troops in this swift advance. They pointed out that the roads were in
extremely bad condition, the bridges for the most destroyed, and the
population to a large extent hostile. A military correspondent figured
that for a daily march of fifty kilometers, such as was frequently
made in Courland, 62,000 steps of an average of eighty centimeters
were required. This for a day's march of from nine to ten hours gives
an average of five to six kilometers per hour, some 6,000 to 7,000
steps. That makes in the neighborhood of 100 steps per minute, which
the correspondent regarded as a considerable accomplishment when
allowance is made for the fact that this was kept up hour after hour
in full marching equipment.
The column coming from Memel, directed along the Baltic shores, had
been steadily moving on Libau. In preparation for the land attack
German naval vessels on the 29th of April had bombarded the forts
defending the town. On the 6th of May the Russians themselves blew up
one of the forts on the eastern front. The shore batteries were soon
after silenced by German fire. The German troops advancing from the
land side took the forts on the south almost without opposition.
Russian troops which had been unloaded at Mitau and sent forward
toward the southwest were unable to come up in time to offer any
obstacles to the German advance, and on the 8th of May, at six o'clock
in the morning, the German soldiers marched into Libau, where they
took about 1,500 prisoners, twelve guns, and a number of machine guns.
The Germans immediately turned the metal-working plants of the city to
their uses in the manufacture of chains, barbed wire, etc. They also
found here a large supply of tools for intrenching work. Most of the
Russians of the city had fled. One motive for the German advance into
Courland advanced by their enemies was that it was an attempt to
include a rich section of country in foraging operations, and it is a
fact that the German authorities gave expression to their satisfaction
at seizing a region that was of considerable economic value. It is
apparent, however, in regarding these operations in the retrospect
that they had no small bearing on the German plan of campaign as a
whole. It was at the time that the inroad into Courland was started
that the signal was about to be given for the great onslaught far to
the south on the Dunajec, as described in the account of the
Austro-Russian campaign. As the vast campaign along the whole eastern
front developed, it became more and more apparent that the position of
the German troops in Courland placed them advantageously for taking
the Russian line of defenses, of which the fortress of Kovno
represented the northern end in the flank in this carrying out of an
important part of the vast encircling movement which took all Poland
in its grasp. They were a constant threat to the all-important
Vilna-Petrograd Railway.
In hostile and neutral countries the Courland invasion provoked
comment indicating astonishment at the resources of the Teutonic
powers in being able to extend their lines while already fully engaged
on an enormous front.
The Russians, awakening from their first astonishment, made vigorous
attempts to obtain permanent possession of the Dubissa line. Along
this line the German troops were for a time forced to yield ground and
to go into the defensive and to resist heavy Russian attacks. Shavli
was given up under Russian pressure. By May 14, all the territory east
of the Dubissa and Windau (Vindowa) was reported free of Germans.
Especially noteworthy among the struggles for the Dubissa was the
fight at Rossiennie, a town which was of special importance because of
its command of the roads centering in it. On the 22d of May, 1915, an
attack was delivered against this place by the First Caucasian Rifle
Brigade with artillery and assisted by the Fifteenth Cavalry Division.
On the 23d the German cavalry which had resisted their crossing the
river drew back, and the Russians here crossed the Dubissa,
approaching Rossiennie from the north. The Germans during the night
moved the greater part of their troops around the western wing of
their opponents and placed them in position for attack.
At daybreak heavy artillery fire was poured upon the Russians from the
German position to the north of Rossiennie, while at the same time the
German infantry fell upon the Russian flank and rolled it up, with the
result that the Russians were compelled to recross the Dubissa. In the
crossing numerous wounded were drowned in the river. The Germans took
2,500 prisoners and fifteen machine guns. Similar counterattacks were
delivered by the Germans on the River Wenta. Then, on the 5th of June,
1915, a general offensive was entered upon by the whole German line on
orders from the General Staff, which carried it beyond the Dubissa,
and after heavy fighting finally secured for the Germans the Windawski
Canal, which they had had to relinquish before. Their troops now
slowly pushed their way back toward Shavli until the city came within
reach of their heavy guns, and took Kuze, twelve kilometers to the
northwest of Shavli on the railway. On the 14th of June, 1915, this
series of operations came to a temporary halt. German official reports
pointed to the fact that among 14,000 prisoners which they had taken
there were only a few officers, and that with these not a single
cannon was captured. They regarded it as showing that the Russians
were getting very cautious in the use of their artillery and were
short of officers.
CHAPTER LV
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO--FOREST BATTLES IN MAY AND JUNE
Offensives on a large scale such as that which had been prevented by
the "Winter Battle of the Mazurian Lakes" were not attempted by the
Russians on their northern wing after the short counterattack that had
pushed their lines into the Mlawa angle in the corner of the Vistula
and the Prussian boundary beyond Przasnysz, to the east of Thorn. They
virtually remained in their strongly fortified positions along the
Narew, the Bobr, and the Niemen, except for the sending out of
occasional attacking columns against the German lines lying opposite
to them.
These forward thrusts were made especially from the fortresses Grodno
and Kovno, and the fortified place Olita. We have already dealt with
one such operation which came to grief in the forest of Augustowo in
March. The German invasion of Courland had taken place, and the
extension of the German lines to the north invited a thrust at their
communications when, in the middle of May, the Russians attempted to
break through the German lines with columns starting from the great
forest to the west of Kovno. Here German troops under General
Litzmann, acting under the command of General von Eichhorn, stood on
guard. When Litzmann received information that the Russians were
advancing in force he was obliged hastily to gather such troops as he
could find to stem the Russian attack. Troop units from a large
variety of different organizations were freshly grouped practically on
the battle field. At Szaki and Gryszkabuda, on May 17-20, they struck
the Russians with such force that the Slavs were driven back into the
forests.
The German general now decided to clear this territory of his enemies,
as it had given them a constant opportunity for the preparation of
moves which could not be readily observed, because of the protection
of the thick woods. Again he executed the favorite maneuver of Von
Hindenburg's armies. He gathered as heavy a weight of troops as
possible on his left wing and pushed them forward in an extended
encircling movement. From the south a strong column from Mariampol and
the line of the Szsczupa moved upon the fortified position of the
Russians and the southern corner of the great forest, meeting with
strong resistance at Dumbowa Ruda. The troops moving down from the
northern part of the woods swung to their right to cut off the
Russians from their retreat toward Kovno. By the time the operations
had reached this stage it was the second week in June, 1915, and in
the great pine forests extending for miles there was an oppressive
heat with perfect absence of breeze. Three Russian positions lying in
the river valleys in the forest were encircled one after another from
the north and had to be given up.
The Russians recognized the danger of the concentric attack directed
at them and fought with great bravery. They strove to keep open the
road of their retreat toward Kovno as long as possible. However, the
ring of the German troops closed swiftly. At Koslowa Ruda, in the
southern part of the forest, they found at night a sleeping army;
something like 3,000 Russians had lain down exhausted in order on the
next day to find the last opening through which to make their escape.
They were now saved the trouble and were led away prisoners. The great
forest was cleared of Russians. The German move had served to insure
the safety of the lines connecting the troops in Courland with their
bases to the south of the Niemen.
In an official announcement of the 18th of March, 1915, the German
Government sketched the line held in the east by the German troops
northward of the front covered by joint German and Austrian forces. It
read: "The line occupied by us in the east runs from the Pilica,
along the Rawka and Bzura to the Vistula. North of the Vistula the
line of our troops is continued from the region to the east of Plozkz
by way of Zurominek-Stupsk (both south of Mlawa). From there it runs
in an easterly direction through the region to the north of
Przasnysz--south of Mystinez, south of Kolno--to the north of Lomza,
and strikes the Bobr at Mocarce. From here it follows the line of the
Bobr to northwest of Ossowetz, which is under our fire, and runs by
way of the region to east of Augustowo, by Krasnopol, Mariempol,
Pilwiszki, Szaki, along the border through Tauroggen to the northwest.
This is from beginning to end entirely on hostile soil." This long
line, it appears, was under the supreme command of Von Hindenburg,
while Von Mackensen had charge of the great drive to the south.
The statement here quoted was issued as reassurance to Germans who had
been made nervous by reports of a Russian invasion of East Prussia,
and was connected with the Russian raid on Memel.
Until June there was practically no change in this great line, except
that on its northern end it was swung outward into Russian territory
to include a large part of Courland, the River Dubissa roughly forming
the dividing line until the front swung eastward toward Libau, in the
line of the Libau-Dunaburg Railway.
The tasks of both German and Russian troops were similar.
Comparatively weak German forces held the front in the region of the
Niemen, the Bobr, and the Narew, safeguarding such Russian territory
as had been seized by the Germans, and protecting East Prussia against
invasion. Opposed to them lay considerable Russian forces whose task
it was, supported by the fortresses of the Narew and the Niemen,
especially Grodno, to protect the flank and rear of the Russians
standing in Warsaw and southward in the bend of the Vistula, with the
Warsaw-Vilna Railway behind them, while great decisions were fought
for in the Carpathians and Galicia.
In Poland, between the lower and the upper courses of the Vistula, the
Germans about the middle of February, 1915, having occupied the
Rawka-Sucha ridge of upland, had developed fortified positions along
the rivers Bzura, Rawka, Pilica, and Nida. The bad weather of the
winter and early spring, which had turned the roads of Poland into
pathless morasses, made against extensive operations, and the
momentous undertakings carried out on the wings of the eastern front
led the German General Staff to refrain from important movements in
this section, where the Russians had strongly fortified themselves for
the protection of Warsaw. It was not until the Teutonic allies had
gone over to the offensive in the Carpathians and in western Galicia,
and the Russians had withdrawn to the Polish hills of Lysa-Gora early
in May, that, favored by improved weather conditions, operations in
this part of Poland again took on larger scope. Especially along the
Bzura the German attacks again became violent in an effort to hold the
Russian forces in the district to the west of Warsaw while thrusting
at their wings from the south and north. However, fighting was not of
great consequence in this middle sector until the middle of June,
1915.
CHAPTER LVI
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND--MOVEMENT UPON WARSAW
By the 1st of July, 1915, the stupendous enveloping campaign of the
Teuton armies on the eastern front had advanced to a point where the
Allies were forced to recognize the imminence of a catastrophe, which
could be averted only by the most decisive action of the Russian
armies.
Far in the north, on the extreme right wing of the Russians, the army
of General von Buelow was hammering at the defenses of the Dubissa
line. Off and on fighting was taking place in the neighborhood of
Shavli. Russian counterattacks, reported from day to day through June,
with difficulty had held in check this army, which evidently was
aiming at the Warsaw-Petrograd Railway on the sector between Vilna
and Dvinsk. On the right flank of these forces operated the troops of
General von Eichhorn, with the line of the Niemen for their objective.
Next to these on the south, aiming at the Bobr River and the Upper
Narew, were the forces of General von Scholtz, and on their right the
army of Von Gallwitz, based on Mlawa with Przasnysz in front of it.
Below the line of the Vistula, before the Bzura and down to the middle
course of the Pilica, operated the Ninth German Army, commanded, at
least in the later stages of the Warsaw campaign, by Prince Leopold of
Bavaria. The whole group of northern and central armies was acting
under the general direction of Field Marshal von Hindenburg.
The armies to the south of this group, cooperating in the drive under
Field Marshal von Mackensen which had gained the Teutons Przemysl and
Lemberg, had as their left flank the forces of Generals von Woyrsch
and Koevess between the Pilica and the Vistula mouth of the San. The
troops of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were pushing forward on the right
of these, and the army directly under Mackensen himself came next in
line to the eastward, joining up with the armies still operating in
Galicia at the extreme right of the great German battle line.
The chief danger to the Russians at this stage still threatened from
the south, where the archduke and Mackensen had pushed forward
irresistibly in their advance to the east of the Vistula toward the
railway running from Warsaw through Ivangorod, Lublin, Cholm, and
Kovell to Kiev and Moscow.
The advance of these Austro-German armies, which had operated in the
neighborhood of Lemberg, was extremely rapid in the last days of June,
1915. In four days they covered from thirty to forty miles in pursuit
of the Russians. By the 1st of July, having swept out of Galicia,
their right, under Mackensen, entered the upper valley of the Wieprz,
a marshy country which presented considerable difficulty to the
advance of troops where a tributary of the Wieprz, the Por, afforded
the Russians a natural line of defense. Drasnik, on the Wyznica, which
here extended the Russian defensive line westward, was occupied by the
archduke's forces on Mackensen's left on the 1st of July, 1915.
The drive of the Austro-German armies through Galicia has been dealt
with in the account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As we carry
forward the account of the activities of the greatest part of the
forces concerned in that series of operations from the point where
they crossed over the boundary between Galicia and Poland out of
Austrian territory, it will be well to glance backward a moment to
enumerate here briefly the gains of these armies on Polish soil up to
the 1st of July.
On June 16, 1915, the Teutonic allies forced the Russians to fall back
upon Tarnograd from north of Siemandria, thus pushing this section of
the front across the boundary into Poland about to the line of the
Tanev. Tarnograd itself was occupied by the Teutons on the 17th, and
on the 18th the Russians retreated behind the Tanev. There was little
change in this particular sector during the fighting which was crowned
for the Austro-Germans by the capture of Lemberg on June 22, 1915.
Further to the east, however, to the south of the Pilica and west of
the Vistula, Von Woyrsch was exerting pressure, and on the 20th of
June Berlin announced the capture of several Russian advance posts by
these troops. By the 24th the Slavs had begun to retreat before Von
Woyrsch in the forest region south of the Ilza on the left bank of the
Vistula; thus rear guards had been thrown across the Kamienna, and
Sandomir was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians. On the 25th the
fighting developed on the line Zarvichost-Sienno-Ilza, to which the
Russians had fallen back.
Defeats of the Russian rear guards on June 29, 1915, to the northeast
and west of Tomaszow, where Teutonic forces had now also crossed into
Poland, caused the Slavs to begin the relinquishment of the Tanev
forest district and the lower San. Tomaszow itself was occupied by the
pursuing troops. By the 30th the Teutonic allies had swept forward
beyond the Tanev region to Franpol, Zamoez, and Komarovo, and on the
same evening they threw the Russians out of their strong defenses on
the Zavichost-Ozarow-Sienno line, west of the Vistula. The pursuit was
pushed energetically on both sides of the Kamienna. The important
bridgehead on the Vistula, Josefovo, was taken on the 1st of July.
The Russians between the Bug and the Vistula were now offering strong
resistance with large forces on the line Turobin-Krasnik-Josefovo, the
rivers Por and Wyznica forming roughly their defensive front, as
previously pointed out.
In its daily bulletins of July 1, 1915, the German Great Headquarters
made this announcement for the eastern theatre of war (from the Baltic
to the Pilica): "The booty for June is: Two colors, 25,595 prisoners,
including 121 officers, seven cannon, six mine throwers, fifty-two
machine guns, one aeroplane, also a large amount of war material." For
the southeastern theatre of war (from the Pilica to Bukowina) the
headquarters announced: "The total booty for June of the allied troops
fighting under the command of General von Linsingen, Field Marshal von
Mackensen, and General von Worysch is 409 officers, 140,650 men, 80
cannon, 268 machine guns." The Austro-Hungarian General Staff on the
same day reported: "The total booty for June of the troops fighting
under Austro-Hungarian command in the northeast is 521 officers,
194,000 men, 93 cannon, 364 machine guns, 78 ammunition wagons, 100
field railway carriages, etc."
CHAPTER LVII
BATTLE OF KRASNIK--CAPTURE OF PRZASNYSZ
On July 2, 1915, the forces of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand which had
passed through Krasnik, on the Lublin road, struck serious resistance
from the Russian army of General Loesche which held strong positions
across the highway, just to the north of the town, and was now
evidently determined to stop once for all the Teuton advance toward
the railway at its back, connecting Warsaw with Kiev, through Lublin
and Cholm.
On July 3, 1915, the Austrian report, however, announced that 4,800
prisoners and three machine guns had been taken in the neighborhood of
Krasnik and along the Por stream, and the next day they reported that
they had occupied the heights which run along to the north of the
city, having pierced the enemy's main position on both sides of
Studzianki, and taken more than 1,000 prisoners, three machine guns
and three cannon.
The Russian front was turned to such an extent that they had to fall
back some three miles on the Lublin road. The Austrians on the 5th of
July summed up their enemy's losses as twenty-nine officers, 8,000
men, six cannon, five ammunition wagons, and six machine guns. As the
result of this Austrian advance the adjoining enemy forces to the
eastward along the Wieprz River had been obliged to fall back beyond
Tarnograd, and by the 6th of July Vienna summarized the Austrian
captures in these battles as having grown to forty-one officers,
11,500 men.
The Austrians, however, could make no further headway. On July 5,
1915, they were heavily attacked, being forced back to their
intrenched lines on a ridge of hills to the north of Krasnik. The
Russians now reported that they had taken 15,000 prisoners and a large
number of machine guns. Two thousand bodies were reported by the
Russians to have been found before their front. More prisoners were
taken by the Russians on the 7th and it was only on the afternoon of
July 9 that the Austrians were able to stem the tide. The total loss
of the Austrians in this action was given by their opponents as 15,000
men.
The Austrian explanation of their retirement in front of Krasnik
issued on July 11, 1915, pointed out that the relative subsidence of
activity of the Teutonic allies was due to the fact that the goal set
for the Lemberg campaign had now been attained. This, they explained,
was the taking of the city and the securing of strong defensive
positions to the east and north. The ridge to the northward of Krasnik
was a natural choice for this purpose on the north, while the line of
the Zlota Lipa and Bug rivers served the purpose toward the east (see
Austro-Russian campaign). The Austrian explanation pointed out further
that some of their troops had rushed beyond the positions originally
selected to meet heavy reenforcements brought up by the Russians from
Lublin, and that these had to withdraw to the ridge, where they were
successfully resisting all attacks.
The battle of Krasnik was regarded by the Russians as an effective
victory, for it seemed to have halted the advance on Lublin. The army
of Von Mackensen had now also come to a stop about halfway between
Zamosc and Krasnostav, an artillery duel on July 7, 1915, being the
last activity noted on the front of this army for some time.
Their comparative quiet in the region between the Vistula and the Bug
where the main advance of the Teutonic forces on the south had been
under way with great vigor for several weeks until the check at
Krasnik was not interrupted until July 16, 1915. Day after day the
Teutonic headquarters reported "nothing of importance" in this
quarter. When the quiet was finally broken it appeared that it had
been the lull before the storm. Before taking up again the activities
on this section of the front, it will be necessary to take a glance
toward the northern half of the great arc that enveloped the Warsaw
salient on two sides.
In these early days of July, 1915, considerable uncertainty prevailed
among those who were watching the progress of the campaign in Poland
as to where the heaviest blow of the Teutons would fall, whether from
the south or the north. The decisive stroke came with lightning
suddenness. A tremendous attack was launched in the direction of the
Narew by the army of General von Gallwitz.
A laconic announcement of the German General Staff on July 14, 1915,
bore momentous news, although its modest wording scarcely betrayed the
facts. It read: "Between the Niemen and the Vistula, in the region of
Walwarga, southwest of Kolno, near Przasnysz and south of Mlawa, our
troops have achieved some local successes." The Russian report
referring to the beginning of the same action was equally
noncommittal, though possibly more misleading. This states:
"Considerable enemy forces between the Orczy and the Lidynja adopted
the offensive and the Russians declining a decisive engagement
retreated during the night of the 13th to the second line of their
positions."
On July 15, 1915, the Germans announced that the city of Przasnysz,
for which such hot battles had been fought in February, and which had
since been strongly fortified by the Russians, had been occupied by
them. The German summary of this action given out a few days later
stated that three Russian defensive lines lying one behind the other
northwest and northeast of Przasnysz had been pierced and taken, the
troops at once rushing forward to Dzielin and Lipa, respectively west
and east of the town. Under attack from these two points the Russians
after yielding Przasnysz, on the 14th, retired to their defensive line
Ciechanow-Krasnosielc which had been prepared long beforehand. On the
15th the German troops pressing closer upon the retiring Slavs stormed
this line and broke through it to the south of Zielona on a breadth of
seven kilometers, forcing the Russians again to retire. General von
Gallwitz's troops in this assault were supported by the forces of
General von Scholtz, on their left, who were pressing the Russians
from the direction of Kolno. On July 16, 1915, the Russians were
retreating on the whole front between the Pissa and the Vistula,
toward the Narew.
The German summary of the fighting during these days reported the
capture by the army of General von Gallwitz of eighty-eight officers,
17,500 men, thirteen cannon (including one heavy gun), forty machine
guns, and seven mine throwers; and by the army of General von Scholtz
of 2,500 prisoners and eight machine guns.
This great attack in the north, to which may be ascribed the final
breaking of the lines that had so long protected Warsaw, had been
carefully planned and undoubtedly was timed in coordination with the
movements of Mackensen's armies on the south, striking the Russians
just when Mackensen and the Archduke Josef, having had time for
recuperation and preparation for another push forward after the check
administered at Krasnik, were in readiness to inflict a heavy blow on
their side of the Warsaw salient. When it began the German lines all
along the front burst into fresh activity. It was the signal for a
simultaneous assault along nearly a thousand miles of battle front.
In the Mlawa sector to the north of Przasnysz the Russians had
developed an exceedingly strong system of fortified positions between
their advance lines and the Narew fortresses. For miles, to a depth of
from fifteen to twenty kilometers, there ran some three or four and at
certain points even five systems of trenches, one behind the other.
Hundreds of thousands of thick tree trunks had been worked into these
defensive works and millions of sand bags piled up as breastwork.
Bombproof dugouts had been constructed deep in the ground. Everywhere
there were strong wire entanglements before the front, sometimes sunk
below the level of the earth, arranged in from two to three rows.
Projecting bastions and thoroughly protected observation posts gave
these systems of trenches the character of permanent fortifications.
The country in this region is hilly, with here and there steep
declivities and peaks of considerable elevation. The Russians had cut
down whole stretches of forest in order to afford them a free field
for their fire and an opportunity to observe the advance of their
opponents. Enveloping tactics on the part of the Germans were here
quite excluded as the two lines ran uninterruptedly close to one
another. Przasnysz which had become a heap of ruins had been converted
virtually into a fortress by strong defensive works built while the
Germans and Russians lay opposite each other in front of it throughout
the spring. The country round about had been drenched with much German
and Russian blood.
General von Gallwitz, to capture a place with the least possible loss,
decided to break through the Russian defenses at two points at both
sides of the town sufficiently close to each other so that the
intervening lines would be immediately affected. His attacks were
therefore directed at the first line Russian positions, which formed
projecting angles to the northwest and northeast of Przasnysz so that
instead of taking the city directly from the front he would seize it
as with a gigantic pair of pincers from both sides and behind. The
plan succeeded to the full. The Russian lines were broken on both
sides of the city and the German troops, rushing through, met behind
it, forcing the Russian defenders hastily to evacuate the place to
avoid being caught within the circle.
Strong infantry forces were collected opposite the points of attack,
and enormous masses of artillery were placed in position with
abundance of ammunition in readiness. The preparations had been made
with all possible secrecy and even when the German batteries had begun
gradually to get their range by testing shots no serious assault seems
to have been expected by the Russians. On the morning of the attack
they were just to inaugurate service on a small passenger railway line
they had constructed behind their front.
On the morning of July 13, 1915, soon after sunrise, a tremendous
cannonade was let loose from guns of all calibers. Although the
weather was rainy and not well fitted for observation the German guns
seem to have found their marks with great accuracy. When the German
infantry stormed the first line of works which had been shattered by
the artillery fire they met with comparatively little resistance and
their losses were small. The bombardment apparently had done its work
thoroughly. The German infantry rushes were started in successive
intervals of a quarter of an hour, line following line. Swarms of
unarmed Russians could be seen coming out of the trenches seeking to
save themselves from the terrible effect of the shell fire by
surrendering. During the course of the forenoon the sun came out and
illuminated a scene of terrific destruction. The Russian positions on
the heights northwest of Przasnysz had been completely leveled. In
their impetuous forward rush the German troops did not give the enemy
time to make a stand in his second line of trenches and overrunning
this, by night began to enter the third Russian defensive line.
Przasnysz was flanked in the course of twenty-four hours and could no
longer be held. A fine rain was falling as the German columns marched
through the deserted, smoke-blackened city, a melancholy setting for a
victory.
On July 14, 1915, the German troops had broken through on both sides
of the city, met to the south of it and forming a mighty battering
ram, on the next day, forced the next Russian line, the last, to the
north of the Narew. This ran through Wysogrod-Ciechanow-Zielona to
Kranosiele. The Russians here made a desperate defense and the German
advance pushed forward but slowly. The effect of the German artillery
fire seems not to have been as striking as on the first day of battle.
The German report of the attack on this line points out that the
regiment of the Guard holding the right wing of a division which was
to attack the heights to the south and southeast of Zielona was
impatient to go forward, and was allowed to advance before the
reserves which were to be held in readiness to support the move had
come up.
However, confident of the accuracy with which the "black brothers"
(shells from the big guns) struck the enemy's trenches, the riflemen
leapt forward through fields of grain as soon as they saw that a gust
of their shells had struck in front of them. By means of signs which
been agreed upon they then signaled their new positions and the guns
laid their fire another hundred meters farther forward. The
infantrymen then stormed ahead into the newly made shell craters. Thus
they went forward again and again. Neither Russian fire nor the double
barbed wire entanglements were able to check their assaults.
As the German shouts rolled forth the Russians ran. A neighboring
division consisting of young men who had enlisted in the course of the
war, in a brilliant charge took a bastion at Klosnowo. The effect of
this first penetration of the Russian main position made itself felt
in the course of the afternoon and night along the whole front.
Further German forces were thrown into the breach and strove to widen
it.
The Russians at many points resisted obstinately, but under the
pressure from the front and in the flank they were finally unable to
hold their ground. The German account speaks with admiration of the
ride to death of a Russian cavalry brigade which attacked the German
infantry southeast of Opinozura without achieving any results.
Cossacks and Hussars were mowed down in an instant.
The German advance taking several intermediate places did not halt
until it stood before the fortification of the Narew line itself. As a
result of this stroke the German troops had advanced some forty to
fifty kilometers into hostile territory on a breadth of a hundred and
twenty kilometers and had captured some 10,000 prisoners and much war
material. By the 18th of July, 1915, German trains were running as far
as Ciechanow.
Advances were likewise made by the Germans to the right of the attack
on the Przasnysz positions on both sides of the Mlawa-Ciechanow
Railway, rolling up the Russian positions as far as Plonsk. On the
left progress had also been made and heavy fighting done, but the
German great headquarters pointed out that in times to come history
will assign the important place to the central feature of this great
offensive by General von Gallwitz, that is the enveloping attack at
Przasnysz and the ramming thrust at Zielona.
The report issued by the Russian General Staff on July 19, 1915,
admitted that to the west of Omulev their troops had withdrawn to the
Narew bridgeheads on the 17th. The points of some of the German
columns on this day, in fact, came within the range of the artillery
of the fortress of Novo-Georgievsk and the army of General von Scholtz
reached the line of the Bobr and the Narew between Osowice and
Ostrolenka. The action at Przasnysz had been decisive. It resulted
ultimately in the relinquishing by the Russians of the lines of the
Rawka and Bzura which had been so stubbornly held against the Germans
in the long defense of Warsaw. The troops directly charged here with
defending the capital fell back to the Blonie lines about fifteen
miles from the city.
CHAPTER LVIII
GRAND OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT
The great stroke at Przasnysz was the most dramatic feature of a grand
offensive all around the German lines that were endeavoring to close
in upon the Russian armies. On July 16, 1915, the Archduke Joseph
struck hard at the Russians on the Krasnik-Lublin road in an endeavor
to carry the fortified positions at Wilkolaz. His men, however, were
thrown back after ten furious assaults. Krasnostav, on the road to
Cholm, was attacked on the same day by the army of General von
Mackensen, and after a series of desperate rear-guard actions had been
fought by the Russians was swept over by the German Allies. By the
close of the day the Germans had taken twenty-eight officers, 6,380
men, and nine machine guns.
The Germans, prepared in the recent pause in the fighting, by the
bringing up of their artillery on the long lines of communication
which now stretched behind them, with troops reenforced by such fresh
forces as they could muster, were hurling themselves upon the Russian
defensive positions everywhere along the line. Thus, on the forenoon
of July 17, 1915, the army of General von Woyrsch, whose objective was
the mighty fortress Ivangorod, operating just to the west of the upper
Vistula, broke through the Russian wire entanglements and stormed the
enemy's trenches on a stretch of 2,000 meters. The breach was widened
in desperate hand-to-hand combat. The Teutons by evening inflicted a
heavy defeat on the Moscow Grenadier Corps at this point and the
Russians were forced to retreat behind the Ilzanka to the south of
Swolen. Some 2,000 men were taken prisoners by the Germans in this
battle and five machine guns were captured.
Far in the northeast in Courland the army of General von Buelow, on
July 17, 1915, defeated Russian forces that had been rushed up at
Alt-Auz, taking 3,620 prisoners, six cannon and three machine guns,
and pursuing the Slavs in an easterly direction. Desperate fighting
was also taking place to the northeast of Kurschany.
Notes of anxiety mixed with consoling speculations had begun to appear
in the press of the allied countries when the vast German offensive
had thus become plainly revealed and had demonstrated its driving
force. A Petrograd dispatch to the London "Morning Post" on the 15th
of July, 1915, said of the German plan that it was to catch the
Russian armies like a nut between nut crackers, that the two fronts
moving up from north and south were intended to meet on another and
grind everything between them to powder. The area between the
attacking forces was some eighty miles in extent, north to south, by
120 miles west to east. The writer offered the consolation that this
space was well fortified, the kernel of the nut "sound and healthy,
being formed of the Russian armies, inspired not merely with the
righteousness of their cause, but the fullest confidence in themselves
and absolute devotion to the proved genius of their commander in
chief."
The dispatch pointed out that it was all sheer frontal fighting, that
the Germans had been twelve months trying frontal attacks against
Warsaw on a comparatively narrow front and in vain. What chance had
they, he added, "of success by dividing their forces against the
united strength of Russia." This sort of argument is typical of the
endeavor to sustain the hopes of Russia's friends during these days.
Doubts, however, began to creep in more strongly as to the possibility
of holding Warsaw.
In Berlin the announcement of the Teutonic victories that began with
the successful assault at Przasnysz was received with general
rejoicing, and the appearance of flags all over the city. The Russian
retreat toward the Narew River in particular was regarded by the
military critics as threatening momentarily to crumble up the right
flank of the positions of the Russians before the capital of Poland.
[Illustration: German Attempts to reach Warsaw in 1914.]
Cholm and Lublin on the southern line of communication of the Russian
armies were now in imminent danger. On July 19, 1915, came the
announcement that the troops under Field Marshal von Mackensen, which
had pierced the Russian line in the region of Pilaskowice and
Krasnostav, had increased their successes, and that the Russians were
making the most desperate effort to prevent complete defeat. All day
the battle had swayed in a fierce struggle for mastery. The Russians
threw a fresh division of the Guards into the fight, but this too had
to yield to the overwhelming force of the Teuton onslaught. Farther to
the east as far as the neighborhood of Grabowiec, Austro-Hungarian and
German troops forced the crossing of the Wolica, and near Sokal in
Galicia Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Bug. (See Austro-Russian
Campaign.) In consequence of these Teuton successes the Russians on
the night of the 18th to the 19th of July retreated along the whole
front between the Vistula and the Bug--practically the last line of
defense, for the Warsaw-Kiev railway had been broken down. The German
troops and the corps under the command of Field Marshal von Arz alone
from the 15th to the 18th of July, 1915, took 16,250 prisoners and 23
machine guns.
It was announced by the Germans that according to written orders
captured during this action the Russian leaders had resolved to hold
the positions here conquered by the Germans to the utmost, regardless
of losses.
The same day that brought the report of this Russian retreat on the
south brought the news that in the adjoining sector to the west of the
Upper Vistula the army of General von Woyrsch had met resistance from
the Russians behind the Ilzanka after the Russian defeat on July 13,
1915, that, however, Silesian Landwehr on the 18th had captured the
Russian defenses at Ciepilovo by storm, and that the Russian line at
Kasonow and Barenow was beginning to yield. The army of General von
Gallwitz had now taken up positions along the whole Narew line from
southwest of Ostrolenka to Novo Georgievsk. The Russians, however, as
already indicated, were still holding fortified places and bridgeheads
on the right bank of the river. In this sector the number of prisoners
taken by the Germans had risen to 101 officers and 28,760 men.
In the sector next adjoining, passing onward around the enveloping
lines, that lying between the Pissa and the Szkwa, the Russians
likewise had retreated until they stood directly on the Narew. Here
the Slavs had been favored by forests and swampy land which made
pursuit difficult.
At the extreme left end of the German line a magnificent success had
been achieved in the occupation of Tukkum and Windau. This capture
brought the Germans to within fifty miles of Riga, seat of the
governor general of the Baltic provinces. They were, however, destined
not to make any substantial progress in the direction of that city for
many months to come.
Blow fell upon blow. The question "Can Warsaw be held?" began to
receive doubtful answers in the allied capitals. The colossal
coordinate movement of the Teutonic forces in these July days had
received so little check from the Russian resistance that the British
press had begun to discount the fall of the Polish capital. Shortness
of ammunition and artillery was ascribed as the cause of Russia's
failure to make a successful stand against the onrushing Teutons.
On July 20, 1915, Berlin announced the capture of those fortifications of
Ostrolenka lying on the northwest bank of the Narew River. This was one
of the strong places designed to protect the Warsaw-Grodno-Petrograd
railway. The threatened fall was highly significant. To the south of the
Vistula the Teuton troops had advanced to the Blonie-Grojec lines. Blonie
is some seventeen miles west of Warsaw and Grojec twenty-six miles south
of the city.
Farther eastward and to the south troops of the army of General von
Woyrsch had completely turned the enemy out of the Ilzanka positions,
having repulsed the counterattacks of the Russian reserves which had
been quickly brought up, and captured more than 5,000 prisoners. Von
Woyrsch's cavalry had now reached the railway line from Radom to the
great fortress of Ivangorod, the objective point of this army, and
Radom itself had been seized.
CHAPTER LIX
BEGINNING OF THE END
So uncertain had grown the positions of Lublin on the southern railway
line leading to Warsaw that the Russian commander in chief had issued
an order that in case of a retreat the male population of the town was
to attach itself to the retiring troops.
On July 21, 1915, the Russians throughout the empire were reported to
be joining in prayer. "Yesterday evening," telegraphed the London
"Daily Mail's" Petrograd correspondent on the 21st, "the bells in all
the churches throughout Russia clanged a call to prayer for a
twenty-four hours' continual service of intercession for victory.
"To-day, in spite of the heat, the churches were packed. Hour after
hour the people stand wedged together while the priests and choirs
chant interminable litanies. Outside the Kamian Cathedral here an
open-air Mass is being celebrated in the presence of an enormous
crowd."
The chronicle of the closing days of July, 1915, is an unbroken
narrative of forward movements of German armies on all parts of the
great semicircle. The movement now, however, was slow. The Russians
were fighting desperately, and the Germans had to win their way inch
by inch. By the 21st the Russians were withdrawing in Courland to the
east of the line Popeljany-Kurtschany, and the last Russian trenches
westward of Shavly had been taken by assault. To the north of Novgorod
the capture of Russian positions had yielded 2,000 prisoners and two
machine guns to the Germans on the 20th.
Farther south on the Narew a strong work of the fortress Rozan
defending an important crossing was stormed by the Germans, and
desperate fighting was going on at Pultusk and near Georgievsk.
Already the Russians were beginning to yield their positions to the
west of Grojec, which meant that the Teuton armies were about to push
into the opening between Warsaw and Ivangorod and divide the Russian
forces. The armies of Von Woyrsch on July 20, 1915, seized a
projecting bridgehead to the south of Ivangorod, and captured the
lines that had been held by the Russians near Wladislavow.
In the positions defending the railway between Cholm and Lublin,
Russian resistance was once more marked, and was checking the progress
of the armies of Von Mackensen and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.
By noon of July 21, 1915, the Silesian troops of Von Woyrsch had
stormed the bridgehead on the Vistula between Lagow and Lugawa-Wola,
with the result that Ivangorod was now inclosed from the south, while
to northwest of the fortress Austro-Hungarian troops were fighting on
the west bank of the Vistula. Austro-Hungarian troops too were
battling their way close up to the fortress directly from the west.
Line after line was giving way before the Teutons. The Russian retreat
over the bridge at Novo Alexandria to the south of Ivangorod was
carried on under the fire of German artillery. Numerous villages set
afire by the Russians were now sending great clouds of smoke into the
sky over all this region.
The troops of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, after a stubborn
resistance on the part of the Russians, seized enemy positions on July
21, 1915, near Chodel and Borzechow, advancing another step toward
Lublin. Eight thousand Russian prisoners, 15 machine guns, and 4
ammunition wagons were taken.
By the 23d of July, 1915, the Teutonic troops were close up to the
encircling forts of Ivangorod and stood on the Vistula all the way
between the fortress and the mouth of the Pilica. On the 24th the
Teutons announced a victory over the Fifth Russian Army by General von
Buelow at Shavli. The report read: "After ten days of continuous
fighting, marching, and pursuit, the German troops yesterday succeeded
in bringing the Russians to a stand in the regions of Rozalin and
Szadow and in defeating them and scattering their forces. The booty
since the beginning of this operation on the 14th of July consists of
27,000 prisoners, 25 cannon, 40 machine guns, more than 100 loaded
ammunition wagons with their draft animals, numerous baggage wagons
and other material."
This day brought the announcement also of the capture of the
fortresses of Rozan and Pultusk on the Narew, after violent charges by
troops of General von Gallwitz. The crossing of the Narew between
these places was now in German hands, and strong forces were advancing
on the southern shore. The Russians had been resisting obstinately in
this quarter, and the Germans had made their way only by the most
heroic efforts. German headquarters announced at this time that in the
battles between the Niemen and the Vistula covering the ten days since
July 14, 1915, more than 41,000 prisoners, 14 cannon, and 19 machine
guns had been captured. The German troops now also attained the
Vistula to the north of the Pilica. In their summing up of results
since the 14th of July the Teutons recounted further on this day, the
24th, that some 50,000 prisoners had been taken by the armies of
General von Woyrsch and Field Marshal von Mackensen during the period.
The army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had been making rapid progress.
On July 24, 1915, under the attacks of these troops the Russians
retreated on a front of forty kilometers, between the Vistula and the
Bistritza, from eight to ten kilometers northward to prepared lines,
their attempts to halt in intermediate positions being frustrated by
the onrush of the victorious Teutonic forces in pursuit.
By July 25, 1915, the Narew had been crossed by the Germans along its
whole front, southward from Ostrolenka to Pultusk, and by the 26th they
had gained the farther side of the Narew above Ostrolenka likewise. The
troops moving southeast from Pultusk now approached the Bug, getting
toward the rear of Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw, and threatening to close
the Russians' line of escape, the Warsaw-Bielostok railway.
On July 26, 1915, the Russians made a determined counteroffensive from
the line of Goworowo-Wyszkow-Serock in an effort to remove the threat
to the rear of Warsaw. This, however, had little success, the Russians
losing 3,319 men to the Germans in prisoners.
To the south of Warsaw the Germans had seized the villages of Ustanov,
Lbiska, and Jazarzew, which brought them nearly to the Vistula, just
below the capital.
The great attacks of the Germans on the troops defending Warsaw were
being hampered to some extent by the laying waste of the country by
the retiring Russians. Difficulty in moving heavy artillery on roads
had also interfered with their progress, but on the morning of July
28, 1915, Von Woyrsch crossed to the eastern shore of the Vistula
between the mouth of the Pilica and Kozienice at several places, and
was threatening the Warsaw-Ivangorod railway.
Novo Georgievsk was steadily being inclosed. The Russian
counterthrusts in the neighborhood of Warsaw both on the north and the
south of the city were repelled by night and day. To the south near
Gora-Kalvaria a desperate attempt of the Russians to push forward
toward the west on the night from July 27th to the 28th, 1915, was
shattered.
The armies of Field Marshal von Mackensen, breaking through Russian
positions to the west of the Wieprz, captured thousands of prisoners
and many guns, and once more thrust back the Russian front between the
Vistula and the Bug. On the evening of the 29th they attained the
Warsaw-Kiev railway at Biskupice, about halfway between Lublin and
Cholm, thus crowning their efforts to get astride their important line
of communications. The Russians were destroying everything of value in
the country as they retired, even burning grain in the fields.
On the afternoon of July 30, 1915, Lublin at last was occupied by the
army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and on the 31st the Germans of
Von Mackensen passed through Cholm. Thus the Teutonic armies were now
across the important railway from Warsaw and Ivangorod to Kiev, on a
broad front, running all the way down to the Vistula at Novo
Alexandria. In Courland the Germans continued to push forward, so that
on the 12th of August they were enabled to seize the important railway
center Mistan.
Hope in Russia died hard. Press correspondents up to July 29, 1915,
still spoke of the possibility of the Russians standing a siege in
their principal fortress on the Warsaw salient. On the 29th, however,
reports came from Petrograd that the fortresses of the Warsaw defense
were to be abandoned and the capital of Poland given up to the army.
The correspondent of the New York "Times" on July 29, 1915, in a
special cable summed up the situation in an announcement that the fate
of Europe hung on the decision that Russia might make on the question:
"Shall Russia settle down to a war of position in her vast
fortifications around Warsaw, or shall she continue to barter space
against time, withdrawing from the line of the Vistula and points on
it of both strategic and political importance, in order to gain the
time which Germany has already stored in the form of inexhaustible gun
munitions?" The reply was the evacuation of Warsaw.
The decisive blow to Russia's hopes came with the crossing of the
Vistula about twenty miles north of Ivangorod on July 28, 1915,
already noted. It showed that Warsaw was being rapidly surrounded. The
Russian communique of the 30th of July told of the crossing over of
the Teutons on both sides of the Radomka, a tributary of the Vistula,
to the right bank of the Vistula on pontoons, and of attempts to throw
bridges across the great rivers. Von Woyrsch's troops that had crossed
over were irresistibly pursuing still farther east on the 30th,
defeating troops hastily brought up to stop their advance. By August 1
two entire German army corps reached the right bank of the Vistula.
Ivangorod, now threatened from all directions, could evidently not be
held much longer.
The fortress surrendered on August 4, 1915, after a violent
bombardment of the outer forts had taken place, beginning on the first
of the month. Austro-Hungarian troops under General von Koevess
especially distinguished themselves in the attack on the west front.
CHAPTER LX
WARSAW FALLS
The retreat from Warsaw began during the night of August 3 and 4,
1915. Already the city had been stripped as far as possible, to judge
by reports from Petrograd, of metals, such as church bells and
machinery that might possibly be of use to the Germans. A portion of
the civilian population left the city. The Blonie line just to the
west of the capital was given up under pressure from the Teutons on
the 3d. While the retreat was taking place the Russians gave all
possible support to their forces defending the Narew lines, so far as
they still were maintained.
Desperate charges were hurled by the Russians against the Germans
moving forward all along the front Lowza-Ostrow-Wyszkow. The bravery
of the Russians, especially in their counterattacks on both sides of
the road from Rozan to Ostrow on the 4th of August, won the admiration
of the Germans.
The correspondent of the London "Times" reports that on August 4,
1915, there was probably not over one Russian corps on the west side
of the Vistula. "Half of that crossed south of Warsaw before 6 p. m.,"
he writes, "and probably the last division left about midnight, and at
3 a. m. on August 5 the bridges were blown up. The Germans arrived at
6 a. m." The formal entry of the Polish capital was made by Prince
Leopold of Bavaria as Commander in Chief of the army which took the
city.
[Illustration: The central figure is Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who
led the victorious Teutons into Warsaw, August 6, 1915. The Prince
with his staff are posed before Warsaw's magnificent cathedral.]
The formal announcement issued by the German Great Headquarters on the
5th of August read: "The army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria pierced and
took yesterday and last night the outer and inner lines of forts of
Warsaw in which Russian rear guards still offered stubborn resistance.
The city was occupied to-day by our troops."
[Illustration: Advance and Capture of Warsaw.]
In the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been employed. The
German northern army, operating against the double-track line which
runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000 miles in the northeast, via
Bielostok and Grodno; the army operating in the Suwalki district,
threatening the same line farther west; the army aimed at the Narew
based on Mearva; the army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the
Vistula; the (Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the
Vistula; ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the
single-and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsk and
Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin and Cholm, which
is for the most part a single track, and, finally, the army of Von
Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of Lemberg.
The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of 1,000 miles,
extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Rumania. An estimate
which lays claim to being based upon authoritative figures placed the
number of men engaged in almost daily conflict on this long line at
between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. The attacks upon the sides of the
lines on which the defense of Warsaw depended had been the most
furious in the course of the war on the eastern front. The losses on
both sides undoubtedly were enormous, though they can be ascertained
only with difficulty, if at all.
The following summary of captures was issued by the German Great
Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July between the Baltic
and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians; 41 guns, including two heavy ones; 4
mine throwers; 230 machine guns. Taken in July in the southeastern
theatre of war (apparently between Pilica and the Rumanian frontier):
323 officers; 75,719 men; 10 guns; 126 machine guns."
PART VIII--THE BALKANS
CHAPTER LXI
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS
In discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I we have already
shown how important a part the little Balkan States played in the long
chain of events leading up to the final catastrophe. When two mighty
lords come to blows over the right of way through the fields of their
peasant neighbors, it is only natural that the peasants themselves
should be deeply concerned. While it is not likely that any of them
would feel especially friendly toward either of the belligerents, it
might, however, be to their advantage to take a hand in the struggle
on the side of the victor. But until each thought he had picked the
winner he would hold aloof.
This was, in fact, the situation of all the Balkan States when the
Great War began, with the exception, of course, of Serbia, which had
been directly attacked. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece very hastily
announced their complete neutrality to each other as well as to the
world at large, though Greece was in the very awkward position of
having signed a defensive treaty with Serbia.
Though the Balkan situation has always been considered very
complicated, certain broad facts may be laid down which will serve as
a key to a fair understanding of the motives behind each of the
various moves being made on the Balkan chess board.
First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays a much
smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such countries as
England, France and our own country. Though each is more or less
democratic in form, none of these governments is really controlled by
its people in matters requiring such quick decisions as war. At the
head of each of the Balkan States is a monarch surrounded by a
governing clique who have full authority in military matters. Each of
these cliques has only one aim in mind: How shall it increase the area
of its territory, or at least save itself from losing any of what it
already controls?
Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with either of
the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or Russia. In her
case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely eliminated. She does,
however, covet a piece of Austrian territory, Transylvania, in which
there is a substantial Rumanian population which has always been
rather badly treated by Austria.
Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes her
freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons there is a very
strong sentiment among the people in favor of Russia. Russian
political intrigues during the past thirty years have done a great
deal, however, in undermining this kindly feeling among the more
intelligent Bulgarians. And then Russia's ambition to possess herself
of the Bosphorus as an outlet into the Mediterranean is directly
contrary to the ambitions of the governing clique of Bulgaria, which
also has its eyes on Constantinople.
Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike:
"Schwabs," they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's
contemplated pathway to Saloniki would cut down through Macedonia,
another territory coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria,
however, is a German by birth and training.
Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears Russia for
the same reason that Bulgaria does; Greece is determined that
Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears Austria because
Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki from her. And finally she
fears Italy because Italy has ambitions in Asia Minor and Albania. All
the belligerents seem to be treading on the toes of Greece.
It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an especially
delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively weak, these small
states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their selfish ambitions, or
of their governing cliques rather, make a combination impossible.
Their only chance is to bargain with the winner at the right moment.
During the first half year of the war there was very little for the
Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch; watch for the first
signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To be sure,
Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this period, but
German control of the Turkish machinery of government and the army
appears to have been so strong that it seems doubtful whether Turkish
initiative was much of a factor in the move.
One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Austria-Hungary
was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which they hoped to eliminate
her from the field and also to swing the other Balkan States,
especially Bulgaria, over to their side. And had Austria succeeded in
penetrating the peninsula through Serbia, there can hardly be any
doubt that the effect would have been immediate.
But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an abject
failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army corps had
been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the huge invading
armies had been driven back across the Danube and Save. Following
close upon this came the extraordinary success of the Russians in
Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which placed Hungary in immediate
danger of being invaded. The cause of the Allies began to look
promising and the machinery of Balkan diplomacy began slowly to
revolve.
Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had been
directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria and the
other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed her of
Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty of Bucharest,
whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely handed over to Serbia, and
Greece was, and continued to be, the main stumblingblock in the path
of the Allies to bring Bulgaria around to a union with Serbia and
Greece and Rumania, for Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's pockets
while she was down, by taking a strip of territory at the mouth of
the Danube. In this she had not even had the excuse of reclaiming her
own people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.
In January, 1915, Rumania began to show signs of shaping a definite
policy that might later lead her to taking sides. Her King, Carol, a
Hohenzollern by blood, had died shortly after the war and his nephew,
Ferdinand, ascended the throne on October 11, 1914. Possibly he may
have had something to do with the change. At any rate, though Rumania
had previously accepted financial assistance from Austria, in January
she received a loan of several millions from Great Britain, most of
which was spent on the army, then partly mobilized.
At the same time negotiations of a tentative nature were opened by the
Foreign Office with Russia offering to throw the Rumanian troops into
the conflict on the side of the Allies for a certain consideration.
This consideration was that she receive Bukowina, part of the province
of Banat, and certain sections of Bessarabia populated by Rumanians.
The Allies considered these demands extortionate, and the negotiations
were protracted. When the Austrians and Germans, later in the spring,
succeeded in driving the Russians out of the Carpathians, Rumania
hastily dropped these negotiations and seated herself more firmly on
top of the fence. And so, under the guidance of Bratiano, her prime
minister, she has continued throughout the whole year, listening to
proposals, first from one side, then from the other, but always
carefully maintaining her neutral position.
Bulgaria had, at about the same time, accepted a loan from Germany.
Attempts were made at the time to explain away the political
significance of the transaction by representing the advance as an
installment of a loan the terms of which had been arranged before the
beginning of the war, but the essential fact was that the cash came
from Germany at a time when she was herself calling in all the gold of
her people into the Imperial treasury.
Bulgaria now plainly let it be understood under what conditions she
would join a union of the Balkan neutrals against the Teutonic Powers.
Her premier, Radoslavov, head of the Bulgarian Liberal Party, whose
policy has always been anti-Russian, is one of the most astute
politicians in the Balkans, and this description is equally true of
King Ferdinand as a monarch. These two stated definitely Bulgaria's
price; that part of Macedonia which was to have been allowed to her by
the agreement which bound her to Serbia and Greece during the first
Balkan War; the Valley of the Struma, including the port of Kavalla,
that part of Thrace which she herself had taken from Turkey, and the
southern Dobruja, the whole of the territory Rumania had filched from
her while her back was turned during the two Balkan wars.
The Entente Powers held council with the other Balkan States, each of
which had taken its share of booty from Bulgaria. In order to persuade
them to consent to Bulgaria's terms, they suggested certain
compensations for the concessions they were asked to make. To Serbia,
which, in spite of her very precarious situation at the time, was very
averse to returning any part of her Macedonian territory, they pointed
out that she could find compensation in adding to her territory
Bosnia, Herzegovina and the other Slav provinces of Austria, where the
population was truly Serb. To Rumania, which was already willing to
meet Bulgaria half way, they promised Transylvania and Bukowina. To
Greece, which had done less and gained more than any of the other
states during the two Balkan Wars and so could afford to be generous,
they held out the prospect of gaining a considerable area in Asia
Minor, thickly populated by Greeks.
These changes naturally all depended on the complete defeat of the
Teutonic Powers, but Bulgaria demanded that at least some, and
especially Serbian Macedonia, should be handed over to her at once.
This latter demand brought about strong opposition. The other Balkan
States considered that, granting even that all these concessions were
to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not expect their fulfillment
until she had earned them by helping to defeat the Teutonic Powers.
Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-minded
statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of Greece,
concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as developed later, in
this he did not have the backing of the King and the rest of the
governing clique. In February no progress in the negotiations had been
made, though a special French Commission, headed by General Pau,
visited all the Balkan capitals and tried to bring about a mutual
agreement.
At about that time another important military event occurred,
especially affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente began
bombarding the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed that
Constantinople was presently to fall into their hands. Not long after
Venizelos stated, in an interview, that he was privy to this action
and proposed to send 50,000 Greek soldiers to assist the Allies by a
land attack on the Turks.
The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to support
Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible unless Greece
first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would not take the
opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall on the flank of the
Greek army operating against the Turks. Venizelos thereupon approached
Bulgaria and was told that Bulgaria would remain neutral if Greece
would cede most of her Macedonian conquests, which would include
Kavalla, Drama, and Serres, which stretch so provokingly eastward
along the coast and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.
Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught between two
obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one inch from her
demand; and, on the other hand, the Greek governing clique suddenly
refused to consider any proposal that would mean the cession of any
territory at all to the hated Bulgars. What probably stiffened the
opposition of the other members of the Greek Government to the Turkish
campaign was the growing suspicion on their part that the Allies were
also negotiating with Italy for her support. Now it was obvious that
if Italy was to fight in the Near East, she meant to demand a good
price. And this looked bad for Greece. Greece and Italy had already
nearly come to blows over their clashing interests in southern
Albania, yet even this was a small matter compared to rivalry in the
AEgean and Asia Minor. What deepened these suspicions was the fact
that the Allies refused to indicate definitely just what territory
Greece was to have in return for her support against the Turks. Their
promise of "liberal compensation" was not at all definite enough. Only
Venizelos was satisfied with this promise; he was in favor of trusting
implicitly to Anglo-French gratitude.
To bring this deadlock to a conclusion King Constantine called a Royal
Council, and by this body the matter was thoroughly discussed during
the first few days of March. The Council, together with the king,
decided against supporting the Allies actively on such terms. On the
morning of March 6 Venizelos called at the British legation in Athens
to say that the opposition of the king made it impossible to fulfill
his promise. That night he resigned.
The fall of Venizelos was, naturally, a heavy blow to the Allies. He
was succeeded by Gounaris, an ex-Minister of Finance, who announced
his policy as one of strict neutrality. Venizelos was so deeply
mortified that he declared that he would withdraw permanently from
public life, and then left Greece.
April, 1915, opened with an occurrence that seemed to throw a strong
light on the attitude of Bulgaria. On the night of the second day of
the month a large force of Bulgar Comitajis made a raid over the
southeastern frontier of Serbia, and, after attacking successfully the
Serbian outposts and blockhouses, in an attempt to cut the railroad,
by which Serbia was getting war supplies from the Allies, they were
repelled by the Serbians, though only after severe fighting.
Serbia and Greece both protested loudly, but Bulgaria affirmed that
she had had nothing to do with the matter.
As has developed since, Bulgaria had by this time definitely decided
to strike for the Teutonic allies when the right moment should come.
Already back in January, 1912, a secret treaty had been negotiated
between Bulgaria and Germany. This was signed a little later by Prince
Buelow and M. Rizoff at Rome. There were more reasons than one for
keeping this secret. For within the Bulgarian Parliament there was a
strong opposition to the German policy of Ferdinand and Radoslavov,
led by Malinoff, chief of the Democratic party, and Stambulovski,
chief of the Agrarian party, an opposition so bitter and determined
that the king had good reason to fear an open revolution should he
openly declare himself for the Germans.
On May 29, 1915, the Allies again sent a note to Bulgaria, making
proposals which comprised the results of their efforts to obtain
concessions from the other Balkan States. On June 15 Radoslavov sent a
reply, asking for further information, obviously drawn up in order to
gain time.
Meanwhile, on June 11, Venizelos had again appeared in Athens, where
he received a warm welcome from the populace, with whom he was the
prime favorite. Within a few days he resumed the leadership of the
Greek Liberal party and, at a general election, which was held shortly
after, he showed a popular majority support of 120 seats in the
Popular Assembly, notwithstanding a determined opposition made by his
opponents. Before the Balkan wars the Greek Parliament had consisted
of 180 members, but by according representation to the districts in
Macedonia annexed after the wars the number was brought up to 316.
Venizelos and his policy in favor of the Allies were emphatically
indorsed by the Greek suffrage. Naturally this expression of the
people's voice was a smart blow at the king and his councillors. On
the other hand, they were encouraged by an unfavorable turn that was
now taking place in the military operations of the Allies.
The attack on the Dardanelles by the warships had been a decided
failure. Nor were the operations of the British troops on the
peninsula of Gallipoli meeting with any real success. The Austrians
and the Germans had driven the Russians back from the Carpathians and
had retaken Przemysl and Lemberg. In fact, the situation of the
Austro-German armies had now become so favorable that it was possible
for the Teutonic allies to make proposals to the Balkan States with a
fair chance of being listened to.
During July, 1915, Serbia was approached by Germany with an offer of a
separate peace, but Serbia would not even consider the terms.
On July 8 Austria delivered a note to Rumania, through the Austrian
Minister in Bucharest, Count Czernin, which contained two sets of
proposals. One was contingent upon the continued but "friendly"
neutrality of Rumania, the other on her active participation in the
war on the side of Austria-Hungary.
In the first proposal Rumania was promised all of Bukowina south of
the Seret River, better treatment of the Rumanian population of
Austrian territory, the establishment of a Rumanian university in
Brasso, large admissions of Rumanians into the public service of
Hungary, and greater liberty of administration to the Rumanian
churches in Austria.
The second proposal specified that Rumania should put five army corps
and two cavalry divisions at the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian
General Staff to operate against the Russians. In return Rumania
should receive all of Bukowina up to the Pruth River, territory along
the north bank of the Danube up to the Iron Gate, complete autonomy
for the Rumanians in Transylvania and all of Bessarabia that the
Rumanian troops should assist in conquering from the Russians.
Just a week after this note was received in the Rumanian capital,
Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, whose wife was a sister of the Queen of
Rumania, arrived in Bucharest and tried to induce King Ferdinand to
come to terms with Austria, or at least to allow the transportation of
war munitions through the country to the Turks, who were then running
short of ammunition. The king refused this concession. How important
it would have been, had it been granted, may be judged from the many
efforts the Germans had made to smuggle material down to Turkey. In
one case the baggage of a German courier traveling to Constantinople
had been X-rayed and rifle ammunition had been found. Again, cases of
beer had been opened and found to contain artillery shells.
Rumania, however, could not yet make up her mind which was going to be
the winner. She accepted neither of the Austrian proposals, and
protracted making any definite answer as long as possible.
There was another reason why Rumania wished to continue her neutrality
until the following winter, at least. The harvesting of her great
wheat crops would begin soon, and this wheat could, as had been done
the previous year, be sold to the Germans and Austrians at big prices,
the blockade of the British fleet having already produced a pressing
shortage in foodstuffs. And then, her conscience being uneasy
regarding her robbery of territory from Bulgaria, she must also be
quite certain how Bulgaria was going to turn.
Having failed at Bucharest, the German agent, Prince
Hohenlohe-Langenburg, moved on to Sofia. At that moment King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria was endeavoring to get Turkey to sign a treaty, for which
negotiations had been going on secretly for some months, by which
Bulgaria was to obtain all the Turkish land on the west side of the
Maritza River, and so free the Bulgarian railroad to Dedeagatch from
Turkish interference. On July 23 this treaty was finally signed, and
Bulgaria acquired a full right of way along the line.
Bulgaria was now frankly asking bids for her support from both sides.
In an interview which the Premier, Radoslavov, granted to the
correspondent of a Budapest newspaper on August 3, 1915, and who
remarked to the premier that it was at least strange for a nation to
carry on such negotiations simultaneously with two groups of powers,
he replied:
"It is these negotiations which give us the chance to make a decision.
Our country seeks only her own advantages and wishes to realize her
rights. We have decided to gain these in any case. The only question
is: How can we achieve this with the least sacrifices? As regards the
internal situation of Bulgaria, I may proudly say that our conditions
have improved, and that everybody in the country looks forward to the
great national undertaking we are about to embark on with immense joy
and enthusiasm."
PART IX--ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
CHAPTER LXII
SPIRIT OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE--CRISIS OF THE GOVERNMENT
The crystallization of popular opinion in favor of intervention kept
pace with the trend of diplomatic negotiations. Italy, especially the
northern provinces, was a great beehive, humming with patriotic
fervor. Evenings in almost any northern town might be seen companies
of young men in civilian dress marching in companies and maneuvering
with military precision. At first the organizers of these "training
walks," as they were called, maintained reticence regarding their
purpose. The youths, they said, were merely undergoing voluntary
training to be ready "in case they should be needed." But the purpose
of these volunteer drills was unmistakable. At times, when the drill
grounds were rather isolated, the marchers would burst into patriotic
songs--the hymn of the Garibaldians, or, perhaps "Trieste of My
Heart." Soon the neutralists began to organize counterpreparations.
Encounters between bands of the rival factions became increasingly
frequent, in fact daily occurrences. From jeers they passed to
scuffles, in which missiles and clubs were the weapons. As a rule
these encounters took place far enough from the city limits to avoid
interference by the police, and only vague reports of them reached the
main body of home-loving citizens.
Milan was the center of these demonstrations. During April, 1915, the
Socialists proclaimed a "general strike," which left a large part of
the working population idle to attend gatherings addressed by the
neutralist orator. These meetings generally wound up with a parade,
and perhaps a hostile demonstration in front of the office of some
interventionist newspaper, or cheers outside the German Consulate. The
next day the Piazza would be thronged with a gathering of
interventionists wearing the national colors entwined with the flag of
Trieste, and, perhaps, with the "honorable red shirt" of the
Garibaldians. During the period just before the entrance of Italy into
the war these rival processions were held on different days by order
of the police, who ruthlessly broke up any attempt to interfere with
assemblies entitled to the right of way. As the war party began to
gain, their opponents adopted the custom of attacking the demonstrants
after they had disbanded.
As it was, a mob attacked the Milan branch of the Siemens-Schuckert
works, the great Berlin electrical machinery factory, battered in the
main entrance, and exchanged shots with some young German employees
left in charge. The timely arrival of the armed police stopped this
riot, and removed the Germans to safe quarters.
At this juncture, or before, the influence of the "Garibaldi" movement
became widely apparent. Early in the war the Garibaldians had launched
a movement to recognize the aid received from France by Italy during
her War of Independence. A special corps of Garibaldi volunteers was
enrolled in France, and its valiant service in the Alsace campaign,
where one of the members of the Garibaldi family fell, had a telling
effect in Italy. Volunteers for this corps at once sprang up from all
parts of the country.
On May 10, 1915, Germans and Austrians throughout Italy were advised
by their consulates to leave the country. The exodus proceeded
rapidly, and during the next ten days nearly all the citizens of the
two Central Powers who were able to leave had taken refuge in
Switzerland. Italy seemed ripe for war; but still the Government
delayed. There was now no doubt of the popular mind; but events
outside the country were not encouraging. Perhaps the weightiest of
these deterring factors was news of the Russian retirement in the
north and information reaching the Italian Minister of War that the
Entente Allies were short of ammunition.
Then came the crisis in the Government. Baron Sonnino's denunciation of
the Alliance caused a change in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Office. Prince von Buelow and the Austrian Ambassador, Baron von
Macchio, were authorized to conclude a new agreement on the basis of
further Austrian concessions. Sonnino refused to accept the new terms and
the German and Austrian representatives played their last trump. Baron
von Macchio telegraphed to Vienna accusing the Italian Foreign Minister
of concealing information of the Austrian concessions both from the king
and the majority of the cabinet. The concessions were printed and
circulated widely among the people. Signor Giolitti, Salandra's
predecessor, and at one time all but dictator of Italy, hurried to Rome
and rallied his followers. The neutralists hailed him as the man to save
Italy from a ruinous war.
Parliament was to meet on May 20, 1915. It was clear that the
supporters of Giolitti, in majority both in the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies, could, if they chose, overthrow the Government. Popular
anxiety was intense.
On the evening of May 13, 1915, came the announcement that the
Salandra ministry had resigned. If there had been any doubt of the
state of things throughout Italy up to that point, this news cleared
the situation. The whole country burst into a flame of indignation.
The next day Italy learned for the first time that the Triple Alliance
had been denounced early in the month.
It became clear that whatever the fate of Salandra and his cabinet,
his foreign policy was bound to be continued.
On May 15, 1915, announcement that the king had declined to accept
Salandra's resignation caused a great popular outburst of joy. In Rome
an immense gathering called to protest against the Giolittians and
German influence was transformed into a demonstration of triumph; more
than 150,000 persons took part in a procession a mile long that moved
from the Piazza del Popolo to the Quirinal.
The next morning, May 16, 1915, there was nobody in Rome who doubted
what Italy would do. That day Giolitti left Rome, and his departure
marked the end of his active influence during the opening months of
the war. His party crumpled.
When Parliament met on May 20, 1915, Salandra received an overwhelming
vote of confidence in the passage of a bill conferring extraordinary
powers upon the Government in the event of war. Miles north of Rome,
word came to the Austrian commanders, working feverishly to strengthen
their forts in the fastnesses of the Alps, to brace themselves for the
assault.
CHAPTER LXIII
THE DECISION MADE--ITALIAN STRATEGIC PLAN
On the night of May 24, 1915, little groups of the Alpini, Italy's
famous mountain troops, moved silently. They passed from San Giorgio,
Cividale and Palmanova on the eastern frontier, from Paluzza and San
Stefano and Pieve on the north, from Agordo, Feltre and Asiago, from
Brentino and Malcesine toward Lake Garda, from Garganano the western
shore of the lake and from other positions all along the mountain
frontier up to the Stelvio Pass.
Marching silently and in single file, by three o'clock in the morning
of May 25, 1915, one detachment reached a deep trench. "Our
frontiers," said their officers. "We advance to make new ones." Then
began a long, steep climb up narrow mountain paths, through snow lying
in patches knee-deep, and through a storm of sleet and rain that broke
along the Trentino boundary before dawn. As dawn broke they hurled
themselves upon an Austrian shelter trench excavated the autumn before
on the plateau. It was empty. The enemy had retired only a few hours
before. The camp-fire ashes were still warm. As the sun began to throw
the long shadows of the Alpine peaks to the west Austrian guns
crashed out their first salute from the rocky fortresses beyond. Italy
and Austria-Hungary were at war.
To comprehend the task before the Italian army it is necessary to
examine the Italian-Austrian frontier. Austria's problem was one only
of defense. Her warning had been ample and when war was declared she
was prepared to the last detail. Being the challenged party hers was
the choice of weapons, and she had equipped herself with an almost
impregnable line of fortifications. The grievance was Italy's, and
hers the duty of assault. Every advantage of position lay with
Austria.
The strategic plan of the Italian generals was determined by hard
geographical facts. The Italo-Austrian frontier is about 480 miles
long, divided naturally into three sections. On the west the Austrian
province of Trentino indents Italian territory like a wedge; next
comes the great wall of the Dolomites and the Carnic and Julian Alps;
then, on the east, a boundary line running north and south between the
main Alpine chain and the Adriatic Sea. Steep mountain heights
dominated by Austrian troops guarded the first two parts of this
frontier. Only on the eastern border, from Pontebba to the Adriatic
was Italian offensive on a large scale at all feasible; but before
offensive operations could be started here it was necessary for the
Italians to close the open gates to the north.
Here in the north lay Italy's problem at the opening of the war; and
here her armies confronted an almost impossible task. In a word, they
had to fight uphill. A salient, such as that formed by the Trentino,
may offer dangers for the side that holds it--an example of which is
the Russian position in Poland at the opening of the war; but the
Trentino situation was quite unlike that in Poland. The sides of the
Trentino were buttressed with mountains. The most tempting avenue of
invasion was the valley of the Adige River. An enemy advancing by this
route would find himself confronted with the strongly fortified town
of Trent, which long resisted attacks from Venice in the Middle Ages.
Having forced his way past Trent the enemy would be in a wilderness of
lateral valleys with the main ridge of the Alpine chain, at the
Brenner, still before him.
On the western side of the Trentino is the lofty Stelvio Pass, leading
from the Upper Adige to the valley of Adda. This pass is 9,000 feet
high and its narrow defiles were easily defended. To the south lies
the pass of Tonale over which runs the road from Noce to the Oglio,
but this offers similar difficulties. The road pass of Cornelle, close
to Lake Garda, is too narrow for any considerable force. On the
eastern side of the salient conditions for invasion are still worse.
The railway from Venice to Innsbruck crosses the Valsugana at Tezze,
but the Brenta valley through which it runs is a difficult road to
Trent. Summed up, the salient of the Trentino was an ideal position
for those who held it, both offensive and defensive. The few breaches
by which invasion could come were a source of strength rather than
weakness, because they compelled attack from the Italian plain to be
made on divergent lines from different bases.
The second part of the frontier is the ramparts of the Dolomite and
Carnic ranges through which an important offensive was possible for
neither belligerent. The main pass, at Ampezzo, 5,000 feet high, makes
a sharp detour toward the west to circumvent the mass of Cristallo,
and here the road is a narrow defile commanded by a hundred points of
danger. The adjacent passes of Misurina and the Monte Croce are no
better, and the defiles to the east contain little more than bridle
paths. The lowest pass, which leads from the valley of the Fella by
Pontebba to the upper streams of the Drave and carries the railway
from Venice to Vienna is only 2,615 feet high at its greatest
elevation. Although this is the easiest of the great routes through
the mountain barrier, it is still narrow and difficult. A modern army
given the advantages of time and preparation should be able to close
and hold it with ease.
Although the maps show few natural difficulties on the third section
of the frontier to compare with those farther west, it is not the
obvious avenue of attack a hasty survey would seem to suggest. It is
only twenty miles wide and behind it is the line of the River Isonzo
with hills along its eastern bank. The upper part of this stream,
above Salcana, is a ravine; then comes six miles of comparatively
level ground in front of Gorizia; then the hills begin again and
sweep round to the seacoast by Monfalcone. What this front lacks in
natural defenses had been amply supplied before the war opened by
Austria with artillery and men. Toward this narrow twenty-mile
stretch, and especially toward the plain before Gorizia, tended, in a
sense, however, all the operations of the Italian strategists. The
engagements fought during the first of the Italo-Austrian struggle all
had their bearing upon the great offensive launched later against
Gorizia.
But the natural lay of the land was by no means the only consideration
with which the rival generals had to deal. In respect to lateral
communications Italy had the advantage. Behind her invading armies
stretched an elaborate system of railways through her northern
provinces. Austria had a railway running through the whole curve of
the frontier, but owing to the difficulty of breaking through from the
hill valleys this system had few feeders. This lack of branch lines
meant that Austria had to concentrate any offensive at certain
definite places--Trent, Tarvis, and Gorizia. Italy aimed at these
points and one more, Franzensfeste, the junction of the Pusterthal
line with the railway from Innsbruck to Trent. If she could take this
point she could cut Austria's communications in the whole Trentino
salient. But Franzensfeste was the most difficult of any of these
local points for Italy to reach, for south and east of it lay the
bristling system of the Dolomites.
The successive revelations of Italian strategy during the first months
of the war brought few surprises. Austria had her hands full in the
Carpathians just then and was unable to take advantage of the
opportunities for swift offensive which her frontier positions
offered. It was a foregone conclusion that the first advance would
come from the Italian side and the direction of that movement was not
long in doubt. Its objective was Trieste, the Austrian peninsula, and
the hills of Styria which sweep to Vienna. There lay the country where
modern armies could maneuver. At the same time the whole northern
boundary must be watched to prevent Austrian forces from the Trentino
cutting the communications of the invader and attacking him in the
rear. Therefore General Cadorna, the Italian commander in chief,
resolved to attack at all the salient points. Such a plan led to a
series of movements--toward Trent, across the Dolomite passes against
the Pusterthal railway, at the Pontebba Pass, and across the Julian
Alps to threaten the line between Tarvis and Gorizia. Meanwhile the
main Italian army was to strike at the Isonzo and the road to Trieste.
The same conditions which made the Austrian frontier lines easy to
defend also would have given the Central Power a big advantage in
offensive operations, but for excellent reasons the Austrian staff did
not attack. In the first place, Austria lacked men. The Teutonic war
councils concluded that Austro-Hungarian troops were of more value in
the great drive then in progress against the Russians than they would
have been in offensive operations against the cities of the northern
Italian plains. Had the Austrians debouched from their mountain
strongholds and forced the Italians to concentrate against them in
Italian territory, as they undoubtedly could have done, the benefits
of such an enterprise from the standpoint of the alliance powers would
have been small in proportion to the risks. Only a combined drive by
both Austria and Germany, it is believed, could have gained any
telling advantage in northern Italy; and Italy, it must be remembered,
had not declared war on Germany. Ensconced in their mountain
fastnesses, the Austrians believed they could maintain a successful
defensive indefinitely. Then, after the Italian armies had exhausted
themselves beating against the mountain barrier, an opportunity might
arise for Austrian reprisals. At the time few believed that Italy
would long be able to maintain her attitude of neutrality regarding
Germany--an opinion, by the way, which was not supported by the
developments of the first year of the war.
The Austrians had months in which to prepare, and they had made good
use of their time. The natural difficulties confronting an Italian
assault had been enormously increased by trenches of steel and
concrete. The Austrian engineers had connected their elaborate systems
of wire entanglements with high-power electric stations, and dug mines
at all vulnerable points. Heavy guns had been moved, at great
expenditure of labor, to the frontier forts and rails laid on which to
move them from place to place. The broken nature of the ground
afforded ideal opportunities for the concealment of artillery
positions. It is safe to say that nowhere in the whole theatre of the
Great War was there a line better adapted by nature and equipped by
man for purposes of defensive warfare. The Austrian Archduke Eugene,
who was in charge of the Italian operations, revealed his plan of
campaign during the first few days after the beginning of hostilities.
His aim was to risk nothing until Field Marshal von Mackensen had
finished his operations in Galicia, where Austria's best troops were
fighting with their German allies. To meet the Italians he had only
the Landsturm and a few reserve divisions, but these were considered
enough. The archduke resolved to hold the crests of the passes along
the Trentino frontier and the line of the Carnic Alps, withdrawing his
outposts before the enemy's advance. On the Isonzo he would abandon
the country west of the river line and make his stand on a fortified
line to the east which touched the Isonzo only at Gorizia, where the
Austrians held the bridgehead on the western bank.
It has been pointed out in preceding pages that not a little of
Italy's delay in entering the war, and of the tortuous diplomatic
negotiations which for several months kept the outside in doubt as to
her ultimate intentions, was due to the state of military
unpreparedness confronting the country in the summer of 1914. But by
May, 1915, the country had had nine months in which to get ready.
Moreover, she had been able to profit by the lessons of the war. When
Italy started to get ready there was no waste motion, although the
task to be accomplished entailed enormous labor and expense.
CHAPTER LXIV
STRENGTH OF ITALIAN ARMY AND NAVY
At the head of the Italian army and navy was the king, Victor
Emmanuel, a monarch whose gallantry and simplicity had made him a
popular idol. Popularity with the people meant also popularity with
the army. The chief of the General Staff was General Count Luigi
Cadorna. At the outbreak of the war General Cadorna was sixty-five
years old. As a young man he had seen service under his father,
Rafaele Cadorna, who, in September 1870, led an army into papal
territory and blew in the Porta Pia. He had been a corps commander at
Genoa. In 1914 he had succeeded General Pollio as chief of the General
Staff.
Cadorna was the Von Hindenburg of Italy. As the German commander had
studied the bogs of East Prussia, so he had devoted a large part of
his life to becoming familiar with the broken line of Italy's northern
frontier. He was known throughout Europe for his writings on military
science.
The beginning of the war found the Italian navy far better equipped
than the army. For the task of holding Austria in the Adriatic, which
Italy now took over from France, she possessed four dreadnoughts and
two more almost ready. She possessed also ten battleships of the
predreadnought class and a number of older vessels. Compared with
those of Great Britain and Germany, her armored cruisers were slow,
none of them being capable of a speed exceeding twenty-two knots; but
she had twenty submarines, forty destroyers and a large number of
torpedo boats. Compared with the Austro-Hungarian fleet, the Italian
navy showed on paper a distinct superiority. Its admiral in chief, the
Duke of the Abruzzi, ranked among the most brilliant men of his time,
not only as a naval man, but as a scientist, explorer, and man of
affairs. He was first cousin of the king.
By May, 1915, General Cadorna virtually had remade the Italian army.
Nine months earlier Italy's military forces were anything but
prepared. There was a shortage in every kind of munitions, stores, and
equipment. This was plainly evidenced when General Porro had refused
an offer of the portfolio of Minister of War in the spring of 1914
because he was unable to obtain a pledge for the adoption of a program
of re-equipment that demanded a great expenditure of money. The late
Government had not made good the expenditure of material caused by the
Lybian War, and great quantities of stores had been allowed to
deteriorate until they were almost valueless. There was a certain
number of guns of medium caliber, but no heavy artillery of the modern
type which the Teutonic allies soon showed they possessed in
abundance. Of machine guns Italy had a lower proportion than any other
of the great powers. All this had been realized, but the money to
repair these deficiencies was not forthcoming until the Italian
statesmen knew that they were on the brink of war.
Filling the gaps in the army, raising it from a peace to a war
footing, was an easier matter. The Italian military law provided
automatically for this increase. Every Italian citizen able to bear
arms is liable to military service. Recruits are called in the year
during which they become twenty years old, although volunteers are
accepted as young as eighteen. The last Italian census, in 1911, gave
Italy a population of 34,686,683 and the levy lists of that year
totaled 487,570. By the close of the year 1914, when the mobilization
began, it is reasonable to suppose that the population had grown to
something like thirty-six or thirty-seven million, with a
corresponding increase in the number available for military service.
The peace strength of the army was 14,000 officers and 271,000 men.
Mobilization added to each of the twelve corps a division of Mobile
Militia bringing its strength up to 37,000 men and 134 guns. The
army's war strength was about 700,000 in the first line--from the two
classes of the regular army--and 320,000 in the Mobile Militia with a
reserve of more than 2,000,000 in the Territorial Militia. The force
of trained men that Italy put into the field at the beginning of
hostilities, therefore, numbered something over 1,000,000 men. The
reservoir of the Territorial Militia contained twice as many more
untrained men who for some reason or other were exempt from military
service in times of peace, although physically fit to be soldiers.
This class was designed primarily for garrison duty, guarding railways
and bridges, but in war time was liable to any service. When the
mobilization began the men of this class immediately went into
training. Each of the twelve army corps consisted of two divisions of
line infantry, a regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry corresponding
to the French Chasseurs and the German Jaegers), a regiment of
cavalry, a section of Carabinieri (military police), thirty-six field
guns and from two to three heavy howitzer batteries. In addition there
was the ammunition column, telegraph and engineer parks, ambulance and
supply sections, reserve store and supply sections, and a section of
field bakery.
The famous Alpine troops ("Alpini") and the mountain artillery were
not within the organization of the twelve permanent army corps. These
numbered seventy-eight companies, each of 256 officers and men on a
war footing. The rest of the Italian infantry units at normal war
strength were as follows: Company, 255 officers and men; Battalion,
1,043 officers and men; Regiment, 3,194 officers and men. Five of the
cavalry regiments contained six squadrons, the rest five. The war
strength of a squadron was 142 officers and men.
The infantry were armed with a magazine rifle of very small caliber,
.256-inch. The magazine held six rounds and was loaded with a clip.
The length of this piece was 4 feet 2-3/4 inches, with bayonet 5 feet
2-1/2 inches. It weighed without bayonet 8 pounds 6 ounces, and was
sighted up to 2,200 yards. The outbreak of the war found a process of
rearmament going on in the artillery. Italy at that time had no
adequate siege train and her heaviest mobile weapons were
210-millimeter howitzers and 149-millimeter guns. While the details of
the final artillery equipment were not made public by the War
Department, events showed that the Italians were well supplied with
modern guns of both medium and heavy caliber. The mountain artillery,
of which there were thirty-nine batteries, was especially efficient,
not only in guns, but in men and transport animals. It was said that
the Italian artillery mules could drag a gun wherever there was room
for its emplacement.
Italy was one of the first countries to use aeroplanes in war, and her
aviation corps had had experience in Tripoli. Although handicapped by
lack of money, the Italian military aviators were well abreast of
their opponents, at least in the theoretical and mechanical
development of the science. During the winter of 1914 a considerable
increase was made in the personnel of the corps and in the number of
machines.
There is reason to believe that at the beginning of the war the
Italian soldier was not highly regarded by Austrian and German
military authorities. As a whole the army's reputation had been
injured by the Adowa disaster and by the slowness of the campaign in
Tripoli. But the developments of actual warfare in the spring and
summer of 1915 proved that Italian apologists were correct in their
claim that in the former war the army was handicapped by political
causes. Physically the Italian troops were equal to any in Europe. The
Alpini were perhaps the best mountain soldiers in the world. The
Italian soldier is not impressive as to stature, but he is tough and
enduring. He is cheerful and obedient under discipline and hardship,
and the relations between officers and men were such as to produce the
best results in a hard campaign.
All these qualities were requisite for the difficult task to which
General Cadorna now turned his first line troops, numbering about
700,000 men. To oppose this advance the Austrians mustered on the
frontier about half that number. General von Hofer was chief of staff
under Archduke Eugene and General Dankl was in command in the Tyrol.
Two reasons have been advanced to explain the succession of small
victories with which the Italians opened their campaign. The first,
already mentioned, is that it was part of the Austrian plan to yield
their outpost positions with slight resistance and protect their
numerically inferior forces in the main strongholds of the mountains.
The other is that the archduke and his generals made the mistake of
underestimating the enemy. For centuries Italy had supplied the
Austrian Court with its poets and musicians, until in the Dual
Monarchy the Italians were regarded as an effete race, fit only for
the politer pursuits of art, literature and song. Italy's successful
War of Independence in the latter half of the nineteenth century had
not altogether destroyed this impression. This idea, it may be said,
was not shared by the Germans, whose military men had made a closer
study of world conditions and had learned to respect the virility of
the men of modern Italy.
CHAPTER LXV
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS
Owing to the nature of the scene of hostilities the first days of the
Austro-Italian campaign brought a series of engagements between small
groups of combatants. Artillery played a large part, and here the
Austrians, with their big guns already in carefully studied positions,
had a decided advantage. Viewed as a whole only does the campaign at
this stage take on an importance and dignity that ranks with the great
battles on other fronts of the Great War. Never before had two great
powers fought in territory so absolutely ill adapted to the movement
of large bodies of troops. For the same reason the story attains a
picturesqueness absent from the dreary plains of Galicia and Poland
and Flanders. Austrians, Hungarians and Italians fought in a land
known throughout the world to tourists for its grandeur of scenery,
its towering, snow-clad peaks, and idyllic lakes and valleys. It was
warfare where the best soldier was the man most able to surmount the
natural difficulties and take advantage of the natural protection of
the ground. The official statements of the Italian and Austrian war
offices told of feats of mountaineering, and of hand-to-hand
struggles, of dripping bayonets and of combatants locked in last
embrace with hands clutching each other's throats.
On both sides of the boundary were thousands of men who had spent
their lives exploring the trackless mountainsides, climbing with ropes
and ice axes and staves. Both nations had encouraged the formation of
Alpine clubs.
Soon after midnight on May 23, 1915, the Alpini and Bersaglieri of the
Italian army, supported by a few battalions of first line troops and
gendarmes, crossed the mountain frontier. Soon the peaks resounded
with the popping of rifle fire and the louder detonations of the
Austrian mountain guns. Along the whole Trentino front that night a
hundred skirmishes drove back the Austrian outpost. Only a few
thousand men in all were engaged. The Italian cyclist sharpshooters
advanced swiftly up the steep mountain roads until greeted by musketry
fire. Then they sought shelter, pushing forward from rock to rock and
from tree to tree. Often the light infantry and Alpini foot soldiers
were able to skirt the enemy's posts and catch them in the rear.
By May 26, 1915, all Italy was thrilled by the news that all the lower
passes of the Dolomites were won and breaches made at Tonale Pass
along the northwest and in the Carnic and Julian Alps along the
northeast front. Among the points occupied were the Montozzo Pass,
9,585 feet high, Ponte Caffaro, running into southwestern Trentino,
the ridge of Monte Baldo, extending northward fifteen miles toward
Arco and Roverto in southern Trentino, some of the heights looking
westward toward Trento, all the valleys in the labyrinth of the
Dolomites, and several footholds in the Alps of Carinthia. The eastern
army was well inside Austrian territory, its left at Caporetto on the
Isonzo just under Monte Nero, its center looking down on Gorizia from
the heights between Indria and the Isonzo, and its right between
Cormons and Terzo. Losses on both sides were surprisingly small
considering the extent of territory covered by the fighting. The
Austrians, after slight resistance, withdrew into their fortresses and
waited behind their guns, grimly conscious that the real struggle was
still before them.
Then, through the holes pierced by the mountain troops, the Italian
engineers began to move forward their artillery and building
emplacements and constructing trenches. Skirmishing on the mountain
frontier continued until the end of May, 1915. By that time Italian
forces attacking Trentino had crossed the Lessini Mountains north of
Verona, captured the Austrian town of Ala on the Adige, and penetrated
nearly ten miles into Austrian territory. They held high ground on the
south commanding the forts of Roverto, and had begun to bring up their
heavy guns against this important stronghold. Roverto is one of a
number of strongly fortified places girdling Trent and commanding the
converging routes to this center of the Austrian defensive. Other
lesser fortresses in this girdle are Laredo on the Chiese, Levico on
the Brenta, and Riva at the head of Lake Garda. Upon these the
Italians closed in, and there they consolidated their positions
awaiting the support of the first-line troops advancing in heavy
detachments, and of their artillery.
While Italy struck the first blow on land, the first offensive
operation of the Italo-Austrian conflict by sea came from Austria.
This was an extensive raid on Italy's Adriatic coast. Its object was
to delay the Italian concentration by attacking vital points on the
littoral railway from Brindisi to the north.
[Illustration: The Coasts of Italy and Austria, Showing the Naval Raid
May, 1915.]
The Austrian fleet began its attack early on the morning of Monday,
May 24, 1915. The ships engaged were a squadron from Pola, consisting
of two battleships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers, strongly
supported by aircraft. The assault extended from Brindisi to Venice,
and covered a large extent of coast territory hard to defend. At
Venice the Austrian air raiders dropped bombs into the arsenal and the
oil tanks and balloon sheds on the Lido. The priceless relics of art
and architecture, all that remained to recall the city's proud
position as ruler of the Adriatic, were uninjured, but the attack from
the air caused an outcry from the nations of the Entente almost equal
to that which rang through the world when the Germans shelled the
cathedral at Rheims and destroyed Louvain. The Austrians replied that
the attack was a serious military operation, and by no means the
wanton outrage their enemies had tried to make it appear.
The Austrian naval raid lasted barely two hours, but in that time the
cruiser _Novara_ and several destroyers attacked Porto Corsini, north
of Ravenna, in a vain effort to destroy the Italian torpedo base; the
cruiser _St. Georg_ shelled the railway station and bridges at Rimini;
the battleship _Zrinyi_ attacked Sinigaglia, and wrecked the railway
station and bridge; south of Ancona the battleship _Radetzky_
destroyed a bridge over the River Potenza. In the south the cruisers
_Helgoland_ and _Admiral Spaun_ with destroyers shelled a railway
bridge and station and several signal stations in the neighborhood of
Manfredonia and Viesti, and caused some damage in small coast towns.
The raid was well planned and swiftly executed, and it accomplished
much of its purpose. The Italian fleet was taken by surprise, and the
marauders were back in safety at Pola by six o'clock in the morning,
unharmed.
While Italian Alpine troops were driving in the Austrian outposts on
the frontiers of Trentino and the Tyrol, General Cadorna advanced his
main infantry force, the Third Army, across the Friuli Plain through
Udine, Palmanova, and St. Georgio toward the Isonzo. Here the covering
troops on May 24 and 25 had captured nearly all the small towns and
villages between the frontier and the river from Caporetto in the
north just below Monte Nero to Belvedere in the south on the Gulf of
Trieste. Cadorna feared lest his opponent, General von Hofer, would
launch his main attack from Gorizia against the Italian city of
Palmanova, fourteen miles to the west. But Von Hofer, so it developed,
had a subtler plan of campaign than a direct attack through Gorizia.
What he did was to place a strong force on the mountain of Korada
between the Isonzo and the Judrio. This height commanded the middle
course of the Isonzo, and it had been transformed into a network of
permanent trenches, protected by strong wire entanglements.
The Austrian general believed that by the time the Italians could
bring up their heavy artillery and begin to smash the entanglements
with their field guns, supports could be pushed across the river.
Realizing that Korada must be captured, if at all, by dash and
surprise, the Italian brigadier in charge of the attack gathered a
herd of fierce bulls, which are numerous in that part of Venetia, and
penned them in a hollow out of sight of the enemy, while his artillery
began to bombard the hostile trenches. When the animals were wrought
to a frenzy of rage and fear by the noise of the guns, they were let
loose and driven up the mountain against the Austrian positions. Their
charge broke through many strands of the wire entanglements, and
before the last of them fell dead under the Austrian rifle fire,
Italian troops with fixed bayonets had crowded through the gaps in the
wires and captured the position.
By the end of May, 1915, the Third Army had reached the Isonzo River,
but had not crossed. Its advance was slow and cautious. Operations
were hampered by the heavy rains, which caused the river to overflow
its banks and added greatly to the difficulties put in the path of the
advancing army by the Austrians, who, as they withdrew, left not a
bridge behind them.