State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle of
Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The battle of Punniah—The Gwalior
contingent—Honours conferred on the artillery—The ordnance
commissariat remodelled—The artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the
regiment—Increase of horse-batteries.
In the following year (1843) the attention of the Supreme Government was
directed towards a new quarter. The death of the Maharajah Junkojee Rao
Scindiah was followed by alarming disturbances at Gwalior. The army
became dominant in the State. The Regent, who had been nominated to
preside over the Durbar, during the minority of the adopted son of the
deceased ruler, was incompetent to control the rebellious soldiery; the
widow of the late king took part against the minister, and the
hostilities, which commenced with a bed-chamber intrigue, ended in a
civil war. Such, indeed, became the anarchy and confusion at Gwalior,
that the British Resident quitted Scindiah’s court, and the
Governor-General, though not contemplating immediate interference, began
to watch with some anxiety the progress of events at the Mahratta
capital. As the year advanced, the Ranee’s party, at the head of which
was the Dadur Khasgeewallah, a man whose temper and designs were
notoriously hostile to the British, became stronger and stronger. Such
of the officers, in the service of the Maharajah, as were known to be
friendly to the paramount state, were ill-treated and dismissed. Covert
hostility began to rise into open defiance; and it now became apparent,
that from the other side of the Sutlej, the Sikhs were watching, with
undisguised satisfaction, the excitement at Gwalior, and waiting to take
advantage of any disaster that might befall us, to declare themselves on
the side of the Mahrattas.
As the cold weather approached, the aspect of affairs became more and
more threatening. To bring about a satisfactory settlement by mere
diplomacy, appeared difficult, if not impossible; and Lord Ellenborough
determined on assembling an army on the banks of the Jumna. The force
assembled at Agra, in the month of November, under the personal command
of Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, and was called the “Army of
Exercise.” At the same time a left wing was formed, under the command of
General Gray, to operate upon Gwalior from the Bundlekhund country,
whilst the main army advanced from Agra. On the 16th of December, Sir
Hugh Gough commenced his march. Affairs were growing worse, and armed
intervention was inevitable. When at length, the Khasgeewallah was given
up, with the hope of arresting the progress of the British, the Army of
Exercise was in full march upon Gwalior, and was not to be stayed.
The artillery division of the Army of Exercise was commanded by
Brigadier G. E. Gowan, Captain J. H. Macdonald being his assistant
adjutant-general. Colonel J. Tennant was appointed, with the rank of
brigadier, to the command of the foot-artillery; Lieutenant and
Brevet-Captain A. Huish, acting as major of brigade; and Captain E. F.
Day, as commissary of ordnance. The components of the horse-artillery
force were the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, commanded by Captain C. Grant,
with Lieutenants Clifford and P. Christie, as subalterns; the 3rd troop
2nd brigade, commanded by Brevet-Major Alexander, with Brevet-Captain A.
Fitzgerald (adjutant of the brigade, who had volunteered to do
subaltern’s duty with the troop), and Lieutenant Wintle; and the 2nd
troop 3rd brigade, with which were Brevet-Major Lane (commanding),
Brevet-Captain C. Mills, and Lieutenant Moir. The foot-artillery
consisted of the 1st company 1st battalion (with No. 10 light
field-battery) under Brevet-Major Saunders; Lieutenants Bruce, Milligan,
and Sladen, subalterns; and the 1st company 4th battalion, commanded by
Captain B. Brown, with Lieutenants Holland and Remington. In addition to
these were the heavy batteries, consisting of six 18–pounders and four
8–inch howitzers, manned by the reserve companies of the 4th battalion
(European) and the 6th golundauze; the former under Lieutenant-Colonel
Farrington, with Lieutenant Whiteford, adjutant; and the latter under
Lieutenant-Colonel Denniss, with Lieutenant Warner, adjutant.
The artillery with the left wing was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Biddulph (Captain Austin, major of brigade), and was composed of the 1st
troop 3rd brigade, commanded by Captain F. Brind, Lieutenants Coxe and
Bourchier, subalterns; the 3rd troop 3rd brigade, under Captain George
Campbell, with whom was Lieutenant Humfrays; and the 6th company 6th
battalion, with No. 16 light field-battery, under Lieutenant W.
Olpherts.
On the arrival of the advanced columns at Dholpore, they were met by the
Khasgeewallah, whose surrender, now become a matter of fact, was
regarded as a prelude to a general compliance with the terms dictated by
the Governor-General. The bulk of the siege-train was therefore halted,
and eventually ordered back to Agra.
On the 27th of December information was obtained that the enemy had
advanced to Choundah, a village within eight miles of the position
occupied by the “Army of Exercise” at Hurgonah, and arrangements were
made next day to attack them on the 29th. On the morning of that day,
the army advanced upon the village of Maharajpore. It was believed that
the enemy were some miles distant; but, as the British troops ascended
the rising ground, the Mahratta batteries opened suddenly upon our
advancing columns; and as our own heavy artillery was in the rear, it
was no easy matter to silence the destructive fire kept up by the enemy,
with a spirit and a precision which could scarcely be excelled by the
best gunners in the service of any European state.
Our light field-batteries were overmatched by the heavy metal of the
Mahratta ordnance; but their steadiness under fire was never exceeded,
and the determined resolution with which they carried on the unequal
contest, elicited the highest praise. Captain Grant’s troop of
horse-artillery came into action about half-past eight o’clock, when it
engaged one of the enemy’s batteries, drawn up on the left of the
village of Maharajpore. Here it was joined by Major Alexander’s troop,
when “both advanced to within 500 yards of the enemy, and soon drove him
from his guns, which were taken possession of by the 3rd brigade of
infantry. On following up the enemy, the two troops were suddenly
exposed to a cross fire, from two of the enemy’s batteries, which had
hitherto been concealed; one in front, and the other on our left flank.
Captain Grant was ordered to oppose the former, and Major Alexander the
latter, which was soon after stormed and taken by the 3rd brigade of
infantry; upon which Major Alexander followed up the retreating enemy
with great effect, and Major Lane, with the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
joined them in the pursuit. In the mean time, Captain Grant had advanced
to within 600 yards of the Choundah position, and was opposed singly to
the fire of a heavy battery of 12 guns, for upwards of half an hour, and
I regret to say, sustained a considerable loss in men and horses. So
well chosen,” adds Brigadier Gowan, from whose report to the
Commander-in-Chief these details are taken, “was the enemy’s position,
that even on horseback, I could only discern the muzzles of their guns,
which in weight of metal, as well as in number, were very superior to
the troop’s. More than once, however, the enemy were driven by our fire
from their guns, but being unsupported at the time, except by a weak
troop of cavalry, no advantage of this could be taken, and he returned
to his guns.”
In another letter, addressed to the assistant adjutant-general of
artillery, Brigadier Gowan, with reference to the other details of field
artillery, says, “Major Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advanced
with the 4th brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, forming the left
column, and Nos. 17 and 10 light field-batteries, with the 4th and 5th
brigades of infantry, respectively forming the centre column of attack.
These came into action on the opposite side of the village of
Maharajpore from that on which we were first engaged.... The conduct of
officers and men was highly satisfactory, and everything I could
desire.”
Nothing could have exceeded the resolute courage with which the Mahratta
batteries were defended, alike by infantry and artillerymen, or the
precision with which the guns were served by the latter. “I never
witnessed,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief, “guns better served, nor a
body of infantry apparently more devoted to the protection of their
regimental guns, held by the Mahratta corps as objects of worship.” “The
fire of the enemy,” wrote Brigadier Gowan, “was remarkably accurate, and
was maintained with a smartness which surprised me. At one time they got
the range of Captain Grant’s troop so exactly, that nearly every shot
fell between the guns and waggons of the battery.”
It was only by the steady gallantry of the British infantry, who charged
the enemy’s batteries in the face of destructive showers of grape and
round shot, that their position at last was carried. Her Majesty’s 39th
and 40th regiments headed the columns. Nothing could have been more
gallant than the attack, more obstinate than the resistance. The enemy’s
golundaz stood to be bayoneted in their batteries, and only yielded up
their guns with their lives.
It is probable that, if in this engagement better use had been made of
the artillery, the loss that fell upon the British army would have been
much less severe. Brigadier Tennant, who commanded the foot-artillery,
had brought up four 8–inch howitzers in line with H. M.’s 39th, but he
was not permitted to advance. Had he been allowed, as was his expressed
desire, to move up within 800 yards’ distance, where he could see the
enemy’s position more distinctly, and therefore operate with greater
precision, he might, it was the opinion of those present, have knocked
the Mahratta batteries to pieces, and enabled the infantry columns to
advance in comparative safety to the attack.
On the same morning of the 29th of December, General Gray, who, with the
left wing of the army, had been advancing upon Gwalior from the Sindh
river, came up with the enemy at Punniah, a village a few miles to the
south of the capital. Here the Mahratta batteries were strongly posted,
as at Maharajpore, on commanding ground, and in gorges flanking one
another. The 3rd Buffs, who led the column sent forward to attack the
enemy’s position, were supported by Captain Brind’s troop of
horse-artillery, 1st troop 3rd brigade, which “opened upon the guns to
the left of Mangore, whilst Major Geddes, with Captain Campbell’s troop,
3rd battalion 3rd brigade, and two guns of Captain Brind’s, opened upon
the battery of seven guns in rear of Mangore; and their practice was
beautiful, silencing all but one of the enemy’s guns, which was served
with the greatest accuracy to the last moment. Lieutenant Olpherts, with
four guns of No. 16 light field-battery, took up a position south of
Mangore, and opened on the enemy as they retreated up the hills, with
good effect. Lieutenant Tombs, with two guns of light field-battery
attached to the rear-guard, fired with great precision several shots
upon the enemy’s left.”[93] The Mahrattas made a gallant defence, but
were driven from their guns with considerable loss; and night closed
upon their total dispersion.
In these engagements on the 29th of December, the artillery lost at
Maharajpore, 1 2nd lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; and 1
serjeant, and 21 gunners, wounded; besides syces, ordnance-drivers, and
a considerable number of horses. At Punniah, the loss was much smaller,
only one man and one horse having been killed. The officer who fell at
Maharajpore, was Lieutenant Leathes. He was posted with the rear-guard,
and had ridden forward, it would seem, to watch the progress of the
action, when coming too close to the Mahratta batteries, a round shot
carried off his head.
For services rendered during this campaign, Colonel Gowan received the
companionship of the Bath; Majors Geddes, Sanders, Alexander, and Lane,
were promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel by brevet, and Captains
Brown, Grant, Brind, Campbell, and Macdonald, were gazetted as
brevet-majors. In the political transactions with which these military
operations were connected, Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, of the
artillery, took a conspicuous part. He acted as an aide-de-camp to the
Commander-in-Chief, during the battle of Maharajpore, and was thanked in
his Excellency’s despatch. Captain Macdonald also received the thanks of
the Commander-in-Chief. On the subsequent settlement of the affairs of
Gwalior, four batteries were raised for service with the new Gwalior
contingent; and placed under the command of Lieutenants Eyre, Warburton,
T. H. Smyth, and Hawkins; Brevet-Captain Frank Turner being appointed
brigade major.
In honour of these victories, a bronze star, with “Maharajpore” or
“Punniah” in the centre, was struck, and distributed to the troops
engaged.
Early in the year 1844, the 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery,
and the 4th company 6th battalion of foot, which formed part of the
relief ordered to Scinde, had their fidelity severely tried by the
conduct of two native infantry regiments who refused to cross the
Sutlej, on the plea that their just allowances had been withdrawn. The
artillery, consisting of a native troop and a native company, who must
have come under the operation of the same order, do not appear to have
taken a leading part in the mutinous movement.
In the autumn of this year (1844), a reorganization of the ordnance
commissariat department was ordered by the Supreme Government. Instead
of a principal commissary of ordnance, resident, as heretofore, in Fort
William, an inspector of magazines, with his head-quarters at Allahabad,
was appointed; and the arsenal of Fort William was placed under the
charge of the deputy principal commissary of ordnance.
In the beginning of the year 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge, then
Governor-General, directed his attention to the state of the artillery,
and, in conjunction with Sir George Pollock, the military member of
council, introduced several important improvements. “The number of
regular horse field-batteries had been gradually increased to five.[94]
These were at first equipped with 89 horses, which allowed six horses
each for six guns and six waggons, one spare per team, and five for the
staff; the gun-teams were subsequently allowed eight horses to each. In
1845, the number of batteries was increased to nine, and the complement
of horses to each fixed at 120, which gave eight horses to each gun and
waggon, and allowed a team for the forge-cart, with six saddle-horses,
including one spare and one spare draught-horse per team. On the
frontier or on service, ten additional horses were sanctioned.[95]
“In July, 1845, a new organization of the whole of the Indian artillery
took place, by which the corps in Bengal received a nominal increase,
but a practical decrease, except in the establishment of officers. The
five European battalions of five companies each, were formed into six
battalions of four companies each, and the two golundaz battalions of
ten companies, into three battalions of six companies each, causing a
total reduction of one European, and two native companies.
“One important advantage was, however, obtained by the increase of
European officers, the want of which had been seriously felt on various
previous occasions. The relief thus granted could not of course be felt
immediately, but its beneficial effect is now becoming manifest.
“This gave an establishment of three brigades and nine battalions, each
having a complement of officers similar to the infantry, with the
exception that an additional captain was allowed to the latter, which
has not been accorded to the artillery, although greatly wanted.”
The important subject of elephant-draught at this time engaged the
attention of the Governor-General. These animals had been long in use
with the light post-guns in Arracan and other places, and an
experimental elephant-battery had been recently established at Dum-dum.
But Sir Henry Hardinge now turned his thoughts towards the application
of this description of draught to heavy ordnance, convinced that, for
the transport of siege-guns, artificers’ carts, &c., elephants would be
found more serviceable and more economical than bullocks. During the
Sikh campaign, the services of the former were tested, especially on the
march to and from Kote Kangra; and the result more than justified the
expectations of the Governor-General.