argumentation sérieuse en opposition à cette loi, depuis dix-sept ans

que j'ai eu le bonheur de la decouvrir, si ce n'est celle que l'on

fondait sur la consideration de la _simultaneité jusq'ici necessairement

très commune_, des trois philosophies chez les mêmes intelligences."

"Cours," I. 27, 50, 10: "L'emploi _simultané_ des trois philosophies

radicalement incompatibles,"--"la _coëxistence_ de ces trois

philosophies opposées." See also IV. 683, 694; V. 28, 39, 41, 57, 171;

VI. 26, 31, 34, 155.

[87] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 14: "En considerant comme _absolument

inaccessible et vide de sens pour nous_ la recherche de ce qu'on appelle

les _causes, soit premières, soit finales_."

[88] SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, "Encyc., Britan.," Preliminary Dissertation,

p. 354.

[89] M. COMTE, "Cours," IV. 664.

[90] Ibid., VI. 728, 730, 760, 826, 835, 866.

[91] NEWMAN'S "Essay on Development," p. 27.

[92] NEWMAN'S "Essay on Development," p. 38.

[93] Ibid., p. 95.

[94] BROWNSON'S "Quarterly Review," No. 1, p. 43.

[95] SEDGWICK'S "Discourse," Fourth Edition. Preface, CCCXCIII.

[96] NEWMAN'S "Essay," p. 447.

[97] Letters of Rev. W. A. BUTLER on the "Development of Christian

Doctrine," p. 116.

[98] PIERRE LEROUX, "Sur l'Humanite." AUGUSTUS COMTE, "Positive

Calendar." The author gave some account of this in an article

contributed to the "North British Review," May, 1851.

[99] PROFESSOR BUTLER'S "Letters," p. 87.

[100] "Eclipse of Faith," p. 13.

[101] DR. WORDSWORTH, "Letters to M. Gondon," p. 153.

[102] LYELL, "Principles of Geology," I. 75.

CHAPTER III.

THEORIES OF PANTHEISM.

At the commencement of the present century, Pantheism might have been

justly regarded and safely treated as an obsolete and exploded

error,--an error which still prevailed, indeed, in the East as one of

the hereditary beliefs of Indian superstition, but which, when

transplanted to Western Europe by the daring genius of Spinoza, was

found to be an exotic too sickly to take root and grow amidst the fresh

and bracing air of modern civilization.

But no one who has marked the recent tendencies of speculative thought,

and who is acquainted, however slightly, with the character of modern

literature, can have failed to discern a remarkable change in this

respect within the last fifty years. German philosophy, always prolific,

and often productive of monstrous births, has given to the world many

elaborate systems, physical and metaphysical, whose most prominent

feature is the deification of Nature or of Man. France, always alert and

lively, has appropriated the ideas of her more ponderous neighbors, and

has given them currency through educated Europe on the wings of her

lighter literature. And even in England and America there are not

wanting some significant tokens of a disposition to cherish a kind of

speculation which, if it be not formally and avowedly Pantheistic, has

much of the same dreamy and mystic character, and little, if any,

harmony with definite views of God, or of the relations which He bears

to man.

One of the most significant symptoms of a reaction in favor of Pantheism

may be seen in the numerous republications and versions of the writings

of Spinoza which have recently appeared, in the public homage which has

been paid to his character and genius, and in the more than philosophic

tolerance--the kindly indulgence--which has been shown to his most

characteristic principles. He is now recognized by many as the real

founder both of the Philosophic and of the Exegetic Rationalism, which

has been applied, with such disastrous effect, to the interpretation

alike of the volume of Nature and of the records of Revelation. In

Germany his works have been edited by Paulus (1803) and by Gfrörer

(1830); in France they have been translated by Emile Saisset, Professor

of Philosophy in the Royal College; while a copious account of his life

and writings has been published by Amand Saintes, the historian of

Rationalism in Germany.[103] All this might be accounted for by

ascribing it simply to the admiration of philosophical thinkers for the

extraordinary talents of the man; and it might be said that his writings

have been reprinted, just as those of Hobbes have been recently

reproduced in England, more as a historical monument of the past than as

a mirror that reflects the sentiments of the present age. But it is more

difficult to explain the eulogiums with which the reappearance of

Spinoza has been greeted, and the cordiality with which his daring

speculations have been received. He has not only been exculpated from

the charge of Atheism, but even panegyrized as a saint and martyr! "That

holy and yet outcast man," exclaimed Schleiermacher,--"he who was fully

penetrated by the universal Spirit,--for whom the Infinite was the

beginning and the end, and the Universe his only and everlasting

love,--he who, in holy innocence and profound peace, delighted to

contemplate himself in the mirror of an eternal world, where, doubtless,

he saw himself reflected as its most lovely image,--he who was full of

the sentiment of religion, because he was filled with the Holy Spirit!"

"Instead of accusing Spinoza of Atheism," says M. Cousin, "he should

rather be subjected to the opposite reproach."[104] "He has been loudly

accused," says Professor Saisset, "of Atheism and impiety.... The truth

is that never did a man believe in God with a faith more profound, with

a soul more sincere, than Spinoza. Take God from him, and you take from

him his system, his thought, his life." "Spinoza, although a Jew," says

the Abbé Sabatier, a member of the Catholic clergy, "always lived as a

Christian, and was as well versed in our divine Testament as in the

books of the ancient Law. If he ended, as we cannot doubt he did, in

embracing Christianity, he ought to be _enrolled in the rank of saints_,

instead of being placed at the head of the enemies of God."

Contrast the language in which Spinoza is now compared to Thomas á

Kempis, and proposed as a fit subject for canonization itself, with the

terms in which he was wont to be spoken of by men of former times; and

the startling difference will sufficiently indicate a great change in

the current of European thought. And if we add to this the

contemporaneous reappearance of such writers as Bruno and Vanini, whose

works have been reprinted by the active philosophical press of Paris, we

may be well assured that it is not by overlooking or despising such

speculations, but by boldly confronting and closely grappling with them,

that we shall best protect the mind of the thinking community from their

insidious and pestilent influence.

But we are not left to _infer_ the existence, in many quarters, of a

prevailing tendency towards Pantheism, from such facts as have been

stated, significant as they are; we have explicit testimonies on the

point, in a multitude of writings, philosophical and popular, which have

recently issued from the Continental press. In a report presented to the

Academy of Sciences, M. Franck, a member of the Institute, represents

Pantheism as the last and greatest of all the Metaphysical systems which

have come into collision with Revelation; and describes it as a theory,

"according to which spirit and matter, thought and extension, the

phenomena of the soul and of the body, are all equally related, either

as attributes or modes, to the same substance or being, at once _one_

and _many_, finite and infinite,--Humanity, Nature, God." Conceiving

that the older forms of error--Dualism and Materialism--have all but

disappeared; and that Atheism, in its gross mechanical form, cannot now,

as Broussais himself said, "find entrance into a well-made head which

has seriously meditated on nature," M. Franck concludes that Pantheism

alone, such as has been conceived and developed in Germany, is likely to

have the power of seducing serious minds, and that it may for a season

exert considerable influence as an antagonist to Christianity.[105] M.

Javari gives a similar testimony. He tells us that "that great lie,

which is called Pantheism (_ce grand mensonge qu'on appelle le

Pantheisme_), has dragged German philosophy into an abyss; that it is

fascinating a large number of minds among his own countrymen; and that

it is this doctrine, rather than any other, which will soon gather

around it all those who do not know or who reject the truth."[106] The

Biographer of Spinoza, referring to the recent progress and prospective

prevalence of these views, affirms that "the tendency of the age, in

matters of Philosophy, Morals, and Religion, seems to incline towards

Pantheism;" that "the time is come when every one who will not frankly

embrace the pure and simple Christianity of the Gospel will be obliged

to acknowledge Spinoza as his chief, unless he be willing to expose

himself to ridicule;" that "Germany is already saturated with his

principles;" that "his philosophy domineers over all the contemporary

systems, and will continue to govern them until men are brought to

believe that word, 'No man hath seen God at any time, but He who was in

the bosom of the Father hath revealed Him;'" that it is this

"Pantheistic philosophy, boldly avowed, towards which the majority of

those writers who have the talent of commanding public interest are

gravitating at the present day;" and that "the ultimate struggle will

be, not between Christianity and Philosophy, but between Christianity

and Spinozism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist."[107] And

the critical reviewer of Pantheism, whose Essay is said to have been the

first effective check to its progress in the philosophical schools of

Paris, gives a similar testimony. He tells us that it was his main

object to point out "the Pantheistic tendencies of the age;" to show

that Germany and France are deeply imbued with its spirit; that both

Philosophy and Poetry have been infected by it; that this is "the

veritable heresy of the nineteenth century; and that, when the most

current beliefs are analyzed, they resolve themselves into Pantheism,

avowed or disguised."[108]

A few _specimens_ of this mode of thinking may be added in confirmation

of these statements. Lessing, as reported by Jacobi, expressed his

satisfaction with the poem "Prometheus," saying: "This poet's point of

view is my own; the orthodox ideas on the Divinity no longer suit me; I

derive no profit from them: [Greek: hen kai pan],--(_un et tout, the

one_ and _the all_),--I know no other." Schelling, in his earlier

writings, while he was Professor at Jena, and before the change of

sentiment which he avowed at Berlin, represented God as the one only

true and really absolute existence; as nothing more or less than Being,

filling the whole sphere of reality; as the infinite Being (_Seyn_)

which is the essence of the Universe, and evolves all things from itself

by self-development. Hegel seeks unity in every thing and every where.

This unity he discovers in the identity of existence and thought, in the

one substance which exists and thinks, in God who manifests and develops

himself in many forms. "The Absolute produces all and absorbs all; it is

the essence of all things. The life of the Absolute is never consummated

or complete. God does not properly exist, but comes into being: 'Gott

ist in werden.'--_Deus est in fieri_. With him God is not a Person, but

Personality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so

many thoughts of one eternal Mind.... Apart from, and out of the world,

therefore, there is no God; and so, also, apart from the universal

consciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality.

God is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself the

objective movement, as seen in Nature, with the subjective, as seen in

Logic; and fully realizing itself only in--the universal spirit of

Humanity."[109]

We select only two specimens from the recent literature of France; they

might be multiplied indefinitely. Pierre Leroux, the editor of the

"Encyclopedie Nouvelle," says, in his "Essay on Humanity," dedicated to

the poet Beranger:--"It is the God immanent in the Universe, in

Humanity, in each Man, that I adore."--"The worship of Humanity was the

worship of Voltaire."--"What, is Humanity considered as comprehending

all men? Is it something, or is it nothing but an abstraction of our

mind? Is Humanity a collective being, or is it nothing but a series of

individual men?"--"Being, or the soul, is eternal by its nature. Being,

or the soul, is infinite by its nature. Being, or the soul, is permanent

and unchangeable by its nature. Being, or the soul, is one by its

nature. Being, or the soul, is God by its nature."--"Socrates has proved

our eternity and the divinity of our nature."[110] The next specimen is

a singular but very instructive one. It is derived from the treatise of

M. Crousse, who holds that "intelligence is a property or an effect of

matter;" "that the world is a great body, which has sense, spirit, and

reason;" that "matter, in appearance the most cold and insensible, is in

reality animated, and capable of engendering thought." It might be

amusing, were it not melancholy, to refer to one of his proofs of this

position: "Une horologe mesure le temps; certes, c'est là un effet

intellectuel produit par une cause physique!"[111] His grand principle

is the doctrine of what he calls "Unisubstancisme," and it is applied

equally to the nature of God and the soul of man. God is admitted, but

it is the God of Pantheism,--Nature, including matter and mind, but

excluding any higher power. "God is the self-existent Being, which

includes all, and beyond which no other can be imagined. The Infinite is

identical with the Universe."--"God is and can only be the whole of that

which exists. Let us proclaim it aloud, that the echoes may repeat it,

God, the Great Being, is the All, and the All is One. God is every thing

that exists; the Universe, that is the supreme Being. In it are life

eternal, power, wisdom, knowledge, perfect organization, all the

qualities, in a word, that are inseparable from the Divinity. Beyond the

universe, or apart from it, there is nothing (_neant_); above the

visible world and its laws there is for man--_nullité_."

It is deeply humbling to think that, in the light of the nineteenth

century, and in the very centre of European civilization, speculations

such as these should have found authors to publish, and readers to

purchase them. Need we wonder that several Catholic writers on the

continent, conversant with the works which are daily issuing from the

press, and familiar with the state of society in which they live, have

publicly expressed their apprehension that, unless some seasonable and

effective check can be given to the progress of this fearful system, we

may yet witness the restoration of Polytheistic worship and the revival

of Paganism in Europe?[112]

The most cursory review of _the history of Pantheism_[113] will serve to

convince every reflecting reader that it must have its origin in some

natural but strangely perverted principle of the human mind; and that

its recent reappearance in Europe affords an additional and very

unexpected proof that, like the weeds which spring up, year after year,

in the best cultivated field, it must have its roots or seeds deep in

the soil. In the annals of our race, we find it exhibited in two

distinct forms; _first_, as a Religious doctrine, and, _secondly_, as a

Philosophical system. It had its birthplace in the East, where the

gorgeous magnificence of Nature was fitted to arrest the attention and

to stimulate the imagination of a subtle, dreamy, and speculative

people. The primitive doctrine of Creation was soon supplanted by the

pagan theory of Emanation. The Indian Brahm is the first and only

Substance, infinite, absolute, indeterminate Being, from which all is

evolved, manifested, developed, and to which all returns and is

reabsorbed. The Vedanta philosophy is based on this fundamental

principle, and it has been well described as "the most rigorous system

of Pantheism which has ever appeared."

We learn from the writings of Greece that a similar system prevailed in

Egypt, different, indeed, in form, and expressed in other terms, but

resting on the same ultimate ground; and we know that Christianity found

one of its earliest and most formidable antagonists in the philosophical

school of Alexandria, which was deeply imbued with a Pantheistic spirit,

and which, perhaps for that reason, has recently become an object of

much interest to speculative minds in France and Germany. The Gnostic

and the Neoplatonic sects maintained, and the writings of Plotinus and

Proclus still exhibit, many principles the same in substance with those

which have been recently revived in Continental Europe. In the earlier

as well as the later literature of Greece we find traces of Pantheism,

while the Polytheistic worship, which universally prevailed, was its

natural product and appropriate manifestation. The ancient Orphic

doctrines, which were taught in the Mysteries, seem to have been based

on the oriental idea of Emanation. Even in the masculine literature of

Rome we find numerous passages which are still quoted, with glowing

admiration, by the Pantheists of modern times.[114] There is, indeed,

but too much reason to believe that the numerous references which occur

in the Classics to the existence of one absolute and supreme Being, and

which Dr. Cudworth has so zealously collected, with the view of proving

"the naturality of the idea of God," must be interpreted, at least in

many instances, in a Pantheistic sense, and that they imply nothing more

than the recognition of one parent Substance, from which all other

beings have been successively developed.

We find some lingering remains of Pantheism in the writings of the

middle age. Scot Erigena, in his work, "De Divisione Naturæ," sums up

his theory by saying: "All is God, and God is all." Amaury de Chartres

made use of similar language. And it must have been more widely diffused

in these times than many may be ready to believe, if it be true, as the

Abbé Maret affirms, and as M. de Hammer offers to prove, that the

Knights of the Order of the Temple were affiliated to secret societies

in which the doctrines of Gnosticism and the spirit of Pantheism were

maintained and cherished.[115] It reappeared in the philosophical

schools of Italy before the dawn, and during the early progress, of the

revival of letters and the Reformation of Religion;[116] and even now,

after three centuries of scientific progress and social advancement, it

is once more rising into formidable strength, and aspiring to universal

ascendancy.

From this rapid survey of the history of the past, it is clear that

Pantheism is one of the oldest and most inveterate forms of error; that

in its twofold character, as at once _a philosophy_ and _a faith_, it

possesses peculiar attractions for that class of minds which delight to

luxuriate in mystic speculation; and that, in the existing state of

society, it may be reasonably regarded as the most formidable rival to

Natural and Revealed Religion. We are far from thinking, indeed, that

the old mechanical and materialistic Atheism is so completely worn out

or so utterly exploded as some recent writers would have us to

believe;[117] for M. Comte and his school still avow that wretched

creed, while they profess to despise Pantheism, as a system of empty

abstractions. We do think, however, that the grand ultimate struggle

between Christianity and Atheism will resolve itself into a contest

between Christianity and Pantheism. For, in the Christian sense,

Pantheism is itself Atheistic, since it denies the Divine personality,

and ascribes to the universe those attributes which belong only to the

living God; but then it is a distinct and very peculiar form of Atheism,

much more plausible in its pretensions, more fascinating to the

imagination, and less revolting to the reason, than those colder and

coarser theories which ascribed the origin of the world to a fortuitous

concourse of atoms, or to the mere mechanical laws of matter and motion.

It admits much which the Atheism of a former age would have denied; it

recognizes the principle of causality, and gives a reason, such as it

is, for the existing order of Nature; it adopts the very language of

Theism, and speaks of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Unchangeable One;

it may even generate a certain mystic piety, in which elevation of

thought may be blended with sensibility of emotion, springing from a

warm admiration of Nature; and it admits of being embellished with the

charms of a seductive eloquence, and the graces of a sentimental poetry.

It may be regarded, therefore, not indeed as the only, but as the most

formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day.

We have sometimes thought that the recent discoveries of Chemical

Science might have a tendency, at least in the case of superficial

minds, to create a prepossession in favor of Pantheism; for what does

modern Chemistry exhibit, but the spectacle of Nature passing through a

series of successive transmutations?--the same substance appearing in

different forms, and assuming in every change different properties, but

never annihilated, never destroyed; now existing in the form of solid

matter, again in the form of a yielding fluid, again in the form of an

elastic gas; now nourishing a plant, and entering into its very

substance; now incorporated with an animal, and forming its sinews or

its bones; now reduced again to dust and ashes, but only to appear anew,

and enter once more into other combinations. The facts are certain, and

they are sufficiently striking to suggest the question, May not Nature

itself be the one Being whose endless transformations constitute the

history of the universe? This question may be naturally suggested, and

it may even be lawfully entertained; but it cannot be satisfactorily

determined by any theory which leaves the evident marks of Intelligence

and Design in the whole constitution and course of Nature unaccounted

for or unexplained.

Influenced by these and similar considerations, many thoughtful men have

recently avowed their belief that the two grand alternatives in modern

times are, Christianity and Pantheism. The Abbé Maret and Amand Saintes

differ only in this: that by Christianity the former means Catholicism,

the latter means the Gospel, or the religion of the primitive church;

but both agree that Pantheism is the only other alternative. Schlegel

contrasts the same alternatives in the following impressive terms: "Here

is the decisive point; two distinct, opposite, or diverging paths lie

before us, and man must choose between them. The clear-seeing spirit,

which, in its sentiments, thoughts, and views of life, would be in

accordance with itself, and would act consistently with them, must, in

any case, take one or the other. Either there is a living God, full of

love, even such a One as love seeks and yearns after, to whom faith

clings, and in whom all our hopes are centred (and such is the personal

God of Revelation),--and on this hypothesis the world is not God, but is

distinct from Him, having had a beginning, and being created out of

nothing,--or there is only one supreme form of existence, and the world

is eternal, and not distinct from God; there is absolutely but One, and

this eternal One comprehends all, and is itself all in all; so that

there is no where any real and essential distinction, and even that

which is alleged to exist between evil and good is only a delusion of a

narrow-minded system of Ethics.... Now, the necessity of this choice and

determination _presses urgently upon our own time_, which stands midway

between two worlds. Generally, it is between _these two paths alone_

that the decision is to be made."[118]

We have made the preceding remarks on purpose to show that the

distinctive doctrines of Pantheism, as a system different, in some

respects, from the colder forms of Atheism, demand the careful study of

the Divines and the Philosophers of the present age; and that any

statement of the evidence in favor of the being and perfections of God,

which overlooks the prevalence of these doctrines, or makes only a

cursory reference to them, must be alike defective in itself, and ill

adapted to the real exigencies of European society. Let this be our

apology for attempting, as we now propose, to exhibit an outline of the

Pantheistic system, to resolve it into its constituent elements and

ultimate grounds, to examine the validity of the reasons on which it

rests, and to contrast it with the doctrine of Christian Theism, which

speaks of a living, personal God, and of a distinct but dependent

Creation, the product of His supreme wisdom and almighty power. The task

is one of considerable difficulty,--difficulty arising not so much from

the nature of the subject, as from the metaphysical and abstruse manner

in which it has been treated. We must follow Spinoza through the

labyrinth of his Theological Politics and his Geometrical Ethics; we

must follow Schelling and Hegel into the still darker recesses of their

Transcendental Philosophy; for a philosophy of one kind can only be met

and neutralized by a higher and a better, and the first firm step

towards the refutation of error is a thorough comprehension of it. But

having an assured faith in those stable laws of thought which are

inwoven with the very texture of the human mind, and in the validity and

force of that natural evidence to which Theology appeals, we have no

fear of the profoundest Metaphysics that can be brought to bear on the

question at issue, provided only they be not altogether unintelligible.

Pantheism has appeared in several different forms; and it may conduce

both to the fullness and the clearness of our exposition if we offer, in

the first instance, a comprehensive outline of the theory of Spinoza,

with a brief criticism on its leading principles, and thereafter advance

to the consideration of the twofold development of Pantheism in the

hands of Materialists and Idealists, respectively.

SECTION I.

THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA.

The Pantheistic speculations which have been revived in modern times can

scarcely be understood, and still less accounted for or answered,

without reference to the system of Spinoza. That system met with little

favor from any, and with vigorous opposition from not a few, of the

divines and philosophers of the times immediately subsequent to its

publication. It was denounced and refuted by Musæus, a judicious and

learned professor of divinity at Jena; by Mansvelt, a young but

promising professor of philosophy at Utrecht; by Cuyper of Rotterdam; by

Wittichius of Leyden; by Pierre Poiret of Reinsburg; by Fenelon,

Archbishop of Cambray; by Huet, Bishop of Avranches; by John Howe, and

Dr. Samuel Clarke, as well as by many others,[119] whose writings

served for a time to preserve the Church from the infection of his most

dangerous errors. But gradually these views became an object of

speculative interest to Metaphysical inquirers, and found favor even

with a growing class of Philosophical Divines;[120] partly by reason of

the strong intellectual energy with which they were conceived and

announced, and partly, also, there is reason to fear, on account of a

prevailing tendency to lower the authority of Scripture, and to exalt

the prerogatives of reason, in matters of faith. The system of Spinoza,

as developed in his "Tractatus Theologico-politicus," and, still more,

in his "Ethica,"--a posthumous publication,--may be said to contain the

germs of the whole system both of Theological and Philosophical

Rationalism which was subsequently unfolded,--in the Church, by Paulus,

Wegscheider, and Strauss,--and, in the Schools, by Fichte, Schelling,

and Hegel.

Theological Rationalism consists in making Reason the sole arbiter and

the supreme judge in matters of faith; in setting aside or undermining

the authority of Revelation, partly by denying or questioning the

plenary inspiration of Scripture, partly by explaining or accounting for

miracles on natural principles, partly by assuming, as Strauss assumes,

that whatever is supernatural must necessarily be unhistorical; in

reducing every article of the creed, by a new method of critical

exegesis, to a mere statement of some natural fact or some moral

doctrine, embellished, in the one case, by mythical legends, and

accommodated, in the other, to local and temporary prejudices, but

amounting substantially to nothing more than a natural development of

human thought. The prolific germs of this Neologian method of the

interpretation of Scripture are to be found every where in the writings

of Spinoza.

Philosophical Rationalism, again, although often, or rather generally,

blended with the Theological, is yet, in some respects, distinct from

it. The one has been developed in the Church, the other in the Schools.

The former, cultivated by divines who acknowledged more or less

explicitly the authority of Scripture, has directed its efforts mainly

to the establishment of a new method of Biblical exegesis and criticism,

by which all that is peculiar to Revelation, as a supernatural scheme,

might be enervated or explained away. The latter cultivated by

Philosophic speculators who were not bound by any authority, nor

fettered by any subscription to articles of faith, has sought, without

reference to Revelation, to solve the great problems relating to God,

Man, and the Universe, on purely natural principles; and, after many

fruitless efforts, has taken refuge, at last, in the Faith of Pantheism

and the Philosophy of the Absolute. The prolific germs of this method of

the interpretation of Nature are also to be found in the writings of

Spinoza.

The circumstance, indeed, which, more than any other, seems to have

commended his system to some of the most inquisitive minds in Europe, is

_its apparent completeness_. It is not a mere theory of Pantheism, nor a

mere method of Exegesis, nor a mere code of Ethics, nor a mere scheme of

Politics, although all these are comprehended under it; but it is a

system founded on a few radical principles, which are exhibited in the

shape of axioms and definitions, and unfolded, by rigorous logical

deduction, in a series of propositions, with occasional scholia and

corollaries, after the method of Geometry; a system which undertakes to

explain the rationale of _every_ part of human knowledge, to interpret

alike the Book of Nature and the Book of Revelation, to determine the

character of prophetic inspiration, and to account for apparent miracles

on natural principles, to establish the real foundations of moral duty,

and the ultimate grounds of state policy; and all this on the strength

of a few simple definitions, and a series of necessary deductions from

them. It is important to mark this characteristic feature of his system;

for while we have directly nothing to do with by far the larger part of

his speculations, which relate to questions foreign to our present

inquiry, yet the fact that his ethical and political conclusions are

deduced from the same principles on which his Pantheistic theory is

founded, serves at once to account for the extensive influence which his

writings have exerted on every department of modern speculation, and

also to show that, in opposing that system, we are entitled to found on

the conclusions which he has himself deduced from it, for the purpose of

disproving the fundamental principles on which it rests. For if, on the

one hand, the principles which he assumes in his definitions and axioms

do necessarily involve the conclusions which are propounded in his

Ethics and Politics; and if, on the other hand, these conclusions are

found to be at variance with the highest views of Morality and

Government, then the more logical the process by which they have been

deduced, the more certain will it be that there is some fundamental flaw

in the basis on which the whole superstructure is reared. In other

cases, it might be doubtful how far the consequences that may seem to be

deducible from a theory could be legitimately urged in argument,

especially when these consequences are disavowed by the author of it;

but, in the present case, the consequences are explicitly declared, not

less than the principles,--they are even exhibited as corollaries

rigorously deduced from them; and thus the very comprehensiveness of the

system, which gives it so much of the aspect of completeness, and which

has fascinated the minds of speculative men, always fond of bold and

sweeping generalizations, may be found to afford the most conclusive

proof of its inherent weakness, and to show that it comes into fatal

collision, at all points, not only with the doctrines of Natural and

Revealed Religion, but also with the practical duties and political

rights of mankind.

We may present, in brief compass, a comprehensive summary of the

doctrine of Spinoza. The fundamental principle of his whole theory is

contained in the assumption with which he sets out,--that the entire

system of Being consists only of _three_ elements, "Substance,

Attributes, and Modes," and in the _definitions_ which are given of

these terms respectively. With him, Substance is Being; not this or that

particular being, nor even being in general, considered in the abstract,

but absolute Being,--Being in its plentitude, which comprehends all

existences that can be conceived without requiring the concept of any

other thing, and without which no other thing can either exist or be

conceived.[121] By an "Attribute" he means, not substance, but a

manifestation of substance, yet such a manifestation as belongs to its

very essence; and, by a "Mode," he means an affection of substance, or

that which exists in another thing, and is conceived by means of that

thing. These are the three fundamental ideas of his system.[122]

The "Substance" of which he speaks is God, the infinite, self-existent,

eternal Being, whose essential nature is defined in terms which might

seem to be expressive of a great truth, for he says: "I understand by

God an absolutely infinite Being, that is to say, a Substance

constituted by an infinity of Attributes, each of which expresses an

eternal and infinite essence." But, on closer inspection, we find that

the God of whom he speaks is not the Creator and Governor of the world,

not a living, personal Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it,

not the Holy One and the Just, possessing infinite moral perfections,

and exercising a supreme dominion over His works; but, simply, absolute

Being, the necessary self-existent Substance, whose known "Attributes"

are _extension_ and _thought_, and whose affections, or "Modes,"

comprehend all the varieties of finite existence; in short, it is Nature

that is God, for every possible existence may be included under the

twofold expression of _Natura naturans_ and _Natura naturata_.

Accordingly, the principle of _Unisubstancisme_ is broadly avowed, and

the very possibility of creation denied. He affirms, and, indeed,

according to his definition, he is entitled to affirm, that there is not

and cannot be more than _one substance_; for by "Substance" he means a

self-existent, necessary, and eternal Being. And, on the same ground, he

affirms that the creation of _such_ a substance is impossible; for,

having excluded every finite thing--everything that does not exist of

itself--from his definition of Substance, he is warranted in saying that

anything called into being by a creative act of Divine power could not

be a "substance," _in his sense of that term_. He sets himself to prove,

by a series of propositions whose logical correctness, as deductions

from his fundamental assumption, may be freely and most safely admitted,

that the production of a "substance" is absolutely impossible; that

between two "substances," having different "attributes," there is

nothing in common; that where two things have nothing in common, the one

cannot be the cause of the other; that two or more distinct things can

only be discriminated from each other by the difference of the

"attributes" or "affections" of their "substance;" and that, in the

nature of things, there cannot be two or more substances of the same

kind, or possessing the same attributes. He holds, of course, that

Nature is as necessary as God, or, rather, that God and Nature are one;

there being but one Substance, appearing only in different aspects, as

cause and effect, as substance and mode, as infinite and yet finite, as

one and yet many, as ever the same and yet infinitely variable.

It is only necessary to add, that the sole attributes of this Substance

which are capable of being known by our limited intelligence, and which

are discerned by an immediate "intuition of reason," are two, namely,

_extension_ and _thought_. We know nothing, and can know nothing, of God

beyond this: He has no will, or his will is mere intelligence or

thought; He has no law, or His law is merely His thought embodied in the

arrangements of nature; He has no moral properties that are cognizable

by the human faculties. It follows that God is not the creator of the

world, for creation implies an act of will, and God has no will; that He

is not the Lawgiver or Governor of the world, for there is no law

emanating from a superior, but such only as is created by _human compact

or agreement_, and there is "no natural obligation to obey God," no

invariable standard of right and wrong. The principles which are thus

assumed in regard to the nature of God are afterwards applied to many

important questions, relating, first, to the soul of man; secondly, to

the science of Ethics; thirdly, to the doctrine of political right and

liberty; and, fourthly, to the supposed claims of Revelation. And they

are carried out, with inexorable logic, into all their most revolting

results.

Such is a concise, but, as we believe, a correct outline of the leading

principles of the system of Spinoza. We shall now offer a few remarks

upon it, directed to the object of showing wherein consists the radical

fallacy on which it rests, and what are the considerations by which

thoughtful men may be most effectually secured against its pernicious

influence.

It has been well said by Professor Saisset, that the fallacy of this

system does not lie in any one proposition of the series, but that it is

a vicious circle throughout; that the paralogism is not in this or that

part of the "Ethics,"--it is everywhere; and that the germ of the whole

is contained in the _definitions_, which are assumed, but not

proved.[123] Our attention, therefore, must be given, in the first

instance, to the fundamental assumptions on which the whole

superstructure is built.

1. It is assumed, without proof, that the entire system of Being may be

ranked under the three categories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes.

It is assumed, equally without proof, that there can be no substance

which is not self-existent, necessary, and eternal, and that every being

which does not possess these properties must be only a "mode" or

affection of another being to whom they belong. It is further assumed,

also without proof, that _extension_ and _thought_ are necessary

"attributes" of the one self-existent "substance," each of the two

exhibiting only a different aspect of his eternal essence, while both

are equally essential and equally infinite. And, finally, it is assumed,

still without proof, that Nature comprehends a twofold series of

existences, distinct from each other, but developed, as it were, in

parallel lines,--Corporeal and Intellectual beings, which correspond

respectively to the Divine attributes of extension and thought,--which

partake of the essential nature of these attributes, but exhibit them in

finite and transient forms, as mere modes or manifestations of the one

infinite "substance." These are some of the fundamental assumptions on

which he proceeds; they are not proved, nor even attempted to be proved;

for, although several are stated in the form of distinct propositions,

and accompanied with a formal demonstration, the most cursory inspection

of the pretended proof is sufficient to show that it consists entirely

in a series of _deductions from principles previously assumed_, and that

its validity must ultimately rest on the _definitions_ in which these

principles are embodied.

Now, let any one examine these "definitions," and he will find that they

are wholly arbitrary, and that he is not bound by any law of his

intellectual nature to admit them, still less entitled, on any ground of

experience, to assume and found upon them, as if they were self-evident

or axiomatic truths. It is possible, and it may even be legitimate and

useful for the purposes of philosophical speculation, to classify the

various objects of human knowledge by ranging them under the categories

of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. But is it a self-evident truth,

that there can be no substance in nature excepting such as is

self-existent and eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that man, with his

distinct personality and individual consciousness, is a mere "mode" or

affection of another being? Is it a self-evident truth that the ape, the

lizard, and the worm are equally "modes" of the same substance with the

angel and the seraph? Is it a self-evident truth that _extension_ and

_thought_ are equally expressive of the uncreated Essence and necessary

"attributes" of the Eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that no being

can exist in nature otherwise than by _development out of the Divine

substance_, and that the _creation_ of a distinct but dependent being is

impossible? In regard to questions such as these, the appeal must lie to

that common sense, or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of

every thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by the

arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. These

definitions must commend themselves _as true_, either by their own

self-evidencing light, or by their manifest conformity with experience,

before they can be assumed and founded on in any process of reasoning;

and we are very sure that those which have been specified cannot be

candidly examined without appearing to be, as they really are, the

grossest instances of a _petitio principii_ that have ever been offered

to the world. For these "definitions" constitute the foundation of the

whole superstructure; they contain the germ, which is subsequently

expanded and developed in a long series of propositions; and, as they

are assumed without proof, while they are far from being self-evident,

no amount of logical power and no effort of dialectic skill can possibly

extract from them any doctrinal results, whether theological, ethical,

or political, possessing greater evidence than what belongs to

themselves. This is our _first_ objection.

2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our special

subject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or experimental

method; it is an argument _a priori_, a deductive process of reasoning.

Now, this method, suitable as it is to a certain class of subjects, such

as those of Geometry, in which clear and precise definitions are

attainable, is either utterly inapplicable to another class of subjects,

such as most of those of which Spinoza treats, or it is peculiarly

dangerous, especially in the hands of a daring speculator, since, in the

absence of adequate definitions, he may be tempted to have recourse to

such as are purely arbitrary. All the possible properties of a circle

may be deduced from the simple definition of it; but it will not follow

that all the possible forms of being in nature may be deduced from the

definition of "substance." The reason is clear; we cannot have such a

definition of substance as we may have of a circle. We do not object

merely to the _geometrical form_ of his reasoning,--that is a mere

accessory, and one which renders the "Ethica" much more dry and less

attractive than the "Tractatus," in which he gives free scope to his

subtle intellect, unfettered by any such artificial plan,--but we object

to the essential nature of his system, to the _a priori_ and deductive

method by which he attempts to solve some of the highest problems of

philosophy respecting God, Nature, and Man. Here, if anywhere, is a

field of inquiry which demands for its due cultivation an enlarged

experience and a patient spirit of induction. Yet, with him, the

starting-point of philosophy is the highest object of human thought. He

begins with the idea of self-existent Being, without which, as he

imagines, nothing else can be conceived; and then, following the line of

a descending series, he attempts to deduce from it the philosophy of

the whole system of the universe![124] His Metaphysics must borrow

nothing from experience; his very Psychology must be purely deductive.

From the intuitive idea of "substance" he deduces the nature and

existence of God; from the nature of God, the necessity of a Divine

development; from the necessity of a Divine development, the existence

of a universe comprising souls and bodies; and nowhere does he

condescend to take notice of the facts of experience, except in two of

his axioms, in which he assumes that "man thinks," and that "he feels

his body to be affected in various ways." His whole philosophy resolves

itself ultimately into an intellectual intuition, whose object is

Substance or Being, with its infinite attributes of extension and

thought,--an intuition which discerns its object directly and

immediately, in the light of its own self-evidence, without the aid of

any intermediate sign, and which is as superior, in a philosophical

point of view, to the intimations of sense, as its objects are superior

to the fleeting phenomena of Nature.

Now, we submit that this method of constructing a philosophy of Nature

is radically vicious, and diametrically opposed to the only legitimate,

the only possible way of attaining to sound knowledge. He is not content

to tell us _what is_ the order of things; he aspires, forsooth, to show

what the order of things _must be_. We have no wish to disparage

Metaphysical Science; it has a natural root in human reason, and a

legitimate domain in the ample territory of human thought; but we

protest against any attempt to extend it beyond its proper boundaries,

or to apply it to subjects which belong to the province of experience

and observation. The schemes which have been recently broached in

Germany, and imitated in France, for constructing, at one time, a

deductive Psychology, at another a deductive Physics, at a third a

deductive Ethics, at a fourth a deductive Theory of Progress, at a

fifth a deductive History of Religion, afford more than sufficient

evidence that hitherto the spirit of the Baconian philosophy has been

little understood, and still less appreciated, by our continental

neighbors; and that the efforts of the highest genius have been sadly

frustrated, in attempting the impracticable task of extracting from mere

reason that knowledge which can only be acquired in the school of

experience. This is our _second_ objection.

3. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it applies a mere

abstraction of the human mind to account for whatever is real and

concrete in the universe. We have no sympathy with those who rail at all

abstract ideas, as if they were imaginary essences or mere illusions; we

recognize the faculty of abstraction as one of the wisest provisions of

Nature, and one of the most useful powers belonging to the mind of

man,--a power which comes into action with the first dawn of infant

intelligence, and is only matured as reason rises into manhood, till it

becomes the internal spring of all Philosophy and Science. Nor do we

hold that an abstract idea is necessarily an unreality, or a mere

negation; for, without reviving the controversy between the Nominalists

and Realists, or pronouncing any decision on the intricate questions

which that controversy involved, we may say, in general terms, that the

idea of a circle, of a square, or of a triangle, is neither unreal nor

negative, but a very positive, and, withal, intelligible thing. It is

the idea of that which is essential to the nature of each of these

figures respectively, and common to all possible figures of the same

class, whatever may be their accidental varieties, whether in point of

dimension or form. And so the idea of Being or Substance, although it be

highly abstract, is not necessarily unreal or negative; it is the idea

of _existence_, or of that which is common to everything that _is_,

abstraction being made of every diversity by which one being is

distinguished from another. Conscious that we ourselves exist, and

observing that other beings exist around us, we strike off the

peculiarities which belong to individuals, and form the general idea

which includes nothing but what is common to all, and yet contains a

positive element, which is the object of one of the strongest

convictions of the human mind.[125] The conception of Infinite Being

contains the positive element of _being_, abstraction being made of all

_limitation_ or _bounds_. That this is a real, legitimate, and useful

conception, we have no disposition to deny; we cannot divest ourselves

of it; it springs up spontaneously from the innermost fountain of

thought. But we cannot accept the account which Spinoza has given of its

nature and origin, and still less can we assent to the application which

he has made of it. He describes it as the idea of absolute, necessary,

self-existent, eternal Being; and he traces its origin, not to the

combined influence of experience and abstraction, acting under the great

primitive law of _causality_, but to an immediate perception, or direct

_intuition, of reason_. Now, we submit that the concept of _being_, and

the concept of absolute _self-existent being_, are perfectly distinct

from each other, and that they spring from different laws of thought.

The concept of _being_ applies to everything that exists, without

reference to the cause or manner of its existence; and this springs

simply from experience and abstraction. The concept of _self-existent

being_, which is equally suggested by the laws of our mental

constitution, does not apply to everything that exists, but only to that

whose existence is not originated or determined by any other being; and

this concept springs also from experience and abstraction, combined,

however, with the law or principle of _causality_, which teaches us that

no change can occur in Nature, and that nothing can ever come into

being, _without a cause_, and prompts us to infer from _the fact of

existence now_, the conclusion that _something must have existed from

all eternity_. The origin of each of these concepts may thus be

naturally accounted for by the known laws of our mental constitution,

without having recourse to any faculty of _intellectual intuition_ such

as Spinoza describes,--a faculty independent of experience, and superior

to it,--a faculty which gazes direct on Absolute Being, and penetrates,

without the aid of any intermediate sign or manifestation, into the very

essence of God. Spinoza has not discriminated aright between these two

concepts, in respect either of their nature or their origin. He has not

overlooked, indeed, the distinction, between _abstract ideas_ and the

_intellectual intuitions_, of which he speaks; but he confounds the

concept of _being_ with the concept of _self-existent being_, as if the

two were identical, or as if _being_ could not be predicated of

anything, otherwise than as it is a "mode" or affection of the one only

"substance." A sounder Psychology has taught us that our conception of

existence arises, in the first instance, from our own conscious

experience; and that, when this conception subsequently expands into the

idea of Absolute Being, and results in the belief of a necessary,

self-existent, and eternal Cause, the new element which is thus added to

it may be accounted for by the _principle of causality_, which

constitutes one of the fundamental laws of human thought, and which, if

it may be said to resemble _intuition_ in the rapidity and clearness

with which it enables us to discern the truth, differs essentially from

that _immediate intuition_ of which Spinoza speaks, since it is

dependent on experience, and, instead of gazing direct on Absolute

Being, makes use of intermediate signs and manifestations, by which it

rises to the knowledge of "the unseen and eternal."

We submit, further, that a system which rests on the mere idea of Being

as its sole support, cannot afford any satisfactory explanation of real

and concrete existences. The idea of Being is one of our most abstract

conceptions; it is associated, indeed, with an invincible belief in the

reality of Being,--a belief which springs up spontaneously, along with

the idea itself, from our own conscious experience. It is even

associated with an invincible belief in necessary, self-existent, and

eternal Being,--a belief which springs from _the principle of

causality_, or that law of thought whereby, from the fact that something

exists now, we instinctively conclude that something _must_ have existed

from all eternity. But neither the simple concept of Being, which is

derived from experience and framed by abstraction, nor the additional

concept of self-existent Being, which springs from the action of our

rational faculties on the data furnished by experience, can afford any

explanation of the nature and origin of the real, concrete existences in

the universe. These must be studied in the light of their own

appropriate evidence; they must be interpreted, and not divined; they

cannot be inferred deductively from any, even the highest and most

abstract, conception of the human mind. Yet the philosophy of Spinoza

attempts to explain all the phenomena of the universe by the idea of

Absolute Being; it accounts for the concrete by the abstract; it

represents all individual beings as mere modes or affections of one

universal substance; in other words, it _realises_ the abstract idea of

thought and extension, but _denies the existence_ of bodies and souls,

otherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences.

4. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole reasoning on the

subject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent fallacy. He affirms the

impossibility of Creation, and attempts to demonstrate his position. But

how? By proving that a "substance" cannot be produced. And why may not

"a substance" be produced? Because, _by the definition_, "a substance"

is that which is "self-existent." In other words, a self-existent

substance cannot be created,--a truism which scarcely required the

apparatus of a geometrical proof by means of propositions, scholia, and

corollaries, or, as Professor Saisset says, with laconic naïveté, "_ce

qui a à peine besoin d'être demontré_." But, while the only proof that

is offered extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated

substance, it is afterwards applied to everything that exists, so as to

exclude the creation even of that which is _not_ self-existent; and this

on the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either a

"substance," or an "attribute," or a "mode." And thus, partly by an

ambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption,

he excludes the possibility of Creation altogether. Surely it might have

occurred to him that by proving the necessary existence of an uncreated

Being--a doctrine held by every Christian Theist--he did not advance one

step towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even

towards the establishment of his favorite theory of _unisubstancisme_;

for, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent Being; grant,

even, that there can be no more than _one_,--would it follow that there

can be no created and dependent beings, or that they can only exist as

"modes" or "affections" of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist

as _creatures_, as _products_, as _effects_, without partaking of the

nature of their cause?[126] Yet, if there be one idea more than another

which Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of creation, and he

summons the whole strength, both of his logic and sarcasm, when he has

to deal with the argument from "final causes." And no marvel; for the

doctrine of a creation would cut up his system by the roots. The radical

difference, in fact, between Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in

this: that the former regards creation as distinct from the Creator, as

the product of His omnipotent and free will, as the object of His

constant providential care, as the subject of His supreme control and

government; whereas the latter represents it as a necessary _emanation_

from the Divine substance, as an eternal _development_ of the uncreated

Essence; the finite, in all its forms, being a "mode" of the infinite,

and the temporary phases of nature so many transient but ever-renewed

manifestations of the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions

are diametrically opposed; they cannot admit of conciliation or

compromise; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove the

impossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence of an

Infinite and Eternal Being.

5. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves erroneous

conclusions respecting both the _body_ and the _soul_. He denies that

they are "substances." And why? Because, _by the definition_, "a

substance" is that which is self-existent, and may be conceived without

reference to any other being. Be it so. What does this argument amount

to? Why, simply to this, that they are not gods. What, then, are they?

Created beings? No. And why? Because creation is impossible, and, also,

because whatever exists must be either a "substance," or an "attribute,"

or a "mode." What then? Clearly not an "attribute," for the only

attributes known to us are extension and thought, and these attributes

are as infinite as "the substance" to which they belong; they must

therefore be "modes" or "affections" of that "substance." But in what

sense? In the sense of being created, and therefore dependent,

existences, whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or accounted

for without reference to the Being who produced them at first, and still

continues to maintain them? No; for in that sense all Theists admit the

derivation and dependence of every finite being; but they must be

"modes" or "affections" of the one uncreated essence, mere phenomenal

manifestations of it. The soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere

succession of ideas. The body is a mere "mode" of the Divine "attribute"

of extension; and neither the one nor the other can be described as a

_distinct being_. They are affections, and nothing more, of the one

infinite "substance."

It is important to remark that, according to this theory, _the distinct

personality of man_ is excluded, not less than _the distinct personality

of God_. It is not easy, indeed, to explain this part of Spinoza's

theory; for he has a subtle disquisition on the relation subsisting

between the soul and the body, by means of which he attempts to explain

the phenomena of self-consciousness, and to show that individual

personality is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine which

represents man as a mere "mode" of the Divine "substance." But one thing

is clear: there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct

personality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. The

unity, especially of the human soul, its individuality, its

self-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent, indeed, on God,

but really distinct from Him, must be sacrificed, if the system is to be

saved; and no other being can be recognized but the absolute

"substance," with its infinite "attributes" and its finite "modes." This

consideration appears to us to be fatal to the whole theory. For it

shows that the Pantheistic speculations, which are directed against _the

personality of God_, are equally conclusive, if they be conclusive at

all, against _the personality of Man_; that they run counter to the

intuitive knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be embraced

without doing violence to some of our clearest and surest convictions.

For what clearer or surer conviction can there be than that of my own

personal existence, as a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active,

and responsible being? And yet the existence of our own bodies and souls

is denied, except in so far as they are mere "modes" or affections of

the one uncreated "substance," which is known, not by experience or

observation, but by a transcendental faculty of intuition.

And, _finally_, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because the

exposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring

self-contradictions. His logical power has been so much admired, and his

rigorous geometrical method so highly extolled, that his Philosophy has

acquired a certain _prestige_, which commends it to many ardent,

speculative minds. Yet there are few philosophical writers who have made

a larger number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded more in

contradictory statements. The "Antinomies" of Spinoza might make the

subject of an amusing, and even instructive, dissertation. Thus, by way

of specimen, take the following:

God is extended; but, nevertheless, incorporeal.

God thinks; but, nevertheless, has no intelligence.

God is active; but, nevertheless, has no will.

The soul is a "mode" of the Divine thought; but, nevertheless, there is

no analogy between God's thought and man's thought.

The love of God is the supreme law of man; but, nevertheless, it is

equally lawful for man to live according to appetite or to reason.

The will of man, is, in no sense, free; but, nevertheless, there is a

science of human ethics.

Man is under no natural obligation to obey God; but, nevertheless, God

is his highest good.

God is neither a Lawgiver nor a Governor; but, nevertheless, a future

state is necessary, that every man may have his due.

Might is Right, and Government has power to restrain "the liberty of

Prophesying;" but, nevertheless, has no power to restrain "the liberty

of Philosophizing."

These are only a few specimens of the gratuitous assumptions and

flagrant contradictions with which his writings abound; but they afford

a sufficient proof of the reckless character of his genius, and of the

utter fallacy of the system which he promulgated as a rival, or as a

substitute, for Natural and Revealed Religion.

On a review of what has been advanced, it must be manifest that the

Pantheistic system of Spinoza is founded on principles assumed without

proof, and embodied in his "definitions;" that it is constructed

according to a philosophical method which is radically vicious; that it

abounds in self-contradictory statements; and that it is opposed, at

many points, to some of the clearest lessons of experience, and to some

of the surest convictions of reason. It is a system which is not

demonstrated, but merely developed. The germ of it exists in the

"definitions;" deny these, and you destroy his whole philosophy. It

cannot, therefore, be held sufficient to foreclose the question

respecting the existence of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature

and independent of it; nor can Pantheism, in this form, become the

successful rival of Christian Theism, until the human mind has lost the

power of discriminating between the different kinds of evidence to which

they respectively appeal.

SECTION II.

MATERIAL OR HYLOZOIC PANTHEISM.

In the system of Spinoza, the two "attributes of _extension_ and

_thought_" and the corresponding "modes" of _body_ and _soul_, were

equally recognized, and were employed jointly, in connection with his

favorite doctrine of Unisubstancisme. They constituted the opposite

poles of his theory, but were both essential to its completeness. But

most of his followers, influenced by an excessive desire for

simplification, have attempted to blend the two into one; and have

either merged the spiritual in the corporeal, or virtually annihilated

the material by resolving it into the mental. Hence two distinct, and

even opposite forms of Pantheism,--the _material_ or _hylozoic_, and the

_ideal_ or _spiritual_.

The former was the first in the order of historical development, so far

as modern Europe is concerned. It was most in accordance with the

Sensational Philosophy which prevailed in the school of Condillac,[127]

and which continued to maintain its ascendancy until it was assailed by

the reviving spirit of Idealism. It was the characteristic feature of

the Atheism of the last century, and was fully exhibited in the "Systême

de la Nature." The recent revival of Idealism has done much to check its

progress, but it has not effected its destruction; on the contrary, the

theory of Material or Hylozoic Pantheism is an error as inveterate as it

is ancient, and it is continually reappearing even in the light of the

intellectual and spiritual Psychology of the nineteenth century.

This theory, although it has been propounded as a religious creed, rests

mainly on a philosophical dogma. It is based ultimately on the

supposition that nothing exists in the universe except _matter_ and its

laws; that _mind_ is the product of material organization; and that all

the phenomena of thought, of feeling, of conscience, and even of

religion, may be accounted for by ascribing them to certain powers

inherent in matter, and evolved by certain peculiarities of cerebral

structure. This fundamental assumption, on which the whole theory of

Hylozoic Pantheism ultimately rests, will be subjected to examination in

the sequel. We think that it may be best discussed separately and apart,

for this among other reasons, that it stands equally related to the old

mechanical Atheism and the new material Pantheism, and that, in point of

fact, it has been applied indifferently to the support of both. Our

remarks at present, therefore, will be directed, not to the refutation

of Materialism, but to the exposition and exposure of the Pantheism

which has been founded upon it.

It is not easy--perhaps it might be found, on trial, to be

impossible--to show that there is any real difference, except in name,

between mechanical Atheism and material Pantheism. Both equally affirm

the self-existence and eternity of the Universe; both equally deny the

fact of creation, and the doctrine of a living, personal God, distinct

from nature, and superior to it. The only apparent difference between

the two consists in this,--that the former speaks more of the rude

materials, and the cold, hard, unbending laws, which exist in Nature;

the latter speaks more of the vital powers, the subtle and ethereal

forces, which are at work in her bosom, and which may seem to impart

warmth and animation to a system that would otherwise be felt to be

cold, inert, and deathlike. But the mechanical Atheist never denied the

vital powers of Nature, he only attempted to account for them without an

intelligent first Cause; and the material Pantheist has little, if any,

advantage over him, except in this, that he has combined Chemistry with

Mechanics in attempting to account for the phenomena of the universe,

and has drawn his analogies from the laboratory and the crucible, the

process of vegetation, and the laws of reproduction and growth, not less

than from the formulæ of Physical Science.

The theory of Material Pantheism runs insensibly into one or other of

the forms of naked Atheism to which we have already referred. Ignoring

the existence of mind, or of any spiritual Power distinct from Nature

and superior to it, it must necessarily hold the eternal existence of

matter; and, in this respect, it coincides entirely with the Atheistic

hypothesis. It may, or it may not, hold also the eternal existence of

the present _order of Nature_, including all the varieties of vegetable

and animal life. In the one case, it harmonizes with the ancient theory

of Atheism, as maintained by Ocellus Lucanus; in the other, it must run

into the modern theory of Development, if it makes any attempt to

account for the origin of new races, as made known by the researches of

Geologists. In either case, it is equivalent to Atheism, and dependent

on one or other of the various theories which have been applied to the

defence of the Atheist's creed.

It is worthy of remark, in this connection, how frequently those who are

the most daring and decided advocates of Atheism or Pantheism do

nevertheless ascribe to Nature many of the attributes which belong to

God only. This fact is admirably illustrated by the distinguished

founder of the Boyle Lectureship;[128] and it is abundantly confirmed by

examples which have been furnished by more recent times. The author of

the "System of Nature," which appeared before the first French

Revolution, was an avowed and most reckless Atheist;[129] yet he

ascribes to Nature most of the attributes which are usually supposed to

belong to God, such as self-existence, eternity, immutability,

infinitude, and unity; and if the _intellectual_ and _moral_ attributes

may seem to be omitted, as they must be, to some extent, in any system

of Atheism, yet _thought_, _design_, and _will_, are expressly ascribed

to Nature.[130] And the only difference between the Theist and the

Atheist is said to be, that the latter ascribes all the phenomena of

Nature "to material, natural, sensible, and known causes," while the

former ascribes them to "spiritual, supernatural, unintelligible, and

unknown causes;" or, in other words, "to an _occult cause_."[131] It is

manifestly a matter of indifference whether this method of accounting

for the phenomena of Nature be called Atheism or Pantheism; in either

aspect it is essentially the same.

The more recent advocates of Atheism or Pantheism have often made use of

similar language. M. Crousse affirms that "all nature is _animated_ by

an internal force which moves it;" that this is the true _spontaneity_,

the _causality_, which is the origin of all sensible manifestations, for

"_mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet_;" that "matter, the most

cold and indifferent, is full of life, capable of engendering thought,

and containing mind in it, at least _potentially_;" and that, to every

man who has true insight, "the world feels, moves, speaks, and

thinks."[132] The author of "The Purpose of Existence" makes it his

grand object to show that "the evolvement of mind out of matter" is the

primary law and final cause of the universe; that "this process

commences with vegetation, extracting from matter the spirit of

vitality;" that "this spirit is preserved amid the decay of vegetables,

and transfused into animals, thus establishing the great

working-principle of Nature, that spirit is extracted from matter by

organized bodies, and survives their dissolution."[133] Of course, if

matter have the power of evolving intelligent and even immortal minds by

its own inherent properties and established laws, it will not be

difficult to find in Nature a sufficient substitute for God.

But the most revolting specimen of that material Pantheism, which is

only another name for absolute Atheism, that has recently appeared,

occurs in the Letters of Atkinson and Martineau: "We require no

supernatural causes, when we can recognize adequate natural causes,

_inherent in the constitution of Nature_;" "nor are more causes to be

admitted than are sufficient to produce any particular change or

effect."--"Man has his place in Natural History; his nature does not

essentially differ from that of the lower animals; he is but a fuller

development, and varied condition, of the same fundamental nature or

cause,--of _that which we contemplate as matter_, and its changes,

relations, and properties. Mind is the consequence or product of the

material man, its existence depending on the action of the brain."--"Its

highest object seems to be, a sense of the infinite and abstract

power,--_the inherent force and principle of Nature_."[134]

From these specimens it must be evident that whatever nominal

distinction may exist between Material Pantheism and avowed Atheism,

they are radically identical, and that, for all practical purposes, they

may be treated as one and the same. From the same specimens we may

derive some useful hints respecting the essential conditions and the

right conduct of the Theistic argument. It is not enough to show that

there must be a self-existent, eternal, and infinite First Cause, for

this is admitted by the advocate of Material Pantheism, who substitutes

Nature for God. It is further necessary to show that the actual

phenomena of the Universe cannot be accounted for by means of any

properties or powers inherent in itself; and that they must be ascribed

to a living, intelligent, and powerful Being, distinct from Nature and

superior to it. The theory of Materialism must be discussed on its own

proper and peculiar merits, and if we find good cause to reject it, the

main pillar of Material Pantheism will fall to the ground. In the mean

time we shall only further observe, that this form of Pantheism cannot

be maintained without the help either of the doctrine of the Eternity of

Matter or of the Theory of Development, or, rather, without the aid of

both; and that, if it could be established, Polytheism would be its

natural product, if not its inevitable result.

SECTION III.

IDEAL PANTHEISM.

We have already seen that the system of Spinoza equally recognized the

two "attributes" of extension and thought, and the two corresponding

"modes" of body and soul, in connection with the one infinite and

eternal "Substance." We have also seen that most of his followers have

taken a one-sided view of the subject, and have either merged the

spiritual into the corporeal, so as to educe a Material or Hylozoic

Pantheism, or have virtually annihilated the material by resolving it

into the mental, so as to educe a system of Ideal or Spiritual

Pantheism.

"In Spinoza," says Mr. Morell, "we see the model upon which the modern

Idealists of Germany have renewed their search into the absolute ground

of all phenomena;" and there can be no doubt that his speculations

contain the germ of Ideal as well as of Material Pantheism. The

historical filiation of modern Pantheism cannot be satisfactorily

explained, in either of its two forms, without reference to his

writings; and yet its precise character, as it is developed in more

recent systems, demands for its full elucidation some knowledge of the

course and progress of philosophical speculation in the interval which

elapsed between the death of Spinoza and the subsequent developments of

his theory.

We cannot here attempt to trace the history of German Idealism, from its

source in the writings of Leibnitz, through the logical school of

Wolfius and his successors, till it reached its culminating point in the

philosophy of Hegel:--we shall content ourselves with a brief reference

to the fundamental principles of Kant's system, which may be justly said

to have contained the prolific germs, or, at least, to have determined

the prevailing character, of all the subsequent speculations of the

German schools. For if modern Pantheism be indebted to Spinoza for its

_substance_, it is equally indebted to Kant for its _form_; and no

intelligible account can be given of the phases which it has

successively assumed, without reference to the powerful influence which

his Philosophy, in one or other of its constituent elements, has exerted

on all his successors in the same field of inquiry.

The Philosophy of Kant has a most important bearing on the whole

question as to the validity of the natural evidence for the being and

perfections of God. We shall confine our attention to those parts of his

system which give rise to the speculations that have issued in the

recent theories of Ideal or Spiritual Pantheism.

In attempting to explain the nature and origin of the whole system of

human knowledge, Kant divides our intellectual being into _three_

distinct faculties,--sensation, understanding, and reason. He supposes

that from sensation we derive the whole _matter_ of our knowledge; that

from the understanding we derive its _form_, or the manner in which it

is conceived of by us; and that from reason we derive certain general or

abstract notions, which are highly useful, since they give a systematic

unity to human thought, but which have no _objective validity_, that is,

either no reality in nature that corresponds to them, or none, at least,

that can be scientifically demonstrated. From this fundamental principle

of his system it follows, that the only part of our knowledge which has

any objective reality is that which is derived from our

sense-perceptions, all else being purely _formal or subjective_, and

arising solely from the laws of our own mental nature, which determine

us to conceive of things in a particular way; and that even that part of

our knowledge which is derived from sense-perception is purely

phenomenal, since we know nothing of any object around us beyond the

bare fact that it exists, and that it appears to us to be as our senses

represent it. Hence the _skeptical_ tendency of Kant's speculations, in

so far as the scientific certainty of our knowledge is concerned. The

_practical utility_ of that knowledge is not disputed, but its

_objective reality_, or the possibility of proving it, is, to a large

extent, denied. Still he admits a primitive _dualism_, and a radical

distinction between _the subject and the object_, between the mind which

thinks and the matter of its thoughts. The _matter_ comes from without,

the _form_ from within; and the senses are the channels through which

the phenomena of nature are poured into the mould of the human mind. All

knowledge implies this combination of _matter_ with _form_, and is

possible only on the supposition of the concurrent action both of the

_object_ and _subject_; not that either of the two is known to us in its

essence, or that their real existence can be scientifically

demonstrated, for we know the subject only in its relation to the

object, and the object only in its relation to the subject; but that

this _relation_ necessarily requires the joint action of both, by which

alone we can acquire the only knowledge of which we are capable, and

which is supposed to be purely phenomenal, relative, and subjective. It

is true that we are capable of forming certain grand ideas, such as that

of God, the universe, and the soul; but these are the pure products of

Reason, the mere personifications of our own modes of thinking, and have

no objective reality, at least none that can be scientifically

demonstrated. But, while "the Speculative Reason" is held to be

incompetent to prove the existence of God, "the Practical Reason" is

appealed to; and in the conscious liberty of the soul, and its sense of

incumbent moral duty,--"the Categorical Imperative,"--Kant finds

materials for reconstructing the basis and fabric of a true Theology,

not scientifically perfect, but practically sufficient for all the

purposes of life.

It was scarcely possible that Philosophy could find a permanent

resting-place in such a theory as this; for, while it recognized both

the "object" and the "subject" as equally indispensable, the one for the

_matter_, the other for the _form_, of human knowledge, it did not hold

the balance even between the two. It assigned so much to the "subject,"

and so little to the "object," and made so large a part of our knowledge

merely formal and subjective, that it could neither be regarded as a

self-consistent system of Skepticism, nor yet as a satisfactory basis

for Scientific Belief. It was almost inevitable that speculative minds,

starting from this point, should diverge into one or other of _three_

courses; either following the line of the "subject" exclusively, and

treating the "object" as a superfluous incumbrance, so as to reach, as

Schulz and Maimon did, a pure Subjective Idealism, akin to utter

Skepticism; or following the line of the "object," and giving it greater

prominence than it had in the system of Kant, so as to lay the

foundation, as Jacobi and Herbart did, of a system of Objective

Certitude; or keeping _both_ in view, and attempting, as Fichte,

Schelling, and Hegel did, to blend the two into one, so as to reduce

them to systematic unity.[135]

In Kant's system a _dualism_ was admitted, a real distinction between

the "subject" and "object" of thought; but he had ascribed so much to

the subject, and so little to the object, that Fichte conceived the idea

of dispensing with the latter altogether, and constructing his whole

philosophy on a purely subjective basis. Since Kant had taught that all

objects are conceived of either according to the forms of our

sensational faculty, or the categories of our understanding, or the

ideas of pure reason, it seemed to be unnecessary to suppose the

existence of any object distinct from the mind itself. For if it be the

mind which furnishes the form of Space, and gives us the idea of

Substance, of Cause, of Being, the mind alone might suffice to account

for the whole sum of human knowledge. Fichte was followed by Schelling,

and Schelling by Hegel, each differing from his predecessor, but all

concurring in the attempt _to identify "Seyn," or absolute Being, with

Thought_, and to represent everything in the universe as a mere mode or

manifestation of one Infinite Essence. The _identity_ of Existence and

Thought is the fundamental principle of Hegel's doctrine. With him,

Being and the Idea of being, are the same; and Being and Thought are

combined in the "Absolute," which is at once ideal and real (l'être and

l'idée). With him, the idea of God is that of _a logical process of

thought_, "ever unfolding itself, but never unfolded,"--a dialectic

movement rather than a Divine Being, which realizes itself, and reaches

a state of self-consciousness in man. God, nature, and man, are but one

process of thought, considered in different aspects; all finite

personalities are only so many thoughts of one eternal mind; God is in

man, and man is in God, and the progress of humanity, in all its stages,

is a Divine development.

This bare outline of these systems must suffice for our present purpose,

and we now proceed to offer a few remarks on the doctrine of Ideal as

distinguished from Material Pantheism.

1. The whole system of "Idealism," as propounded in the German schools,

is utterly baseless, and contradicts the intuitive, the universal

convictions of the human mind. For what is Idealism? Reduced to its

utmost simplicity, and expressed in the briefest formula, it amounts, in

substance, to this: _that the whole universe is to us a mere process of

thought_, and that nothing exists, or, at least, can be known by us,

beyond _the ideas of our own minds_. And what is the ground on which it

rests? It rests entirely on the assumption, that, since we can know

nothing otherwise than through the exercise of our mental faculties,

these faculties must be the sole sources of all our knowledge, and

altogether independent of any external object. According to this theory,

the mind is not informed or instructed by the universe, but the universe

is created by the mind; the objective is developed from the subjective;

and there is no reality anywhere except in the region of consciousness.

Nature is seen only as it is imaged in the mirror within; and to us it

is a mere phantasmagoria, a series of phenomena, a succession of

thoughts. "The sum total," says Fichte, "is this; there is absolutely

nothing permanent, either without me or within me, but only an unceasing

change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own.

I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute

all that apparently exists; and what they know of themselves is after

the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being

aught to witness their transition; that consist, in fact, of the images

of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of

these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of

images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life

to dream of, and without a mind to dream,--into a dream made up only of

a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought--the source of all

existence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of _my_

existence, of my power, of my destination--is the dream of that

dream."[136]

The tendency of such speculations as these towards universal Skepticism,

or even absolute Nihilism, with the exception only of certain fleeting

phenomena of Consciousness, is too apparent to require any formal proof;

and it must be equally evident that they contradict some of the most

universal and deeply-rooted convictions of the human mind. The ultimate

ground of every system of Idealism which excludes the knowledge of an

external world must be one or other of these two assumptions, or a

combination of both: either, that our knowledge cannot extend beyond the

range of consciousness, which takes cognizance only of ideas, or of

subjective mental states; or that any attempt to extend it beyond these

limits, so as to embrace external objects as really existing, can only

be successful on this condition,--that we _prove_, by reasoning from the

subjective to the objective, that there is a necessary _logical_

connection between the state of the one and the reality of the other.

Each of these assumptions is equally groundless. It is true that

consciousness, strictly so called, takes cognizance only of what passes

within; it is not true that consciousness, in this restricted sense, is

commensurate with our entire knowledge. It is true that we acquire our

knowledge only through the exercise of our mental faculties; it is not

true that our mental faculties are the only sources of our knowledge,

nor even that, without the concurrence of certain objects, they could

give us any knowledge at all. It is true that there must be a connection

between the subjective and the objective; it is not true that this

connection must be established by _reasoning_, or that we must _prove_

the existence of an external world distinct from the thinking mind,

before we are entitled to believe in it. For a great part of our

knowledge is _presentative_, and we directly perceive the objects of

Nature not less than the phenomena of Consciousness.

When it is said, in the jargon of the modern German philosophy, that

"the Ego has no immediate consciousness of the Non-Ego as existing, but

that the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the

self-conscious Ego, and is, in fact, only a phenomenon of the Ego,"--a

plain, practical Englishman, little tolerant of these subtle

distinctions, might be ready, if not deterred by the mere sound of the

words, to test them by a particular example. What am I to think, he

might say, of my own father and mother? They are familiarly known to me.

I have seen them, and talked with, them, and loved them as my own soul.

I have hitherto believed that they existed, and that they were really a

father and mother to me. But now I am taught that they are--mere

modifications of my own mind; that they are nothing more than simple

phenomena of the self-conscious Ego; and that, so far from being the

earthly authors of my existence, they are themselves--the creation and

offspring of my own thought. And on what ground am I asked to receive

this astonishing discovery? Why, simply because I can be sure of nothing

but the facts of consciousness. But how are _these facts proved_? They

"need no proof; they are self-evident; they are immediately and

irresistibly believed." Be it so. I can just as little doubt of the

existence of my body, of the distinct personality of my parents, and the

reality of an external universe, as of any fact of consciousness. May it

not be, whether we can explain it or not, that the one set of facts is

as directly _presented_, and needs as little to be _proved_, as the

other?

2. The doctrine of "Identity" constitutes a prominent and indispensable

part of the theory of Idealism, and is the ground-principle of

Philosophical Pantheism. It amounts, in substance, to the proposition,

that Existence and Thought are _one_, that the "subject" and "object" of

knowledge are _one_. "If the doctrine of Identity means anything, it

means that Thought and Being are essentially one; that the process of

_thinking_ is virtually the same as the process of _creating_; that in

constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same

thing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself in all the forms and

regions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God;

in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the

world."[137] It is through the medium of this doctrine of Identity that

Idealism passes into Pantheism,--not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley,

which recognized, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the human

mind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the independent

existence of matter,--but the Idealism of Fichte and others, which

resolved mind into a mere process of thought, a continuous stream or

succession of ideas. To _such_ a theory the doctrine of Identity was

indispensable. Its advocates were bound to show that nothing existed, or

could be proved to exist, in the universe but _thought_, and that, in

every case, the _subject_ and _object_ of thought might be identified as

one. We find, accordingly, that from the earliest ages down to the

present time, the idea of "absolute unity," or "universal identity," has

been frequently exhibited in connection with the speculations of

philosophical Idealists. The disciples of the Eleatic school in ancient

Greece, not less than those of the modern schools of Germany, insisted

on the identity of thought and its object, and regarded everything that

might seem to be external to the mind as a mere illusion.

It may be difficult for the British mind, familiarized from infancy with

the philosophy of common sense, to grasp the idea which this doctrine

involves; but, on the principles of absolute Idealism, it may be easily

explained, and may even seem to have some foundation in facts that must

be acknowledged by all. There are _two_ cases, particularly, which may

serve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. The first is

that of the Supreme Intelligence, conceived as existing before the

production of a created universe, when He was himself the sole "subject"

and the sole "object" of thought; in other words, the absolute

"Subject-Object." The second is that of the human consciousness,

conceived as occupied solely with certain subjective mental states, when

the mind may be said to be at once the "subject" and the "object" of its

own thought. There are cases, then, in which mind may be regarded as a

"subject-object;" the case of human consciousness, when the mind takes

cognizance of its own states or acts, and the case of the Divine

consciousness, while as yet the created universe had not been called

into being. But the question is, whether, _in all cases_, the "subject"

and "object" of thought are the same? or, whether existence and thought

are _universally_ identical? An affirmative answer to this question

would imply, that nothing whatever exists except only in the mind that

perceives it; that, according to Bishop Berkeley, "the existence of

unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived" is an

absurd or impossible supposition; that "their _esse_ is _percipi_," that

is, that their being consists in their being perceived or known; whence

it would follow, as Berkeley himself admits, that we have no reason to

believe in the continued existence of the desk at which we write, after

we have left the room in which we see it, excepting such as may arise

from the supposition, that if we returned to that room we might still

see it, or that in our absence it may still be perceived by some other

mind. Existence is identified with thought, and nothing exists save only

as it is thought of. Why? Simply because it can become known to us only

through the medium of consciousness, and that, too, in no other

character than as _a phenomenon of our own minds_.

That this doctrine is at direct variance with the universal convictions

of mankind, is too evident to require the slightest proof. That it is

_unphilosophical_, as well as _unpopular_, may be made apparent by two

very simple considerations. The _first_ is, that it assumes without

proof the only point in question, namely, that the objects of our

knowledge are nothing but the ideas of our own minds; whereas it is

affirmed, on the other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of

apparent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct

perception of external objects as well as of internal mental states. The

_second_ is, that the very formula of Idealism, which represents the

"Non-ego" as a mere modification of the conscious "Ego," seems to

involve a palpable contradiction; since it recognizes, in a certain

sense, _the difference between the "Ego and the Non-ego,"_ and yet, in

the same breath, annihilates that difference, and proclaims their

"identity."[138] Fichte admits, indeed, that we have the idea of

something which is _not-self_; but instead of ascribing it to an

external object, he accounts for it by a law of our mental nature, which

constrains us to _create a limit_, so as to give a determinate character

to our thought. The three technical formulas, therefore, which are

said[139] to express, respectively,--the affirmation of self,--the

affirmation of not-self,--and the determination of the one by the

other,--are all equally the products of our own mental laws, and do not

necessarily require the supposition of any external object; and hence it

follows that Self is the one only absolute principle, and that

everything else that is conceived of is constructed out of purely

subjective materials. The question whether the "object" be the

generative principle of the "idea," or _vice versâ_, is thus superseded;

for there is no longer any distinction between "object" and "subject;"

existence is identified with thought; the _Ego_ and the _Non-ego_ unite

in one absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object, the

percipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known.

Of course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, just as there

can be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowledge of our fellow-men, as

distinct objective realities; it is a system of pure Idealism, which, if

consistently followed out, must terminate in utter _skepticism_ in

regard to many of the most familiar objects of human knowledge; or,

rather, in the hands of a thoroughly consequent reasoner, it must issue,

as Jacobi endeavored to show, in absolute _Nihilism_; since we can have

no better reason for believing in the existence of Self than we have

for believing in the reality of an external world, and the coexistence

of our fellow-men. Each of these beliefs is equally the spontaneous

product of certain mental laws, which are just as trustworthy, and need

as little to be proved, in the one case as in the other.

Fichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental defect of his

system; and, at a later period, he attempted to give it a firmer basis

by representing _self_, not as individual, but as Divine, that is, as

the Absolute manifesting itself in Man. He now admitted what, if he had

not denied, he had overlooked before, an essential reality as the

substratum both of the _Ego_ and _Non-ego;_ a reality of which all

things, whether within or without, are only so many "modes" or

manifestations. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism

passes into Pantheism, and that we mark the close affinity between his

speculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in some respects, a wide

difference between the two; Spinoza assumed, Fichte denied, the

existence of matter; the former affirmed Substance to be the absolute

and infinite Essence; the latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose

essence was the infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with

these and other points of difference, there existed a real, radical

affinity between the two systems, that of Fichte, not less than that of

Spinoza, being based on _the identity of existence and thought_; and

both systems being directed to show that there is but one Absolute

Being, of which all phenomena, whether material or mental, are only so

many modes or manifestations.

3. The philosophy of "the absolute," as applied in support of German

Pantheism, depends on the doctrine of "Identity," and must stand or fall

along with it.[140] The "absolute" is described as being at once

_ideal_ and _real_, pure _being_ and pure _thought_, and as developing

itself in a great variety of forms. The philosophy of the "absolute" is

represented as the _only science_, properly so called: it is assumed

that there can be no science of the finite, the variable, the

contingent, the relative, but only of the absolute, the unchangeable,

and the infinite. To constitute _this_ science, the doctrine of

"identity" is indispensable; the subject and the object of thought,

knowledge and being, must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and

Idealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the

philosophy of the "absolute." The idea of the "absolute," in which

_being_ and _thought_ are identical, is the only foundation of science,

and the ultimate ground of all certitude. And Pantheism is inferred from

this idea; for the "absolute," in which _being_ and _thought_ are

identified, is properly _the sole existence_, which develops and

manifests itself in a great variety of finite forms.

We are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the "absolute" either

with levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings us into contact with

some of the most profound and most deeply mysterious problems of human

thought. Finite as we are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid

framing the _idea_, although we can never attain to a _comprehension_,

of the Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, among

the elements of human knowledge. Account for them as we may, their

reality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their importance disparaged.

There is a tendency--and a most useful one--in the human mind, to seek

unity in all things, to trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to

laws, to resolve the complex into the simple, and to rise from the

contingent to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are

few more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology than that

which seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and the validity of

those ideas which introduce us into the region of absolute, eternal,

and immutable Truth; and it were a lamentable result of the erratic

speculations of Germany did they serve to cast discredit on this

inquiry, or even to excite a prejudice against it, in the more sober,

but not less profound, minds of our own countrymen. But there need be

little apprehension on this score, if it be clearly understood and

carefully remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in

Germany and applied in support of Pantheism, rests ultimately on the

theory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by which all is

resolved into one absolute "subject-object," and _existence_ is

identified with _thought_. _This_ system may be discarded, and yet there

may still remain a sound, wholesome, and innocuous philosophy of the

"absolute;" a philosophy which does not seek to identify things so

generically different as _existence_ and _thought_, or to reduce mind

and matter, the finite and the infinite, to the same category; but

which, recognizing the differences subsisting between the various

objects of thought, seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources

of that part of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary

truths. The former of these rival systems may be favorable to Pantheism,

the latter will be found to be in entire accordance with Christian

Theism.

The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is either _the

unity of substance_, as taught by Spinoza, or _the identity of existence

and thought_, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte,

Schelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living

Being to whom a proper personality and certain intelligible attributes

may be ascribed, but as a vague, indeterminate _somewhat_, which has no

distinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to

its development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But

this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops,

determines, and limits itself: it becomes being, and constitutes all

being: the infinite passes into the finite, the absolute into the

relative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all

other existences are only so many modes or forms of its manifestation.

Here is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more

intelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian

faith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles

on which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite

things have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that there

exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of

forms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of

universal "Identity." But what if this affirmation be denied? What if,

founding on the clearest data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge

that _existence_ is identical with _thought_?[141] What if we continue

to believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from

thought itself, and which must be _presented_ to the mind before they

can be _represented_ by the mind? What if, while we recognize the idea

both of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the

contingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our

reason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to

one absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls

along with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not

a solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously

constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind.

The advocates of this system assume that the relations which subsist

between _beings_ are the same as the relations which subsist between our

_ideas_, and infer that _logic_ is sufficient to construct a system of

_metaphysic_. But Professor Nicolas has well said, that "while it is

certain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them,

and a certain parallelism may thus be established between _what exists_

and _what we think_ of that which exists, yet from this to the

_identity of being and thought_, such as Pantheism requires, there is a

vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the _logical

relations_ of our ideas are identical with the _real relations_ of

beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It

describes the relations of being according to the logical relations of

our thought; and it takes _logic_ for a kind of _metaphysic_. It

confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve

the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to

other beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other

beings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of

becoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate,

indifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that

we actually know. All this is true of our _ideas_, but not of _beings_.

The highest idea,--that which is the logical condition of all others, and

also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,--this

idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it

becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the _idea_ is

not true of the _being_; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being

exists; and yet Pantheism confounds _the idea_ with _the being_, and

rests entirely on that confusion of thought."

* * * * *

In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a

few remarks illustrative of its _nature and tendency_, whether

considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a substitute for

religious belief.

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory

of "Idealism," and the doctrine of "Identity," which constitute the

groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse

to our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to

our belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and

personality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these

_three_ topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be

impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their

legitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole

question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has

not been duly considered by the more superficial _litterateurs_, who

have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but it will be acknowledged

at once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own

philosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all

its practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently

candid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds,

if they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal God,

are equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and

against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men.

With most minds, this consideration would be of itself a powerful

counteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism,

were it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an

argument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that

theory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature,

or in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held

sufficient to disprove the existence of God.

It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency

to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of

Skepticism on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to

avoid Skepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an "intellectual

intuition," such as gives an immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it

terminates in Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects

the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," and discovers that it has no

other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally

possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the

Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt.

It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as

taught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of

the Sciences, not less than to Theology, and that it has given birth to

numerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in

History, and in Politics, all strongly marked by the same characteristic

feature--the substitution of _à priori and deductive_ speculation for

the more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province

of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the

light of experience and observation, has been rudely invaded by this

transcendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of

universal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the

Absolute. We are indebted to Mr. Morell for a specimen,[142] alike

amusing and instructive, of Schelling's speculations on this subject. We

shall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not

pretend to understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of

Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of

Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries

from the "idea of the Absolute;" and in the name of Natural Science, not

less than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method

of Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the substitution of

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle,

and Newton, as models of scientific thought.

The _practical influence_ of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar

tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs,

must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of

mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it may be seductive to some

ardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwithstanding;

and it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most

serious evils. It has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a

creed alike beautiful and beneficent,--as a source of religious life

nobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy

system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, God is manifest to

all, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandized and

glorified, and everything in Nature is invested with a new dignity and

interest; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes

and superstitious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil

satisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes

of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death?

The dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process

of its further development; and whether it passes into a new form of

self-conscious life, or is reabsorbed into the infinite, it still forms

an indestructible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore,

or, rather, we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature's

inexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than

Nature, to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should

dread.[143] But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest

partisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed,

when compared with that faith which teaches us to regard God as our

"Father in heaven," and that "hope which is full of immortality." It is

worse, however, than dreary; it is destructive of all religion and of

all morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not

less hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates

error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and

beneficial manifestations of the "infinite." It is a system of

Syncretism, founded on the idea that error is only an incomplete truth,

and maintaining that truth must necessarily be developed by error, and

virtue by vice. According to this fundamental law of "human progress,"

Atheism itself may be providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic

Optimism--"Whatever is, is best"--must be admitted equally in regard to

truth and error, to virtue and vice.

It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its

Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the

earliest and most inveterate Principles of Paganism,--the same Paganism

which still flourishes among the "theosophic" dreamers of India, and

which exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo

superstition. For Pantheism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited

in new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first

taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria.

Christianity, which encountered and triumphed over it in her youth, can

have nothing to fear from it in her mature age,[144] provided only that

she be faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But

there must be no truce, and no attempt at conciliation between the two.

The Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the

virtual sanction of Christianity; they have even dared to make use of

Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration,

Incarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and Regeneration, in such a way as

to adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged,

and the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of

individuals--some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry--who

have substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus

Christ, and assailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred

cause which they had solemnly vowed to maintain. But even in Germany

itself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labors of

such men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as

the dawn of a better and brighter day.

It may be observed, _finally_, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to

Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the

principal points of collision between the two:

1. Pantheism denies,--Christian Theism affirms, the existence of a

_living, personal God_, distinct from Nature, and superior to it.

2. Pantheism supersedes,--Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a

real creation.

3. Pantheism contests,--Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the

constant providence and moral government of God.

4. Pantheism disowns,--Christian Theism declares, the doctrine of _a

conscious, personal immortality_.

5. Pantheism rejects,--Christian Theism receives, the whole scheme of

Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one

accounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the

other on that of supernatural interposition.

6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God, no loving

Father, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, no Object of

confiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no Comforter: it leaves us

with nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond

its eternal vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter.

FOOTNOTES:

[103] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,

Fondateur de l'Exegése et de la Philosophie Modernes."

[104] M. COUSIN, "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I. 403. See

also "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface, second edition, p. XXVII.;

"Nouveaux Fragments," pp. 9, 160.

[105] M. AD. FRANCK, "De la Certitude," Preface, p. XXI.

[106] M. A. JAVARI, "De la Certitude," p. 509.

[107] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,"

pp. 208, 210.

[108] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes,"

pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., "Theodicée Chretiénne," pp. 437, 444, 449.

[109] MR. MORELL'S "Historical and Critical View," II. 104, 153.

[110] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanité," I. vi. 3, 295.

[111] L. D. CROUSSE, "Des Principes, ou Philosophie Première," 2d

Edition, Paris, 1846.

[112] ABBÉ MARET, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 94.

[113] ABBÉ GOSCHLER, sur "l'Histoire du Pantheisme." ABBÉ MARET,

"Essai," chap. IV.

[114] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanité," I. 249. M. CROUSSE, "Des

Principes," pp. 199, 211, 296. BAYLE, "Pensées," III. 67. The well-known

lines of the sixth Æneid, "Principio coelum, ac terras, camposque

liquentes," &c. are thus applied.

[115] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai," pp. 152, 156, 221.

[116] DR. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, "History of Reformation," V. 84.

[117] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai," p. 89; "Theodicée," p. 368.

[118] FRED. VON SCHLEGEL, "Philosophy of Life," p. 417. See, also, DR.

THOLUCK'S remarks on the same point in the "Princeton Theological

Essays," I. 555.

[119] MUSÆUS, "Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen

examinatus," 1674. REGNERI A MANSVELT, "Adversus anonymum

Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis," 1674. FRANCOIS CUYPER, "Arcana

Atheismi Revelata," 1676. JOHN BREDENBOURG, "Enervatio Tractatus

Theol.-polit." CHRIST. WITTICHII, "Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen," 1690.

PIERRE POIRET, "Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis

Spinozianæ." FENELON, "De l'Existence de Dieu," p. II., c. III.,

"Refutation du Spinozisme." HUET, "La Conformité de la Raison avec la

Foi," 1692. HOWE, "Living Temple," I. 262. S. CLARKE, "Discourse on the

Being and Attributes of God," pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.

[120] JEAN COLERUS, "Vie de Spinoza," reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.

[121] SPINOZA, "Ethica," Definitions III., IV., V.

[122] "Il construit le systéme entiere des êtres avec ces trois seuls

elements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode."--"Voila l'idée mere de

la metaphysique de Spinoza."--SAISSET.

[123] SAISSET, "Introduction," p. XXXIX.

[124] SPINOZA, "De Intellectus Emendatione." This treatise contains the

exposition of his method.

[125] M. F. PERRON, "Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées

Fondamentales," 1843.

[126] "Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il

soit demontré qui _la Creation est impossible_, principe justement cher

au Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c'est que

_l'Etre en soi est necessairement incréé_,--verité incontestable, dont

_le Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer_."--PROF. SAISSET, Introduction, p.

XLII.

[127] M. L'ABBÉ DE CONDILLAC, "Traité des Sensations," 2 vols.

[128] The HON. ROBERT BOYLE, "Theological Works," II. 79.--"A Free

Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature."

[129] "Systême de la Nature," II. 75, 110, 115.

[130] "Tout est toujours dans l'ordre rélativement à la Nature, où tous

les êtres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. Il est

entré _dans son plans_ que de certaines terres produiroient des fruits

delicieux, tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que des épines, des

vegetaux dangereux. _Elle a volu_ que quelques societés produise des

sages," &c.--Vol. I. 265, also 267.

[131] "Systême de la Nature," II. 102.

[132] M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: "Pour qui

sait voir, le Monde sent, se ment, parle, et pense."

[133] "The Purpose of Existence," pp. 85, 89. London, 1850.

[134] "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development." By H. G.

ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU. London, 1852.

[135] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 71.

[136] SIR WM. HAMILTON'S Edition of DR. REID'S "Works," p. 129.

[137] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 127. M. MARET, "Essai sur

le Pantheisme," pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 5,

123, 192, 199.

[138] SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S edition of REID'S "Works," p. 281. Sir

William does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I

have noted.

[139] 1. "The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms _itself_." 2. "The _ego_ or _moi_

affirms a _non-ego_ or _non-moi_." 3. "The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms itself

to be determined by the _non-ego_ or _non-moi_."

[140] M. MARET, "Essai," pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid.,

"Theodicée," pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394. MR. MORELL, "History," II.

127, 138.

[141] PROFESSOR NICOLAS, "Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,"

pp. 20-31.

[142] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 129.

[143] M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes." M. MARET, "Essal," pp. 69, 86, 150;

"Theodicée" pp. 311, 314. VALROGER, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 97, 101,

115, 151, 412.

[144] M. MARET, "Essai sur Pantheisme," p. 107. "Le Christianisme saura

vaincre dans son âge mûr l'ennemi qu'il a terrassé en naissant."

CHAPTER IV.

THEORIES OF MATERIALISM.

The doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the "mechanical"

form of Atheism, and to the "hylozoic" form of Pantheism. It is subsumed

in both, and is the fundamental postulate on which they respectively

depend.

It has no natural affinity with the more "ideal" or "spiritual" form of

Pantheism. We must not conclude, however, that it has no historical

connection with it. For it is instructive to mark, in tracing the

history of philosophic speculation, that its course resembles not so

much the uniform current of a stream, as the alternate flowing and

ebbing of the tide; or, if we may change the figure, that its movement

may be likened to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches

its highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency to

rush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be little doubt

that the recent revival of speculative "Idealism" was the result, at

least in part, of a strong reaction against the "sensational"

philosophy, which had degenerated in the school of Priestley at home,

and in that of Condillac abroad, into a system of gross and revolting

Materialism. For the same reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a

speedy reaction the other way,--a reaction against the extravagances of

"idealistic" and "transcendental" speculation, and a tendency towards a

more practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. This tendency, if guided

by the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give a powerful impulse

to Inductive Science in all its departments; but, if biased by partial

and one-sided views, may issue either in the temporary ascendancy of the

Positive School, or the partial revival of some other form of

Materialism.

Some such tendency might have been expected to arise as soon as Idealism

should have reached its culminating point. For, on a comprehensive view

of the whole history of speculative thought, we find that there are just

_four_ great systems of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as

it were, in cycles. The first is the system of Dualism,--not the Dualism

of Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the Creator and

the creature,--but the Dualism of ancient Paganism, which held Matter

and Spirit to be equally uncreated and eternal: the second is

Materialism, which resolves all into Matter and its laws: the third is

Idealism, which resolves all into Mind and its modifications: and the

fourth is Pantheism, which identifies Existence with Thought, and

resolves all into the Absolute.[145] In the present age, Idealism is in

the ascendant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a

natural reaction, many are beginning to desiderate a more substantial

and practical philosophy, while the rapid progress of physical science

is directing their thoughts more and more to the wonders of the material

world. In these circumstances, there may be a tendency to relapse into

the Materialism of the last century, which attempted to explain the

whole theory of the universe by the laws of _matter_ and _motion_; or at

least to embrace some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which

excludes all _causes_, whether efficient or final, from the field of

human knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phenomena and

laws of material nature.

There are not wanting various significant indications of the existence

of this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently indicated, in

some quarters, by the mere omission of all reference to Mind or Spirit

as distinct from Matter; and, in others, by elaborate attempts to

explain all the phenomena of life and thought by means of physical

agencies and organic laws. The writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and

Broussais,[146] afford ample evidence of its growing prevalence in

France; and although it has been said by a recent historian of

Philosophy that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least

no recognized school, of Materialism, since the publication of Dr.

Thomas Brown's reply to Darwin's Zoönomia, yet there is too much reason

to believe that it was all along cherished by not a few private

thinkers, who had imbibed the spirit of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it

is beginning to speak out, in terms too unambiguous to be misunderstood,

in such works as "The Purpose of Existence" and the "Letters" of

Atkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of individual

inquirers, it must be remembered that there is a tendency in certain

studies, when exclusively pursued, to generate a frame of mind which

will tempt men either to adopt the theory of Materialism, or at least to

attach undue importance to physical agencies and organic laws. This

tendency may be observed in the study of Physiology, especially when it

is combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnetism; not that there

is any necessary or strictly logical connection between these studies

and Materialism, for some of their ablest expounders, including Cabanis,

Gall, and Spurzheim, have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply

that, in prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to

bestow an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and laws

of our material organization, so as to become comparatively unmindful of

what is mental, moral, and spiritual in the constitution of man. For

these reasons, and considering, especially, the close connection of

Materialism both with the mechanical Atheism of the past, and the

hylozoic Pantheism of the present age, we deem it necessary to subject

its claims to a rigorous scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our

present inquiry.

What, then, is the doctrine of Materialism? What are the forms in which

it has appeared, and what the ground on which it rests? How does it

stand related to the question concerning the nature and existence of

God, or the constitution and destiny of Man? A brief answer to these

questions will be sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely

disregarded in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive

argument on the first principles of Natural Theology.

SECTION I.

DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM.

The doctrine of Materialism has assumed several distinct phases or forms

in the hands of its different advocates; and these must be carefully

discriminated from each other, if we would either estimate aright their

respective merits, or do justice to the parties by whom they have been

severally maintained.

The grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that which

_identifies mind with matter_, and _thought with motion_. It denies that

there is any real or radical difference between physical and moral

phenomena, and affirms that life and thought are so entirely dependent

on material organization, that the dissolution of the body must

necessarily be the destruction of conscious existence, and that death

can only be an eternal sleep. This is the doctrine of Materialism which

was taught in a former age, by the author of the "Systême de la Nature,"

and which has recently been revived by M. Comte in France, and by

Atkinson and Martineau in England. A few extracts will sufficiently

illustrate its character and tendency. "Men have evidently abused the

distinction," says Baron D'Holbach, "which is so often made between _man

physical_ and _man moral_: man moral is nothing else than that physical

being considered in a certain point of view, that is, with reference to

some modes of action which belong to his peculiar organization."--"The

universe--that vast assemblage of everything that exists--exhibits

nowhere anything else than _matter and motion_."--"If we are asked, what

is man? we reply, that he is a material being, organized or framed so as

to feel, to think, and to be affected in certain ways peculiar to

himself, according to his organization."[147] More recently, M. Comte

has affirmed that "the subject of all our researches is _one_," and that

"all natural phenomena are the necessary results either of the laws of

extension or of the laws of motion;" while M. Crousse is quite clear

that "intelligence is a property or effect of matter," and that "body

and spirit together constitute matter." In our own country, Atkinson and

Martineau have not shrunk from the avowal of the same doctrine, or the

adoption of the most revolting consequences that can be deduced from it.

"Instinct, passion, thought, are effects of organized substances."--"Mind

is the consequence or product of the material man; it is not a thing

having a seat or home in the brain, but it is the manifestation or

expression of _the brain in action,_ as heat and light are of fire, and

fragrance of the flower."[148]

The doctrine of Materialism, as formerly taught by Dr. Priestley and

his followers, is in some respects similar to that which we have just

noticed, but in other respects differs from it, if not in its essential

nature, at least in its collateral adjuncts and its practical

applications. It resembles the theory of D'Holbach and Comte, in so far

as it affirms the doctrine of _unisubstancisme_, and rejects the idea of

a _dualism_ such as is implied in the common doctrine of Matter and

Spirit. But it differs from that theory, inasmuch as it is combined,

whether consistently or otherwise, with the recognition of a personal

God, a resurrection from the dead, and a future state of reward and

punishment. Dr. Priestley seems to have fluctuated for a time between

two opposite extremes,--that of _spiritualizing_ Matter, and that of

_materializing_ Mind; for, in a very remarkable passage, we find him

saying, "This scheme of _the immateriality of Matter_, as it may be

called, or rather, _the mutual penetration of Matter_, first occurred to

my friend Mr. Mitchell on reading 'Baxter on the Immateriality of the

Soul.'"[149] But at length he settled down in the fixed belief of

Materialism, as he had always held the principle of _unisubstancisme_.

He held throughout that "Man does not consist of two principles so

essentially different from each other as Matter and Spirit, but the

whole man is of _one uniform composition_; and that either the material

or the immaterial part of the universal system is superfluous."[150] He

attempts, therefore, to show, that sensation, perception, and

thought,--the common properties of _mind_,--are not incompatible with

extension, attraction, and repulsion, which he conceives to be the only

essential properties of _matter;_ that both classes of properties may

possibly belong to the same subject; and that hence no second substance

is necessary to account for and explain any of the phenomena of human

nature. In this respect, his theory is precisely the same with that

which has been already noticed; but the peculiarity by which it is

distinguished from the Atheistic and Antichristian speculations of

D'Holbach and Comte is twofold. In the _first_ place, while he ascribes

to mere matter the power of sensation, thought, and volition, he admits

that these powers, and all others belonging to matter, were communicated

to it at the first, and are still continued, by the Divine will, thus

recognizing the doctrine both of Creation and Providence; and in the

_second_ place, while he denies the natural immortality of the soul, and

even the possibility of its conscious existence in a state of separation

from the body, he does not deny the immortality of man, but receives it,

as well as the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, on the

authority of that Divine Revelation which speaks of "the resurrection of

the dead," and of "a judgment to come." In these respects, his theory is

widely different from that of the "Systême de la Nature," while the two

are substantially the same in so far as they relate simply to the

constitution of human nature. He is not an Atheist, but a Theist, and a

Theist, too, who, believing in Revelation, admits the immortality of

man, and a future state of retribution. But it must be evident that as

in these respects he founds entirely on the authority of Scripture, so

he may be confronted with the same authority when he denies the

spirituality of the soul; and in that case the question would resolve

itself into one of Biblical exegesis, and would fall to be decided, not

by metaphysical reasoning, but by Scriptural proofs.

Another variety of the theory is presented by Dr. Good in his "Life of

Lucretius." It agrees with the doctrine of Priestley in representing the

soul as material; but differs from it in holding the possible existence

of the soul in a separate state, during the interval between the

dissolution and resurrection of the body. It speaks of the body as being

composed of gross material particles; and of the soul as consisting of

more subtle, refined, and ethereal matter. This modification of the

theory may be illustrated by the following extract: "Perception,

consciousness, cognition, we continue to be told, are qualities which

cannot appertain to matter; there must hence be a thinking and an

immaterial principle; and man must still be a compound being. Yet, why

thus degrade matter, the plastic and prolific creature of the Deity,

beyond what we are authorized to do? Why may it not perceive, why not

think, why not become conscious? What eternal and necessary impediment

prevents? or what self-contradiction and absurdity is hereby implied?

Let us examine Nature as she presents herself to us in her most simple

and inorganized forms; let us trace her through her gradual and

ascending stages of power and perfection. In its simplest form, matter

evinces the desire of reciprocal union, or, as it is commonly called,

the attraction of gravitation. Increase its mass, arrange it in other

modifications, and it immediately evinces other powers or attractions;

and these will be perpetually, and almost infinitely, varied, in

proportion as we vary its combinations. If arranged, therefore, in one

mode, it discloses the power of magnetism; in another, that of

electricity or galvanism; in a third, that of chemical affinities; in a

fourth, that of mineral assimilations. Pursue its modifications into

classes of a more complex, or rather, perhaps, of a more gaseous or

attenuate nature, and it will evince the power of vegetable or fibrous

irritability: ascend through the classes of vegetables, and you will at

length reach the strong stimulative perfection, the palpable vitality of

the _mimosa pudica_, or the _hedysarum gyrans,_ the former of which

shrinks from the touch with the most bashful coyness, while the latter

perpetually dances beneath the jocund rays of the sun. And when we have

thus attained the summit of vegetable powers and vegetable life, it will

require, I think, no great stretch of the imagination to conceive that

the fibrous irritability of animals, as well as vegetables, is the mere

result of a peculiar arrangement of simple and unirritable material

atoms."--"Hence, then, animal sensation, and hence, necessarily and

consequently, ideas, and a material soul or spirit, rude and confined,

indeed, in its first and simplest mode of existence, but, like every

other production of Nature, beautifully and progressively advancing from

power to power, from faculty to faculty, from excellence to excellence,

till at length it terminate in the perfection of the human mind."[151]

According to this theory, the mind is supposed to have a real existence,

as a substance distinct from the grosser forms of matter, and capable

even of surviving its separation from them. It is supposed to be "a

combination of the most volatile auras or gases, diffused over the whole

body, though traced in a more concentrate form in some organs than in

others;" and it is described as "the very texture of that separate state

of existence which the infallible page of Revelation clearly indicates

will be ours."

A form of the theory very nearly resembling this has been recently

reproduced. It consists in representing the Mind or Spirit of man, not

as a mere fleeting phenomenon of the brain, or an evanescent effect of

its organization, but as a distinct substantive product, generated,

indeed, from matter, and partaking, therefore, of its nature, but so

exquisitely subtle and ethereal that it has no resemblance to the

grosser materials of the body, and admits only of being compared with

the Dynamides--the imponderable elements and forces of Nature. This

"spirit" is generated in man by his peculiar organization, and

especially by the action of the brain; it is capable of surviving the

dissolution of the body, of retaining its individual consciousness after

death, of passing into new spheres of being, and of rising from lower to

higher states, according to a law of eternal progression. Such is the

theory of Davis, the "Poughkeepsie Seer;" and such also, with some

variations, is that of the author of "The Purpose of Existence."

"Matter and Spirit," says Davis, "have heretofore been supposed to

constitute two distinct and independent substances, the latter not

having any material origin." ... "Instead of making material and

spiritual existence totally disconnected, the object and intention of

the foregoing has been to prove, by acknowledged laws and principles of

matter, _the production of intelligence,_ the perfection of which is

_spirit_;" to show that "the Organizer uses Nature and all things

therein as an effect, to produce _spirit_ as an end and designed

ultimate." The author of "The Purpose of Existence" adopts a similar

view. He tells us, indeed, that "the first simple forms or states of

existence are admitted to be _two_, spirit and matter,--the first the

moving power, the second the moved substance;" that of the positive

essence of either we can arrive at no knowledge; and that "whether

spirit be a refined, etherealized portion of matter, or a distinct

dynamic principle, we cannot ascertain." And yet, one of the leading

objects of his work is to account for "the origin and development of the

human mind;" and this he does by ascribing it to "a self-dynamic spirit

which is resident in matter," and which he denominates "the spirit of

vitality." The spirit exists in vegetables, and is extracted by means of

the organs of the animals which feed upon them, and then, "by a delicate

work of distillation, it is converted into _spirit_!"--"Nature proclaims

one of her great working principles to be, that _spirit is evolved out

of matter, and outlives the body in which it is educated_."--"Matter is

full of spirit. This spirit is brought out of matter by vegetation. By

means of vegetation, it is conveyed into animal frames, in which its

purest essence centres in the brain.... This is no idle theory," he

adds, "no vain hypothesis, for making matter think. It is a clear

proposition, showing how matter is employed by the Supreme Intelligence

for evolving, training, and educating spirit."--"We conclude that

Progression is the great law of the universe, the purpose for which its

present arrangement was ordained; and that the object of this

progression is _the evolvement of mind out of matter._"

This is a new and very singular phase of Materialism. It is widely

different from the doctrine which was taught by the infidel writers of

the last century. They had recourse to the theory of Materialism chiefly

with the view of excluding a world of spirits, and of undermining the

doctrine of a future state: here it is applied to prove the constant

development and indestructible existence of minds generated from matter,

but destined to survive the dissolution of the body; nay, every particle

of matter in the universe is supposed to be advancing, in one

magnificent progression, towards the spiritual state. The danger now is,

not that Religion may be undermined by Materialism, but that it may be

supplanted by a fond and foolish superstition, in which the facts of

Mesmerism and the fictions of Clairvoyance are blended into one ghostly

system, fitted to exert a powerful but pernicious influence on

over-credulous minds.[152]

On a review of the various forms which the theory of Materialism has

assumed, it must be evident that we should be doing great injustice to

their respective advocates, did we place them all on the same level in

relation to Theology, or pronounce upon them one indiscriminate censure.

In the hands of D'Holbach and Comte, it was associated with the avowal

of Atheism, and the denial of a future state: in the hands of Priestley,

it was associated with the recognition of a God, and the Christian

doctrine of a resurrection: in the hands of Dr. Good, it was combined

with the principles of Theism, and even with the revealed doctrine of

the separate existence of the soul during the interval between death and

the resurrection: and in the hands of Davis and the author of the

"Purpose of Existence," it is exhibited in connection with a theory of

Progression, widely different, indeed, from the doctrine of Scripture,

but equally different from the infidel speculations of the last century.

Still, with all these shades of difference, there is _that common to

all_ the forms in which it can be presented which shows that they are

radically one and the same: _they all deny the existence of any generic

difference between Matter and Mind_.

Confining our attention to this common element, and omitting the

consideration of minor diversities, we may now inquire into the grounds

on which the theory rests, and the most plausible reasons which have

been urged in support of it.

To some minds it has been recommended by its _apparent simplicity_. It

speaks only of _one_ substance as existing in Nature under various

modifications. It represents the universe, so far as created being is

concerned, as entirely composed of _matter_, more or less refined; and

thus excludes the complication which must necessarily arise from the

supposition of two substances, generically different, yet intimately and

indissolubly related. The principle, therefore, which prompts us to seek

unity in diversity, and to reduce, by some comprehensive generalization,

a multitude of phenomena under one general law, has led some to adopt

the theory of _unisubstancisme_ in preference to the opposite doctrine

of _dualism_. Not content with the generalization, alike safe and

legitimate, which ranks both mind and matter under the generic head of

_substance_, they have sought to reduce them to the same category, and

to give to matter a monopoly of the universe, at least of created being.

In support of their views, they remind us of the fundamental principle

of philosophy as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, that "we are to admit no

more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances."[153]

The principle is a sound one; and the only question is, whether matter

alone is sufficient to account for mental phenomena? On _this_ question

the two parties are at irreconcilable variance; and the controversy

cannot be determined, _brevi manû_, by the mere assumption of the

simplicity and uniform composition of everything in Nature; it can be

settled only by an appeal to the facts as they are known to exist. It is

the aim of science, undoubtedly, to reduce all compound substances to

the smallest possible number of constituent elements, and all complex

phenomena to the smallest possible number of general laws. But we feel

that, desirable as this simplification may be, we are not warranted in

identifying light with heat, or even electricity with magnetism, however

closely connected with each other, simply because there are certain

observed differences between them, which could not be explained, in the

present state of our knowledge, consistently with any such theory of

their absolute identity: and so, there are such manifest differences

between Mental and Material phenomena, that we cannot yield to the

temptation of ascribing them to one cause or origin, until it has been

satisfactorily proved that the same cause is sufficient to account for

appearances so diverse. It should be considered, too, in connection with

this pretence of greater simplicity, that even if we could succeed in

getting rid of the _dualism_ of Mind and Matter in the constitution of

man, we never can get rid of it with reference to the universe at

large, otherwise than by denying _the spirituality of God himself_: for

the grand, the indestructible, the eternal _dualism_ would still

remain,--the distinction between God and His works,--between the Creator

and the universe which He has called into being,--between the finite,

contingent, and transitory, and the infinite, necessary, and eternal.

And this is a distinction that cannot be obliterated, although it may be

obscured, by the speculations of Pantheism.

Another reason which has induced some to adopt, or at least to regard

with favor, the theory of Materialism, is--the difficulty of conceiving

of the union of two substances so incongruous as Mind and Matter are

supposed to be,--and still more the difficulty of explaining how they

could have any mutual action on each other. Dr. Priestley largely

insists on this, as well as on the former reason, as one of the main

inducements which led him to abandon the commonly-received doctrine.

"Many doubts occurred to me," he says, "on the subject of _the intimate

union of two substances so entirely heterogeneous_ as the soul and body

were represented to be." And he was led to conclude, that "man does not

consist of two principles so essentially different from one another as

matter and spirit, which are always described as having _no one common

property_ by means of which they can affect or act upon each other." In

the "Systême de la Nature," the same argument is often urged. It is

boldly and repeatedly affirmed that "an immaterial cause cannot produce

motion;" and this is applied equally to the soul and to God. "How can we

form an idea of a substance destitute of extension, and yet acting on

our senses, that is, on material organs which are extended? How can a

being without extension be capable of motion, and of putting matter into

motion?"--"It is as impossible that spirit or thought should produce

matter, as that matter should produce spirit or thought."[154]

Now, it is not denied by any,--it is admitted on all hands,--that the

union between the soul and the body is a great mystery, and that we are

not able, in the present state of our knowledge, to explain either the

action of matter on mind, or the action of mind on matter. The mode of

the union between them, and the nature of the influence which they

mutually exercise, are to us inscrutable: but _the facts_ of our most

familiar experience are not the less certain, because they depend on

causes to us unknown, or stand connected with mysteries which we cannot

solve. Besides, the theory of _unisubstancisme_ itself, were it adopted,

would still leave many facts unexplained, and the inmost nature of man

would continue to be as inscrutable as before. There is nothing

inconceivable, impossible, or self-contradictory in the supposition of a

non-material or spiritual substance; nor is there any reason _a priori_

to conclude that such a substance could not be united to a material

frame, although the nature of their union, and the mode of their

reciprocal action, might be to us inexplicable.

There is still another reason which is urged by some, derived from _the

dependence of the mind on the body_, and its liability to be affected,

beneficially or injuriously, by mere physical influences. "The faculty

of thinking," says Dr. Priestley, "in general ripens and comes to

maturity with the body; it is also observed to decay with it,"--"If the

brain be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within

the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are

universally affected in proportion. Likewise, as the mind is affected in

consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is

liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is

evident in the visible effects of all-strong passions,--hope or fear,

love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly

irrefragable arguments that it is properly no other than _one and the

same thing_ that is subject to these affections."[155] Mr. Atkinson

urges the same reason. "The proof that mind holds the same relation to

the body that all other phenomena do to material conditions, may be

found," he tells us, "in the whole circumstances of man's existence, his

origin and growth; the faculties following the development of the body

in man and other animals; the direction of the faculties being

influenced by surrounding circumstances; the desires, the will, the

hopes, the fears, the habits, and the opinions, being effects traceable

to causes,--to natural causes,--and becoming the facts of History and

Statistics. We observe the influence of climate, of sunshine and damp,

of wine and opium and poison, of health and disease." ... "When a glass

of wine turns a wise man into a fool, is it not clear that the result is

the consequence of a change in the material conditions?"[156]

Now, these facts are sufficient to show that, in the present life, there

is a very close and intimate union between the soul and the body, and

that they exert a reciprocal and very powerful influence. This is

admitted by the firmest advocates of _Spiritualism_; nay, it is

necessarily involved in the doctrine which they maintain, relative to

_the union_ of two distinct, but mutually dependent, principles in the

present constitution of human nature. But it is far, very far, from

affording any ground or warrant for the idea, that Matter may be

identified with Mind, or Thought with Motion.

There are certain Theological considerations which, if they have not

been pleaded as reasons, may yet have been felt as inducements, to the

adoption of the theory of Materialism. Not to speak of the difficulty

which has been felt in explaining "the traduction or propagation of

human souls," occasionally referred to in this controversy, it is plain

that many Deists in the last century, and that not a few Atheists still,

have been induced to embrace and avow Materialism, with the view of

undermining the doctrine of man's immortality, and of a future state of

rewards and punishments. It is equally certain that Dr. Priestley was

influenced by his peculiar views as a Socinian; for he tells us himself

that the doctrine of Materialism commended itself to his mind as a sure

and effectual means of disproving _the preëxistence of Christ_. "The

consideration," he says with singular candor, "that biases me as a

Christian, exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the

doctrine of a separate soul, is, that it has been the foundation of what

appears to me to be the very grossest corruptions of Christianity, and

even of that very Antichristianism that began to work in the apostles'

times, and which extended itself so amazingly and dreadfully afterwards.

I mean the Oriental philosophy of the 'preëxistence of souls,' which

drew after it the belief of the preëxistence and divinity of Christ, the

worship of Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of Purgatory, with

all the Popish doctrines and practices that are connected with them, and

supported by them."--"This doctrine (of the preëxistence of Christ) is

the point to which all that I have written tends, it being the capital

inference that I make from the doctrine of Materialism." There is also

abundant reason to believe that both Atheists and Pantheists have had

recourse to the theory of Materialism with the view of excluding the

doctrine of a living, personal God, and explaining all the phenomena of

Nature by the eternal laws of matter and motion. Now, if the question

stands related in any way to such themes as these,--the immortality of

man, the preëxistence and divinity of Christ, and the personality and

spirituality of God,--it must be confessed to have at least a very high

_relative_ importance, as it bears on some of the most momentous

articles of our _religious faith_; and the question naturally arises,

What relation it bears to the fundamental principles of Theism, and how

far it comports with right views of God, as the Creator and Governor of

the world?

We cannot, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, bring an

indiscriminate charge of Atheism, or even of irreligion, against all the

advocates of Materialism. It is true that it has often, perhaps most

generally, been associated with infidel opinions, and that in the hands

of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, it has been applied in support of

Atheism; but it is equally true, that in the hands of Dr. Priestley and

Dr. Good, it is combined with the professed, and, as we believe, the

sincere recognition of a personal God and of a future state. In point of

fact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists; and even were we

convinced that Materialists professing religion were illogical or

inconsequent reasoners, we should not be justified in ascribing to them

those consequences of their system which they explicitly disclaim and

disavow. Still it is competent, and it may be highly useful, to

entertain the question, What are the grounds on which the theory of

Materialism rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would

not lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some of the

most vital and fundamental articles of the Christian faith?

In attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose to state,

confirm, and illustrate a few propositions which are sufficient, in our

opinion, to show that the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons to

which it appeals, are not such as to warrant or justify any prejudice

against the articles of Natural or Revealed Religion.

SECTION II.

PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM.

I. Our _first_ proposition is, that the recent progress of Natural

Science, great and rapid as it has been, has not materially altered "the

state of the question" respecting the distinction between Mind and

Matter, however much it may have extended our knowledge respecting the

properties of both, and of the relation subsisting between the two.

We place this proposition on the foreground, because we have reason to

believe that a very different impression prevails in certain quarters,

associated in some cases with the hope, in others with the apprehension,

that the advances which have been made in physical science may

ultimately lead to the obliteration of the old distinction between Mind

and Matter. This impression has been deepened by every successive

addition to the doctrines of Physiology; and especially by the recent

speculations on Phrenology, Animal Magnetism, and Clairvoyance. Now, we

think that these speculations, even if they were admitted into the rank

of true sciences, would not materially alter the "state of the question"

respecting the distinction between Mind and Matter, as that question was

discussed in former times.

Take the case of Phrenology. It had always been admitted that the mind

has certain _external organs_, through which it receives various

impressions from without, and holds communication with the sensible

universe. The existence and use of these organs were held to be

perfectly compatible with the doctrine that the soul itself is

immaterial. Phrenology appears, and professes to have discovered

_certain other organs_, certain cerebral developments, which stand

connected with the various functions of thought and feeling; in other

words, to the _five senses_ which are universally recognized, it adds

_thirty_ or _forty_ organs in the brain, not hitherto known to exist.

But how does this discovery, even supposing it to be fully established,

affect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction

betwixt Mind and Matter? A material organization, in the case of man,

was always admitted; and the only difference which that discovery could

be supposed to make, must arise from the addition of certain organs to

those which were previously established. But why should the spirituality

of the soul be more affected by the one set of organs than it was by the

other? The ablest advocates of Phrenology have repudiated Materialism.

Dr. Spurzheim expressly disclaims it. "I incessantly repeat," says he,

"that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out _what the

mind is in itself_. I do not say that the organization produces the

affective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings

forth fruit or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic

conditions are necessary to every manifestation of mind."--"If the

manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend on organization,

Materialism, it is said, will be established.... When our antagonists,

however, maintain that we are Materialists, they ought to show where we

teach _that there is nothing but matter._ The entire falsehood of the

accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations.

The expression 'organ' designates an instrument by means of which some

faculty proclaims itself. The muscles, for example, are the organs of

voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the

organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the

faculties of the soul, or of the mind, from the organs; and consider the

cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest

themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain

extent, admit the dependence of the soul on the body.... We are,

therefore, no more Materialists than our predecessors, whether

anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great number of

philosophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependence of the soul

on the body. For the Materialism is essentially the same, whether the

faculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole

brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain; the

faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition."[157] We

conclude, therefore, that Phrenology, even supposing it to be fully

established, could not materially affect the state of the question

respecting the radical distinction between Mind and Matter.

Similar remarks apply to the case of Mesmerism or Animal Magnetism. It

had always been known and admitted that the soul is liable, by reason of

its connection with the body in the present state, to be affected by

_certain influences_,--from light, from heat, from electricity, from the

atmosphere, and from other sources. Mesmerism appears, and professes to

have discovered _another influence_ by which the nervous system is

peculiarly affected; in other words, it merely adds a new influence to

the number of those which were universally acknowledged before, it

matters little whether it be the Magnetism of Mesmer, or the Odyle of

Reichenbach, or the Dia-magnetism of Faraday. But how could this

discovery, even supposing it to be fully established, affect the state

of the question respecting the radical distinction between Mind and

Matter? If we were Immaterialists before, while we acknowledged the

influence of the atmosphere, of light, of heat, and of electricity, may

we not be Immaterialists still, notwithstanding the addition of Odyle to

the class of _dynamides_? May we not admit the stranger, with the

strange name, if suitably attested, without the slightest apprehension

of thereby weakening the grounds on which we hold Mind to be

essentially different from Matter, and incapable of being identified

with it? It were a foolish and dangerous expedient, and one to which no

enlightened advocate of Immaterialism will have recourse, to denounce

the professed discoveries either of Phrenology or of Mesmerism, on the

ground of their supposed tendency to obliterate the distinction between

Mind and Matter. For the fact, that certain "organs" exist, by means of

which the mind acquires a large portion of its knowledge, and that

certain "influences" are known to affect it from without, is too well

established to be called in question; and the mere extension of that

fact by the discovery of _other organs and other influences_, hitherto

unknown, could have no tendency to shut us up, more than before, to the

adoption of the theory of Materialism. It is the part of wisdom, then,

to leave ample scope and verge for the progress of Physiological

research in this as in every other department, and to rest in the

confident persuasion that whatever discoveries may yet be made in regard

to the _connection_ between mind and body, they can have no effect in

disproving a _radical distinction_ between the two. And this we deem a

much safer ground than that which Professor Gregory has adopted, when he

first of all denies the possibility of defining either matter or spirit,

and then leaves the existence of "a thinking principle or soul distinct

from the body" to rest merely on "our instinctive consciousness."[158]

We think it, in every point of view, a safer course to meet all

objections by saying, that the admission of the _odylic_ or any other

influence of a similar kind, would not in the least affect the grounds

of our belief in the existence of an immaterial mind.

We are disposed to pursue the same line of argument a step further, and

to apply it to the case of "Hypnotism" or "Clairvoyance." It had always

been known that the mind, in its present state of connection with the

body, is liable to be affected by _sleep_ and by _dreams_; and the

phenomena of natural sleep and of ordinary dreams were never supposed to

be incompatible with the distinction between mind and body. But the

Hypnotist or the Clairvoyant appears, and announces a state of _magnetic

sleep_, with a new set of phenomena dependent on it, resembling the

dreams and visions of the night. The facts are strange and startling;

but, after recovering from our first surprise, we may calmly ask, what

effect these facts, if established, should have in modifying our

convictions respecting the essential nature of mind and matter; and we

shall find that they afford no sufficient reason for relinquishing the

doctrine of an "immaterial spirit," but that, on the contrary, these

very facts, were they sufficiently verified, would open up a new view of

the powers and activities of "spirit," such as might well fill us with

wonder and awe. "I have heard, times innumerable," says Professor

Gregory, "religious persons declare, on seeing these phenomena, that

nothing could more clearly demonstrate the immateriality, and

consequently the immortality of the soul. 'In _clairvoyance_,' say these

persons, 'we observe the mind acting separate from the body, and

entirely independent of it. How beautiful a proof of the infinite

difference between _spirit_ and _matter_.'" It is a proof that we would

be slow to adduce, for the facts are doubtful as well as obscure; but,

for our present purpose, it is not necessary either to admit or to deny

the truth of these facts; it is sufficient to say that the phenomena of

Mesmeric sleep and the visions of Clairvoyance are not more inconsistent

with the doctrine of an immaterial soul than the more familiar, but

scarcely less mysterious, phenomena of natural sleep and common dreams.

It is, indeed, not a little remarkable that the profound and sagacious

Butler expressed himself in the following terms, long before the

phenomena of Magnetism and Clairvoyance were spoken of as subjects of

scientific study: "That we have no reason to think our _organs_ of

sense _percipients_ ... is confirmed by the experience of dreams, by

which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and what would

otherwise be an unimagined, unknown power of perceiving sensible

objects, in as strong and lively a manner, _without our external organs

of sense as with them_."[159]

On the whole, we think it clear that neither by Phrenology, which adds

merely to the number of our material "organs," nor by Mesmerism, which

adds _one_ to the number of the "influences" by which we are affected,

nor by Clairvoyance, which adds the phenomena of _magnetic_ to those of

_natural_ sleep, is the state of the question materially altered from

what it was before these additions were made to Physiological

speculation. And hence those who are well versed in our older writers on

the doctrine of "spirit" and "matter," will be sufficiently furnished

with weapons for repelling the more recent assaults of Materialism. If

any one has read and digested the Treatises of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his

replies to Dodwell, Collins, and Leibnitz; the "Free Discussion" between

Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price; the "Examen du Materialisme" by Bergier, in

reply to the "Systême de la Nature;" and the writings of Andrew Baxter,

Drew, Ditton, and others, on the same subject, he will find little

difficulty in grappling with the arguments of Comte, Atkinson, and

Martineau. He will see at once that the main, the fundamental question,

is not materially affected by the advances which have been made in

Physiological discovery. These discoveries may have extended our

knowledge respecting _the relations_ which subsist between the "mind"

and the "body;" they have in no degree served to obliterate the

_distinction betwixt the two_.

In perfect consistency, however, with this conviction, we may frankly

avow our opinion, that some of the older opponents of Materialism

adopted a method of stating their argument which appears to us to be

liable to just exception, and which the progress of Physical, and

especially of Chemical science, has tended greatly to discredit. They

seem to have been apprehensive that by ascribing any peculiar properties

or active powers to matter, they might incur the hazard of weakening the

grounds on which they contended for the spirituality of man and the

supremacy of God. Thus, in the "Inquiry into the Nature of the Human

Soul," by Andrew Baxter, the existence of any active property or power

in matter is explicitly denied, and the only property which is ascribed

to it is a certain passive power, or "vis inertiæ," by which it is

incapable of changing its state, whether of rest or of motion. This "vis

inertiæ" is not only supposed to be the sole property of matter, but is

even held to be inconsistent with, and exclusive of, any active power

whatever; and all the effects which are usually said to be produced by

it are ascribed to the power of an immaterial Being. We are told that

"vis inertiæ," or "a resistance to any change of its present state, is

essential to matter, and inconsistent with any active power in it;" that

"all gravity, attraction, elasticity, repulsion, or whatever other

tendencies to motion are observed in matter (commonly called natural

powers of matter), are not powers implanted in matter or possible to be

made inherent in it, but impulse or force impressed upon it _ab extra_;"

and that "the cause of its motion must be sought for in something not

matter, in some _immaterial cause or being_."--"Gravity," for instance,

"is not the action of matter upon matter, but the virtue or power of an

immaterial cause or being, constantly impressed upon it." Nor has this

doctrine been confined to such metaphysical reasoners as Andrew Baxter.

Professor Playfair tells us, that when he was introduced to Dr. Horsley,

the Bishop "expressed great respect for Lord Monboddo, for his learning

and his acuteness, and (what was more surprising) for the soundness of

his judgment. He talked very seriously of the notion of _mind being

united to all the parts of matter and being the cause of motion_. So far

as I could gather, Dr. Horsley supposes that _every atom of matter has a

soul_, which is the cause of its motion, its gravitation, &c. What has

made him adopt this strange unphilosophical notion I cannot tell, unless

it be the fear that his study of natural philosophy should make him

suspected of Atheism, or at least of Materialism. For it is certain that

there is at present a prejudice among the English clergy that natural

philosophy has a tendency to make men Atheists or Materialists. This

absurd prejudice was first introduced, I think, by that illiberal,

though learned, prelate, Dr. Warburton."[160] A similar opinion has been

recently reproduced by Dr. Burnett in his "Philosophy of Spirits in

relation to Matter," in which he attempts to show that the forces and

laws of Nature cannot be proved to be _the result of anything inherent

in matter alone_, and that they ought to be ascribed to some substantive

and distinct, but immaterial and dependent _spirits_, called "the spirit

of life," "the spirit of electricity," "the spirit of heat."[161].

All these statements are only so many modifications of the same theory,

and they agree in denying the existence of any active powers in matter,

while they ascribe the phenomena of motion, life, and thought to an

immaterial principle. There is, as it seems to us, a mixture of truth

and error in this theory. It affirms a great truth, in so far as it

declares the impossibility of accounting for the phenomena of motion,

life, and thought, without ascribing them ultimately to a spiritual,

intelligent, and voluntary cause; but it adopts a dangerous, and, as we

conceive, a perfectly gratuitous assumption, when it denies that matter

is capable of possessing any other properties or powers than those of

extension, solidity, and "vis inertiæ." We know little of the nature of

those fluids, forces, or powers, which have been denominated "dynamides"

or "imponderables;" but, unquestionably, they possess properties and

produce phenomena very different from any that can be reasonably

ascribed to mere "vis inertiæ." Nor is their possession of these

properties incompatible with that law, when it is correctly understood.

For what is the real import of the law of "vis inertiæ?" It amounts

simply to this, as stated by Baxter himself, "that a resistance to any

change of its present state,--whether of motion or rest,--is essential

to 'matter,'" he adds, indeed, "and inconsistent with any active power

in it;" but this is an assumption which is true only in a sense that

would make it inconclusive with reference to the point at issue. It is

true, if it means merely that matter is destitute of spontaneity and

self-motion, such as belongs to living, voluntary agents; but it is not

true, if it means that matter is destitute of all inherent properties

and powers. Indeed, the "vis inertiæ" which is ascribed to matter is

itself a power, and a very formidable one; it is described by Baxter

himself as "a kind of positive or stubborn inactivity," as "something

receding further from action than bare inactivity," for "_matter is so

powerfully inactive a thing_!" Now, if such a power as this may be

ascribed to matter, why may it not be admitted with equal safety that

God has bestowed on it certain other properties and powers, not

inconsistent with this, but additional to it; and that He has

established such relations and affinities between different substances

as that they may act and react--mechanically or chemically--on one

another? The phenomena of chemical affinity, the motions, and other

changes, produced by the contact, or even the juxtaposition, of certain

substances, and the variety of the resulting products, do certainly

evince the operation of other powers besides that of "vis inertiæ;" and

we cannot see why these powers should be ascribed to "immaterial

spirits," any more than that of "vis inertiæ" itself, or why it would be

a whit more dangerous to ascribe them to matter than to created

_spirits_. All that is required, as it appears to us, to establish the

dependence of the creature on the Creator and to vindicate the truth of

Christian Theism, is to maintain these two positions: _first_, that

whatever properties or powers belong either to "matter" or to "mind,"

were originally conferred on them, respectively, at the time of their

creation by the will of God; and, _secondly_, that by the same will,

these properties and powers are continually sustained, governed, and

controlled. These two positions are held by all enlightened Theists, and

are abundantly sufficient, if proved, to vindicate their doctrine

against every assault; but we think it unwarrantable and dangerous to go

further, and to ascribe, on the strength of mere gratuitous assumptions,

all the activity, motion, and change which occur in the universe to

created spirits or immaterial causes. These assumptions are extremely

different from the common-sense notions of men, and they are utterly

unnecessary for the support of any doctrine which we are concerned to

defend.

On the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical distinction

between Mind and Matter has not been materially affected by the recent

progress of Physiological research, and that the old arguments against

Materialism are still available, except in so far as they were founded

on a too limited view of the properties of matter, which the advancing

Science of Chemistry has done so much, to unfold and to illustrate.

II. Our _second_ proposition may be thus stated: That were we reduced to

the necessity of embracing any form of the theory of "unisubstancisme,"

there could not be less,--there might even be greater,--reason for

_spiritualizing matter_, than for _materializing mind_.

On the supposition that one or other of the two must be dispensed with,

the question still remains, which of them can be most easily spared? or,

which of them can be most conclusively proved? Mankind have generally

thought that they had equally good evidence for the existence of both;

that in the direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had

proof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and in the

less direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Perception, proof

sufficient of the existence of a material world. But each of these

convictions has been in its turn assailed by the cavils of skepticism;

and men have been asked to prove _by reasoning_ what needed, and,

indeed, admitted of no _such_ proof,--the existence of Matter as

distinct from Mind, and the existence of Mind as distinct from Matter.

The latter is denied by Materialists, the former is equally denied by

Idealists; and what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories

is one-sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being

reduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of "unisubstancisme," we

should still have greater reason to reduce all to the category of

"spirit," than to reduce all to the category of "matter." Many seem to

think that it is more easy, or, perhaps, that it is less necessary, to

prove the distinct existence of matter, than to prove the distinct

existence of mind. They are so familiar with matter, and so continually

surrounded by it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as

possible, and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence

in the case. But can it be justly said that they are more familiar with

matter and its movements than they are with a living spirit within them,

which feels, and thinks, and wills, and by means of which alone the

phenomena of external nature itself can become known to them? If they

receive the testimony of Perception as a sufficient proof of the

existence of Matter, why should they not also receive the still more

direct and immediate testimony of Consciousness as a sufficient proof of

the existence of Mind? Or, if they refuse the latter, and admit the

former, are they quite sure that, on their own partial principles, they

could offer any conclusive answer to the "Idealism" of Berkeley? That

ingenious and amiable prelate will tell them that "the objects of sense

cannot exist otherwise than _in a mind perceiving them_;" that "their

_esse_ is _percipi_, nor is it possible that they should have any

existence out of the minds, or thinking things, which perceive them;"

and that "all the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth,--in a

word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have

not any subsistence without a mind."[162] Nay, others who are not

Idealists, but who believe equally in the existence of "mind" and

"matter," will tell them that Berkeley's arguments are conclusive, at

least to the extent of showing that the existence of "matter," as a

thing external to us, cannot be proved without presupposing the

existence of "mind." "For what," says Lord Brougham, "is this matter?

Whence do we derive any knowledge of it? How do we assure ourselves of

its existence? What evidence have we at all respecting either its being

or its qualities? We feel, or taste, or smell something; that is, we

have certain sensations, which make us conclude that something exists

beyond ourselves." ... "But what are our sensations? The feelings or

thoughts of our own minds. Then what we do is this: from certain ideas

in our minds, produced no doubt by, and connected with, our bodily

senses, but independent of and separate from them, we draw certain

conclusions by reasoning; and these conclusions are in favor of the

existence of something other than our sensations and our reasonings, and

other than that which experiences the sensations and makes the

reasonings, passive in the one case, active in the other. That something

is what we call--Mind. But plainly, whatever it is, we owe to it the

knowledge that matter exists; for that knowledge is gained by means of a

sensation or feeling, followed by a process of reasoning; it is gained

by the mind having first suffered something, and then done something.

Therefore, to say _there is no such thing as matter_ would be a much

less absurd inference than to say _there is no such thing as mind_." ...

"The truth is, that we believe in the existence of 'matter,' because we

cannot help it. The inferences of our reason from our sensations impel

us to this conclusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach

it. But the steps are fewer, and shorter, and of the self-same nature,

which lead us to believe in the existence of Mind, for of that we have

the evidence within ourselves."[163]

It follows that were we reduced, as we are not, to the necessity of

adopting the theory of "unisubstancisme," we might with at least as good

reason dispense with the existence of "matter" as with the existence of

"mind;" for, in the words of Dugald Stewart, "it would no more be proper

to say of 'mind' that it is _material_, than to say of 'body' that it is

_spiritual."_[164]

III. Our _third_ proposition is, That we are _not_ reduced to the

necessity of adopting any theory of "unisubstancisme," since there is

nothing inconceivable or self-contradictory in the supposition of two

distinct substantive beings, possessing diverse properties, such as

"mind" and "body," or "spirit" and "matter," are usually held to be.

Let any one endeavor to assign a reason for the sole, exclusive

existence either of "matter" or of "spirit," or a distinct, specific

ground for the opinion that they are necessarily incompatible with each

other, and he will be compelled to own that the theory of

"unisubstancisme," however plausible by reason of its apparent

simplicity, is really nothing more than a gratuitous assumption. It

cannot be admitted with reference even to _nature_ and _man_ without

confounding the simplest elements of human knowledge; and with reference

to _God_ and the _universe_, it is attended with still more fatal

consequences, since it must lead, if consistently followed out, to

undisguised Pantheism. Why should it be supposed that there is, or can

only be, _one_ substance in Nature? one substance invested with all

those properties and powers which exist, in such manifold diversity, in

the organic and inorganic kingdoms? The wonder might rather seem to be

that any _two_ substances should be capable of accounting for such a

variety of phenomena as the universe exhibits. A "dualism" is

unavoidable, unless we are to materialize God as well as man; and why

may there not be a "dualism" in the case of created _mind_ and _matter_,

as there must be, on any supposition except that of Pantheism, in the

case of the uncreated mind and the material universe? We see variety and

gradation in all the works of God; we see thousands of substances,

simple and compound, possessing various properties, even in the

inorganic world; we see different forms of life, vegetable and animal,

ascending by steps of regular gradation, from the lowest to the highest;

we see, in the animal kingdom, various propensities, instincts, and

powers, which constitute the characteristics of distinct species; at

length we rise to Man, with his rational, responsible, and immortal

nature. Why may not Man be the _nexus_ between a world of "matter" and a

world of "spirits,"--Man, who is equally connected with the material

world by his body, and with the spiritual by his soul,--who is, as it

were, "mind incarnate," spirit in flesh? And why may there not be higher

spirits still, whether embodied in subtler and more refined vehicles, or

existing apart from all material forms, in those other worlds which

Astronomy has brought to light? No reason can be assigned for a negative

answer to these and similar queries, unless it be that _we cannot

conceive of pure spirit without bodily form_; and this may be true, if

it be meant merely to affirm that we can find no sensible image for it,

nothing by which it can be represented to our sight, or pictured in our

imagination, as visible things may be; but it is not true, if it be

meant to imply that we have no distinct notion of "mind" or "spirit,"

for it is as clearly known by its properties, of thought, feeling,

volition, and consciousness, as matter itself can be; and who will

venture to define, or to depict, or to form any image of _the substance

of matter_, apart from the properties which belong to it?

We are under no necessity, then, of adopting the theory of

"unisubstancisme," and we cannot found upon it in argument without

building on a mere gratuitous assumption.

IV. Our _fourth_ proposition is, That the same reason which warrants us

in ascribing certain properties and phenomena to a distinct substance

called "matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other

properties and phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that

the difference between their respective properties and phenomena is so

great as to justify the belief that the _substances_ are different and

ought to be denominated by distinctive names.

When Materialists affirm, as they do, the existence of one only

substantive being in Nature, and represent all our mental phenomena as

the mere results of physical organization, they assume that "matter," at

least, is a real _entity_; that it is a _substance_ or _substratum_ in

which certain powers or qualities inhere; and that its existence, as

such, is evident and undeniable. We are entirely relieved, therefore, by

their own admission or assumption, from the necessity of discussing the

more general problem of Ontology; the problem, whether we can prove the

existence of _any_ being, properly so called, from a mere series of

phenomena, a succession of appearances. They virtually admit, since they

evidently assume, that the phenomena must have a substance under them,

the qualities a substratum in which they inhere. Now, the very same

reason which warrants, or rather obliges them to recognize "matter" as a

substance and not as a shadow,--as an _entity_ which really exists and

manifests itself by its properties and effects,--must equally warrant,

or rather oblige them to recognize "mind" or "spirit" also as a

distinct substantive being, unless it can be shown either that its

properties are the same with those of matter, or that they may be

accounted for by some peculiar modification of matter, some law of

physical organization. There can be no reason for admitting the

existence of "matter" as a substance, which does not apply also to the

existence of "mind" as a distinct substance, if it shall be found that

their properties are essentially different. We know, and can know,

nothing of _substance_ otherwise than by its properties or powers: we

know nothing of "matter,"--it would, in fact, be to us non-existent, but

for its extension, solidity, and other properties; we know nothing of

"mind,"--it would equally be to us non-existent, but for its

consciousness, its thoughts, feelings, and desires; and if it be right

to ascribe the one set of properties to a substantive being, called

"matter," it cannot be wrong to ascribe the other set of properties also

to a substantive being, called "mind."

If it could be shown, indeed, that the properties of the one substance

might either be identified with, or accounted for, by those of the

other; if animal feeling could be identified with or derived from, mere

physical impulse; if intellectual thought could be reduced to material

motion; if desire and aversion, hope and fear could be explained by the

natural laws of attraction and repulsion, then we might blend the two

substances into one, and speak of "mind" as a mere modification of

"matter." But as long as the properties or powers by which alone any

substance can be known are seen to be generically different, we cannot

confound the substances themselves, or reduce them to one category,

without violating the plainest rules of philosophical inquiry.

And yet to these rules Dr. Priestley refers, as if they warranted the

conclusions at which he had arrived. He desires his readers "to recur to

the universally received rules of philosophizing, such as are laid down

by Sir Isaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of "Principia."

The first of these rules, as laid down by him, is that we are to _admit

no more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances_; and the

second is, that to _the same effect_ we must, as far as possible, assign

_the same cause_." We cheerfully accept these canons of philosophical

inquiry; and it is just because no one substance is sufficient, in our

estimation, to account for _all_ the appearances, that we equally reject

the "spiritualism" of Berkeley, who would resolve all phenomena into

"mind," and the "materialism" of Priestley, who would resolve all

phenomena into "matter." Matter and Mind may, indeed, be said to

resemble each other in some respects,--in their being equally existent,

equally created, and equally dependent; but their essential properties

are generically different, for there is no identity, but a manifest and

undeniable diversity, between thought, feeling, desire, volition, and

conscience, and the various qualities or powers belonging to matter,

such as extension, solidity, and _vis inertiæ_, or even the powers of

attraction and repulsion. On the ground of this manifest difference

between the properties by which alone any substance makes itself known,

we hold ourselves warranted to affirm that the "mind" is immaterial, and

to ascribe mental phenomena to a _distinct substantive being_, not less

than the material phenomena of Nature.

Some ingenious thinkers, on both sides of the question, have not been

fully satisfied with this method of stating the grounds of our opinion.

It has been said by our opponents, that if we found merely on the

acknowledged difference between two sets of properties or phenomena,

while we admit that the substance or substratum is in itself entirely

unknown to us, or known only through the medium of the properties to

which we refer,--then the dispute becomes a purely _verbal_ one, and can

amount to nothing more than this, whether a _substance_ of whose essence

we are entirely ignorant should be called by the name of "matter" or by

the name of "spirit." But the dispute is not a purely _verbal_ one,

even on the suppositions which have been stated. For it is essential to

a right "philosophy of nature," that every substance possessing peculiar

properties should have a distinctive name. Thus, even in the material

world itself, we distinguish sulphur from soda, gold from granite, and

magnesia from electricity or _odyle_. Why? Because, while they have some

properties in common, in virtue of which we rank them in the same

category as "material substances," they have, severally, certain

distinctive or peculiar characteristics, which forbid us to call the one

by the same name as the other. And for precisely the same reason, when

we find another class of properties and powers existing in certain

beings, which are totally different from those belonging to mere

material substances,--incapable not only of being identified with them,

but also of being accounted for by means of them,--we are equally

warranted in ascribing these properties to a _substance_, and in

affirming that this substance, of which we know nothing except through

its properties, is radically different from "matter." That there is

something more than a mere _verbal_ difference between us and our

opponents might seem to be admitted by themselves, when they evince so

much zeal in assailing our position and defending their own; but it

becomes strikingly apparent as soon as we extend our inquiry so as to

embrace the grand question respecting the distinction, if any, between

God and the material universe.

Some, again, who are substantially, at least in all important respects,

on our side of the question, have not been satisfied with showing that

the two sets of properties are generically different, and that the same

reason exists for ascribing the one to a distinct substantive being

called "mind," as for ascribing the other to a substantive being called

"matter." They have been anxious to advance a step further; and to show

that the two sets of properties are _mutually exclusive_, and that they

could not possibly _coexist_ in the same subject. This is the declared

object of Baxter's Work on the Soul, which professes to prove that the

only power belonging to "matter," namely, its _vis inertiæ_, or

resistance to any change in its present state, is inconsistent with its

possession of any active power. It is not held sufficient to show that

the properties are generically different, and that the substances in

which these properties inhere may and should be designated by distinct

names, as matter and spirit, soul and body; but it must be further

proved that they are so heterogeneous and inconsistent as to be mutually

exclusive, and incapable of coexisting in the same substance. To a

certain extent, we think this mode of reasoning may be admitted. We do

not conceive that "vis inertiæ" is the only property belonging to

matter, or that it is necessarily exclusive of attraction and repulsion,

and the other powers which may belong to its specific varieties; but we

do conceive that the "vis inertiæ" of mere matter is utterly

inconsistent with the self-activity, the self-moving power, which

belongs to "mind:" and we are confirmed in this conviction by the

anxiety which our opponents have evinced to explain the phenomena of

mind by purely mechanical laws, and to establish a system, not of

_moral_, but of _material_ necessity, in opposition to the doctrine of

man's spontaneity and freedom. We are further of opinion, that

_extension_ cannot be predicated of "mind," without also being

predicated of "thought;" and that to ascribe it to either would lead to

ridiculous absurdities, such as have been noted, and perhaps

caricatured, by Dr. Thomas Brown. We think, too, that the unity and

continuity of consciousness, with the intimate sense of personal

identity, that belongs to all rational and responsible beings, are

utterly irreconcilable with the continual flux and mutation that are

incident to matter, and that they cannot be accounted for without the

supposition of a distinct substance, existing the same throughout all

the changes that occur in the material receptacle in which it dwells. To

this extent we think that the argument is alike legitimate and valid;

but when it goes beyond this, and attempts either to divest matter of

all active properties, or to demonstrate that, in the very nature of

things, sensation and thought could not possibly be annexed to a

material substance, we think that it advances beyond the real exigencies

of the case, and that it undertakes a task which is somewhat too arduous

for our present powers,--a task which many of the ablest advocates of

Immaterialism would humbly, but firmly, decline.

In this connection, it may be useful to remark that it is only with

reference to this advanced and more arduous part of the general

argument, that such writers as Locke and Bonnet, whose authority is

often pleaded in opposition to our views, ever felt the slightest

difficulty. They were both "Immaterialists," because they both discerned

the radical difference between mental and material phenomena, and

because they both admitted the reasonableness of ascribing them,

respectively, to a _distinct substance_. But they were not convinced by

the more metaphysical arguments of those who professed to show that none

of the phenomena of "mind" could possibly be exhibited by matter, or, at

least, they declined to take that ground. That Locke was an

Immaterialist is evident from many passages in his writings. "By putting

together," he says, "the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and

power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a

perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material.

For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, &c., joined to

_substance_, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an

immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid

parts and a power of being moved, joined with _substance_, of which

likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter: the one

is as clear and distinct an idea as the other."[165] But notwithstanding

this explicit statement, he demurred to the doctrine of those who

maintained that the power of thinking could not possibly be superadded

to matter, and this because he deemed it presumptuous to set limits to

the Divine omnipotence, or to pronounce any judgment on a question of

that kind. "We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall

never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it

being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without

Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some

systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think.... I

see _no contradiction_ in it that the first eternal thinking Being

should, if He pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless

matter, put together as He sees fit, some degrees of sense, perception,

and thought."[166]

In these and similar passages, Locke did not mean, we think, to retract

or modify the doctrine which he had taught respecting the radical

distinction betwixt mind and matter; he intended merely to intimate

that, in adopting that doctrine, he proceeded on grounds different from

those which had been assumed by some other writers; that his belief

rested mainly on the essential difference between the properties

belonging to the two substances, and not on the mere metaphysical

arguments by which some had attempted to prove that God himself could

not impart to matter the power of thinking. He shrunk from pronouncing a

positive decision on _this_ one point; and yet his words have ever since

been quoted with triumph by the advocates of Materialism as affording a

virtual sanction to _the possibility_ at least of that for which they

contend. And on the same account, Locke has been severely blamed by some

modern "spiritualists." Mr. Carlyle, speaking of "Hartley's and

Darwin's, and all the possible forms of Materialism,--the grand

Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which at all times the true

worship, that of the invisible, has been polluted and withstood"--adds

the following characteristic remarks: "Locke, himself a clear,

humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay religious man, had paved the way

for banishing religion from the world. Mind, by being modelled in men's

imaginations into a Shape, a Visibility, and reasoned of as if it had

been some composite, divisible, and reunitable substance, some finer

chemical salt, or curious piece of logical joinery, began to lose its

immaterial, mysterious, divine, though invisible character: it was

tacitly figured as something that might, were our organs fine enough, be

_seen_. Yet who had ever seen it? who could ever see it? Thus, by

degrees, it passed into a Doubt, a Relation, some faint Possibility,

and, at last, into a highly probably Nonentity. Following Locke's

footsteps, the French had discovered that 'as the stomach secretes

chyle, so does the brain secrete thought.'"[167]

The sentiments of Bonnet of Geneva, as stated in his "Palingenesie," are

substantially in accordance with those of Locke, and have met with

similar treatment. He is not a Materialist; he admits a real

distinction, as well as a close union, between the soul and the body; he

speaks even of the possible existence of disembodied souls or pure

spirits; he affirms the immateriality of the thinking principle; and

expressly assigns his reasons for _not_ being a Materialist.[168] But he

appears to have thought, as Locke did, that possibly the power of

thinking might be superadded to matter, by the Creator's omnipotent

will, and that there is nothing in this supposition which could

seriously affect either the doctrine of Theism or the "immortality" of

man. And hence he affirmed, in words which Dr. Priestley selected for

the motto of his "Disquisitions," that "if any one should ever

demonstrate the soul to be material, far from being alarmed at this, we

should only admire the power which could give to _matter_ the power of

_thinking_."

We conceive that the language both of Locke and Bonnet on this

particular point amounts to a dangerous and very unnecessary concession.

Were it meant merely to affirm that God could so unite a thinking

spiritual being with a material organism, as to make the two mutually

dependent and subservient, this is no more than is admitted by all the

advocates of Immaterialism, and it is actually exhibited in the

constitution of human nature. But if it were meant to admit that the

power of "thinking" and "willing" might be superadded as a property or

quality to matter itself, _without any substantive being other than

matter as a substratum_, then we conceive it to be at variance with the

grounds on which Locke and Bonnet themselves had previously declared

their belief in the distinct existence both of matter and spirit. We

shall only add, that the prejudice against our doctrine, which is

founded on the union of two _substances_ apparently so heterogeneous as

mind and matter in _the same person_, is, to say the least, fully

counterbalanced by the difficulty, incident to the theory, of

demonstrating the coexistence of _two sets of properties_, apparently so

diverse and disparate as thought and extension, "vis inertiæ" and

spontaneity, in _the same substance_.

On the whole, we conclude that the same reason which warrants us in

ascribing certain properties or phenomena to a distinct substance called

"matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other properties or

phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that the difference

between their properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the

belief that the substances are different, and ought to be denominated by

distinctive names.

V. Our _fifth_ proposition is, That it is impossible to account for the

phenomena of thought, feeling, desire, volition, and self-consciousness,

by ascribing them, as Materialists do, either to the _substance of_

"matter," or to its _form_; that is, either to the _atomic particles_

of which it consists, or to the _peculiar organization_ in which these

particles are arranged.

It is too manifest to admit either of doubt or denial, that the power of

thinking, feeling, and willing, does not belong to every form of matter.

It is not, therefore, one of its essential properties; and if it belong

to it at all, it must be either a _quality superadded_ to the ordinary

powers of matter, or a _product resulting_ from its configuration in an

organized form.

If it be a quality superadded merely to the ordinary powers of matter,

then it must exist equally in every part of the mass to which it is

attached; every particle of the matter in which it inheres must be

sentient, intelligent, voluntary, and active; and, on this supposition,

it will remain a difficult, if not desperate problem, to account for the

_unity_ of consciousness by such a diversity of parts, and especially

for the _continuity_ of consciousness, when the material elements are

confessedly in a state of constant flux and mutation. It would seem,

too, that if thought be thus connected with an extended, divisible, and

mutable substance, it must be itself extended, and, of course,

divisible; and, accordingly, Dr. Priestley does not hesitate to affirm

that our _ideas_, as well as our _minds_, possess these characters.

"Whatever ideas," he says, "are in themselves, they are evidently

produced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them; and

since many of the objects or archetypes of ideas are _divisible_, it

necessarily follows that _the ideas themselves are divisible also_." ...

"If the archetypes of ideas have _extension_, the ideas which are

expressive of them, and are actually produced by them according to

certain mechanical laws, must have extension likewise; and, therefore,

the mind in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, must

have extension also.... I am, therefore, obliged to conclude that the

sentient principle in man, containing ideas which certainly have parts,

and are divisible, and consequently must have extension, cannot be that

simple, indivisible, and immaterial substance that some have imagined it

to be, but something that has real extension, and therefore may have the

other properties of matter."[169] He argues that _ideas_ must be

extended and divisible because their objects or archetypes are so; and,

further, that the _mind_ itself must be material, because these

properties belong to the ideas which inhere in it as their subject or

seat. Now, _this_ argument is fairly met by the reasoning, or the

ridicule, call it which you will, of Dr. Thomas Brown: "In saying of

mind that it is matter, we must mean, if we mean anything, that the

principle which thinks is hard and divisible; and that it will be not

more absurd to talk of the _twentieth_ part of an affirmation, or the

_quarter_ of a hope, of the _top_ of a remembrance, and the north and

east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or

of the different points of the compass, in reference to any part of the

globe. The true answer to the statement of the Materialist,--the answer

which we feel in our hearts, on the very expression of the plurality and

divisibility of feeling,--is that it assumes what, far from admitting,

we cannot even understand, and that, with every effort of attention

which we can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming

any conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half

of a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a

central point, or of a square without a single angle."[170]

But the theory which supposes the soul to be extended and divisible, and

its ideas, feelings, and volitions to be extended and divisible also,

has given place to another, which does not represent the mental

qualities as inhering in every particle of the matter with which they

are associated, but rather as _the products of organization_, the

results, not of the atomic elements, but of the form, or figure, into

which they are cast. It seems to have been felt that it would be unsafe

to ascribe the power of thinking to every particle of the brain, and it

is now represented as the result or product of "the brain in action, as

light and heat are of fire, and fragrance of the flower."[171] This idea

is illustrated by a great variety of natural examples, in which certain

effects are produced by the _arrangement of matter,_ which could not be

produced by its individual particles, existing separate and apart, or

combined in other forms. Nor is this a new phase of the theory, or an

original discovery of the present age; it was familiarly known and fully

discussed[172] in the days of Clarke and Collins, and every similitude

which is now employed to illustrate it may be found dissected in their

writings. Collins had undertaken to prove that "an individual power may

reside in a material system which consists of separate and distinct

parts,"--"an individual power which is _not_ in every one, nor in any

one, of the particles that compose it, when taken apart and considered

singly:" and he had adduced as an example the very similitude which

Atkinson employs, namely, "fragrance from the flower;" for he adds, "a

rose, for example, consists of several particles, which, separately and

singly, want a power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience

in them when united." Other instances are given; such as "the power of

the eye to contribute to the act of seeing, the power of a clock to show

the hour of the day, the power of a musical instrument to produce in us

harmonious sounds;" these, he says, "are powers not at all resulting

from any powers of _the same kind_ inhering in the parts of the system;"

and he infers that "in the same manner the power of thinking, without

being an aggregate of powers of the same kind, may yet inhere in a

system of matter." But these examples, so far from confirming, serve

rather to confute, the theory in whose support they are adduced. Could

it be shown, indeed, that the eye possesses _in itself_ the power of

vision, and that sight results solely from its peculiar texture; or,

that a clock is really an "intellectual machine," and produces an

"intellectual effect;" or, that a musical instrument possesses in itself

the soul of melody, and is conscious of its own sweet sounds,--then it

might be possible to entertain the supposition that, _in like manner_,

an organized brain may have the power of producing thought, and feeling,

and will. But what is the matter of fact? Let Dr. Clarke's answer with

reference to the case of a timepiece suffice for all: "That which you

call the power of a clock to show the time of the day is evidently

_nothing in the clock itself_, but the figure and motion of its parts,

and, consequently, not anything of a different sort or kind from the

powers inherent in the parts. Whereas 'thinking,' if it was the result

of the powers of the different parts of the machine of the body, or of

the brain in particular, would be something really inhering in the

machine itself, specifically different from all and every one of the

powers of the several parts out of which it resulted; which is an

express contradiction, a supposing the effect to have more in it than

the cause." ... "That particular and determinate _degree of velocity_ in

a wheel, whereby it turns once round precisely in twelve hours, is that

which you call _the power of a clock_ to show the time of the day; and

because such a determinate velocity of motion is _made use of by us_ for

the measure of time, is it therefore really a new quality or power

distinct from the motion itself?" The same answer is equally applicable

to all the other examples, and it may be stated generally as amounting

to this, that "it is absolutely false in fact, and impossible in the

nature of things, that any power whatsoever should inhere or reside in

any system or composition of matter, different from the powers residing

in the single parts."[173]

The two great difficulties which adhere to the theory of Materialism,

and which must ever prove insurmountable, are these: first, to account

for the power of thinking by means of material atoms, which are

individually destitute of it; and secondly, to account for the unity and

continuity of human consciousness by means of material atoms which are

constantly undergoing flux and mutation. For the first end, recourse has

been had to the theory which ascribes the power of thinking, not to the

particles of matter, but to their order, arrangement, or organization;

and for the second, the continuous sense of personal identity is

supposed to be sufficiently accounted for by supposing that, as the

particles which compose the brain are changed, the retiring atoms leave

their share of the general consciousness as a legacy to their

successors. And both these expedients for surmounting the difficulty are

exquisitely caricatured in the "Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus," in a

chapter which is justly described as "an inimitable ridicule on Collins'

argument against Clarke, to prove the soul only a quality." The Society

of Freethinkers, addressing Martinus, propose to send him an answer to

the ill-grounded sophisms of their opponents, and likewise "an easy

mechanical explanation of perception or thinking."--"One of their chief

arguments," say they, "is that self-consciousness cannot inhere in any

system of matter, because all matter is made up of several distinct

beings which never can make up one individual thinking being. This is

easily answered by a familiar instance. In every _jack_ there is a

_meat-roasting_ quality, which neither resides in the fly, nor in the

weight, nor in any particular wheel, of the jack, but is the result of

the whole composition.... And as the general quality of meat-roasting,

with its several modifications, does not inhere in any one part of the

jack, so neither does consciousness, with its several modes of

sensation, intellection, volition, &c., inhere in any one, but is the

result from the mechanical composition of the whole animal." And then,

in regard to the _second_ difficulty: "The parts," say they, "of an

animal body are perpetually changed, ... from whence it will follow that

the idea of individual consciousness must be constantly translated from

one particle of matter to another.... We answer, this is only a fallacy

of the imagination. They make a great noise about this _individuality_,

how a man is conscious to himself that he is the same individual he was

twenty years ago, notwithstanding the flux state of the particles of

matter that compose his body. We think this is capable of a very plain

answer, and may be easily illustrated by a familiar example. Sir John

Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his maid darned so

often with silk, that they became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now,

supposing those stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree of

consciousness at every particular darning, they would have been sensible

that they were the same individual pair of stockings, both before and

after the darning!"

The subject is here presented in a ludicrous point of view, and some may

doubt whether this is a legitimate method of treating it. But it should

not be forgotten that while _ridicule is no safe test of truth, it may

be the most effective exposure of nonsense and folly_.

SECTION III.

THE RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY.

It has been generally felt and acknowledged, that the doctrine which

preserves the distinction between matter and spirit, body and soul, is

more in accordance with the truths of Natural and Revealed Religion,

than the opposite theory which identifies them; and that, on the other

hand, a profound and serious study of these truths has a tendency to

raise our thoughts above the low level of Materialism, and to direct

them to the contemplation of a higher and nobler world,--the world of

spirits.

There are many distinct points at which the theory of Materialism comes

into contact and collision with the truths both of Natural and Revealed

Religion. By a brief enumeration of these, the practical importance of

the subject may be clearly evinced.

1. The doctrine of "the immortality of the soul" is seriously affected

by the theory of Materialism. That there is _some_ connection between

the two is apparent from the very anxiety with which infidels have

labored to undermine the doctrine of "spirit," on purpose to get rid of

the doctrine of "immortality." But in stating the connection between

them, we must exercise the utmost caution, lest we should unwarily place

the truth on a precarious or questionable basis. In arguing for the

future life of the soul, as a doctrine of Natural Religion, some writers

have spoken as if they supposed that nothing more was needful to

demonstrate its "immortality" than the bare fact of its being

"immaterial," and that, by its very nature as "spirit," it is

indestructible by God Himself. Now, we do not hold that the mere proof

of its being an immaterial substance would necessarily infer its being

also immortal. For ought we know, the principle of life, sensation,

memory, and volition _may_ belong to an immaterial substance even in the

lower animals, who are not supposed to be immortal; and the only use

which we would make of its "immateriality" in connection with its

"immortality," is simply this,--that not being material, _its

destruction is not necessarily implied in the dissolution of the body_.

It is not in the metaphysical doctrine of its immaterial nature, but in

the practical evidence of its moral responsibilities and religious

capacities, that we find the most satisfactory natural proof of its

immortality. It is perfectly possible to hold, on the one hand, that all

"immaterial substances" are not necessarily indestructible; and yet to

hold, on the other hand, that _such_ an immaterial substance as the soul

of man is known to be,--endowed with conscience, with intelligence, with

affections and aspirations, with hopes and fears such as can find no

suitable object and no adequate range within the limits of the present

life,--must be destined to an immortal existence. The "immortality," for

which alone we ought to contend, is such as implies neither a necessity

of existence in the creature, nor its independence on the will of the

Creator. The _power_ of God to annihilate the soul is not called in

question, but the _purpose_ of God to make the soul immortal is inferred

from its nature and capacities, its aspirations and hopes and fears. And

all that is necessarily implied in the doctrine of what has been called

"the natural immortality of the soul" is well stated by Dr. S. Clarke,

when he says that, "the soul may be such a substance as is able to

continue its own duration forever, by the powers given to it at its

first production, and the continuance of those general influences which

are requisite for the support of created beings in general." Mr. Baxter,

acute and metaphysical as he was, placed the argument substantially on

the same ground. "It appears," he says, "that all substance equally, as

well material as immaterial, cannot cease to exist but by an effect of

infinite power.... The human soul, having no parts, must be

indissoluble in its nature by anything that hath not power to destroy or

annihilate it. And since it hath not a natural tendency to annihilation,

nor a power to annihilate itself, nor can be annihilated by any being

finitely powerful only, without an immediate act of the omnipotent

Creator to annihilate it, it must endlessly abide an active perceptive

substance, without either fear or hopes of dying through all eternity,

which is, in other words, to be immortal as to the agency of all natural

or second causes, that is, 'naturally immortal.'"[174]

When thus stated and limited, the argument is at once safe and valid. It

is first proved that the Mind is a "substance," living, perceptive, and

active, which is simple and indivisible, and not capable, like matter,

of being separated into parts possessing the same properties or powers;

and then this distinction betwixt mind and matter is applied to prove

that it cannot be _destroyed by dissolution_, as the body may be, but

that if it be destroyed at all, it must be by _annihilation_. But no

substance, material or immaterial, can be annihilated by any _finite or

second cause_; it can be annihilated only by the will of him who created

it; and the question respecting the soul of man remains, What are the

indications of God's will concerning it? When this question is seriously

entertained, we can hardly fail to see in the structure of its powers,

in the grandeur of its capacities, in the moral and responsible

consciousness which belongs to it, a strong presumptive proof of its

being His purpose that it should continue to live after the dissolution

of the body. The Metaphysical argument is sufficient to remove

preliminary objections, the Moral argument furnishes a presumptive

proof.

The theory of Materialism, as it assumes different forms, so it admits

of being associated with different views respecting the future

prospects of the soul. When it is held in its grossest form, it stands

in a relation of direct antagonism to the doctrine of "immortality," as

is apparent in the speculations of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, who

insist at large on the proof of Materialism on purpose to undermine and

overthrow the doctrine of Immortality. The theory of Materialism has

been maintained by Dr. Priestley and others, in conjunction with a

professed, and, as we believe, sincere belief in a future state of

rewards and punishments. The sleep of the soul during the interval

between death and the resurrection, and its ultimate awakening by an

immediate and miraculous interposition of Divine power, are equally held

to be true,--the one on the ground of a natural evidence, the other on

that of the authority of Revelation. But the natural evidence is

defective, since it depends entirely on the assumption that "thought" is

produced by and dependent on a certain material organization, without

which it could not exist; and the supernatural authority is still less

to be relied on, since it _seems_, at least, to recognize the existence

of disembodied spirits, and unequivocally declares that the soul cannot

be killed as the body may. If the soul be material, as Dr. Priestley

says it is, it must be, equally with the body, affected by the stroke of

death; yet our Lord says,--and His authority cannot be declined when the

doctrine of a future resurrection is made to depend on the mere

testimony of Scripture,--"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not

able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both

soul and body in hell."[175] And the soul is represented as existing in

a state of conscious happiness or misery, even during the interval

between death and the resurrection, in the parable of the rich man and

Lazarus, as well as in the statement of the apostle that "he was in a

strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ,

which is far better."[176] In its most recent and refined form, the

theory of Materialism represents "mind" as a subtle product, evolved out

of matter, and destined to an endless existence,--an ever-ascending

progression; and in this form of it, the doctrine of a distinct,

personal immortality is, no doubt, far better preserved than in its

earlier and grosser forms, which spoke of the utter destruction of

individual consciousness at the hour of death, and of our material

particles passing merely into other kinds of organic or inorganic being.

But then, it is placed on a very precarious ground,--the mere

supposition of a material product, which can never be established by

proof, and which, if there were no other objection to it, might well

seem to be sufficiently discredited by the mere fact that it ascribes to

_the effect_ properties and powers, of a very high and peculiar order,

which do not exist in _the cause_.

2. The doctrine of "future rewards and punishments," or of "man's

responsibility" as a subject of the Divine government, is also

materially affected by the theory of Materialism, in some, at least, of

its forms. When it is connected, as it often has been, with the doctrine

of "Mechanical Necessity," which represents every thought, opinion,

emotion, desire, and habit, as the unavoidable result of mere physical

influences acting on the brain, and makes no account of the spontaneity

or freedom which belongs to man as an intelligent, moral, and

responsible agent, it is manifestly impossible to discover any ground

for the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. And accordingly,

D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson describe man as if he were the mere

creature of circumstances, and deny that his character could possibly

have been different from what it is. But even when it is not associated

with fatalism, the theory, which denies the distinct existence of the

soul as a substantive being, has a tendency to shake our belief in the

doctrine of a "future retribution," properly so called, since that

doctrine rests on the assumption of our continued personal identity, or

the unity and continuity of our consciousness, as dying yet immortal

beings; whereas, if there be no "soul," or substantive spiritual being,

and if the "body" be in a state of perpetual flux and mutation, it is

difficult to see how _the same being that sinned can suffer_, or how the

doctrine of "retribution," properly so called, can be consistently

maintained.

3. The doctrine of "the spirituality" of the Divine nature must be

seriously affected, in different ways, by the theory of Materialism.

It is said in Scripture that "God made man in His own image," and that

He "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a

living soul." Deny the existence of "spirit" or "soul," as God's living

image on earth, and what ground of evidence, or what help of analogy,

remains for either conceiving or proving aright the existence of Him who

is "a Spirit" and "the Father of the spirits of all flesh?" And if the

"spirituality" of the Divine nature be called in question, many of the

Divine attributes must also suffer; for it is only as "a spirit" that

God can be _omnipresent_, and his omnipresence is presupposed in his

_omniscience_ and _omnipotence_. For these reasons, we incur the

greatest risk of entertaining limited and false conceptions of God, by

obliterating the distinction between "matter" and "spirit."

It is, no doubt, competent, and it may even be highly useful, to

entertain the question, how far the theory of Materialism should be held

to affect the grounds on which we believe in a living, personal,

spiritual God? In answer to this question, we have no hesitation in

avowing our conviction that the theory of Materialism, however it may be

modified, has a tendency to impair the evidence of that fundamental

article of faith. God is "a Spirit," and man was made "in the image of

God." Take away all spiritual essences; reduce every known object in

nature to matter, gross or refined; let mental and moral phenomena be

blended with the physical, and what remains to constitute the groundwork

of a "spiritual" system, or to conduct us to the recognition of a

supreme, immaterial Mind? If the material body, with its peculiar

organization, be capable of producing human thought, and sufficient to

account for the intelligence of man, why may not the material universe,

with its mysterious laws and manifold forces, be held sufficient to

explain whatever marks of a higher intelligence may appear in Nature?

and why may we not at once embrace Pantheism, and conceive of God only

as "the soul of the world?" Dr. Priestley's reply to this question

appears to us to be a mere evasion of the difficulty. In treating of

"the objection to the system of Materialism derived from the

consideration of the Divine essence," he first of all premises that "in

fact we have no proper idea of any essence whatever; that our ideas

concerning 'matter' do not go beyond the powers of which it is

possessed, and much less can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or

attributes with respect to the Divine Being;" and then adds, "Now, the

powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the

works of God, are not only so infinitely superior to those of the human

mind, when there is some analogy between them, but so essentially

different from them in other respects, that whatever term we make use of

to denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other." He

specifies several points of "essential difference" between the human and

the Divine mind: the _first_ is, the limited intelligence of the one as

contrasted with the all-comprehensive omniscience of the other; the

_second_ is, the omnipotence which belongs to God, and in virtue of

which He can produce, or annihilate, anything at His pleasure: the

_third_ is, that "the Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our

senses, as everything else that we call 'matter' is." And on these

grounds he concludes that "as the Divine powers, so the Divine nature,

must be essentially different from ours, and, consequently, no common

term, except such comprehensive terms as _being, nature_, &c., can be

properly used to express both." He further argues that "no proof of the

materiality of man can be extended, by any just analogy, to a proof or

evidence of a similar materiality of the Divine nature; for the

properties or powers being different, the 'substance' or 'essence' (if

it be any convenience to us to use such terms at all) must be different

also."[177]

Now, we conceive this to be a mere evasion of the real difficulty:

_first_, because the same mode of reasoning, if applied to the case of

the human mind, would equally serve to prove that _it_ should be

distinguished from matter: and, _secondly_, because the alleged

_differences_ between the human and the Divine mind, great and real as

we admit them to be, afford no better reason for calling God a "spirit,"

than that which may be found in the _resemblance or analogy_ between

created and uncreated intelligence. It is as true of the human as it is

of the Divine mind, that we know nothing of its essence, except what we

learn through its properties and powers, that "it cannot be the object

of any of our senses, as everything that we call 'matter' is," and that

if it be right to give different and distinctive names to substances,

expressive of their properties in so far as these are known to us, we

are warranted in calling the human soul a "spirit" and distinguishing it

from "matter," until it can be shown that the properties of both are

identical. If this be denied, we cannot see on what ground the

distinction between "matter" and "spirit" can be maintained with

reference to God Himself. Dr. Priestley founds, not on the _resemblance

or analogy,_ but on the _essential difference_, between created and

uncreated intelligence; but, in point of fact, the _difference_, great

and real as it is, has no bearing on the only question at issue; it is

the _resemblance or analogy_ between all thinking beings and the

Supreme Mind that suggests the reason for classing them under the same

category as "spirits," and that enables us to rise from the spiritual

nature of man to the spiritual nature of God.

The personality of God, as a living, self-conscious, and active Being,

distinct from the created universe and superior to it, is dependent on

the "spirituality" of His nature; and in so far as the latter is

affected by the theory of Materialism, the evidence of the former must

also be proportionally weakened. We find, accordingly, that many

Materialists have exhibited a tendency towards a Pantheistic theory of

nature, in which the material universe is conceived of as the "body," of

which God is the "soul." Some Materialists, indeed, have stopped short

of Pantheism; but this may have arisen from their being less consequent

reasoners, or more timid thinkers, than others who were prepared to

follow out their principles fearlessly to all their logical results;

for, assuredly, if there be no evidence sufficient to show that the

"mind" is distinct from the "body," it will require a very high kind of

evidence to make it certain that "God" is distinct from "Nature."

4. The theory of Materialism comes into direct collision, at several

points, with the doctrines of Revealed Religion.

The doctrine of Scripture in regard to the "human soul" is manifestly at

variance with that theory. In the earliest pages of Genesis, we have an

account of its creation, which, when compared with other statements and

forms of expression occurring elsewhere, seems very clearly to imply

that the "soul" is a distinct substantive being, possessing properties

and powers peculiar to itself, and, although now united to the "body,"

yet capable of existing apart from it, and destined to an immortal

existence hereafter.[178] That it is a distinct substantive being,

connected with the body, but not dependent on it, at least in the sense

of being incapable of existing apart from it, appears from various

testimonies of the inspired Word. God is there pleased to call Himself

"the Father of our spirits," and that, too, in contradistinction to "the

fathers of our flesh." "We have had fathers of our 'flesh' which

corrected us, and we gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in

subjection unto the Father of 'spirits' and live?" He is called "the God

of the 'spirits' of all flesh," and "the Lord who formeth the 'spirit'

of man within him." The historical narrative, too, of man's creation,

which declares that he was "made in the image of God," and that his

"soul" was infused by an immediate Divine afflatus, seems to imply that

there is another and a higher relation subsisting between God and the

"soul" than any that subsists between God and "matter." In other

passages, the soul is expressly represented as distinct and different

from the body:--"Fear not them which can kill the 'body,' but are not

able to kill the 'soul.'" "Into thy hands I commit my 'spirit,'" said

our Lord, just as his proto-martyr Stephen said, "Lord Jesus, receive my

'spirit.'" There are other passages still which affirm the separate

existence of disembodied spirits: "Then shall the dust return to the

earth as it was, and 'the spirit,' shall return unto God who gave it."

"A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Nay, _spiritual

life_, such as clearly presupposes the continuance of conscious

existence, without interruption and without end, is said to be imparted

by Christ to his people:--"I am the resurrection and the life: he that

believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live again, and

whosoever liveth and believeth in me _shall never die_."--"Whoso

believeth in me ... is passed from death unto life."[179] Life is said

to be already imparted, such a life as shall survive death, and

continue without interruption and without end; and surely this is

utterly inconsistent with that theory of Materialism which affirms,

either the annihilation of the "soul" at death, or even the cessation of

its conscious existence during the interval between death and the

resurrection.

The revealed doctrine of "angels," or spiritual intelligences existing

in other parts of the universe, is also opposed to the theory of

Materialism. According to the common belief, the "soul" of man is the

_nexus_ between two worlds or states of being,--the world of "matter"

and the world of "mind." In man the elements of both worlds are united;

by his body he is connected with the world of matter, by his soul with

the world of mind. Death, which dissolves the union between the two,

consigns the one to the dust, and introduces the other into the world of

spirits. On this view, there is no difficulty in rising to the

conception of higher spiritual intelligences; and the variety and

gradation that are observable in all the works of God on earth may

impart to that sublime conception such a measure of verisimilitude as to

make it easily credible on the authority of Revelation. But the theory

of Materialism, especially as advocated by Dr. Priestley, plainly

excludes the existence of any order of "spiritual beings" other than the

uncreated Mind; for if that only is to be termed "spirit" which

possesses omniscience and the power of producing anything at pleasure,

it is clear that the highest angels and seraphims are no more "spirits"

than the souls of men.

Such being the relation which subsists between the theory of

Materialism, and some of the most important doctrines of Natural and

Revealed Religion, it is not wonderful that a serious consideration of

the latter should lead reflective men to abjure the former, or that

their aversion to it should increase in proportion as their views of

Divine truth are extended and enlarged. Not a few have yielded, in early

youth, to the charm of speculative inquiry, and fondly embraced the

idea of "unisubstancisme," who have lived to exchange it for a more

Scriptural faith. For just in proportion as men are brought under the

influence of serious views of God, of the soul, and of an eternal world,

in the same proportion will they become alienated, and even averse, from

a theory which confounds "spirit" with "matter," obscures their

conceptions of God and of the world of spirits, and degrades men to the

level of the beasts that perish. This effect of new, or, at least, more

vivid views of "things unseen and eternal" was instructively exemplified

in the case of the late Robert Hall. Like many an ardent speculatist, he

had embraced in early life the system of Materialism; and even after he

had entered on the work of the ministry, he could write to a professedly

Christian congregation in the following terms: "I am, and have been for

a long time, a Materialist, though I have never drawn your attention to

this subject in my preaching, because I have always considered it

myself, and wished you to consider it, as a _mere metaphysical

speculation_. My opinion, however, on this head, is, that the nature of

man is simple and uniform, that the thinking powers and faculties are

the result of a certain organization of matter,--and that after death he

ceases to be conscious until the resurrection."[180] But speculative

inquiry was soon to give place to spiritual faith. The death of his

revered and pious father brought his mind into realizing contact with an

unseen and eternal world; and, in the words of his biographer,

distinguished alike for profound science and deep practical piety, "The

death of Mr. Hall's father tended greatly to bring his mind to the state

of serious thought with which he entered on the pastoral office.

Meditating with the deepest veneration upon the unusual excellences of a

parent now forever lost to him, he was led to investigate, with renewed

earnestness, the truth as well as the value of those high and sacred

principles from which his eminent piety and admirable consistency so

evidently flowed. He called to mind, too, several occasions on which his

father, partly by the force of reason, partly by that of tender

expostulation, had exhorted him to abandon the vague and dangerous

speculations to which he was prone. Some important changes in Mr. Hall's

sentiments resulted from an inquiry conducted under such solemn

impressions, and among these may be mentioned his renunciation of

Materialism, which, he often declared, he _buried in his father's

grave_."

FOOTNOTES:

[145] M. AD. FRANCK, "Rapport a l'Academie," Preface, p. XXI.

[146] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 44, 89, 141; IV. 675; V. 45, 303. M.

CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M. CABANIS, "Rapports du

Phisique et du Moral de l'Homme," 3 vols. M. BROUSSAIS, "Traité de

Physiologie appliquée a la Pathologie," 1828.

[147] "Systême de la Nature," I. 2, 10, 86, 101, and _passim_. This

eloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and

refuted by M. BERGIER in his "Examen du Materialisme," 2 vols. Paris,

1771.

[148] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 44, 141. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp.

84, 86. ATKITSON AND MARTINEAU, "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and

Development."

[149] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and

Colors." MR. DUGALD STEWART, "Philosoph. Essays," p. 187.

[150] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit;"

"Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism;" "Correspondence

between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price."

[151] DR. JOHN MASON GOOD, "Life of Lucretius," prefixed to his poetical

version of "The Nature of Things," I. XXXVIII.

[152] The "fictions of Clairvoyance" may be studied at large in "The

Principles of Nature and her Divine Revelations," by AND. J. DAVIS, the

Poughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols.; and in "The Celestial Telegraph," by M.

CAHAGNET. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by

introducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See "Memoirs

of a Physician, Joseph Balsamo," by ALEXANDER DUMAS, I. 15, 21, 82; II.

50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be

ranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to

solve, before we reject the "Revelations" of Davis.

[153] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," p. 2.

[154] "Systême de la Nature," I. 97, 108.

[155] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," pp. 27, 38, 60.

[156] MR. ATKINSON, "Laws of Man's Nature," p. 17.

[157] DR. SPURZHEIM, "Philosophical Principles of Phrenology," pp. VI.,

86, 100. PROFESSOR DOD, "Princeton Theological Essays," II. 376.

[158] DR. GREGORY, "Letters on Animal Magnetism," p. 57.

[159] BISHOP BUTLER, "Analogy," p. I. c. 1, p. 170.

[160] DR. JOHN PLAYFAIR, "Works," I., Preface, XXIX.

[161] C. M. BURNETT, M. D., "Philosophy," &c. London, 1850.

[162] BISHOP BERKELEY, "Words," I. 80.

[163] LORD BROUGHAM, "Discourse of Natural Theology," p. 238.

[164] STEWART, "Elements of Philosophy," I. 5.

[165] LOCKE'S "Essay," b. II. c. 23, § 15. Ibid., b. IV. c. 3, § 6.

[166] LOCKE, "Letter to Bishop of Worcester," Works, IV. 31.

[167] THOMAS CARLYLE, "Essays," I. 77, 214.

[168] C. BONNET, "Palingenesie Philosophique," 4 vols., I. 7, 47, 52.

[169] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," pp. 37, 38.

[170] DR. THOMAS BROWN, "Lectures," No. XCVI.

[171] ATKINSON, "Letters," p. 17.

[172] DR. SAM. CLARKE'S "Third Defence," in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8,

17.

[173] DR. SAM. CLARKE, "First Defence," pp. 11, 16; "Second Defence,"

pp. 4, 10.

[174] DR. CLARKE'S "Letter to Mr. Dodwell," pp. 34, 69, 72. ANDREW

BAXTER, "On the Soul," I. 227, 233.

[175] Matthew 10: 28.

[176] Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23.

[177] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," p. 103; "Free Discussion," pp. 66,

237.

[178] FLAVEL, "Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul," I. 290. SIR M.

HALE, "Primitive Origination of Mankind," p. 309.

[179] _Compare_ Heb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23:

43, 46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 8; James 2: 26; Luke 24:

39; John 10: 25; John 5: 24.

[180] DR. OLINTHUS GREGORY, "Life of Hall," Works, VI. 26.

CHAPTER V.

THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS.--VOLNEY.--COMBE.

The theory of "natural laws" has been applied to disprove or supersede

the doctrine of Creation, by means of the principle of Development. It

has been further applied to _the government_, as well as to the

_creation_, of the world; and in this connection, it has been urged as a

reason for disbelieving the doctrine of God's special PROVIDENCE, and

employed to discredit the efficacy of PRAYER.

When thus applied, it is often associated with the recognition of the

Divine existence, and cannot, therefore, be ranked among systems

avowedly Atheistic. But from the earliest times, it has been the belief

of seriously reflecting men, that a system which professedly recognizes

the Divine Being as the Creator of the world, but practically excludes

Him from the government of its affairs, however _theoretically_

different from Atheism, is substantially the same with it.[181] It was

against this Epicurean Atheism that Howe contended in his "Living

Temple;" an Atheism which acknowledged gods, but "accounted that they

were such as between whom and man there could be no conversation,--on

_their_ part by providence, on _man's_ by religion." And it was against

the same Epicurean Atheism that Cudworth contended in his "Intellectual

System of the Universe," when he grappled with the objections which had

been urged against the doctrine of Providence and the practice of

prayer.[182]

It is not wonderful that either Atheists or Pantheists should discard

the doctrine of Providence, or deny the efficacy of Prayer. On their

principles, there is no room for the recognition of a supreme

intelligent Power governing the world, or of a Will capable of

controlling the course of human affairs.[183] But while neither Atheism

nor Pantheism could be expected to recognize a presiding Providence,

since they equally exclude a personal God, it may well seem strange that

any system of Theism, whether natural or revealed, should omit or oppose

this fundamental truth. For the doctrine of Providence may be

established, _inductively_, by the very same kind of evidence to which

every Theist has recourse in proving the existence and perfections of

the Divine Being; and, His existence and perfections being proved, the

doctrine of Providence may be inferred, _deductively_, from His

character, and from the relations which He sustains towards His

creatures, since it cannot be supposed that He who brought them into

being, as the products of His own wisdom, goodness, and power, and

endowed them with all their various properties for some great and noble

end, will ever cease to care for them, or deem them unworthy of His

regard. Yet, strong as is the proof arising from these and similar

sources, there have occasionally appeared in all ages, and especially at

a certain stage in the progress of philosophical speculation, men who

admitted, and even maintained, the existence of the Supreme Being, while

they denied, nevertheless, the doctrine of Providence and the efficacy

of Prayer.

In certain stages of philosophic inquiry, there is a natural tendency,

we think, or at least a strong temptation, to substitute the laws of

Nature in the place of God, or to conceive of him as somehow removed to

a greater distance from us by means of these laws. Every one must be

conscious, to some extent, of this tendency in his own personal

experience; he must have felt that when he first began to apprehend any

one of the great laws of Nature, and still more when he advanced far

enough to see that every department of the physical world is subject to

them, so as to exhibit a constant order, an all-pervading harmony, his

views of God and Providence became less impressive in proportion as the

domain of "law" was extended, and that he was in imminent danger of

sinking, if not into _theoretical_, at least into _practical_ Atheism.

"It is a fact," says Dr. Channing, "that Science has not made Nature _as

expressive of God_ in the first instance or, to the beginner in

religion, as it was in earlier times. Science reveals a rigid, immutable

_order_; and this to common minds looks much like self-subsistence, and

does not manifest intelligence, which is full of life, variety, and

progressive operation. Men in the days of their ignorance saw an

immediate Divinity accomplishing an immediate purpose, or expressing an

immediate feeling, in every sudden, striking change of Nature, ... and

Nature, thus interpreted, became the sign of a present,

deeply-interested Deity."[184] That the scientific study of Nature, and

especially of certain departments of physical inquiry, has often had the

effect of deadening our sense of a present and presiding Deity, of

obscuring or perplexing our views of the connection of God with His

works, and of virtually removing Him from all efficient control over the

creatures of His hands, is attested, not only by the published

speculations of some, but also by the inward consciousness of many more,

who have never avowed infidel sentiments to others, nor even, at least

articulately, to themselves. It may be useful, therefore, to inquire

somewhat particularly, whether, and how far, the existence of "natural

laws" and the operation of "second causes" should affect our views of

the Providence which God exercises over us, or of the Prayers which we

address to Him.

SECTION I.

THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES.

The existence of "natural laws," and the operation of "second causes,"

are often explicitly recognized, and always obviously implied, in

Scripture. Revelation is not designed to explain the nature or the

action of either; but it assumes the reality of both.[185] It is plainly

implied in the very _first_ chapter of Genesis, that, at the era of

creation, God gave _a definite constitution_, implying peculiar

properties and powers, to all the various classes of objects which were

then called into being. He created light, with its peculiar properties;

He created water, with its peculiar properties. He created everything

"after its kind." The distinction between one created thing and another,

such as light and water, and the distinction also between "genera" and

"species," especially in the case of plants, trees, fish, fowl, cattle,

and reptiles, are very strongly marked in the sacred narrative: and this

distinction implies the existence of certain properties peculiar to each

of these objects or classes,--properties not common to them all, but

distinctive and characteristic, which made them to be, severally, what

they are, and which amount to a _distinct definite constitution_. These

properties, account for them as we may, are essential to their

existence as distinct objects in nature, and cannot be separated from

them as long as the objects themselves exist. Light has certain

properties, and so has water, and so has every distinct order of

vegetable or animal life, which make them to be what they severally are,

and which cannot be severed from them otherwise than by the destruction

of their very nature. These properties are known to us by their

_effects_; and hence the substances or beings to which they respectively

belong are regarded by us as _causes_; and their operation as causes is

regulated by certain "laws," imposed upon them by the same Omnipotent

Will which called them into being and endowed them with all their

peculiar properties and powers. The operation of these "natural causes,"

and the existence of certain "established laws" by which they are

regulated, are explicitly recognized or obviously assumed in

Scripture.[186] "Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth; they

continue this day _according to thine ordinances_, for all are _thy

servants_."

The established constitution and settled order of Nature, as well as the

"laws," "decrees," or "ordinances" by which it is regulated, are thus

explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; and there are several reasons

why this fact should be deliberately considered. First, because it seems

to have been assumed by our opponents, that the discovery of "natural

laws," and the admission of "second causes," must necessarily be

adverse, and may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion; or,

in other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as Science

advances; whereas the Bible speaks both of natural objects, possessing

peculiar properties and powers, and also of natural laws, as God's

"ordinances" both in the heavens and the earth, but speaks nevertheless

of a presiding Providence or governing Will, without ever supposing

that the two are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because

some of the less intelligent members of the Christian community itself

seem to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same error which

we ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very groundless jealousy of

Science, as if they feared that the progress of physical research might

have the effect of weakening the grounds on which they believe in the

care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives

no countenance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms

God's providential government and encourages man's believing prayer, at

the very time when it founds upon and appeals to the established

constitution and course of Nature.[187] And thirdly, because a right

apprehension of the properties and powers belonging to created beings,

and of the laws to which they are severally subject, will be found to

conduce largely to a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which

God sustains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and

exemplified in Scripture, has _a necessary reference to the natural

constitution of things_; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the

spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable discrimination and

accuracy, affirms that "God, the Creator of all things, doth uphold,

direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from

the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;"

that "by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall out

_according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely,

or contingently;" and that "God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of

means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His

pleasure."[188]

"Natural laws" and "second causes" are thus established by experience,

and explicitly recognized in Scripture. It is necessary, however,

especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to

discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely

related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they

are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable,

from each other. It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in

France that the knowledge of "causes" is utterly interdicted to man, and

that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in

the knowledge of "phenomena," and their coördination under "general

laws." M. Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr. Mill and Mr.

Lewes give it their implied sanction.[189] According to their theory,

all Science is limited to "the laws of the coexistence and succession of

phenomena," and "causes" are not only unknown, but incapable of being

known. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte

anticipates the possible ultimate reduction of _all_ "phenomena" to

_one_ all-comprehensive, all-pervading "law," as the highest perfection

of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr. Mill,

doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that

there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur

_without causes_ of any kind, and even without any _fixed law_.

In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass

that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought,

should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many

expressions which denote or imply "causation," if it be true that all

knowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? Nay,

why is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to

command the immediate assent of the whole human race?

It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who

contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in

"causation" is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek

merely _to substitute "laws" for "causes_," or rather to represent _the

laws of nature_ as the only _efficient causes_ of all natural phenomena.

They thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost

consequence to discriminate and keep distinct. There is an ambiguity,

however, in the common usage of the term "law," which may seem to give a

plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and

conceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere statement of

_a general fact_, or the result of a comprehensive generalization,

founded on the observation and comparison of many particular facts; it

denotes at other times _the force or power_, whatever that may be, which

produces any given set of phenomena. The "law" of gravitation, for

example, is often used to denote nothing more than the _general fact_,

ascertained by experience, that all bodies near the surface of the earth

tend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their mass,

and inversely to the square of their distance; and when it is employed

in _this_ sense, it determines nothing as to the "cause" which is in

operation,--it affirms merely a fact, or a fact reduced to a formula,

and confirmed by universal experience. But it is often transferred, at

least mentally and almost perhaps unconsciously, to denote some "power"

which is instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is

observed,--a "power" which may be conceived of, either as a _property_

inherent in mind or in matter, or as a _force_, such as the Divine

volition, acting upon it _ab extra_; and it is only in the latter of

these two senses, as denoting a "cause," properly so called, and not a

mere fact or law, that it can be applied to account for any phenomenon.

In like manner, the "laws of motion" are merely the generalized results

of our experience and observation relative to the direction, velocity,

and other phenomena of moving bodies; but "motion," although it is

regulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a "cause,"

whatever that may be, which is not only distinguishable, but different

from them all. Yet when we speak of the "laws of motion," we may

imperceptibly include, in our conception of them, that _force_ or

_power_ which impels the body, as well as the mere _law_ or _rule_ which

regulates its movements. It were a mere unprofitable dispute about

words, did we entertain and discuss the question, whether the import of

the term "law" might not be so extended as to include under it _powers_,

_properties_, and _causes_, as well as the _rules_ and _conditions_ of

their operation: for, even were this question answered in the

affirmative, there would still be room for a real distinction between

the two, and there could be no reason for saying that the knowledge of

"causes," as distinguished from "laws," is wholly inaccessible to the

human faculties. There is thus a real and important distinction between

"laws" considered simply as general facts, and "causes" considered as

efficient agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category,

otherwise than by giving such an extension to the term "law" as shall

make it comprehensive of _causation_; and even then, the distinction

remains between the mere formulas of Science and the actual forces of

Nature. "The laws of Nature," says the sagacious Dr. Reid, "are the

_rules_ according to which the effects are produced, but there must be a

_cause_ which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation

never navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a

house."[190]

It might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, that the

object of Science is _threefold: first_, to ascertain particular facts;

_secondly_, to reduce these facts under general laws; and, _thirdly_, to

investigate the "causes" by which both _facts_ and _laws_ may be

accounted for. The exclusion of any one of the three would be fatal to

Philosophy as well as Religion; and it is prohibited by the "natural

laws" of the human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing

particular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to deduce

from them a knowledge of general laws, and which is also imbued with an

instinctive and spontaneous tendency to ascribe every change that is

observed to some "power" or "cause" capable of producing such an effect.

It might further be shown, that in every instance a "cause," properly so

called, is a _substance_ or _being_ possessing certain properties or

powers,--properties which may be called, if you will, the "laws" of that

substance, but which necessarily include the idea of _causation_ or

_efficiency_; that in the case of mere physical agency, there must be a

plurality of substances so related as that the one shall act on the

other in certain conditions which are indispensable to their mutual

action; and that these requirements leave ample room for those manifold

adjustments and adaptations on which the argument from "design," in

favor of the Perfections and Providence of God, is founded. The mere

recognition of "general laws," considered simply as the "coördination of

facts," and especially as exclusive of the idea of causation or

efficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, nor exhaust the

legitimate functions of Science. For, in the expressive words of Sir

John Herschell, "It is high time that philosophers, both physical and

others, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as

to the meaning they intend to convey in speaking of causes and

causation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of

physical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them

to their _causes_; on the other, that the inquiry into 'causes' is

altogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but with the

discovery of 'laws.' Which of these is the truth? Or are both views of

the matter true _on a different interpretation of the terms_? Whichever

view we may take, or whichever interpretation we may adopt, there is

one thing certain,--the extreme inconvenience of such a state of

language. This can only be reformed by a careful analysis of the widest

of all human generalizations, disentangling from one another the

innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its

progress, and establishing among them a rational classification and

nomenclature.... A 'law' may be a _rule of action_, but it is not

_action_. The great First Agent may lay down a rule of action for

himself, and that rule may become known to man by observation of its

uniformity; but, constituted as our minds are, and having that conscious

knowledge of _causation_ which is forced upon us by the reality of the

distinction between _intending_ a thing, and _doing_ it, we can never

substitute the 'rule' for the 'act.'"[191]

But while the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second

causes" are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is

still left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard to _the

precise relation which God sustains to His works_, and especially in

regard to _the nature and method of His agency in connection with the

use of "second causes_." Hence have arisen the various theories which

have appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have

had for their avowed object the explanation of the _connection between

God and Nature_, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.[192]

Hence, first of all, the theory of "occasional causes," as taught by

Father Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken,

design of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually

superseding every other power in Nature;--a theory which represents

physical agencies as the mere _occasions_, and God as the sole _cause_

of all changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence of

light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine

interposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and that a man's

desire or volition to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the

occasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper

muscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of "preëstablished

harmony" as taught by Leibnitz;--a theory which was mainly designed to

explain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which

involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect,

and applicable to the relation subsisting between God and His works.

This theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no

real influence on each other, that each of them acts by its own

properties and powers, and that their respective operations exactly

correspond to each other by virtue of a "preëstablished harmony" between

the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with

another, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives

any part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies

everything like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is

extended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between God and the

world, it would seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of

both, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The

manifest defects of these theories have given rise to a _third_, which,

in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,--the theory

of "instrumental causes."

This theory has assumed two distinct and very different forms. In the

first, all natural effects are ascribed to powers _imparted_ to created

beings, and _inherent_ in them; that is, to powers which are supposed to

have been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by

God's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked

according to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some

respects the doctrine of "occasional causes," all natural effects are

ascribed to powers not _imparted_, but _impressed_, not belonging to the

natural agent, but communicated by impulse _ab extra_; and God's will is

represented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the

theory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are,

in a certain sense, acknowledged; but in the _former_, second causes are

apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God;

in the _latter_, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all

events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both

extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second

causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing

the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the

Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot

be excluded or denied, without virtually making God's will _the only

efficient cause_, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him,

not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all

the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against

these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real

existence and actual operation of "second causes;" while we are careful,

at the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any

created being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are

still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and

liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His

will. We would thus have _one First_, and MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former

_supreme_, the latter _subordinate_; really distinct, but not equally

independent, since "second causes" are, from their very nature, subject

to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them

into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the

accomplishment of His great designs.

We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the _efficiency_ of

any "second causes," and seek to resolve all events, even such as are

brought about by the volitions of men, into the will of God, as the only

Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created

spirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to

acknowledge any active powers in _matter_, and are anxious to show that

_mind_, and _mind only_, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for

this extreme jealousy of "second causes" either in the mental or the

material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, as distinct,

although subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making

God's will _the only cause_ in Nature, and thereby representing Him as

the _cause of sin_, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposition, or

without destroying the distinct individuality and personal

responsibility of man. Man must be regarded as a distinct, though

dependent, _agent_, and, as such, a real, though subordinate, _cause_;

otherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly

and immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and _to that

alone_. And in the material world, "second causes" can as little be

dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge

the existence of _some_ power or property in matter, were it only the

passive power or _vis inertiæ_ on which all the laws of motion depend.

And if _this_ can be admitted as a power inherent in matter and

inseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence of _other_ powers,

not incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to

the dominion and providence of God. In a certain sense, indeed, God's

will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since

nothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this

sense, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second

causes" are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been

originated at first, and ever afterwards sustained by the Divine Will,

the latter being _supreme_, the former _subordinate_. It may also be

said, in a certain sense, that Mind only is active:[193] for all the

properties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition,

and their mode of action is regulated and determined by "laws" which God

has imposed; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to

infer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough

to say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds

and governs it by His Providence.

It must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have

a close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for

the being, perfections, and providence of God. That argument, in so far

as it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the

nice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by

supposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the

ascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether

mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since

the evidence depends not so much on the phenomena of _physical_, as on

those of _moral_ causation.

On the whole, we conclude that the existence of "natural laws" and the

operation of "second causes" are recognized alike by the sacred writers

and by sound philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to

be regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we

are concerned to defend.