WAR AS POLICY
"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by
other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is
what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is
the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole
amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards
acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There
can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength
or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.
Clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases
in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as
the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as
independent of the other.
It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we
regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace
negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to
attain the political object.
War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous
negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As
Clausewitz says, "_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point
of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead
of writing notes._" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts
to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political
object. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war,
determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources
and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained,
and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders,
supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "_All the
leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that
is, by a political, not a military functionary._"
Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that
war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means
an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be
otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political
relations between different nations and governments? Is not war
merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?"
"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse;
and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way,
all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent,
broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."
"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from
policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war,
and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its
absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity;
only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through
it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of
view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon."
"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find
out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and
judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend
the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only
the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency."
"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests
generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the
expressions or manifestations of policy itself_."
To the student of history this unity of conception is equally
necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without
it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in
1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of
many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for
instance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that
these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought
from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that
the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to
suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to
draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a
continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now,
let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.
SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN
"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things
a necessary conflict between the political and military interests,
and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect
knowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it
cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows
the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and
_indispensable supposition_."
"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when
people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy
on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different
to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself
which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds
in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with
advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the
object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain
military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it
can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes.
Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant
sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending
right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_.
"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain
knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of
political intercourse._"
THE WAR MINISTER
"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false
interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to
say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_
qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,
strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he
must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE
"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy
to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only
one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are
not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick
the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an
_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its
councils and decisions on important occasions."
"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the
Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous
action."
REFLECTIONS
We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding
dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to
policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much
as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may
be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of
his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,
guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an
_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is
going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations
between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the
political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued
in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains
control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his
object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well
as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is
theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._
after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should
keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds
that the two are so intimately related that the political influence
cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two
such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and
must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often
has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814,
1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry
on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in
many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its
interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations.
Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is
wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this,
that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but
during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest
possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by
_overwhelming political necessity_.
Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war
as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to
use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed.
It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an
instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course,
that a politician should study all the details of naval and military
matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war,
and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political
object of war, through the submission of the enemy.
Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may
harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests
are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep
his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say,
he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely
to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful
study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at
his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his
policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without
_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the
nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must
not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do
so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a
reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,
Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war
will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall
of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not)
lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as
we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy,
the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the
most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the
destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.