Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling
of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall of
Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours to the
Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks.
In accordance with the treaties entered into with the Sikh government,
the Jullundur Doab, and the hill country immediately bordering upon it,
became a portion of the British territory. Within the latter stood the
celebrated fortress of Kote Kangra, the killedar of which refused to
deliver up possession of the place to the British authorities, declaring
that, unless the Maharajah Runjeet Singh himself appeared before the
gates, he would not surrender the keys. “The fort of Kangra is one of
those which is strong from its position: it is built near the conflux of
the Bub Gunja with the Beeas; and is bounded, for the most part, by
precipices nearly perpendicular; and where the declivities are less
formidable, the aid of masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render
the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable under European
engineers. * * * The occupants of the fort were believed to amount to
about 500, principally Akalis, and their guns were said to be ten in
number.”[105]
It now, of course, became necessary to reduce this fortress to
subjection. Accordingly, a force, under Colonel Wheeler, was sent
against it. It consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th native
infantry, with a wing of the 63rd, and a siege-train composed of three
18–pounder guns, two 8–inch howitzers, and six mortars, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, with Captain Swinley’s troop (3rd troop 1st
brigade), and Captain Fitzgerald’s (2nd company 7th battalion), and
Captain Christie’s (4th company 6th battalion) batteries. The march was
one of the most arduous character. It seemed impossible that heavy guns
could be transported up the precipitous defiles which led to the fort.
“With our heavy guns,” writes an officer of the force, “we had to cross
the river Gooj no less than fifty-six times between the Beeas and Kote
Kangra; and the last day we crossed it, rain having fallen on the hills,
it swelled to a roaring torrent. Frequently the guns got completely
fixed between enormous boulders of rock, so as to defy all the ingenuity
both of artillery officers and engineers; when the united strength of
men, horses, and bullocks, aided by two elephants dragging had failed,
one fine old mukhna (a male elephant, with tusks like a female) was
always called for. Coming forward with an air of pitying superiority—his
look seeming to express clearly, ‘What! can’t you do it without me?’ he
would look carefully at the gun in every direction, and when he had
found the point where his power could be best applied, he put his head
to it, and gave it a push, as if to weigh the opposition; then followed
another mightier push; and if that did not suffice, a third, given with
tremendous force, almost invariably raised the gun out of its fixed
position, and sent it on. He would then retire with the air of
Coriolanus, when he said to Aufidius, ‘Alone I did it!’—a more valuable
ally than Coriolanus, because he said nothing, and was always willing.”
Such, indeed, were the difficulties of the march, that the enemy,
believing that our heavy ordnance could never be brought under the walls
of the fort, determined to hold out. The same opinion of the
impracticability of the road was entertained by many of our own
officers. “The brigadier,” says the writer above quoted—Colonel Jack, of
the 30th native infantry—“was recommended to leave his 18–pounders on
the other side of the river Beeas; he, however, determined to take them
on as far as possible, and, by extraordinary management and exertion, he
succeeded in taking them all the way. They turned out, as the Europeans
quaintly remarked, to be the really influential _politicals_.”
On the 25th of May this tremendous march—one of which it has been
rightly said, that it “reflects everlasting credit on the artillery”—had
been successfully accomplished. Preparations were commenced for the
erection of batteries and the planting of the guns in position; but
siege operations were rendered unnecessary by the unconditional
surrender of the fortress. A portion of the artillery force, including
the heavy guns, remained at Kote Kangra throughout the greater part of
the year, being finally withdrawn in December. The return march of the
heavy ordnance was little less difficult than the ascent; but on this,
as on the former occasion, the elephant-draught was found to be
admirably adapted to the required service. “From the experience of this
march,” says Lieutenant Clifford in an elaborate report, “I am
satisfied, that from their intelligence, docility, and strength,
elephants are admirably adapted for the draught of heavy ordnance
through a mountainous country; and I doubt whether the heavy guns could
possibly have been taken up to Kangra and back without the assistance of
these animals; for though bullocks answered sufficiently well for the
draught of carts and lighter carriages, the number requisite to move a
siege-gun could not have been used at many of the windings and
declivities met with during this march, to say nothing of the difficulty
of guiding bullocks over narrow, dangerous roads, in which the elephants
appeared to show a sense of the necessity of caution. Throughout the
march, ten elephants were immediately attached to the four guns; viz.
two in draught with each piece, accompanied by two spare.”
The year 1847 was one of almost uninterrupted tranquillity. During the
first quarter of the following year little occurred to break the quiet
that reigned in the Punjab; but in the month of April, affairs began to
wear a more threatening aspect. The refusal of Moolraj, the Dewan of
Mooltan, to give up that fortress to the British officers commissioned
to transfer it to the hands of another chief, and the murder of those
officers (Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson) by the people of the
garrison, led, in the course of that year, to the celebrated siege of
that stronghold. Before, however, we dwell upon this important event, it
should be mentioned that, in the month of May, some disturbances having
been created in the Manjha country by a Sikh Ghooroo (Bhaee Maharaj),
two guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade (which had marched from Loodianah
to Lahore early in the month), under Lieutenant A. Bunny, accompanied
the detachment sent in pursuit of the rebels; and subsequently, the
entire troop, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, proceeded on a similar
service.
The operations of Lieutenant (now Major) Edwardes having brought him
before the walls of Mooltan, it became matter of discussion between the
Commander-in-Chief and the Resident at Lahore (Sir F. Currie),[106]
whether a regular force should be sent against the fortress at that
time, or delayed to a later period. Eventually, the Resident took upon
himself the responsibility of ordering the advance of the force; and
Major-General W. S. Whish, commandant of the Lahore division, an old and
experienced artillery officer, proceeded in command of it.
The artillery with this force was commanded by Major Garbett. Lieutenant
J. Mill was appointed major of brigade. The 4th troop of the 1st
brigade, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, marched down with the Lahore
column, along the left bank of the Ravee. The 4th troop 3rd brigade,
under Captain John Anderson,marched with the Ferozepore column along the
right bank of the Sutlej. The 2nd company 2nd battalion, the 3rd and 4th
companies of the 3rd battalion, and the 6th company 7th battalion, under
the command of Major E. F. Day, went by water down the Sutlej with the
heavy ordnance. Lieutenant Peter Christie was appointed commissary.
These details set out towards the close of July. The land column reached
Mooltan before the end of August. On the 4th of September the
siege-train arrived. On the 5th, General Whish, in the name of the
Maharajah and the Queen of England, called upon the garrison to
surrender. No answer being returned to the summons, the engineer
officers were called upon to submit their plans for the attack of the
place. It was finally determined to commence regular siege operations;
and on the morning of the 7th, the first parallel was commenced. It had
previously been in contemplation to attempt the seizure of the place by
a coup-de-main; and on the 6th, our mortar batteries had commenced
playing on the town. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, there was some slight
skirmishing. At daybreak on the 10th, some of our guns were got into
position, and a tolerably heavy fire was maintained throughout that day.
On the following day orders were issued for an attack upon a position
which the enemy maintained in advance of the city. The column named for
this service was accompanied by 4th troop 1st brigade of
horse-artillery, under Captain Mackenzie. The attack took place on the
morning of the 12th, and was highly successful, though attended with
considerable loss. Among the officers wounded, was Lieutenant Bunny, of
the horse-artillery: General Whish had a horse shot under him. This
successful attack placed all the defensible points on this side the city
in our hands, and by enabling the heavy guns to be advanced to within
600 yards of the city walls, would have considerably shortened the
operations of the siege, but the defection of Shere Singh, which took
place on the 14th, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. This
circumstance, combined with other causes, the most prominent of which
was the numerical inefficiency of the force employed to carry on the
various duties of the siege, embracing the formation of trenches and
batteries, the protection of the camp and lines of ammunition, as well
as the thorough investment of the place, induced the general most
unwillingly to suspend operations until the arrival of reinforcements
should enable him to proceed with the siege.
In the meanwhile the standard of revolt had been raised in the countries
beyond the Indus, and on the banks of the Chenab. The Sikh troops at
Bunnoo had mutinied and murdered their officers; and Chuttur Singh, a
chief of considerable note, headed the insurrection in the Hazareh.
Towards this point the eyes of Shere Singh were directed. He was the son
of Chuttur Singh, and after his defection, did not long remain with
Moolraj, but marched northward to join the rebels, taking with him 5,000
men, 12 guns and howitzers, and 80 zumbooruks. It was now no longer an
isolated case of rebellion in remote provinces. The whole Sikh nation
appeared to be rising up in arms against us. The very troops which had
been despatched by the Durbar to assist General Whish in his operations,
had joined the insurgent force, and it was doubtful whether we had a
single friend, Sikh or Mahomedan, in the country. It became necessary,
therefore, to take the field on a more extended scale, and the
Commander-in-Chief determined to place himself at the head of the army.
It was thus that in vain General Whish applied to Simla for
reinforcements. All the available troops were required for the campaign,
which appeared inevitable, on the Chenab. Accordingly orders were sent
to the Bombay Government to afford the necessary assistance. Here for a
time we must quit that division of our army, and follow the movements of
the Commander-in-Chief.
In October, 1848, orders were issued for the assembly of the army of the
Punjab, under the personal command of Lord Gough; Brigadier Tennant was
nominated to the command of the artillery, with the rank of
brigadier-general; Brevet-Captain Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd
brigade horse-artillery, was appointed deputy assistant
adjutant-general; Lieutenant H. Tombs, deputy assistant
quartermaster-general; Captain Hogge, commissary of ordnance, and
Lieutenant P. Christie (with General Whish at Mooltan), deputy
commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts was subsequently
nominated aide-de-camp to the brigadier-general. Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooke, C.B., 2nd brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant C. V. Cox, his
adjutant, were respectively appointed brigadier and brigade-major of
horse-artillery; and Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, C.B., 1st brigade
horse-artillery, and Lieutenant E. Kaye, his adjutant, were nominated to
the same situations in the foot-artillery.
The artillery division was constituted as follows: Head-quarters and 4th
troop (at Mooltan) 1st brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters and 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 4th troops 2nd brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters,
1st, 2nd, and 4th troops (at Mooltan) 3rd brigade horse-artillery; 1st
company 1st battalion (No. 10 horse field-battery); 3rd company 1st
battalion (No. 17 horse field-battery); 2nd company 2nd battalion (at
Mooltan); 3rd and 4th companies 3rd battalion (at Mooltan);
head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies 4th battalion; 2nd company
7th battalion (No. 6 horse field-battery); 3rd company 7th battalion
(No. 5 horse field-battery); and 6th company 7th battalion (at Mooltan).
The several components of the army crossed the river Sutlej near
Ferozepore, at different times—the majority during the month of October,
or early in November; but some of the corps and the artillery train,
with No. 6 field-battery, and some reserve companies, did not move
across the bridge till the middle of November. Brigadier Huthwaite was
intrusted with the equipment and preparation of the train and park, and
all arrangements regarding a plentiful supply of ammunition.
Some regiments of cavalry and troops of horse-artillery had been early
pushed forward, under command of General Cureton; and Brigadier-General
Campbell followed him across the Ravee with his division of infantry and
some field-batteries. The Commander-in-Chief followed with General
Gilbert’s division.
At the time that our troops crossed the frontier, the Rajah Shere Singh
was in force on both banks of the Chenab, with his advanced parties
pushed forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally even to
the banks of the Ravee. These, however, fell back before the advancing
columns under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell, and the Rajah
abandoned the town of Ramnuggur, and placed the principal part of his
force on the right bank of the river, but still holding the left with
large masses of cavalry, and some smaller bodies of infantry. The town
of Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two
miles from the river, from which it is divided by a low tract of waste
_cander_ land, subject to occasional inundation, and intersected by a
few easy nullahs. Nearly midway between the town and the river was a
small but dense grove of trees, around which hovered the advanced bodies
of the Sikh army.
On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell were
within an easy march of Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined
by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day the first collision took
place between the army of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere
Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to the loss of some
valuable lives without any corresponding advantages to ourselves. Lord
Gough was on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General
Campbell was that day in command. However, as the work was entirely
confined to the cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was the
actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to drive Shere Singh
completely across the river. The Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned,
hovering between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry and two troops
of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s) were pushed forward rapidly to
dislodge them. The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far in
advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled with Sikh infantry, and
were received with a heavy musketry fire, which caused them considerable
loss. Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish, and also
the brave old General Cureton. Nor was this all; one of our troops of
horse-artillery (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the
river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries, and was
compelled to retreat with the loss of a gun, which stuck against the
bank of a nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the unpropitious
commencement of the campaign. The Sikhs were certainly compelled to
confine themselves to the right bank, but no doubt the same object might
have been gained without so great an expenditure of life.
Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery, and Penny’s
brigade of infantry, were moving up as rapidly as possible. After
crossing the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main road for the
purpose of attacking a fort of some strength, called Jhubber, into which
a rebel sirdar, Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he
proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two guns of No. 6
field-battery, with small detachments of infantry and irregular cavalry,
proceeded in advance against the fort, while the main body followed. The
garrison, however, refused to surrender to the nine-pounders, and the
walls were too strong for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight
of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw open their gates,
and yield themselves prisoners. Some small pieces of ordnance were
captured in the fort, which, together with the neighbouring village,
were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.
On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance, anxiously awaited by Lord
Gough, joined head-quarters at Ramnuggur, and that very night several
pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and also farther to the
right and higher up the stream, while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all
the cavalry, Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of
horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up the stream to find
a ford whereby to effect a passage, and so turn the enemy’s
position.[107] This Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine
miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell found himself under the
necessity of moving nearly as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect
the passage. This of course occasioned considerable delay.
On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of shots between our
batteries and those of the enemy on the opposite bank; but the distance
was too great to allow of any effect being produced. On the night of the
second, our batteries were advanced to within 400 yards of the river’s
edge; but in the morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn back a
great part of his camp, though he had left some batteries near the
river, between which and ours some desultory firing took place. In the
afternoon heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river. This was
Thackwell, who had been attacked while resting after several long
marches.
There was nothing more than a cannonade from either side. Shere Singh
tried to dislodge Thackwell, but could effect nothing by his fire,
while, on the other hand, he himself was soon driven from the field by
three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 1st
troop 3rd brigade, under Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two
field-batteries (No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of No. 10
under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no pursuit; being ignorant of the
strength of the enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops being
somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become more closely engaged. The
enemy suffered considerably, but our loss was trifling, and principally
in the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10 heavy field-battery,
was severely, and Lieutenant J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade
horse-artillery, slightly wounded.
As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered by the
indefatigable General Gilbert, as he rode from our batteries to the
river’s edge, that the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A ford
was immediately sought for, and soon discovered; Thackwell, reinforced
from head-quarters,[108] pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered
a thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider it prudent to
follow them. He accordingly encamped at Hailah, his camp equipage and
baggage having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur. About the 8th or
9th he was again reinforced. The remainder of the horse-artillery, under
Brigadier Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17 heavy
field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the 1st company 4th brigade with
four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C.
Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly all the force; two
brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s
battery (No. 6), and the park, being all now left at head-quarters. His
camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive and for the most part
uncultivated plain. In his front was the broad belt of jungle before
mentioned, which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks of the
Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into the Dooab. At the further edge
of this belt lay Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the
western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank being at
Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards the river. After the 5th
December, each force remained inactive for a considerable period, save
that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties of horse through the
jungle, who annoyed Thackwell by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.
On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed across the river,
head-quarters, Mountain’s brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular
cavalry (with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left at
Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his staff, crossed the Chenab,
and were then joined by No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant
Robertson. On the 1st January, the head-quarters force moved to Janu-ke
(about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah), when the artillery train and park
joined from Ramnuggur, at which place a bridge-head had been
constructed, armed with two 24–pounders and the guns of No. 6 heavy
field-battery.
On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under Madwell changed ground,
and effected a junction at Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road
from Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance of the Chenab. Here
it was supposed that the force would remain for a considerable time, and
no doubt such was the original intention; but Attock, long defended by
the gallant Herbert, fell, and Chutter Singh was known to be in full
march to join his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson, the
Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the
advisability of overthrowing the latter before reinforced by his father.
His lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels, readily
consented: he reviewed his army, ordered up two corps of native infantry
from Ramnuggur, on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee, and on
the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.
The strongest part of the enemy’s position was supposed to be his left,
at Russool, on the extremity of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the
river Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee was pretty free
from jungle, but along the base of the sand ridge, and in front of the
whole of the Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering all
military operations (especially movements of cavalry or artillery) most
difficult and hazardous; and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It
was Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool with his right
(Gilbert’s division), while General Campbell should operate upon
Lallianwallah and Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much counter
advice offered to him on the night of the 12th, that he was induced to
forego his intention of attacking the enemy on the following morning.
The force, however, marched from camp on the 13th, and the line of
contiguous columns at first bore steadily down towards the enemy, the
right directed on Russool. After a time, the right was brought more
forward, so that the direction of our march became parallel to the
enemy’s line, and Lord Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s
department to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going too
near the enemy, and, at the same time, without the necessity of
retracing our steps towards Dhingee. This was somewhat difficult, as the
army had just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao, between
which and Chillianwallah there was no water. At Chillianwallah, on a
mound, or small hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of this,
however, we were not aware, till a small party of our cavalry came upon
it unexpectedly, and was fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was _forced_ to
fight the action on that day.
Our cavalry (with exception of 3rd and 9th irregulars, under Hearsay,
our rear-guard) was divided between the two extreme flanks. Gilbert’s
division formed the right wing, Campbell’s the left, and Penny’s brigade
was in reserve.
The 1st troop 2nd brigade, 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 2nd troop 3rd
brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, were with the cavalry on the
right; Captain Dawes’s, H.F.B. (No. 17), was with Gilbert; No. 5,
H.F.B., and three guns of No. 10 (the other three guns being on
rear-guard), were, under Major Mowatt, with Campbell. The 2nd troop 2nd
brigade, 4th troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were under
Lieutenant-Colonel Brind. The heavy guns (consisting of six 18–pounders
and four 8–inch howitzers), under Major Horsford (the respective
batteries commanded by Majors Ludlow and Sir R. C. Shakespear), were in
the centre of the line. These were all drawn by elephants, which were,
however, exchanged for bullocks before the action commenced. Brigadiers
Brooke and Huthwaite were, with their respective brigades, on the march,
but during the action with the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. The army
moved in line of contiguous columns of brigades, at first directed
towards the enemy’s position, but subsequently changing front to the
left, parallel to the Sikh line, our right towards it. As soon as the
Sikh post on the mound at Chillianwallah had been discovered, line was
formed from the columns. The outpost was of course soon driven in; after
which, Lord Gough again changed front,—to his right this time, so as to
bring our front again opposite the Sikh line. The army halted, arms were
piled, and the quarter-masters proceeded to mark out ground for
encampment. But the Sikhs, determined to bring matters to an issue under
cover of the jungle, brought up some light pieces, and fired upon us. As
it was evidently impossible to encamp within reach of their guns, which
the denseness of the jungle enabled them to move up unobserved by us,
and as we could not encamp elsewhere from want of water, without
retracing our steps, which would have borne too much the appearance of
retreating, Lord Gough was _compelled_ to fight, and that, too, under
peculiar disadvantages, as he knew little or nothing of the ground in
his front, nor did the thick jungle admit of his reconnoitring. He was
forced, too, to abandon his original plan of attacking Russool, as we
had now got opposite their centre; the enemy, too, had frustrated all,
by moving out of their position into the jungle in front of it.
The enemy’s position was a very extensive one, and Lord Gough was forced
to lengthen his own line. The consequence was, that our left and right
wings were at a considerable distance apart. The cavalry on the right
was divided into two parties; the one under Brigadier Pope comprised the
14th dragoons, a wing of the 9th lancers, the 1st light cavalry, and a
wing of the 6th; with these were Huish’s troop (1st troop 2nd brigade)
and half of Christie’s (3rd troop 2nd brigade), under Colonel Grant.
Further to the right, and somewhat to the rear, so as to cover the right
flank of our army, were a wing of 9th lancers and a wing of 6th light
cavalry, with Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade), and half of 3rd
troop 2nd brigade, under a subaltern. To the left of Brigadier Pope was
Gilbert’s division, with Dawes’s battery; and left of these again the
heavy guns. Campbell’s division and the remaining cavalry, with which
were three troops of horse-artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind,
were far removed to the left, and could not be seen from the centre of
the line. The action commenced with the heavy guns. It would have been
well had they had the battle to themselves a little longer. They
produced soon a very considerable effect on the enemy’s fire. In the
words of the Commander-in-Chief, “After about an hour’s fire, that of
the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to
justify an advance. I then ordered my left division to advance.”
Campbell soon became closely engaged. Lord Gough then deemed it
necessary to push forward his right wing, and the heavy guns were
ordered to cease firing. The Commander-in-Chief soon received
intelligence of a great misfortune having happened to Pennycuick’s
brigade (one of Campbell’s division)—the 24th regiment of foot
especially suffered severe loss.[109] The other brigade, consisting of
61st foot and two native corps, had, however, made a more successful
advance. The reserve under Penny was now ordered forward to support
Gilbert’s division; but this consisted of but two native regiments (one
having been left on rear-guard). Sir W. Gilbert’s division, well
supported by Dawes’s brigade, met with but little loss, with the
exception of the 30th and 56th native infantry, which corps suffered
severely. But further on the right, Pope’s brigade of cavalry, and the
horse-artillery under Colonel Grant, were driven back with much loss.
The cavalry, it seems, had formed line on the right of the guns, and
were then ordered to advance through the jungle. From some unexplained
causes, they had only just come within sight of the enemy, when the
brigade—notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to stop the
movement—retreated, not, however, without loss, for the Sikh cavalry
hung closely on their heels. Unfortunately, the men did not retreat
directly to the position from whence they had advanced, but, obliquing,
came in front of the guns (some of which were unlimbered) and galloped
through them, the Sikhs mixed up with them, or close behind; so that our
men could not fire without slaying our own cavalry. The consequence was,
many of the gunners were cut down at their guns, and six of the pieces
fell into the enemy’s hands (two were afterwards recovered by Lieutenant
C. Cookworthy, of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, who, after the action, took
limbers and horses, and sought for his division). Major Christie
received several severe sword and spear wounds, of which he died on the
15th. The other three guns and the cavalry retreated through the jungle,
until they reached an open space, near which stood the Chief and his
staff. Here the guns drew up, and the cavalry rallied, with the
exception of a small party, which continued its flight as far as the
field hospital, established on the mound near Chillianwallah.
The Sikh cavalry, who had followed in pursuit, halted at the edge of the
jungle, and a few rounds from our remaining pieces soon forced them to
retire. Colonel Lane, who commanded on the extreme right, had also been
attacked by cavalry, but he had repulsed them with a grape fire from his
guns. Meantime our cavalry and artillery on the left had made a
successful advance, and Campbell, at the head of the 61st foot and some
native infantry, had swept all before him, taking several batteries.
Gilbert too, in his advance, had overthrown everything, capturing a
great quantity of ordnance. The enemy was everywhere driven from his
ground and forced back upon his positions, and our troops, somewhat
shattered, remained in possession of the field. But night had now come
on, and, seeing the great loss that we had met with, the difficulty of
the ground, and that our men were weary and exhausted, the
Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with Campbell, considered it
expedient to bivouac on the edge of the jungle, at the foot of the mound
at Chillianwallah. Unfortunately, this caused the loss of nearly all the
guns which we had taken from the enemy—most of them were recovered by
them in the night—four of our own too, were carried off, and we secured
only thirteen of the enemy’s. Whether the Sikhs claimed the victory, or
whether it was in exultation at the trophies gained—some colours besides
the guns—or whether it was merely to inform their friends that they
still held Russool, they fired a salute that night from the summit of
the ridge.
Our loss in this action was severe. Of the artillery, Major Christie, as
before mentioned, died of his wounds, as also did Lieutenant Manson, of
the 4th troop 2nd brigade; Captain Dawes and 1st Lieutenant Dundas were
wounded. The total loss of _killed_ was 2 serjeants, 14 rank-and-file, 1
lascar and 1 syce; _wounded_, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank and file,
8 lascars, and 1 syce; _missing_, 2 rank and file, and 6 syces.
The morning of the 14th set in wet and gloomy, and the Chief then issued
orders to pitch camp upon ground marked out immediately in rear of the
mound, fronting the enemy’s position. Whatever intentions Lord Gough may
have half-formed of resuming the attack on the 14th, the heavy fall of
rain which commenced that evening and continued during several following
days, induced him to abandon them. He immediately set about
strengthening his position, and the sad task of collecting and burying
his dead. And so the British and Sikh armies sat down in sight of each
other, with scarcely four miles of ground between their respective
camps.
Such was the battle of Chillianwallah; a victory, certainly, insomuch as
we remained in possession of the field of battle; but a failure,
inasmuch as Lord Gough did not accomplish his object—to drive Shere
Singh across the Jhelum, and to completely overthrow him before Chuttur
Singh could form a junction with his son.
A month of inactivity succeeded. Our position was a bad one; it covered
no road, did not protect the country in our rear, nor guard our
communications; neither did it in any way confine the enemy. Our
communication with Dhingee was exceedingly precarious; supplies and
forage, as well as water, were scarce. We should have felt the want of
the latter severely, had it not been for several heavy falls of rain,
which filled some dry hollows. As considerable reinforcements were in
progress to join Shere Singh, it seemed not at all improbable that he
might venture to attack us in our camp. The Commander-in-Chief therefore
strengthened our position as much as possible. A good deal of jungle
which might conceal the enemy’s designs was cut down; several trenches
were dug in front of the line, to afford temporary protection to
picquets; the heavy ordnance was placed in battery at the mound to sweep
all the ground in front,—and subsequently, a square redoubt was erected
to strengthen our right flank, which approached the sand-ridge, and was
more liable to attack than any other part. This redoubt was at first
armed with some spare field-pieces, drawn by bullocks, but afterwards by
the 3rd company 2nd brigade horse-artillery,[110] to which Captain
Kinleside, of No. 5 heavy field-battery, had been appointed—Major Ludlow
succeeding him in command of the battery. The right flank of our camp
was thrown back nearly at right angles. In it were two troops of
horse-artillery under Colonel Grant. Fordyce’s troop (2nd company 2nd
brigade) of 9–pounders was at the angle, and afterwards placed in a
small battery a short distance to the front. Dawes was in the front face
with Gilbert, sending out two guns on picquet; the heavy ordnance at the
mound; No. 5, with Campbell’s division near the village; No. 10, in rear
with Penny. Beyond the village were three troops of horse-artillery
under Colonel Brooke (when the 3rd troop 2nd brigade was removed to the
redoubts, the number with him was reduced to two). Our left, beyond the
village, was slightly retired in an oblique direction. The park was in
rear of the mound. As the enemy became stronger and more threatening,
several changes took place. The whole of the left was thrown back so as
to unite the village of Mojawalla in rear of camp—with the front face,
and our right flank was also connected with the village by a rear
face—thus our camp formed an irregular quadrilateral figure, or
rhomboid, and four pieces of heavy ordnance were placed near Mojawalla.
But it was some time before our camp had assumed this form.
The enemy almost daily received accessions of strength. Chuttur Singh
joined the Sikh force, and salutes were common in their camp. Reports
were frequent of their intention to attack, but little credit was given
to them. The Chief, however, considered it prudent to be prepared; half
the men, and latterly all, were ordered to sleep in their clothes, and a
signal (three guns from the mound) was agreed upon, at which all the
troops should turn out. The enemy occasionally made some demonstration.
Sometimes his whole line turned out, but more frequently he brought
small parties into the jungle, below Russool, and then attacked our
right wing, which was frequently on the alert. But the Sikhs gave us the
greatest annoyance by capturing our baggage-cattle. This they did
frequently, and we were obliged to send out very strong parties of
cavalry to protect them. Our horse-artillery, too, had very fatiguing
work, guns being frequently out with detachments sent to protect convoys
of grain, &c. These had to make long, harassing marches, and latterly it
became necessary to send out parties of cavalry and horse-artillery to
reconnoitre the country in our right rear.
Thus wearily passed the time, news from Mooltan being most anxiously
looked for. At length we had the pleasure to fire a royal salute for its
capture and to discuss the circumstances of the successful siege. What
those circumstances were, should be here briefly recorded:—On the 26th
of December the Bombay troops joined General Whish under the walls of
Mooltan. The force now amounted to 17,000 men, with sixty-four pieces of
artillery. The time for renewed action had arrived, and Whish was ready
to commence operations. Indeed, on the morning of the 26th, before the
Bombay division had come up, he had issued an order, expressing his hope
that within twenty-four hours after their arrival, “all the enemy’s
posts that are a requisite preliminary to the commencement of a regular
attack on the citadel,” would be carried; and in the course of the
following day they were in our possession. In these operations, four
guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain
Anderson, and four guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade, under Captain
Mackenzie, were engaged; the former with the centre column, and the
latter with the right column. On the following day Whish, reporting
these operations to the adjutant-general, wrote, “I hope to-morrow
morning to have an 8–inch mortar-battery of six pieces playing on the
citadel, at five or six hundred yards’ distance.”
On the 30th the general reported that our batteries were in full play,
and that already a shell from a mortar, laid by Lieutenant Newall, had
exploded the principal magazine in the citadel. Whish had been with the
rocket troop at Hatrass, when the great magazine had been blown up
there, and now he wrote that the sight of the Mooltan explosion was
“awfully grand, and precisely similar to that at the siege of Hatrass,
on the 1st of March, 1817.” “I hope,” he added, “that the consequence
may be the same; in which case the enemy would abandon the fort
to-night; otherwise I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow.” The
batteries at this time in operation, as reported in the general’s
letter, were six 8–inch mortars, three 10–inch ditto, four 5½-inch ditto
(opened on the 28th), six 18–pounders (opened on the Kooneeh-Boorj), two
8–inch mortars, two 10–inch ditto, and two 24–pounders (with the mortars
in the first line, opened on the 29th). Five more 8–inch mortars were
then laid down.
Seldom or never in any part of the world has a city been exposed to such
a terrific shelling as the doomed city of Mooltan. The well served
ordnance did tremendous execution upon both houses and inhabitants; and
soon the ruined streets were choked with the mutilated bodies of the
dead. The effect was highly creditable to the skill of both artillery
and engineers. On the first day of the new year (1849) the breaches in
the city walls appeared to be practicable, and the assault was fixed for
the following day. It was on the 2nd of January that the city of Mooltan
was carried by the British troops. The gallantry of the infantry column,
on this occasion, will never be overlooked by the general historian; but
it does not come within the scope of this memoir to record it. Mooltan
was carried at the point of the bayonet, but the citadel still remained
in the hands of Moolraj.
The batteries now, therefore, opened again, with tremendous effect, on
the fortress. The possession of the city had enabled Whish to advance
his guns, and he had erected new batteries of heavy ordnance to bear
upon the citadel. On the 7th a battery of seven 18–pounders was
completed and armed, and a mortar battery for three 10–inch howitzers.
On the 8th a battery for six 24–pounders and six 18–pounders was
commenced. “The object of this battery,” wrote the general, “is to keep
down the fire of the citadel opposite to it, and eventually to breach at
the north-east angle.” On the following day a shell from the enemy’s
position ignited the seven 18–pounder battery, which was constructed of
fascines and sand-bags, and burnt it down, in spite of every effort to
extinguish the flames. The engineers in the mean time were sapping up to
the foot of the glacis; and the enemy, alarmed by our near approach,
were thinking of making terms for themselves. The interior of the
citadel had become a ruin; and further resistance was, indeed, hopeless.
The garrison declared that they could no longer hold out against the
terrible shelling, which was destroying them. Moolraj was at the last
gasp. All his efforts to rally his followers were in vain. They told him
that he must either sally out at the head of his men and cut his way
through the besiegers, or abandon his post and trust himself to the
clemency of the victors. So the Dewan began to sue for terms. The answer
of the British general was, that nothing would satisfy him but an
unconditional surrender. So on the morning of the 22nd of January the
garrison laid down their arms, and Moolraj came into the British camp.
The operations had lasted nearly four weeks, throughout which time the
artillery were continually engaged—keeping up an incessant fire of shot
and shell, from guns, howitzers, and mortars—first upon the city, and
then upon the citadel of Mooltan. The practice is admitted to have been
excellent. It was, said General Whish, with the enthusiasm of an old
artillery officer, “the theme of admiration with all.”[111] The officers
of the Bengal division especially named in his official despatch were
Majors Garbett and Day; Captains Daniel, Anderson, Master, and
Mackenzie; Lieutenant Mill (brigade-major), and Lieutenant Peter
Christie (commissary of ordnance).
The following officers were present at the siege of Mooltan:—
_Majors_—H. Garbett, E. F. Day; _Captains_—J. H. Daniell, J. Anderson,
E. V. Master, M. Mackenzie; _Lieutenants_—W. Hay, G. Moir, F. W.
Swinhoe, F. Alexander, H. Francis, R. Mecham, D. J. Newall, A. Bunny, W.
Miller, J. F. Raper, J. Thompson, H. T. Bishop; _2nd Lieutenants_—F. R.
Debudé, J. Hunter, C. T. Graham, F. C. Simons, M. C. Sankey, J. G.
Worthington, W. F. Quayles, E. W. Day;—Lieutenant John Mill,
brigade-major; Lieutenant P. Christie, commissary of ordnance;
Lieutenant W. K. Footes, brigade quarter-master.
In the course of the operations, the casualties in the Bengal artillery
amounted to 1 European officer (Lieutenant James Thompson), 2 havildars,
and 10 rank and file, _killed_; with 4 European officers (Lieutenants
Bunny, Hunter, Sankey, and Graham), 3 havildars, and 62 rank and file,
_wounded_. These include all the casualties since the raising of the
siege. Lieutenant Bunny was wounded in September, and Lieutenant Sankey
in November, 1848; the other two officers in the course of the January
siege.
Before quitting the subject of these memorable operations, we must
insert the following memorandum of the artillery practice at Mooltan, by
Lieutenant Newall, which affords much interesting information relative
to the details of the siege:—
“During the siege of Mooltan, the Bengal artillerymen were so few,
that it was found impossible to afford a relief in the batteries
without withdrawing gunners from the troops of horse-artillery. A
relief, however, was thus effected daily between 3 and 4 P.M., which
was found the most convenient hour, as it afforded time to the
relieving officer to ascertain his range, &c. before nightfall, and
to prepare and fix his ammunition for expenditure during the night.
It was convenient, also, for the men in other respects.
“In the howitzer batteries, it was the practice to receive the
charge ready weighed out from the magazine; but in the mortar
batteries the charges were invariably weighed out in battery. The
bursting charges of all shells were received in battery ready
weighed out in small bags, and the shells were always filled by
means of a funnel, and fuzes prepared and set by means of a
fuze-bench in the battery. Live shells were never sent down to
battery from the magazine, as no advantage in point of time was to
be gained thereby, the preparing of shells being found in the hands
of expert men to fully keep pace with the working of the ordnance.
The practice was thus rendered very much more satisfactory, as the
length of the fuze could be altered according to circumstances; such
as the variation of strength of powder, which was found to be most
dependent on the state of the weather, and even of the ordnance,
which as the day advanced would gradually warm, contracting the
dampness of the powder, and rendering necessary an alteration in the
length of fuze. The effects of the howitzers employed in breaching
was a subject of satisfaction and astonishment to all; indeed it is
doubtful whether the natural mounds of the fort would have been
practically breached without their aid. Even against the brickwork
their effects were conspicuous. These shells, made to burst at the
moment of contact with the walls, afterwards during their passage
through the revêtement, and ultimately with a longer fuze in the
earth beyond it, would probably (against such masonry) have alone
effected practicable breaches without the assistance of heavy guns.
“At a distance of 150 yards, both the 8–inch and 10–inch howitzers
were employed in breaching a scarp wall, part of which was invisible
from the battery, and only reached by a plunging fire, obtained by
very small charges, and succeeded admirably. At a distance of
thirty-five yards, 8–inch howitzers were similarly employed with a
charge of 8 oz., a very low velocity being requisite to prevent the
shell from burying itself too far in the soft earth. Of the effects
of the vertical fire, nothing could have afforded a clearer proof
than the ruinous appearance presented by the interior of the fort on
its surrender; and the explosion of the great magazine, which took
place within one hour of its site being indicated to the batteries,
was a subject of congratulation to the Bengal artillery employed,
bearing testimony as it did to the accuracy of their practice.
“On the 9th January, 600 shells were fired from an 8–inch mortar
battery of six pieces in twenty-four hours, and the mortars did not
suffer. No new feature, however, presented itself from the
employment of these pieces, nor from that of the heavy guns, which,
however, vied with the mortars and howitzers in utility. Doubtless
it is by a judicious combination of the three that such powerful
effects are produced,—but it may be worth inquiring whether, in the
siege-trains employed against fortresses in the East, built as they
generally are of old and often crazy materials, a greater proportion
of howitzers might not be used with advantage, in cases where no
particular object exists to curtail the transport of the shells,
which is doubtless great. In addition to what has been above stated
of the effects of these most useful pieces in mining the defences
and in counter-battery, which was conspicuous throughout the siege,
it may be remarked that one shell was often found sufficient to
silence the fire from an embrasure of the enemy for a whole day.
Rack-lashing platforms were used by the Bengal artillery throughout
the siege for the guns and howitzers, and were found to answer most
satisfactorily, and the small Bengal mortar platforms, consisting of
three sleepers, upon which seven strong planks, each four feet long,
were pegged transversely, were made up in the park, and thus taken
down to the batteries, where they were expeditiously laid, and stood
the firing both of the 8–inch and 10–inch mortars without renewal
during the siege; the only difference being, that from the 10–inch
mortars other sleepers were laid transversely beneath, to prevent
the platforms sinking.”
Having now reduced Mooltan, and captured the Dewan, General Whish
determined to move forward, with all possible despatch, to reinforce the
Commander-in-Chief. Leaving, therefore, a British garrison in Mooltan,
he commenced his march, with the head-quarters, on the 29th January; an
advanced brigade, with a troop of horse-artillery, having broken ground
two days before. The main body of the Bengal division was accompanied by
a siege-train of twelve pieces. The march which he then accomplished,
though it has been unaccountably slurred over in the published papers,
is one of the most memorable upon record. It was not only distinguished
by the energy and rapidity which marked the general’s movements, but by
its effect upon the issue of the entire campaign. Had not Whish, with
his leading column, reached Ramnuggur, as he did, on the 13th of
February, Shere Singh would have ravaged the Rechna Doab, and the
campaign would have been a long and desultory one.[112]
Whilst the troops under the Commander-in-Chief were patiently awaiting
the coming of General Whish, which would enable them to resume the
offensive, the enemy seemed at one time inclined to become the
assailant, but by some unaccountable freak of madness chose to abandon
his strong position, and take to the open country. His probable object
was more readily to procure food. In the second week of February, about
half the Sikh army changed ground to its left, and took possession of
the Khuri defile, running through the sand-ridge. His advanced parties
held Noor Jumal and Dingee, and occasionally even the villages of Burra
and Chota Omrao, between our camp and Dingee. They were now on both
sides of us; but as our camp was now formed, we were well prepared for
an attack. On the 11th, the signal-guns were fired, and our whole army
turned out. The enemy was threatening us on both sides; but to our rear,
his line had advanced from Khuri, even beyond the villages of Omrao, and
could be plainly seen at the edge of the jungle from Mojawalla. Cavalry
and horse-artillery were sent out to meet him on this side. The former
threw out a chain of videttes, which the Sikhs did not attempt to break.
It was not Shere Singh’s object to attack us in camp, but to draw us out
into the jungle. After a demonstration of about four hours, the Sikhs
withdrew into their camps.
Early on the morning of the 12th, it was discovered, to our surprise,
that the enemy had abandoned his position at Russool. His rear-guard was
then quickly leaving the sand-ridge. On the 13th, he withdrew also from
Khuri. At first we were rather perplexed to ascertain in what direction
he had proceeded, but it was soon ascertained that his march was towards
Goojerat. Thus he had completely turned our right flank, and our
remaining at Chillianwallah was consequently no longer prudent; but, on
the contrary, there was the utmost need that we should make a
corresponding movement, as it seemed to be the design of the enemy to
cross the Chenab, and march straight upon Lahore. Luckily this was
frustrated. On the 15th, the army marched to Lussooria, which we had so
fruitlessly quitted only a month before. From this it had been intended
to cross the river at Ramnuggur, and endeavour to outstrip the enemy in
the race to Lahore. But, fortunately, General Whish had now reached
Ramnuggur, and, seeing the danger, should the enemy be able to cross the
Chenab, he pushed forward the 53rd foot (which had come out from
Lahore), with two guns of No. 6 field-battery, and some other troops, to
guard the fords near Wuzeerabad, and Markham’s brigade, with two guns of
4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery,—those lower down. Thus Shere
Singh was foiled, and his army remained encamped near the town of
Goojrat, the centre of a richly-cultivated province.
From Lussooria our army moved towards the enemy, slowly, to enable the
Mooltan troops to join. On the 16th, they marched to Sadoolapore; on the
17th, to Kunjur; and after a halt, they reached Shahdiwaol on the 20th.
By this time all Whish’s force had joined, except Markham’s brigade, and
two guns—4th troop 3rd brigade—watching the fords. The brigade, however,
crossed before the action.
The accession of strength in artillery which Whish brought us, was as
follows:—4th troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, under Captain M.
Mackenzie; 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery (2 guns absent), under
Captain J. Anderson; a troop of horse-artillery of the Bombay army (the
horse field-battery of Bombay was on rear-guard duty), and four
18–pounders, and four 10–inch howitzers, under Major Day.
Our march from Lussooria had been through most beautiful cultivation. We
had marched in a line of contiguous columns, encamping in the same
order.
On the 21st, our artillery was thus disposed:—On the extreme right,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Warner’s troop, 1st troop 3rd brigade
(attached to Lockwood’s cavalry brigade), with Whish’s division;
Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s troops, under Major H. Garbett, with
Gilbert’s division; Fordyce’s troop, and Dawes’s battery.
In the centre, Major Horsford; four 18–pounders and two 8–inch
howitzers, under Major Sir R. Shakespear; two 18–pounders, and two
8–inch howitzers, under Captain J. D. Shakespear.
Major Day; two 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain
Master; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers under Captain Austin.
On their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Kinleside’s and Lane’s
troops, with Campbell’s division—No. 5 (Major Ludlow’s), and 10 (under
Lieutenant Robertson), horse field-battery, commanded by Major Mowatt,
with the cavalry on the extreme left,—Huish’s and Duncan’s troops.
This time we had everything in our favour—a beautiful, level, open
country, with no obstructions, a richly-cultivated plain, dotted with a
few villages and trees. It was a bright sunny day: before nine the
action was commenced. The enemy’s camp was close to Goojrat, but he
moved out about a mile to oppose us, occupying the villages of Burra and
Chota Kalrha, in front of his centre and left. But we were not aware at
first that he had any troops in them. As soon as he perceived our line,
he fired three signal-guns. Our line then halted, while the
Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred and made his dispositions. But little
delay was, however, necessary—all was so clear—and we had marched from
camp in battle order. The action soon commenced.
“At half-past seven o’clock,” says the Commander-in-Chief, in his
official despatch, “the army advanced with the precision of a parade
movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which
exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I
halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my
artillery, covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the
enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed.[113] The Sikh guns were
served with their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and resolutely
maintained its position. But the terrific force of our fire obliged
them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back.”
In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, General Gilbert says,—“Having
received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to
show their position, I immediately advanced a troop of horse-artillery
(Fordyce’s), and Dawes’s field-battery, which constantly drew a very
heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy
had established on either side of the village of Kalrha, by which they
were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light
companies, were still further pushed forward. The heavy guns on our
centre at this time opened a very destructive fire.”
Of the artillery with his division, General Whish observes,—“Both troops
(Anderson’s and Mackenzie’s) began a spirited cannonade, and continued
it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour,
until the enemy’s guns in our front were silenced.”
Nos. 5 and 10, light field-batteries, were attached to the infantry
division, under General Campbell. Of these, the General writes:—“I
cannot find language to express my sense of the calm, steady, and
admirable manner in which these two batteries were commanded and worked
by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow, and
Lieutenant Robertson. The infantry of the 3rd division had not occasion
to fire a shot. The enemy were driven from their different positions,
and from the field, by the fire of these two field-batteries, aided by
that of the Bombay troop.”
In the meanwhile, Huish’s and Duncan’s troops on the left, and Warner’s
on the right, acted in conjunction with the cavalry on our flanks. Of
the former, General Thackwell thus writes:—“To oppose the enemy’s guns,
I ordered Captain Duncan to move his troop of horse-artillery to the
front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600
yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish’s
troop, and both did considerable execution upon the enemy. These troops
[the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers] made a most
brilliant charge upon the enemy. At the same time I advanced the guns
and cavalry towards the enemy’s line. The fire of the guns soon put the
Gowcherras to retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on the
right, caused their whole force to seek safety in flight.” Brigadier
Lockwood says:—“At the commencement of the action, I directed Captain
Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy near a village in
our front. But as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I
changed position, left back, and the horse-artillery ceased firing. The
enemy’s horsemen now appeared in great force on our right, threatening
to turn our flank. So I changed front to the right. Captain Warner’s
guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them; but
they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular
cavalry moved round by a circuitous route and got completely into our
rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns, with a squadron of
the 16th dragoons, who, in conjunction with Major Christie’s corps of
irregular cavalry, drove them off. About this time a large _gole_ of
horse came on towards me, but as they turned at once from the fire of
the guns, I refrained from advancing after them.”
The two troops of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Brind were in
reserve at the commencement of the action, but soon afterwards were
brought to the front, for the purpose of enfilading one of the enemy’s
batteries.
After detailing the attacks on the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha,
which were taken in the most spirited manner by Brigadiers Penney and
Hervey, Lord Gough continues, in his published despatch: “The heavy
artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up
successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had
retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the
horse-artillery and light field-batteries, which I strengthened, by
bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse-artillery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general
superintendence of the whole of the horse-artillery), broke the ranks of
the enemy at all points.”
The battle was now over, and the pursuit commenced, the whole of the
horse-artillery accompanying. The action was almost entirely an
artillery fight. For about two hours and a half that arm alone was
engaged. It was before the terrible fire of eighty-eight guns that the
Sikh army abandoned the field.
In his official despatch, the Commander-in-Chief thus writes:—“To
Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm, the artillery,
to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious
victory of Goojrat, I am indeed most grateful. Conspicuous as the
artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over the
enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown
than in this battle. The heavy batteries manœuvred with the celerity of
light guns; and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious
selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed fire of
the troops of horse-artillery and light field-batteries merit my warmest
praise.”
At the two villages alone were the infantry seriously engaged. Penney’s
(late Godby’s) and Hervey’s brigades were sent to take them, and were
somewhat surprised to find them occupied by some considerable parties.
Our left wing scarcely fired a shot. The cavalry was hardly engaged at
all. The Scinde horse made one charge. All the horse-artillery suffered
severely, especially the 4th troop 1st brigade, the 2nd troop 2nd
brigade, and the 4th troop 3rd brigade. Captain Anderson, of the
last-mentioned troop, was killed, as was also Lieutenant Day, of No. 10
horse field-battery.
The artillery loss was greater than that of any other branch in
proportion to its numbers.
The artillery division lost in _killed_, 2 officers, 1 sergeant, 20 rank
and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, and 3 syces; _wounded_, 1 European
officer (Sir Richard Shakespear), 1 native officer, 4 sergeants, two
trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, and 7 syces:
_total_, killed and wounded, 111.
The enemy did not attempt to rally at the town of Goojrat, as it was
supposed they would, but fled precipitately at once, leaving camp,
baggage, and a vast quantity of material and artillery in the hands of
the victors. It was almost to be regretted that they did not wait on
their ground a little longer; their loss, except in the two villages,
was from the artillery alone, and they suffered but little that
afternoon in the pursuit.
The broken Sikh army fled across the Jhelum, with a few hundred Afghan
cavalry, who had left their mountains, hoping for some opportunity to
avenge themselves on their old enemies. Sir W. Gilbert, with two
divisions of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, was ordered in
pursuit.
The artillery branch consisted of the 2nd troop 2nd brigade and the 4th
troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, Blood’s troop horse-artillery,
Dawes’s horse-battery, the Bombay horse brigade, and four reserve
companies, with a well-equipped train, adapted to elephant-draught, the
whole under Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., with Brigade-Major Kaye as his
staff officer. The brilliant success which attended Gilbert’s rapid
pursuit is well known. No further opportunity was given to our troops to
gain distinction in the field. The march was an arduous one, the country
most difficult, especially for heavy ordnance; but perseverance overcame
all. The Sikhs soon saw the futility of further opposition; the sirdars
surrendered,—their army was disarmed, and disbanded at Hoormuch and
Rawul-pindee,—and Gilbert drove the Afghans across the Attock, and into
the rugged mountains of the Khyber; and thus ended the second Sikh war.
The under-named artillery officers were mentioned in general orders:—
Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Tennant; Lieutenant
Olpherts, A.D.C.; Captain Abercrombie, D.A.A.G.A.; Brigadiers
Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigade Majors Kaye and
Cox; Captain Hogge, commissary, and Lieutenant Christie,
deputy-commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant-Colonel Grant; Majors
Garbett, Horsford, Day; Lieutenant-Colonel Brind; Major Mowatt;
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B.; Majors Ludlow, Fordyce; Captains J.
D. Shakespear, F. K. Duncan, L. P. Master, R. R. Kinleside, A.
Huish, Major Sir R. Shakespear; Captains E. G. Austen, M. Mackenzie,
W. K. Warner, M. Dawes; Lieutenants A. Robertson, H. Tombs (deputy
assistant quartermaster-general), E. B. Johnson (deputy
judge-advocate-general).
The following honorary distinctions were conferred:—
To be a Knight-Commander of the Bath.—Major-General Whish.
To be Commanders of the Bath.—Colonel Tennant, Lieutenant-Colonels
Grant, Brind.
To be Lieutenant-Colonels.—Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day, Mowatt,
Ludlow, Fordyce, Sir R. Shakespear.
To be Majors.—Captains J. D. Shakespear, Duncan, Master, Kinleside,
Huish, Austen, Mackenzie, Warner, Dawes, Hogge, Abercrombie.
Also to be Majors on promotion to Captains regimentally.—Lieutenant
E. Kaye, C. V. Cox, A. Robertson, P. Christie, H. A. Olpherts, H.
Tombs, E. B. Johnson.
Brigadier-General Tennant was subsequently created a K.C.B.
In commemoration of the victories of the Punjab, a medal was struck, of
which the following is a transcript:—
[Illustration]
A vote of thanks was passed by both Houses of Parliament and by the
Court of Proprietors to the armies engaged in these operations, and the
eminent services of General Whish and Brigadier Tennant, of the
artillery, were especially named. To the splendid working of the
artillery the highest military authorities in the country mainly
attributed the brilliant termination of the war: and we know not how
this record of the services of the corps can be more fitly brought to a
close than with the following well-merited tribute paid to the artillery
by Lord Hardinge in the House of Lords, on the 24th of April, 1849:—
“It was, it appeared, to the skilful employment of the artillery that
they were indebted for this victory; and great as the result had been
with so small a loss of men, he (Viscount Hardinge) felt that that arm
of the service was most admirably conducted on that occasion. This
argued most admirable conduct on the part of the artillery; and it
would appear, by most of the accounts received, that so effectually
had this arm of the service been employed, that the Sikh artillery,
though managed as usual with great bravery, was, notwithstanding all
their efforts, perfectly silenced; so that it was not necessary for
the British infantry to fire in line, with the exception of two
regiments of Europeans and four regiments of Native Infantry. With the
exception of those regiments, not a regiment of their infantry fired a
musket-shot, so considerable was the service rendered by the Indian
artillery. That force was certainly a most splendid one, and second he
would say to none; and it had been mainly instrumental in obtaining
for Lord Gough one of his best and most splendid triumphs. The
statement made by his Lordship, in his despatch, was, that the heavy
artillery—eighteen-pounders—were actually manœuvred and handled with
the facility of field-guns. He (Viscount Hardinge) had seen the same
thing done with those eighteen-pounders during the campaign of the
Sutlej. Two elephants were harnessed to each eighteen-pounder, and
they carried the guns with the greatest facility over every sort of
ground without any assistance and without causing any delay or
impediment to the infantry. That practice was first resorted to in the
campaign of 1846, when the heavy guns were brought up from Delhi, a
distance of 300 miles, and were carried on every occasion without any
trouble, and he believed that had never before been seen in India. The
able officer who commanded the artillery in the late battle had been
mentioned,—he referred to Brigadier-General Tennant, who had been so
much praised by Lord Gough; and he (Viscount Hardinge) wished to say
that he had the honour of knowing him, and he was ably seconded by
another excellent officer. Seeing the great importance of artillery in
modern warfare, and seeing, also, that its value had been so signally
manifested in India, he would remind their Lordships at the same time
that a committee was sitting elsewhere to investigate the state of the
Ordnance Department; and he trusted that their Lordships would not
allow that valuable arm of the service, which took so much time to
create, and which when created was so valuable, to be reduced below a
scale of proper strength and efficiency. In Bengal alone, the regular
army had 200 pieces of artillery ready to be moved, comprising 120
nine-pounders, and the remainder three and six-pounders, and that was
exclusive of all the artillery that belonged to local and irregular
corps. Besides that, there was during the campaign more than 100
pieces of heavy artillery, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders,
actually on the Sutlej, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun. They
were all complete and ready for action, and all that was required was
the actual necessity for their movement. That was a state of readiness
that was very much to be admired, and he hoped they would never
consent to cripple that noble arm of their service.”
* * * * *
_Note to page 435._—It is stated at page 435, that a monumental column
was raised (at Dum-Dum) to the memory of Captain Nicholl and the
officers and men of the 1st troop 1st brigade, who perished so
gloriously on the retreat from Caubul. As this sheet is going through
the press, I learn that the column has been blown down during a
_typhaun_, and that it is the intention of the regiment not to restore
it, but to place, in its stead, a monumental slab in the Dum-Dum church.
I trust that I shall be pardoned for saying that I believe such a
resolution, if carried into effect, will be greatly regretted by many of
the relatives of the brave men to whom the column was dedicated, and by
some, at least, of the original promoters of the testimonial.—_Editor._
* * * * *
ERRATA.
In the preface, page x, line 4, _for_ “Sikhs crossed the Punjab,” _read_
“Sikhs crossed the Sutlej.”
Page 130, line 8 from bottom (Colonel Deare’s Epitaph), _for_ “Royal
Artillery,” _read_ “Bengal Artillery.”
Page 371, line 8, _for_ “G. R. MacGregor,” _read_ “R. G. MacGregor.”
Page 409, last line of text, _for_ “Walrek,” _read_ “Walker.”
ILLUSTRATIONS TO CHAPTER IV.
FIELD-CARRIAGES.
[Illustration:
No. 1.—_Page 164._]
[Illustration:
No. 2.—_Page 168._]
[Illustration:
No. 3.—_Page 172._]
AMMUNITION-WAGGONS.
[Illustration:
No. 5.—_Page 173._]
[Illustration:
No. 6.—_Page 174._]
ELEVATING-SCREWS.—_Page 176._
[Illustration:
Fig. 3]
[Illustration:
Fig. 4]
[Illustration:
Fig. 5]
[Illustration:
Fig. 6]
[Illustration:
Fig. 7]
[Illustration:
Fig. 8]
[Illustration:
Fig. 9]
SIEGE-CARRIAGES.
[Illustration:
No. 8.—_Page 179._]
COLONEL DUFF’S PATTERN.—_Page 179._
[Illustration]
[Illustration:
Nos. 10 and 11.—_Page 182._]
[Illustration]
[Illustration:
No. 12.—_Page 183._]
HARDWICKE’S PATTERN.—_Page 183._
[Illustration]
HORSFORD’S MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.—_Page 184._
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.
[Illustration:
No. 14.—_Page 185._]
[Illustration:
No. 15.—_Page 186._]
[Illustration:
No. 16.—_Page 186._]
AMMUNITION-CARRIAGE (1823).—_Page 187._
[Illustration]
INDEX.
Abbott, A. Capt. 195;
Lieut. 386;
Capt. 415, 426, 432, 440, 442, 444, 445, 446, 451
—— J. Lieut. 386, 409, 411
Abercrombie, Sir Ralph, 229
—— Sir Robert C. C. 154, 156
—— Lieut. 407, 443, 446, 471;
Capt. 526, 571
Achmuty, Sir Samuel, 300
Adams, Major, 20, 23;
Col. 352, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359
Adamson, Lieut. 23
Addison, Lieut. 90
Agnew, Mr. 522
A’Hearne, Gunner, 448
Ahmuty, Lieut. 214
Aldercron, Col. 4, 8
Alexander, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 443, 444, 446, 451;
Major, 457, 462;
Lieut.-Col. 499, 503, 513, 514, 515
Allen, Sub-Lieut. 373
Amyatt, Mr. 19
Anderson, W. Capt. 195;
Lieut. 385;
Capt. 427, 437, 447, 448, 451
—— J. Lieut. 409;
Capt. 523, 550, 554, 561, 562, 564, 569
Archer, Lieut. 297
Armstrong, Lieut. N.I. 326
Ashburnham, Brig. 504, 510
Atlay, E. Lieut. 497, 483
Auckland, Lord, 394
Austen, Lieut. 468, 492, 504
—— E. G. 571
Austin, Capt. 455, 499, 514, 533, 562
Backhouse, Major, 185;
Lieut. 385;
Capt. 400, 413, 427, 431, 440, 441, 442, 446, 448
Baillie, Capt. 31, 39;
Major, 69;
Lieut.-Col. 70, 73;
Col. 84, 90
—— Lieut. 77, 82, 83, 84
Baker, Lieut. 156
—— O. Lieut. 327
Balfour, H. Lieut. 84, 150;
Capt.-Lieut. 214
Ball, Lieut.-Col. 290
Barr, Lieut. 413, 414
Barton, Lieut. 89;
Capt. 127, 159, 166;
Major, 204
Battine, Capt.-Lieut. 316, 334, 346;
Major, 385
Bayle, Lieut. 214
Bazely, 2nd Lieut. 386
Beagham, Lieut. 256, 284
Beatson, 217
Bedingfield, Lieut. 376
Begbie, Lieut. 378
Bell, C. H. Lieut. 322, 323
—— W. Lieut. 296, 357;
Capt. 385;
Maj. 407
Best, R. Capt.-Lieut. 246, 250, 255, 284
Biddulph, Capt. 371, 379, 455;
Lieut.-Col. 499;
Brig. 507, 514, 515
Biggs, Capt. 327, 345, 353;
Lieut.-Col. 385
Bingley, Lieut. 385
Bishop, Lieut. 554
Black, Lieut. 30
Blacker, Col. 354
Blaquiere, Col. 174
Blair, Col. 74
Blake, E. Lieut. 371
—— G. Lieut. 319, 345, 352, 354;
Capt. 385
Blood, Capt. 570
Blundel, Lieut. 89
Blunt, Sir Charles, 99
Boileau, Lieut. 283;
Capt.-Lieut. 303, 314;
Capt. 333
—— F. 2nd Lieut. 385;
Capt. 468, 503, 515
Bolton, Capt. 158
Bourchier, Lieut. 455
Boyce, Lieut. 69
Boyle, J. D. Lieut. 264
Bowie, Lieut. 479
Bradshaw, Major, 319
Brady, Lieut. 376, 378
Brind, F. Capt. 171;
Lieut. 376;
Capt. 455, 461, 462;
Major, 469, 483, 485, 492, 493, 494, 495, 514, 515;
Lieut.-Col. 538, 540, 541, 562, 567, 571
Briscoe, Lieut. 127, 151
Broadbridge, or }
Broadburn, } Capt. 15, 18, 19
Broadfoot, Major, 472, 473, 514
Brooke, Lieut. 214, 215;
Capt. 288, 289, 290, 314, 317;
Lieut.-Col. 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 499, 507, 514, 515, 527, 534,
538, 547, 567, 571
—— G. Lieut. 331
Brougham, Lieut. 436, 447
Broughton, Lieut.-Col. 261
Brown, B. Lieut. 371, 376;
Capt. 455, 462
—— Chas. Lieut. 146, 151, 156
—— Clement, Lieut. 119, 121;
Brev.-Capt. 231, 242, 250;
Capt. 260, 271, 272, 283, 284;
Major, 364;
Brig. 385
Brown, J. Lieut. 23
—— M. Lieut. 260, 284
—— Lieut. 89, 94
Browne, R. Lieut. 119, 214
Bruce, R. Lieut. 69;
Major, 153;
Lieut.-Col. 204
—— W. Lieut. 89
Buchan, Lieut. 134, 148, 151
Buck, Lieut. 17, 327
Buckle, Lieut. 376, 407;
Capt. 509
Bunny, Lieut. 522, 524, 554, 555
Burn, Col. 270
Burnett, Lieut. 31;
Capt. 147, 150, 200;
Major, 204
Burrington, Col. 158
Burroughs, W. 155
Burton, Lieut. 376
Butler, Lieut. 121, 146, 250;
Capt. 273;
Major, 302, 303, 333
Caldwell, Capt.-Lieut. 214;
Major, 296, 301
Cameron, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 300, 301, 302, 303
Campbell, A. 7
—— C. H. Lieut. 288;
Capt.-Lieut. 289, 314, 333
—— G. N. Lieut. 331, 373, 385
—— G. 455, 461, 462;
Brev.-Major, 468, 483, 513, 514, 515
—— Gunner, 282
—— Sir Archibald, 372, 379
Cardew, Lieut. 374
Carnac, Major, 19, 25;
Col. 73
Carne, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361
Carnegie, Lieut. 88;
Capt. 155;
Major, 204;
Col. 293
Cartwright, Capt. 317, 326, 331, 333
Cautley, Lieut. 386
Chesney, Lieut. and Adj. 316
Champion, Col. 26, 38, 39
Christie, A. Lieut. 432, 443, 449
Christie, P. Lieut. 454, 523, 527, 554
—— E. Capt. 499, 514, 515, 518, 533, 540, 543, 566
Clark, Lieut. 121;
Capt. 159
Clarke, E. Lieut. 150, 159;
Capt. 214, 228, 229
Cleland, Serg. 448
Clerk, Lieut. 386
Clifford, Lieut. 454, 521
Clifton, Capt.-Lieut. 29
Cochrane, Lieut. 16
Cockerell, Lieut.-Col. 121, 126
Collier, Capt.-Lieut. 214
Combermere, Lord, 383
Constable, Lieut. 89;
Capt. 246, 250, 284
Cookworthy, Lieut. 543
Cooper, Lieut. 409, 414, 428, 429, 447
Cornish, Lieut. 436, 449
Cotes, H. Lieut. 69
Coulthard, Lieut. 334;
Capt.-Lieut. 357, 361, 363
Counsell, Lieut 319, 363, 371
Cox, C. V. Lieut. 455, 479, 527, 571
Crabb, Major, 77, 78, 83
Cranch, Lieut. 121, 144
Cranell, Capt. 150
Crawford, Lieut. 318, 354, 355, 358, 359
Crommelin, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361
Cross, Corp. 280, 282
Crossdill, Lieut.-Col. 363
Croxton, Lieut. 319, 334
Cruikshanks, Lieut. and Adj. 317
Cureton, Brig. 506, 529, 530
Curphy, Capt. 385
Curtis, Lieut. 314
Cullen, Lieut. 107, 385
Daniell, Lieut. 378;
Capt. 554
Dashwood, F. Lieut. A.-D.-C. 385, 389;
Capt. 469, 475, 476, 478, 479
Davies, Major, 227
Dawes, Lieut. 409, 415, 426, 431, 440;
Capt. 444, 534, 538, 540, 542, 544, 547, 562, 564, 570, 571
Day, E. F. Capt. 409, 454, 468, 483, 507, 514, 515;
Major, 523, 554, 561, 562, 571
—— E. W. Lieut. 554, 569
Deare, C. Capt. 89, 99, 100, 130;
Lieut.-Col. 150, 151, 165, 167, 210
—— G. Lieut. 39;
Capt 99;
Lieut.-Col. 119, 121, 122, 126;
Col. 130, 134, 204, 209, 210;
Major-Gen. 211, 261
De Brett, Lieut. 318, 363
Debudé, Lieut. 554
Deckers, Lieut. 23
Delafosse, Lieut. 302, 303, 334;
Capt. 443;
Major, 446, 451
Delamar, Serg. 24
Denniss, Lieut. 327;
Lieut.-Col. 455, 470, 480, 483, 499, 507, 515
Dickson, Lieut. 334, 358
Dirom, Major, 137
Dixon, C. B. Lieut. 316
—— R. C. Lieut. 385
Don, Col. 264, 270
Douglas, Lieut. 89, 127, 141, 150, 154, 214, 443, 446
Dow, Lieut.-Col. 43
Dowell, Lieut. 121, 151, 154;
Capt.-Lieut. 260
D’Oyley, Lieut. 358, 361
Doxat, Lieut. 39;
Capt.-Lieut. 75
Drummond, Lieut. 119, 134, 151, 214, 231, 233, 245, 263
Duff, Lieut. 27;
Capt. 29;
Major, 47;
Col. 48, 100, 101, 135, 139, 140, 146, 148, 149, 150, 170,
179;
Major-Gen. 204, 209, 210, 242
Duncan, Lieut. 386, 409;
Capt. 562, 565, 571
Dundas, J. Capt. 296
Dunn, Lieut. 88, 151;
Capt. 214, 284
—— A. Lieut. 156, 214, 244, 245, 263
Dyke, Lieut. 374
Edwards, Lieut. 386
Egerton, Capt. 496
Elliot, Capt. 88;
Lieut.-Col. 95
Ellis, Lieut. 386
Ellwood, Capt. 150
Erskine, Lieut.-Col. 155, 214
Ewart, Lieut. 295, 385
Exshaw, Lieut. 89, 134, 150
Eyre, Lieut. 434, 435, 448, 463
Faithful, G. Lieut. 262, 288
—— H. Capt. 296
Faithfull, Lieut. 513
Farnabie, Lieut. 296, 298
Farrington, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 301, 302, 303, 385;
Lieut.-Col. 455
Fawcett, Lieut.-Col. 260, 265
Feade, Lieut. 121, 122, 123, 151;
Capt.-Lieut. 260, 265
Fenning, Lieut. 374
Ferris, Capt.-Lieut. 289
Fitzgerald, A. Lieut. 443, 446;
Brev.-Capt. 454, 518
Fleming, Capt. 30
Flemyng, Lieut. 90, 231;
Capt.-Lieut. 233
Floyd, Col. 129, 131
Footes, Lieut. 554
Forbes, A. Lieut. 69
Forde, Col. 15
Fordyce, T. D. Lieut. 295;
Capt. 317
Fordyce, Lieut. 334, 374
—— J. Capt. 468, 510, 514, 515, 547, 562, 564;
Major, 571
Forrester, Lieut. 285
Fortnham, P. Inf. Cadet, 151
Francis, Lieut. 554
Fraser, A. Capt. 244, 334
Frazer, Capt. 154
Frith, Lieut. W. H. 283
—— Major, 268
Fuller, Lieut. 244;
Major, 306
Fulton, Lieut. 319
Gaitskell, Lieut. 374
Garbett, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 409, 422, 469, 483, 489, 515, 523, 554, 562, 571
Gardiner, Lieut.-Col. 322
Garrett, Lieut. 386
Geddes, Lieut. 327;
Major, 461, 462;
Lieut.-Col. 469;
Col. 474, 475, 483, 485, 488, 490, 492, 493, 507, 514, 515
Gibbs, Col. 300
Giddes, Capt. 99
Gillespie, Lieut. 84
Glass, A. Lieut. 73, 135;
Capt. 141, 150, 166, 214;
Major, 169
Goddard, Col. 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 97, 103, 201, 217;
Gen. 218, 219
Gordon, Major, 169, 204, 246, 247
Gore, J. Inf. Cadet, 151
Gowan, Lieut. 303, 314, 317, 334
—— G. Lieut. 333;
Capt. 345;
Col. 454, 458, 459, 462, 498;
Brig. 514, 515
Gowing, Lieut. 279, 284
Gowdie, Major, 136, 141, 142