PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR
"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the
province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is
settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from
others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to
liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and
activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on
its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale.
Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which
its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of
living creatures in their germs."[13]
These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of
feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate
hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher,
for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and
repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state
of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political
motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a
perfect explosion."
"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its
elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind
instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free
activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political
instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second,
more the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The
passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence
in the peoples._
"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject.
A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would
immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality,
that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[14]
Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great
philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the
truth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the
intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no
more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which
requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It
is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human
nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by
declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden
of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle
to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in
passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile
people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_
will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling
all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For
_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that
it regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a
social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it
implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he
may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward
here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all
clear thought thereon.
So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for
its influence in and during war.
"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz.
"(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.
"(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression,
and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
"(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15]
"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be
directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten
before we can follow up the other two objects with success.
"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against
those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated:
principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the
enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be
encountered.
"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the
possession of the enemy's capital."[16]
This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz
of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the
three great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those
instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of
modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring
value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great
industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more
and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving
of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has,
in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern
national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in
its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he
presides, or over whom he may preside.
REFLECTIONS
(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of
18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an
aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw
materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed
by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible
to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships
brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To
prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people,
to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war,
and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It
requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._
It appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided
as follows:--
I. An adequate gold reserve.
II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and
exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of
origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could
be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book
thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food
and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a
thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the
principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of
our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.
III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by
selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to
(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
due to effect of war on trade.
Work and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and
before the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary
that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually
_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial
effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject
by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future
the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed
out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
important _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack,
weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed
the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams
unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO
it. There is no great difficulty.
(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of
patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and
safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much
may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to
those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must
be made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of
circulation or pecuniary injury thereby.
(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our
statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of
improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education
_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the
physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building
must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening
us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and
preserving of our Public Opinion in War.