THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY
Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to
understand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why
every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The
great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no
reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand
and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his
finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military
question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it
is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these
simple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter,
then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a
difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness
the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no
matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend,
is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these
difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand
them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution
in war.
THE GENIUS FOR WAR
In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[60] he sets forth
the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius,
the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of
war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all
to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.
After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general,
physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength
of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm,
etc., he comes to the unexpected.
"_War_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of
those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden
more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above
all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the
truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths
of the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all
information of the situation has been collected and published, were
unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from
a number of contradictory reports.
"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this
continual interposition of chance_." "Now, if he is to get safely
through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities
are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even
in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces
of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to
follow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase
_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution."
"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "The
forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the
necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite
peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man
by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in
strong minds."
The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged
by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the
strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
in war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly
exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at
Dresden.
Also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst
of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent
passions."
"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the
stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is
just THE difficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative
maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim
is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to
give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_."
"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen
when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself,
begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this
the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as
Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice,
which the commander has to contend with in himself."
"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of
the commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his
name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.
REFLECTIONS
(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a
suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though
not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this.
In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history
nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of
one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in
the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was
_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it
out. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any
particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the
principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter
to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to
overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what
means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties
of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian
campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of
the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a
series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but
what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of
affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would
be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of
writing a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be
repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.
(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly
brought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with
and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our
criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to
aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to
increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have
much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have
we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly
weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often
have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the
scale against our country.
(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war
constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance
were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance
of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals
that this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public
craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in
the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would
certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which
is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest
details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen
them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their
occurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field
to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are
deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by
their own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt,
but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil
intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the
immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of
our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more
attention were directed to the importance of secrecy.
The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent
when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we
undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves
engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will
the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously
increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly
problematical.
In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has
secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it
will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in
some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information
published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile
general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication
in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up
the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat
the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's
march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely
necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the
English newspapers.--Result, Sedan.
That this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the
patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end
if it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61]