THE CHINA WAR.
Gordon was back in England in good time for the Christmas festivities
of 1858, and a few months later--1st April 1859--he was gazetted to
the rank of Captain. About the same time he also received the
appointment of Field-Work Instructor and Adjutant at Chatham, where
his practical knowledge gained in the Sebastopol trenches was turned
to good account in the theoretical training of future officers of his
Corps. He was thus employed when the conflict in China, which had been
in progress for some years, assumed a graver character in consequence
of the Chinese refusal to ratify the Treaty of Tientsin and Admiral
Hope's repulse in front of the Taku forts. Gordon at once volunteered
for active service, and on 22nd July 1860 he sailed for the Far East.
He did not reach Tientsin until the following 26th September, being,
as he said in his first letter home, "rather late for the amusement,
which won't vex mother." Not only had he missed the capture of the
Taku forts, but also the one battle of the war, that fought at
Chan-chia-wan on 9th September. He was, however, in time for the sack
of the Summer Palace, which he describes in the following letter:--
"On the 11th October we were sent down in a great hurry to throw
up works and batteries against the town, as the Chinese refused
to give up the gate we required them to surrender before we would
treat with them. They were also required to give up all the
prisoners. You will be sorry to hear that the treatment they have
suffered is very bad. Poor De Norman, who was with me in Asia, is
one of the victims. It appears that they were tied so tight by
the wrists that the flesh mortified, and they died in the
greatest torture. Up to the time that elapsed before they arrived
at the Summer Palace they were well treated, but then the
ill-treatment began. The Emperor is supposed to have been there
at the time.
"To go back to the work--the Chinese were given until twelve on
the 13th to give up the gate. We made a lot of batteries, and
everything was ready for the assault of the wall, which is
battlemented and 40 feet high, but of inferior masonry. At 11.30
P.M. the gate was opened, and we took possession; so our work
was of no avail. The Chinese had then until the 23rd to think
over our terms of peace, and to pay up L10,000 for each
Englishman and L500 for each native soldier who died during their
captivity. This they did, and the money was paid, and the Treaty
signed yesterday. I could not witness it, as all officers
commanding companies were obliged to remain in camp.
"Owing to the ill-treatment the prisoners experienced at the
Summer Palace, the General ordered it to be destroyed, and stuck
up proclamations to say why it was so ordered. We accordingly
went out, and, after pillaging it, burned the whole place,
destroying in a Vandal-like manner most valuable property which
would not be replaced for four millions. We got upwards of L48
a-piece prize money before we went out here; and although I have
not as much as many, I have done well. Imagine D---- giving
sixteen shillings for a string of pearls, which he sold the next
day for L500!
"The people are civil, but I think the grandees hate us, as they
must after what we did to the Palace. You can scarcely imagine
the beauty and magnificence of the places we burnt. It made one's
heart sore to burn them; in fact, these palaces were so large,
and we were so pressed for time, that we could not plunder them
carefully. Quantities of gold ornaments were burnt, considered as
brass. It was wretchedly demoralising work for an army. Everybody
was wild for plunder.
"You would scarcely conceive the magnificence of this residence,
or the tremendous devastation the French have committed. The
throne-room was lined with ebony, carved in a marvellous way.
There were huge mirrors of all shapes and kinds, clocks, watches,
musical boxes with puppets on them, magnificent china of every
description, heaps and heaps of silks of all colours, embroidery,
and as much splendour and civilization as you would see at
Windsor; carved ivory screens, coral screens, large amounts of
treasure, etc. The French have smashed everything in the most
wanton way. It was a scene of utter destruction which passes my
description."
It may be of interest to state here that Gordon bought the throne
referred to. Its supports are the Imperial Dragon's claws, and the
cushions are of yellow Imperial silk. He presented it long afterwards
to the headquarters of his Corps at Chatham, where it now stands.
On the exchange of the Treaty ratifications, which took place within
the walls of the Imperial capital, the force under Sir Hope Grant was
withdrawn to Tientsin, and after a brief space from China. But pending
the payment of the instalments of the war indemnity, a garrison of
3000 men, under General Staveley, was left at Tientsin, and Captain
Gordon was attached to this force. He had a very busy time of it at
first, for suitable quarters had to be provided for our troops, and
Gordon was fully employed in the construction of barracks and stables.
Among the other tasks that engaged his attention at the time was the
management of a fund for the benefit of the Chinese poor, and he was
much distressed by an unfortunate accident that attended its
distribution.
"We had collected about nine hundred dollars for the poor, and
had asked the mandarins to issue tickets to the most deserving.
This they would not do, so a certain day was fixed upon which to
distribute the funds. There were about 3000 beggars, and in the
crush seven women and one boy were killed. The poor women on
their little feet, on which they are never very safe, were thrown
down and trampled upon."
During the eighteen months that Gordon resided at Tientsin he took
every opportunity of seeing the country, and as often as he could he
rode from that town along the banks of the Peiho river to the Taku
forts at its mouth. The distance is about forty miles each way, and he
computed that he accomplished it not fewer than twenty times. He also
visited Peking in August 1861, and remained several days on a visit to
Sir Frederick Bruce at the British Legation. At that date rumours were
already current that the Emperor Hienfung, who never returned to
Peking after our occupation, but made Yehol his capital and place of
residence, was dead. These were true, but some time elapsed before it
was officially announced that the Emperor had died on the 22nd of that
month, the very day that Gordon reached Peking himself, and wrote the
following letter:--
"The Emperor is reported to be dead, and his coffin has been sent
for; but this is no proof, since it is the custom to send for a
man's coffin when he is seriously ill, and it is kept for him
even if he lives fifty years after."
Writing again some time after, he says on the grave event: "A great
operation relating to the funeral of Hienfung is going on: a marble
block, weighing sixty tons, is being removed from the quarries to the
west of Peking to the cemetery in the east. It is drawn along upon a
huge truck by six hundred ponies, and proceeds at the rate of four
miles per day. When it arrives it is to be set up and carved into the
shape of an elephant; several other large stones are also _en route_."
But the most interesting expedition Gordon undertook from Tientsin was
that to the Great Wall, and here I must borrow Dr Birkbeck Hill's
graphic description, which is based on a long letter from Gordon
himself:--
"In December 1861, accompanied by Lieutenant Cardew of the 67th
Regiment, he made a tour on horseback to the outer Wall of China
at Kalgan. A Chinese lad of the age of fourteen who knew a little
English acted as their servant and interpreter, while their
baggage was carried in two carts. In the course of their journey
they passed through districts which had never before been visited
by Europeans. Against the northern side of the city of Siuen-hoa
(_not_ Si_n_en-hoa, as printed in Dr Hill's book) they found that
the sand had drifted with the wind till it had formed a sloping
bank so high that it reached to the top of the walls, though they
were nearly twenty feet high. Nature had followed in the steps of
the generals of old, and had cast up a bank against the town. At
Kalgan the Great Wall was with its parapet about 22 feet high and
16 feet broad. Both of its faces were built of bricks, each of
which was three times the size of one of our bricks. The space
between was filled in with rubble. 'It is wonderful,' writes
Colonel Gordon, 'to see the long line of wall stretching over the
hills as far as the eye can reach.' From Kalgan they travelled
westwards to Taitong, where the wall was not so high. There they
saw huge caravans of camels laden with 'brick tea' going towards
Russia. Here they were forced to have the axle-trees of their
carts widened, for they had come into a part of the country where
the wheels were always set wider apart than in the province
whence they came. Their carts therefore no longer filled the deep
ruts which had been worn in the roads.
"The chief object of their journey had been to ascertain whether
there was in the inner wall any pass besides the Tchatiaou, which
on that side of the country led from the Russian territory to
Peking. They pushed along southwards, in vain trying for a long
time to find a way eastward over the mountains. It was not till
they reached Taiyuen that they struck into the road that led to
Peking or Tientsin.
"In this town, for the first time on their journey, they got into
any kind of trouble. When their bill was brought them for their
night's lodging they found that the charge was enormous. Seeing
that a dispute would arise, they sent on their carts, and waited
at the inn till they felt sure that they had got well on their
way. They then, like the three Quakers with whom Charles Lamb
travelled to Exeter, offered what they thought a reasonable sum.
It was refused. They tried to mount their horses, but the people
of the inn stopped them. Major Gordon took out his revolver, for
show more than for use, for he allowed them to take it from him.
He thereupon said, 'Let us go to the Mandarin!'
"To this they agreed, and at the same time they gave him back his
revolver. They all walked towards the Mandarin's house--the two
Englishmen alongside their horses. On the way Major Gordon said
to his companion, 'Are you ready to mount?' 'Yes,' he answered.
So they mounted quietly, and went on with the people. When they
reached the Mandarin's they turned horses, and scampered after
their carts as fast as they could. The people yelled and rushed
after them, but it was too late.
"Some way beyond Taiyuen they came upon the pass over the
mountains which led down into the country drained by the Peiho.
The descent was a terrible one. All along the cold had been
intense--so much so that raw eggs were frozen hard as if they had
been boiled. To add to their troubles, when they were on in front
their carts were attacked by robbers; but the Chinese lad--an
ugly imp--kept them off with his gun. When they drew near
Paoting-fu they sent on with the lad the two carts and their
tired horses, which had now carried them for three weeks without
the break of a single day, and they hired a fresh cart in which
they thought to ride to Tientsin. But with the boy gone they had
no interpreter, and in their impatience, 'their new driver'--to
quote our traveller's own words--'got rather crossly dealt with.'
They stopped near Paoting-fu for the night. Early next morning as
they were washing they heard the gates of the inn open and the
rumble of cartwheels. They guessed what was happening. 'Half
stripped as I was, I rushed out and saw our cart bolting away. I
ran for a mile after it, but had to come back and hire another
with which we got to Tientsin--more than fourteen days over our
leave.'"
From this pleasant but uneventful occupation Gordon was summoned to a
scene where important events were in progress, and upon which he was
destined to play what was perhaps, after all, the most brilliant part
in the long course of his remarkable career. His brother puts the
change into a single sentence:--
"On the 28th of April 1862 Captain Gordon left the Peiho and
arrived at Shanghai on 3rd of May, and at once dropped into the
command of a district with the charge of the engineer part of an
expedition about to start, with the intention of driving the
rebels out of a circuit of thirty miles from Shanghai."
By the end of March 1862 the Chinese Government had sufficiently
carried out its obligations to admit of the withdrawal of the force at
Tientsin, and General Staveley transferred the troops and his quarters
from that place to Shanghai, where the Taeping rebels were causing the
European settlement grave anxiety, and what seemed imminent peril. The
Taepings, of whose rebellion some account will be given in the next
chapter, were impelled to menace Shanghai by their own necessities.
They wanted arms, ammunition, and money, and the only means of
obtaining them was by the capture of the great emporium of foreign
trade. But such an adventure not merely implied a want of prudence and
knowledge, it could only be attempted by a breach of their own
promises. When Admiral Hope had sailed up the Yangtsekiang and visited
Nanking, he demanded and received from Tien Wang, the Taeping king or
leader, a promise that the Taeping forces should not advance within a
radius of thirty miles of Shanghai. That promise in its larger extent
had soon been broken, and an attack on Shanghai itself, although
unsuccessful, crowned the offences of the rebels, and entailed the
chastisement a more prudent course would have averted. Without
entering into the details here that will be supplied later on, it will
suffice to say that in January 1862 the Taepings advanced against
Shanghai, burning all the villages _en route_, and laid irregular
siege to it during more than six weeks. Although they suffered several
reverses, the European garrison was not in sufficient strength to
drive them away, and a general anxiety prevailed among the European
community when the arrival of General Staveley altered the posture of
affairs.
Before Gordon arrived two affairs of some importance had taken place.
At Wongkadza, a village twelve miles west of Shanghai, General
Staveley obtained a considerable success, which was, however, turned
into a disaster by the disobedience of his orders. The Taepings had
retired to some stronger stockades, and General Staveley had ordered
the postponement of the attack until the next day, when the trained
Chinese troops, carried away by their leaders' impetuosity, renewed
the assault. The result was a rude repulse, with the loss of nearly
100 men killed and wounded. The next day the stockades were evacuated,
and within another week the fortified villages of Tsipu and Kahding
were also taken. It was at this point that Gordon arrived from
Tientsin, and reached the scene of action just as the arrangements for
attacking the important village of Tsingpu were being completed.
That the Taepings were not contemptible adversaries, at least those
under their redoubtable leader Chung Wang, was shown by their
attempting to destroy Shanghai by fire, even while these operations
were in progress. The plot nearly succeeded, but its promoters were
severely punished by the summary execution of 200 of their number. The
force assembled for the attack on Tsingpu assumed almost the
dimensions of an army. General Staveley commanded 1,429 British troops
with twenty guns and mortars, in addition to a naval brigade of 380
men and five guns. There was also a French contingent of 800 men and
ten guns, under Admiral Protet. At Tsingpu Gordon specially
distinguished himself by the manner in which he reconnoitred the
place, and then placed and led the ladder parties after two breaches
had been pronounced practical. The Taepings fought well, but the place
was carried, and the Chinese auxiliaries killed every one they found
with arms in their hands. Commenting on Gordon's part in this affair,
General Staveley wrote in his official despatch:--
"Captain Gordon was of the greatest use to me when the task of
clearing the rebels from out of the country within a radius of
thirty miles from Shanghai had to be undertaken. He reconnoitred
the enemy's defences, and arranged for the ladder parties to
cross the moats, and for the escalading of the works; for we had
to attack and carry by storm several towns fortified with high
walls and deep wet ditches. He was, however, at the same time a
source of much anxiety to me from the daring manner he approached
the enemy's works to acquire information. Previous to our attack
upon Tsingpu, and when with me in a boat reconnoitring the place,
he begged to be allowed to land in order better to see the nature
of the defences; presently, to my dismay, I saw him gradually
going nearer and nearer, by rushes from cover to cover, until he
got behind a small outlying pagoda within 100 yards of the wall,
and here he was quietly making a sketch and taking notes. I, in
the meantime, was shouting myself hoarse in trying to get him
back, for not only were the rebels firing at him from the walls,
but I saw a party stealing round to cut him off."
A letter from Gordon gives an interesting account of the two
subsequent affairs at Nanjao, where Admiral Protet was killed, and at
Cholin, where the Taepings suffered a severe but, as it proved, not a
decisive defeat.
"On going through the village a Chang-mow (rebel leader) came out
of a house rubbing his eyes, evidently having been taking a
siesta; he was horrified, and bolted, but was soon caught, and
the sailors had much difficulty in saving his life from the
villagers, who flew upon and would have killed him. Poor man! he
had such a nice costume when taken, but in five minutes
afterwards you would scarcely have known him; all his finery, and
even more, had been taken from him. The small force encamped and
entrenched themselves 900 yards from Cholin, much to the surprise
and anger of the garrison. They came down in force on the next
morning with no end of banners. Upon the principle that inquiring
minds should not be balked, they were allowed to come pretty
close, but then the poor things received a check, and the
beautiful silk banners were furled up and carried back to the
town.
"The next day General Staveley sent us word to come back, since
he would attack Nanjao first, but as there were nearly 1000
villagers depending upon our protection and crowding round our
camp, I was sent back with an armed party, and Captain Willes
remained in front of the town. I went back by a different road
and came on the General four miles from Nanjao. We marched on,
and halted near the town, which was reconnoitred during the
night, and the guns placed in position by 5 P.M. On the 17th we
opened fire at seven, and attacked the place. Here Admiral Protet
was killed; he was among 500 men, and was the only one struck.
The town was a wretched affair, and a good many Chang-mows
escaped. These Chang-mows are very funny people; they always run
when attacked. They are ruthlessly cruel, and have a system of
carrying off small boys under the hope of training them up as
rebels. We always found swarms of these boys who had been taken
from their parents (whom the rebels had killed) in the provinces.
"I saved one small creature who had fallen into the ditch in
trying to escape, for which he rewarded me by destroying my coat
with his muddy paws in clinging to me. I started soon after the
attack for Cholin, and got there on the 18th. The rebels had made
a _sortie_ since my departure, and had got into a pretty mess.
Willes let them come up and then advanced on them; over sixty
were killed, and several taken prisoners. The General then came.
We got our guns in position during the night, opened fire next
morning, and assaulted at seven. The place was miserable and
poor. The Armstrong guns, which enfiladed one face, did great
execution."
The fruits of these successes were lost by the signal overthrow and
practical annihilation of a large Chinese army at Taitsan. One of
General Staveley's detachments was cut off, and with his
communications threatened he found himself compelled to abandon
Kahding, and to retire towards Shanghai. Tsingpu had also to be
abandoned, and the garrison suffered some loss in effecting its
retreat. Of the first results of General Staveley's campaign there
thus remained very little, and it was only in the autumn that these
places were retaken, and the campaign against the Taepings in the
Shanghai districts continued with varying fortune throughout the
remainder of the year 1862 and the early months of 1863.
While these military events were in progress Major Gordon, who was
raised to the rank of Major in the army in December 1862 for his
services in China, had been trusted with the congenial task, and one
for which he was pre-eminently well suited, of surveying and mapping
the whole of the region for thirty miles. This work, necessary in
itself for many reasons, proved of incalculable value to him in the
operations which he eventually undertook and carried out to a
successful issue against the rebels. His own letters show how
thoroughly he fulfilled his instructions, and how his surveys ended in
his complete mastery of the topography of the region between the Grand
Canal, the sea, and the Yangtsekiang:--
"I have been now in every town and village in the thirty miles'
radius. The country is the same everywhere--a dead flat, with
innumerable creeks and bad pathways. The people have now settled
down quiet again, and I do not anticipate the rebels will ever
come back. They are rapidly on the decline, and two years ought
to bring about the utter suppression of the revolt. I do not
write about what we saw, as it amounts to nothing. There is
nothing of any interest in China; if you have seen one village
you have seen all the country. I have really an immensity to do.
It will be a good thing if the Government support the
propositions which are made to the Chinese.
"The weather here is delightful--a fine cold, clear air which is
quite invigorating after the summer heats. There is very good
pheasant-shooting in the half-populated districts, and some quail
at uncertain times. It is extraordinary to see the quantities of
fishing cormorants there are in the creeks. These cormorants are
in flocks of forty and fifty, and the owner in a small canoe
travels about with them. They fish three or four times a day, and
are encouraged by the shouts of their owners to dive. I have
scarcely ever seen them come up without a fish in their beaks,
which they swallow, but not for any distance, for there is a ring
to prevent it going down altogether. They get such dreadful
attacks of mumps, their throats being distended by the fish,
which are alive, when the birds seem as if they were pouter
pigeons. They are hoisted into the boats and then are very
sea-sick. Would you consider the fish a dainty?"
And again he writes about the Taepings, who were not in his eyes "a
people nobly struggling to be free," but a horde of ruthless
marauders.
"We had a visit from the marauding Taepings the other day. They
came close down in small parties to the settlement and burnt
several houses, driving in thousands of inhabitants. We went
against them and drove them away, but did not kill many. They
beat us into fits in getting over the country, which is
intersected in every way with ditches, swamps, etc. You can
scarcely conceive the crowds of peasants who come into Shanghai
when the rebels are in the neighbourhood--upwards of 15,000, I
should think, and of every size and age--many strapping fellows
who could easily defend themselves come running in with old women
and children.
"The people on the confines are suffering very greatly, and are
in fact dying of starvation. It is most sad this state of
affairs, and our Government really ought to put the rebellion
down. Words could not depict the horrors these people suffer from
the rebels, or describe the utter desert they have made of this
rich province. It is all very well to talk of non-intervention,
and I am not particularly sensitive, nor are our soldiers
generally so, but certainly we are all impressed with the utter
misery and wretchedness of these poor people.... In the midst of
those terrible times the British and foreign merchants behaved
nobly and gave great relief, while the Chinese merchants did not
lag behind in acts of charity. The hardest heart would have been
touched at the utter misery of these poor harmless people, for
whatever may be said of their rulers, no one can deny but that
the Chinese peasantry are the most obedient, quiet, and
industrious people in the world."
The propositions referred to in the former of these two letters were
that the services of Major Gordon should be lent to the Chinese
Government for the suppression of the Taeping rebellion, that he
should assume the command of an Anglo-Chinese legion of which the
nucleus already existed, and that he might enlist the services of a
certain number of our own officers. Considerable delay took place in
the execution of this project, as it was necessary to send to Europe
for the necessary authority; and another explanation was given
subsequently to the effect that Gordon insisted on finishing his
survey first. But Sir Charles Staveley, who nominated Major Gordon for
the work, has effectually disposed of this latter statement by
declaring that the former was the true and only cause. At length these
propositions were sanctioned, and on 26th March 1863 Major Gordon
proceeded to Sungkiang, a town west of Shanghai and south of Tsingpu,
to take over the command of the Chinese force, which had already been
named the Ever Victorious Army, and which in his hands justified its
name.
Before closing this chapter it will be well to give some account of
the origin of this force, and of the more important events that
preceded Gordon's appointment to the command. As far back as April
1860 the Viceroy of the Two Kiang provinces had begged the English and
French representatives to lend him military assistance in dealing with
the rebels. The request was not complied with, but when some of the
richest native merchants of Shanghai, with one Takee at their head,
formed themselves into a patriotic association, and bound themselves
to provide the funds required to raise a European-led force, no
impediments were placed in their way. In July 1860 the services of two
American adventurers who had had some military experience in Central
America and elsewhere were enlisted and taken into the pay of this
merchants' guild. Their names were Ward and Burgevine, and they were
both adventurers of an unscrupulous and unattractive type. In addition
to excellent pay, they were promised handsome money rewards for the
capture of specified places, and what spoil there was to take should
be theirs. Such a prospect was very inviting to the bold spirits of a
great port like Shanghai, with its trading ships from every quarter
of the world, and they succeeded in recruiting about 100 Europeans
and 200 Manilla men or Spanish half-breeds.
In order to test the quality of this force it was decided to attack
Sungkiang; and in July, only a week or so after it was organised, Ward
led his somewhat motley band against that place. The result was
unfavourable, as his attack was repulsed with some loss. Nothing
daunted, Ward collected some more Manilla men and renewed the attack.
He succeeded in capturing one of the gates, and in holding it until an
Imperial army of 10,000 men arrived, when the town was carried by
storm. Having thus proved its mettle, Ward's force became very
popular, and it was increased by many fresh recruits, chiefly Greeks
and Italians. It also was strengthened by the addition of some
artillery, two six-pounder and later two eighteen-pounder guns.
The Chinese merchants then offered Ward and his quarter-master
Burgevine a large reward for the capture of Tsingpu; and their legion,
accompanied by a Chinese force of 10,000 men, who were, however, only
to look on while it did the fighting, accordingly marched on that
place. The attack made during the night of 2nd August resulted in a
most disastrous repulse, most of the Europeans being either killed or
wounded, Ward himself receiving a severe wound in the jaw. He renewed
the attack with fresh men and two eighteen-pounders three weeks later;
but after bombarding the place for seven days, he was attacked by the
Taeping hero Chung Wang, and routed, with the loss of his guns and
military stores. It was on this occasion that Chung Wang, following up
his success, and doubly anxious to capture Shanghai because this new
and unexpected force was organised there, attacked that town, and was
only repulsed by the English and French troops who lined its walls.
This reverse at Tsingpu destroyed the reputation of Ward's force, and
for several months he remained discredited and unemployed. In March
1861 he reappeared at Sungkiang, at the head of sixty or seventy
Europeans whom he had recruited for the Imperial cause; but at that
moment the policy of the foreign Consuls had undergone a change in
favour of the Taepings, and Ward was arrested as a disturber of the
peace. Perhaps a more serious offence was that the high pay he offered
and prospect of loot had induced nearly thirty British sailors to
desert their ships. He was released on his claiming that he was a
Chinese subject, and also on his sending orders to his colleague
Burgevine to return the troops they had enlisted. Burgevine thought he
saw in this a chance of personal distinction, and before disbanding
the men he made with them another attack on Tsingpu. This attack, like
its two predecessors, was repulsed with heavy loss, and the original
Ward force was thus finally discredited. It should be borne in mind,
to distinguish it from what followed, that it was a mercenary force of
European and Spanish half-breeds, without a single Chinese in it.
In September 1861 these two men altered their proceedings, and gave a
new turn to the whole question. As it was impossible for them to
recruit foreigners, they induced Takee and his associates to provide
the funds for a native Chinese force, which they undertook to train
and organise. In this task they made considerable progress, and with a
view to making it popular with the Chinese, and also to give the men
confidence, this new force was named, probably by Takee, the Chun Chen
Chun or Ever Victorious Army. This proud title was given long before
the claim to it was justified, but its subsequent appropriateness has
buried in oblivion the slender claim it possessed to it on its
inception.
By the end of January 1862 Ward had succeeded in training two
regiments of 1000 men each, and with these he captured Quanfuling and
200 boats in the rear of the Taeping force, which attacked Shanghai
for a third time in that month. When the English and French forces
assumed the offensive before the arrival of Sir Charles Staveley, part
of Ward's Corps accompanied them in the attack on Kachiaou. It led the
attack, and behaved extremely well, thus giving rise to very
favourable anticipations as to what a properly-trained Chinese army
might do.
In a second action at Tseedong the force maintained the reputation it
had gained. The Chinese fought with great bravery, and the difficulty,
in fact, was in keeping them back. The English general reviewed them
after this encounter, and declared himself much impressed with their
appearance. Representations were made at Peking, and on 16th March
1862 an Imperial decree gave the first public recognition of the Ever
Victorious Army.
Although reverses followed, the Corps maintained the reputation it had
gained for steadiness and discipline. Under General Staveley at
Wongkadza it acted well and lost heavily, and in all the subsequent
movements of that officer it took a prominent part. When Tsingpu was
captured, as already described, one of Ward's regiments was left in it
as a garrison, but on the evacuation of that place in consequence of
the return of Chung Wang with fresh and more numerous forces, it
narrowly escaped annihilation. It was then that the Taeping general
named them in scornful irony, "Cha-Yang-Kweitser," or "Sham Foreign
Devils," the point of the sarcasm being that these troops wore an
European costume.
During the summer of 1862, when the heat rendered active operations
impossible, everything was done to increase both the numbers and the
efficiency of the Ever Victorious Army. By the month of July its
strength had been raised to 5000 men, the commissioned officers being
all Europeans except one Chinese, named Wongepoo, who had been given a
commission for special gallantry by Admiral Hope. Ward was in chief
command, and Colonel Forrester and Burgevine were his first and second
lieutenants. When the weather became a little cooler in August, it was
determined to utilise this force for the recapture of Tsingpu, which
was taken at the second assault on the 9th of that month, although not
without heavy loss in officers and men. Six weeks later the important
Taeping position at Tseki, across the Hangchow Bay and not far distant
from Ningpo, was attacked by Ward and a party of English blue-jackets.
The operation was perfectly successful, but Ward was shot in the
stomach and died the next day. His loss was a very considerable one,
for, as Gordon said, "he managed both the force and the mandarins very
ably." Colonel Forrester should have succeeded to the command, but he
declined the post, which then devolved upon Burgevine.
After a brief space the services of Captain Holland of the Royal
Marine Light Infantry were lent to Burgevine in the capacity of Chief
of the staff, and as this was done at the suggestion of the Futai
Li--since famous to Europeans as Li Hung Chang--it did not conduce to
greater harmony between him and Burgevine, for their antagonism had
already become marked. An occasion soon offered to fan this feeling to
a flame. A Chinese army under Li and General Ching advanced to attack
a Taeping position near Tsingpu, at the same time that Burgevine at
the head of his corps assailed it from the other side. The brunt of
the fighting fell on the latter, but when Li issued his bulletin he
claimed all the credit of the victory, and totally ignored Burgevine
and his men. Burgevine did not accept this rebuff meekly, and his
peremptory manner offended the Chinese. The breach was widened by the
distrust many of the Chinese merchants as well as officials felt as to
his loyalty, and soon it was seen that the funds so freely supplied to
Ward would not be forthcoming in his case.
Burgevine's character has been described in the following sentence by
Gordon himself:--
"He was a man of large promises and few works. His popularity was
great among a certain class. He was extravagant in his
generosity, and as long as he had anything would divide it with
his so-called friends, but never was a man of any administrative
or military talent, and latterly, through the irritation caused
by his unhealed wound and other causes, he was subject to violent
paroxysms of anger, which rendered precarious the safety of any
man who tendered to him advice that might be distasteful. He was
extremely sensitive of his dignity."
The situation between the Chinese authorities and Burgevine soon
became so strained that the former presented a formal complaint to
General Staveley, and begged him to remove Burgevine. This, as the
English commander pointed out, was for obvious reasons beyond his
power, but he made representations to his Government, and suggested
that an English officer should be lent to the Chinese, and he
nominated Gordon as the best qualified for the work. Pending the
arrival of the required authority, the Chinese, assisted by
Burgevine's own impetuosity, brought their relations with him to a
climax. The merchant Takee withheld the pay of the force; Burgevine
was first ordered to proceed with his troops to Nanking, and then, on
consenting, the order was withdrawn; some weeks later a fresh order to
the same effect was issued, and Burgevine demanded the payment of all
arrears before he would move, and thus Li's object of exposing
Burgevine as a disobedient officer to the Government that employed him
was attained.
The Ever Victorious Army, excited by the absence of its pay, and
worked upon by the exhortations of its chief, was on the point of
mutiny, and Burgevine hastened to Shanghai to obtain by force rather
than persuasion the arrears. On 4th January 1863 he saw Takee, a
violent scene ensued, and Burgevine used violence. Not only did he
strike Takee, but he carried off the treasure necessary to pay his
men. Such conduct could not be upheld or excused. Li Hung Chang made
the strongest complaint. Burgevine was dismissed the Chinese service,
and General Staveley forwarded the notice to him with a quiet
intimation that it would be well to give up his command without making
a disturbance. Burgevine complied with this advice, handed over the
command to Captain Holland, and came back to Shanghai on 6th of
January. He published a defence of his conduct, and expressed his
regret for having struck Takee.
Captain Holland was thus the third commander of the Ever Victorious
Army, and a set of regulations was drawn up between Li Hung Chang and
General Staveley as to the conduct and control of the force. It was
understood that Captain Holland's appointment was only temporary until
the decision of the Government as to Gordon's nomination arrived, but
this arrangement allowed of the corps again taking the field, for
although it cost the Chinese L30,000 a month, it had done nothing
during the last three months of the year 1862. Early in February 1863,
therefore, Captain Holland, at the head of 2,300 men, including a
strong force of artillery--600 men and twenty-two guns and
mortars--was directed to attack Taitsan, an important place about
fifty miles north-east of Shanghai. An Imperialist army of nearly
10,000 men acted in conjunction with it. The affair was badly managed
and proved most disastrous.
After a short bombardment a breach was declared to be practicable, and
the ladder and storming parties were ordered to the assault.
Unfortunately, the reconnoitring of the Taeping position had been very
carelessly done, and the attacking parties were checked by a wet
ditch, twenty feet wide and six feet deep, of which nothing had been
seen. Situated only forty yards from the wall of the town, and without
any means of crossing it, although some few did by throwing across a
ladder, the storming party stood exposed to a terrific fire. Captain
Holland ordered a retreat, but it was not managed any better than the
attack. The light guns were removed too quickly, and the heavy ones
were stuck so fast in the mud that they could not be removed at all.
The Taepings attacked in their turn, and the greatest confusion
prevailed, during which the survivors of the larger half of the Ever
Victorious Army escaped in small detachments back to Sungkiang. Twenty
European officers were killed or wounded, besides 300 Chinese
privates. Captain Holland exposed himself freely, but this, his only
action in independent command, resulted in complete and unqualified
failure. Gordon himself summed up the causes of this serious and
discouraging reverse:--
"The causes of the failure were the too cheap rate at which the
rebels were held. The force had hitherto fought with the allies
with them (except at Tsingpu). They now had to bear the brunt of
the fighting themselves, the mistake of not having provided
bridges in spite of the mandarin's information, and the too close
proximity of the heavy guns to the walls, and the want of cover
they had, and finally the withdrawal of the lighter guns before
the heavy guns, whose removal they should have covered. There is
little doubt that the rebels had been warned by persons in
Shanghai of the intended attack, and that several foreigners, who
had been dismissed by Captain Holland, were with the rebels
defending the breach. As may be imagined, Burgevine's removal had
caused considerable feeling among his acquaintances, who were not
sorry to see the first expedition of the force under an English
officer fail, being in hopes that the command would again revert
to Burgevine."
This reverse occurred on 13th February, and no further steps of any
consequence were taken until the appointment of Major Gordon, which at
last was sanctioned in the latter portion of March, about a week
before ill-health compelled General Staveley to resign his command in
China. That officer was connected with the Gordon family, his sister,
a most amiable and sympathetic lady, being Lady Gordon, widow of the
late Sir Henry Gordon. As far back as May 1861--that is, prior to most
of the events described in this chapter--Gordon's sensitiveness about
his family connection with the commanding officer in China had
impelled him to write this letter:--
"I was much put out in Henry's writing, and I think hinting he
could do something for me, and I went to Staveley and told him
so. It is the bother of one's life to be trying after the honours
of the profession, and it has grown in late years into a regular
trade--everyone uses private interest."
When Gordon gave this early manifestation of his independent spirit he
was little more than twenty-eight years of age, but it should
certainly be noted as showing that in one respect he was very little
changed in his later years from what he was in his youth.
After these reverses in February nothing more was attempted until
Major Gordon arrived at Sungkiang on 25th March 1863 to take over the
command of the force. It is to be hoped that the last few pages have
made clear what that force was like. In the first place, it had been
one composed entirely of Europeans, a band somewhat resembling those
that have set up and cast down the mushroom republics that separate
the conquests of Pizarro from those of Cortes. That force achieved
nothing and had an ignominious end. It was succeeded by the larger
force of drilled Chinese, to which was given the name of the Ever
Victorious Army. Although these Chinese showed far more courage than
might have been expected of them, none of their leaders--Ward,
Burgevine, or Holland--seemed able to turn their good qualities to any
profitable purpose. They were as often defeated as successful, and at
the very moment of Gordon's assuming the command the defeat of Captain
Holland at Taitsan, and a subsidiary reverse of Major Tapp at Fushan,
had reduced their _morale_ to the lowest point, and even justified a
belief that for military purposes this force was nearly, if not quite,
worthless.