The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures taken for its
prevention—The artillery reinforced—Affair at Buddowul—Battle of
Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours conferred on the artillery—The
occupation of Lahore.
As the year 1845 drew towards its close, the state of affairs in the
Punjab demanded the most anxious attention of the Governor-General.
Eager to maintain peace, but at the same time determined to be prepared
for war, Sir Henry Hardinge had noiselessly increased the strength of
the frontier army, and had himself proceeded, in September, to the
North-west, apparently on an ordinary tour of inspection. In July, 1844,
there had been between Meerut and Ferozepore 24,000 men, and 66
field-pieces. This force he had, with as little ostentation as possible,
increased to 45,500 men, and 98 field-guns. The most important position
was Umballah. As it was from this point that any attack from beyond the
Sutlej must have been met, the Governor-General, by December, 1845, had
placed there, in the front line, 32,470 men, and 66 field-guns, where
before, in July, 1844, there had only been 13,530 men, and 48
field-guns. But all these preparations were made in the manner least
calculated to alarm or to irritate the Sikhs, and it was hoped that, in
spite of the boastings of the turbulent soldiery, they would be
restrained by their own intestine feuds from advancing to the attack of
their neighbours. The middle of December, however, saw them preparing to
cross the river; and the great event, which had for many years been
talked of in every cantonment in India, was now on the eve of
accomplishment; the war in the Punjab was about to commence.
We come now to speak more in detail of the disposition of the artillery
at this time. At the commencement of the war, there were stationed at
Ferozepore, the 5th troop 1st brigade, under Captain E. F. Day; the 3rd
troop 3rd brigade, under Brevet-Major George Campbell; the 4th company
6th battalion, with No. 19 light field-battery, under Captain J.
Fordyce; and the 2nd company 7th battalion, with No. 6 light
field-battery, under 1st Lieutenant A. G. Austen (Captain Boileau,
lately posted, not having joined), in all 12 horse-artillery guns and
howitzers (6 and 12–pounders), and 12 foot-artillery guns and howitzers
(9 and 24–pounders). Besides these troops and companies, there was a
reserve company (the 2nd company 2nd battalion) for the service of heavy
guns and rockets. The whole were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade.
At Loodianah were posted the 1st troop 1st brigade, under Captain F.
Dashwood; and the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain H. Garbett (total
12 guns); the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes.
But the largest force of artillery was posted at Umballah, under
Lieutenant-Colonel George Brooke, of the 1st brigade horse-artillery. At
that station were the 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain D’Arcy Todd;
the 3rd troop 1st brigade, under Captain G. H. Swinley; the 1st troop
3rd brigade, under Major F. Brind; the 3rd company 4th battalion, under
Captain Jasper Trower; and the 2nd company 6th battalion, under Captain
R. Horsford; Nos. 7 and 9 light field-batteries being attached to these
two companies. There were also at Umballah, the 2nd and 4th companies
(reserve) 4th battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Denniss.[96]
Thus the Sirhind division of artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooke, numbered forty-two horse-artillery and twenty-four
foot-artillery guns and howitzers. The four 9–pounder batteries were
horsed; but No. 19, at Ferozepore, having only lately been changed from
a bullock-battery, and being incomplete in harness, was obliged to take
the field with bullock-draught. The Governor-General was at this time at
Umballah; and he had with him on escort duty, two horse-artillery guns,
under 1st Lieutenant George Moir, of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade
horse-artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, then at Muttra.
The Sikhs crossed the Sutlej on the 11th and 12th. On the latter day Sir
Hugh Gough marched from Umballah to Rajpoora, with the head-quarters of
the Sirhind division, a distance of 18 miles; and on the 13th, Sir John
Littler moved his troops into camp, to protect the cantonments of
Ferozepore; one regiment being detached with three guns, from No. 6
battery, under Lieutenant Tulloch, to defend the city. On the same day,
he brigaded his force; Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade,
being temporarily appointed a brigadier of artillery; Lieutenant
Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd brigade, being his brigade-major.
On the 13th, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief being then
only a few miles distant from each other, and in constant communication,
the Army of the Sutlej was formed into brigades and divisions.
Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke was appointed brigadier to command the
artillery; consisting of all the troops and companies before mentioned,
as stationed at Ferozepore, Loodianah, and Umballah, as well as the two
guns under Lieutenant Moir, from the escort of the Governor-General.
Brevet-Captain Murray Mackenzie, adjutant of the 1st brigade, was
appointed major of brigade to the artillery, and Brevet-Captain Warner,
adjutant of the 4th battalion, commissary of ordnance.
On the 13th, the troops at Loodianah received orders from Sir H.
Hardinge to march to Busseean, a distance of twenty-eight miles; and at
the same time, the two horse-artillery guns from Muttra, and the 5th
cavalry, which formed part of the Governor-General’s escort, were sent
thither to join them. The object of this movement was to cover Busseean,
full as it was of supplies for the British army, which, but for the
interposition of the Loodianah force, would in all probability have been
destroyed by the enemy. By this movement also, the force under the
Commander-in-Chief, marching up from Umballah, was augmented by 4,000
men and 12 guns.
On the 15th the troops halted, and on the following day moved on to
Wudnee, of which place a Sikh garrison was in possession. On their
refusal to furnish supplies to the force, the two troops of artillery
were brought into position before the town—a movement which had the
desired effect. Here the Umballah force, with the main body of the
artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, joined the troops from Loodianah.
On the 17th the army made a short march of ten miles to Chirruck, where
the troops suffered much from scarcity of water.
On the 18th the whole force moved to Moodkee. During the march a message
was received from Major Broadfoot, who was reconnoitring in front, to
the effect that the Sikhs were in possession of the fort and village of
Moodkee, and that a portion of their cavalry were in advance of that
place. The horse-artillery and cavalry were immediately ordered to form
line to the front; the enemy’s pickets, however, had abandoned their
advanced position, and Moodkee opened its gates at the sight of a few
guns.
It was half-past two o’clock before the army was encamped. The horses
had been picketed, and men and officers were about to seek some
refreshment after the fatigues of the march, when Major Broadfoot
brought intelligence that the enemy was within three miles of our lines.
The Governor-General himself rode down the front of the artillery camp,
and the guns were quickly in motion.
The camp of the British army was, at this time, formed on a tract of
cultivated ground immediately to the west of Moodkee. In front, for
about a mile, extended ploughed fields, beyond which there stretched a
dense jungle of low brushwood and stunted trees. Through this the Sikh
columns were now advancing. The horse-artillery, with cavalry on the
flanks, moved rapidly across the ploughed fields. The dust caused by the
march of the Sikh columns rose densely against the blue sky above the
brush-jungle; but when the enemy perceived that the British line was in
motion, they halted in the jungle to make their arrangements for the
battle. The horse-artillery proceeded in line across the fields, but
halted before entering the jungle. The light field-batteries, which had
been directed to follow, with the infantry columns, came up soon after
the action commenced; and in a short time 30 horse-artillery and 12
field-battery guns were in full play.
Our fire soon told upon the enemy, who were hidden in a thick jungle,
and their position only indicated by the smoke from their guns. Soon,
apparently, some of the Sikh pieces were either silenced or withdrawn,
for their fire gradually slackened. Brigadier Brooke, in his official
despatch, reports, that “the line of artillery kept up a heavy fire on
the enemy, nearly silencing their guns;” and the Commander-in-Chief
corroborates this statement, saying, that the enemy “opened a very
severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied
to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was
soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and
well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of
the enemy.”
Rather more than half an hour after the commencement of the action, the
Commander-in-Chief directed Colonel Geddes to take two troops of
horse-artillery, and to proceed with the 4th light cavalry and 9th
irregulars to the left, to oppose a demonstration of the Sikhs from
their right flank. The 1st and 4th troops of the 3rd brigade (under
Major Brind and Captain Garbett), being on the left of the line, were
those which accompanied Colonel Geddes. The two troops with the cavalry
moved rapidly into the jungle towards the left front, and came into
action against some Sikh cavalry and infantry, who had apparently been
creeping round with the intention of turning our left flank. Colonel
Geddes, who was the senior officer on the left, perceiving this body of
the enemy retiring before the fire of our guns, directed the 9th
irregular cavalry to charge. This was accordingly done. As the cavalry
moved forward, the guns ceased firing, and again advanced through the
jungle, which at every step grew denser and denser, and much impeded the
movements of the horse-artillery.
At the same time that this occurred on the left, a similar movement was
made from our right to turn the enemy’s left flank, and to check their
cavalry, who were endeavouring to circle round our right. The 1st[97]
and 3rd troops 1st brigade, under Captains Dashwood and Swinley, and
Captain Trower’s battery, were pushed forward to support the 3rd
dragoons and a brigade of native cavalry, who were now ordered to charge
the enemy’s left flank. The 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain Todd,
and Captain Horsford’s battery, still remained in the centre, covering
the advance of the infantry brigades. After the brilliant and successful
charges of our cavalry on both flanks, the troops and batteries detached
to the right and left were ordered to close in to the centre, in order
to support the attack of the infantry. It was nearly dusk. The early
evening of a winter day had set in whilst the action still raged
furiously. The jungle at every pace grew denser, and it was with
difficulty that the guns could force their way through the brushwood.
Captain Swinley’s troop, in covering the advance of an European
regiment, suffered much from a close discharge of grape and musketry,
and one gun, having lost all its horses, was temporarily disabled. The
1st troop 1st brigade sustained great loss from the close fire of the
enemy’s artillery and infantry. Captain Dashwood, who commanded the
troop, was, at this period of the action, with his staff-serjeant and
several of his men, struck down by grape. Lieutenant Pollock, of the 3rd
troop 1st brigade, also received a mortal wound; and Captain Trower was
shot at the head of his battery by a Sikh soldier concealed in a bush.
At this time darkness was rapidly covering the field, and the artillery,
being within a few paces of the enemy’s line, were suffering much from
their galling fire. But at length the Sikh line gave way before the
advance of the British infantry, who, supported by a part of the
artillery, pursued for a considerable distance the retreating enemy;
but, as the Commander-in-Chief observed in his despatch, “night saved
them from worse disaster.”
The action commenced at half-past three in the afternoon, and, as the
day was one of the shortest of the year, the rapid closing in of night
prevented the British force from taking full advantage of its success.
The Sikhs saved a portion of their ordnance, some of their guns being
apparently withdrawn early in the action. It is supposed that they had
in all from thirty to forty guns engaged, of which seventeen fell into
our hands.
The artillery suffered more in this action from grape and musketry than
from the round shot of the enemy, which did comparatively little
mischief. Only one or two waggons were blown up, and in fact scarcely
any loss was sustained until the troops and field-batteries were pushed
up through the jungle close to the enemy’s fire. It was then that
Captains Dashwood and Trower, and Lieutenant R. H. Pollock (son of
Major-General Sir George Pollock, G.C.B.), received their death-wounds.
The first was struck down by grape, receiving two wounds, one on the arm
and the other on the foot, the latter of which proved mortal. Lieutenant
Pollock had his knee smashed by a musket-ball, and being for a long time
exposed to the cold night air, lying in a waggon, though the limb was
amputated immediately upon his arrival in camp, sunk on the 19th.
Captain Trower, as we have said, was shot by a Sikh concealed in the
jungle; the ball passed through his body, and he died during the night.
There were several Sikhs—Akalis and others—lying concealed behind the
bushes, who waited until our troops came close upon them, to pick out
our officers. The total loss of artillery was (_killed_) 2 European
officers, 4 serjeants, 13 rank and file, 5 syces and grass-cutters, 3
drivers, and 45 horses;—and (_wounded_) 4 European officers, 1 native
officer, 2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 11 lascars, 2 drivers, 7 syces,
and 25 horses. The officers killed and wounded were, Captain Jasper
Trower, killed; Lieutenant R. Pollock, killed; Captain F. Dashwood,
severely wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. V. Cox, slightly wounded; 1st
Lieutenant C. A. Wheelwright, wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. Bowie, slightly
wounded. Captain Dashwood died soon afterwards.
The morning of the 19th[98] was devoted to the mournful duty of bringing
in the wounded and burying the dead. The artillery sent out limbers and
cattle to bring in the captured ordnance. Whilst thus employed, our
working parties were disturbed and obliged to retire towards camp, by
some bodies of the enemy’s horse, who had returned to the field probably
with the same intention. As large bodies of the enemy’s horse were still
hovering about, the Commander-in-Chief drew up his troops again,
prepared, if necessary, to renew the action; but nothing, at this time,
worthy of note in our memoir, occurred.
On the night of the 20th, two 18–pounder guns and two 8–inch howitzers
arrived in camp from Umballah, under Brigadier Denniss and Captain
Warner, commissary of ordnance. Short as the time was, ammunition was
prepared for the howitzers, which were thus enabled to accompany the
force on the following morning. The 18–pounders were, however, left
behind in camp at Moodkee.
An hour before daybreak on the 21st, the army broke ground. The main
body of the artillery moved in rear of the centre column under General
Gilbert. Two troops of horse-artillery were, however, detached, one with
the column under Brigadier Wallace, and the other was attached to
Major-General Sir H. Smith’s division. The distance from Moodkee to
Ferozeshuhur, where, according to intelligence received in camp, the
main body of the enemy were posted,[99] is not above twelve miles; but
the army moved slowly, led by the infantry columns, and a very
considerable detour was made to the left, in order that a junction with
the Ferozepore division, under Sir John Littler, might be made, at a
sufficient distance from the intrenched position of the enemy. Although
the communication with Ferozepore had been lately interrupted, as the
Sikhs had interposed between that station and the headquarters force,
instructions had been sent to the major-general to move out of his camp
at Ferozepore on the morning of the 21st, so as to form the desired
junction. The Governor-General’s despatches had been duly received; and
Sir John Littler, with 5,900 men and 21 guns, marched early on the 21st
to Misrèe-wallah, a village a short distance from the Sikh position.
This movement was skilfully accomplished by the general, who left the
whole of his camp standing, and threw out the usual mounted picquets in
front, thus deceiving that portion of the Sikh force under Tej Singh
which had been employed in watching him. The sirdar, ignorant of
Littler’s march, remained in front of the empty camp during the whole of
the day, and did not learn the general’s movement until the next
morning. The junction of the two forces was effected about half-past one
P.M.; and “dispositions were made for an united attack upon the enemy’s
intrenched camp.” About 4 o’clock the British troops moved forward under
their veteran commanders; Sir Hugh Gough leading the right wing, and Sir
Henry Hardinge, who, after the battle of Moodkee, had chivalrously
volunteered his services as second in command, placing himself at the
head of the left.
The nature of the ground was somewhat similar to that at Moodkee,
covered with thick jungle, and, as on that day, the sun was rapidly
sinking when the action commenced. It was the shortest day of the year,
and but a few hours of daylight remained. The line of attack was formed,
Sir John Littler on the left, Brigadier Wallace in the centre, and
General Gilbert on the right. Sir Harry Smith’s division, the reserve,
was in the second line. The cavalry was in reserve and on both flanks.
The artillery was thus posted—Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd
brigade, was with Sir John Littler. He had under his command the 5th
troop 1st brigade, under Captain E. F. Day—3rd troop 3rd brigade, under
Major G. Campbell—4th company 6th battalion (bullock-battery attached)
and three guns of No. 6 horse field-battery—the other three guns having
been left with a detachment to protect the city of Ferozepore. Captain
D’Arcy Todd’s troop—the 2nd of the 1st brigade, was on the left of
Brigadier Wallace’s division; and Captain G. H. Swinley’s, the 3rd troop
of the 1st brigade, was on the extreme right of the line, beyond her
Majesty’s 29th foot. The 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain Garbett,
and the 1st troop 1st brigade, now under Captain C. E. Mills, with
Lieutenant Moir’s two guns, were on the left of Gilbert’s division.
Major Brind’s troop was with Sir Harry Smith’s in the second line; but
just as the action commenced was moved up to the first line, and took
post to the right of Captain Garbett’s troop. These three troops, the
1st and 4th of the 3rd brigade, and the 1st of the 1st, were under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes. To the left of these were two
horse field-batteries under Captain Horsford and Lieutenant Atlay, and
the heavy howitzers and rockets under Brigadier Denniss and Captain
Warner.
The action commenced on the left, Colonel Huthwaite pushing forward with
his two troops of horse-artillery and his light field-batteries, to the
attack of the enemy’s position. The heavy guns and rockets and 9–pounder
batteries next came into action, and almost immediately afterwards the
horse-artillery in the centre and on the right. The action now became
general with the artillery on both sides. The roar of the ordnance was
tremendous. The British had 65 pieces in action—but, with the exception
of two heavy howitzers, all light guns. The enemy had upwards of 100
guns in battery, and most of them of large calibre; whilst even those of
smaller dimensions, being of much heavier metal than our own
field-pieces, were fired with increased charges and carried greater
distances.
The ground in front of our line was, in the first positions taken up,
covered with jungle as at Moodkee, but afterwards, as we neared the
enemy, became clear and open. After a few rounds, the horse-artillery in
the centre of the line were advanced to a closer distance, and the
troops moved through the jungle at a rapid pace, the shot from the
enemy’s guns tearing up the ground on all sides, but as yet causing
little loss.
As before mentioned, the detachment of artillery under Colonel Huthwaite
on the left, commenced the action. Pushing the guns forward from one
position to another, until within grape distance, he had for a time
completely silenced the batteries opposed to him. Meanwhile the infantry
on his left moved forward to the attack, but the movement was not
successful. Subsequently, however, the 9th foot and 26th light infantry
(with a portion of the 14th N.I.), under Brigadier Wallace, carried the
enemy’s battery.
Meanwhile the other troops and batteries, from their different positions
in line, had advanced through the jungle. The 2nd troop 1st brigade,
under Captain Todd, being on the left of Brigadier Wallace, approached
the artillery attached to Littler’s division. Major Brind’s troop, the
1st of the 3rd, after advancing to a great distance, was despatched to
the right to join Captain Swinley’s, which had accompanied the 29th
foot. Two troops under Colonel Geddes, after several positions, emerged
from the jungle and came into a clear open space in front of the
southern face of the enemy’s intrenchments, and within reach of their
grape-shot; and now the artillery fire ceased, the infantry were moved
forward and (forming line) advanced to the storm. The batteries in front
were carried at the point of the bayonet, notwithstanding the most
determined resistance, and the great loss sustained, just as the line
reached the battery, by the explosion of a large under-ground magazine,
which had all the effect of a mine.
The sun had now set, and darkness was rapidly falling on the field. The
obscurity was much increased by the dust and the smoke from the
batteries and the exploding magazines. From the frequency of these
explosions, and the quantity of earth thrown up by them, it was at first
supposed that the enemy’s position had been mined; but they were nothing
more than under-ground magazines, which, some by accident, some by
design, were now exploded, adding to the confusion and din of the fight.
Several regiments having penetrated the batteries, reached the Sikh
tents, many of which were now on fire. Here the troops became partially
broken and entangled; nothing could be distinguished clearly amidst the
smoke and obscurity. It was difficult to ascertain in which direction
lay friend or foe. Shots were falling thick on all sides, and even now
the troops of horse-artillery, halting unemployed before the Sikh
position, suffered material loss. Two waggons of Captain Mills’ troop
exploded simultaneously—giving at first a momentary impression that the
mines extended even so far from the enemy’s batteries. The 3rd dragoons,
who had charged from the right of the line on the batteries immediately
opposed to them, carrying everything before them in their course, now at
length emerged from the enemy’s position in scattered parties. It was
now dark. All our infantry were engaged. The reserve, under Sir Harry
Smith, had been called up and had penetrated beyond the batteries, most
of which had been captured; and one brigade had even reached the village
of Ferozeshuhur. Yet all opposition had not ceased, and the enemy still
held a great portion of their intrenchments. Amidst, however, the
darkness and intricacies of the camp, it was impossible then to push our
success further. It was advisable, therefore, to withdraw our shattered
regiments, which within the Sikh position were exposed to hidden
dangers, without any compensating advantage.
Accordingly, a bivouac was formed within two or three hundred yards of
the batteries. Here were collected, under Gilbert and Wallace, the 9th,
29th, 31st, and 80th regiments of foot, and the 1st European light
infantry. The 1st troop of 1st brigade, and 4th troop 3rd brigade, under
Colonel Geddes, joined this division of infantry, near which the
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief remained throughout the night.
The 2nd troop 1st brigade, now under Lieutenant Mackinnon (Major Todd
having fallen in the action), and some field-battery guns, under Captain
Horsford, soon afterwards came up to the ground. The 5th troop 1st
brigade, 3rd troop 3rd brigade, and 9–pounder batteries attached to the
4th company 6th battalion, and 2nd company 7th battalion, bivouacked a
short distance to the left. The 3rd troop 1st brigade, 1st troop 3rd
brigade, with some field-battery guns, bivouacked during the night near
Misrèe-wallah, which was occupied by British troops of all arms.
The night passed wearily away in cold and watching; the enemy,
occasionally firing, allowed our harassed troops little rest. One gun
was particularly troublesome during the greater part of the night, until
the Governor-General ordered its capture by the 80th foot and 1st
Europeans. Other guns were playing during the night with little or no
effect. The uproar in the Sikh position was tremendous; the shouting was
incessant, and the beating of drums, the sounding of bugles, and the
firing of matchlocks and musketry continued, with short intervals, until
daybreak. Frequently their drums beat to arms, and it was supposed that
the enemy were preparing to attack us. Accordingly, a few guns were got
into position and held ready with grape; but nothing came of these
indications.
About midnight the troops, having originally bivouacked as they came
upon the ground, were formed up in order; the guns in front, and the
infantry in two lines in their rear. At length day broke, and the Sikh
position was now comparatively quiet. The uproar had gradually
diminished, and it was generally supposed that the enemy had begun to
abandon their intrenchments. At first a thick mist shrouded all
surrounding objects; but the beams of the rising sun soon dispelled it,
and the three troops of horse-artillery, under Captain Mills, Lieutenant
Mackinnon, and Captain Garbett, pushed forward and again opened on the
Sikh position.
But there was no longer the determined resistance which had marked the
contest of the previous day. It is true that some batteries of heavy
metal replied to our fire for a time, and did some little mischief, a
few of our waggons being blown up; but the enemy’s fire soon grew
feeble. The infantry, who were close in rear of the guns, formed into
line, and with a hearty cheer sprang forward. Soon the intrenchments,
here most insignificant, were gained and passed; and the British line
swept through the camp, meeting with but little opposition. The
horse-artillery, after ceasing their fire, limbered up and accompanied
the infantry line under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes. There was
no check to the progress of our troops. No steady resistance was offered
by the enemy. The village of Ferozeshuhur was carried as the line
advanced. There was a smart skirmishing fire in front, but it was
evident that many of the Sikh battalions had already fled, and that our
advance expedited the retreat of the others. The line having passed the
village of Ferozeshuhur, leaving it to the left, and having reached the
extremity of the enemy’s position, halted. Upwards of seventy of the
Sikh guns, and the whole of their _matériel_ and camp equipage, fell
into our hands. And thus apparently the battle terminated.
But such in reality was not the case. We now come to a period of the
engagement sufficiently difficult to describe. Orders had been given to
allow a certain number of men to fall out for the purpose of procuring
water, and arrangements were also being made for securing the captured
ordnance. It was generally believed that the contest had ceased, when
suddenly to the left of the British line, and extending over a
considerable arc of the horizon, a dense cloud of dust was seen rising
from the jungle. The sirdar, Tej Singh, who had been uselessly watching
Sir John Littler’s empty camp, had now marched from his position before
Ferozepore to join the main army under Lal Singh, whom he supposed to be
still in possession of the intrenched position. But to his surprise he
found himself in the presence of the victorious British army.
Our ammunition was getting scarce.[100] The horse-artillery was at this
time in three separate bodies. Two troops (and a part of a
field-battery, under Lieutenant Austen) were with Colonel Huthwaite on
the left of the field. The troops commanded by Major Brind and Captain
Swinley were, early in the morning, with Sir Harry Smith’s division; and
Colonel Geddes commanded three troops with headquarters. Colonel
Huthwaite moving through the jungle on the left of the village, came
unexpectedly on the Sirdar Tej Singh. He immediately opened upon the
Sikh force, and drew down a heavy fire. This was the commencement of the
affair. Major Brind, in command of his own troop and that of Captain
Swinley, soon after became engaged with the enemy on the left front of
the village. His fire was answered by about thirty pieces of all kinds
from the Sikh batteries. The three troops under Colonel Geddes were also
directed to move forward to the attack. The artillery under Colonel
Huthwaite, being entirely unsupported, and his ammunition failing, was
compelled to fall back, as the enemy was within a few hundred yards, and
appeared to be moving round his flanks. At the same time the two troops
of horse-artillery under Major Brind, being exposed to an enfilading
fire from some heavy guns of the enemy, were obliged to retire upon the
village where the supports were posted. About this period, Colonel
Geddes, after sustaining a very heavy fire, finding his ammunition
expended and that he was entirely unsupported, was compelled to fall
back upon the hollow square which, in the mean time, had been formed by
the infantry on the right front of the village. The greater number of
the guns were now placed on the prolongation of one of the sides of the
square. Some were in the village, and three guns of the 4th troop 3rd
brigade were posted in one of the angles of the square immediately
fronting the direction of Tej Singh’s advance. There was now a pause—the
army quietly waiting the expected attack of the Sikh sirdar. Most of our
guns were now without, or nearly without, ammunition, only a few rounds
of grape remaining. Near the village to the left of the large square
were several Sikh ammunition-carts, and the Commander-in-Chief directed
the artillery to seize as much of the enemy’s ammunition as time would
admit of, to replenish the exhausted boxes. But unfortunately most of
the guns, being on the right of the square, were too far removed to
avail themselves of this opportunity. The three guns, however, which
were in the angle, procured each some fifteen or sixteen rounds, which
proved of material assistance. Meantime the Sikh line under Tej Singh
continued to advance. At length, when he had arrived some six hundred
yards from the British position, Major Brind’s troop in the village, and
the three guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade in the angle of the square,
opened upon the enemy, and drew down a furious cannonade from some forty
field-guns. Those of our guns which were on the right of the square,
besides being short of ammunition as before mentioned, were placed with
their left flank towards the enemy, and therefore could not, even had
they ammunition, take part in the conflict. From their position they
suffered much from the enfilading fire of the enemy, as did also the
regiments on that side of the square. For some twenty minutes, the few
guns which we had opposed to the enemy kept up this unequal contest.
Whilst the Sikh artillery were playing upon our position, the sirdar
appeared to be gradually crossing our front. It was about this time that
the Commander-in-Chief changed the front of the line, bringing a portion
of it within shelter of the village. The fire of the artillery on our
side now entirely ceased. Major Brind, who had been in the village with
two troops, was directed to join the entire mass of the artillery which
was on the extreme right, in column with the cavalry—as did also the
three guns of the 4th troop of the 3rd brigade, which had expended all
their ammunition, including that which they had captured from the Sikhs.
But by this time the Sikh fire was gradually lessening, and the sirdar
appeared to be withdrawing from the field.
It was after the change of front had been effected, and whilst the
artillery and cavalry, in a mass of contiguous columns (the cavalry on
the right, left in front), were moving round the right of the village,
that orders were given to the latter to form line to the right
preparatory to charging. The cavalry accordingly, whilst the artillery
halted, moved forward in line, and made a demonstration against the
enemy—which was the last offensive movement made on either side.
During this movement of the cavalry, the artillery halted, to be able,
if necessary, to support the former. But on the cavalry re-forming and
again forming column, the march was resumed, and orders[101] were
received by the senior officer, Brigadier Harriott, to escort the whole
of the field-artillery into Ferozepore for the purpose of refilling
their ammunition-boxes. But the action was now entirely over, and the
Sikh sirdar was making the best of his way towards the river.
In this action the artillery lost 31 killed, including officers; and 77
wounded (exclusive of lascars, &c.). Major D’Arcy Todd had his head
carried away by a cannon-shot on the 21st; Captain J. F. Egerton, at the
time attached to the quarter-master general’s department, was cut down
on the 22nd, near the village of Ferozepore, whilst carrying a message.
He lingered more than a month under very severe sabre-cuts, and died on
the 23rd of January, 1846. 1st Lieutenant P. C. Lambert, a very
promising young officer of horse-artillery, was killed by a cannon-shot
on the 22nd. The wounded officers were Captain W. K. Warner, commissary
of ordnance (slightly), Captain M. Mackenzie, brigade major (slightly),
1st Lieutenant R. M. Paton (slightly), and 1st Lieutenant E. Atlay
(slightly).
The artillery had several pieces disabled at different periods of the
action, and some six or seven limbers or waggons were blown up.
The exhaustion of the ammunition with the field-artillery at
Ferozeshuhur was a matter of too pregnant and suggestive a nature to be
lost, in the way of warning, upon the sagacious practical mind of the
Governor-General, who, soon after the conclusion of the war, addressed
himself to the remedy of the evil which had threatened such serious
consequences during the campaign. It was obvious that the guns had gone
into the field with a scanty supply of ammunition, and that the Indian
system, which allowed a smaller number of rounds than is sanctioned by
the regulations of the royal army, was unequal to the exigencies of such
trying service.[102] To remedy this for the future, it was recommended
by Lord Hardinge, that there should be allotted to each gun of every
troop and battery, whether a 6–pounder or a 9–pounder, two
ammunition-waggons, giving to each 6–pounder 224 rounds, and to each
9–pounder 168 rounds. One waggon, it was proposed should always be close
at hand with each gun in action, and the other in reserve, the whole
supply of ammunition being under the charge of the officer commanding
the troop or battery. The Military Board, whilst concurring in the
expediency of the proposed increase of ammunition, suggested that the
six waggons with the troop or battery, should be under the charge of the
officer commanding; and the six spare waggons in magazine, a proposal
which was readily concurred in by the Governor-General.
On the 24th of December the army moved to Sultan-Khan-Wallah, and
thence, in a few days, to Hurruff, with an advanced division at
Mulloowal. On the 1st of January the army was again brigaded. Colonel
Gowan, C.B., was appointed to the command of the artillery division;
Captain Edward Christie was nominated deputy assistant adjutant-general;
Captain Warner, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. H. Maxwell, deputy
assistant quartermaster-general (originally appointed at Wudnee).
Lieutenant-Colonels Biddulph, Brooke, and Dennis, were appointed
brigadiers; with Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and Lieutenant Kaye, as
brigade majors. Great exertions were now made, in anticipation of the
renewal of the struggle, to strengthen our ordnance force, especially by
the addition of a siege-train. To the artillery formerly specified were
accordingly added three troops of horse-artillery from Meerut, and one
from Muttra—the 1st troop 2nd brigade, under Captain Turton—the 2nd
troop 2nd brigade, under Major Grant—the 3rd troop 2nd brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander; and the 2nd troop 3rd brigade (two guns of
which had been previously with the army), under Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane;—also, the 1st company 4th battalion, under Captain Waller, with
twelve 9–pounder iron guns, reamed out to 12–pounders, and drawn by
elephants, with some reserve companies of the 3rd and 6th battalion,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The horse-artillery from Meerut, and
Captain Waller’s guns, joined the army early in January, and the
remainder at a later period.
On the 12th of January the head-quarters of the army changed ground to
Bootawallah, with its extreme flanks resting on Mukkoo and Attaree. On
the 13th and 14th there was an interchange of a few distant rounds
between the British and Sikh artillery, which led to no results. On the
18th, a force under Sir Harry Smith was detached towards Dhurrum Khote.
The artillery which accompanied this division, consisted of the 1st and
3rd troops of the 2nd brigade, and No. 6 horse field-battery, under
Colonel Lawrenson. The 1st troop 1st brigade, under 1st Lieutenant J.
Mill, followed with Brigadier Wheeler, who was sent to the reinforcement
of Sir Harry Smith, but did not take part in the affair of Buddowal. It
was on the 21st that this incident occurred, in which the artillery
assisted in covering the retirement of Sir Harry Smith to Loodianah. A
few store-carts, which were in the rear with the baggage, fell into the
hands of the enemy.
A week after this, the battle of Aliwal was fought. Reinforced by a body
of troops under Brigadier Wheeler, which joined the division on the 26th
of January, Sir Harry Smith made his arrangements to attack the enemy’s
position at daybreak on the 28th. “My order of advance,” writes the
general, in his well known despatch, “was the cavalry in front, in
contiguous columns of squadrons of regiments; two troops of
horse-artillery, in the intervals of brigades: the infantry in
contiguous columns of brigades, at intervals of deploying distance;
artillery in the intervals, followed by two 8–inch howitzers, on
travelling carriages, brought into the field by the indefatigable
exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, horse-artillery.” About 10 o’clock
the enemy’s batteries opened on our advancing columns, and the action
soon became general. All arms distinguished themselves greatly on this
memorable occasion:—“Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s and Captain Turton’s
troops of horse-artillery, under Major Lawrenson, dashed almost among
the flying infantry, committing great havoc, until about 800 or 1,000
men rallied under the high bank of a nullah, and opened a heavy but
ineffectual fire from below the bank.” “I immediately,” adds Sir Harry
Smith, “directed the 30th native infantry to charge them, which they
were able to do upon their left flank, while in a line in rear of the
village. This native corps nobly obeyed my orders, and rushed among the
Avitabile troops, driving them from under the bank, and exposing them
once more to the deadly fire of twelve guns within three hundred yards.
The destruction was very great, as may be supposed, by guns served as
these were. Her Majesty’s 53rd moved forward in support of the 30th
native infantry, by the right of the village. The battle was won; our
troops advancing with the most perfect order to the common focus, the
passage of the river. The enemy, completely hemmed in, were flying from
our fire, and precipitating themselves in disordered masses into the
ford and boats, in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our 8–inch
howitzers soon began to play upon their boats, when the ‘debris’ of the
Sikh army appeared upon the opposite and high bank of the river, flying
in every direction, although a sort of line was attempted, to
countenance their retreat, until all our guns commenced a furious
cannonade, when they quickly receded. Nine guns were on the verge of the
river by the ford. It appears as if they had been unlimbered to cover
the ford. These, being loaded, were fired once upon our advance. Two
others were sticking in the river; one of them we got out; two were seen
to sink in the quicksands; two were dragged to the opposite bank, and
abandoned. These and the one in the middle of the river were gallantly
spiked by Lieutenant Holmes, of the 11th irregular cavalry, and Gunner
Scott, of the 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, who rode into the
stream, and crossed for the purpose, covered by our guns and light
infantry.”
The highest praise has been bestowed by Sir Harry Smith on the
artillery, for its conduct throughout these operations,—“The guns
literally being,” he says, “constantly ahead of everything.” “I would
beg,” he continues, in his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, “to call
his Excellency’s marked attention to Major Lawrenson, commanding the
artillery; in Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, Captain Turton, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, the service has officers of the very first
order; and I am equally satisfied with Captain Boileau, in command of
the 9–pounder battery, and with Lieutenant Mill, in charge of four light
guns. The two 8–inch howitzers did right good service, organized,
equipped, and brought into the field by the exertions and determination
to overcome all difficulties of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, equally well
served and brought forward always with the infantry by Lieutenant
Austen.” Lieutenant Tombs, who was present as acting aide-de-camp to the
general, also received the thanks of Sir Harry Smith.
In this engagement the artillery lost 3 men and 30 horses, _killed_; 15
men and 9 horses, _wounded_; 5 men and 12 horses, _missing_.
We come now to the crowning action of Sobraon. It was on the night of
the 7th of February that the long-expected siege-train arrived from
Delhi, with four companies of foot-artillery, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The Commander-in-Chief, overjoyed by this
accession to his strength, determined upon the immediate attack of the
enemy’s intrenched position. But short time was allowed to the artillery
to prepare ammunition for the heavy ordnance. On the 8th, the artillery,
which had been detached with Sir Harry Smith, rejoined head-quarters: on
the 9th, the plan of operations was sketched out for the following day.
A little before midnight the heavy ordnance moved out of camp to the
advanced position of Rodawallah, there to be joined by Brigadier
Ashburnham’s brigade of infantry, to which was added the 62nd foot,
which, owing to some mistake, did not reach that post till near
gun-fire. The following account of the Sikh intrenchments and of the
plan of attack is taken from the _Calcutta Review_:—
“The Sikhs had taken up one of the falsest positions possible; viz. with
their rear resting on the Sutlej; yet, by dint of much labour, some
foreign science, and the ingenuity natural to a military people, they
contrived to convert it into one of the strongest fortifications against
which troops were ever led;—being nothing less than a series of vast
semicircular intrenchments, the outer one of which was two miles and a
half from end to end, and three quarters of a mile in depth; the whole
surrounded by a deep ditch and ‘bristling’ with sixty-seven pieces of
artillery. A bridge of boats united this formidable camp to another on
the opposite bank of the Sutlej; where also were planted some heavy
guns, whose range swept easily across the river.
“Sir Hugh Gough’s plan of attack was as follows:—The heavy guns were to
commence operations by a cannonade upon the intrenchment, into which,
crowded as it was with upwards of 30,000 men, their fire was expected to
carry confusion and dismay. Sir Robert Dick’s division, on the extreme
left of the British line, was then to advance and storm the right, or
western corner of the Sikh position; General Gilbert’s division on the
centre, and Sir H. Smith’s division on the right, were simultaneously to
make false attacks, with the view of diverting the enemy’s attention
from the real attack of Sir Robert Dick. Brigadier Cureton, with a
brigade of cavalry and a troop of horse-artillery, was directed to
threaten the ford of Huríkí Puttun, about a mile distant from the
eastern corner of the intrenchment, on the opposite bank of which the
enemy’s cavalry were posted.
“Agreeably to this plan, at about 7 o’clock A.M., the artillery opened;
the fog rolled off as it were a curtain, and the surprised Khalsa at
once heard and saw that the avenger had come upon them. In an instant
the Sikh drums beat to arms; and many rounds had not been fired from the
British guns before an answering thunder from the intrenchment told that
the works were manned and the struggle had begun.”
Owing to the delay above mentioned, it was not until a little after
sunrise that the heavy guns were placed in position. Opposite the
enemy’s centre was a mortar-battery, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood. On the prolongation of the right flank of the enemy’s
intrenchment, at a distance of 1,300 yards, were placed three batteries
of heavy ordnance—six 18–pounders under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Lawrenson—six 10–inch howitzers under Brigadier Dennis—and eight 8–inch
howitzers under Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite. Further to the left of
these batteries, and slightly in advance, were the rockets, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes; Brigadiers Biddulph and Brooke superintended
these batteries; the first on the right, the second on the left. The
attack was commenced by Major Grant’s howitzer-troop. The surprise was
most complete. The Sikh position, which up to this time had been wrapped
in profound silence, now became a scene of uproar and commotion. Their
drums beat to arms; and they began to busy themselves in preparations
for the engagement. The 12–pounder reamers, manned by the men of the 5th
troop 1st brigade, under the command of Captain Day, were the next to
open. These, after a short interval, were followed by the heavy
batteries. Then, to use the words of the Commander-in-Chief’s despatch,
“The whole of our artillery fire was developed. It was most spirited and
well directed. I cannot speak in terms too high of the judicious
disposition of the guns, their admirable practice, or the activity with
which the cannonade was sustained; but notwithstanding the formidable
calibre of our iron guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way
in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have
been visionary to expect that they could, within any limited time,
silence the fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of
earth, plank, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered either by
redoubts or epaulements, or within a treble line of trenches.”
As already mentioned, but a short time had been allowed for the
preparation of ammunition for the heavy guns; to this and to the great
distance at which they were posted from the enemy’s works, is to be
attributed their inability to silence the Sikh fire. But the practice
both of guns and rockets was considered highly effective. It had been
proposed by the commanding officers of artillery, to place the guns in
battery nearer the enemy’s intrenchments; and had this been done, some
satisfactory results might have been obtained.[103] But the
Commander-in-Chief was unwilling to hazard the delay which the formation
of the necessary parapets would have occasioned. Hence, at the time when
Sir Robert Dick, who was on the extreme left, was ordered to advance to
the attack, the ammunition of the heavy guns had been well nigh
expended.
“The attack,” says the writer in the _Calcutta Review_, “was led by
Brigadier Stacy with her Majesty’s 10th and 53rd regiments, and the 43rd
and 59th native infantry, supported on the flanks by Captains Horsford’s
and Fordyce’s batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s troop of
horse-artillery. Beyond all comparison this was the finest attack of the
campaign. The artillery galloped up and delivered their fire within 300
yards of the enemy’s batteries, and the infantry charged home with the
bayonet, and carried the outworks without firing a single round.”—“a
forbearance,” says the Governor-General, “much to be commended, and most
worthy of constant imitation.” As it was the finest attack, so also did
it meet with the most determined hand-to-hand resistance which the
Khalsa soldiers had yet opposed to the British. Like lightning, the real
plan of the attack seemed to flash on the minds of all the desperate men
in that intrenchment; and, disregarding the distant feints of Gilbert’s
and Smith’s divisions on their left and centre, they rushed to the right
to repel the real danger that was upon them. In vain, Stacy’s brigade
tries to withstand the mass which every moment is growing denser; in
vain, Wilkinson’s brigade comes up to the support; in vain, Ashburnham’s
reserve swells the furious tide of the assault. It was like the meeting
of two mighty rivers, one swifter and one deeper than the other;—and as
the swifter for a moment penetrates its duller neighbour’s stream, then,
yielding to the overpowering waters, is rolled back and swept away; so
would the conquered trenches of the Sikhs have been wrested again from
the brave division of the British, had not Sir Hugh, with the intuitive
quickness of a general’s eye, marked the crisis and the struggle,
foreseen its issue, and ordered up Gilbert’s and Smith’s divisions to
the rescue. They advanced; the enemy beheld it, and, returning
tumultuously to the posts they had abandoned, poured upon these new
enemies, from every foot of the intrenchment, a destructive fire of
grape, round shot, and musketry. In spite, however, of a loss,
unprecedented in so short a time,—Sir H. Smith’s division losing 489,
and General Gilbert’s 685 men, in about half an hour, these two
indomitable divisions persevered in storming what proved to be the
strongest part of the enemy’s position; and the intrenchment being thus
carried by the British at three different points, the gunners, who drew
their swords when they could no longer fire, were bayoneted beside the
guns they had so murderously served,—while the cavalry and infantry,
driven from three sides into a confused and disordered mass, but
fighting to the last, were inch by inch forced to retreat where alone
retreat was possible. Preferring death to surrender, they recklessly
plunged into the river. The bridge, of which they were so proud, and to
which they had so confidently trusted, broke down under the first party
of flying horsemen, and became impassable; while the Sutlej, having
risen seven inches in the night, had flooded the ford. “In their efforts
to reach the right bank,” says the graphic narrative of the
Commander-in-Chief, “through the deepened water, they suffered from our
horse-artillery a terrible carnage.[104] Hundreds fell under this
cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the
perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay, were
such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous
conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of the
action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mangling
every wounded soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune
of war left at their mercy.” “Sixty-seven pieces of cannon, upwards of
200 camel swivels, numerous standards, and vast munitions of war,” were
left in possession of the victors.
The loss of artillery in this action was not very severe; Lieutenant
Faithfull, of the 1st troop 2nd brigade, was killed by a cannon-shot.
Major Grant was wounded in the arm. The total of killed and wounded in
the different troops and batteries, was (_killed_), 1 European officer,
3 rank-and-file, 3 syces, and 17 horses; (_wounded_), 1 European
officer, 1 sergeant, 33 rank-and-file, 5 lascars, 5 syces, and 23
horses.
The following officers were especially named by the
Commander-in-Chief:—Brigadiers Gowan, Biddulph, Brooke, Denniss; Captain
Christie, deputy assistant adjutant-general; Captains Pillans and
Warner, commissaries of ordnance; Lieutenant Maxwell, deputy assistant
quartermaster-general; Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and Lieutenant Kaye,
brigade majors; Lieutenant-Colonels Wood, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander,
and Lane; Majors Lawrenson, Grant, Brind, and Campbell; Captains Day,
Turton, Swinley, Fordyce, Horsford, Waller, and Lieutenant Holland.
It should be mentioned in this place, that, on the death of Major
Broadfoot, the political agent on the north-western frontier, Major H.
M. Lawrence, of the artillery, then political agent at Catmandoo, was
summoned from Nepaul to take charge of our relations with the Punjab,
and to execute the congenial policy of the Governor-General. The summons
was responded to with remarkable despatch, and, within a fortnight from
its receipt, he had joined the camp of the Governor-General. He was
present at the battle of Sobraon.
We subjoin here a complete list of the honours conferred on the
artillery:—
To be A.D.C. to the Queen:—Lieut.-Col. Gowan, C.B.
To be Lieut.-Cols.:—Majors F. Brind, G. Campbell, H. M. Lawrence, C.
Grant, and G. S. Lawrenson.
To be Majors:—Captains H. Garbett, R. Horsford, E. F. Day, G. H.
Swinley, J. Fordyce, W. S. Pillans, F. Boileau, R. Waller, and E.
Christie.
To be Companions of the Bath:—Lieut.-Cols. Biddulph, Brooke,
Denniss, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander, Lane, Lawrence, and
Lawrenson.
Immediately after this action, the British army crossed the Sutlej, and
marched upon Lahore. Indeed, the firing had scarcely ceased, when the
Governor-General despatched a staff officer to Khoondah ghaut, directing
Sir John Littler to commence the passage of the river at that point.
Captain Garbett’s troop of horse-artillery and two native infantry
regiments were ferried across the Sutlej, and thus, both banks being in
possession of the British army, an excellent bridge of boats was thrown
across, and the passage of the river was effected without opposition.
Thus closed the first Sikh war—one of the most memorable and glorious in
the annals of our eastern empire. Upon the history of the subsequent
treaties, this memoir need not enter. In April, 1846, the greater part
of the army returned to India, leaving a strong body of troops to occupy
Lahore.