Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of Colonel given
to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations in uniform—Shekawuttee
campaign—Establishment of Retiring Fund.
At the conclusion of the Burmese war, the horses from the Sylhet local
corps were transferred to Dum-Dum, for the purpose of being attached to
a battery, and in the early part of 1827, the undersized stud horses,
which had hitherto been sold to the public, were directed to be admitted
into the service for the light field-batteries, as Government had
decided on horsing them all, the uselessness of bullocks for the purpose
having been thoroughly proved. The number of batteries was, in July,
1827, fixed at twelve. The arrangement was immediately commenced on,
and, by the end of the year, six batteries were in an effective state,
and the remainder would soon have been ready. It will, however, scarcely
be credited that in April, 1828, these orders were countermanded, and
bullocks directed to be retained and the horses of the batteries so
equipped sold off.
It is difficult to penetrate the veil of mystery which shrouds the acts
of the Council Chamber, so as to ascertain the real author of such
vacillating policy; the reasons which induced the equipment of 1827, and
which were the accumulated experience of years, were equally cogent in
1828, and that they were sound, every one who has had experience of
Indian warfare will vouch. That there is no reason to suppose the change
was made consequent on orders from home, we may conclude, for in 1834,
we find the Court of Directors “satisfied of the superiority of horses
over bullocks for light field-artillery,” directing “their gradual
substitution,” an order to which no attention was paid by the then
Governor-General. Under these circumstances, rumour, with her hundred
tongues, is perhaps not wrong in attributing it to a “malignant
influence,” which for a quarter of a century opposed every suggestion
for the improvement of the prospects or efficiency of the ordnance
branch. A late military member of the Council of India, long secretary
to Government in the military department, who, repeating the one
argument, equally applicable against every advance, “We won India with
bullocks, and why should we not keep it with bullocks?” supported the
late Lord W. Bentinck in putting aside the Court’s orders of 1834, and
Lord Auckland in paying a slow and partial obedience to them when
repeated in 1841.
Cotemporary with this retrograde movement, was the reduction of the
field-batteries from eight to six pieces each, a good arrangement, had
it been accompanied by a proportionate increase in their numbers; but
this was not done, and it therefore reduced, by one fourth, the
field-artillery, already far too low, in reference to the other branches
of the army. The gun contract was at this time transferred from the
senior artillery officer at the station to the officer commanding the
battery, a very judicious change, as it placed the power in the hands of
the person most properly responsible for the efficiency of the battery,
and left to the superior officer his proper duty of supervision
unfettered by personal considerations.
The rocket-troop was converted into a gun-troop; but, that the use of
the weapon might not be forgotten, a proportion of rockets was directed
to be attached to each field-battery. For this purpose, the Commandant
submitted a proposition to add a car, capable of carrying 120 6–pounder
rockets, to each field-battery, and capable of manœuvring in line with
it; but after the pattern car had been prepared, the subject was,
somehow or other, allowed to fall into oblivion, probably, we believe,
from the supplies of rockets having been countermanded; and thus for
many years neither officers nor men had any opportunities of accustoming
themselves to their use. From 1828 till 1840, when at the headquarters
of the regiment their use was resumed previous to despatching a supply
to China, and at Kurnal and Ferozepore, where, in 1842, some which were
sent for service in the passes of Affghanistan were used, not a rocket
was fired.
Another reduction followed, causing great excitement in the army at
large, but which pressed more heavily on the artillery than any other
branch. We refer to the orders of December, 1828, placing certain
stations on half-batta; of these, Allahabad, Benares, Dinapore, and
Dum-Dum, were artillery stations, and the latter, that of the
head-quarters of the regiment, the artillery being a European regiment,
and therefore considered not liable to be called on for sudden
movements: the officers were placed on half-tentage likewise.
That the reduction in allowances was such as to bear heavily on
individuals, especially in the lower grades, the marginal statement[83]
will show, and this, moreover, was subject to another tax of 4½ per
cent., the exchange between sonat and sicca rupees, the former being the
coin in which the military accounts are kept, while the latter was that
current in Calcutta, and in which the troops were actually paid. The
head-quarters of the regiment being at Dum-Dum, the mess, band, library,
and other regimental institutions, were there, and officers were
naturally fond of being stationed there, for various reasons; such as
its gaiety and amusements, and the opportunities it offered for studying
their profession or improving their prospects in the service.
From these circumstances, the regimental head-quarters generally had in
a time of peace a large number of officers of the higher ranks present,
and this contributed to render it a desirable station. But all this was
reversed by the half-batta order; instead of thronging to the
head-quarters, the station was avoided by all ranks, and the discipline
of the regiment suffered much in after years from the difficulty of
keeping sufficient officers of standing for the common routine duties of
the place and instruction of the young officers joining the regiment.
The want of a sufficient body of officers at Dum-Dum of known talents
and experience is also felt when vacancies suddenly occur in any of the
important artillery situations dependent on it for the temporary
arrangement in cases of exigency. We refer to the arsenal, foundry,
powder-works, expense magazine, acting assistant quarter-master, and
ordnance secretary in the Military Board; in several of these situations
much difficulty has at times been experienced, and has only been met by
doubling-up the duties of two appointments on several occasions in one
person.
The regiment (and the army) memorialized strongly on the occasion, but
without effect, though some years afterwards the hardship was partially
ameliorated by the grant of full tentage to the artillery, it having
been clearly shown that the officers of no branch of the army are
subject to such sudden and repeated movements, and these as individuals,
and not with the aids and conveniences which the officers of a wing or
detachment of infantry find by combining their means. In the margin[84]
is noted the receipts of officers at half-batta stations, as sanctioned
in 1835, and since continued. Recently, a further modification of the
order, limiting its effects to stations within two hundred miles of each
presidency, has taken place, and as the saving caused by it is now
reduced to so very a trifle, and its weight laid so unequally on the
different branches of the army, a strong feeling of hope exists that the
order will finally be totally repealed.
Further reductions followed; two troops and companies were struck off
from each regiment of cavalry and infantry, and with them two
lieutenants and one ensign. Although the reduction of the companies
neither was nor could be made applicable to the artillery, yet the three
subalterns per battalion, or thirty in all, were reduced, the twenty
first lieutenants remaining supernumerary till absorbed, and thus
stopping the promotion of the second lieutenants about four years. The
results of this were not felt for some time, because the actual number
of officers present with the regiment continued much the same, and the
number of cadets sent out to replace casualties was not altered, the
supernumerary list continued long, and it was even attempted to retain
the cadets unpromoted until vacancies occurred; but we believe that the
Government law officers decided that it would not be legal, and they
were accordingly all promoted to commissions.
With the reduction above noticed, was coupled what was thought a boon,
at the time, but which in fact has proved the cause of much
supersession by the royal service,—the promotion of all
lieutenant-colonels commandant to the rank of colonel. Every
lieutenant-colonel in H.M.’s service in India who happened to be
senior in that rank to any one of the lieutenant-colonels commandant
now promoted, was also breveted with the rank of colonel, and as in
each presidency there are no less than four distinct gradation-lists
leading to this rank, viz., artillery, engineers, cavalry, and
infantry, each of which has had its fortunate period, the confusion
and supersession which followed may easily be imagined. It was brought
to a crisis by Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, a lieutenant-colonel of
1827 (a cadet of 1794), obtaining his regimental colonelcy in four
years, and, of course, all lieutenant-colonels of H. M.’s service
senior to him were also promoted, and the anomalies became so
stupendous, that an alteration was made in the plan, and the Bengal
native infantry, as the largest body, was made the guide; but this
destroys the only chance the other branches had of ever retrieving in
the higher grade the slow promotion they may have had in the lower,
and gives the royal service, with its promotion by purchase and
regimentally to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, a fearful
advantage[85] over the Company’s service, which has been increased by
the power exercised by the Commander-in-Chief in India to grant
brevets of major-general to such colonels in India as H.M.’s brevet to
Company’s officers may supersede. The rank thus given is of a double
nature, and may be made use of or laid aside at pleasure, allowing
them to be lieutenant-colonels or major-generals, as most convenient,
and thus enabling them to reap the benefits of high rank without its
drawback—removal from lucrative commands in India.
In 1828, the uniform of the officers of the horse artillery was changed;
the jack-boots and leather breeches were superseded by the overalls, and
the equipments and horse furniture of a similar pattern to those worn by
light cavalry were adopted; but the uniform of the non-commissioned
officers and gunners remained unchanged. For actual hard work on
horseback, such as is riding in the guns, few will deny that the boots
and breeches are the most serviceable dress, but they are inconvenient
when dismounted, and ill-adapted for exposure to wet, and at no time can
they be indued in a hurry. The foot artillery about the same time
discarded their short jacket faced with scarlet and embroidered with
gold, for the present plain but handsome uniform: the second epaulette
to the subaltern ranks was ordered in 1833. The undress remained a blue
jacket with scarlet cuffs and collar, unrelieved by a button or atom of
lace until 1841, when a row of studs down the front, and gilt
shoulder-scales, were added; the latter adding as much to its appearance
as they detracted from its comfort.
Several years now passed away void of internal change or external
employment. Such universal quiet reigned, that it appeared as if swords
and spears might be most usefully turned into ploughshares and
reaping-hooks, and the army looked round in vain for employment. Central
India was at rest, Nepal not likely to disturb the quiet, and the
Punjab, under the strong rule of Runjeet Sing, seemed removed from the
chance of inimical contact with the Indian Government.
Suddenly rumours sprung up of disturbances in Rajasthan, which, by
degrees, assumed a more determined aspect, and Maun Sing, of Joudpoor,
was mentioned as the delinquent, and an army was about to assemble
against him, but, humbling himself, he averted his ruin, and a portion
of the force was sent against the robber tribes of Shekawut.
With the force were three troops of horse artillery, eight companies of
foot, and a siege-train of twenty-six pieces.
Brigadier Parker commanded the artillery; Captain Sanders, commissary of
ordnance; but the force met with no opposition, and after destroying
many of the robbers’ strongholds, returned to cantonments.
The reductions which took place in 1828 by this time began to tell, as
the supernumeraries were absorbed; and to provide even a small number of
officers for the foot artillery, the subalterns of the horse artillery
were reduced to two per troop; a very inadequate number when the Indian
contingencies are borne in mind.
For many years the officers of the Bengal army had been accustomed to
procure the retirement of their seniors by the donation of a sum of
money, varying in amount according to the value of the step and the
abilities of the donors. The custom, it is true, was contrary to the
orders of the Court of Directors, but they were aware of and permitted
it. In the artillery the same custom prevailed; and this year it was
systematized by the establishment of a fund by monthly contributions
from all captains and subalterns to provide for two retirements
annually. Its advantages have been most apparent in its working, and the
principle of a mutual insurance tontine, on which it was formed, has
rendered it more effective even than was expected. The other branches of
the army were not successful in establishing funds of the sort; but the
question being much agitated, led to a memorial, from Lieutenant-Colonel
Powel, of the Bombay army, to the Court of Directors, praying that the
system might be put a stop to, on the plea of its interfering with the
seniority system of the Company’s army. It was met by several
counter-memorials, and, on replying to the whole together, the Court
gave the proceedings their sanction, by declaring that, although they
would not cancel the orders forbidding purchase, they would hold them in
abeyance, unless there appeared such a probability of the pension-list
being overloaded, that their interference would be necessary, and that
of this, due warning should be given.
These years passed off without any portion of the army being called on
to take the field, if we except a slight _émeute_ among the Bheels in
the neighbourhood of Mhow, in 1837, to check which, a small body of
troops with two horse artillery guns, from the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
under Lieutenant Kinleside, were detached; but towards the end of the
next, a storm appeared to be gathering in the north-west. The Persians
besieged Heerat, and were only foiled in their attempt by the steady
persevering gallantry and resources of Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of
the Bombay Artillery, who, throwing himself into the fortress, inspired
its defenders with a portion of his own dauntless spirit. Persia was
supposed to be egged on by Russian intrigue, and India to be its
ultimate object. Self-defence called upon the Indian Government to check
these designs, and having vainly endeavoured by negotiation to render
Affghanistan under Dost Mahomed a barrier, the Government resolved to
espouse the cause of its exiled sovereign, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, with
the hopes that, when replaced on the throne of his forefathers, he would
prove a stanch friend. To carry this plan out, an army was assembled
after the rains, at Ferozepore; but information arriving of the
Persians, baffled by Pottinger’s cool resolution, having decamped from
before Heerat, the plan of the campaign was altered. In fact, our end
was gained; and had it not been for the very unnecessary connection with
Shah Soojah as a reason for our interference, and which would have stood
better on the simple plea of self-preservation, not a soldier need have
moved from Ferozepore. But before entering on the eventful campaigns
which followed this step, let us glance at events in other parts of
India which necessitated the assembly of a force in Bundlecund, though
the campaign was a bloodless one.
The Jhansee raj having lapsed through the failure of direct heirs, the
widow of a former Raja endeavoured to place, as the adopted son of the
previous ruler, a boy on the throne. A disturbance arose, which ended in
the murder of the minister supported by the British authority. This act
of the Bhaiee was called in question by the Governor-General’s agent;
his authority was treated with disrespect, and he found it necessary to
call in the aid of a regiment and a couple of guns. At these, the
insurgents, who had seized the fort, laughed, and on his attempting a
parley with them, attacked and wounded his elephant and chuprassees, and
forced him precipitately to retreat. Reinforcements and a battering
train were sent for from Sagur; but the country had been so denuded of
troops to form the army of the Indus, that, had it not been for the Mhow
troops just being relieved from Bombay, a very insufficient force could
have been collected. A train of four 18–pounders and four 8–inch
mortars, with as much ammunition as carriage could be obtained for, was
got ready, and, in the absence of available artillery officers, the
commissary of ordnance at Sagur, Lieutenant Buckle, who had offered his
services, started in charge of it early in December, and after a march
of twelve days, rendered difficult and fatiguing by the badness of the
roads, the steep banks and rocky beds of the rivers and nullahs which
abounded, and the broken rocky ghats leading from table-land into
Bundlecund, reached Jhansee on the 18th December.
The troops collected by degrees, and the artillery, when reinforced from
Cawnpoor, amounted to that detailed in the margin.[86] The engineer park
was placed in the charge of the commissary of ordnance, the field
engineer, Major Smith, having joined dak, and the preparation of
_matériel_ instantly commenced.
Continual communications passed between the Bhaiee and the agent, which
were warlike to the last, and, as she had collected bands of Nagas,
resistance was expected; but on the preparations being completed, the
force moving down to invest the fort, carrying their train and the stock
of gabions and fascines which had been prepared, she fled during the
night, and the fort was taken possession of without firing a shot.
The labour of conveying the heavy ordnance over a broken country was the
chief difficulty, but this was not much felt, owing to the season of the
year.
The army of the Indus assembled at Ferozepore, and a meeting took place
between the Governor-General and Runjeet Sing. The news of the Persians
breaking up from before Heerat determined Government on sending only one
division of the army, accompanied by the troops which were being raised
for Shah Soojah, under British officers, into Affghanistan. The
artillery for the Shah’s service consisted originally of two troops of
horse artillery, to which were afterwards added a mountain train and
some body-guard guns. Captain W. Anderson was intrusted with the
formation of the horse artillery, and though but little time was allowed
him, and many difficulties arose from the demand for men and horses for
the other branches, his exertions succeeded in overcoming them, and he
marched in good time from Dehli, with his two troops fully equipped,
but, of course, untrained. His endeavours were well seconded by his two
subalterns, Lieutenants Cooper and Turner. The Shah’s guns were in
Lieutenant Warburton’s charge, and the mountain train was organized by
Captain Backhouse, but not until 1840.
The regular artillery, with this division from Bengal, consisted of
Major Pew, commanding; Captain Day, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant
Backhouse, M.B.
────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────────────────────
Company.│Brigade.│Battalion.│Captains.│ Lieutenants.
────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────────────────
2 │ 2 │ │Grant │Duncan, J. Anderson.
4 │ 3 │ │Timmings │Mackenzie, Hawkins, E. Kaye.
2 │ │ 6[87] │A. Abbott│Dawes, R. Shakespear, Warburton.
4 │ │ 2 │Garbett │J. Abbott, Walker, Green.
────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────────────────────────
Captain Todd, of the artillery, who had been employed in Persia, was
attached to the political department.
The army commenced its march on the 10th December, and met with no
difficulties until the 16th March, 1839, when they entered the Bolan
pass, a pass as terrible to the Indian, as that of Avernus to the
classical, imagination. Here the toils of the campaign began, and, as
usual in such cases, a double share fell to the artillery. The horses,
overweighted and ill-fed, with difficulty dragged the carriages through
its stony lengths; the camels and bullocks, over-driven to keep pace
with the column, and escape the new danger arising from the matchlocks
of the Murrees and Brahoos perched on the rocks, stumbled and fell, many
never to rise again: store-carts and baggage were lost by these
accidents.
The difficulties of procuring provisions were increased after clearing
the pass by the arrival of the Bombay column, though the country became
easier until reaching the Kojuck pass; narrow, steep, and in places
blocked up by large rocks, it was with the greatest difficulty, and by
incredible perseverance, that the heavy and light artillery were got
through this obstacle. Great loss of baggage occurred here from the
deaths of camels. At this point, the camel battery, which had hitherto
got on very well, showed symptoms of knocking up; the animal’s
conformation, from want of power of muscular exertion, being quite
unfitted for draught in situations of difficulty. All at length reached
Candahar towards the end of April, but the horses of the horse artillery
and cavalry so worn, that a long rest was necessary to fit them for
work; the troops, too, required rest and food, and the halt continued
till the end of June, though not entirely without employment, for the
camel battery took part in the expedition against Girisk, and two guns
of the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant E. Kaye, were detached
with the Shah’s troops against refractory chiefs in Tezeen.
From Candahar a mission was sent to Heerat; Captain Todd was placed at
the head of it, and Lieutenants J. Abbott and R. Shakespear were his
assistants. Of the results of this mission, or of his assistants, to
Khiva; of the difficulties and dangers endured and overcome by Abbott as
the pioneer, and the success which crowned Shakespear, in following his
path, nothing need be said in this place. Their own accounts have
already been published.
On the army moving forward, the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, 2nd company 6th
battalion, with No. 6 light field battery, alone accompanied it. The
Shah’s artillery, the 4th troop 3rd brigade, the 4th company 2nd
battalion, and the heavy guns, remained at Candahar. On the 21st July
the fortress of Ghuznee was reached, reconnoitred the next day, and the
artillery placed in position, by 3 A.M. of the 23rd, to cover the
assault which was ordered at dawn. On the gate being blown in by two
bags of powder, every gun opened to cover the advance of the storming
party, which was perfectly successful, and, by 5 o’clock, the place was
in our possession.
The exertions of the troops were rewarded by a medal from Shah Soojah,
and which is remarkable for one thing—being the first given in India to
all engaged. Hitherto, these decorations had been granted to the native
troops alone; but on this occasion the medal was given to all, without
any distinction whatever. It was suspended from a crimson and green
ribbon.
[Illustration]
The army continued its march to Cabul without opposition. Deserted by
his followers, Dost Mahomed fled, leaving his guns at Maidan a spoil to
the invaders; and himself narrowly escaping from a band of officers,
among whom was Lieutenant Backhouse, of the artillery, who, under Major
Outram, followed him closely, but were misled by the arch traitor Haji
Khan Kokur.
But while the main army was thus employed, a small column, chiefly of
irregulars, with Colonel Wade, escorted the Shah-Zada by the Khyber pass
to his father’s capital. With this column were two howitzers, manned by
a detachment of the 4th company 2nd brigade, and commanded by Lieutenant
Barr: Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery, was attached to the prince’s
suite. This column met with no opposition, except on first entering the
Khyber pass, where they were engaged with the Afreedis at Koulsir, and
again at Alee Musjid. The names of Lieutenants Barr and Maule are both
mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Wade’s despatches on the occasion.
The main army reached Cabul on the 6th August, and Colonel Wade’s column
on the 3rd September. The Bombay column returned in October, and,
picking up four of the Shah’s horse artillery guns, under Lieutenant
Cooper, proceeded against Khelat. Reaching it on the 13th November, the
troops advanced to the assault under cover of the fire from the guns,
which drove the enemy from the neighbouring heights; the guns were now
directed against the gates, and, these being forced, the place was soon
won. In his despatch, General Wiltshire says, “To Lieutenants Forster
and Cooper I feel greatly indebted for the scientific and steady manner
in which the service of dislodging the enemy from the heights and
afterwards effecting an entrance into the fort was performed.”
The main army left Cabul for Hindustan in October, 1839; the 2nd company
6th battalion with No. 6 battery alone remained. The camel draught had
proved so useless for such a country, that horses were now directed to
be substituted, and so promptly was this order carried out by Captain
Abbott, that within fifteen days after receiving it, half the battery
was equipped, and marched against the Ghilzies, under Lieutenant Dawes,
moving upwards of 400 miles ere it returned. The other half of the
battery was employed in the following January in the Koh-i-daman under
Captain Abbott. Pushoot held out, and the 9–pounders being placed in
battery at daylight, a breach was formed on both sides of the outer
gate, but an inner one existing, against which the guns could not be
brought to bear, bags of powder were tried without avail, and the troops
were forced to withdraw; but the enemy fled during the night. “To
Captain Abbott,” Colonel Orchard wrote, “the highest praise is due, for
the manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties devolving on
him, as well as the great service rendered by him yesterday.”
We have now to notice perhaps the most extraordinary march ever
performed by artillery,—that of a native troop of horse artillery across
the Hindoo Kosh to Bamian; extraordinary both from obstacles overcome,
and the circumstance of the men of this troop being natives of
Hindostan. The 4th troop 3rd brigade was ordered for this trip in
September, 1839, and, Captain Timmings having just died, it was under
the command of a subaltern, Lieutenant M. Mackenzie, with whom was
Lieutenant E. Kaye.
The valley of Bamian lies about N. W. from Cabul, distant only 112
miles; but it is separated from the valley in which the capital is
situate by a broad belt of stupendous mountains, the highest range of
which exceeds in altitude 12,000 feet. The troop entered upon its
mountain road near the village of Urghundee, and while toiling up the
first laborious ascent (steep in itself, but rendered still more
difficult by huge stones and fragments of rock), it was met by Major
Thomson, of the engineers, and some other officers,[88] who were just
returning from an excursion to Bamian. Major Thomson immediately
declared the road to Bamian to be impracticable for guns,—that the
passes in advance were still more difficult in their nature than that of
Urghundee, and said that he would, immediately on arrival at Cabul,
report to the envoy that it would be useless to attempt to reach Bamian.
The troop, however, continued its march, and, the passage of the
Urghundee ghât accomplished, descended into the beautiful valley of the
Cabul river, along the banks of which the route continued for three
marches, passing Julraiz and Sir-i-Chushmeh. The road was at times
difficult, being frequently in the rocky bed of the stream, and always
ascending, gradually becoming steeper and more toilsome.
The summit of the Oonai pass is said to be 11,400 feet in elevation; at
this great elevation, even in September, the cold was intense. The
passage of the range was a work of great toil, as the ascents and
descents were numerous. The summit of the range is in general a
table-land, gradually sloping towards the north-west; not one continuous
table-land, but intersected by numerous deep glens, running parallel to
each other, with steep precipitous sides, difficult to ascend or
descend. On the 21st, a small mud fort, named Youatt, was reached, and
on the 23rd the troop, after crossing several spurs from the range just
surmounted, descended to the banks of the Helmund, beyond which towered
the snow-capped peaks of Koh-i-Baba.
In consequence of the report received from Major Thomson of the
impracticable nature of the road to Bamian, the envoy had sent
instructions for three guns and all the ammunition-waggons to return to
Cabul, the other three guns to halt until elephants sent from Cabul
should arrive; it was then intended that the three guns should be
dismounted and carried over the remaining passes on elephants. These
instructions were received at Youatt, but the neighbourhood being
entirely destitute of forage, it was considered advisable to move the
troop on to Gurden Dewaal, on the river Helmund. Having arrived there,
the troop halted, and Lieutenant Mackenzie went forward and examined the
pass over the Hindoo-Koosh range. This officer having considered the
passage practicable, forwarded a report to that effect to head-quarters,
and requested permission to proceed with the whole of the troop.
Permission was at length received, and on the 30th the march was
resumed. The foot of the Irak pass was attained in three difficult
marches, the ascent being constant and fatiguing. The passage was
commenced immediately, nearly all the guns and carriages being pulled up
by hand (the horses being taken out); at this work, the artillery and
infantry soldiers and some 200 Hazarehs were employed during the whole
day, and it was not until dark that the entire battery had reached the
foot of the western face of the mountain, which was found to be
considerably steeper than that up which the ascent led. On the following
day the march was resumed through a deep and dreary defile, abounding in
rocks, and the precipices enclosing it so steep and lofty, that the
sun’s rays scarcely ever penetrated to its lowest depths. Through this
tortuous glen the troop wound its way, until, after many an interruption
from rocky ledges of dangerous descent, the small valley of Meeanee Irak
was reached on the 4th of October, and vegetation and human habitations
were once more seen.
The whole of the 5th was occupied in passing the Kuski ghât, over a
range of no great elevation (a spur only of the Hindoo-Koosh) but of
great difficulty. The ascent was occasionally so steep (at an angle of
45°) that the men working at the drag-ropes could not keep their
footing; horses, of course, were out of the question. The ascent was,
however, accomplished in the afternoon, and the descent by the edge of a
precipice, where a false step would have insured instant destruction,
commenced. This, too, was effected, but night found the troop in a
defile so narrow, and enclosed by such steep walls, that it seemed to be
but a fissure in the mountain, caused by some convulsion of nature.
Nothing further could be done till daylight; early on the morning of the
6th of October, the troop crossed the last intervening ridge and entered
the valley of Bamian at Zohauk. Next day the troop reached Bamian, and
encamped close to some mud forts, which were destined now, for the first
time, to become the dwelling-places of British officers and soldiers.
This march to Bamian has been dwelt upon somewhat longer than is
altogether suitable to the pages of a work of this nature; but, within a
smaller space it would have been scarcely practicable to give an idea of
the service performed. It was certainly one of the most arduous
undertakings ever accomplished by horse-artillery.[89]
Nor less singular the position of the troop after its arrival; in the
midst of a belt of mountains more than 200 miles in width, separated
from Cabul by the highest range, impassable by troops during some months
in the year, and in a valley scarcely ever exceeding 500 yards in
breadth (generally much less), and only a few miles long. As might have
been expected, the horses had suffered, though not in a very great
degree, from the severity of the march, the cold, and the great scarcity
of forage. The two latter evils continued to press upon the troop for
many months, until the returning summer brought the green crops and more
genial weather. The carriages of the troop had, however stood the hard
work over rocky roads admirably, and a most favourable report was made
on them by Lieutenant Mackenzie.
On the 15th of October, the troop went into winter quarters in a large
mud fort.
With the exception of a movement to Syghan, at the beginning of
November, in which sixty horse-artillery troopers, acting as cavalry,
took part, and an attack on Mahomed Ali Beg’s fort in December, when two
small mortars and a 3–pounder mountain-gun, mounted on ponies, were sent
with the troopers, the long dreary winter season passed over quietly—the
soldiers of the artillery and infantry being employed for some time in
throwing up intrenchments, connecting the various forts in possession of
the British. This was done at the suggestion of Dr. Lord, the political
agent, there having been some probability of a coalition among the Usbeg
powers to support the ex-Ameer. Had such an event occurred during the
winter, the Bamian detachment would have been thrown entirely on its own
resources, as no help could come from Cabul, while, on the other hand,
the roads from Toorkhistan were open. The cold was intense during the
winter, the thermometer at sunrise being often as low as 12° below zero.
All the rivers were frozen over.
On the 1st of March, 1840, Captain H. Garbett (who had been posted to
the troop on the decease of Captain Timmings) joined, and took command
of all the troops at Bamian; he had been obliged to walk 100 miles
through the snow, as the mountains were now only passable by men.
On the 14th of March, two guns of the troop were present in a small
affair with the Hazarehs at Fouladee, about six miles from Bamian. A mud
fort had to be captured, and the surrounding hills to be cleared of a
considerable body of Hazarehs; the gateway was knocked down by a few
round shot, and the fort was then carried by the infantry, while a few
rounds of shrapnels cleared the neighbouring hills of the Hazarehs. The
whole affair did not last much above half an hour. The artillery lost
one European laboratory-man, one syce, and one horse killed, and one
trooper wounded. Dr. Lord admitted the chiefs of the refractory tribe to
terms, and affairs resumed their wonted peaceful aspect.
In July, however, there seemed to be every prospect of hostilities being
renewed; Dost Mahomed, who had for months been a prisoner at Bokhara,
had effected his escape to Kooloom, and the Usbegs began to arm in his
cause. The British infantry had been pushed forward to Bajgah,
twenty-five miles northward of Syghan, and had come into contact with
the unfriendly tribes. At the beginning of August, a small affair
occurred near Kamurd, in which two companies of infantry suffered a very
severe loss. On the 4th of August, two guns of horse-artillery were sent
to Syghan,[90] more as a demonstration than with any other object, as
the roads to Kamurd and Bajgah, across the Dundan-Shikun and
Nal-i-Ferish passes, were totally impracticable. The Dost was now
advancing from Kooloom, accompanied by the Wallee of that place, at the
head of about 10,000 men, and every prospect of his force increasing
daily.
On the 13th of September, Brigadier Dennie arrived from Cabul with
reinforcements, which had been despatched on hearing of the Ameer’s
advance. The force at Bamian, besides the troop, consisted now of the
35th native infantry, the Goorkah regiment, a resallah of irregular
cavalry, and 400 janbaz, or Afghan horse. The Afghan infantry had been
disarmed and sent to Cabul.
On the 17th, in the evening, the Dost’s piquets entered the Bamian
valley at Soorukdhurrah, about four miles distant, and on the following
morning the brigadier having received information which led him to
believe that merely the advanced guard of the enemy had arrived, took
out a small detachment of only eight companies, and engaged the whole
Usbeg force, who were completely routed and driven from the field in
great confusion. Two guns of the troop, under Lieutenant Mackenzie, were
present in this affair. The Usbegs fell back almost immediately when the
guns opened on them, abandoning in succession three positions in which
they attempted to make a stand, but from which they were instantly
dislodged by the guns advancing. Thus in the valley itself, where the
main body of the enemy was, the contest was decided by the
horse-artillery, but on the heights the infantry were engaged with some
other parties of the enemy, mostly foot-men. The cavalry pursued the
Usbegs for some miles up the defile of Soorukdhurrah. The enemy has been
variously computed at from 5,000 to 10,000 men in the field.
Four guns of the troop accompanied Brigadier Dennie in his subsequent
pursuit of the enemy, but the movements of the Usbegs had been too rapid
to allow it to be effectual; but the results were most happy, as it
induced the Ameer to leave the Usbeg camp, and forced the Wallee to
abandon his cause. The rest is well known: the Dost threw himself into
the Kohistan of Cabul, and the theatre of war being thus changed, the
British troops were recalled from Bamian, and on the 8th October
(exactly a year and a day after its arrival), the troop marched in
progress to Cabul with Colonel Dennie. At the commencement of the
following year the troop returned to India with the escort in charge of
the captive Ameer.
In the expedition to the Kohistan, under Brigadier Sale, Captain A.
Abbott and his battery, and Lieutenant Warburton with two of the Shah’s
bodyguard guns, were employed. The fort of Tootundurra was carried with
little loss, a fact attributed “in a great measure to the dread inspired
by the excellent practice of the artillery under the able direction of
Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and Warburton.”
In breaching Julga in October, these same guns were again employed, and
Captain A. Abbott and Lieutenant Warburton are reported as having
distinguished themselves in the service of the artillery.
In November the detachment was engaged with the Dost’s followers at
Purwundurrah, and two guns of No. 6 battery, under Lieutenant Dawes,
covered the successful attack on the heights after the shameful flight
of the cavalry.
At this period, a brigade marched from the provinces under Colonel
Shelton, to relieve part of the Cabul force; with it was Captain
Nicholl’s (1st company 1st brigade) troop of horse artillery—Lieutenants
Waller and Stewart, subalterns—and the newly-formed mountain-train under
Captain Backhouse and Lieutenant Green. The brigade advanced as far as
Jellalabad, when rumours arising of the disaffection of the Sikhs in the
rear, it returned by forced marches to Jumrood, but, finding its
presence not required, again marched without rest to Jellalabad. By the
difficulty and rapidity of this march the horses of the troop were much
knocked up, and their distress was much increased by the officer
commanding the brigade having insisted, in spite of Captain Nicholl’s
remonstrances, on the troop marching in rear of the infantry, checking
the natural pace of the horse, and subjecting the troop to continual
halts. Two of its guns, under Captain Nicholl, were employed in February
in reducing forts in the Nazian valley, as also was the mountain-train.
While the artillery with the Cabul force was thus employed, that at
Candahar was not inactive. In April, 1840, Captain W. Anderson, with one
of his troops of horse-artillery and a body of the Shah’s troops,
marching in the direction of Ghuznee, fell in with a large body of
insurgent Ghilzies, and defeated them near Tazee, on the Tornuek river.
The enemy made a firm stand, twice charged our line, and were driven
back by the steadiness of the troops and the well-sustained fire of the
guns under Lieutenant Cooper.
Colonel Wymer’s detachment was attacked at Ealmee on the 19th May, on
its route to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, by a large body of Ghilzies. Two of the
Shah’s horse-artillery guns under Lieutenant Hawkins were present, “and
opened upon the enemy’s dense masses of attack at about 900 yards, with
beautiful precision and effect, causing them to break into three
columns, which still continued the attack,” but were driven back by the
steady fire of the line, though they continued their efforts from five
till nearly ten at night. “Too much cannot be said of the scientific and
destructive manner in which the artillery practice was conducted by
Lieutenant Hawkins, which created awful havoc in the ranks of the enemy,
to the admiration of the troops present.”
In July, Lieutenant Cooper, with two guns, accompanied Captain Woodburn
against Uctar Khan, in the neighbourhood of Girisk. The enemy attacked
the left “with great boldness, but were repulsed by the well-directed
fire of the guns, and three companies on the left; failing in this, they
attacked the right, but were again met by a most destructive fire from
the guns and five companies which were on the right.” The rear was then
attacked, but a gun being reversed, and the rear rank of the infantry
facing about, the enemy were driven off, after standing three rounds of
case shot.
“Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments for the rapidity and
admirable manner in which he brought his guns to play upon the enemy;
and I had frequent opportunities of noticing the precision of his
practice. His guns are never in difficulty,” are Captain Woodburn’s
words in his official report, in which also he speaks in another place
of the “admirable conduct of the artillery.”
In August, this same officer, with four guns, when attached to Captain
Griffin’s force, was again in action with the enemy near Khawind, and
again rendered effectual assistance, and earned the praises of his
superiors for himself and his details.
On the arrival of Shah Soojah at Cabul, a grand durbar was held, and a
new order of chivalry was instituted,—that of the “Dur-i-Dooranee,” or
Pearl of the Dooranee Empire, consisting of three ranks, similar to
those of the Bath. The annexed is a representation of the star of the
order. It was conferred on several artillery officers at various times
previous to Shah Soojah’s death.
[Illustration]
Hitherto we have had the gratifying task of recounting the exploits of a
victorious army; a darker page must now follow; but though success no
longer brightens the narrative, we have still the consolation of knowing
that those parts of the regiment employed, heroically performed their
duty in scenes of no common trial, and that their exertions, in a cause
which from the first was evidently hopeless, only ceased when the cold
hand of death laid them low in the dark defiles of the Koord Kabool and
Jugdulluck.
In October, the Eastern Ghilzies occupied the passes between Bhootkhak
and Jellalabad. Brigadier Sale, with a brigade, was sent to clear them;
No. 6 battery and the mountain-train accompanied. Lieutenant Dawes with
the two 9–pounders was with the advance-guard, on whom, in forcing the
Kabool pass, the chief brunt fell. In the Tezeen valley, all the guns
were brought into action, in a succession of skirmishes which lasted
till dusk, with much effect. The march was now a daily struggle; two
guns, sometimes commanded by Lieutenant Dawes, sometimes by Captain
Backhouse (part of whose train, under Lieutenant Green, had returned
with the 37th regiment of native infantry to Cabul), on the rear-guard,
were engaged daily; at Jugdulluck a severe struggle ensued, and its
favourable conclusion was insured by the guns seizing an unoccupied
position, which took the enemy’s line in reverse; the rear-guard was,
however, suddenly attacked and the baggage seized; “soon, however, by
the praiseworthy exertions, and cool and soldier-like orders and example
of Captain Backhouse, * * * confidence was restored and the rear-guard
extricated from the defile.”
“I have been much pleased,” continues the report, “with the address and
able arrangements of Captain Abbott, who has twice commanded the
advance-guard.”
The insurrection burst out on all sides; myriads of Ghilzies, &c.,
re-occupied the passes in the rear, and cut off all communication with
Cabul, forcing Sir Robert Sale to seek the safety of his brigade by
occupying Jellalabad. The Kohistanees rose in Charekar, and murdered
Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery. Candahar was surrounded. Ghuznee
fell. The Khyberees sealed the mouth of their pass. Colonel Wild’s[91]
attempt to force it failed, and the last act of the tragedy was
completed in the annihilation of the Cabul garrison on its fatal and
ill-judged retreat. The details of these sad events have been so
graphically described, that we need here do no more than record the
losses of the regiment, and extract from the accounts of eye-witnesses
their testimony to the admirable conduct of that noble troop, the 1st
troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, both during the siege and the
retreat.
After detailing the disastrous action of the 23rd November, Captain
Melville says, “Here, amidst so much that was condemnable, let me again
bear just and heartfelt testimony to the behaviour of that brave, though
small, body of men, whose conduct on this, and every other occasion
during the war, was that of a band of heroes, and who, preferring death
to dishonour, met their fate, nobly fighting to the last for the gun
they had so ably served. I allude to the horse-artillery; when Sergeant
Mulhall and six gunners, whose names I feel deep sorrow I cannot here
record, sword in hand awaited the advance of the foe, and it was not
until they saw themselves alone in the midst of thousands of the enemy,
that they dashed at full gallop, cutting their way through them, down
the hill; and though surrounded by cavalry and infantry, yet they
managed to bring their gun safely to the plain, where, however, only
three of them being alive, and they desperately wounded, they were
obliged to leave it, and contrived to reach cantonments.” Again, during
the retreat, he says, “On reaching the extremity of the (Khoord Cabool)
pass, the horse-artillery, that noble branch of the service, whose
courage, even in extremity, never failed, and who supported all their
misfortunes cheerfully, halted, and, turning a gun on the pass, awaited
the debouchment of our troops and the arrival of the enemy’s. This soon
happened, and we received them with some well-directed rounds of
grape.” * * * After their guns and horses were lost, “the artillerymen,
those few that remained, formed in the ranks of the 44th, and gallantly
supported on foot that deathless reputation they had gained when urging
their steeds into the heart of the battle.”
Lieutenant Eyre, speaking of the siege, says, “The gunners, from first
to last, never once partook of a full meal or obtained their natural
rest; of the hardships and privations undergone, it would be difficult
to convey an adequate idea.” * * * “On the retreat from Cabul, owing to
the starved condition of the horses, which disabled them from pulling
the guns through the deep snow and rugged mountain-passes, the guns
were, one by one, spiked and abandoned. In the Khoord Cabool pass, a
whole gun’s crew perished rather than desert their charge; on nearing
Jugdulluck, some horse-artillerymen, headed by Captain Nicholl, acting
as dragoons, charged and routed a party of the enemy’s cavalry.”
“Throughout the last struggle, up to Gundamuck, all eye-witnesses concur
in testifying to their stubborn valour.”
Of his troop, Captain Nicholl, Lieutenant Green (who joined it on the
loss of the mountain-train early in the retreat), and Lieutenant
Stewart, were killed; Lieutenants Eyre and Waller, both of whom were
wounded during the siege, were given over, with their families, by the
orders of Major-General Elphinstone, to Akbar Khan; 8 non-commissioned
officers and gunners were killed in Cabul, 30 in the Khoord Cabool pass,
26 between that and Jugdulluck, 32 in reaching Gundamuck, 3 were taken
prisoners at the close, 3 left wounded at Cabul, and 3 doing duty with
No. 6 battery and the mountain-train at Jellalabad. Sergeant Mulhall was
killed at Gundamuck on the 13th January, 1842.
The regiment raised a monumental column to the memory of this gallant
troop, on the base of which, on one marble slab, the circumstances under
which they fell are narrated, and on another, the names of every
non-commissioned officer and gunner are inscribed.
Previous to the insurrection breaking out, the 3rd company[92] 2nd
battalion moved from Ferozepore to relieve the 4th company at Candahar;
it dropped down the Indus to Sukkur, and marched to Quettah, where it
arrived on the 27th November, 1841, and remained, on account of the
communications with Candahar being closed. Here it was employed in
throwing up defences and field-works, for the protection of the
cantonment, whenever the frost and snow intermitted. The only building
available for their barracks becoming unsafe, during the winter they
were forced to occupy their tents, and the severity of the weather in
which they were exposed to this insufficient shelter, may be judged of
by the fact of 180 camels of the company having perished from it. In the
second advance of Major-General England, and the successful attack on
the heights of Hykulzye, this company shared; a party under Lieutenant
Cornish assisting in working the guns of Captain Leslie’s troop of
Bombay Horse Artillery, and with that force it joined the head-quarters
of the Candahar army on 10th May.
Before this junction occurred, the Candahar force had been on more than
one occasion moved out to clear the neighbourhood of the insurgents. In
January, they came up with them on the Urghandab, and after driving them
from their position, the horse-artillery and cavalry pursued them some
distance. In the report of this action, Captain W. Anderson’s name was
brought to the favourable notice of Government.
In March, the army again took the field, and on the 9th the
horse-artillery under Captain Anderson got within range, and opened on
the enemy with good effect; they broke and fled too rapidly for the
infantry to come up with them. While the main body was absent, an attack
was made on the city, but without success: part of the 4th company 2nd
battalion was present with the garrison.
On the 25th March, the insurgents were attacked near Baba Wala by
Colonel Wymer. The well-directed fire of two guns under Lieutenant
Turner soon drove in on the pass a large body of the enemy, and they
were finally put to flight by the arrival of the main body under
Major-General Nott. In his report, Colonel Wymer writes, “I trust that I
may be permitted to bring to the Major-General’s notice the admirable
practice of the artillery under Lieutenant Turner’s guidance, every shot
from which told with beautiful effect on the dense masses of the enemy.”
A small garrison, with which was one-half the 3rd company 2nd battalion
artillery, under Lieutenant Walker, had been left in Khelat-i-Ghilzie in
November, 1841; the insurrection isolated them from the Candahar force,
and for several months they underwent very great hardships; an
insufficient supply of firewood exposed them to cold, barracks without
doors, and piercing cold winds, bread and water for rations for days
together, and an enemy at the gates; under these privations the
artillerymen never grumbled nor lost their good temper, but continued to
work as if they had been highly fed. The enemy gradually closed in round
the fort, and on the night of the 21st May commenced a simultaneous
attack on two points; at one point, there were two 6–pounders, under
Lieutenant Walker, at the other only one. The enemy came on in a
determined manner, crossing the ditch by means of scaling-ladders, and
some even reached the parapets; so closely were the artillery assailed,
that at one time they were forced to turn to their small-arms to assist
in driving them off; towards morning the attack ceased, and the little
garrison was left in quiet possession of their fort, and in the course
of a few days Colonel Wymer arrived from Candahar with a force to
relieve them.
This service was rewarded by a medal to all engaged, the handsomest of
any by which the campaigns in Afghanistan are marked.
[Illustration]
Brigadier Sale’s force, on reaching Jellalabad, immediately occupied
themselves in rendering its defences tenable, collecting provisions,
preparing ammunition, and mounting their guns on the most advantageous
positions. In availing himself of the resources of the country, and
keeping up our communications, Captain MacGregor’s services were most
conspicuous and successful, and perhaps to his exertions it may mainly
be attributed that the “illustrious garrison” were enabled to hold out,
and earn for themselves the undying honour they have gained. The
exertions also of Captain Abbott, Captain Backhouse, and Lieutenant
Dawes, are honourably recorded in the records of that siege, records
which have been so fully published that little is left to us beyond
extracting a few passages; and we shall first refer to the report of the
construction of the works. “With the exception of a few of the larger
bastions, all the batteries were prepared by the artillerymen
themselves, both Captain Abbott’s company and Captain Backhouse’s
mountain-train, under the superintendence of their own officers; besides
this, a party of Captain Abbott’s artillerymen was always ready to
assist in the works generally, and they were most ably superintended by
Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid as constant as it was
valuable, and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men and
detachment of the 6th infantry Shah Soojah’s force, not only prepared
the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages
done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several
of the most useful and laborious operations executed.” * * *
“Captain MacGregor, political agent, gave me,” writes Brigadier Sale,
“the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures
our dâk communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of
grain collected. * * * Captain Abbott made the artillery dispositions in
the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to and economize our
resources, in the way of gun and musket ammunition.”
“The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been
excellent, and has been equalled by that of the mountain-train. Captains
Abbott and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves
excellent ordnance officers.”
The siege, or rather blockade, continued from November to April. The
greatest want at times prevailed of everything but grain; but the men
preserved their cheerfulness under all privations, the native
artillerymen of the 2nd company 6th battalion vying with the Europeans
of H. M.’s light infantry in setting an example of good discipline and
patient and cheerful endurance of hardship and danger. In April, Akbar
Khan collected a large body of troops in the neighbourhood, both to
overwhelm the garrison and meet the army advancing to its succour
through the Khyber. This body the garrison attacked on the morning of
the 6th April, and completely overthrew, capturing standards and
baggage, and four of the guns lost by the Cabul force. In the action,
No. 6 battery, with which, in addition to Captain Abbott and Lieutenant
Dawes, were Captains Backhouse and MacGregor, as volunteers, was most
effective; moving rapidly to the front, it covered the advance of the
infantry, and held in check a large body of cavalry which threatened the
flank. This success was most complete, and the garrison achieved its
safety by its own prowess. Its gallantry was rewarded by a medal to all
engaged; the corps were permitted to wear a “mural crown,” with the word
“Jellalabad” on their appointments, and a donation of six months’ batta
was granted as a compensation for the various losses suffered, and at
the close of the campaign the rank of major, with the companionship of
the Bath, was bestowed on Captains Abbott, Backhouse, and MacGregor.
[Illustration]
On the news of the insurrection reaching India, steps were taken for
despatching a force to aid the troops in Affghanistan. Major-General
Pollock, C.B., of the artillery, was selected for its command, and
joined it at Peshawur in February. The artillery with it was very
insufficient. A troop of horse-artillery and half a light field battery,
a second troop (Captain Delafosse’s), and the remainder of the field
battery, did not join until after the entrance to the Khyber was won.
──────┬────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬───────────────────────
Troop.│Brigade.│Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│ Lieutenants.
──────┼────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼───────────────────────
3 │ 1 │ │ │Delafosse│Richardson, Money,
│ │ │ │ │Abercrombie.
3 │ 2 │ │ │Alexander│A. Fitzgerald, Larkins.
│ │ 2 │ 2 │ │L. Smith, Douglas.
│ │ 4 │ 6 │ │A. Christie, Robertson.
──────┴────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴───────────────────────
Captain Lane, commissary of ordnance, Lieutenant Pollock, aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, military secretary, Captain H. M.
Lawrence, political agent.
On the 5th April, the attack was made on the Pass; the guns were
directed on the barriers raised to defend the entrance; two columns
attacked the heights on either side, and the main body carried the Pass
when the way had been opened by the fire of the guns. The arrangements
of General Pollock were admirable. The attack was completely successful;
and the enemy evacuated Ali-Musjid at our approach. Captains Alexander
and Lawrence, Lieutenants Shakespear and Pollock, are mentioned in the
despatches.
Jellalabad was reached, but the enemy had disappeared, and here the
force halted, pending the receipt of orders for an advance on Cabul, and
till arrangements for carriage could be made to enable them to carry out
the order. This halt was not altogether inactive; in July, No. 6
battery, with Captains Abbott and Dawes, was engaged with Brigadier
Monteith’s force in the Shinwaree valley with much credit. Captain
MacGregor accompanied the brigade, and “when opportunity offered itself,
served with the guns.”
While the force remained halted, a supply of rockets reached the
artillery, which had been forwarded by dâk banghy from Allahabad, under
the impression that the weapon was particularly calculated to be
serviceable in the passes at points where artillery could not be used at
all, or without the greatest difficulty. The expectation was not
realized,—the rockets being too delicate to bear the shaking they
underwent; this, together with the expansion of the iron case and the
contraction of the composition from the heat to which they were exposed,
rendered them nearly useless on reaching their destination.
Towards the end of August the arrangements were completed, and the force
moved on; the artillery strengthened by No. 6 battery and the
mountain-train, which had formed part of the “illustrious garrison.” On
the 24th, the enemy were driven by General Pollock from Mammoo Khel, in
which action the services of Captains Abbott and MacGregor, and
Lieutenant Pollock are mentioned. On the 8th September, some fighting
occurred near Jugdulluck, and on the 10th, the enemy assaulted the
rear-guard on all sides, but “were checked by the very effective fire of
the guns, ably directed by Captain Lawrence (political agent), who
volunteered his services, and by Lieutenant Abercrombie.” The brigades
were collected in the Tezeen valley, for which purpose Major-General
Pollock halted on the 12th, and on the 13th were attacked by the whole
of Akbar Khan’s troops, who were defeated with much loss. Two of the
guns, a 24 and 12–pounder howitzer, lost on the retreat, were here
recaptured. The rear-guard was hard pressed in defending the entrance to
the pass as the troops moved on, and the effective services of Captains
Alexander and Lawrence, and Lieutenant Douglas, in the use of the guns
at this period, are acknowledged. In the despatches of Major-General
Pollock, the names of Major Delafosse, Captains Abbott, Backhouse,
Alexander, MacGregor, Lieutenants Fitzgerald, Shakespear, and Pollock,
are mentioned with applause.
On the 15th, the force reached Cabul, and on the 16th possession was
taken of the Bala Hissar, under a salute from Major Delafosse’s troop.
Major-General Nott, after being joined by Major-General England’s force,
as related in a previous page, continued to hold Candahar, pending final
instructions. Towards the end of May the enemy, collecting in numbers,
endeavoured to carry the town, when Major-General Nott moved out against
them. Both Captain Anderson’s troops were engaged in this affair with
credit. Early in August, Candahar was evacuated: one column with the
baggage retired by the Kojuck pass; with this was Lieutenant Cooper’s
troop of horse-artillery and the 3rd company 2nd battalion artillery
under Lieutenant Walker. In its route to Sukkur this force met with
little or no opposition.
The main force marched on the 8th August. The artillery consisted of
Major Sotheby, commandant; Lieutenant Brougham, adjutant, S. S. Horse
Artillery, Captain W. Anderson, Lieutenants Turner and Hawkins; 3rd
company, 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Cornish, four 18–pounder guns
attached.
On the 31st August, within forty miles of Ghuznee, the governor, with
about 12,000 men, moved out to meet the British, but he was defeated
with the loss of guns, tents, &c. Major Sotheby was mentioned in the
despatch, which concluded by saying, “I cannot close this despatch
without expressing my admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct,
rapid movements, and correct practice, of Captain Anderson’s troop of
horse-artillery; nothing could exceed it, and I beg to bring this
officer and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the
particular notice of his Lordship, as officers who have on many
occasions rendered me most essential service.”
Ghuznee yielded without opposition; its walls and bastions were
destroyed—the gates of Somnath and the Zubber Jung rewarded the
conquerors and graced their triumphant march to Cabul, which they
reached on the 17th, after defeating the enemy at Beni Badam and Mydam
on the 14th and 15th, in which actions “the artillery” are reported as
having “distinguished themselves,” and the names of Captain Anderson and
Lieutenant Turner are particularly mentioned.
A body of Kuzzilbash horse, despatched under Sir R. Shakespear towards
Bamean, to aid the prisoners, met them on their return, they having
effected their escape; of the artillery, Lieutenants Eyre, Waller, and
Warburton; Sergeants MacNee and Cleland; gunners A’Hearne, Kean, and
Walton, were the sole survivors.
A force was sent against Istaliff on the 30th September, in which the
mountain-train under Captain Backhouse, and two 18–pounders under
Lieutenant Cornish, were employed. Lieutenants Richardson and Pollock
accompanied the force, and the former was slightly wounded.
The combined armies now turned homewards, meeting with many difficulties
from the exhausted state of the cattle and the obstacles in the passes;
so much so, that the four 18–pounders which had originally marched with
the Army of the Indus were burst in the passes and their carriages
burnt. Daily skirmishes took place, and in passing a ravine near Alee
Musjid just at dusk, a rush was made by the Afredis on a small
detachment of artillery with a gun of the mountain-train under
Lieutenant A. Christie. He was killed, and the gun carried off, but
afterwards recovered.
Of the trophies, the Zubber Jung was burst at Cabul; the Kazee travelled
with difficulty as far as Lundi-khana, in the Khyber, where, upsetting
into a ravine, it was burst and abandoned; the Somnath gates alone
reached Hindustan, travelling on a spare 18–pounder carriage; but they
were fated, even after 800 years of absence, not to pass their kindred
threshold; they got no further than Agra in the attempt, and were there
deposited in the armoury of the magazine.
The troops were received on their return by the Army of Reserve at
Ferozepore, assembled in case its aid should have been wanted, and
medals bestowed for the different services, bearing the inscriptions of
Candahar—Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—and Cabul,
1842; the obverse of all was similar, and this, and all the medals since
that for Ghuznee, were worn on a particoloured ribbon of light tints,
called “the ribbon of India,” ill fitted for a military decoration.
[Illustration]
For these distinguished services General Pollock was rewarded with the
first class of the order of the Bath, and received the thanks of both
Houses of Parliament. He was subsequently appointed a member of the
Supreme Council of India, and on being compelled to quit the country on
account of ill-health in 1846–7, a pension of £1,000 per annum was
bestowed upon him by the East-India Company, with the unanimous
approbation of the Court of Proprietors. The freedom of the city was
also voted him by the corporation of London.
Of the artillery officers who served under Generals Pollock and Nott,
the following received honorary distinctions:—Captains Anderson,
Alexander, Lane, and Lawrence, were gazetted brevet-majors; and Majors
Delafosse, Sotheby, and Anderson, companions of the Bath.
Before closing this account of the war in Afghanistan, it should be
mentioned, that in the political department several artillery officers
were greatly distinguished. The names of Captains Todd and MacGregor are
associated with important historical events at Herat and Jellalabad;
whilst Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear (who was
subsequently knighted for these services) will be remembered for their
enterprising and perilous journeys to Khiva and the Caspian for the
purpose of liberating the Russian slaves confined in the former place.