THE NATURE OF WAR
"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the
whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration
of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We
shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by
Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a
duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would
conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a
war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives
by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him
incapable of further resistance.
"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in
order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost
imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of
International Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its
power.
"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_;
the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate
_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be
disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities
in theory."[17]
Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful
method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great
bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.
However plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must
be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which
proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the
use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the
co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force
unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST
_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "To
introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation
would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War
is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_."
THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR
In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at
war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting
a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant
passages. However, a selection must be made.
I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy,
because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical
way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for
the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would
understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to
understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which
the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action
incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History
is full of such examples.
Clausewitz clearly lays down: "_War is only a continuation of State
policy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will
introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and
things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[18] "It
is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the
political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means
must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or
government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to
its will."[19]
Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little
understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it
alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can,
therefore, pass on for the present.
THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY
Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory,
because that is essential in order to understand his division of all
wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be
able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating
point, where reaction may set in.[20]
"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his
adversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a
culminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently."[21]
As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its
successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from
the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening
line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further
from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing
nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent
the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of
the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war,
from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc.,
etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a
culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin
would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.
Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our
preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,
instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "_The
point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says,
"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of
power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which
causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience,
productive of most disproportionate effects."[22] The reader will find
it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of
victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been
overstepped and where it has not been overstepped.
THE TWO CLASSES OF WARS
From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the
two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.
"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the
complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his
destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to
conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is
merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either
for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to
account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23]
All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the
enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object."
In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in
accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with
the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point
of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or
beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited
object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the
plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of
Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866,
or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most
decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is
rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_,
not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which,
by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This,
therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical
questions._"[24]
In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this
difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria,
the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against
France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack
by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium,
one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political
conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were
doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and
the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it
would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to
limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French
vigorously the moment they entered that country.
Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to
attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking
at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a
decisive victory was to be adopted.
PREPARATION FOR WAR
The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to
Clausewitz's clear statement that--
"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then
the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal
classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war
itself_. This distinction must also be made in theory."
Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater
honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of
gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic
utterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution.
Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent
(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian
short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day.
And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared,
the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been
continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming
importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or
nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation
has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.
Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may
nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that
that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE
the war breaks out.
A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root
of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that
speeches are a substitute for preparations.
It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature
of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an
unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time,
are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require
study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part
of the latter.
FRICTION IN WAR
I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual
war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war
on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the
part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway
between the two.
Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He
always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction
and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be
the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical
war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which
makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a
habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.
"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is
difficult_,"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing
difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction
be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of
discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the
great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and
these military virtues as the deciding factors in war.
"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to
that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. Each
individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions."
"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it
requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the
greatest causes of it."[27] "_This enormous friction is everywhere
brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place
upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being
chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the
fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from
firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents
a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively,
because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider
for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the
Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.
"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_The knowledge
of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in
war_, which is required in a good general." "It is therefore this
friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in
reality."[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore
always add to the known circumstances--friction.
WAR ITSELF
In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first
place to his doctrine, "_The destruction of the enemy's military force
is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive
action _the direct way to the aim_."[29] This dictum, repeated in
many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the
old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by
manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth,
in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the
Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he
brushes aside by "our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can
lead to great strategical results."[30] Thus he leads and concentrates
our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle,
and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles
and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth.
"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of
overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed,
and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However
plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_,
for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a
spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[31] For "he who uses force
unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_
obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the
"worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly
held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which
greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much
Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.
"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds."
"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody
slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more
respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the
sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity,
till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the
arm from our body."
SIMPLE PLANS
The second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_,
because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions,
but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_
for wide-reaching skilful combination."[32] "By this it appears to us
that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are
complicated is conclusively shown."
"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the
opponent will get his thrust in first.
"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter."
"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by
complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand
with him by the simplest and shortest_."
STRATEGIC LINES
The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between
the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation,
and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his
predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing
a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on
"The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate
to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends
upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the
form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course
he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above
sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He
therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to
the heart of things.
FRICTION
has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about
its components.
DANGER
"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger.
"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is
necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under
notice here."[35]
BODILY EXERTION
Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on
the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul."
"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36]
To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the
awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round
Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen
bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde
of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal
measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely
break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?
As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and
resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six
hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the
results of his victory.
INFORMATION IN WAR
"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words,
_most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one
report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if
these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of
probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual
uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he
compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and
groping uncertainly for one another.
"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war
and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated
danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses
sight of this; it pervades everything he writes.
THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL
"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in
this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and
effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than
the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real
bright polished weapon."[38] Pages might be filled with extracts
showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader
is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral
is to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military
questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly
characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and
which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable
for all who come after him.
TENSION AND REST IN WAR
In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a
conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest;
the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those
frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first
sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are
due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty,
irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.
In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles
all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they
seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain
pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new
combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the
next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps
considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a
longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring
forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this
subject.[39]
"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither
party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for
the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes
to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards
it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy
opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the
decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies
always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is
followed by a movement in one or other direction."
"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only
feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality."
"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human
weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates
dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one."
"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find
so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that
_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal
condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_.
This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception.
But if military history has this effect by the great body of its
events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of
the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only
proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the
campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited
degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the
element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then
it is necessary."
REFLECTIONS
(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards
International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous
victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training,"
and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war
bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard
nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a
disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should
cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in
any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power
and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of
foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves
is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it
expedient to do it?"
(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length
of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as
long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same.
Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most
solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or
as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up
treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper
basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way,
and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket
is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only
in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing
should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to
enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary.
(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the
success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of
armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a
policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction,
which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The
prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength.
The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its
rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have
been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On
the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more
reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So
that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the
more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful
compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.
Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our
national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our
prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead
eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the
payment before many years of a War Indemnity of £800,000,000 or so.
Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.
(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of
national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise
by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of
war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the
fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise
by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a
decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence,
and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly
ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.
(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger
scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart
the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open
with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or
simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or
even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in
the Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with
almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The
invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more
would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a
possibility which requires to be kept in our view.
(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want
of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As
Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting
machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by
the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all
that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as
excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent
with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled
as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always
apt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former
days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted
in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and
hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at
this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic
efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and
retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted
war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the
outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a
modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought
up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be
different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so
immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything
has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not
_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_
the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that
war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical,
while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then
there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The
war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to
utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation,
so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to
recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to
fear, and to keep ever in mind.