On the 7th of May, 1915, came the most sensational act committed by

German submarines since the war had started--the sinking of the Cunard

liner _Lusitania_. The vessel which did this was one of the _U-39_

class. In her last hours above water the giant liner was nearing

Queenstown on a sunny day in a calm sea. When about five miles off

shore, near Old Head of Kinsale, on the southeastern coast of Ireland,

a few minutes after two o'clock, while many of the passengers were at

lunch and a few of them on deck, there came a violent shock.

[Illustration: The Great liner, "Lusitania," which was torpedoed by a

German submarine, not far from Old Kinsale Head, Ireland, May 7,

1915.]

Five or six persons who had been on deck had noticed, a few moments

before, the wake of something that was moving rapidly toward the ship.

The moving object was a torpedo, which struck the hull to the forward

on the starboard side and passed clean through the ship's engine room.

She began to settle by the bows immediately, and the passengers,

though cool, made rushes for lifebelts and for the small boats. The

list of the boat made the launching of some of these impossible.

The scenes on the decks of the sinking liner were heartrending.

Members of families had become separated and ran wildly about seeking

their relatives. The women and children were put into the

lifeboats--being given preference.

"I was on the deck about two o'clock," narrated one of the survivors,

"the weather was fine and bright and the sea calm. Suddenly I heard a

terrific explosion, followed by another, and the cry went up that the

ship had been torpedoed. She began to list at once, and her angle was

so great that many of the boats on the port side could not be

launched. A lot of people made a rush for the boats, but I went down

to my cabin, took off my coat and vest and donned a lifebelt. On

getting up again I found the decks awash and the boat going down fast

by the head. I slipped down a rope into the sea and was picked up by

one of the lifeboats. Some of the boats, owing to the position of the

vessel, got swamped, and I saw one turn over no less than three times,

but eventually it was righted."

Not all of the women and children got off the liner into the small

boats. "Women and children, under the protection of men, had clustered

in lines on the port side of the ship," reported another survivor. "As

the ship made her plunge down by the head, she finally took an angle

of ninety degrees, and I saw this little army slide down toward the

starboard side, dashing themselves against each other as they went,

until they were engulfed."

Even under the stress of avoiding death the sight of the sinking hull

was one that held the attention of those in the water. One of the

sailors said afterward: "Her great hull rose into the air and neared

the perpendicular. As the form of the vessel rose she seemed to

shorten, and just as a duck dives so she disappeared. She went almost

noiselessly. Fortunately her propellers had stopped, for had these

been going, the vortex of her four screws would have dragged down many

of those whose lives were saved. She seemed to divide the water as

smoothly as a knife would do it."

Twenty minutes after the torpedo had struck the ship she had

disappeared beneath the surface of the sea. "Above the spot where she

had gone down," said one of the men who escaped death, "there was

nothing but a nondescript mass of floating wreckage. Everywhere one

looked there was a sea of waving hands and arms, belonging to the

struggling men and frantic women and children in agonizing efforts to

keep afloat. That was the most horrible memory and sight of all."

Fishing boats and coasting steamers picked up many of the survivors

some hours after the disaster. The frightened people in the small

boats pulled for the shore after picking up as many persons as they

dared without swamping their boats. Some floated about in the waters

for three and four hours, kept up by their lifebelts. Some, who were

good swimmers, managed to keep above water till help came; others

became exhausted and sank.

Probably the best story, covering the entire period from the time the

ship was hit till the survivors were landed at Queenstown, was told by

Dr. Daniel V. Moore, an American physician: "After the explosion,"

said Dr. Moore, "quiet and order were soon accomplished by assurances

from the stewards. I proceeded to the deck promenade for observation,

and saw only that the ship was fast leaning to the starboard. I

hurried toward my cabin below for a lifebelt, and turned back because

of the difficulty in keeping upright. I struggled to D deck and

forward to the first-class cabin, where I saw a Catholic priest.

"I could find no belts, and returned again toward E deck and saw a

stewardess struggling to dislodge a belt. I helped her with hers and

secured one for myself. I then rushed to D deck and noticed one woman

perched on the gunwale, watching a lowering lifeboat ten feet away. I

pushed her down and into the boat, then I jumped in. The stern of the

lifeboat continued to lower, but the bow stuck fast. A stoker cut the

bow ropes with a hatchet, and we dropped in a vertical position.

"A girl whom we had heard sing at a concert was struggling, and I

caught her by the ankle and pulled her in. A man I grasped by the

shoulders and I landed him safe. He was the barber of the first-class

cabin, and a more manly man I never met.

"We pushed away hard to avoid the suck, but our boat was fast filling,

and we bailed fast with one bucket and the women's hats. The man with

the bucket became exhausted, and I relieved him. In a few minutes she

was filled level full. Then a keg floated up, and I pitched it about

ten feet away and followed it. After reaching the keg I turned to see

what had been the fate of our boat. She had capsized. Now a young

steward, Freeman, approached me, clinging to a deck chair. I urged him

to grab the other side of the keg several times. He grew faint, but

harsh speaking roused him. Once he said: 'I am going to go.' But I

ridiculed this, and it gave him strength.

"The good boat _Brock_ and her splendid officers and men took us

aboard.

"At the scene of the catastrophe the surface of the water seemed

dotted with bodies. Only a few of the lifeboats seemed to be doing any

good. The cries of 'My God!' 'Save us!' and 'Help!' gradually grew

weaker from all sides, and finally a low weeping, wailing,

inarticulate sound, mingled with coughing and gargling, made me

heartsick. I saw many men die. Some appeared to be sleepy and worn out

just before they went down."

Officials of the Cunard Line claimed afterward that three submarines

had been engaged in the attack on the liner, but, after all evidence

had been sifted, the claim made by the Germans that only one had been

present was found to be true. The commander of the submarine had

evidently been well informed as to just what route the liner would

take. Trouble with her engines, which developed after she had left New

York, had brought her speed down to 18 knots, a circumstance which was

in favor of the attacking vessel, for it could not have done much

damage with a torpedo had she been going at her highest speed; it

would have given her a chance to cross the path of the torpedo as it

approached. No sign of the submarine was noticed by the lookout or by

any of the passengers on the _Lusitania_ until it was too late to

maneuver her to a position of safety. A few moments before the white

wake of the approaching torpedo was espied, the periscope had been

seen as it came to the surface of the water. From that moment onward

the liner was doomed.

The German admiralty report of the actual sinking of the ship, which

was issued on the 14th of May, 1915, was brief. It read: "A submarine

sighted the steamship _Lusitania_, which showed no flag, May 7, 2.20

Central European time, afternoon, on the southeast coast of Ireland,

in fine, clear weather.

"At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the _Lusitania_, which hit

her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation of the

torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion of extremely

strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard and began to sink.

"The second explosion must be traced back to the ignition of

quantities of ammunition inside the ship."

One of the effects of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ was to cut down

the number of passengers sailing to and from America to Europe on

ships flying flags of belligerent nations. Attacks by submarines on

neutral ships did not abate, however, for on the 15th of May, 1915,

the Danish steamer _Martha_ was torpedoed in broad daylight and in

view of crowds ashore off the coast of Aberdeen Bay.

The sinking of ships in the "war zone" continued in spite of rumors

that the German admiralty was expected to discontinue operations of

the submarines against merchantmen on account of the unfriendly

feeling aroused in neutral nations, particularly the United States. On

the 19th of May, 1915, came the news that the British steamship

_Dumcree_ had been torpedoed off a point in the English Channel. A

torpedo fired into her hull failed to sink her immediately, and a

Norwegian ship came to her aid, passing her a cable and attempting to

tow her to port. But the submarine returned, and fearing attack, the

Norwegian ship made off. A second torpedo fired at the _Dumcree_ had

better effect than the first one, and she began to settle. When the

submarine left the scene the Norwegian steamship again returned to the

_Dumcree_ and managed to take off all of her crew and passengers.

Three trawlers, one of them French, were sunk in the same neighborhood

during the next forty-eight hours.

As soon as Italy entered the war an attempt was made by the Teutonic

Powers to establish the same sort of submarine blockade in the

Adriatic which obtained in the waters around Great Britain. This was

evinced when the captain of the Italian steamship _Marsala_ reported

on May 21, 1915, that his ship had been stopped by an Austrian

submarine, but the latter not wishing to disclose its location to the

Italian navy, allowed his ship to proceed unharmed.

The suspicion that the German admiralty maintained bases for their

submarines right on the coasts of Great Britain where the submersible

craft could obtain oil for driving their engines, as well as supplies

of compressed air and of food for the crew, was confirmed on the 14th

of May, 1915, when it was reported that agents of the British

admiralty had discovered caches of the kind at various points in the

Orkney Islands, in the Bay of Biscay, and on the north and west coasts

of Ireland.

In order to damage shipping in the "war zone" by having ships go wrong

through having no guiding lights an attack was made by a German

submarine on the lighthouse at Fastnet, on the southern coast of

Ireland, on the night of May 25, 1915. Shortly after nine in the

evening the submarine was sighted in the waters near the lighthouse by

persons on shore. She was about ten miles from Fastnet, near Barley

Cove. When she came near enough to the lighthouse to use her deck

guns, men on shore opened fire on her with rifles, and she submerged,

not to reappear in that neighborhood again.

But this same submarine managed to do other damage. The American

steamship _Nebraskan_ was in the neighborhood on its way to New York.

The sea was calm and the ship was traveling at 12 knots, when some

time near nine o'clock in the evening a shock was felt aboard. A

second later there came a terrific explosion, and a subsequent

investigation showed that a large hole, 20 feet square, had been torn

in her starboard bow, not far from the water line. When she began to

settle the captain ordered all hands into the small boats. They stayed

near the damaged ship for an hour and saw that she was not going to

sink. When they got aboard again they found that a bulkhead was

keeping out the water sufficiently to allow her to proceed under her

own steam. In crippled condition she made for port, being convoyed

later by two British warships which answered her calls for help.

In spite of the sharp diplomatic representations which were at the

time passing back and forth between Germany and the United States over

the matter of the German submarine warfare, the craft kept up as

active a campaign against merchant ships as they did before the issues

became pointed. On May 28, 1915, there came the news that three more

ships had been sent to the bottom. The _Spennymoor_, a new ship, was

chased and torpedoed off Start Point, near the Orkney Islands. Some of

her crew were drowned when the lifeboat in which they were getting

away capsized, carrying them down. On the same day the large liner

_Argyllshire_ was chased and fired upon by the deck guns of a hostile

submarine, but she managed to get away. Not so fortunate, however, was

the steamship _Cadesby_. While off the Scilly Islands on the afternoon

of May 28, 1915, a German submarine hailed her, firing a shot from a

deck gun across her bows as a signal to halt. Time was given for the

crew and passengers to get into small boats, and when these were at a

distance from the ship the deck guns of the submarine were again

brought into action, and after firing thirty shots into her hull they

sank her. The third victim was the Swedish ship _Roosvall_. She was

stopped and boarded off Malmoe by the crew of a German submarine.

After examining her papers they permitted her to proceed, but later

sent a torpedo into her, sinking her.

A new raider, the _U-24_, made its appearance in the English Channel

during the last week in May, 1915. On the twenty-eighth of the month

this submarine sank the liner _Ethiope_. The captain of the steamship

attempted some clever maneuvering, which did not accomplish its

object. He paid no attention to a shot from the deck guns of the

submarine which passed across his bow. The hostile craft then began to

circle around the liner, while the rudder of the latter was put at a

wide angle in an effort to keep either stern or bow of the ship toward

the submarine, thus making a poor target for a torpedo. But the

commander of the submarine saw through the movement and ordered fire

with his deck guns. After shells had taken away the ship's bridge and

had punctured her hull near the stern the crew and passengers were

ordered into the small boats. They had hardly gotten twenty feet from

their ship when she was rent by a violent explosion and went down.

The transatlantic liner _Megantic_ had better luck, for she managed to

escape a pursuing submarine on May 29, 1915, as she was nearing

Queenstown, Ireland, homeward bound. A notable change in the methods

adopted by the commanders of submarines as a result of orders issued

by the German admiralty in answer to the protests throughout the press

of the neutral nations after the sinking of the _Lusitania_ was the

giving of warning to intended victims. By the end of May, 1915, in

almost every instance where a German submarine stopped and sank a

merchantman the crew was given time to get off their ship and the

submarine did not hesitate to show itself. In fact, warning to stop

was generally given when the submarine's deck was above water and the

gun mounted there had the victim "covered." This was done in the case

of the British steamship _Tullochmoor_, which was torpedoed off Ushant

near the most westerly islands of Brittany, France.

On the 1st of June, 1915, there came the news of the sinking of the

British ship _Dixiana_, near Ushant, by a German submarine which

approached by aid of a clever disguise. The crew managed to get off

the ship in time; when they landed on shore they reported that the

submarine had been seen and on account of sails which she carried was

thought to be an innocent fishing boat. The disguise was penetrated

too late for the _Dixiana_ to make its escape.

The clear and calm weather which came with June, 1915, made greater

activity on the part of German submarines possible. On the 4th of

June, 1915, it was reported by the British admiralty that six more

ships had been made victims, three of them being those of neutral

countries. In the next twenty-four hours the number was increased by

eleven, and eight more were added by the 9th of June, 1915.

On that date Mr. Balfour, Secretary of the British admiralty,

announced that a German submarine had been sunk, though he did not

state what had been the scene of the action. At the same time he

announced that Great Britain would henceforth treat the captured crew

of submarines in the same manner as were treated other war prisoners,

and that the policy of separating these men from the others and of

giving them harsher treatment would be abandoned.

On the 20th of June, 1915, the day's reports of losses due to the

operations of German submarines, issued by the British Government,

contained the news of the sinking of the two British torpedo boats,

the _No. 10_ and the _No. 20_. No details were made public concerning

just how they went down.

On the same day the Italian admiralty announced that a cache

maintained to supply submarines belonging to the Teutonic Powers and

operating in the Mediterranean, had been discovered on a lonely part

of the coast near Kalimno, an island off the southwest coast of Asia

Minor. Ninety-six barrels of benzine and fifteen hundred barrels of

other fuel were found and destroyed. It was believed that this supply

had been shipped as kerosene from Saloniki to Piraeus. How submarines

belonging to Germany had reached the southern theatre of naval warfare

had been a matter of speculation for the outside world. But on the 6th

of June, 1915, Captain Otto Hersing made public the manner in which he

took the _U-51_ on a 3,000 mile trip from Wilhelmshaven on the North

Sea to Constantinople. He was the commander who managed to torpedo the

British battleships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_.

He received his orders to sail on the 25th of April, 1915, and

immediately began to stock his ship with extra amounts of fuel and

provisions, allowing only his first officer and chief engineer to know

the destination of their craft. He traveled on the surface of the

water as soon as he had passed the guard of British warships near the

German coast; traveling "light" allowed him to make six or seven knots

more in speed. As he passed through the "war zone" he kept watch for

merchantmen which might be made victims of his torpedo tubes. His

craft was sighted by a British destroyer, however, off the English

coast and he had to submerge to escape the fire of the destroyer's

guns. He then proceeded cautiously down the coast of France,

encountering no hostile ships. When within one hundred miles of

Gibraltar he was again discovered by British destroyers, but again

managed to escape by submerging his craft.

Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar was made in the early morning

hours, while a mist hung near the surface of the water and permitted

no one at the fort to see the wake of the _U-51's_ periscope. Once

inside the Mediterranean he headed for the south of Greece, escaping

attack from a French destroyer and proceeding through the AEgean Sea to

the Dardanelles. The journey ended on the 25th of May, just one month

after leaving Wilhelmshaven.

The British ships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_ were sighted early in the

morning, but attack upon them was difficult on account of the

destroyers which circled about them; one of the destroyers passed

right over the _U-51_ while she was submerged. Captain Hersing brought

her to the surface soon afterward and let go the torpedo which sank

the _Triumph_. For the next two days the submarine lay submerged, but

came up on the following day and found itself right in the midst of

the allied fleet. This time the _Majestic_ was taken as the target for

a torpedo and she went down. Again submerging his vessel Captain

Hersing kept it down for another day, and when he again came to the

surface he saw that the fleets had moved away. He then returned to

Constantinople.

On the 23d of June, 1915, the British cruiser _Roxborough_, an older

ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine in the North

Sea, but the damage inflicted was not enough to prevent her from

making port under her own steam.

The deaths of a number of Americans occurred on the 28th of June,

1915, when the Leyland liner _Armenian_, carrying horses for the

allied armies, was torpedoed by the _U-38_, twenty miles west by north

of Trevose Head in Cornwall. According to the story of the captain of

the vessel, the submarine fired two shots to signal him to stop. When

he put on all speed in an attempt to get away from the raider her guns

opened on his ship with shrapnel, badly riddling it. She had caught

fire and was burning in three places before he signaled that he would

surrender. Thirteen men had meanwhile been killed by the shrapnel.

Some of the lifeboats had also been riddled by the firing from the

submarine's deck guns, making it more difficult for the crew to leave

the ship. The German commander gave him ample time to get his boats

off.

To offset the advantage which the Germans had with their submarines

the British admiralty commissioned ten such craft during the week of

June 28, 1915. These vessels were of American build and design and

were assembled in Canada. During the week mentioned they were manned

by men sent for the purpose from England. Each was manned by four

officers and eighteen men, to take them across the Atlantic. Never

before in history had so many submarines undertaken a voyage as great.

They got under way from Quebec on July 2, 1915, and proceeded in

column two abreast, a big auxiliary cruiser, which acted as their

escort steaming in the center.

The next large liner which had an encounter with the German submarine

_U-39_ was the _Anglo-Californian_. She came into Queenstown on the

morning of July 5, 1915, with nine dead sailors lying on the deck,

nine wounded men in their bunks, and holes in her sides made by shot

and shell. She had withstood attack from a German submarine for four

hours. Her escape from destruction was accomplished through only the

spirit of the captain and his crew, combined with the fact that patrol

vessels came to her aid forcing the submarine to submerge.

A variety in the methods used by the commanders of German submarines

was revealed in the stopping of the Norwegian ship _Vega_ which was

stopped on the 15th of July, while voyaging from Bergen to Newcastle.

The submarine came alongside the steamship at night and the commander

of the submarine supervised the jettisoning of her cargo of 200 tons

of salmon, 800 cases of butter, and 4,000 cases of sardines, which was

done at his command under threat of sinking his victim.

The week of July 15, 1915, was unique in that not one British vessel

was made the victim of a German submarine during that period, though

two Russian vessels had been sunk. Figures compiled by the British

admiralty and issued on the 22d of July, 1915, gave out the following

information concerning the attacks on merchantmen by German submarines

since the German admiralty's proclamation of a "war zone" around Great

Britain went into effect on the 18th of February, 1915.

The official figures were as follows:

Week ending Vessels lost Lives lost

Feb. 25, 1915 11 9

March 4, " 1 None

March 11, " 7 38

March 18, " 6 13

March 25, " 7 2

April 1, " 13 165

April 8, " 8 13

April 15, " 4 None

April 22, " 3 10

April 29, " 3 None

May 6, " 24 5

May 13, " 2 1,260

May 20, " 7 13

May 27, " 7 7

June 3, " 36 21

June 10, " 36 21

June 17, " 19 19

June 24, " 3 1

July 1, " 9 29

July 8, " 15 2

July 15, " 12 13

July 22, " 2 None

235 1,641

The first year of the Great War came to an end with the German

submarines as active in the "war zone" as they had been during any

part of it. On the 28th of July, 1915, the anniversary of the

commencement of the war, there was reported the sinking of nine

vessels. These were the Swedish steamer _Emma_, the three Danish

schooners _Maria_, _Neptunis,_ and _Lena_, the British steamer

_Mangara_, the trawlers _Iceni_ and _Salacia_, the _Westward_ Ho, and

the Swedish bark _Sagnadalen_. No lives were lost with any of these

vessels.

The first year of the war closed with a cloud gathered over the heads

of the members of the German admiralty raised by the irritation the

submarine attacks in the "war zone" had caused. Germany's enemies

protested against the illegality of these attacks; neutral nations

protested because they held that their rights had been overridden. But

the German press showed the feeling of the German public on the

matter--at the end of July, 1915, it was as anxious as ever to have

the attacks continued. Conflicting claims were issued in Germany and

England. In the former country it was claimed that the attacks had

seriously damaged commerce; in the latter it was claimed that the

damage was of little account.

PART VI--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XXXV

THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN--REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

In the beginning of 1915 comparative calm reigned over the

Austro-Russian theatre of war, so far as actual hostilities were

concerned. But it was not altogether the variable climatic conditions

of alternate frost and thaw--the latter converting road and valley

into impassable quagmires--that caused the lull. It was a short winter

pause during which the opposing forces--on one side at least--were

preparing and gathering the requisite momentum for the coming storm.

During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly favorable

position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as we have seen,

they held an advanced position in front of the Vistula, which

circumstance enabled them to utilize that river as a line of

communication, while barring the way to Warsaw against Von Hindenburg.

Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, which they had captured in September,

1914, was still in their hands. Sixty miles away to the west there lay

the great fortress of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under General

Selivanoff, and completely cut off from the outer world since November

12, 1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities of stores

and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying forts, together

with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly Polish. In addition to

these material advantages, the Russians held all the Carpathian passes

leading from Galicia into the vast plains of Hungary, and a strong

advanced position on the Dunajec in the west, which, besides

threatening Cracow, the capital of Austrian Poland, served also as a

screen to the mountain operations. Finally, to the far east of the

range, they had occupied nearly the whole of the Bukowina right up to

the Rumanian frontier.

Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front when the

second winter campaign opened. For Austria the situation was extremely

critical. Her armies, broken and scattered after a series of

disastrous reverses, could scarcely hope by their own efforts to stem

the threatened invasion of Hungary. General Brussilov, however, made

no serious attempt to pour his troops through the passes into the

plain below; although what was probably a reconnaissance emerged from

the Uzsok Pass and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty miles

south, while on several occasions small bands of Cossacks descended

from the Dukla and Delatyn (Jablonitza) passes to raid Hungarian

villages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable to risk

an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold control of the

southern exits from the passes, beyond which he would be exposed to

attack from all sides and liable to encounter superior forces. The

main Austrian anxiety for the moment was the precarious position of

Przemysl, to relieve which it was first essential to dislodge

Brussilov or to pierce his line. Again, in the hour of her extremity,

Austria's powerful ally came to the rescue.

[Illustration: The Carpathian Passes and Russian Battle Line.]

Under the command of the Archduke Eugene the Austrian troops--all that

were available--were formed into three separate armies. For

convenience sake we will designate them A, B, and C. Army A, under

General Boehm-Ermolli, was ordered to the section from the Dukla Pass

to the Uzsog. It was charged with the task of cutting a way through to

relieve Przemysl. Army B, under the German General von Linsingen, who

also had some German troops with him, was to assail the next section

eastward, from the Uzsog to the Wyszkow Pass; and Army C, under the

Austrian General von Pflanzer-Baltin, likewise supplied with a good

"stiffening" of German soldiers, was accredited to the far-eastern

section--the Pruth Valley and the Bukowina. These three armies

represented the fighting machine with which Austria hoped to retrieve

the misfortunes of war and recover at the same time her military

prestige and her invaded territories. We have no reliable information

to enable us to estimate the exact strength of these armies, but there

is every reason to believe that it was considerable, having regard to

the urgency of the situation and the bitter experience of the recent

past. Hence the figure of 400,000 men is probably approximately

correct. Somewhere about January 23, 1914, after a period of thaw and

mud the weather settled down to snow and hard frost. Then the machine

began to move. A snow-clad mountain rampart lay spread before; over

200 miles of its length embraced the area of the projected operations.

Here we may leave this army for a while in order to review some of the

political and strategic considerations underlying the campaign, which

is the scope of this chapter.

The Russian occupation of the Bukowina, which was undertaken and

accomplished by a force far too small to oppose any serious

resistance, appears to have been carried out with the definite

political object of favorably impressing Rumania, and to guide her

into the arms of the Allies. From her geographical position Rumania

commands nearly the whole western frontier of the Dual Monarchy. Her

fertile soil supplied the Central Powers with grain, dairy produce,

and oil. Furthermore, Rumania's foreign policy leaned to the side of

Italy, and the general European impression was, after the death of

King Carol, October 10, 1914, that if one of the two countries entered

the war, the other would follow suit. As subsequent events have shown,

however, that expectation was not realized. Rumania, too, had

aspirations in the direction of recovering lost territories, but her

grievance in this respect was equally divided between Russia and

Austria, for, while the one had despoiled her of Bessarabia, the other

had annexed Transylvania (Siebenbuergen). Hence the Russian tentative

conquest and occupation of the Bukowina paved the way for Rumania,

should she decide on intervention. The road was clear for her to step

in and occupy the Bukowina (which Russia was prepared to hand over),

and probably Transylvania as well, which latter the proximity of a

Russian force might--at the time--have enabled her to do. But the bait

failed, no doubt for weighty reasons. Even if Rumania had favored the

Triple Entente, which there is strong ground to presume she would, by

entering the war, have found herself in as perilous a position as

Serbia, with her Black Sea littoral exposed to hostile Turkey and her

whole southern boundary flanked by a neighbor--Bulgaria--whose

intentions were as yet unknown. However, on January 27, 1915, the Bank

of England arranged a $25,000,000 loan to Rumania--an event which

further heightened the probability of her entry into the arena.

We may safely take it for granted that these considerations were not

overlooked by the German staff, in addition to the patent fact that

the Russians were persistently gaining ground against the Austrians.

German officers and men were therefore rushed from the eastern and

western fronts to the south of the Carpathians to form the three

armies we have labeled A, B, and C. The points of attack for which

they were intended have already been stated; but the roundabout manner

in which they traveled to their respective sections is both

interesting and worthy of notice. At this stage a new spirit seemed to

dominate Austro-Hungarian military affairs; we suddenly encounter

greater precision, sounder strategy, and deeper plans: a master mind

appears to have taken matters in hand. It is the cool, calculating,

mathematical composite brain of the German General Staff. As the

formation and dispatching of three great armies can hardly be kept a

secret, especially where hawk-eyed spies abound, a really astute piece

of stage management was resorted to. Wild rumors were set afloat to

the effect that the Austrian Government had decided to undertake a

great offensive--for the third time--against Serbia, and erase her

from the map, with the assistance of four German army corps. The

concentration zone for operations against either Serbia or the Russian

front in the Carpathians was naturally in the central plains of

Hungary. But to cover the real object of Austro-German concentration

active demonstrations were made on the Serb border in the form of

bombardments of Belgrade, and occupation of Danube islands. These

demonstrations made plausible the Teutonic assertion that the

concentration of troops was being carried out with a view to an

invasion of Serbia. So successful was the ruse, and so well had the

secret been kept that on February 1, 1914, a Petrograd "official"

gravely announced to an eagerly listening world: "The statement is

confirmed that the new Austro-German southern army, intended for the

third invasion of Serbia, consists of six Austrian and two German

corps or 400,000 men, under the command of the Archduke Eugene(!)" At

the very time this appeared the new Austro-German "southern" army had

been already, for quite a week, making its presence severely felt in

the eastern and central sections of the Carpathians, and still the

Russian authorities had not recognized the identity of the forces

operating there.

A brief description of the battle ground will enable the reader to

follow more easily the course of the struggle. Imagine that length of

the Carpathian chain which forms the boundary between Galicia and

Hungary as a huge, elongated arch of, roughly, 300 miles. (The whole

of the range stretches as a continuous rampart for a distance of 900

miles, completely shutting in Hungary from the northwest to the east

and south, separating it from Moravia [Maehren], Galicia, the Bukowina,

and Rumania.) Through the curve of this arch run a number of passes.

Beginning as far west as is here necessary, the names of the chief

passes eastward leading from Hungary are: into Galicia--Beskid,

Tarnow, Tilicz, Dukla, Lupkow, Rostoki, Uzsok, Vereczke (or Tucholka),

Beskid[2] (or Volocz), Wyszkow, Jablonitza (or Delatyn); into the

Bukowina--Strol, Kirlibaba, Rodna; into Rumania--Borgo. In parts the

range is 100 miles in width, and from under 2,000 to 8,000 feet high.

The western and central Carpathians are much more accessible than the

eastern, and therefore comprise the main and easiest routes across.

The Hun and Tartar invasions flooded Europe centuries ago by this way,

and the Delatyn is still called the "Magyar route." The passes vary in

height from under a thousand to over four thousand feet. The Dukla and

Uzsok passes were to be the main objective, as through them lay the

straightest roads to Lemberg and Przemysl. The former is crossed by

railway from Tokay to Przemysl, and the latter by rail and road from

Ungvar to Sambor. A railroad also runs through the Vereczke from

Munkacs to Lemberg, and another through Delatyn from Debreczen to

Kolomea. So far as concerned means of communication, matters were

nearly equal, but geographical advantage lay with the Russians, as the

way from Galicia to Hungary is by far an easier one than vice versa.

[Footnote 2: There are two passes named Beskid.]

CHAPTER XXXVI

BATTLE OF THE PASSES

Before proceeding with the opening of the second winter campaign in

the Carpathians, the reader should remember that, as stated in the

beginning of this narrative, a Russian army under General Radko

Dmitrieff (a Bulgarian), held an advanced position on the

Dunajec-Biala line, extending from the Vistula to Zmigrod, northwest

of Dukla. This force was consequently beyond the zone of the

Austro-German offensive, but, as events proved, it had not been

overlooked, for it was here that the heaviest blow was finally to

fall. It is also important to bear in mind that the Russian armies

occupying Galicia and the northern slopes of the Carpathians were not

conducting an isolated campaign on their own account; they formed an

integral part of the far-flung battle line that reached from the

shores of the Baltic down to the Rumanian frontier, a distance of

nearly 800 miles. Dmitrieff's force represented a medial link of the

chain--and the weakest.

Over the slushy roads of the valleys and into the snow-laden passes

the Germanic armies advanced, each of the widely deployed columns with

a definite objective: From Dukla, Lupkow, and Rostoki to relieve

Przemysl; from Uzsok through the valley of the Upper San to Sambor;

through Beskid and Vereczke northward to Stryj, thence westward also

to Sambor; over Wyszkow to Dolina; via Jablonitza to Delatyn; and

across Kirlibaba and Dorna Vatra into the Bukowina. Opposed to them

were the Russian Generals Brussilov, Ivanoff, and Alexieff,

respectively.

Correspondents with the Teutonic troops in these weeks wrote in

wonderment of the scenes of the slowly forward toiling advance into

the mountains which they had seen. On every road leading into Galicia

there was the same picture of a flood rolling steadily on. Everywhere

could be seen the German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the move, men

going into the firing line to fight for days, day after day, with the

shedding of much blood, among the peaks and valleys, under changing

skies.

Here is a word picture of the supply columns winding upward into the

Carpathians to the support of the Teutonic troops furnished by a

German correspondent:

"Truly fantastic is the appearance of one of these modern supply

caravans, stretching in zigzag, with numerous sharp corners and turns,

upward to the heights of the passes and down on the opposite side.

Here we see in stages, one above the other and moving in opposite

directions, the queerest mixture of men, vehicles, machines and

animals, all subordinated to a common military purpose and

organization by military leadership, moving continually and regularly

along. The drivers have been drummed up from all parts of the

monarchy, Serbs, Ruthenians, Poles, Croats, Rumanians, Hungarians,

Slovaks, Austrians, and turbaned Mohammedans from Bosnia. Everyone is

shouting to his animals and cursing in his own language. The whole

mix-up is a traveling exhibition of most variegated characteristic

costumes, for the most part, of course, extremely the worse for wear.

Common to all these are the little wagons adapted to mountain travel,

elastic and tough, which carry only half loads and are drawn by little

ponylike, ambitious horses. In between are great German draft horses,

stamping along with their broad high-wheeled baggage and ammunition

wagons, as though they belonged to a nation of giants.

"Gravely, with a kind of sullen dignity, slow-stepping steers drag at

their yokes heavily laden sledges. They are a powerful white breed,

with broad-spreading horns a yard long. These are followed in endless

rows by carefully stepping pack animals, small and large horses, mules

and donkeys. On the wooden packsaddles on their backs are the

carefully weighed bales of hay or ammunition boxes or other war

materials. Walking gingerly by the edges of the mountain ridges they

avoid pitfalls and rocks and walk round the stiff, distended bodies of

their comrades that have broken down on the way. At times there ambles

along a long row of working animals a colt, curious and restlessly

sniffing. In the midst of this movement of the legs of animals, of

waving arms, of creaking and swaying loaded vehicles of manifold

origin, there climbs upward the weighty iron of an Austrian motor

battery, with an almost incomprehensible inevitableness, flattening

out the broken roads like a steam roller.

"From the first pass the baggage train sinks down into the depths,

again to climb upward on the next ridge, to continue striving upward

ever toward higher passages, slowly pushing forward toward its

objective against the resistance of numberless obstacles.

"The road to the battle field of to-day crosses the battle field of

recent weeks and months. Here there once stood a village, but only the

stone foundations of the hearths are left as traces of the houses that

have been burned down. Sometimes falling shots or the terrors of a

brief battle in the streets have reduced to ruins only a part of a

village. The roofs of houses have been patched with canvas and boards

to some extent, and now serve as quarters for troops or as stables. In

the narrow valleys the level places by the sides of streams have been

utilized for encampments. Here stand in order wagons of a resting

column and the goulash cannons shedding their fragrance far and wide,

or the tireless ovens of a field bakery. Frequently barracks, hospital

buildings, and shelters for men and animals have been built into the

mountain sides. Here and there simple huts have been erected, made of

a few poles and fir twigs. Often they are placed in long rows, which,

when their inmates are warming themselves by the fire at night turn

the dark mountain road into a romantic night encampment, and

everywhere fresh crosses, ornamented at times in a manner suggestive

of the work of children, remind us of our brothers now forever

silenced, who, but a short time before went the same road, withstood

just such weather and such hardships, talked perhaps in these same

huts of the war, and dreamt of peace.

"The saddest spectacle, however, were the lightly wounded, poor

fellows, who might under ordinary conditions have readily walked the

distance from the first aid station to the central gathering point,

but who here on account of the ice or muddy roads require double and

three times the usual time."

CHAPTER XXXVII

BATTLE OF KOZIOWA--OPERATIONS IN THE BUKOWINA

Owing to the topographical conditions under which fighting must be

carried on in the central Carpathians, some weeks might be expected to

elapse before a general engagement developed along the entire front.

Lateral communication or cooperation between the advancing columns was

out of the question; the passes were like so many parallel tunnels,

each of which must first be negotiated before a reunion can take place

at the northern exits.

We will follow the achievements of the three groups in separate order.

Army A, under Boehm-Ermolli, crossed Uzsok and Rostoki, and forced

part of the Russian line back upon Baligrod, but Brussilov held it

fast on Dukla and Lupkow, strongly supported by Dmitrieff on his

right. Here the attack failed with severe losses; the Germanic forces

were thrown back into Hungary, and the Russians commanded the southern

ends of the passes around Dukla. The Uzsok Pass was of small

strategical value to the Austrians now that they had it. It is

extremely vulnerable at every point; steep, narrow, and winding roads

traverse its course nearly 3,000 feet high, with thickly wooded

mountains up to 4,500 feet overlooking the scene from a close circle.

Regarded merely as a short cut to Przemysl and Lemberg, the Uzsok was

a useful possession provided always that the northern debouchment

could be cleared and an exit forced. But the Russians held these

debouchments with a firm grip, and the pass was consequently of no use

to the Austrians. About February 7, 1915, the Russians attempted to

outflank the Austrian position in the Lupkow Pass from the eastern

branch of the Dukla by pushing forward in the direction of Mezo-Laborc

on the Hungarian side. The movement partially succeeded; they took

over 10,000 prisoners, but failed to dislodge the Austrians from the

heights east of the pass. Severe fighting raged round this district

for over a month, the Russians finally capturing Lupkow, as well as

Smolnik at the southern exit of Rostoki. Had the Russians succeeded in

getting between Uzsok and the Austrian line of communication, as was

undoubtedly their aim, the Austrians would have been compelled to

relinquish the pass without even a fight. However, General

Boehm-Ermolli's mission proved a failure.

Army B, under Von Linsingen, succeeded in traversing all the passes in

its appointed section. Crossing by the railway pass of Beskid and the

two roads leading through Vereczke and Wyszkow, they pushed forward in

the direction of Stryj and Lemberg, but never reached their

destination. Barely through the passes, the Germans struck upon Lysa

Gora, over 3,300 feet high. This mountain range is barren of all

vegetation--no sheltering trees or shrubs adorn its slopes. The route

of the Germans crossed Lysa Gora south and in front of the ridge of

Koziowa, where the Russian lines, under General Ivanoff, lay in

waiting. Passing down the bald slopes of Lysa Gora toward the valley

of the Orava River, the advancing German columns presented a

conspicuous target for the Russians on the opposite slopes of Koziowa,

screened by thick forests. Here one of the most desperate battles of

the campaign ensued on February 6, 1915, between Von Linsingen's

Austro-German army and Brussilov's center.

In close formation and with well-drilled precision the Germans

attempted to storm the position at the point of the bayonet. Again and

again they returned to the charge, only to be repulsed with severe

losses. As many as twenty-two furious bayonet charges were made in one

day, February 7. Wherever a footing was gained in the Russian lines,

there a few minutes ferocious hand-to-hand _melee_ developed--Saxon

and Slav at death grips--the intruders were expelled or hacked down.

Great masses of Austro-German dead and wounded were strewn over the

lower slopes of Koziowa. For five weeks Von Linsingen hammered at the

Russian front without being able to break through. So long as the

Russians held the heights it was impossible for their enemy to emerge

from the passes. These two, Vereczke and Beskid, so close together,

may literally be described as twin tunnels. Owing to the highland

between them, the two columns moving through could not cooperate; if

one side needed reenforcements from the other, they had to be taken

back over the range into Hungary to the junction where the roads

diverged. It was sound strategy on the Russian side to select Koziowa

as the point from which to check the Germanic advance. For the time

being, with Dukla and Lupkow in their hands and the exits of Uzsok and

Rostoki strongly guarded, the defense of Koziowa held Galicia safe

from reconquest. The attacks against Koziowa continued beyond the

middle of March, 1915. On the 16th of that month the Russians captured

a place called Oravcyk, about four miles westward, from where they

could threaten the German left, which had the effect of keeping Von

Linsingen still closer to his mountain passages. The fighting in this

region represents one of the important phases of the war, for it

prevented the relief of Przemysl; temporarily saved Stryj and Lemberg

for the Russians; enabled them to send reenforcements into the

Bukowina, and, finally, inspired the German General Staff to plan the

great and decisive Galician campaign, which was to achieve the task

wherein Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen had both failed.

Meanwhile, what had Von Pflanzer-Baltin accomplished with Army C--the

third column? His path lay through Jablonitza, Kirlibaba, and Dorna

Vatra; his task was to clear the Russians out of the Bukowina, and

either to force them back across their own frontiers, or to turn the

extreme end of their left flank. We have seen that the Russian

occupation of the Bukowina was more in the nature of a political

experiment than a serious military undertaking, and that their forces

in the province were not strong enough to indulge in great strategical

operations. Hence we may expect the Austrian general's progress to be

less difficult than that of his colleagues in the western and central

Carpathians. To some extent this presumption is correct, for on

February 18, 1915, after launching out from the southern corner of the

Bukowina at Kimpolung and via the Jablonitza Pass down the Pruth

Valley, they captured Czernowitz, and after that Kolomea, whence the

railway runs to Lemberg. Within three days they reached Stanislawow,

another important railway center, defended by a small Russian force,

and a big battle ensued. Altogether, the Germanic troops in the

Bukowina were reported at 50,000 in number, though these were split up

into two columns, one of which was making but slow progress farther

east.

[Illustration: Detail Map of the Forts of Przemysl.]

Russian reenforcements were thrown into the town, and the struggle for

the railway, which lasted a week, appears to have been of a seesaw

nature, for no official reports of the fighting were issued by either

side. Still the Austrians pushed westward in the hope of reaching the

railways which supplied those Russian armies which were barring the

advance through the central passes. The Russians were forced to

withdraw from Stanislawow, and their opponents now held possession of

the line running to Stryj and Przemysl--a serious menace to the

Russian main communications. This meant that Von Pflanzer-Baltin had

succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians. But assistance came

unexpectedly from the center, whence Ivanoff was able to send

reenforcements to his colleague, General Alexeieff, who was

continually falling back before the Austrians. Furious counterattacks

were delivered by the Russians at Halicz and Jezupol, the

bridgeheads of the southern bank of the Dniester. If the Austrians

could not force a victory at these points, their position in

Stanislawow would be untenable, since the Russians still had a clear

road to pour reenforcements into the fighting area between the

Dniester and the Carpathians. On March 1, 1915, the Austrians were

defeated at Halicz in a pitched battle, and on the 4th the Russians

reentered Stanislawow. According to their official communique the

Russians captured nearly 19,000 prisoners, 5 guns, 62 machine guns,

and a quantity of stores and munitions. About March 16 the opposing

forces came again into touch southeast of Stanislawow on the road to

Ottynia, but nothing of importance appears to have happened. To sum up

the results of the Germanic offensive, we must remember what the

objectives were. Of the latter, none was attained. The Russians had

not been expelled from Galicia; Przemysl was no nearer to relief than

before, and Lemberg had not been retaken. With the exception of Dukla

and Lupkow, all the passes were in Austrian hands; but the Russians

dominated the northern debouchments of all of them excepting

Jablonitza.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

FALL OF PRZEMYSL

The town and fortress of Przemysl formally surrendered to the Russian

General Selivanoff on Monday, March 22, 1915. The first investment

began at the early stages of the war in September, 1914. On the 27th

of that month the Russian generalissimo announced that all

communications had been cut off. By October 15, 1914, the Russian

investment had been broken again, and for a matter of three weeks,

while the road was open, more troops, provisions, arms, and munitions

were rushed to the spot. As we have seen, however, the Russians

recovered their lost advantage, for, after the fall of Jaroslav, the

fortress to the north of Przemysl, their troops were hurried up from

east, north, and west, and within a few days the Austrians were sent

back along the whole front. From the region of Przemysl three

railroads cross the Carpathians to Budapest, along all of which the

Russians had pushed vigorously, besides advancing on the west. As

regarded railroad communications, the fate of Przemysl was sealed by

the capture of Chyrow, an important junction about twenty miles south

of the fortress. Przemysl itself was important as a road junction and

as a connecting link with the Uzsok and Lupkow passes. The garrison

prepared to make a stubborn resistance with the object of checking the

Russian pursuit. A week later the Russians had broken up their heavy

artillery and had begun a steady bombardment. By November 12, 1914,

Przemysl was once more completely besieged by General Selivanoff with

not more than 100,000 troops.

Przemysl is one of the oldest towns of Galicia, said to have been

founded in the eighth century. It was once the capital of a large

independent principality. In the fourteenth century Casimir the Great

and other Polish princes endowed it with special civic privileges, and

the town attained a high degree of commercial prosperity. In the

seventeenth century its importance was destroyed by inroads of Tatars,

Cossacks, and Swedes. Przemysl is situated on the River San, and was

considered one of the strongest fortresses of Europe.

The original strategic idea embodied in the purpose of the fortress

was purely defensive; in the event of war with Russia only the line of

the San and Dniester was intended to be held at all costs, while the

whole northeastern portion of Galicia was to be abandoned. With the

fortress of Cracow guarding the west, Przemysl was meant to be the

first defense between the two rivers and to hold the easiest roads to

Hungary through the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok passes. Within the last

ten years, however, the Austrian War Staff altered its plans and

decided upon a vigorous offensive against Russia should occasion

offer, and that Eastern Galicia was not to be sacrificed. Hence a

network of strategic railways was constructed with a view to attacking

the prospective enemy on a wide front extending from the Vistula near

Cracow on the west to the Bug on the east, where the latter flows

into Austrian territory and cuts off a corner of eastern Galicia. The

plan does not appear to have worked successfully, for, before the war

was many days old, the Russians had taken Lemberg, swept across the

Dniester at Halicz, across the San at Jaroslav, just north of

Przemysl, and had already besieged the fortress, which at no time

imposed any serious obstacle in the path of their progress. Perhaps

the only useful purpose that Przemysl served was that it restrained

the Russians from attempting an invasion of Hungary on a big scale, by

holding out for nearly seven months. Not having sufficient siege

artillery at their disposal, the Russians made no attempt to storm the

place. General Selivanoff surrounded the forts with a wide circle of

counterdefenses, which were so strongly fortified that the garrison

would have found it an almost hopeless task to attempt a rush through

the enemy's lines. The Austrian artillery was naturally well

acquainted with the range of every point and position that lay within

reach of their guns; and Selivanoff wisely offered them little

opportunity for effective practice. Considering it too expensive to

attack by the overland route, he worked his way gradually toward the

forts by means of underground operations. To sap a position is slow

work, but much more economical in the expenditure of lives and

munitions. The weakness of Przemysl lay in the fact that its garrison

was far too large for its needs, and that provisions were running

short. In the early part of the campaign the Germanic armies operating

in the San region had drawn freely on Przemysl for supplies, and

before these could be adequately replaced the Russians had again

forged an iron ring around the place. The Russian commander, moreover,

was aware that a coming scarcity threatened the town, and that he had

only to bide his time to starve it into submission. Whilst he was

simply waiting and ever strengthening his lines, the Austrians found

it incumbent on them to assume the offensive. Several desperate

sorties were made by the garrison to break through the wall, only to

end in complete disaster. General Herman von Kusmanek, the commander

in chief of the fortress, organized a special force, composed largely

of Hungarians, for "sortie duty," under the command of a Hungarian,

General von Tamassy. These sorties had been carried out during

November and December, 1914, especially during the latter month, when

the Austro-German armies were pouring across the mountains. So

critical was the Russian position at the time that the relief of

Przemysl was hourly expected. According to an officer of General

Selivanoffs staff, "The Austrians in the fortress were already

conversing with the Austrians on the Carpathians by means of their

searchlights. The guns of Przemysl could be heard by the Austrian

field artillery. The situation was serious, and General Selivanoff

took prompt measures. He brought up fresh troops to the point of

danger and drove the sortie detachments back to the fortress." It is

stated from the Austrian side that one of the sortie detachments had

succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines and marching to a

point fifteen miles beyond the outer lines of the forts. A Russian

official announcement states that during two months of the siege the

Austrian captures amounted only to 4 machine guns and about 60

prisoners, which occurred in an engagement where two Honved regiments

fell on a Russian company which had advanced too far to be reenforced

in time. On their part in repulsing sorties by the garrison,

frequently made by considerable forces, the Russians made prisoners 27

officers and 1,906 soldiers, and captured 7 machine guns, 1,500,000

cartridges, and a large quantity of arms. In two sorties the garrison

in the region of Bircza had more than 2,000 killed and wounded, among

them being many officers. No further sorties were undertaken in that

particular region. During January and February, 1915, very little

fighting took place around Przemysl; sorties were useless as there was

no Austro-German force anywhere near the fortress, and the Russians

were tightening the pressure around it. The only means of

communication with the outer world was by aeroplane, so that, despite

the rigid investment, the Austro-German war staff were kept fully

informed of the straits in which Przemysl found itself. General

Boehm-Ermolli, with Army A, was making desperate efforts to extricate

himself from the Russian grip round Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla; he did

not get beyond Baligrod, as the crow flies, thirty miles south of

Przemysl.

On March 13, 1915, the Russians stormed and captured the village of

Malkovise, on the northeast, breaking through the outer line of the

defense. From this position they began to bombard parts of the inner

ring. About the beginning of the third week in March, 1915, a new

spirit of activity appeared to seize the beleaguered garrison: they

commenced a terrific cannonade which, however, elicited no response.

It was but the energy of despair: they were firing to get rid of their

ammunition, hoping at the same time to hit something or somebody. The

end was at hand.

On March 18, 1915, a Petrograd "official" laconically reports that:

"In the Przemysl sector the fortress guns continue to fire more than a

thousand heavy projectiles daily, but our troops besieging the

fortress lose only about ten men every day." It is also on March 18

that General von Kusmanek issued the following manifesto to the

defenders of Przemysl:--"Heroes, I announce to you my last summons.

The honor of our country and our army demands it. I shall lead you to

pierce with your points of steel the iron circles of the enemy, and

then march ever farther onward, sparing no efforts, until we rejoin

our army, which, after heavy fighting, is now near us."

Just before the surrender two Austrian officers escaped from the

fortress in an aeroplane. These reported concerning the last days of

the siege:

"On the 18th of March the last provisions had been dealt out and at

the same time the last attempt at breaking through the line of the

besiegers had been ordered. This was carried out on the night of the

19th of March. It was shattered, however, against the unbreakable

manifold ring of the Russian inclosing lines and against the superior

forces which were brought in time to the threatened points. Our men

were so weakened by their long fasting that it took them fully seven

hours to make the march of seven kilometers, and even in this short

stretch many of them had to lie down from exhaustion, yet they fought

well and were bravely led by their officers.

"In spite of all this," Captain Lehmann, one of the escaped officers,

reported, "the heroic garrison fought on, after their last sortie, for

fully forty-eight hours, against assaults of the Russians which now

set in with terrific violence. The men of the fortress were fully

informed of the situation by an announcement of the commander. They

knew that the provisions were at an end and this very knowledge

spurred them on to make their last sacrifice. Practically all the

nations of the monarchy were represented in the fortress. Tyrolese

Landsturm held the south, Hungarians the west, Ruthenians and Poles

the north, and lower Austrians the east. To this last battle the

troops marched out singing, striving thus to master their weakness. On

this, occasion the above mentioned notice had fallen into the hands of

the Russians and the prospect had thus been opened to them to seize

the fortress with little effort. For two days and nights all the works

of Przemysl were taken under an uninterrupted terrible artillery fire,

including that of modern howitzers of all calibers, up to eighteen

centimeters. Then followed an assault at night on the east front,

which, however, was again bloodily repelled."

Starvation is conducive neither to good feeling nor heroism,

especially when it is superimposed upon an unbroken series of more or

less disastrous experiences. Misfortune and the so-called "tradition

of defeat" had dogged the steps of Austria's troops from the beginning

of the war; unlucky generals--Dankl, Auffenberg, and others--had been

relieved of their commands and replaced by "new blood"--Boehm-Ermolli,

Boroyevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three, two

had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans which had

taken the place of those of their own strategists. Hence it is not at

all improbable that the reports of dissensions among the garrison,

which leaked out at the time, were substantially accurate. That

jealousies broke out among the numerous races forming the Austrian

Army--especially between the Slavonic and Germanic elements--is

supported by strong evidence. The sentiments of the Slav subjects of

Austria leaned more toward Russia than the empire of which they formed

a considerable portion, while there was never any love lost between

them and the Magyars. However that may be, the Slav regiments were

reported to have refused obedience to the general's order for the last

sortie, which was eventually undertaken by a force composed of the

Twenty-third Hungarian Honved Division, a regiment of Hussars, and a

Landwehr brigade, altogether about 30,000 men. Everything depended

upon the venture, for not only were all their food supplies used up,

but they had already eaten most of their horses. Instead, therefore,

of making southward to where their comrades were fighting hard to tear

themselves away from the Carpathian passes, the sortie turned toward

the east, in the direction of Mosciska, twenty miles off, which was

supposed to be the Russian supply base. This attempted foraging

expedition--for it was nothing else--can only be defended on the broad

general principle that it is better to do something than nothing as a

last resort. Supplies were essential before any more could be

undertaken to cut a passage through the strong double set of Russian

lines that lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl; but that these

supplies were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further,

considering that the whole country was in their opponents' hands, a

strength of 30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazardous an

adventure. Even if they succeeded in breaking through, their return to

the fortress was not assured. In that case, if they could not get

back, they would have to go forward: eastward lay Lemberg, held by the

Russians; northward was the Russian frontier, and southward stood the

Russian forces holding the passes. Thus, in any case, however

successful the expedition might prove, it meant breaking at least

twice through lines which the enemy had spent months in strengthening

or fortifying. Undeterred by the almost certain possibility of

failure, the expedition of the "forlorn hope" set out across the plain

of the San--and speedily came to grief. They had to pass by the

strongest Russian artillery position, which was stationed in the low

hollow through which the railway runs to Lemberg. Here a terrific hail

of shells burst over their heads; rattle of machine guns and rifle

fire tore great holes in their ranks; the stoutest courage and

bravest hearts were unavailing against an enemy who could not be

reached nor even seen. The number of killed and wounded in that fatal

sortie has not been made public; that it was an enormous figure is

certain. The Russians took 4,000 prisoners of those who survived the

ordeal, and captured the forts on the western side directly after the

struggling remnants had regained their starting place. General von

Kusmanek issued his manifesto in the morning, and by the same night

the sortie ended in disaster. Like the misdirected charge of the Light

Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, it was "brilliant, but it wasn't war."

One more attempt was made on Saturday, March 20, 1915, toward

Oikovice, but it was easily frustrated by the vigilant Russians. On

Sunday and Monday, the 21st and 22d of March, a number of explosions

were heard in and around Przemysl. The Austrians were destroying

everything possible previous to surrendering. Large quantities of

explosives were thrown in the river; all kinds of arms were destroyed

or rendered useless; three bridges were crippled; the few remaining

horses were shot, and a railway bridge over the Wiar, which possessed

no strategic value, was also destroyed. These tactics of destroying

approaches naturally isolated the town more than ever, and made it

exceedingly difficult afterward to convey food supplies to the

starving population.

On Monday morning, March 22, 1915, the Austrian chief of staff

appeared outside the lines of Przemysl under a flag of truce. He was

blindfolded, driven by automobile to Russian headquarters, and ushered

into the presence of General Selivanoff. When the bandage had been

removed from his eyes, the Austrian officer handed over a letter of

capitulation from General von Kusmanek, which ran as follows:

"In consequence of the exhaustion of provisions and stores, and in

compliance with instructions received from my supreme chief, I am

compelled to surrender the Imperial and Royal Fortress of Przemysl to

the Imperial Russian Army."

The Russians took charge without any triumphal display. Some officers

were sent to receive the surrender and take stock of the spoils.

General von Kusmanek himself supplied the inventory, in which were

listed 9 generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 "Offiziere und Beamten"

(subalterns and officials), and 117,000 rank and file, besides 1,000

pieces of ordnance, mostly useless, and a large quantity of shells and

rifle cartridges.

General Artamoff was appointed military governor and to superintend

the process of dispatching the prisoners into Russian territory, which

was carried out at the rate of 10,000 a day. Extensive arrangements

were set on foot to supply the inhabitants with food, drink, and other

necessaries of life. As the Russians had not bombarded the town, its

natural and artificial beauties had suffered no damage beyond that

which the Austrians had themselves inflicted; only the outskirts and

the fortifications had been injured by fire and explosion.

Thus fell, on March 22, 1915, Przemysl, "by its own momentum like an

overripe fruit," and with a garrison twice as large as would have been

adequate to defend it. To Austria the blow was a severe one, for it

cost her about four army corps; the immediate advantage it brought to

the Russians was the release of Selivanoff's army of 100,000 men, who

were urgently required elsewhere. It was only a week earlier that the

commander in chief of all the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Archduke

Frederick, had granted an interview to an American journalist (Dr. J.

T. Roche), in the course of which he stated: "We have only recently

reached the point where we are really prepared, to carry on a campaign

as it should be carried under modern conditions of warfare. Now that

our organization has been completed and all branches of the service

are working harmoniously, we entertain no doubts as to our ability to

hold the enemy at all points and to drive him back from that section

of Galicia which is still in his possession."

CHAPTER XXXIX

NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE--AUSTRO-GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Three days before the fall of Przemysl the Russians abandoned the

defensive and commenced a vigorous attack on the Carpathian front.

Active preparations for the advance had been completed when the

capitulation of the fortress was to be expected any hour. Having so

far held the Germanic armies in check, it was necessary for the

Russians to regain complete control of the Carpathians and the passes

before the snow should begin to melt, especially if they decided on an

invasion of Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive could be

undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians at Cracow,

it was imperative to secure the southern flank in Galicia. They had by

this time partially grasped one particular feature of German strategy,

namely, to parry a blow from one direction by striking in another. A

further consideration may have been the absolute certainty that

Germany would dispatch more reenforcements to the aid of her ally.

Selivanoff's siege army was distributed between Dmitrieff, Brussilov,

and Ivanoff, but they could not be employed to full advantage owing to

the restricted area presented by the Germanic front. Being largely

composed of siege artillery as well as cavalry, a considerable portion

of Selivanoff's army was unsuited for mountain warfare. Cavalry were

converted into infantry, but could not be supplied with the necessary

equipment; they had no bayonets, and most of the fighting was

hand-to-hand.

Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in northern

Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin wedge south of

Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost near Bartfeld. To leave

this position undeveloped meant compulsory withdrawal or disaster.

With the continual influx of reenforcements on both sides, the

struggle for the main passes gradually develops into an ever-expanding

and unbroken battle front: all the gaps are being filled up. From

Dukla westward to the Dunajec-Biala line and the Carpathian foothills

a new link is formed by the Fourth Austrian Army, commanded by the

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a half army corps and one

German division. In the Central Carpathians a fifth army, under the

command of the Austrian General von Bojna, appears between the forces

of Boehm-Ermolli and those of Von Linsingen. Right away eastward the

purely Austrian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin was holding the Pruth

Valley. The Germanic chain was complete, with every link welded

together.

When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the entire battle

line still rested on the northern side of the Carpathians, and here

the struggle was resumed. The Russian grand attack was directed

between the Lupkow and Uzsok passes, where great forces of the enemy,

concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl, were stationed. In

the western sector, facing Dmitrieff, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand

held the roads leading from Novy-Sacz and Grybow to Tarnow, covering

Cracow; and from south of the range the two roads diverging from Zboro

to Gorlice and Jaslo were in Russian possession, though the Austrians

held their junction at Zboro, eight miles north of Bartfeld. Of the

actual fighting that took place in this region very few details were

published by the Russian official communique. One of these documents,

dated April 18, 1915, announced that on March 23, "our troops had

already begun their principal attack in the direction of Baligrod,

enveloping the enemy positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on

the east near the sources of the San. The enemy opposed the most

desperate resistance to the offensive of our troops. They had brought

up every available man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as

far as the Uzsok Pass, including even German troops and numerous

cavalrymen fighting on foot. The effectives on this front exceeded 300

battalions. Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural

difficulties at every step. In the course of the day, March 23, 1915,

we captured more than 4,000 prisoners, a gun, and several dozen

machine guns."

On March 24, 1915, the battle was in full progress: "Especially severe

is the fighting for the crest of the mountain south of Jasliska and to

the west of the Lupkow Pass. The forests which cover these mountains

offer special facilities for the construction of strong

fortifications." March 25: "The woods in the Lupkow region are a

perfect entanglement of barbed wire ... surrounded by several layers

of trenches, strengthened by deep ditches and palisades. On this day

our troops carried by assault a very important Austrian position on

the great crest of the Beskid Mountains." The Russian captures for the

day amounted to 100 officers, 5,600 men, and a number of machine guns.

Advancing from Jasliska the Russians seriously threatened the

Austro-German position in the Laborcza Valley, to which strong

reenforcements were sent on March 25. With terrific violence the

battle raged till far into the night of the 27th, the Russians forcing

their way to within seven miles of the Hungarian frontier.

In eight days they had taken nearly 10,000 prisoners. By the night of

March 28, 1915, the entire line of sixty miles from Dukla to Uzsok was

ablaze--the storm was spreading eastward. Like huge ant hills the

mountains swarmed with gray and bluish specks--each a human

being--some to the waist in snow, stabbing and hacking at each other

ferociously with bayonet, sword, or lance, others pouring deadly fire

from rifle, revolver, machine gun, and heavy artillery. Over rocks

slippery with blood, through cruel barbed-wire entanglements and into

crowded trenches the human masses dash and scramble. Here, with heavy

toll, they advanced; there, and with costlier sacrifice, they were

driven back. Fiery Magyars, mechanical Teutons and stolid muzhiks

mixed together in an indescribable hellbroth of combative fury and

destructive passion. Screaming shells and spattered shrapnel rent the

rocks and tore men in pieces by the thousand. Round the Lupkow Pass

the Russians steadily carved their way forward, and at the close of

the day, March 29, 1915, they had taken 76 officers, 5,384 men, 1

trench mortar, and 21 machine guns. Along the Baligrod-Cisna road the

fighting proceeded, up to March 30, by day and night.

Gradually the Russians pushed toward Dvernik and Ustrzyki south of

Lutoviska, threatening the Austrian position in the Uzsok and lines of

communications to the south. German reserves were hurried up from the

base at Ungvar, but could not prevent the capture of 80 Austrian

officers, over 5,000 men, 14 machine guns, and 4 pieces of cannon.

Ivanoff had been careful to hold his portion of Selivanoff's army in

reserve; their presence turned the scale.

On the day and night of March 31, 1915, the Russians stormed and

carried the Austrian positions 4,000 feet high up on the Poloniny

range during a heavy snowstorm. So deep was the snow in places that

movement was impossible; the trampling of the charging battalions

rushing down over the slopes dislodged avalanches of snow,

overwhelming both attackers and defenders. By April 1, 1915, the

Russians approached Volosate, only twelve miles from the rear of the

Uzsok Pass, from which they were now separated by a low ridge. Holding

full possession of the Poloniny range farther west, they commanded the

road from Dvernik to Vetlina. From the north other Russian columns

captured Michova on the Smolnik-Cisna railroad, crossed the

Carpathians, and penetrated into the Virava Valley. Occupying the

entire loop of the Sanok-Homona railway north and south of Lupkow, and

Mezo-Laborcz toward Dukla, the Russians now threatened the Austrian

mountain positions between Lupkow and the Vetlina-Zboj road from the

western flank as well. Violent winter storms raged across the

Carpathians on April 2 and 3, 1915; nature spread a great white pall

over the scenes of carnage. While the elements were battling, the

weary human fighting machine rested and bound its wounds. But not for

long. Scarcely had the last howls of the blizzard faded away when the

machine was again set in motion.

South of Dukla and Lupkow and north of Uzsok fighting was resumed with

intense vigor. Painfully digging through the snowdrifts the Austrians

retired from the Smolnik-Kalnica line, now no longer tenable. Storm

hampered the pursuing enemy, who captured the Cisna railway station on

April 4, 1915, with all its rolling stock and large stores of

munitions.

On April 6, 1915, a Russian communique announced that "during the

period from March 20 to April 3, 1915, we took prisoners in the

Carpathians, on the front from Baligrod to Uzsok, 378 officers, 11

doctors, and 33,155 men. We captured 17 guns and 101 machine guns. Of

these captives 117 officers, 16,928 men, 8 guns, and 59 machine guns

were taken on a front of fifteen versts (10 miles)."

The Russians again advanced along their whole front on April 4, 1915;

forcing their way along the Rostoki stream, they carried the village

of Rostoki Gorne with the bayonet and penetrated the snow-bound

Rostoki Pass. Their first line arrived at a Hungarian village called

Orosz-Russka, five miles from Nagy Polena, at the foot of the pass.

The Austrians attempted to drive them back, but they held their

ground.

While fortune was steadily following the efforts of the czar's troops

in the Lupkow-Uzsok sector, the German War Staff were preparing their

plans for the great decisive blow that was soon to be struck. South of

the Carpathians, barely thirty miles away, formidable reenforcements

were collecting; they arrived from the East Prussian front, from

Poland, and even from the west, where they had faced the French and

British. There were also new formations fresh from Germany. General

von der Marwitz arrived in the Laborcza Valley with a whole German

army corps. These gigantic preparations were not unknown to the

Russians; they, also, strained every nerve to throw all available

reenforcements behind and into the battle line, strengthening every

position _except one_. South of the Lupkow the Germanic forces opened

their counteroffensive on April 6, 1915. Official reports on the first

day's fighting differ somewhat. The Russians admit a slight German

advance, but assert that they were able to withstand all further

attacks. The Germans, on the other hand, claim great successes and the

capture of 6,000 Russian prisoners.

The Germanic armies in this case, however, certainly did advance, for

the Russians withdrew from the Virava Valley, which they had entered

four days earlier. The first object of the counteroffensive was to

save the Austrians who were holding the frontier south of Lupkow from

being enveloped and cut off. But on April 9, 1915, the Russians again

moved forward, and recovered part of the Virava Valley. By this day

the whole mountain crest from Dukla to Uzsok, a distance of over

seventy miles, had been conquered by the Russians. By the same night

they had repulsed a counterattack near the Rostoki and captured a

battalion of Austrian infantry. The Russian report sums up thus: "We

seized Height 909 (909 meters=3,030 feet) with the result that the

enemy was repulsed along the entire length of the principal chain of

the Carpathians in the region of our offensive."

For the next three days Brussilov attempted to work his way to the

rear of the Uzsok position with his right wing from the Laborcz and

Ung valleys, while simultaneously continuing his frontal attacks

against Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. Cutting through snow sometimes

more than six feet deep, the Russians approached at several points

within a distance of three miles from the Uzsok Valley. But the

Austrians still held the Opolonek mountain group in force. Severe

fighting then developed northwest of the Uzsok on the slopes between

Bukoviec and Beniova; the Russians captured the village of Wysocko

Nizne to the northeast, which commands the only roads connecting the

Munkacz-Stryj and the Uzsok-Turka lines. Though both sides claimed

local successes, they appear to have fought each other to a deadlock,

for very little fighting occurred in this zone after April 14, 1915.

Henceforth Brussilov directed his main efforts to the Virava and

Cisna-Rostoki sector. From here and Volosate, where there had been

continuous fighting since the early days of April, the Russians strove

desperately for possession of the Uzsok. They were ow only two or

three days' march from the Hungarian plains.

Between April 17 and 20, 1915, a vigorous Austrian counterattack

failed to check the Russian advance. Between Telepovce and Zuella, two

villages south of the Lupkow, the Russians noiselessly approached the

Austrian barbed-wire entanglements, broke through, and after a brief

bayonet encounter gained possession of two heights and captured the

village of Nagy Polena, a little farther to the east. During the night

of April 16-17, 1915, the Russians took prisoners 24 officers, 1,116

men, and 3 machine guns.

On April 18, 1915, the Austrians directed several fierce attacks

against the heights south of Telepovce, but were compelled to evacuate

the approaches to their positions. Here, also, an Austrian battalion

was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile the fighting was

gradually decreasing in intensity; the great Carpathian campaign had

reached the end of another chapter. The Austro-German offensive had

failed in its purpose. From Uzsok eastward there had been but little

fighting after the Russian recapture of Stanislawow.

CHAPTER XL

CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA--BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

While the struggle for the passes was raging in the central

Carpathians an interesting campaign was being conducted in Eastern

Galicia and the Bukowina between Von Pflanzer-Baltin and Lechitsky.

There we left the Russians in possession of Stanislawow, which they

had reoccupied on March 4, 1915. Two days before, an Austrian

detachment of infantry and two divisions of cavalry attempted a raid

into Russian territory near the Bessarabian frontier. Within

forty-eight hours they were hurled back. Beyond local skirmishes and

maneuvering for positions, nothing of importance happened from March 4

till the 15th, when the Russians attacked the main Austrian forces

southeast of Czernowitz. Crossing the River Pruth opposite

Ludihorecza, which lies about 600 feet high, and where the Czernowitz

waterworks are situated, the Russians occupied the place and

threatened the Austrian position in the town, around which pressed

laborers were digging trenches night and day for the defenders. Along

the line between Sadagora and Old Zuczka the Russians had been settled

for over six months. The Austrians attacked this position on March 21,

1915, with the aid of reenforcements and compelled the Russians to

evacuate Sadagora. While falling back in the south the Russians

endeavored to advance in the north, from the direction of Czerniavka,

and outflank the Austrians. Violent fighting raged for several days,

especially northeast from Czernowitz to beyond Rarancze, with the

result that the Russians were compelled to withdraw toward Bojan, near

their own frontier, on March 27. Three days later some Hungarian

Honved battalions, who had penetrated into Russian territory near

Szylowce, were surrounded by Cossacks and severely handled. Besides

many killed and wounded the Austrians lost over 1,000 prisoners, and

by April 2, 1915, the Russians had thrown the remainder back across

their borders. On April 10, 1915, the Russians withdrew from Bojan,

but returned on the 14th. Here, at the close of April, they

concentrated large reenforcements and recovered most of the ground

they had lost since the middle of March.

Some twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, sheltered in a loop of the

Dniester, lies an important fortified town called Zaleszczyki. It had a

population of over 76,000, and is a station on the branch line

connecting Czortkow junction with the Kolomca-Czernowitz railway. From

the dense forests east of the town an Austrian column commanded by Count

von Bissingen had attempted during the night of March 22-23, 1915, to

turn the adjacent Russian positions, held by Cossacks and Siberian

fusiliers. A furious fight developed, and the Austro-Hungarian column,

which included some of the finest troops, was repulsed with heavy loss.

Two other attempts were made here, on April 10 and 17, 1915. On the

latter date a detachment of Tyrolese sharpshooters were trapped in the

wire entanglements and annihilated.

One more battle on a big scale remains to be chronicled from the far

eastern sector; it may also serve to illustrate the wide divergence

that not infrequently exists between official communiques recording

the same event. Early in April, 1915, a Russian force threw a bridge

across the Dniester near the village of Filipkowu and moved along the

road running from Uscie Biskupie via Okna and Kuczurmik on to

Czernowitz, the intention being to turn the Austrian positions south

of Zaleszczyki from the rear. We will let the rival communiques

relate what happened:

_Austrian Version_

Annihilated two battalions of Russian infantry belonging to the

Alexander Regiment; took 1,400 prisoners, and drove Russians back

beyond the Dniester.

_Russian Version_

Annihilated two battalions of the Honveds; captured 21 officers, over

1,000 rank and file, and 8 machine guns.

The curtain was about to rise for the next act, wherein will be played

one of the most terrific reversals of fortune ever produced in

military history.

For quite a month it had been an open secret that considerable masses

of German troops were being transported to the Carpathian front. What

was not known, however, was the magnitude or the plan of these

preparations. Never was a greater concentration of men and machinery

more silently and more speedily accomplished. All along the south of

the range, on the great Hungarian plains, there assembled a gigantic

host of numerous nationalities. But it was away to the west, in that

narrow bottle neck where the Dunajec flows from the Polish frontier

down to the Tarnow Pass, that the mighty thunderbolt had been forged.

Thousands of heavy guns were here planted in position, and millions of

shells conveyed thither under cover of night. Countless trains carried

war materials, tents, pontoons, cattle, provisions, etc. Finally the

troops arrived--from the different fronts where they could be spared,

and new levies from Germany and Austria-Hungary. Smoothly and silently

men and machines dropped into their respective places: All was ready;

not a detail had been overlooked; German organization had done its

part. The commander was Von Mackensen, nominally Commander of the

Eleventh German Army, but in reality supreme director of the whole

campaign.

During April, 1915, a number of changes had taken place among the

commanding officers of the Austro-German armies; the new dispositions

of groups along the battle line differ considerably from those which

obtained during the fighting for the passes. The line was now

enormously strengthened, and more compact. This applies only to the

Germanic side; there is little change on the Russian. At this stage

the Russian front on the west of Galicia extended from Opatovie on the

Polish frontier along the Dunajec, Biala, and Ropa Rivers by Tarnow,

Ciezkovice, and Gorlice down to Zboro in Hungary; from here it runs

eastward past Sztropko, Krasnilbrod, Virava, and Nagy Polena to the

Uzsok Pass, a distance of about 120 miles. Ewarts commanded the army

on the Nida; the Dunajec-Biala line was still held by Dmitrieff,

Commander in Chief of the Eighth Russian Army; Brussilov still

commanded the main army of the Carpathians, and Lechitsky in the

Bukowina in the place of Alexeieff, who had succeeded General Russky

in the northern group. The whole southern group, from the Nida to the

Sereth inclusive, was under the supreme command of General Ivanoff.

Facing Dmitrieff on the Dunajec front stood now the Fourth

Austro-Hungarian Army under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, about five

army corps, including a German cavalry division under General von

Besser; then the Ninth and Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps; to their

right, several Tyrolese regiments; the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army

Corps of General Arz von Straussenburg, with the Prussian Guards on

his left and Bavarian troops under Von Emmich on his right; the

Eleventh German Army Corps under Von Mackensen; the Third

Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna; the Tenth

Army Corps under General Martiny. This formidable combination now

confronted the Dunajec-Biala positions, which Dmitrieff had held

without exertion for four months. Only a mile or two away he still

inspected his trenches and conducted his minor operations, totally

unconscious of the brewing storm specially directed against him. The

Laborza district was held by the Archduke Joseph with the Seventh Army

Corps; on his left stood a German corps under Von Marwitz, and on his

right the Tenth Army Corps, north of Bartfeld, with some additional

forces in between. Around the Lupkow and Uzsok passes the Second

Austro-Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli was stationed where it had

been since February, 1915. Next, on the right, the Austro-Hungarian

army corps under Von Goglia; in the Uzsok lay an army under Von

Szurmay, nearly all Magyars, of whom the chief commander was Von

Linsingen. Farther eastward stood a Prussian corps, embodying a

division of Prussian Guards and other regiments commanded by General

Bothmer, a Bavarian, who had been reenforced with a Hungarian division

under Bartheldy; then followed the corps of Generals Hofmann and

Fleischman, composed of all Austrian nationalities, intrenched in the

mountain valleys. More German troops held the next sector, and,

finally, came Von Pflanzer-Baltin's army groups in the Bukowina and

Eastern Galicia. Against this huge iron ring of at least twenty-four

Germanic corps (about 2,000,000 men) and a great store of reserves,

the Russians could not muster more than about fourteen of their own

corps. As has already been pointed out, the greatest disparity of

strength existed on the Dunajec line, where Dmitrieff stood opposed to

about half of the enemy's entire force with only five corps of Russian

troops. The Austro-German forces, moreover, were infinitely better

equipped with munitions and heavy artillery. The lack of big guns was

undoubtedly the reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion

of Hungary. Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their

opponents were unable to carry their artillery, although they were

amply supplied with the same. It is true that the Russians could have

produced an equal--or even greater--number of men, but they had not

the arms and accouterments.

Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible to

indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious

stratagems adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous

preparations against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting in this

region had never been severe. When, therefore, local attacks and

counterattacks on a small scale started on the Biala, as far back as

April 4, 1915, Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this activity on the

Austrians part as merely a continuation of the sporadic assaults they

had grown accustomed to. Besides holding his own, Dmitrieff had on

several occasions been able to assist Brussilov on his left. Until the

big German drive commenced they had only been opposed to three

Austro-German army corps and a Prussian division; now there were

twelve corps on their front, supplied with enormous resources of

artillery, shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had

neglected to construct second and third lines to which he could retire

in an emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him--the Wisloka, the

Wistok, and the San--the first would be useful to cover Brussilov's

position at the western passes, but beyond that he could not retreat

without imperiling the whole Carpathian right flank. It was on this

very calculation that the German plan--simple but effective--was

based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians could only be released

either by forcing a clear road through any pass into Galicia, or by

turning one of the extreme flanks. Had the Austrians succeeded in

breaking through as far as Jaslo, Dmitrieff would have been cut off

and Brussilov forced to withdraw--followed by the whole line. The same

result would follow if a thrust from the Bukowina succeeded in

recapturing Lemberg. Both methods had been attempted, and both had

failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority in artillery could not be

effectively displayed in mountain warfare, but Dmitrieff's position on

the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of approach.

At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and applied to

Ivanoff for reenforcements. Owing to some blunder the appeal never

reached the Russian chief, and Dmitrieff had to do the best he could.

Nothing now could save his small force from those grim lines of gaping

muzzles turned against his positions. The overture began on April 28,

1915, with an advance on the Upper Biala toward Gorlice, by Von

Mackensen's right. Here some minor attacks had been previously made,

and the gradually increasing pressure did not at first reveal the

intent or magnitude of the movement behind it. Meanwhile the German

troops about Ciezkovice and Senkova--respectively northwest and

southeast of Gorlice--were moving by night nearer to the battle line.

The Russian front line extended from Ciezkovice in a southeasterly

direction. Hence it soon became clear that Gorlice itself was to be

the main objective of the attack. A Russian official announcement of

May 2, 1915, boldly states:

"During the nights of April 30 to May 1 strong Austrian forces opened

an offensive in the region of Ciezkovice. Our fire forced the enemy to

intrench 600 paces in front of our trenches." Furthermore, the Germans

at the same time had directed artillery fire and bayonet attacks

against various points on the Rava, Pilica, Nida, and the Dunajec.

These, however, were merely movements aiming at diversion, meant to

mask the intentions of the main attack and to mislead the Russians. On

the evening of May 1, 1915, the German batteries began experimenting

against the Russian positions. This was kept up all night while the

engineers attempted to destroy the first line of the Russian wire

entanglements. During the same night the Austrians dragged several

heavy howitzers across the road from Gladyszow to Malastow, and got

them into position without the knowledge of the Russians. In the

morning of May 2, 1915, the great batteries began to roar against the

Russian line--a fire such as had perhaps never been witnessed before.

A spectator thus describes the scene: "In one part the whole area was

covered with shells till trenches and men were leveled out of

existence." It was reported that 700,000 shells had been fired in the

space of four hours, for which period this preliminary bombardment

lasted. The Russian line was turned into a spluttering chaos of earth,

stones, trees, and human bodies. The German and Austrian batteries

then proceeded to extend the range, and poured a hurricane of shells

behind the enemy's front line. This has the effect of doubly isolating

that line, by which the survivors of the first bombardment cannot

retreat, neither can reenforcements be sent to them, for no living

being could pass through the fire curtain. Now is the time for the

attacker's infantry to charge. Along the greater part of the

Ciezkovice-Walastow line this stage was reached by ten o'clock in the

morning of May 2, 1915.

[Illustration: Grand Duke Nicholas.]

A German writer tells us that "in this part of the front infantry

fighting has given place for the time being to the action of our heavy

artillery, which is subjecting to a terrible fire the positions of the

enemy. These positions had been carefully reconnoitered during the

lull in the fighting which prevailed during the last few months. Only

after all cover is destroyed, the enemy's infantry killed or forced

to retire, we take up the attack against the positions; the _elan_ of

our first attack now usually leads to a favorable result."

At Ciezkovice the Germans pushed bridges across the Biala under cover

of a furious cannonade. Troops were thrown over, and after a very

short struggle the village was taken. The huge oil tanks soon were in

flames and Ciezkovice a heap of smoldering ruins. The Russian defense

crumpled up like smoke; their position blown out of existence. Their

guns were toys compared with those of the Germans and Austrians. North

of Ciezkovice the Prussian Guard and other German troops under General

von Francois fell upon the Russians and forced them to retire toward

the Olpiny-Biecz line. The ground of the Russian positions on Mount

Viatrovka and Mount Pustki in front of Biecz had been "prepared" by

21-centimeter (7-inch) Krupp howitzers and the giant Austrian

30.5-centimeter (10-inch) howitzers from the Skoda-Werke at Pilsen.

The shells of the latter weigh nearly half a ton, and their impact is

so terrific that they throw the earth up 100 feet high. Whatever had

remained of the town of Gorlice in the shape of buildings or human

beings was meanwhile being wiped out by a merciless spray of shells.

Being the center of an important oil district, Gorlice possessed oil

wells, great refineries, and a sulphuric-acid factory. As the flames

spread from building to building, streets pouring with burning oil,

huge columns of fire stretching heavenward from the oil wells in full

blaze, and, over all, the pitiless hail of iron and explosives pouring

upon them, the horror of the situation in which the soldiers and

civilians found themselves may be faintly imagined. Gorlice was an

inferno in a few hours. When the German infantry dashed into the town

they found the Russians still in possession. Fighting hand to hand,

contesting every step, the Russians were slowly driven out.

We have mentioned that German troops were moving on Senkova, southeast

of Gorlice, by night. During the last two days of April the Bavarians

captured the Russian position in the Senkova valley. A further move

was made here during the night of May 1-2, 1915, preparatory to

dislodging the Russians from the ground they still held. At seven

o'clock in the morning the big howitzers started to "prepare" that

ground. By ten o'clock it was deemed that every living thing had

perished, when the "fire curtain" was drawn behind the Russian

position. Infantry were then thrown forward--some Bavarian regiments.

To their intense astonishment they were received with a most murderous

fire from Russian rifles, and machine guns. The first attack failed

and many were killed, few getting beyond the wire entanglements.

Cautiously other troops advanced to the battered Russian trenches cut

off from the rear by the artillery screen behind. Yet here again they

met with strenuous resistance in the Zamczysko group of hills. The

Austrian artillery shelled the heights, and the Bavarians finally took

possession. The Tenth Austrian Army Corps had meanwhile conquered the

Magora of Malastow and the majority of the heights in the Ostra Gora

group. On Sunday, May 2, 1915, the Austro-German armies pierced the

Dunajec-Biala line in several places, and by nightfall the Russians

were retreating to their last hope--the line of the Wisloka. The

operations round Gorlice on that day resulted in breaking the Russian

defenses to a depth of over two miles on a front of ten or eleven

miles. Mr. Stanley Washburn wrote from the battle field at the time:

"The Germans had shot their last bolt, a bolt forged from every

resource in men and munitions that they could muster after months of

preparation." Of the Russian army he said, "it was outclassed in

everything except bravery, and neither the German nor any other army

can claim superiority in that respect."

With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian line

had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. Ten miles

north of Ciezkovice lies the triangle formed by the confluence of the

Dunajec and Biala rivers and the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road. Within this

triangle, commanding the banks of both rivers up to the Cracow-Tarnow

line, the Russians held the three hills marked 402, 419, and 269 which

figures express their height in meters.

During February and March, 1915, the Austrians attempted to dislodge

the enemy, but without success. It was now necessary to take those

positions before advance could be made against Tarnow, and the Fourth

Austro-Hungarian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand,

undertook the task. At six A. M. on May 2 the Austrian artillery

opened fire against Hill 419 from Mount Val (also within the

triangle), and the opposite bank of the Dunajec. After three hours'

bombardment some regiments of Tyrolese fusiliers, who had crossed the

valley between Mt. Val and 419 and had taken up positions at the foot

of the latter, about 400 yards from the Russian trenches, were ordered

to charge. Dashing up the open, steep slope the fusiliers were

suddenly enfiladed from their right by a spray of machine gun and

rifle fire, killing many and driving back the survivors. Next day Hill

419 was again fiercely shelled, this time with deadly effectiveness;

but even then the Russians still clung to their battered ground.

The Austrians now charged the trenches on Hill 412, whence the

fusiliers had been ambushed the previous day. A desperate hand-to-hand

encounter, in which they had to force their way step by step, finally

gave the position to the attackers. The few Russians still left on 419

could not hold out after the loss of 412. They retired northward on to

Height 269, but subsequently followed the general retreat of the line.

Still farther north, almost at the right flank of Dmitrieff's line,

the Austrians effected a crossing of the Dunajec opposite Otfinow,

thus breaking the connection between the West Galician Army of

Dmitrieff, and the neighboring Russian Army on the Nida--the left wing

of the northern groups commanded by Alexeieff.

Just below Tarnow, however, the Russians still held out; losing the

three hills had not quite broken their defense on the Biala. The right

wing of Von Mackensen's army, which had smashed the Russian front

around Gorlice, rapidly moved east in an almost straight line to reach

the Dukla Pass and cut off the retreat of the Russian troops stationed

south of the range between Zboro and Nagy Polena, in northwest

Hungary. The left wing, on the other hand, advanced in a northeasterly

direction, ever widening the breach made in the enemy's domain. This

clever move brought the Germans to the rear of Tarnow and onto the

lines of communications of the Russians holding it. It also prevented

reenforcements from reaching the truncated end of Dmitrieff's

right--or what had been his right--wing. By pushing on to Dembica and

Rzeszow, along which route assistance could otherwise have been sent

to the Russians, Von Mackensen opened a wide triangle into Western

Galicia, by drawing an almost horizontal line from Gorlice to Radymno,

between Jaroslav and Przemysl, and from there perpendicular down to

the Uzsok Pass.

From Uzsok to the Lupkow westward stood the Second Austro-Hungarian

Army under Boehm-Ermolli on the north of the Carpathians. To his left,

southwest of the Magora of Malastow, and adjoining the formidable

Germanic array facing the Dunajec-Biala line lay the Third

Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna. These two

armies, it will be remembered, took part in the first offensive in

January, and had been there ever since. Both of these armies now began

to advance into the triangle, and the brilliant simplicity of Von

Mackensen's geometrical strategy becomes clear. Let one imagine

Galicia as a big stone jar with a narrow neck lying on the table

before him, neck pointing toward the left hand, and he will obtain an

approximately accurate idea of the topographical conditions. That side

of the jar resting on the table represents the Carpathian range, solid

indeed, but with numerous openings: these are the passes. The upper

side of the jar represents the Russian frontier, across which the

invaders had swarmed in and taken possession of the whole inside,

lining themselves right along the mouths of the passes at the bottom

and across the neck upwards.

For months the Austrians vainly endeavored to force an entrance

through the thickest walls--from the lower edge, and from the base or

bottom of the jar (the Bukowina), apparently overlooking the rather

obvious proposition that the cork was the softest part and _that_ was

Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala line. Here at least no mountain range stood

in the way. It may also be regarded as a mathematical axiom that,

given sufficient artillery power, the strongest defense the wit of man

could devise can be smashed. What Mackensen did, therefore, was to

blow a hole through the cork, push in a pair of scissors up to the

rivet, meanwhile opening the blades to an angle of about forty-five

degrees. From the lower or southern shoulder of the jar the Third

Austro-Hungarian Army pushes forward inside, supported on its right by

Boehm-Ermolli, who had been just inside a long time, but could get no

farther. They began to shepherd the Russian troops around and in the

western passes toward the lower double-edged blade of Von Mackensen's

terrible scissors. The Russian retreat to the Wisloka was a serious

disaster for Dmitrieff; he had been caught napping, and had to pay

dearly in men and guns for not having created a row of alternative

positions. His force had been a cover for Brussilov's operations on

both sides of the western passes as well as for the whole Russian line

in the Carpathians. Now that Von Mackensen had pried the lid off,

Brussilov's men in the south encountered enormous difficulties in

extricating themselves from the Carpathian foothills, suddenly

transformed from comparative strongholds into death-traps and no

longer tenable. They suffered severely, especially the Forty-eighth

Division.

Besides the menace from the northwest of Von Mackensen's swiftly

approaching right, a third blade was gradually growing on the deadly

scissors, in the shape of Boehm-Ermolli's and Von Bojna's forces,

threatening to grind them between two relentless jaws of steel. It is

Sunday, the second day of May, 1915; to all intents and purposes the

battle of the Dunajec, as such, was over, and the initial aim of the

Germanic offensive has been attained. The Russian line was pierced and

its defense shattered. Von Mackensen's "Phalanx" was advancing two

mighty tentacles guided by a master mind, remorselessly probing for

the enemy's strongest points. Its formation comprised, in the

northeastern tentacle, the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps and the

Prussian Guards; in the southern, the Bavarians under Von Emmich and

the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army corps under General Martiny.

On May 3, 1915, Dmitrieff's troops were falling back farther every

hour, continuously fighting rear-guard actions and compelling the

pursuers to conquer every foot of ground. There was a powerful reason

for this stubborn retirement: it was to gain time for Brussilov to get

his men out of their perilous positions and to join the main line

again with Dmitrieff's receding ranks. If this could be effected, the

fatal gap between them--made by Von Mackensen's battering-ram--would

be repaired, and they could once more present a united front to the

enemy. It was mentioned a little farther back that the Austrians had

pierced the Dunajec line at Otfinow, north of Tarnow, by which was cut

in two the hitherto unbroken Russian battle front, from the Baltic to

the Rumanian frontier (900 miles); the "scissors" at Gorlice had made

it three; if Boehm-Ermolli's drive from the Uzsok upward along the

"triangle line" to Jaroslav succeeds, there will be four separate

pieces of Russian front. But from Tarnow southward to Tuchow, a small

twenty-mile salient on the Biala, the Russians are still in possession

on May 4, 1915, defying the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.

CHAPTER XLI

RUSSIAN RETREAT

It is a matter for speculation whether the numerous successes achieved

by the Russians against the Austrians and Germans in Galicia and the

Carpathians during the first seven months of the war had begotten a

spirit of overconfidence among the Russian commanders, or whether it

was not in their power to have made more effective preparations than

they had done. We have seen that Dmitrieff had not provided himself

with those necessary safety exits which were now so badly needed. As

no artificially prepared defenses were at hand, natural ones had to be

found. The first defense was irretrievably lost; the second line was a

vague, undefined terrain extending across the hills between Biala in

the west and the River Wisloka in the east. Between Tuchow and Olpiny,

the Mountain Dobrotyn formed one of the chief defensive positions,

being 1,800 feet high and thickly covered with woods.

Southward, the Lipie Mountain, about 1,400 feet, formed another strong

point. Just below Biecz, close to the road and railroad leading to

Gorlice, a mountain of 1,225 feet, called Wilczak, is the strategical

key to the valley of the lower Ropa. Between Biecz and Bednarka, the

line of defense followed the heights of the Kobylanka, Tatarovka, Lysa

Gora, and of the Rekaw; hence to the east, as the last defense of the

Jaslo-Zmigrod road, lay the intrenched positions on the Ostra Gora,

well within Brussilov's sector. Southward of the Gorlice-Zmigrod line

lay the mountain group of the Valkova, nearly 2,800 feet high, the

last defense of the line of retreat for the Russian forces from Zboro.

The Wisloka was the third line of defense, only a river, and without

intrenchments. From Dembica to Zmigrod it runs roughly parallel with

the Dunajec-Biala line; its winding course separates it in places from

fifteen to thirty-five miles from the latter river. Strong hopes were

entertained that the Russians would be able to stem the Germanic

torrent by a firm stand on the Wisloka.

A fierce battle raged on the third and fourth of May, 1915, for the

possession of the wooded hills between the Biala and the Wisloka. The

Prussian Guard stormed Lipie Mountain and captured it on the third; on

the fourth they took Olpiny, Szczerzyny and the neighboring hills at

the point of the bayonet.

The Thirty-ninth Hungarian Division, now incorporated in the Eleventh

German Army under the direct command of Von Mackensen himself, had

advanced from Grybow via Gorlice on the Biecz railway line, and were

making a strong attack on the Russian positions on Wilczak Mountain

with a tremendous concentration of artillery. It seems the Russians

simply refused to be blown out of their trenches, for it required

seven separate attacks to drive them out. That accomplished, the fate

of Biecz was decided and the road to Jaslo--the "key" to the Wisloka

line of defense--was practically open to General Arz von

Straussenburg. Lying at the head of the main roads leading into

Hungary through the Tilicz, Dukla, and Lupkow passes, Jaslo is the

most important railway junction in the whole region between Tarnow and

Przemysl. It was at Jaslo that Dmitrieff had held his headquarters for

four months.

Just south of him, barely fifteen miles away, General von Emmich and

General Martiny, with the "Bayonet Bavarians" and the Tenth

Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, went pounding and slashing a passage

along the Bednarka-Zmigrod road and the auxiliary road from Malastow

to Krempna. They were striving hard to reach the western passes before

Brussilov had time to withdraw. He began that operation on the fourth.

On the same night Von Emmich and Martiny reached Krempna, and the last

line of retreat for the Russians around Zboro was imperiled. They have

yet to cross the range from Hungary back into Galicia. So subtly

potent and effective was the pressure on a flank that the whole

line--be it hundreds of miles long--is more or less influenced

thereby, as witness:

On the same night, May 4, 1915, the retreat spread like a contagion to

the entire west Galician front, compelling the Russians to evacuate

northern Hungary up to the Lupkow Pass; in that pass itself

preparations are afoot to abandon the hard-earned position. It is not

fear, nor the precaution of cowardice that prompted this wholesale

removal of fighting men: the inexorable laws of geometry demanded it.

The enemy was at Krempna; as the crow flies the distance from Krempna

to the northern debouchment of Lupkow is eighty miles; yet Lupkow was

threatened, for the "line" or "front" is pierced--the vital artery of

the defense is severed. The strength of a chain is precisely that of

its weakest link.

[Illustration: Galician Campaign from Tarnow to Przemysl.]

The course of events become complex; fighting, advancing and

retreating occurred over a widespread area. Apparently disconnected

movements by the Austro-Germans or the Russians fall into their proper

places in accordance with the general scheme or objective either side

may have in view. It is necessary to follow the scattered operations

separately. We will therefore return now to the Tarnow-Tucho sector,

where we left a small Russian force holding the last remnant of the

Dunajec-Biala front. Tarnow had been the supply base for that front,

and great stores of provisions and munitions still remained in the

town. These the Russians succeeded in removing entirely. The main

forces had already withdrawn in perfect order and fallen back beyond

the Wisloka. During the night of May 4-5, 1915, two regiments of the

Ninth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps crossed the Biala near Tuchow and

moved northward in the direction of the road leading from Tarnow to

Pilzno, along which the remainder of the garrison would have to pass

in order to retreat. On the hills west of Pilzno the Russians still

held a position to protect that road. By the morning of the sixth

everything had gone eastward, and the Austrians had surrounded the

town.

The small cavalry detachment that had been left behind as rear guard

cut through the Austrian lines and rejoined the main forces on the

Wisloka. The Austrians had been bombarding Tarnow for months with

their heaviest artillery, destroying parts of the cathedral and the

famous old town hall in the process.

On May 7 the Russians withdrew from the Pilzno district, and the

Dunajec-Biala Russian front had ceased to exist. From the hour that

the Austro-Germans had broken through the line at Ciezkovice, on May

2, 1915, the Russian retreat on the Wisloka had begun. Yielding to the

terrible pressure the line had increasingly lost its shape as the

various component parts fell back, though it gradually resumed the

form of a front on the Wisloka banks, where most determined fighting

continued for five days.

The Russians lost much of their artillery; they had to reverse the

customary military practice of an army in retreat. If the retreating

army is well equipped with artillery and munitions, its guns cover the

retreat and are sacrificed to save the men. During their retreat the

Russians had often to sacrifice men in order to save their guns for a

coming greater battle at some more important strategic point. Many

prisoners fell to the Germanic armies; according to their own official

reports they took 30,000 in the fighting of May 2-4, 1915. What the

Austro-German side lost in that time was not made public.

CHAPTER XLII

AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST OF WESTERN GALICIA