By the time the retreating Russians had reached the Wisloka they had

to some extent recovered from the first shock of surprise, and were

better able to attempt a determined stand against the overwhelming

onrush of the Austro-Germanic troops. Ivanoff hurriedly sent

reenforcements for Dmitrieff and Ewarts which included the Caucasian

Corps of General Irmanoff from the Bzura front. The heavy German guns

belched forth with terrible effect, and the Russians could not reply

at the same weight or distance. Bayonets against artillery means

giving odds away, but the attempt was made. With a savage fury that

seems to belong only to Slavs and Mohammedans--fatalists--the Russians

hurled themselves against the powerful batteries and got to close

quarters with the enemy. For nearly twenty minutes a wild, surging sea

of clashing steel--bayonets, swords, lances and Circassian

daggers--wielded by fiery mountaineers and steady, cool,

well-disciplined Teutons, roared and flowed around the big guns, which

towered over the lashing waves like islands in a stormy ocean. A

railway collision would seem mild compared with the impact of 18,000

desperate armed men against a much greater number of equally desperate

and equally brave, highly-trained fighters. But machinery, numbers and

skillful tactics will overcome mere physical courage. The Russian

avalanche was thrown back with terrific slaughter; the Caucasian Corps

alone lost over 10,000 men, for which, it is estimated, they killed

and wounded quite as many. More remarkable still was the fact that

they captured a big battery and carried off 7,000 prisoners. For five

days the storm raged backward and forward across the river; during the

more violent bombardments the Russians left their trenches to be

battered out of shape and withdrew into their shelter dugouts; when

the enemy infantry advanced to take possession, the Russians had

returned to face the charge. Whereas cool, machinelike precision

marks the German soldier in battle as on the parade ground, an

imperturbable obstinacy and total disregard of mortal danger

characterizes the Russian.

During the night of May 6-7, 1915, the Austrians sent two regiments

across the Wisloka, north and south of Brzostek, about midway between

Pilzno and Jaslo, under cover of artillery posted on a 400-foot hill

near Przeczyca on the opposite bank, _i.e._, the left. Austrian

engineers constructed a bridge across the river, and on the morning of

May 7 the Austrian advance guard were in possession of the hills north

of the town. Infantry were then thrown across to storm Brzostek. Here,

again, they met with resolute opposition from the Russian rear guards

covering the retreat of the main armies, which had already fallen back

from the Wisloka. Desperate bayonet fighting ensued in the streets,

each of which had to be cleared separately to dislodge the

Russians--the civilians meanwhile looking out of their windows

watching the animated scenes below. Hungarian troops in overwhelming

masses poured across the river and finally captured the town. Once

more on the backward move, the Russians established themselves along

the western and southern fringe of the forests by Januszkovice, only

eight miles away, and prepared to make another stand. More fighting

occurred here, and during May 7 and 8, 1915, the Russians fell back

farther toward Frysztak, on the river Wistok.

We left Von Emmich and General Martiny with the Bavarians and the

Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps on their arrival at Krempna on the

night of the 4th, during which time the Russians were making desperate

efforts to evacuate northern Hungary and the western passes. The main

forces of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were meanwhile pushing on toward

Jaslo, still in Russian possession. On the hills west of the Wisloka

the Russian rear guards had intrenched themselves and held their

positions till nightfall on May 5, 1915, all with the object of

delaying the Germanic advance sufficiently for their comrades to clear

the passes. Then they fell back again and made a stand near Tarnoviec,

about six or seven miles east of Jaslo, where they dominated an

important strategic position. Between them and Jaslo two railways ran

along the valley of the River Jasliska, forming a serious obstacle to

Von Mackensen's advance so long as the Russians could hold it. It was

imperative that they should be cleared out, but the task of carrying

it through was a difficult one. The undertaking fell to the Hungarian

troops of the Thirty-ninth Honved Division, who advanced to the attack

again and again only to be driven back each time by the Russian fire

from the heights. Big howitzers were called into play and soon

demolished the positions.

The Russians retired east of the Wistok, followed by Von Mackensen's

Austro-Hungarian corps, while the Prussian Guards moved on toward

Frysztak, where the Russian troops from the Tarnow sector had taken up

positions after the retreat from Brzostek.

On May 7, 1915, the Prussian Guards had passed over the railway at

Krosno, and at night fell upon the Russian lines east of the Wistok.

Particularly fierce encounters took place near Odrzykon and Korczina,

ten to fourteen miles southeast of Frysztak. A little farther westward

Von Mackensen delivered his main attack against the railway crossing

at Jaslo, which fell on the same day, May 7. The Russians retreated in

confusion with Von Mackensen close upon their heels. The whole defense

on the Wisloka collapsed, and nothing apparently could now save the

Dukla and those troops struggling through to escape from the net that

was gradually being tightened around them. Meanwhile, General Ewarts's

Army of the Nida, which formed the connecting link between the Russian

northern and southern armies, had fallen back above Tarnow to the

River Czarna in order to keep in touch and conformity with Dmitrieff's

shrinking line, which was now actually broken by the Wisloka failure.

The Russian position was extremely critical, for it seemed that the

German general would roll up the two halves and thereby inflict a

crushing and decisive defeat. General Ivanoff appears to have

recognized Von Mackensen's intentions in time to devise measures to

counteract the peril and save his left (Brussilov's army) from

disaster. By pushing forward strong columns from Sanok on the Upper

San to impose a temporary check upon the advancing tide, he gained a

brief respite for the troops entangled in the passes. To that sector

we will now turn to review the course of events.

On May 4, 1915, the Russians began to evacuate the positions they held

south of the range when Von Mackensen's extreme right approached

Krempna. Forging along at high speed the Germans and Austrians

occupied the towns of Dukla and Tylava, and arrived at Rymanow--still

farther east--on the following day. The town of Dukla lies some

fifteen miles due north of the Galician debouchment of the pass of

that name, and Rymanow is about another fifteen miles east of that.

Hence the German strategic plan was to draw a barrier line across the

north of the Carpathians and hem the Russians in between that barrier

and the Austro-Hungarian armies of Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. It

must distinctly be borne in mind that these two forces are also north

of the passes: that of Von Bojna being stationed at the elbow where

the Germanic line turned from the Carpathians almost due north along

the Dunajec-Biala front, or across the neck of our hypothetical jar.

The Dukla and Lupkow passes were still in Russian hands; these were

the only two that the Germanic offensives of January, February, and

March, 1915, had failed to capture; all the others, from Rostoki

eastward, were held by the Austrians and Germans. It was through the

Dukla and Lupkow that the Russians obtained their foothold in northern

Hungary, and it was the only way open to them now to get back again.

Around the Laborcza district stood the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army

Corps under the command of the Archduke Joseph, who now began to

harass them, aided by the German "Beskid Corps" under General von

Marwitz. This was the only section in the range where the Russians

held both sides. Boehm-Ermolli had forced the Rostoki and Uzsok, but

hitherto had been unable to get very far from their northern

exits--not beyond Baligrod. During the fighting on the Dunajec these

three armies merely marked time; it was their object to keep the

Russians in Hungary and in the two passes until Von Mackensen had

thrown the right of his "phalanx" across their only avenue of escape.

That time was now rapidly approaching, and Von Bojna was gradually

squeezing Brussilov from the west, while Boehm-Ermolli was following

from the east and south. It appears that the commanders of the Twelfth

Russian Army Corps and the Third Russian Army, which stood on

Hungarian soil from Zboro to Nagy Polena, did not grasp the full

significance to them of the Dunajec catastrophe.

Germanic troops were building a wall against their exits before they

had seriously thought of withdrawing. Escape was impossible for many

of them; some had managed to get across the Dukla in time, while those

left behind would either have to surrender or fight their way through

the lines across their path in the north. At the same time they would

have Von Bojna and Boehm-Ermolli on their tracks. To make matters

worse, they were also being pressed severely from the Hungarian plains

by the troops which hitherto stood inactive. The Second

Austro-Hungarian Army (Boehm-Ermolli) was fighting on both sides of

the range. Through Rostoki they attempted to separate the Russians

around Zboro from those situated farther east at Nagy Polena. We have

stated elsewhere that the Forty-eighth Division was severely handled.

They were surrounded in the Dukla by an overwhelming superior force,

but General Korniloff, the commander, with a desperate effort and no

little skill, succeeded in hacking his way through the enemy's lines

and bringing a large portion of his force safely out of the trap. Inch

by inch the Russian rear guards retreated, fighting tooth and nail to

hold the pass while their comrades escaped. No less brave were the

repeated charges made by the Austrians--clambering over rocks, around

narrow pathways hanging high in the air, dizzy precipices and mountain

torrents underneath. On Varentyzow Mountain, especially, a fierce

hand-to-hand battle was fought between Hungarians and Cossacks, the

latter finally withdrawing in perfect order. To conduct a successful

retreat in the face of disaster is a no less difficult military

achievement than the gaining of a decisive victory, and Brussilov's

retreat from the passes deserves to rank as a masterly example of

skillful tactics.

On May 8, 1915, the Third Russian Army and the Forty-eighth Division

had reunited with Brussilov's main army in the neighborhood of Sanok,

twenty miles north of the Lupkow. When the commanders of a retreating

army lose their heads the rank and file will inevitably become

demoralized and panic-stricken. The retreat became a rout, and the

possibility of making a stand, and to some extent retrieving the lost

fortune of war, was extremely remote. A deeper motive than the mere

reconquering of Galicia lay behind Von Mackensen's plan--he aimed at

nothing less than the complete overthrow and destruction of the

Russian armies. It was a gigantic effort of the Germanic powers to

eliminate at least one of their most dangerous enemies. Once that was

accomplished it would release some millions of troops whose services

were needed in the western theatre of war. The original plan had

fallen through of crushing Russia quickly at the beginning of the war,

before she would have had time to get ready, and then to turn against

France in full force. The Austro-German Galician campaign was planned

and undertaken with that specific object, and now, although defeated

and in full retreat, the Russian troops still formed an army in being,

and not a fugitive, defenseless rabble. So long as an army is not

captured or annihilated, it can be reorganized and again put in the

field. It is on this consideration that so much importance attaches to

the handling of an army in retreat. The Russians did not, of course,

run away; on the contrary, they fought desperately and stubbornly

throughout the retreat, for their pursuers did not average more than

six miles per day--a fact which testifies to the steady and orderly

character of the Russian retirement. They suffered from the

consequences of inadequate preparation and lack of foresight on the

part of their leaders.

The Russian troops on the Lower Wisloka held their positions longest,

but they also fell back about May 8, 1915, and for the next two days

engaged the enemy near some villages southwest of Sanok. Here a strong

force had collected, which not only offered a powerful resistance, but

even attempted a counterattack against their pursuers. Over a front of

145 miles, extending from Szczucin near the Vistula north of Tarnow,

down almost to the Uzsok Pass, a fierce battle progressed between May

8 and 10, 1915. In the region of Frysztak, where the Russian line was

weakest, the main German offensive was developing its strongest

attack. Reenforcements were on the way, but could not arrive in time.

For the moment disaster was averted by an aggressive Russian

counteroffensive halfway between Krosno and Sanok, from the

Besko-Jacmierz front, by which move sufficient time was gained to

enable the main forces to retreat. The Russian defense in the Vistok

Valley collapsed on May 10, 1915; the German center had almost arrived

within striking distance of the important railway line from Tarnow via

Dembica and Rzeszow to Jaroslav north of Przemysl. At Sanok the

battered remnants of the Russian troops who had escaped from the

passes maintained themselves with the greatest difficulty. Heavy

German artillery followed the Bavarians to Rymanow, five miles from

the Russian line at Besko, and were now playing fiercely upon the

positions west of Sanok. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps as well

as the Seventh were making their presence felt from the southwest

against Odrzechova and from the south, whence Von Marwitz with the

German Beskid Corps was rapidly advancing. To the southeast,

Boehm-Ermolli was battering the Baligrod-Lutoviska front, almost in

the same position he occupied at the end of January in the first

attempt to relieve Przemysl.

The battle was practically over by the night of May 10, 1915; the

Russians could hold out no longer against the ever-increasing flood of

Austrians and Germans pouring across every road and pathway against

their doomed line. Blasted and scorched by artillery, machine-gun and

rifle fire; standing against incessant bayonet and cavalry charges;

harassed by the Austrians from the south, the Russians were indeed in

sore straits. Yet they had fought well; in the losing game they were

playing they were exhausting their enemies as well as themselves in

men and munitions--factors which are bound to tell in a long,

drawn-out war. Above all, they still remained an army: they had not

yet found their Sedan. No alternative lay before them--or rather

behind them--other than retreat to the next possible line of

defense--toward Przemysl.

Between May 11-12, 1915, the Germanic troops occupied the districts of

Sendziszow, Rzeszow, Dynow, Sanok, Lisko, Lancut, and Dubiecko.

Przevorsk was deserted by the Russians on the 13th. The Seventh

Russian Railway Battalion, under Captain Ratloff, brought up the rear

of the retreat to the Dembica-Jaroslav line. From Rzeszow onward this

battalion were employed in destroying stations, plants, tunnels,

culverts, rolling stock, and railway bridges, to hamper as much as

possible the German advance. It took the Austro-Hungarian engineers

between two and three weeks to repair the road and put it into

sufficient working order to transport their heavy siege artillery.

With uninterrupted labor and the most strenuous exertions they could

only reconstruct about four miles per day. Repairs and renovations

other than those of the railway system were necessary. The wounded had

to be sent back to hospital, and fresh troops had to be brought up to

fill the gaps torn in the Austro-German ranks during all the severe

fighting since May 2, 1915. It is not known exactly what the series of

victories cost the Germanic armies in casualties, but it is known that

their successes were dearly bought. One fairly competent authority

places the loss at between 120,000 to 130,000. From May 2 to May 12,

1915, the forces of Von Mackensen, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and

Boroyevitch von Boyna claim to have captured 103,500 men, 69 guns, and

255 machine guns. A retreating army must inevitably lose many of their

number as prisoners, besides their wounded must also be abandoned.

Furthermore, the Russian line of retreat led through rough and

mountainous country, where large bodies of troops could not be kept in

touch with each other. Thus it frequently happened that isolated

detachments were captured _en bloc_ without being able to offer any

resistance. In the neighborhood of Sanok and the watering places of

Rymanow and Ivonicz some of the biggest Russian base hospitals were

situated. These, of course, could not have been evacuated in time, and

the patients consequently swelled the number of prisoners. Most of the

guns captured by the Austro-Germans were those of the Russian troops

whose retreat from northern Hungary and the passes had been

intercepted.

They often sacrificed large bodies of troops to save their guns. The

lack of artillery was the main cause of their defeat; what little they

could save from the wreck was therefore husbanded with jealous care.

The German staff accurately calculated on the preponderance of heavy

artillery, and that Russia would be compelled to bow low before the

superior blast of cannon fire. Though it involved the sacrifice of

many miles of territory, it was now the Russian object to draw the

enemy's line out to the fullest extent. After the retreat from the

Wistok the Russian Generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, was concerned

only to save the most for his country at the greatest expense to her

enemies. It meant continual retreat on a gigantic scale. Przemysl,

captured ten weeks ago, lay behind Ivanoff's line, and Lemberg was but

sixty miles beyond. Two hundred miles northward the Germans were

hammering at the gates of Warsaw. A retreat such as the grand duke

contemplated might involve the loss of all three of these places, but

it would stretch the Germanic lines enormously and enable the Allies

in the west to strike with better effect. No territorial

considerations must stand in the way against the safety of the Russian

armies. It was the same policy that had crippled Napoleon in 1812.

CHAPTER XLIII

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND THE BUKOWINA

In order to keep the narrative abreast of the steadily advancing

Austro-German line, we must change occasionally from one sector to

another to watch the progress of operations over the huge battle

field. In accordance with the details laid down in the great strategic

plan, each of the different Germanic forces had a distinct task to

perform. Turning then to eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, we find

that on May 1, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies were

facing each other along almost the same front where we left them in

the middle of March. That front extended to the north of Nadvorna and

Kolomea, by Ottynia across to Niczviska on the Dniester, and from

there eastward along the river toward Chotin on the Russian frontier

of Bessarabia.

By the beginning of May, 1915, the spring floods had subsided, when

operations became again possible. General Lechitsky, on the Russian

side, probably aimed at recovering the Pruth Valley, while the

Austrian commander, General von Pflanzer-Baltin, directed his efforts

to establishing himself on the northern bank of the Dniester. He would

then be able to advance in line with the Germanic front that was

pressing on from the west, and northward from the Carpathian range

between Uzsok and the Jablonitza passes; otherwise his force would lag

behind in the great drive, a mere stationary pivot. At that time he

held about sixty miles of the Odessa-Stanislau railroad (which runs

through the valley via Czernovice and Kolomea) with the Russians only

twenty miles north of the line. If that position could be taken the

Austrians would have the South Russian line of communications in their

hands, for it was along this line that supplies and reenforcements

were being transported to Ivanoff's front on the Wisloka from the

military centers at Kiev and Sebastopol. Thus the railway was of

tremendous importance to both belligerents. What it meant to the

Austrians has been stated; to the Russians its possession offered the

only opportunity for a counteroffensive in the east that could

possibly affect the course of the main operations on the Wisloka, San,

and later the Przemysl lines. But however successful such a

counteroffensive might prove, it could not have exerted any immediate

influence on the western front. With the Transylvania Carpathians

protecting the Austro-German eastern flank, there would still be

little hope of checking the enemy's advance on Lemberg even if

Lechitsky succeeded in reconquering the whole of the Bukowina and that

part of eastern Galicia south of the Dniester. Every strategic

consideration, therefore, pointed to the Dniester line as the key to

the situation for the Austrian side, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin decided

to stake all on the attempt.

[Illustration: Galician Campaign from Przemysl to Bessarabia.]

On May, 6, 1915, the machine was set in motion by a violent

bombardment. By the 8th the Austrians captured the bridgehead of

Zaleszczyki; on the 9th the Russians drove them out again, capturing

500 men, 3 big guns, 1 field gun, and a number of machine guns. On May

10 the Russians took the initiative and attacked a front of about

forty miles, along the entire Dniester line from west of Niczviska to

Uscie Biskupic, crossed into the Bukowina and advanced to within five

miles of Czernowitz from the east. A little stream and a village both

named Onut are situated southwest of Uscie Biskupic. Here a detachment

of Don Cossacks distinguished themselves on May 10, 1915. Advancing

toward the Austrian wire entanglements in face of a terrific

fusillade, they cut a passage through in front of the Austrian's

fortified positions. Before the latter realized what was happening the

Cossacks were on top of them, and in a few minutes a ferocious bayonet

struggle had cleared out three lines of trenches. Russian cavalry

poured in after them, hacking the Austrian's rear, and compelling them

to evacuate the entire district. The Cossacks charged into the

hurriedly retreating masses--on horse and on foot, with saber, lance,

and bayonet, capturing 4,000 prisoners, a battery of machine guns,

several caissons and searchlight apparati.

The entire northern bank of the Dniester was in Russian possession by

the night of May 10, 1915; several desperate counterattacks attempted

by the Austrians on the 11th completely failed to recover the lost

ground. Two days later a Russian official reported: "In this operation

the Austrian units which led the offensive were repulsed near

Chocimierz with heavy losses. Our artillery annihilated two entire

battalions and a third surrendered. Near Horodenka the enemy gave way

about seven o'clock in the evening of the same day and began a

disorderly retreat. We again captured several thousand prisoners,

guns, and some fifty ammunition caissons." Being a junction of six

roads and a railway station on the curved line from Kolomea to

Zaleszczyki, Horodenka is considered to be the most important

strategic point along the Dniester-Czernowitz front. It was

undoubtedly a severe blow to the Austrians.

During the night of May 11, 1915, and the next day they evacuated a

front of about eighty-eight miles, and retired south of the Pruth.

General Mishtchenko led his Cossacks on the Austrian trail, taking

several towns on their way to Nadvorna, which they captured after a

fierce fight. From here they took possession of part of the railway

line from Delatyn to Kolomea, and completely severed the connection

between Von Pflanzer-Baltin's forces and those of Von Linsingen lying

along the north of the range. Larger bodies of Russian troops were on

the way to Kolomea; on May 13, 1915, they stormed and carried some

strongly fortified Austrian positions eight miles north of the town,

in front of which the Austrians had placed reenforcements and all

their last reserves. By dint of great efforts they held their position

here, but from May 9 to May 14, 1915, the Russians drove them back

elsewhere on a front of over sixty miles for a distance of about

twenty miles, also capturing some 20,000 prisoners with many guns and

valuable stores of munitions. About the middle of May matters quieted

down in the eastern sector; the only fighting of importance consisted

of severe artillery combats around Czernowitz and Kolomea. The issue

of the conflict hung in the west with Von Mackensen's armies; fighting

in the Bukowina at this stage became an unnecessary expenditure of

strength and energy. The fate of eastern Galicia was being decided 140

miles away, on the banks of the River San, to which region we will now

direct the reader's attention.

CHAPTER XLIV

RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT--RETREAT TO THE SAN

After the Russian troops retreated from the Lower Wisloka northward

toward the confluence of that river with the Vistula they held the two

important bridgeheads of Sandomierz and Rozvadov.

On May 14, 1915, Ivanoff's right was being forced toward the Vistula

in the vicinity of Opatow. This right wing was the army under General

Ewarts, which since December, 1914, had been stationed in strongly

fortified positions on the Nida in Russian Poland. The front extended

across the frontier into western Galicia and joined on to the right

wing of Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala front, which was shattered between

Otfinow and Gorlice. The retreat of Dmitrieff's army was in an

easterly direction along Tarnow, Pilzno, Dembica, Rzeszow, and Lancut

to Przevorsk on the San; from the region of Gorlice and Ciezkovice

along Biecz, Jaslo, Frysztak, Krosno to Dynow, Dubiecko, and Sanok,

the latter also on the San. The troops that Brussilov extricated from

the passes and those with which he held the northern part of the

western Carpathians against Boehm-Ermolli were now likewise

concentrated on the San. A glance at the map will show that the

Russian front on the San from Przevorsk down to Sanok forms a shield

between the Germanic advance and the two towns of Jaroslav and

Przemysl. It will also be observed that General Ewarts's forces about

Rozvadov are on the west side of the San, that is to say, nearer

toward the advancing Austrians under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

The retreat in Galicia necessitated modifications in the Russian front

in Poland on the way to Warsaw. The line south of the Pilica had to be

withdrawn and positions on the Nida abandoned to conform with the

retreating line in Galicia. New positions were taken up along Radom

and across the Kamienna River. The pivot or hinge from which the line

was drawn back was the town of Ivanlodz, about fifty-five miles

southwest of Warsaw. North of Ivanlodz the front remained unaltered.

While this line shifting was in progress (in Poland) the German troops

hung closely to the heels of the retiring Russians, evidently

mistaking the motive behind the change of position. Mr. Stanley

Washburn thus summarizes the results of these retreating battles:

"Regarding the movement as a whole, suffice it to say that in the two

weeks following the change of line one (Russian) army inflicted upon

the enemy a loss of nearly 30,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The Russian losses were comparatively trifling." The Austro-German

forces were following up leisurely the retreating Russian corps, not

expecting any serious fighting to occur until the lines behind the

Kamienna were reached.

Instead of that, however, on May 15, 1915, the Russian commander

suddenly halted the main body of his troops in front of his fortified

positions on a line extending from Brody by Opatow toward Klimontow.

Between May 15-17, 1915, a battle developed on this front, which is

the more notable as it is one of the few in this war fought in the

open without trenches. To quote Mr. Washburn: "In any other war it

would have been called a good-sized action, as from first to last more

than 100,000 men and perhaps 350 to 400 guns were engaged."

The Austro-Germans came on in four groups. The Third German Landwehr

was moving from the southwest by Wierzbnik against Ilza, slightly to

the north of Lubienia. Next to it, coming from the direction of

Kielce, was the German Division of General Bredow, supported by the

Eighty-fourth Austrian Regiment. This body was advancing against

Ostroviec, the terminus of a railway which runs from the district of

Lodz to the southeast by Tomaszow and Opoczno, and crosses the

Ivangorod-Olkusz line halfway between Kielce and Radom. Farther to the

south three Austro-Hungarian divisions were also advancing--namely,

the Twenty-fifth Austrian Division against Lagow, and the Fourth

Austrian Landwehr Division, supported by the Forty-first Honved

Division, against Ivaniska; they moved along roads converging on

Opatow. The Twenty-fifth Austrian Division, commanded by the Archduke

Peter Ferdinand, was composed of crack regiments, the Fourth Hoch and

Deutschmeisters of Vienna, and the Twenty-fifth, Seventeenth, and

Tenth Jaeger battalions. The Russians were outnumbered about 40 per

cent. The supposedly demoralized Russians were not expected to give

any battle short of their fortified line, to which they were thought

to be retiring in hot haste. The Russian general selected the

Austrians on whom to spring his first surprise, but commenced by

making a feint against the German corps, driving in their advanced

guards by vigorous attacks which caused the whole force to halt and

begin deployment for an engagement.

This occurred on May 15, 1915. On the same day, with all his available

strength, he swung furiously with Opatow as an axis from both north

and south, catching in bayonet charge the Twenty-fifth Division on the

road between Lagow and Opatow. Simultaneously another portion of his

command swept up on the Fourth Division coming from Ivaniska to

Opatow. "In the meantime a strong force of Cossacks had ridden round

the Austrians and actually hit their line of communications at the

exact time that the infantry fell on the main column with a bayonet

charge, delivered with an impetuosity and fury that simply crumpled up

the entire Austrian formation. The Fourth Division was meeting a

similar fate farther south, and the two were thrown together in a

helpless mass, losing between 3,000 and 4,000 casualties and nearly

3,000 in prisoners, besides a large number of machine guns and the

bulk of their baggage. The remainder, supported by the Forty-first

Honved Division, which had been hurried up, managed to squeeze

themselves out of their predicament by falling back on Uszachow, and

the whole retired to Lagow, beyond which the Russians were not

permitted to pursue them, lest they should break the symmetry of their

own line." It is admitted by the Austrians themselves that their

losses were very severe in this battle. An Austrian source at the time

stated that on May 16, 1915, not a single officer and only twenty-six

men were left of the entire Fourth Company, First Battalion of the

Tenth Austrian Infantry Regiment. By the 17th of May the Austrians had

withdrawn more than twelve miles from the scene of the disaster.

During the following night, May 25, 1915, an Austrian division was

moving from the line of advance of General Bredow's troops along the

Lagow-Opatow road where it is separated by a spur of the Lysa Gora,

the highest mountain group in Russian Poland. The Russians, elated

over their recent victory, crossed the mountains by a forced march,

and fell on the right flank of the German formation, while other

troops opened a general frontal attack against it. Bredow was

compelled to fall back in haste in the direction of Bodzentyn and to

call for assistance from the adjoining Fourth German Landwehr

Division. The sudden withdrawal of that division had the effect of

weakening the German line southwest of Radom near the Radom-Kielce and

the Konsk-Ostroviec railway crossings. The opportunity of thinning the

enemy's line in that sector was too good to be lost, for a Russian

communique of May 17, 1915, states that "near Gielniow, Ruski-Brod,

and Suchedniov our sudden counterattacks inflicted severe losses on

the enemy's advance guards." Having thus checked the German advance

for the time being, the Russians ceased from further troubling to

await developments on the San.

CHAPTER XLV

BATTLE OF THE SAN

When the Austro-German armies reached the line of the San on May 14,

1915, the battle for mid-Galicia was over, and a fresh chapter of the

campaign opened with the battle of the San, which might more fittingly

be described as the battle for Przemysl. The position of Ivanoff's

right has been shown; his right center lay west of the Lower San; the

center east of the river covered Przemysl; his left center extended

along the Upper Dniester, while his left, under Lechitsky, was keeping

Von Pflanzer-Baltin employed. Von Mackensen's "phalanx" was slowly

coming into action again, directing its course toward the Russian

center. The "phalanx" was compelled to travel slowly, for it carried

about 2,000 pieces of artillery with ample munitions, and the

railroads had been wrecked by the retreating Russians. What has been

described by military writers as "Von Mackensen's phalanx" was a

concentration of troops along the lines on which the strongest

resistance was expected or where the quickest advance was intended. No

special group of forces appear to have been set apart for that

purpose; there was very little shifting about or regrouping necessary

during the campaign, and so well was the plan arranged that the

concentrations occurred almost automatically wherever and whenever

they were most needed. The infantry marched in successive lines or

echelons, about forty yards apart, while in the ranks the men were

allowed about four feet elbow room apiece. For frontal attacks this

might be considered fairly close formation, but Von Mackensen

calculated more upon the disintegrating effect of his artillery to

first demoralize the enemy and wreck his position, after which the

infantry came into play to complete the destruction. Without an

overwhelming supply of artillery the "phalanx" plan would have been

unworkable--machine guns would exact too heavy a sacrifice of life.

Ivanoff's chief object for the moment was to hold the enemy in check

long enough to allow Przemysl to be cleared of ammunitions and

supplies, and to withdraw the troops in possession of the place.

Already, on May 14, 1915, the German troops of Von Mackensen's army

had occupied Jaroslav, only twenty-two miles north of the fortress.

Ivanoff had concentrated his strongest forces on the line between

Sieniava, north of Przevorsk, and Sambor, thirty miles southeast of

Przemysl. Here he had deployed the three armies which had held the

entire front from the Biala to Uzsok in the beginning of May, 1915,

nearly twice as long as the line they were now guarding. These were to

fight a holding battle on the center while he adopted a series of

vigorous counterthrusts on his right and left wings. By the retirement

of the center Ewarts had been compelled to fall back from the Nida to

the Vistula with Woyrsch's Austrian army against him. When Ewarts

dropped behind Kielce in Russian Poland, Woyrsch seized the junction

of the branch line to Ostroviecs in front of the Russian line. Ivanoff

decided to venture a counterattack which would at the same time

relieve the pressure on his center and also check the move on Josefov,

dangerously near to the Warsaw-Ivangorod-Lublin line. The result of

this plan was the brilliant surprise attack on the Austrians and

Germans previously described. Along the San the troops just south of

Ewarts delivered a fierce attack and drove the Archduke Ferdinand back

to Tarnobrzeg on the Vistula. Ivanoff next drew as many reenforcements

from that flank to strengthen his center as was compatible with

safety. What had happened meanwhile on Ivanoff's extreme left--in

eastern Galicia and the Bukowina--has already been stated. These

counterattacks may be regarded as merely efforts to gain time, but the

hour of another great battle was at hand.

The battle of the San, one of the greatest of the war, opened on May

15, 1915. Jaroslav was in German hands; the Fourth Austro-Hungarian

Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) reached the western side of the San

on the 14th; by the 16th the Austro-German armies held almost the

entire left bank of the river from Rudnik to Jaroslav, about forty

miles. They crossed at several points on the same day and enlarged

their hold on the right bank between Jaroslav and Lezachow near

Sieniava, which they captured. A German division arrived at

Lubaczovka, due north of Jaroslav, and half of the Germanic circle

around Przemysl was now drawn. The German plan was an advance in force

from the Sieniava-Jaroslav front against the Przemysl-Lemberg railway,

the most vulnerable point of the Russian line of retreat from the

fortress. Fifteen bridges were accordingly erected over the San in

that sector between May 20-24, 1915, across which the German battering

ram was to advance on Przemysl. South of the town mounted patrols came

into touch with Russian cavalry; four Austro-Hungarian and one German

army corps were standing prepared between Dobromil and Sambor; Sambor

was occupied by them. The Russians held the left bank close to the

river from Sieniava to Jaroslav, and northward of the former and to

the west as far as Tarnobrzeg. From Jaroslav their front ran in almost

a straight line for thirty miles southeastward to the outer and

northern forts around Przemysl, described nearly a complete circle

around the western and southern forts to Mosciska on the east, thence

south to Sambor, and from Sambor to Stryj. From Stryj; eastward to the

Bukowina the line remained unaltered. In that region Lechitsky and Von

Pflanzer-Baltin had been conducting a campaign all by themselves; they

were now resting, waiting, watching.

While great Germanic preparations for the capture of Przemysl were

proceeding north of the town, the battle opened on Saturday, May 15,

1915, in the south, against the Russian front between Novemiasto and

Sambor. Here the Austro-German troops were thrown against Hussakow and

Krukenice to hack their way through trenches and barbed-wire

entanglements in order to reach the Przemysl-Lemberg railway and

thereby complete the circle. "At the cost of enormous sacrifices the

enemy succeeded in capturing the trenches of our two battalions."

But on May 17, 1915, these trenches near Hussakow were recaptured by

the Russians. The Austrians returned to the charge, however, and by

May 19 were within six miles of Mosciska. By May 21 they had overcome

the main Russian defenses to the east of Przemysl and were threatening

the garrison's line--their only line--of retreat to Grodek, for other

Germanic forces were advancing upon Mosciska from the north.

On May 21, 1915, the Russians opened a sudden counteroffensive along

the whole line in a desperate effort to save, not the fortress, but

the garrison. The Austrians had destroyed most of the forts before

they surrendered the town on March 22; and forts cannot be built or

reconstructed in a few weeks. Besides, the Austrians knew the ground

too well. Von Mackensen's "phalanx" was meanwhile advancing against

the Jaroslav-Przemysl front with Von Bojna's corps on his right;

Boehm-Ermolli deserted the passes which had so long occupied him and

was now pressing against the south of the town while Von Marwitz on

his right attempted to seize the railway between Sambor and Dobromil.

Von Linsingen was forging ahead toward Stryj and the Dniester; he had

finally worked through the ill-fated Koziova positions, and was now

able to rest his right upon Halicz. From there his connection with Von

Pflanzer-Baltin had been broken by Lechitsky, and was not repaired

till June 6, 1915.

The Russian counteroffensive was a homeopathic remedy, on the

principle of "like curing like:" an enveloping movement against being

enveloped themselves at Przemysl; but the case was hopeless. Yet they

met with some successes of a temporary nature. Between the Vistula and

the San they captured some towns and villages; they also got very

close to Radava, north of Jaroslav, and forced the Austro-German

troops to fall back on to the left bank of the river on a

considerable line of front north of Sieniava, where they captured many

prisoners and guns.

The counteroffensive reached its zenith on May 27, 1915, when

Irmanow's Caucasian Corps stormed Sieniava and captured something like

7,000 men, six big guns, and six pieces of field artillery. Von

Mackensen resumed the offensive on May 24, by advancing due east of

Jaroslav, capturing Drohojow, Ostrov, Vysocko, Makovisko and Vietlin

all in one day. Radymno was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians under

General Arz von Straussenburg, still further narrowing the circle and

compelling the Russians to fall beyond the San. On the twenty-fifth

the Austrians followed them over, captured the bridgehead of Zagrody,

the village of Nienovice and the Heights of Horodysko, while Von

Mackensen's troops farther north captured Height 241. South of the

village of Naklo, between Przemysl and Mosciska, a hill 650 feet high

was violently attacked; it commanded the only line of retreat from the

fortress still left open. To the south of the town the Russian

counteroffensive tried to outflank the Austrian troops which had

approached close to the fortress and the railroad to Lemberg. With the

assistance of strong reenforcements the Russians were able to check

the advance here and make 2,200 prisoners, besides capturing

ammunitions and machine guns.

CHAPTER XLVI

RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

The counteroffensive ended--of necessity--on May 24, 1915. The

Russians could still offer an effective resistance between Krukienice

and Mosciska, but the pressure of continuous attack against their

positions around Hussakow grew fiercer every hour. The enemy was

knocking at the outer ring of the forts; from the west the heaviest

cannons were pouring shot and shell with such violence that the fall

of Przemysl could no longer be prevented. Most of the troops had

already been withdrawn, as well as the supplies and munitions; only a

small garrison remained behind to man the guns of the forts to the

last moment; the little avenue to safety on the east was still open.

On May 30, 1915, the Austrian batteries began their deadly work on the

Grodek line near Medyka. The exit was under fire; since May 17,

Przemysl had been invested from three sides, and the fourth was all

but closed. From the northern side, guarded by the Bavarians under

General Kneusel, twenty-one centimeter Krupp howitzers bombarded the

Russian positions round Korienice and Mackovice, drawing ever nearer

the forts commanding the road and railway to Radymno. The Tenth

Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, approaching from Krasiczyn, endeavored to

rush some of the outer works, but paid heavily for the venture. They

settled down before the forts of Pralkovice, Lipnik, Helicha and

Grochovce, and those round Tatarovka mountain. General Artamoff, the

Russian commander of Przemysl, had laboriously reconstructed some of

the old Austrian forts and equipped them with Russian 12-centimeter

howitzers. As the Austrians had brought only their 15-centimeter

howitzers, they were obliged to wait until their 30.5 batteries

arrived before they could undertake any serious attack.

These batteries came on the scene about May 25, 1915, it took five

days' preparation, and the final bombardment began on the 30th. It was

an ironical circumstance that the Austrians and Germans were in

numerous places sheltering themselves behind the very earthworks which

the Russians had constructed when they were besieging the place two

months earlier. There had been no time to destroy them on the retreat.

The northern sector of the outer ring of forts fell on May 30, 1915,

when the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near Orzechovce. A

terrific bombardment was directed against the entire northern and

northwestern front; great columns of infantry were pushed forward to

finish the cannons' work--still the Russians hung on, ever bent on

doing all possible damage to the enemy.

[Illustration: The triumphal entry of the Austrian uhlans and

artillery into Przemysl. Their horses are decorated with sprays of

leaves]

During the night of May 30-31, 1915, the enemy succeeded in

approaching within 200 paces, and at some points even in gaining a

footing in the precincts of Fort No. 7, around which raged an

obstinate battle that lasted until two in the afternoon of the 31st,

when he was repulsed after suffering enormous losses. The remnants of

the enemy who had entered Fort No. 7, numbering 23 officers and 600

men, were taken prisoners.

Since the 20th of May, 1915, the clearing of the road had been going

on; Von Mackensen battering the western forts and the river line as

far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli struggling to force the southern

corner to get within range of the Lemberg railway. On his right, Von

Marwitz had become stuck in the marshes of the Dniester between

Droholycz and Komarno. The Bavarians on the north again let fly their

big guns against the forts round Dunkoviczki on May 31, 1915. At four

in the afternoon they ceased fire; the forts and defenses were

crumpled up into a shapeless mass of wreckage. Now Prussian, Bavarian

and Austrian regiments rushed forward to storm what was left. They

still found some Russians there, severely mauled by the bombardment;

but they could no longer present a front. They retreated behind the

ring. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps now made another attempt

on Pralkovice and Lipnik. Von Mackensen's men captured two trenches

near Fort No. 11--"they had to pay a heavy price in blood for every

yard of their advance." Heavy batteries are also spitting fire against

Forts Nos. 10 and 12. When the curtain of night fell over the scene of

carnage and destruction, two breaches had been made in the outer ring

of the forts.

June 2, 1915, dawned--a bright, warm summer's day; the sun rose and

smiled as impassively over the Galician mountains, and valleys, and

plains as it had smiled through countless ages before the genius of

man had invented even the division of time. From all sides of the

doomed fortress eager, determined men were advancing; Fort No. 10 was

captured at noon by the Twenty-second Bavarian Infantry Regiment;

later in the day the Prussian Grenadier Guards took possession of Fort

No. 12; during the night the besieger's troops marched into the

village of Zuravica, within the outer ring. Austrian troops had broken

through from the southwest and also penetrated the inner circle.

June 3, 1915, dawned and again the sun smiles over Galicia and sees

the same iron belt of machinelike men still nearer the fortress; but

the haggard defenders, where are they? Gone! Flown! They have vanished

during the night. Austrians and Bavarians march into the town early in

the morning. The only enemies they meet are the dead.

Przemysl has fallen again--fallen before twenty times as powerful a

blow as that which struck it down seventy-two days earlier.

Before proceeding with the progress of Von Mackensen and his mighty

"phalanx," let us briefly trace the progress of Von Linsingen, whom we

left on the road to Stryj and the Dniester, or rather, attempting to

force that road. While the forts of Przemysl were being smashed in the

north, Von Linsingen was pounding and demolishing the Russian

positions between Uliczna and Bolechov. Heavy mortars and howitzers

were at the same time being placed into position in front of the

Russian trenches between Holobutow and Stryj.

On May 31, 1915, they began to roar, and before long the trenches were

completely pulverized--the very trenches that thousands of Germans and

Austrians had died in in vain attempts to carry by assault. The

Thirty-eighth Hungarian Honved Division were sent to finish the work

of clearance and take possession of Stryj. The entire Russian line

withdrew to the Dniester, step by step, ever fighting their favorite

rear guard actions, killing and capturing thousands of their enemies.

They retired behind the Dniester, but maintained their hold on any

useful strategical position south of the river, so far as was possible

without imperiling the continuity of their line.

We must also consider two more Austro-German sectors in order to bring

the combatants stationed there into line with the Germanic

advance--the Uzsok Pass and the Bukowina-_cum_-Eastern Galicia

sectors. In the former the army of Von Szurmay stood beside that of

Von Linsingen opposite the Ninth Russian Army. Von Szurmay led his

men out of the pass and advanced northward on May 12, after the fall

of Sanok had forced the Russians away from their positions in the

vicinity of it. Their line of retreat was threatened by the Austrian

approach to Sambor.

On May 16, 1915, Von Szurmay moved across the upper Stryj near Turka

and passed along secondary roads in the direction of the oil districts

of Schodnica, Drohobycz and Boryslav, arriving on May 16-17, 1915. Von

Linsingen's troops had started their advance on the same day as those

of Von Szurmay, when the Russians round Koziowa had to retire for the

purpose of keeping in touch with their line: the same pressure that

Sambor exerted on the Uzsok. Here again the Russians adopted

rear-guard tactics and considerable fighting occurred during their

retreat to Stryj and Bolechow, both of which were eventually captured

by Von Linsingen.

In Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina matters had come almost to a

standstill between Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin about the middle

of May, 1915. When the former had cut the latter's connection with the

main line, the brigade of General von Blum and other adjoining German

troops on the extreme right of Von Linsingen tried hard to relieve the

pressure of Lechitsky on the Austrian forces. Not till after the fall

of Przemysl was the connection restored, when the Russians had to fall

back from Kalusz and Nadvorna; on June 9 they evacuated Obertzn,

Horodenka, Kocman and Sniatyn. Lechitsky was also compelled to

withdraw from the Bukowina between Zaleszczyki, Onut, and Czernowitz,

where the Austrians were moving along the Dniester in the north, the

Pruth in the south, and over the hills in the center against the

village of Szubraniec. Here the Russians once more inflicted severe

losses on the Austrians, but being in danger from a flanking movement

by the Forty-second Croatian Infantry through the Dniester forests,

they retired from the Bukowina on to Russian territory on June 12,

1915.

CHAPTER XLVII

CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

The capture of Przemysl and of Stryj terminates the second stage of

the Austro-German offensive in Galicia. The third stage may be

described as the battle for Lemberg, or Lwow. Lemberg is the ancient

capital of Galicia, and formerly bore the name of Lwow. The Austrians

many years ago had changed it to "Lemberg." When the Russians captured

the town on September 3, 1914, they had given it back the old Slavonic

name, which, however, was destined soon to be transformed back again

into the more pronounceable appellation of "Lemberg."

It is estimated that between April 28, 1915, and the recapture of

Przemysl the Russian forces in Galicia had been diminished by at least

a quarter of a million casualties. The heaviest losses occurred among

Dmitrieffs troops in the first days of May, 1915, but in the battles

on the San, at the close of the month, the forces of Von Mackensen's

"phalanx" were also greatly reduced. Along the entire Galician front,

it is computed that quite 600,000 Austro-German troops were put out of

action.

While the fight for Przemysl was in full swing an important event of

the war occurred--Italy joined the enemies of Austria on May 3, 1915;

the Dual Monarchy had now to defend her western frontier as well.

Dankl and Von Bojna were transferred to the Italian front with a

considerable portion of their Galician troops. A general

redistribution of units was effected among the Austrian and German

armies. The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was held along the

lower San as far as Sieniava. Von Mackensen was advancing east of

Jaroslav along the railway toward Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was

fighting on the road to Lemberg from Mosciska. An army under Count

Bothmer was operating near the Dniester marshes, beyond which, farther

south, a group of armies under Von Linsingen (mainly German) had

forced the passage of the Dniester at Zuravno, and was trying to

advance on Lemberg and catch Ivanoff's main forces on the flank. This

last movement, if successful, would be the most effective method of

crushing the retreating Russian armies: being thus outflanked, some of

their lines of retreat would be cut and a dissolution of a large

portion of the retiring forces could hardly have been avoided.

However, all attempts in this direction failed. The Russians gradually

rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east, keeping step

with the retreat of the armies which were facing west. With strong

reenforcements from Kiev and Odessa Brussilov commanded the Dniester

front under the direction of General Ivanoff. If only the ponderous

advance of Von Mackensen could have been arrested, Brussilov would

have had little difficulty in sweeping Von Linsingen back to the

Carpathian barrier. A somewhat similar condition existed in the north,

where the Austrians were at the mercy of Ivanoff's strong right wing.

The archduke's front was smashed at Rudnik early in June, 1915; his

forces were driven back a day's march and lost 4,000 men in prisoners,

besides many guns. The Second, Third and Fourth Tyrolese regiments

were almost annihilated. German troops were hurried to the rescue.

Boehm-Ermolli also got into serious difficulties at Mosciska, where

the Russians held him up for a week with a furious battle. Ivanoff was

scoring points against all his individual opponents excepting only Von

Mackensen. The "phalanx," always kept up to full strength by a

continuous influx of reserves and provided with millions of

high-explosive shells, not only pursued its irresistible course

eastward, but had to turn now right, now left, to help Austrian and

German commanders out of trouble. Heavy howitzers lumbered along the

way to Rawa-Ruska--not to Lemberg, but to the north of it, on the

flank of the Russian army still holding the Lower San. This army had

therefore to retire northward to the river line of the Tanev stream,

cautiously followed by the archduke's forces. The "phalanx" had again

saved them from disaster. Similarly, at Mosciska, when Boehm-Ermolli

tried to storm the Russian position by mass attacks, his infantry was

driven back with such terrible punishment that they could not be

induced to make another advance. There was nothing to be done here,

but wait till Von Mackensen turned the flank of the Russian position

for them, which he did in one of the most stubborn conflicts of the

war--the battle of the Lubaczovka, a tributary of the San between

Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg. Never were the fighting abilities of Slav and

Teuton more severely tested. For over a week the struggle raged; a

half million men were brought up in groups and flung against the

Russian front. Shell, shrapnel, bullets and asphyxiating bombs finally

wore down the Russian resistance.

Incapacitated by physical exhaustion and outnumbered by three to one,

the Russian infantry gave way on June 13, 1915. The "phalanx" drove

into their ranks and advanced rapidly in a northerly direction on its

great flanking movement. But the Russian spirit was not broken, for at

this critical moment General Polodchenko rode out with three regiments

of cavalry--the Don Cossacks, the Chernigov Hussars, and the Kimburn

Dragoons. They dashed into the unbroken lines of the triumphant German

infantry like a living hurricane, sabered the enemy, and put thousands

on the run. Swerving aside, they next charged deep into the German

rear, mauled the reserves into confusion, hacked their way out again

and captured several machine guns. The most remarkable feature about

this extraordinary exploit was the fact that the losses sustained by

the cavalry amounted only to 200 killed and wounded. The effect on the

"phalanx," however, was such that no more attacks were made that day,

and the Russians were able to retire to the hills near Rawa-Ruska.

Ivanoff was now compelled to draw reenforcements from other parts of

the line to strengthen his front at Rawa-Ruska. This meant weakening

Ewarts's against the archduke and Brussilov against Boehm-Ermolli. The

downfall of the Dunajec-Biala front had been attributed by the Russian

War Staff to overconfidence or neglect on the part of General

Dmitrieff, who was subsequently relieved of his command and replaced

by General Lesch. At an official inquiry Dmitrieff was exonerated and

reinstated on the reasonable ground that, whatever precautions of

defense he might have taken, they would have proved ineffective

against the preponderance of the German artillery.

After the battle of Lubaczow the Russian line drew back about twenty

miles. For the defense of Lemberg the front ran in a concave form from

along the River Tanev, five miles from Rawa-Ruska, down to Grodek and

Kolodruby; then eastward behind the Dniester to Zuravno and Halicz.

The marshes of the Dniester, then swollen by heavy rains, formed a

good natural defense; the intrenchments on the hills north of Grodek

to Rawa-Ruska protected the approaches to Lemberg from that direction.

The weakest spot lay around Janov, fifteen miles north of Grodek,

where the level ground would permit the easy transport of heavy

artillery. This position had been fortified with trenches and wire

entanglements. Here also were concentrated the troops withdrawn from

other parts of the line, and four armored trains with quick-firing

guns from the depot at Rovno. General Ivanoff had no intention of

making any decisive stand against the "phalanx"; neither did he think

of risking his armies in a battle for Lemberg. That town was certainly

of great military and political importance--worth a dozen

Przemysls--and worth fighting for. But for that he would need

artillery in enormous quantity. Von Mackensen carried 2,500 guns with

him, as well as siege trains of heavy howitzers. Ivanoff possessed

none of these, and could therefore hope only to fight rear-guard

actions while retiring before Von Mackensen. In any other part of the

Galician line except the center he had little to fear. We left Von

Linsingen forcing the Dniester at Zuravno. He got the bulk of his army

across, the main advance commanded by Von Bothmer, who captured the

northern heights and penetrated the forests near the Stryj-Tarnopol

railway. They were less than fifty miles from Lemberg.

The "retreating" Brussilov suddenly turned round and fell on Von

Bothmer's advance. The fight lasted three days, with the result that

the Austro-Germans were obliged to fall back across the Dniester,

leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, besides 17 guns, 78 machine

guns, 348 officers and 15,430 men as prisoners, June 8-10, 1915.

On June 11, 1915, however, the Germans renewed the attack on Zuravno,

recaptured the town, and on June 12 were five miles north of it. By

June 13 they had made ten miles, when Brussilov lashed out again.

Within two days the Germans were back on the Dniester. Von Mackensen

had meanwhile concentrated a new series of heavy batteries around

Jaroslav and formed a new "phalanx" (with reenforcements) west of the

San between Piskorovice and Radymno. Another attempt was preparing to

break through Ivanoff's right wing.

A violent bombardment began on June 12, 1915, and Austro-Hungarian

troops crossed the river and occupied both Sieniava and Piskorovice.

Next day the advance spread along the whole line, extending from

Tarnoviec on the Zlota to the Radymno-Javorov road, pressing north and

eastward against the Russian front. Pivoting on Sieniava, Von

Mackensen swung his right toward Mosciska, which Von Marwitz captured

on June 14, 1915. The same night the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's

entire army was slowly wheeling from the San toward the Tanev, facing

due north.

On June 16, 1915, the left of this line was already inside the borders

of Russian Poland, and its right wing along the entire Tanev front. By

June 16 numerous towns and villages were taken by the Germans. The

Wolff Telegraphic Bureau announced that Von Mackensen's army had

captured 40,000 men and 69 machine guns, which undoubtedly referred to

all the Galician groups, for on June 12, 1915, Von Mackensen had

"replaced" the Archduke Frederick as generalissimo of the

Austro-Hungarian armies. The "phalanx" was pressing against

Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, and Janov; Boehm-Ermolli against Grodek, part of

which he captured by a midnight assault on June 16. In five weeks the

Russian line or front in Galicia had shrunk from 300 miles to about

100. Before Dunajec, when it was united with the northern groups, it

had represented the longest battle line in the history of the world.

The Russians began to evacuate Lemberg about June 17, 1915, the day

Von Mackensen's right entered Javorov. On the 19th his advance guard

was approaching Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was meanwhile undergoing

severe punishment near Komarno, where an Austrian advance force

endeavored to get through the Grodek Lakes. The Russian artillery

drove them back; for three days there were furious bayonet and cavalry

charges and counter-charges; despite the most terrific bombardments

the Austrian attacks were broken by the desperate Russians. On this

occasion, at least, the Russians were well supplied with shells

hurriedly sent by rail from Kiev, which enabled them to repulse the

Austrians on the lakes. Boehm-Ermolli is said to have lost half of his

effectives in his attempt to penetrate through Grodek and Dornfeld,

fifteen miles south of Lemberg.

Von Mackensen again came to the rescue by making a great turning

movement in the district of Zolkiev, about sixteen miles north of

Lemberg, and attacking the Russian positions about Janov, forcing the

Russians over the hills and the Rawa-Ruska railway to Zolkiev. His

left wing, resting on Lubaczov, swung northward in a wheeling movement

to envelop Rawa-Ruska. But the Russians intercepted the move;

ferocious encounters and Cossack charges threw the Germans back to

their pivot with heavy losses on both sides. Von Mackensen's center,

however, was too strong, and Ivanoff desired no pitched battle--the

only way to check its advance. He therefore fell back between

Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg, yielding the former to Von Mackensen and the

latter to Boehm-Ermolli, who was able to lead his battered troops into

the town on June 22, 1915, without further resistance. Brussilov now

had to withdraw from the Dniester. As at Przemysl, the Russian

garrison departed with all stores and baggage before the victors

arrived. Lemberg had been in Russian possession for 293 days.

A German attack near Rawa-Ruska was repulsed by the Russians on June

25, 1915. For two days the "phalanx" rested to replenish its stock of

shells; when these had arrived along the Przemysl line, Von Mackensen

turned northward in the direction of Kholm on the Lublin-Brest-Litovsk

railway. On his left marched the Austro-Hungarian army of the Archduke

Joseph Ferdinand. These two armies drop out of the Galician campaign

at this stage and become part of the great German offensive against

the Polish salient. The gigantic enveloping movement had failed in the

south; it was now to be attempted against the Russian line in front

of Warsaw, conducted by Von Hindenburg and Von Gallwitz in the

northern sector, and by Von Mackensen, assisted by General Woyrsch and

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the southern. These operations are

described in the pages following.

More than three-fourths of Galicia had now been reconquered, and it

was left to the Austrians and the Germans to complete the conquest.

The campaign was one of the greatest operations of the war. An English

military writer thus describes the achievement: "Only a most

magnificent army organization and a most careful preparation,

extending to infinite detail, could execute a plan of such magnitude

at the speed at which it was done by the Austrian and German armies in

May, 1915."

Not yet, however, were the Russian armies destroyed; to the German War

Staff it was not now a question of taking or retaking territory, but

of striking a final and decisive blow at the vitals of Russia. The

continuous series of reverses suffered by Boehm-Ermolli and Von

Linsingen exerted an important effect on the end of the Galician

campaign: it frustrated the plan of eliminating the Russian forces.

The battle lines in France and Flanders could wait a while till the

Russian power was annihilated.

After the fall of Lemberg, Ivanoff withdrew the main body of his

troops toward the river line of the Bug, Boehm-Ermolli following up

behind. Again that unfortunate general was roughly handled--another of

his divisions was annihilated southeast of Lemberg in a rear-guard

action. Von Linsingen directed his efforts against the Gnila Lipa and

Halicz, while Von Pflanzer-Baltin still operated on the Dniester. For

many months the Russians and Austrians faced each other in eastern

Galicia; they were still skirmishing at the end of the year. Both

Russia and Austria had more important matters on hand elsewhere: the

former against Germany in the north, and the latter with her new

enemy--Italy. Galicia became a side issue.

The Galician campaign will rank as one of the most instructive

episodes in military history, an example of unparalleled calculation,

scientific strategy, and admirable heroism, involving, it is computed,

the terrible sacrifice of at least a million human lives.

PART VII--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XLVIII

WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

The battle known in the German official accounts as the "Winter Battle

in Mazurian Land" is sometimes described as the "Nine Days' Battle."

In this sense it is to be considered as beginning on the 7th of

February, 1915, and ending on the 16th, when the German Great

Headquarters reported that the Tenth Russian Army, consisting of at

least eleven infantry and several cavalry divisions, had been driven

out of its strongly fortified positions to the east of the Mazurian

Lake district, forced across the border, and, having been almost

completely surrounded, had been crushingly defeated. In fact, however,

fighting continued as part of the same action until the 21st of

February, 1915, when the pursuit of the defeated army ended.

The forces engaged in this titanic conflict were the Russian Tenth Army,

consisting, according to the Russian version, of four corps, under

General Baron Sievers, and the German East Prussian armies, under

General von Eichhorn, operating on the north on the line

Insterburg-Loetzen, and General von Buelow on the line Loetzen-Johannisburg

to the south of Von Eichhorn. Sources favorable to the Allies represent

the strength of General Sievers's army as 120,000 men. They assert that

the total German force consisted of nine corps, over 300,000 men. These

are said to have included the Twenty-first Corps, which had been with

the Crown Prince of Bavaria in the west; three reserve corps, also from

the west; the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth Corps, new formations, from

the interior of Germany; the equivalent of three corps from other

sections of the eastern front; and a reserve corps of the Guard. The

German official description of the battle credits the Russians with

having had in this sector of the battle front in East Prussia at the

beginning of February six to eight army corps, or about 200,000 men.

For months the heavy fighting in the east had centered on other

sections of the immense battle line, running from the Baltic to the

Carpathians. The second general Russian offensive, the great forward

thrust of the Grand Duke Nicholas toward Cracow in the direction of

Berlin, aimed through the center of the German defense, had been met,

and the German counterthrust toward Warsaw had come to a standstill in

the mud of Poland and before the stone-wall defensive of the Russians

on the Bsura and the Rawka. Attacks launched by the Russians against

the East Prussian frontier, centering at Lyck, in January, 1915,

seemed to forebode a fresh Russian offensive intended to sweep back

the German armies in this section whose position on the Russian right

wing was a continual threat to the communications of the Russian

commander in chief.

The Germans, disposing of comparatively weak forces, estimated at

three army corps, were compelled to yield a strip of East Prussian

territory, and had fallen back to positions of considerable natural

strength formed by the chain of Mazurian Lakes and the line of the

Angerapp River. They reported their forces standing on the defensive

here as 50 per cent Landwehr, 25 per cent Landsturm, and only 25 per

cent other troops not of the reserve. Repeated attempts of the

Russians to gain possession of these fortified positions had, however,

broken down. They had been directed especially against the bridgehead

of Darkehmen and the right wing of the German forces in the Paprodtk

Hills. Wading up to their shoulders in icy water, the hardy troops of

the Third Siberian Corps had attempted in vain to cross the Nietlitz

Swamp, between the lakes to the east of Lyck.

At the beginning of February, 1915, finally Von Hindenburg had been

able to obtain fresh German forces and to put them in position for an

encircling movement against the Russians lying just to the east of the

lakes, from near Tilsit to Johannisburg. With the greatest secrecy the

reenforcements, hidden from observation by their fortified positions,

and the border forces maintaining the defense, were gathered behind

the two German wings. The Russians apparently gained an inkling of the

big move that was impending about the time the advance against their

wings was under way. The first news of the opening of the battle came

to the public in a Russian official announcement of the 9th of

February, 1915, to the effect that on the 7th the Germans had

undertaken the offensive with considerable force in the

Goldap-Johannisburg sector. The northern group of Germans began its

movement somewhat later from the direction of Tilsit.

Extensive preparations had been made by the German leaders to meet the

difficulties of a winter campaign under unfavorable weather

conditions. Thousands of sleighs and hundreds of thousands of sleigh

runners (on which to drag cannon and wagons), held in readiness, were

a part of these preparations for a rapid advance. Deep snow covered

the plain, and the lakes were thickly covered with ice. On the 5th of

February, 1915, a fresh snowstorm set in, accompanied by an icy wind,

which heaped the snow in deep drifts and made tremendously difficult

travel on the roads and railways, completely shutting off motor

traffic.

The Germans on the south, in order to come into contact with the main

Russian forces, had to cross the Johannisburg Forest and the Pisseck

River, which flows out of the southernmost of the chain of lakes. The

attacking columns made their way through the snow-clad forests with

all possible speed, forcing their way through barriers of felled trees

and driving the Russians from the river crossings.

Throughout the 8th of February, 1915, the marching columns moved

through whirling snow clouds, the Germans driving their men forward

relentlessly, so that, in spite of the drifted snow which filled the

roads, certain troops covered on this day a distance of forty

kilometers. The Germans under General von Falck took Snopken by

storm; those under General von Litzmann crossed the Pisseck near

Wrobeln. The immediate objectives of these columns were Johannisburg

and Biala, where strong Russian forces were posted.

On the 9th the southern column, under Von Litzmann, was attacked on

its right flank by Russians coming from Kolna, to the south of them.

The German troops repelled the attack, taking 2,500 prisoners, eight

cannon, and twelve machine guns. General Saleck took Johannisburg, and

Biala was cleared of the Russians. The advance of these southern

columns continued rapidly toward Lyck.

The German left wing at the same time fell overwhelmingly on the

northern end of the Russian line. On the 9th they took the fortified

Russian positions stretching from Spullen to the Schorell Forest and

nearly to the Russian border. They had here hard work to force their

way through wire entanglements of great strength. Having noticed signs

of a retreat on the part of their opponents, these German forces had

on the preceding day begun the attack without waiting for the whole of

their artillery to come up. The Russians retreated toward the

southeast.

Swinging forward toward the Russian border, the German left wing now

exerted itself to the utmost to execute the sweeping encircling movement

for which the strategy of Von Hindenburg had become famous. The Russian

right wing had been turned and was being pressed continually toward the

southeast. The German troops rushed forward in forced marches, ignoring

the difficulties which nature put in their way. By the 10th of February

these columns reached the Pillkallen-Wladislawow line, and by the 11th

the main highway from Gumbinnen to Wilkowyszki. The right wing, up to

the capture of Stallupoehnen, had taken some 4,000 prisoners, four

machine guns, and eleven ammunition wagons. The center of this army, at

the capture of Eydtkuhnen, Wirballen, and Kibarty, took 10,000

prisoners, six cannon, eight machine guns, numerous baggage wagons,

including eighty field kitchens, three military trains and other rolling

stock, a large number of gift packages intended for the Russian troops,

and, of chief interest to the fighting men, a whole day's provisions.

On the afternoon of February 10 some one and a half Russian divisions

had come to a halt in these three neighboring villages: Eydtkuhnen,

Kibarty, and Wirballen. Although it was known that the Germans were

approaching, it was apparently regarded by the Russians as impossible

that pursuers would be able to come up with them in the raging

snowstorm. So certain were they of their security that no outposts

were put on guard. Only thus could it happen that the Germans, who had

not allowed the forces of nature to stop their advance, arrived right

at the Russian position on the same day, though with infantry alone

and merely a few guns, everything else having been left behind, stuck

in the snowdrifts.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE RUSSIANS OUT OF GERMANY

It was evening when the Germans made their surprise attack on

Eydtkuhnen and midnight when they fell upon Wirballen. On the roadway

stood two Russian batteries with twelve guns and a considerable number

of ammunition wagons. The German infantry approached without firing a

shot until they were within fifty yards. Then all the horses were shot

down and the guns and ammunition seized. The men of the battery fled.

In both these towns there was street fighting in the night, lit up by

burning houses which had been fired by the Russians in their retreat.

One of the captured trains was the hospital train of the czar. This

was utilized as headquarters for the night by the staff of General von

Lauenstein.

By the 12th of February, 1915, the German troops of the left wing,

sweeping down from the north and pressing the Russians back from

village to village, were entirely on Russian soil. Wizwiny, Kalwarja,

and Mariampol were occupied on this day. The number of guns taken by

these troops had been increased by seventeen, according to German

reports. The German Headquarters Staff declared that by this time the

Russian Seventy-third and Fifty-sixth Divisions had been as good as

annihilated, and the Twenty-seventh division nearly destroyed. The

Russians lying before the Angerapp line and the defenses of Loetzen had

in the meantime also begun to retreat toward the east. German troops,

consisting chiefly of reserves of the Landwehr and Landsturm which up

to this time had been held back within the German fortified line, now

advanced to attack the yielding army, whose long marching column could

be observed by the German flyers. While General von Eichhorn's troops,

coming from the neighborhood of Tilsit and making their way through

snow and ice, were advancing upon Suwalki and Sejny, and the German

right wing was fighting its way through Grajewo, toward Augustowo, the

center of the troops of General von Buelow for several days fought the

Russians in furious battle in the vicinity of Lyck. From all sides the

Germans were closing in. To protect the withdrawal of this main army

to Suwalki and Augustowo, the Russians endeavored by all means to hold

the narrows of the lakes before Lyck, where they were favored by the

nature of the ground and aided by strong defensive works, for the most

part well provided with wire entanglements. The best of the Russian

troops, Siberian regiments, here fought with great energy under a

determined leadership, and the Russians, in fact, at some places took

the offensive. By the 12th of February, 1915, however, the Germans had

taken these positions and the Russians had withdrawn to the narrow

passages among the lakes before Lyck. The battles around this town

were carried on under the eye of the German Emperor. The German

soldiers were still occupied in hunting through the houses for

scattered Russians as the emperor stepped from his motor car. He was

received with hurrahs, and the soldiers surrounded him, singing

"Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles." The emperor, standing amid the

blackened ruins of burned homes, delivered a short address to the

soldiers gathered about him, giving special recognition to Infantry

Regiment No. 33, an East Prussian unit which had especially

distinguished itself and suffered great losses. On the same day the

Germans advanced beyond Lyck, and by the 15th of February no Russian

remained on German soil.

CHAPTER L

TIGHTENING OF THE NET--REPORT OF THE BOOTY

The Russian right, retiring to avoid envelopment, sought the natural

line of retreat along the railway to Kovno. In executing this movement

it turned toward the northeast, and exceeding in speed of movement the

corps to the south of it, the Twentieth, under the command of General

Bulgakov, the latter was left out of the line. In consequence its

right wing was turned and it was pressed down toward the south with

the enemy on three sides of it. It speedily became a broken force in

the forest north of Suwalki. The Russians endeavored to reach the

protection of their great fortress of Grodno. It was the task of the

German division coming down from the north in forced marches to cut

off this way of escape and prevent the Russians coming out of the

forest toward the southeast.

The march of these German troops carried them through great woodlands,

amid frozen lakes, when suddenly a thaw set in. The sleighs which had

been used had to be abandoned and wagons requisitioned on the spot

wherever possible.

An officer with these troops relates that infantrymen were sent

forward on wagons, and on the night following the 15th of February

took Sopozkin, to the east of Augustowo, on the line of the Russian

retreat, capturing the baggage of an entire Russian army corps. "The

morning," he writes, "presented to us a unique picture. Hundreds of

vehicles, baggage carts, machine guns, ammunition, provision and

ambulance wagons stood in a vast disorder in the market place of the

town and in the street. In between were hundreds of horses, some

harnessed, some loose, dead Russians, dead horses, bellowing cattle,

and sounding over it all the words of command of our troops

endeavoring to create order in this mad mix-up, and to take care of

the rich booty. Many an interesting find did we make--'mementos' which

the Russians had taken with them from Prussia and which now were to

find their way back."

A German commander tells how, in their efforts to cut off the Russian

retreat, the artillery were compelled to cross many brooks running

through deep gullies, so that it was necessary frequently to lower

guns and wagons by means of ropes on one side and pull them up on the

other.

One of the German leaders, describing this encircling movement to the

southeast from the north in which he played a part, says: "The roads

and the weather were beyond all description--twelve to fifteen degrees

Reaumur, with a cutting wind and driving snow, with nothing to eat, as

the field kitchens on these roads could not follow. During pauses in

the march one could but lean against the wall of a miserable house or

lie down in the burned-out ruins, without straw to lie on and no

covering. Men and horses sank to their hips in the snow, and so we

worked our way forward, usually only about two kilometers an hour.

Wagons and horses that upset had to be shoveled out of the drifts. It

was a terrible sight, but we got through. We had to go on without

regard for anything, and the example of the higher officers did much."

Two Russian corps from the southern wing of the army retreating by the

Suwalki-Sejny causeway and by the Ossowetz Railway, according to

accounts from Russian sources, made their way out of the trap under

heavy rear-guard fighting.

The escaped portions of the Russian army crossed the Bobr toward

Grodno. From the direction of this Russian stronghold a desperate

effort was made to relieve the four corps which were endeavoring to

escape toward the fortress from the forest southeast of Augustowo into

which they had been pressed by the Germans from the west and north. On

the 21st of February came the final act in the great drama. The German

troops pushed forward at their best speed from all directions toward

the forest. The help that had been intended for them came too late.

Concerning the captures of this day, the German Great Headquarters

reported: "On the 21st of February the remnants of the Tenth Army laid

down their arms in the forest of Augustowo after all attempts of the

Russian commander of this army, General Sievers, to cut a way out for

the encircled four divisions by means of those parts of his army which

remained to him after escaping over the Bobr to Grodno failed with

extremely heavy losses."

Summarizing the results of the entire battle in an announcement of the

22d of February, the German Great Headquarters said: "The pursuit

after the winter battle in Mazurian Land is ended. In cleaning up the

forests to the northwest of Grodno, and in the battles reported during

the last few days in the region of the Bobr and the Narew, there have

been captured to date one commanding general, two division commanders,

four other generals, and in the neighborhood of 40,000 men,

seventy-five cannon, a quantity of machine guns, whose number is not

yet determined, and much other war material.

"The total booty of the winter battle in Mazurian Land, therefore, up

to to-day rises to seven generals, more than 100,000 men, more than

150 cannon, and material of all sorts, inclusive of machine guns,

which cannot yet be approximately estimated. Heavy guns and ammunition

were in many cases buried by the enemy or sunk in the lakes; thus

eight heavy guns were yesterday dug out or hauled out of the water

near Loetzen and Lake Widmin.

"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may, therefore, now

be considered as completely annihilated."

This summary was corrected in a later announcement, which stated that

the number of guns taken as booty in the pursuit after the winter

battle in Mazurian Land had risen to 300, including eighteen heavy

guns. This was published on the 23d of February. In an announcement of

the 26th of February the Great Headquarters amplified its account of

the victory with this statement:

"In the Russian official report the extent of the disaster in the

winter battle of Mazurian Land is either concealed or an attempt is

made to obscure it. It is unnecessary to go further into these

denials. As evidence of the extent of the defeat, the following list

of the positions held by the captured generals, however, may serve:

"Of the Twentieth Army Corps: the commanding general, the commander of

the artillery, the commander of the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth

Infantry Divisions, and of the First Brigade of Infantry of the

Twenty-ninth Infantry Division. The commander of this latter division

succumbed to his wounds soon after being made prisoner.

"Of the Third Army Corps: the commander of the Twenty-seventh Infantry

Division and the commander of the artillery and of the Second Infantry

Brigade of this division.

"Of the Fifty-third Reserve Division: the division commander and the

commander of the First Infantry Brigade.

"Of the First Siberian Cossack Division: a brigade commander."

This brought the total of Russian generals captured up to eleven.

This account of one of the greatest battles of the European War is

necessarily based to a large extent on reports of the Germans, owing

to the fact that material from this source is virtually the only

official account available of the operation as a whole. The Russian

General Staff has contented itself with the following announcement,

made public on February 21, 1915:

"When the Germans, after a series of extraordinary obstinate and

persistent attacks which caused them heavy losses, had recognized the

impossibility of pressing in our front on the left bank of the

Vistula, they turned at the end of January to the execution of a new

plan. After the creation of several new corps in the interior of the

country, and the bringing up of troops from their west front, the

Germans threw important forces into East Prussia. The transportation

of troops was made easier by the extraordinarily developed net of

railways which Germany has at its disposal.

"The task of the new troops sent to East Prussia was to defeat our

Tenth Army, which held strongly constructed positions along the

Angerapp. To assure the success of the undertaking the Germans brought

a portion of their forces from the Bzura and Rawka fronts to the right

bank of the Vistula. A movement of the Germans in East Prussia already

became noticeable on the 4th of February, 1915. But the extent of this

movement could only be recognized a few days later. As our leaders,

because of the lack of railroad lines, could not collect the necessary

forces on the East Prussian front with the necessary speed to meet the

hostile attack adequately, they decided to take back the

above-mentioned army of East Prussia to the border. In this movement

of the right wing the Tenth Army, which was pressed by heavy hostile

forces and threatened with being surrounded from the right, was forced

to make a rapid change of alignment in the direction of Kovno. In this

rapid movement a corps was separated from the rest of the army. The

other corps which continued the battle obstinately without

interruption, slowly drew back in the prescribed direction, bravely

repelling the enemy and inflicting upon him heavy losses. Our troops

overcame unbelievable difficulties, which were caused by the snow

which filled all roads. As the streets were impassable, automobiles

could not run. Trains were delayed and frequently failed to arrive at

their destination. Our corps which formed the left wing of the Tenth

Army held the enemy, while drawing back step for step for nine days on

a stretch of territory which ordinarily is covered in four days. On

the 19th of February these corps withdrawing by way of Augustowo left

the battle field and took the position assigned to them. Further

battles developed in the region before Ossowetz, on the roads from

Lomza to Jedwabno and to the north of Radislow, also halfway between

Plozk and Plonsk. These battles were in places very intense."

An English authority says: "The chief Russian loss was in General

Bulgakov's Twentieth Corps, which the German staff asserted they had

completely destroyed. But during the fortnight which ended on Saturday

the 20th, at least half of that corps and more than two-thirds of its

guns safely made their way through the Augustowo and Suwalki woods to

the position which had been prepared for the Russian defense. The

total Russian losses may have been 80 guns and 30,000 men; they were

no more. The two southern corps, in spite of their stubborn action at

Lyck, crossed the woods between Augustowo and Ossowetz without serious

disaster."

CHAPTER LI

BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ--BEFORE MLAWA

The shattering of the Tenth Russian Army in the "winter battle" of the

Mazurian Lakes was part of a greater conflict which in February, 1915,

extended far down the armies on the right flank of the great Russian

battle line which ran from the Baltic to the Dniester. A "new gigantic

plan" of the Slavs was involved. As interpreted by the German General

Staff it meant that while the extreme northern wing of the Russian

armies was to sweep westward through the projecting section of

Germany, East Prussia, along the Baltic another Russian army was to

advance in force from the south against the corner formed by West

Prussia and the Vistula. With vast masses of cavalry in the van, it

was to break through the boundary between Mlawa and Thorn, and pushing

northward, come into the rear of those German forces which were facing

eastward against the attack aimed at East Prussia from the northeast.

For operations in this section the Russians had favorable railway

connections. Two railways terminating at Ostrolenka permitted the

rapid unloading of large masses of troops at this point, and the line

Warsaw-Mlawa-Soldau led straight into the territory aimed at by such

an invasion. It seemed easily credible that the Russian commander in

chief did, as reported, give orders that Mlawa should be taken be the

cost what it might.

The northern Russian armies based upon the fortresses of Kovno and

Grodno on the Niemen had not fully started on their part of this great,

well-planned undertaking when the German counteroffensive was suddenly

launched with tremendous strength from the Tilsit-Insterburg-Mazurian

Lakes line. The disaster which followed, and which banished all hope of

an advance of the Russians on this wing, has been described on a

preceding page. While the Germans, using to the best advantage their net

of railroads for the swift accumulation of troops, had gathered large

forces on the Mazurian Lakes line, they had at the same time

strengthened the troops standing on the southern boundary of West and

East Prussia. An artillery officer, General von Gallwitz, was placed in

command of this army with orders to protect the right flank of the

German armies attacking in Mazurian Land, and to prevent the expected

Russian attempt at invasion in his own sector of the front.

While the "winter battle" was raging to the east of him, Von Gallwitz

in the characteristic German fashion of defense by a strong offensive

moved forward up the right bank of the Vistula to Plozk. A cavalry

division and regiments of the Guard at Sierpe and Racionz, February

12-18, 1915, won well-earned laurels for themselves by driving an

enemy of superior strength before them. At Dobrin, according to German

report, they took 2,500 prisoners.

General von Gallwitz's plan, however, was of more ambitious scope. It

was his intention, by encircling the Russians in the territory before

him from both wings, to sweep clear of enemies the entire stretch of

country in the Polish triangle between the Vistula and the Orczy

rivers. The right wing of his troops that had come down the bank of

the Vistula was to swing to the eastward in behind the Russians.

German troops which had arrived at Willenberg inside of the East

Prussian boundary, one of the German concentration points on the line

of railroad lying behind their front, on the other hand, received

orders to descend the valley of the Orczy and to come in behind the

Russian right flank from the east. These troops, making a wide detour,

swept past Przasnysz on the east, and swinging round to the south of

the city attacked the Russians holding the place from this direction.

The Germans had understood that only small Russian forces were in the

city. Anticipating the German movement, however, a Russian division,

as the Germans learned later, had hastened to Przasnysz. The Russians

also had collected large forces on the Narew, and were hurrying them

toward Przasnysz on roads covering a wide front. Two full Russian

corps from this line were flung upon the German left wing.

The forces of Von Gallwitz which had carried out the encircling

movement from the east and south of Przasnysz now found themselves

caught between two Russian armies. However, they were unwilling to

relinquish the booty which they had planned to seize. A part of the

German forces was disposed in a half circle as a defense against the

Russians coming up from the south, and a division of reserves,

February 24, stormed Przasnysz. The German Great Headquarters

announced that the Germans captured 10,000 prisoners, including 57

officers, and took 36 cannon, 14 machine guns, and much war material

of various sorts. However, the Russian troops were now pressing

forward from the south with irresistible force. The Germans, in

consequence, slowly fell back, fighting under great difficulties, and

moving northward toward their defensive lines, carrying with them

their prisoners and booty.

The Russian General Staff on the first of March, 1915, devoted an

explicit account to the fighting about Przasnysz which differs but

slightly from the narrative by the German Great Headquarters which has in

general been followed in the preceding description. Both sides apparently

considered the operation of special importance, and as reflecting credit

upon their respective troops. The Russian story emphasizes the attacks

made by their force on the line Lyssakowo-Chainovo simultaneously from

north and south, that is, both in the flank and in the rear of the

Germans to the west of Przasnysz. They represent their troops in the city

as having consisted of only a brigade of infantry and some insignificant

cavalry units. On the 25th of February, when the Germans had established

themselves in the town, the Russians, according to their account, were

pressing their enemies hard upon a long front from Krasnoseltz through

Vengerzinovo, Kolatschkowo to Voliaverlowska.

On the evening of this day they drove the Germans into positions close

to the city. The Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division on the same

evening is said to have met serious disaster after a determined

resistance at the crossings of the Anetz. On the evening of the next

day the Russians began to reenter Przasnysz, but did not completely

occupy the town until the night after the 27th. "The Germans," the

Russian account continues, "hereupon began a disorderly retreat,

endeavoring to withdraw in the direction of Mlawa-Chorgele. Regardless

of the exhaustion consequent upon the marching they had undergone and

four days of battle, our troops energetically took up the pursuit of

the enemy. On the 28th of February they inflicted serious losses upon

his rear guard. In these battles we seized a large amount of booty.

The total number of prisoners amounts to at least 10,000." The

Russians maintain that they had defeated no less than two German army

corps and thrown them back to the border.

On the 12th of March, 1915, the German Great Headquarters protested

against this version of the affair, and pointed to the fact that

within a few days their troops were again threatening Przasnysz, and

that since giving up the city they had captured on the battle fields

between the Vistula and the Orczy no less than 11,460 Russians.

The city of Przasnysz itself suffered heavily in these attacks and

counterattacks. For days and nights it had lain under bombardment and

repeatedly fierce, hand-to-hand combats had been fought in its

streets. Most of the houses of the place were left mere heaps of

smoking ruins.

From the German point of view this offensive just north of the Vistula

which included the temporary capture of Przasnysz was a success,

especially in this, that it had prevented the big Russian forward

movement against the West Prussian boundary which the impending great

Russian offensive had foreboded. It had been impossible for the

Russians seriously to endanger the German flank in this section, while

the Germans had struck to the east in the "winter battle," and had

definitely spoiled the Russian appetite for invasion from the

Kovno-Grodno line.

As though determined to avenge their defeat to the east of the lakes,

the Russians now continued to direct a series of fierce attacks in the

direction of Mlawa, intending apparently to break through the German

line of defense between Soldau and Neidenburg. It was said that the

Russians believed General von Hindenburg in person to be in charge of

the German forces in this sector. In consequence the German troops for

the most part were forced to stand upon the defensive. In the

beginning of March the Russian attacks increased steadily in violence.

They broke against the German positions to the east and south of

Mlawa, according to German reports, with enormous losses. At Demsk, to

the east of Mlawa, long rows of white stones mark common graves of

masses of Russians who perished before the German barbed-wire

entanglements. The Germans point to these as dumb witnesses of the

disaster that overtook forty-eight Russian companies that assaulted

ten German ones. The cold weather at this time had made possible the

swampy regions in which the Orczy rises, and had enabled the Russians

to approach close to the German line of defense.

The Russian attack at this point in the night of the 7th of March,

1915, was typical of the fighting on this line in these weeks. After a

thousand shells from the Russian heavy guns had descended upon and

behind Demsk, a seemingly ceaseless series of infantry attacks set in.

They were carried close up to the lines of wire of the German defense.

Enough light, however, was shed by the searchlights and light balls

shot from pistols to enable the Germans to direct a destructive

infantry and machine-gun fire on the approaching lines. Those of the

Russians who did not fall, fled to the next depression in the ground.

There they were held by the beams of the searchlights until daybreak.

Then they surrendered to the German patrols. Of another attack a few

kilometers farther to the north, at Kapusnik, the Germans reported

that after the enemy had penetrated into their trenches and had been

driven out in a desperate bayonet fight, they buried 906 Russians and

164 Germans.

On the 8th of March, 1915, General von Gallwitz again tried an

offensive with fresh forces which he had gathered. It was thwarted,

however, on the 12th, to the north of Przasnysz. The Germans estimated

the Russian forces which here were brought, up for the counterattack

at some ten army corps and seven cavalry divisions. The Russians in

advancing this time, instead of directing their thrust at Mlawa,

pushed northeastward of Przasnysz along the rivers Orczy and Omulew.

In this sector the Germans counted from the 13th to the 23d of March

forty-six serious assaults, twenty-five in the daytime and twenty-one

at night. With special fury the battles raged in the neighborhood of

Jednorozez. This attempt to break into Prussia was also unsuccessful,

and in the last week of March the Russian attacks slackened, quiet

ensuing for the weeks following Easter.

For six weeks the armies had struggled back and forth in this bloody

angle, fighting in cold and wet, amid snow and icy rains. The Germans

asserted that in these six weeks the troops of General von Gallwitz

had captured 43,000 Russians and slain some 25,000. They estimated the

total losses of the enemy in this sector during the period at 100,000.

Countless graves scattered about the land, and the ruins of cities and

villages were left to keep awake the memory of some of the fiercest

fighting of the war in the east.

CHAPTER LII

FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR--BOMBARDMENT OF OSSOWETZ

The winter battles of the Mazurian Lakes had forced the armies at the

northern end of the Russian right flank back into their great

fortresses Kovno and Grodno, and behind the line of the Niemen and the

Bobr. A great forest region lies to the east and north of Grodno, and

between the Niemen and the cities of Augustowo and Suwalki which the

Germans, after their successful offensive, used as bases for their

operations. A strip of country including these forests, and running

parallel to the Niemen was a sort of no-man's land in the spring of

1915. Movements of troops in the heavily wooded country were difficult

to observe, and the conditions lent themselves to surprise attacks.

This resulted in a warfare of alternate thrusts by Russians and

Germans aimed now at this point, now at that, in the disputed

territory. Several actions during the spring stand out beyond the rest

in importance, both because of the numbers engaged and their effects.

In what follows will be described a typical offensive movement in this

district undertaken by the Russians, and the way it was met by the

Germans.

A new Russian Tenth Army had been organized by the end of February,

1915, with Grodno for its base. General Sievers, his chief of staff,

and the general in command of the Third Russian Army Corps had been

demoted from their commands, and three new army corps (Two, Three, and

Fifteen) had been brought to Grodno. The ranks of the remaining corps

that had suffered in the "winter battle" had been filled up with fresh

recruits. Hardly had the German pursuit in the forest of Augustowo

come to an end when the freshly strengthened Russians moved forward

from their defensive lines in a counterattack. The Germans had been

engaged in the task of gathering and carting away their enormous booty

which lay scattered about the forest. They now drew back from in front

of the Russian fortified lines to prepare positions close to

Augustowo, and on a line running roughly north and south from this

place, with the forest in front of them.

The Third Russian Army Corps advanced from Simno toward Lozdsisjo,

their Second Army Corps from Grodno by way of Kopiewo and Sejny toward

Krasnopol and other Russian corps advanced through the forest of

Augustowo. Here they soon struck strong German resistance, and for

several days vainly attacked German fortified positions.

On the 9th of March, 1915, a German offensive began against the

Russian Third Corps which held the right wing of the advancing army.

When this corps suddenly found itself threatened in the flank from the

north and in danger of being surrounded it hastily began to retreat

toward the east and southeast, leaving several hundred prisoners and

several machine guns in the hands of the Germans. This withdrawal

exposed the right flank of the adjoining Second Army Corps, which by

this time, March 9, 1915, had reached Berzniki and Giby. The German

attack was now continued against this corps. It was cold weather, the

thermometer was considerably below the freezing point, and the roads

were slippery with ice, so that dozens of horses fell, completely

exhausted, and the infantry could march only two or three kilometers

an hour.

On March 9 and 10, 1915, the battle flamed up at Sejny and Berzniki,

the Russian corps, which had developed its front toward the west,

being forced to swing about and face the north, whence the Germans

were driving down upon it. At Berzniki two Russian regiments made up

entirely of young troops were, according to the German account,

completely annihilated, and the commanders of the regiments captured.

It seemed as though the leader of the Russian armies saw approaching a

repetition of the encircling movements that had proved fatal to the

Russians in the Mazurian "winter battle," for on the 10th of March he

gave orders for the withdrawal of his entire army. The German airmen

on this day reported the Russian columns on the march through the

forest in full retreat toward Grodno all along the line from Giby to

Sztabiz, far to the south.

On the 11th of March, 1915, the German troops vigorously pushed the

pursuit. They occupied Makarze, Froncki, and Giby. On the same night a

German cavalry division took Kopciovo by assault. At this place alone

they counted 300 dead Russians, and more than 5,000 prisoners, 12

machine guns, and 3 cannon, fell into the hands of the Germans.

The threatened envelopment of this Russian army was typical of the

method employed by the leaders under Von Hindenburg in local

operations, as it was of German method in general when applied to

operations extending over the entire field of action. It could be

applied with special success where the German information service was

superior to that of the Russians, as it usually was, and the movements

of German troops were facilitated by good railway connections. In the

Augustowo forests, however, rapidity of movement had to be achieved by

the legs of the German soldiers to a large extent, and on this they

prided themselves not a little. The operation just described was

regarded by the German Great Headquarters as being of great

significance, valuable for its moral effect in establishing in the

German troops a sense of superiority, and confidence in their

leadership, and for its infliction of material losses of considerable

moment on the Russians.

The Russians likewise claimed advantages from their forward thrust

from Grodno. As represented by the Russian General Staff the

withdrawal of the Germans from a front close to the line of the

fortress in the first place was not a voluntary one, as it is pictured

in the German account, but was forced by the strong pressure exerted

by the Russian attacks following upon their retreat after the "winter

battle." Thus they report the complete defeat of two German army

corps, resulting in the seizure by the Russians of Height 100.3, which

they described as dominating the entire region of the operations

before Grodno. "In this battle," says the Russian report of March 5,

1915, "we took 1,000 prisoners and six cannon and a machine gun.

Height 100.3 was defended by the Twenty-first Corps, the best of them

all which lost during the battle 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers, as can be

estimated from the dead left behind. After the shattering of the

German counterattack at Height 100.3 the operations of the enemy

became entirely passive. We, on the other hand, took village after

village, and everywhere made prisoners."

The fortress of Ossowetz on the Bobr River proved inconquerable by the

42-centimeter mortars which had worked such terrific effects on the

forts of Belgium and France. It was continually under German artillery

fire through the months of February and March, 1915, without suffering

appreciable damage. The great mortars were brought up within range of

the fortress with much difficulty, owing to the fact that the place is

almost completely surrounded by swamps. The Germans apparently had

counted seriously at first on making a breach in the Russian defensive

lines at this place. After persistent attempts to make an impression

on the fortress with their heaviest guns they were obliged, however,

to content themselves with keeping the garrison in check so as to

forestall offensive moves.

A German artillery officer who took part in the bombardment relates

that the chief obstacle to the pressing home of an attack were several

heavily armored batteries which lay concealed outside the visible

works of the fortress itself in the broad strip of swampland

surrounding it. These were built deep into the ground, protected by

thick earthworks, and very effectively screened from observation. They

were a constant menace and apparently could not be destroyed by the

German fire. Even though the main fort itself had been destroyed they

would have prevented the approach of the enemy's troops, for they

commanded the only causeway leading through the swamps to the fortress

and would have blown to pieces any infantry that ventured to push

along this road.

Furthermore, even the intense cold did not make the swamp passable

except by the roadway because warm springs here and there prevented

the ice from freezing sufficiently strong to bear the troops. The

German gunners noted too that their shots fell practically without

effect, plunging quietly into the mud to a great depth so that they

did not even throw up earth or mud.

The result was that the 42-centimeter monsters were hastily withdrawn

after a few trial shots and the bombardment was continued with a

battery of 28-centimeter coast defense guns, an Austrian motor

battery, a 30.5-centimeter mortar and some other heavy batteries. The

fire rose to considerable intensity in the last days of February and

the first days of March.

On the 3d of March the Russians in their official report dwelt on the

fierceness of the bombardment and its ineffectiveness. On the 16th

they reported that the Germans were pushing several of their batteries

up into closer range, as they had recognized the uselessness of

shooting from a greater distance and on the 18th they stated that the

fire was falling off. On the 22d, finally, they reported that

beginning with the 21st the Germans had been withdrawing their heavy

batteries. They added that a 42-centimeter mortar had been damaged by

the Russian fire, and that "not a single shot of these mortars has

reached the fortress, not a redoubt has been penetrated. The

superiority of the artillery fire evidently rests with us. The German

attack was not only far removed from placing the fortifications of

Ossowetz in a critical position, it did not even succeed in driving

our infantry out of the field works."

On the 27th of March there was a resumption of the bombardment on a

small scale and another effort began on April 11 with some heavy guns,

ending in an attempted advance which was repulsed without difficulty

by the Russians.

CHAPTER LIII

RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL

An event in which no great number of troops were concerned, but which

is of importance, because of the feeling which it aroused in Germany

and because it was the first of a series of operations in what was

practically a new theatre of the war was the Russian invasion of the

very northernmost tip of East Prussia. On Thursday, the 18th of March,

1915, the Russians coming simultaneously from the north and the east

across the border of Courland, moved on the Prussian city of Memel in

several columns. Their troops included seven battalions of militia

with six or eight guns of an old model, several squadrons of mounted

men, two companies of marines, a battalion of a reserve regiment, and

border defense troops from Riga and Libau, a total of some 6,000 to

10,000 men. The German Landsturm troops at the Prussian boundary fell

back on Memel, not being in sufficient force to resist the advance.

They were finally driven through the city and across the narrow strip

of water known as the Kurische Haff to the dunes along the shore of

the Baltic. The Russians burned down numerous buildings along the

roads on which they approached, according to the German report,

inflicting heavy damage on fifteen villages. A considerable number of

the inhabitants, including women and children, were removed to Russia,

and a number of civilians were killed. The troops entered the city on

the evening of March 18 and took the mayor and three other men of the

town as hostages. Apparently the Russian commander made some efforts

to restrain his men, but plundering of stores and dwellings

nevertheless occurred. On the 20th of March, 1915, the city was for a

time cleared of Russian troops, but on Sunday, the 21st, other

soldiers entered the town from the north. These were met by German

patrols, which were followed by stronger German forces that had come

up from the south to drive back the invaders. Street fighting

followed, and the Russians were finally thrown out, losing about 150

dead.

The Russians were pursued on March 22 and 23, 1915, and in passing

through Polangen, close to the shore of the Baltic, came under the

fire of German cruisers. They lost some 500 prisoners, 3 guns, 3

machine guns, and ammunition wagons. With the German troops which

cleared the Russians out of Memel was the son of the emperor, Prince

Joachim of Prussia.

Concerning this raid the following official announcement was made by

the Germans on March 18, 1915: "Russian militia troops have gained a

cheap success in the northernmost corner of East Prussia in the

direction of Memel. They have plundered and burned villages and farms.

As a penalty, we have ordered the cities occupied by us in Russian

territory to pay considerable sums in damages. For every village or

farm burned down by these hordes on German soil three villages or

farms of the territory occupied by us in Russia will be given over to

the flames. Each act of damage in Memel will be answered by the

burning of Russian Government buildings in Suwalki and other capitals

of governments."

To this the following Russian official reply was made on March 21,

1915: "The official communique of the German Great Headquarters of the

18th of March concerning the movement of Russian troops against Memel

contains a threat of reprisals to be exacted on Russian villages and

cities held by the enemy on account of the losses which might be

suffered by the population in the neighborhood of Memel. The Russian

General Staff gives public notice that Memel was openly defended by

hostile troops, and that battle was offered in the streets. Since the

civil population took part in this fight our troops were compelled to

reply with corresponding measures. If, therefore, the German troops

should carry out their threat against the peaceful inhabitants of the

Russian territory which they hold, such acts should be considered not

as reprisals but as independent acts. Responsibility for this, as well

as for the consequences, would rest upon the Germans."

The move against Memel was apparently part of a Russian operation

which was intended also to strike at the city of Tilsit. The German

Great Headquarters reported that for operations intended to seize the

northern regions of East Prussia a so-called Riga-Shavli army group

had been formed under the command of General Apuchtin. While portions

of these troops were active in Memel on March 18, 1915, the fourteen

German Landsturm companies holding Tauroggen, just to the north of the

East Prussian boundary, were attacked by superior forces and

practically surrounded. They fought their way through to Langszargen

with some difficulty, and were being pressed back on the road to

Tilsit when on March 23 German reenforcements came up and General von

Pappritz, leading the Germans, went over to the offensive.

A heavy thaw made movement of troops anywhere except on the main roads

extremely difficult. Guns were left stuck in the mud, and the infantry

waded to the knee in water, and sometimes to the waist. It is reported

that one of the horses of the artillery literally was drowned on the

road. Germans attacked Tauroggen, where the enemy had intrenched

himself, under an artillery fire directed from the church tower of the

place. On the 28th the town was taken, after a difficult crossing of

the Jura River in front of it, on the ice. The Germans then exulted in

the fact that not a Russian was left on German soil.

CHAPTER LIV

GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND--CAPTURE OF LIBAU

On the 20th of April, 1915, an announcement was made by the German

Great Headquarters which took the Russians and the world in general

more or less by surprise. It gave the first glimpse to the public of a

group of operations which caused no little speculation in the minds of

strategists. It read:

"The advance troops of our forces operating in northwestern Russia

yesterday reached on a broad front the railway running from Dunaburg

(Dvinsk) to Libau. Thus far the Russian troops present in that region,

including also the remnants of those which took part in the raid

against Memel, have attempted no serious resistance anywhere. Fighting

is now in progress near Shavli."

The advance into Courland here announced had been made by the German

troops at high speed. The forces were under the command of General von

Lauenstein. They had begun to move early on the 27th of April, in

three columns. One of these crossed the Niemen at Schmalleningken,

forming the right wing of the troops engaged in the movement. The

columns of the left wing broke out of East Prussia at its northernmost

point, and moved along the dunes of the Baltic. On the second day of

the forward march it was learned by the leaders of the advancing

troops that the Russians had hastily left their position at Skawdwile,

on the main road from Tilsit to Mitau, to escape being surrounded on

their left flank, and had withdrawn to Shavli by way of Heilmy. On the

third day the German right column crossed the Windawski Canal under

the enemy's fire, and on the afternoon of the 30th of April this

column entered Shavli, which had been set on fire by the Russians.

[Illustration: German Advance on Riga.]

The Germans had now crossed at several points the Libau-Dunaburg

railway. They were in Telsche and Trischki. Their cavalry pushed ahead

at full speed with orders to destroy the railways wherever it found

them. On the road to Mitau they captured Russian machine guns,

ammunition wagons, and baggage, and broke up the railway tracks to the

southwest and northwest of Shavli. The Russians who had been taken by

surprise by this movement had apparently only weak forces in Courland,

and these had retired while reenforcements were being rushed up by

railway. The German infantry, upon the receipt of reports that the

Russians were moving up by rail from Kovno on their right flank, was

ordered to stop its advance and prepare to hold the Dubissa line,

taking up a front running a little east of south. Cavalry moving

forward in the center of the German advance on the 3d of May, 1915,

got within two kilometers of Mitau, going beyond Gruenhof and capturing

2,000 Russians. At Skaisgiry on the day before 1,000 prisoners had

been taken, and Janischki and Shagory had been occupied far beyond the

Libau-Dunaburg railway. By this time Russian reenforcements were

arriving at Mitau in huge numbers. The German cavalry ultimately fell

back after indicting all possible damage to the communications in

their reach.