THE TAEPING REBELLION.
In order to bring before the reader the magnitude of Gordon's
achievements in China it is necessary to describe briefly the course
of the Taeping rebellion, and to show the kind of opponents over whom
he was destined to obtain so glorious and decisive a victory. But as
this would be to tell a thrice-told tale, I content myself with giving
in an abridged form the account I prepared from the papers of General
Gordon and other trustworthy sources, which appears in the last volume
of my "History of China."
As far back as the year 1830 there had been symptoms of disturbed
popular feeling in Kwangsi, the most southern province of China
adjacent to Tonquin. The difficulty of operating in a region which
possessed few roads, and which was only rendered at all accessible by
the West River or Sikiang, had led the Chinese authorities, much
engaged as they were about the foreign question, to postpone those
vigorous measures, which, if taken at the outset, might have speedily
restored peace and stamped out the first promptings of revolt. The
authorities were more concerned at the proceedings of the formidable
secret Association, known as the "Triads," than at the occurrences in
Kwangsi, probably because the Triads made no secret that their object
was the expulsion of the Manchus and the restoration of the old Ming
dynasty. The true origin of the Triads is not to be assigned, but
there seems reasonable ground for the suspicion that they were
connected with the discontented monks of a Buddhist monastery which
had been suppressed by the Government. Between them they seem to have
formed the inception of what became the famous Taeping rebellion.
The summer of 1850 witnessed a great accession of energy on the part
of the rebels in Kwangsi, which may perhaps have been due to the death
of the Emperor Taoukwang. The important town of Wuchow on the Sikiang,
close to the western border of Kwantung, was besieged by a force
reported to number 50,000 men. The governor was afraid to report the
occurrence, knowing that it would carry his own condemnation and
probable disgrace; and it was left for a minor official to reveal the
extent to which the insurgents had carried their depredations. Two
leaders named Chang assumed the style of royalty; other bands appeared
in the province of Hoonan as well as in the southern parts of
Kwantung, but they all collected by degrees on the Sikiang, where they
placed an embargo on merchandise, and gradually crushed out such trade
as there had been by that river. Their proceedings were not restricted
to the fair operations of war. They plundered and massacred wherever
they went. They claimed to act in the name of the Chinese people; yet
they slew all they could lay hands upon, without discrimination of age
or sex.
The confidence of the insurgents was raised by frequent success, and
by the manifest inability of the Canton Viceroy to take any effectual
military measures against them. Two hundred imperial troops were
decoyed into a defile, and slaughtered by an overwhelming force in
ambush. This reverse naturally caused considerable alarm in Canton
itself, and defensive measures were taken. Governor Yeh was sent
against them with 2000 men, and he succeeded in compelling, or as some
say in inducing, them to retreat. Any satisfaction this success may
have occasioned was soon dispelled, for at Lienchow, near the small
port of Pakhoi, the rebels not merely gained a victory, but were
joined by the troops sent to attack them. But these successes at
several different points were of far less significance than the
nomination of a single chief with the royal title of Tien Wang, or the
Heavenly King.
The man on whom their choice fell was named Hung-tsiuen. He was the
son of a small farmer, who lived in a village near the North River,
about thirty miles from Canton. If he was not a Hakka himself, he
lived in a district which was considered to belong exclusively to that
strange race, which closely resembles our gipsies. He belonged to a
degraded race, therefore, and it was held that he was not entitled to
that free entry into the body of the civil service, which is the
natural privilege of every true-born Chinese subject. His friends
declared that he came out high at each of the periodical examinations,
but their statements may have been false in this as in much else. The
fact is clear that he failed to obtain his degrees, and that he was
denied admission into the public service. Hung was therefore a
disappointed candidate, the more deeply disappointed, perhaps, that
his sense of injured merit and the ill-judging flattery of his
admirers made his rejection appear unjust.
Hung was, at all events, a shrewd observer of the weakness of the
Government, and of the popular discontent. He perceived the
opportunity of making the Manchu dynasty the scapegoat of national
weakness and apathy. He could not be the servant of the Government.
Class contempt, the prejudices of his examiners, or it may even have
been his own haughty presumption and self-sufficiency, effectually
debarred him from the enjoyment of the wealth and privileges that fall
to the lot of those in executive power in all countries, but in
Asiatic above every other. To his revengeful but astute mind it was
clear that if he could not be an official he might be the enemy of the
Government and its possible subverter.
The details of his early career have been mainly recorded by those who
sympathised with the supposed objects of his operations; and while
they have been very anxious to discover his virtues, they were always
blind to his failings. The steps of his imposture have therefore been
described with an amount of implicit belief which reflected little
credit on the judgment of those who were anxious to give their
sanction to the miracles which preceded the appearance of this
adventurer in the field. Absurd stories as to his dreams, allegorical
coincidences showing how he was summoned by a just and all-powerful
God to the supreme seat of power, were repeated with a degree of faith
so emphatic in its mode of expression as to make the challenge of its
sincerity appear extremely harsh. Hung, the defeated official
candidate, the long-deaf listener to the entreaties of Christian
missionaries, was thus in a brief time metamorphosed into Heaven's
elect for the Dragon Throne, into the iconoclastic propagator of the
worship of a single God, and the destroyer of the mass of idolatry
stored in the hearts and venerated in the temples of the Chinese
people for countless ages. Whether Hung was merely an intriguer or a
fanatic, he could not help feeling some gratitude to those who so
conveniently echoed his pretensions to the Throne at the same time
that they pleaded extenuating circumstances for acts of cruelty and
brigandage often unsurpassed in their infamy.
If he found the foreigners thus willing to accept him at his own
estimate, it would have been very strange if he had not experienced
still greater success in imposing upon the credulity of his own
countrymen. To declare that he had dreamt dreams which showed that he
was selected by a heavenly mandate for Royal honours was sufficient to
gain a small body of adherents, provided only that he was prepared to
accept the certain punishment of detection and failure. If Hung's
audacity was shown by nothing else, it was demonstrated by the lengths
to which he carried the supernatural agency that urged him to quit the
ignominious life of a Kwantung peasant for the career of a pretender
to Imperial honours. The course of training to which he subjected
himself, the ascetic deprivations, the loud prayers and invocations,
the supernatural counsels and meetings, was that adopted by every
other religious devotee or fanatic as the proper novitiate for those
honours based on the superstitious reverence of mankind, which are
sometimes no inadequate substitute for temporal power and influence,
even when they fail to pave the way to their attainment.
Yet when Hung proceeded to Kwangsi there was no room left to hope that
the seditious movement would dissolve of its own accord, for the
extent and character of his pretensions at once invested the rising
with all the importance of open and unveiled rebellion. After the
proclamation of Hung as Tien Wang, the success of the Kwangsi rebels
increased. The whole of the country south of the Sikiang, with the
strong military station of Nanning, fell into their hands, and they
prepared in the early part of the year 1851 to attack the provincial
capital Kweiling, which commanded one of the principal high roads into
the interior of China. So urgent did the peril at this place appear
that three Imperial Commissioners were sent there direct by land from
Peking, and the significance of their appointment was increased by the
fact that they were all Manchus. They were instructed to raise troops
_en route_, and to reach Kweiling as soon as possible. Their movements
were so dilatory that that place would have fallen if it had not been
for the courage and military capacity shown by Wurantai, leader of the
Canton Bannermen. This soldier fully realised the perils of the
situation. In a memorial to the Throne he spoke plainly:--
"The outer barbarians (Europeans) say that of literature China
has more than enough, of the art of war not sufficient. The whole
country swarms with the rebels. Our funds are nearly at an end,
and our troops few; our officers disagree, and the power is not
concentrated. The commander of the forces wants to extinguish a
burning wagon-load of fagots with a cupful of water. I fear we
shall hereafter have some serious affair--that the great body
will rise against us, and our own people leave us."
The growth of the rebellion proved steady if slow. Although 30,000
troops were stated to be concentrated opposite the Taeping positions,
fear or inexperience prevented action, and the numbers and courage of
the Imperialists melted away. Had the Chinese authorities only pressed
on, they must, by sheer weight, have swept the rebels into Tonquin,
and there would thus have been an end of Tien Wang and his
aspirations. They lacked the nerve, and their vacillation gave
confidence and reputation to an enemy that need never have been
allowed to become formidable.
While the Imperial authorities had been either discouraged or at the
least lethargic, the pretender Tien Wang had been busily engaged in
establishing his authority on a sound basis, and in assigning their
respective ranks to his principal followers who saw in the conferring
of titles and posts, at the moment of little meaning or value, the
recognition of their past zeal and the promise of reward for future
service. The men who rallied round Tien Wang were schoolmasters and
labourers. To these some brigands of the mountain frontier supplied
rude military knowledge, while the leaders of the Triads brought as
their share towards the realisation of what they represented as a
great cause skill in intrigue, and some knowledge of organisation.
Neither enthusiasm nor the energy of desperation was wanting; but for
those qualities which claim respect, if they cannot command success,
we must look in vain. Yet the peasants of Kwangsi and the artisans of
Kwantung assumed the title of "Wang" or prince, and divided in
anticipation the prizes that should follow the establishment of some
dynasty of their own making.
The war dragged on in the Sikiang valley during two years, but the
tide of success had certainly set in the main against the
Imperialists, as was shown by the scene of operations being
transferred to the northern side of that river. The campaign might
have continued indefinitely until one side or the other was exhausted
had not the state of the province warned Tien Wang that he could not
hope to feed much longer the numerous followers who had attached
themselves to his cause. He saw that there would very soon remain for
him no choice except to retire into Tonquin, and to settle down into
the ignominious life of a border brigand. To Tien Wang the thought was
intolerable, and in sheer desperation he came to the resolve to march
northwards into the interior of China. It was not the inspiration of
genius but the pressure of dire need that urged the Taeping leader to
issue his orders for the invasion of Hoonan. He issued a proclamation
on the eve of beginning this march, announcing that he had received
"the divine commission to exterminate the Manchus and to possess the
Empire as its true sovereign."
It was at this stage in the rebellion that the name "Taepings" came
into general use, and various accounts are given as to its origin.
Some say it was taken from the small town of that name in the
south-west of Kwangsi, where the insurrection began; others that the
characters mean "Universal Peace," and that it was the style assumed
by the new dynasty. In seeming contradiction with this is the fact
that some of the Taepings themselves declared that they never heard
the name, and did not know what it meant. At this particular juncture
the rebels were in the heart of Kwangsi, at the district capital of
Woosuen. In May 1851 they moved to Siang, a little north of that
place. They ravaged the country, making no long stay anywhere. In
August they were at Yungan, where 16,000 men were ranged under the
banner of the Heavenly King, and for a moment Tien Wang may have
thought of making a dash on Canton. Respect for Wurantai's military
capacity induced him to forego the adventure, and at Yungan, where he
remained until April 1852, the Taeping leader made his final
arrangements for his march northwards.
At Yungan a circumstance occurred which first promised to strengthen
the Taepings, and then to lead to their disruption. Tien Wang was
joined there by five influential chiefs and many members of the Triad
Society. For a time it seemed as if these allies would necessarily
bring with them a great accession of popular strength; but whether
they disapproved of Tien Wang's plans, or were offended by the
arrogant bearing of the Wangs, who, but the other day little better
than the dregs of the people, had suddenly assumed the yellow dress
and insignia of Chinese royalty, the Triad leaders took a secret and
hurried departure from his camp, and hastened to make their peace with
the Imperialists. The principal of these members of the most
formidable secret society in China--Chang Kwoliang by name--was given
a military command of some importance, and afterwards distinguished
himself among the Imperial commanders. In April 1852 the Taeping army
left its quarters at Yungan and marched direct on Kweiling, the
principal city of the province, where the Imperial commissioners sent
from Peking had long remained inactive. Tien Wang attacked them at the
end of April or the beginning of May, but he was repulsed with some
loss. Afraid of breaking his force against the walls of so strong a
place, he abandoned the attack and marched into Hoonan. Had the
Imperial generals only been as energetic in offensive measures as they
had shown themselves obstinate in defence, they might have harassed
his rear, delayed his progress, and eventually brought him to a
decisive engagement under many disadvantages. But the Imperial
Commissioners at Kweiling did nothing, being apparently well satisfied
with having rid themselves of the presence of such troublesome
neighbours.
On 12th of June the Taepings attacked the small town of Taou in Hoonan
with better success. Some resistance was offered, and one of the
Taeping Wangs, known as the "Southern King," was killed. This was a
great loss, because he was a man of some education, and had taken the
most prominent part in the organisation of the Taeping rebellion.
General Gordon inclined to the opinion that he was the real originator
of the whole rising. His loss was a severe blow to the Taepings, whose
confidence in themselves and their cause was alike rudely shaken. They
could not however turn back, for fear of the force at Kweiling, and to
halt for any time was scarcely less dangerous. Necessity compelled
them therefore to press on, and in August they captured the three
small towns of Kiaho, Ching, and Kweyang. Their next march was both
long and forced. Overrunning the whole adjacent country, they appeared
early in the month of September before the strong and important town
of Changsha, situated on the river Seang, and only fifty miles south
of the large lake Tungting.
At this town, the capital of Hoonan, some vigorous preparations had
been made to withstand them. Not merely was the usual garrison
stationed there, but it so happened that Tseng Kwofan, a man of great
ability and some considerable resolution, was residing near the town
at the time. Tseng Kwofan had held several offices in the service, and
as a member of the Hanlin enjoyed a high position and reputation; but
he was absent from the capital on one of those frequent periods of
retirement to their native province which the officials of China have
to make on the occasion of any near relative's death.
When tidings of the approach of the Taepings reached him he threw
himself with all the forces he could collect into Changsha. At the
same time he ordered the local militia to assemble as rapidly as
possible in the neighbourhood, in order to harass the movements of the
enemy. He called upon all those who had the means to show their duty
to the state and sovereign by raising recruits or by promising rewards
to those volunteers who would serve in the army against the rebels.
Had the example of Tseng Kwofan been followed generally, it is not too
much to say that the Taepings would never have got to Nanking. As it
was, he set the first example of true patriotism, and he had the
immediate satisfaction of saving Changsha.
When the Taepings reached Changsha they found the gates closed and the
walls manned. They proceeded to lay siege to it; they cut off its
supplies, and they threatened the garrison with extermination. They
even attempted to carry it by storm on three separate occasions.
During eighty days the siege went on; but the Taepings were then
compelled to admit that they were as far from success as ever. They
had suffered very considerable losses, including another of their
Wangs, the Western King, and although it was said that the loss of the
Imperialists was larger, they could better afford it. On the 1st
December they accordingly abandoned the siege and resumed their march
northwards. They crossed the Tungting Lake on boats and junks which
they had seized, and secured the town of Yochow on the Yangtsekiang
without meeting any resistance. Here they captured much war material,
including a large supply of gunpowder left by the great Chinese
Viceroy, Wou Sankwei, of the seventeenth century. From Yochow they
hastened down the river. The important city of Hankow surrendered
without a blow. The not less important town of Wouchang, on the
opposite or southern bank of the river, was then attacked, and after a
siege of a fortnight carried by storm. The third town of Hanyang,
which completes the busy human hive where the Han joins the great
river, did not attempt any resistance.
These successes raised the Taepings from the depths of despair to the
heights of hope. The capture of such wealthy places dispelled all
their doubt and discouragement. They were able to repay themselves for
the losses and hardships they had undergone, and the prize they had
thus secured furnished ground for hoping for more. But even now it was
no part of their mission to stand still. They waited at Hankow only
long enough to attach to their cause the many thousands attracted to
Tien Wang's flag by these successes. The possibility of pursuit by
Tseng Kwofan at the head of the warlike levies of Hoonan, where each
brave is considered equal to two from another province, was still
present to their minds. But he unfortunately rested content with his
laurels, while the Taepings swept like an irresistible wave or torrent
down the valley of the Yangtsekiang.
The capture of Kiukiang, a town situated on the river near the
northern extremity of the lake Poyang, and of Ganking followed in
quick succession, and on 8th March the Taepings sat down before
Nanking, the old capital of the Mings. The siege lasted only sixteen
days. Notwithstanding that there was a considerable Manchu force in
the Tartar city, which might easily have been defended apart from the
Chinese and much larger town, the resistance offered was singularly
faint-hearted. The Taepings succeeded in blowing in one of the gates.
The townspeople fraternised with the assailants, and the very Manchus,
who had looked so valiant in face of Sir Hugh Gough's force ten years
before, now surrendered their lives and their honour after a mere show
of resistance to a force which was nothing better than an armed
rabble. The Manchu colony of Nanking, to the number of some 4000
families, had evidently fallen off from its high renown. Instead of
dying at their posts, they threw themselves on the pity of the Taeping
leader. Their cowardice helped them not; of 20,000 Manchus not 100
escaped. The tale rests on irrefragable evidence. "We killed them all
to the infant in arms; we left not a root to sprout from; and the
bodies of the slain we cast into the Yangtse."
The capture of Nanking and this sweeping massacre of the dominant race
seemed to point the inevitable finger of fate at the Tatsing dynasty.
It was no longer possible to regard Tien Wang and his miscellaneous
gathering as an enemy beneath contempt. Without achieving any
remarkable success, having indeed been defeated whenever they were
opposed with the least resolution, the Taepings found themselves in
possession of the second city in the Empire. With that city they
acquired the control of the navigation of the Great River, and they
cut off the better part of the communications between the northern and
southern halves of the Empire. They abandoned Hankow, and confined
their occupation of the river banks to the part between Kiukiang and
Nanking; but they determined to secure the Grand Canal, which enters
the river east of the city. On 1st April 1853 they occupied
Chinkiangfoo, on the southern side of the river, and they held it, but
although they also captured Yangchow on the northern bank, they
evacuated it in a few days. These successes were obtained without any
loss, as all the garrisons fled at the mere approach of the dreaded
Taepings.
The Imperialist authorities seemed paralysed by the rapidity and
success of the rebels, who devoted all their efforts to strengthening
the defences of Nanking and to provisioning it in view of all
eventualities. But the thoughts of Tien Wang and his immediate
advisers were still of offensive and forward measures, and when
Nanking was equipped for defence a large part of the Taeping army was
ordered to march against Peking. At this time it was computed that the
total number of the Taepings did not fall short of 80,000 trustworthy
fighting men, while there were perhaps more than 100,000 Chinese
pressed into their service as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The
lines of Nanking and the batteries along the Yangtsekiang were the
creation of the forced labour of the population which had not fled
before the Taepings.
On the 12th of May an army, stated to consist of 200,000 men, but
probably consisting of less than half that number of combatants,
crossed the Yangtse and marched northwards. It would be uninteresting
to name the many small places they captured on their way, but on 19th
June they reached Kaifong, the capital of Honan, and once of China
itself. They had thus transferred in a few weeks their advanced posts
from the Yangtsekiang to the Hwangho, or Yellow River.
The garrison of Kaifong made a resolute defence, and repulsed the
Taepings, who at once abandoned the siege in accordance with their
usual custom, and resumed their march. They succeeded in crossing the
Yellow River under the eyes of the Kaifong garrison, and they then
attacked Hwaiking, an important prefectural town, where they
encountered a stout resistance. They besieged it for two months, and
then had to give up the attempt. Forces were gathering from different
directions, and it became necessary to baffle their opponents. They
marched westwards for some distance along the southern bank of the
Hwangho, turned suddenly north at Yuenking, and on reaching Pingyang
they again turned in an easterly direction, and secured the Lin
Limming Pass which leads into the Metropolitan province of Pechihli.
The whole of the autumn of 1853 was taken up with these manoeuvres,
and it was on 30th September that the Taepings first appeared in the
province containing the capital. They met with little or no
opposition. They had mystified their pursuers, and surprised the
inhabitants of the districts through which they passed. Having forced
the Limming Pass, the Taepings found no difficulty in occupying the
towns on the south-west border of Pechihli. The defeat of the Manchu
garrison in a pass that was considered almost impregnable gave the
Taepings the prestige of victory, and the towns opened their gates one
after another. They crossed the Hootoo River on a bridge of boats
which they constructed themselves, and then occupied the town of
Shinchow; on 21st October they reached Tsing, about twenty miles south
of Tientsin and only one hundred from Peking; but beyond this point
neither then nor at any other time did the rebels succeed in getting.
The forcing of the Limming Pass produced great confusion at Peking. It
was no longer a question of suffering subjects and disturbed
provinces. The capital of the Empire, the very person of the Emperor,
was in imminent danger of destruction at the hands of a ruthless foe.
The city was denuded of troops. Levies were hastily summoned from
Manchuria in order to defend the line of the Peiho and the approaches
to the capital. Had the Taepings shown better generalship there is no
saying but that they would have succeeded in capturing it, as the
Imperialists had left quite unguarded the approach by Chingting and
Paoting, and the capture of Peking would have sounded the knell of the
Manchu dynasty. But the Taepings did not seize the chance--if it were
one--and they were far from being in the best of spirits. They had
advanced far, but it looked as if it was into the lion's mouth. Their
march had been a remarkable one, but it had been attended with no
striking success. In their front was the Tientsin militia,
strengthened by a large if nondescript force, led by the Mongol chief
Sankolinsin. In their rear the levies of Hoonan, of the vast district
that had suffered from their exactions, were closing up, and soon they
were closely beleaguered in a hastily-fortified camp at Tsinghai. In
this they were besieged from the end of October to the beginning of
March 1854. The Imperial generals, afraid to risk an assault, hoped to
starve them out, and so they might have done had not Tien Wang sent a
fresh army to extricate this force from its peril. Then the retreat
began, but, beset by assailants from every side, it was slow and
disastrous. The struggle went on until March 1855, when Sankolinsin
was able to declare that not a Taeping remained north of the Yellow
River. Only a very small portion of the two armies sent to capture
Peking ever returned to the headquarters of Tien Wang.
While these events, and others that do not call for description as
being of minor importance, were in progress, symptoms of
disintegration were already beginning to reveal themselves in the camp
at Nanking. After its capture Tien Wang himself retired into the
interior of his palace and never afterwards appeared in public. All
his time was passed in the harem, and the opportunity was thus given
his more ambitious lieutenants to assert themselves. Tung Wang, the
"Eastern King," became principal Minister. He, too, claimed to have
communion with Heaven, and on celestial advice he began to get rid of
those of his comrades who opposed his schemes. He even summoned Tien
Wang to his presence and reproved him for his proceedings. A plot was
then formed against Tung Wang, and he was slain with three of his
brothers, in the presence of Tien Wang, by another of the Taeping
chiefs. Nor did the slaughter stop there, for it is alleged, although
the numbers must not be accepted literally, that 200,000 of his
partisans--men, women, and children--were massacred. These internal
dissensions threatened to break up the Taeping confederacy, and no
doubt they would have done so but for the appearance of the most
remarkable man associated with the movement, and one of the most
heroic figures in China's history.
A young officer, rejoicing in the innumerable Chinese name of Li, had
attracted Tung Wang's favourable notice, and was by him entrusted with
a small command. It will be more convenient to speak of him by his
subsequent title of Chung Wang, or the "Faithful King." He
distinguished himself in his first enterprise by defeating a large
Imperial army besieging Chinkiang, and in relieving the garrison when
on the point of surrender. But while engaged on this task the
Imperialists closed in on his rear and cut off his retreat back to
Nanking, whither Tien Wang hastily summoned him to return. He
endeavoured to make his way along the northern bank, but was checked
at Loohoo by the ex-Triad Chang Kwoliang, the same who deserted the
Taepings in Kwangsi. Chang had crossed the river to oppose him, and
Chung Wang, hastily conveying his army over the river, fell upon and
destroyed the weakened force that the Imperial general had left there,
under General Chi, who committed suicide. Chang Kwoliang crossed after
him, but only to suffer defeat, and Chung Wang made his way into
Nanking. He then attacked the main Imperial army before its walls,
under the Emperor's generalissimo Heang Yung, and drove it out of its
entrenchments. Heang took his defeat so much to heart that he also
committed suicide, but Chang Kwoliang made a supreme effort to
retrieve the day, and succeeded in retaking all the lost positions,
with the exception of the Yashua Gate of Nanking.
While these events were in progress in the Taeping capital, some
events that must be briefly referred to happened on a different scene.
The Triads, aided by the mob, rose in Shanghai, overcame the Emperor's
officers and garrison, and on 7th September 1853 obtained complete
mastery of the native city. The foreign settlement was placed in a
state of siege, the men-of-war covered the approaches to the
factories, and a volunteer corps was carefully organised and
constantly employed. Then an Imperial army re-appeared on the scene,
and laid siege to Shanghai, but it was conducted with no skill, and
the situation remained unchanged. After twelve months' delay the
French Admiral, Laguerre, decided to help the Imperialists, and he
began to bombard the walls in December 1854. He combined with them in
an assault, and 400 French sailors and the Imperialists attacked the
walls which had been breached. The assault ended disastrously, for the
rebels defended the houses, and at last drove back the assailants with
much loss. The pressure of famine compelled the besieged some months
later to make a _sortie_, when the Imperialists recovered the town. A
similar rising, with a similar result, occurred at Amoy. The
insurgents caused a great loss of life and property, but in the end
the authorities gained the upper hand. These events compelled the
foreign consuls and their Governments to reconsider their policy,
which had been one of sympathy towards the Taepings, and gradually the
conviction became universal that it would be well for civilization and
trade if a speedy end were put to the Taeping rebellion. But for our
own quarrel and war with the central Government these views would have
borne fruit in acts at an earlier date than they did.
During the campaign of 1858 the Taepings more than held their own
through the courage and activity shown by Chung Wang. He relieved the
town of Ganking when closely pressed by Tseng Kwofan, and although he
could not prevent a fresh beleaguerment of Nanking, it caused him no
apprehension because the Emperor's generals were well known to have no
intention of attacking. Notwithstanding this, it was clearly foreseen
that in time Nanking must fall by starvation. In these straits Chung
Wang proved the saviour of his party. The city was invested on three
sides; only one remained open for any one to carry out the news of
Tien Wang's necessities. In this moment of peril there was a general
reluctance to quit the besieged town, but unless someone did, and that
quickly, the place was doomed. In this supreme moment Chung Wang
offered to go himself. At first the proposal was received with a
chorus of disapproval, but at last, when he went to the door of Tien
Wang's palace and beat the gong which lay there for those who claimed
justice, he succeeded in overcoming the opposition to his plan, and in
impressing upon his audience the real gravity of the situation. His
request was granted, and having nominated trusty men to the command
during his absence, he left by the southern gate. A few days later and
Tseng's last levies constructed their fortified camp in front of it.
The Emperor's generals unfortunately reverted to their old dilatory
measures, because they failed to realise the importance with which the
possession of Nanking still invested the Taepings. Without that city
they would have been nothing but a band of brigands, who could easily
have been dispersed. With it they could claim the status of a separate
dynasty. Yet the capture of Nanking was put off until the last act of
all. These sapient leaders, whose military knowledge was antiquated,
acted with an indifference to the most obvious considerations, that
would have been ludicrous if it had not been a further injury to a
suffering people. In 1858 their apathy was such that it not merely
saved Nanking but played the whole game into the hands of Chung Wang.
That chief succeeded in collecting a small force, with which he at
once began to harass Tseng's army. By transferring his army rapidly
from one side of the river to the other, he succeeded in supplying his
deficiency in numbers; but with all his activity he could make no
impression on the mass of his opponents. He even got the worst of it
in several skirmishes, but by a supreme effort he succeeded in
overpowering the Imperial force north of the river at Poukou, and thus
relieved the pressure on Nanking. But this was only momentary, and
after a doubtful and wearisome campaign throughout the year 1859, the
situation again became one of great gravity for the besieged Taepings
who were now confined to Nanking and a few other towns in the Yangtse
valley.
In this extremity Chung Wang conceived a fresh plan for extricating
his cause from the difficulties that beset it. By January 1860 all
Chung Wang's arrangements were completed. He distributed considerable
sums of money among his men to put them in good humour, and then set
forth. His first movements were directed to misleading his enemy as to
his real object, and having succeeded in this he marched as rapidly as
possible towards the important harbour of Hangchow, in the bay of the
same name, south of Shanghai. On 19th March he succeeded in capturing
the Chinese city, but the Tartar portion held out, and a relieving
army compelled Chung Wang to retire. What seemed an unredeemed
calamity proved a stroke of good fortune, for the Imperialists had
sent their best troops to pursue him, and thus materially weakened the
force before Nanking. Chung Wang saw his chance, and while the
Imperialists were rejoicing in Hangchow at its recovery, he hastened
back by forced marches, and fell upon the besieging army. In the
desperate engagement that followed 5000 Imperialists were slain, and
the remainder were driven ignominiously from the field. Thus, at the
blackest moment of their fortunes, did Chung Wang succeed in
delivering his kinsmen who had so long been shut up in Nanking. This
siege had then continued with more or less interruption for seven
years.
Nor did Chung Wang's success stop here. He fought a battle at Tayan
with his old adversary Chang Kwoliang, and defeated him with a loss of
10,000 men. At the height of the engagement Chang Kwoliang was drowned
while crossing a canal, and this decided the battle. Encouraged by
these successes, and with increased forces--for most of the prisoners
he took were incorporated in his army--Chung Wang assumed the
offensive, and after winning no fewer than three regular engagements,
he succeeded in capturing the important city of Soochow, on the Grand
Canal, and this became his chief quarters during the remainder of this
long struggle. By these successes he obtained fresh supplies, and
commanded the great and hitherto little touched resources of the
wealthy province of Kiangsu. It was thus that he was brought into the
neighbourhood of Shanghai, and made those attempts to acquire
possession of the Chinese city which were set forth in the last
chapter, and which were the true cause of the inception of the
foreign, or foreign-trained force, that began with Ward.
After his repulse at Shanghai, Chung Wang was recalled to Nanking. He
went reluctantly, leaving Hoo Wang, "the Protecting King," as his
deputy at Soochow. He found there everything in confusion, and that
Tien Wang, instead of laying in rice for a fresh siege, was absorbed
in his devotion and amusements, while the other chiefs were engaged in
plundering their own subjects. Dissatisfied with what he saw at
Nanking, Chung Wang again took the field, and transferred the scene of
hostilities to the province of Kiangsi, but although he showed great
activity, and marched 800 miles, he gained little, and, indeed, was
defeated on one or two occasions. Nor could he save Ganking, which,
after being besieged for three years, surrendered to Tseng Kwotsiuen,
and thus all hope of succour from the west, or of retreat there, in
the last resort, was removed from the hard-beset garrison of Nanking.
As some set-off to this reverse, Chung Wang captured the ports of
Ningpo and Hangchow, after a gallant defence by a small Manchu
garrison. The Taepings could scarcely now hope for durable success,
but their capacity for inflicting an enormous amount of injury was
evidently not destroyed. Chung Wang's energy and military skill alone
sustained their cause, but the lovers of rapine and turbulence flocked
in their thousands to his standard.
In the Yangtse valley--in fact, wherever Chung Wang was not--the
Taepings met with many reverses that counterbalanced these successes.
Several Chinese armies approached Nanking from different sides, and
Tien Wang in a state of panic summoned Chung Wang, his only champion,
back to his side. That warrior obeyed the summons, leaving Mow Wang in
charge of Soochow, but he could do no good. He found nothing but
disorder at the Taeping capital, and no troops with which he could
venture to assume the offensive against the powerful army, in numbers
at all events, that the two Tsengs had drawn round Nanking. In this
position his troubles were increased by the suspicion of Tien Wang,
who deprived him of all his honours, and banished him to the province
of Anhui, adjacent to both Kiangsi and Kiangsu, and joined with them
in the same viceroyalty. This order to depart was a relief to Chung
Wang, who was thus able to complete his own measures for the defence
of Soochow and the other places along the Canal that had fallen to his
arms. He saw clearly that the success of the foreigners in keeping him
back at a distance of thirty miles from Shanghai, and in expelling him
from Ningpo, signified his being shut in just as effectively on the
east, as he already was on the west by the fall of every place except
Nanking, and by the miserable inefficiency of the garrison in that
place. He may have really despaired, but this Chinese Frederick was
resolved, if he could, to break his chains. Unfortunately for him, a
new and more formidable antagonist than any he had met appeared on the
scene at this juncture, in the person of Gordon.
This summary of the progress and nature of the Taeping rebellion up to
the 25th March 1863 when Gordon assumed the command will make clear
what follows to the general reader. It would be as great a mistake to
minimise the fighting military strength of the Taepings as it would be
to exaggerate it. There was a moment, years before Gordon came on the
scene, when the Imperial commanders by a little energy and promptitude
might have stamped out the rebellion; but having missed the
opportunity the military skill and daring of Chung Wang had revived
the Taeping cause, and made it more formidable than ever from a
military point of view. The blunders of the Imperial commanders
precluded any confidence as to their superior numbers and resources
effecting their natural result, and although Gordon himself declared
that the Taeping cause was a lost one before he assumed the command,
no cause could be pronounced irretrievable with a leader so expert and
resolute as Chung Wang, and opponents so incapable and craven as his
were. But another thing was certainly incontestable, and that was that
the Taepings could not in any sense be regarded as patriots. Their
regular mode of conduct stamped them at once as undiscriminating
plunderers of all, whether Chinese or Manchu, who had the misfortune
to fall into their hands, and their acts of cruelty surpassed
description and even belief. Some instances of the massacres they
perpetrated have been mentioned, but these were only a few out of the
many that stained, or rather characterised, their usual proceedings.
It will suffice to say that their ordinary way of dealing with their
prisoners was to crucify them, and there will then be no difficulty in
accepting the conclusion that the Chinese population thoroughly
detested them, and regarded them as a scourge rather than as
deliverers.
Nor does a closer examination of the system of administration set up
at Nanking by the leader Tien Wang raise one's opinion of the cause or
its promoters. The foreign missionaries long thought that the Taepings
were the agents of Christianity, and that their success would lead to
the conversion of China. That faith died hard, but at last in 1860 a
missionary had to confess that after visiting Nanking "he could find
nothing of Christianity but its name falsely applied to a system of
revolting idolatry," and out of that and other irresistible testimony
resulted the conclusion that the conversion of China by the agency of
the Taepings was a delusion. The missionaries were not alone in their
belief among foreigners. The Consuls and their Governments entertained
a hope that the Taepings might establish an administration which would
be less difficult to deal with than they had found the existing one at
Peking. They attempted to, and did in an informal manner, establish
some relations with Tien Wang. They acquainted him with the articles
of the Treaty of Tientsin, and they requested him to conform with its
conditions. On a second occasion Sir George Bonham, our head
representative in China, even honoured him with a visit; but closer
acquaintance in the case of our diplomatists, as of the missionaries,
stripped the Taepings of the character with which interested persons
would wish they had been invested. From the first feeling of
friendship and sympathy there consequently ensued a slow but steady
revulsion, until at last the general feeling was that the Taepings
were little more than marauders, and as such a scourge to the country
and a standing injury to the trade and interests of Europeans. Then
came the desire to see the rising suppressed, and finally the
disillusionment culminated in active measures being taken to assist
the Imperial Government in suppressing a rebellion which had defied
all its efforts for more than ten years. Of these measures the
appointment of Major Gordon to the command of the Ever Victorious Army
was both the last and the most effectual in producing the desired
result.