STRATEGY
Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the
object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together,
one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy
is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits.
"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally;
secondly, at the decisive point._"[41]
"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the
most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be
sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating
circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest
possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive
point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not,
we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is
_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or
Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."
It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How
many generals have been ruined in consequence!
SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY
Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military
history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an
army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no
means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of
modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception,
that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in
numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and
when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon,
Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present
state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented
general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if
we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even
the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small
as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but
which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the
victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]
The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore,
the ideal of strategy. "_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to
be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before
all_, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has
done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most
of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory.
Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to
the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the
hostile armed force is destroyed.
This _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of
strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to
repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We
must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and
"the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for
us. This rests with our statesmen.
THE DECISIVE POINT
If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the
decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?
Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon,
confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre
of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_.
"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against
which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and
destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases,
the most essential_."[45]
Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE
is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces.
"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they
see too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the
enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._"
THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES
"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set
forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and
destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied
to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more
everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[46] This he
calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in
strategy_."[47] "In strategy we can never employ too many forces."[48]
"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be
regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success."
"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every
available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being
meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in
1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might,
if present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were
useless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again.
CONCENTRATION
"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said
Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive
point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the
enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and
space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation
of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of
strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither
the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently
the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior
forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right
appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by
that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in
_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the
important_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are
especially characteristic."[50]
"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to
keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the
main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim
we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[51]
"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting
distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an
exception which must be justified_."[52] Of course, this does not
mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon
one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_It
is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of
the action._"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes
Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence
leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways,
telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.
Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration,
concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an
evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we
find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us
to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an
imperative maxim always in our minds.
THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE
"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as
well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the
more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first
battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly
ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at
once in the first battle."[54]
"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the
first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage
to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the
first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more
influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[1]
"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the
principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost
always at the commencement of the great act."[55] A great victory thus
won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow
us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the
crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision
all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be
directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp.
Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of
every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It
is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.
The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle
is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will
be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis
will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.
"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the
crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is
the first-born son of war._"[56]
Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should
think of nothing else.
Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the
altered circumstances to win the next.
"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the
decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor
points_"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else
matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything
else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by
sacrifice.
PURSUIT
"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about
rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only
of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the
enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever
else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[58]
Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel
his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT
force of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need
only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate,
being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory
at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and
indeed his last chance of ultimate success.
SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical
thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at
Clausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:--
"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves
is to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_
UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it
is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_.
"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible
at the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at
that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._
"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are
the most powerful elements of victory._
"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain
with the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the
only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._
"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If
we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with
regard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means
of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces
every disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward
with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._"
These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being
paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element)
in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little
consequence."
"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his
powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every
imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at
the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with
resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general
way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is
altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the
same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and
energy."
REFLECTIONS
When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy
firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of
our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On
consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all
apply these principles with advantage.
I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise
to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about,
to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each
belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to
carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded
or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search
for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military
operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or
failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative
degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of
effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole
means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how
far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof,
and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which
was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough
application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the
war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of
them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war
and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these
principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.
II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will
be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will
direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to
assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare
accordingly.
III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war
which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to
carry out these principles therein.
In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals
to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences
and the huge war indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which would follow
defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it
possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of
strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers.
How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that,
how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that
they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How?
Or are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three
eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to
save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the
impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few
great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political
object and safeguard the interests of the nation.