CHAPTER VII._Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization

Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment of

Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance General Officers

debarred the General Staff—Conceded to them—Guns formed into

Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun

Carriage Agency—Ordnance Commissariat Department—Commandants’

position improved—Model department—Select Committee formed—Reduction

of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion system introduced into

Bengal—Burmese war—Siege of Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment.

The overbearing conduct of the Nepaulese having forced the British into

war, Lord Hastings prepared to carry it on with vigour, and bring it to

as speedy a termination as possible; and with this view no preparations

were spared which the most consummate foresight and consideration could

suggest. A nearly simultaneous attack on four different points,

necessitating the Goorkhas to spread their forces and resources along

their whole extensive frontier, was the plan originally adopted, and

carried out with some alterations, suggested by an increased knowledge,

or forced upon us by those obstacles and failures which must ever attend

upon extended combinations.

Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, with about 6,000 native infantry and a

small train of artillery, was to attack the western or extreme right of

the Goorkha territories,—the districts in the neighbourhood of the

present hill station, Simlah.

Major-General Sir R. R. Gillespie, with about 1,000 Europeans and 2,500

native troops, with artillery, was to penetrate the valley of Deyrah,

and, after dislodging the Goorkhas from their positions in it, to attack

Gurhwal; this done, another force was to attack Kumaon from Rohilcund.

Major-General J. S. Wood, further to the eastward, was to penetrate by

Bootwul to Palpa: about 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 native troops, with a

small artillery, composed this force.

Major-General Marley was to operate on the east, or left, against their

capital at Katmandro, by the passes between the Gunduck and Bagmuttee

rivers: a moderate train of artillery, 1,000 Europeans, and 7,000 native

troops, formed this division.

With all these forces were portions of the regiment, which we shall

enumerate as we notice the actions of each division.

The first which came in contact with the enemy was Gillespie’s. This

force marched from Meerut, and entered the Dhoon by the Kheeree pass,

and seized Deyrah on the 22nd October, 1814: the horse artillery under

Major Pennington accompanied this division.[63]

Colonel Mawbey having been sent forward to seize Nalapanee (Kalunga),

found it so much stronger than was expected, that he fell back, and the

whole force advanced; one end of the ridge was seized on the 30th, and

under cover of this party a hasty battery was raised during the night to

receive ten field guns, about 600 yards from the fort; at daylight they

opened their fire, and four columns were to have advanced to the

assault, but by some misunderstanding only two advanced; the enemy,

throwing open a wicket, pushed out a gun, took them in flank, and forced

them to retire. A fresh attack by three companies of H.M.’s 53rd was

equally fruitless, and, rendered impatient by the repulse, Gillespie

rushed on at the head of a small party of dismounted dragoons from his

own regiment, the 8th Royal Irish: in this attack he fell. The force now

retired to Deyrah, and awaited till the 24th November the arrival of

siege guns[64] from Delhi. On the 25th operations were recommenced; a

battery for the 18–pounders was raised at about 300 yards, and by the

27th the wall was brought down. The enemy made a spirited sally on the

battery, but were driven back by discharges of case shot. The assault

was attempted, and failed, and a gun was run up by Lieutenant Luxford,

who volunteered, and was shot in the attempt to clear the breach. The

troops would not advance.

Open force having thus failed, a successful attempt to cut off the

supply of water was made, while shells were continually poured into the

fort. Cooped up in so small a space, without shelter, their execution

was great, and on the 30th the brave garrison evacuated the place,

leaving to their victors a scene which none could look on without

shuddering.

With the siege guns, parts of the 5th and 6th companies 3rd battalion

arrived, with the officers noted in the margin.[65] The horse artillery

also remained, “as the professional advice and opinion of so able an

officer as Major Pennington on the subject of artillery as affected by

local circumstances, could not fail of being of the greatest use to

Captain-Lieutenant Battine.”

The artillery losses were not severe: Lieutenant Luxford was the only

officer killed; and in reporting it Colonel Mawbey said, “Lieutenant

Luxford, of the horse artillery, is so severely wounded that I have no

hopes of his recovery. This excellent officer had gone to the foot of

the breach in command of an howitzer and 12–pounder gun, which I sent in

hopes, with the assistance of shrapnell shells, of lessening the

astonishing exertions made by the Goorkhas.”

A detachment being left near the Jumna, the main body marched for Nahun

by the plains on the 5th December, and on the 20th Major-General

Martindell assumed the command. His first efforts were not successful. A

combined attack on the enemy’s positions on the heights by columns under

Majors Ludlow and Richards, was beaten back, the former with much loss,

and the division took up its position before Nahun.

Major-General Ochterlony’s division was accompanied by the 4th company

3rd battalion artillery, and early in November attacked Nalagurh. The

place was breached, and the garrison capitulated on the 5th November, on

which occasion the Major-General considered it his “particular duty to

express his obligations to Major McLeod and officers and men who manned

the batteries.”[66]

The next object was the attack of Ramgurh, and some manœuvring was

necessary. The news of the failures at Kalunga arriving, gave fresh

confidence to the Goorkhas, and made the British cautious. Sir David

waited for reinforcements till near the end of the year. Light guns

arriving, the force moved, and manœuvred to place itself in rear of the

Goorkha position, who, to meet it, changed their front, and occupied the

heights of Maloun, exposing Ramgurh, which was the immediate object of

the movement. With incredible labour and perseverance, two 18–pounders

were carried up the hills and placed in battery about 700 yards from the

fort by the 12th November. Their fire was ably directed by Captain

Webbe, and the walls having crumbled away under it, the garrison were

glad to capitulate on the 17th, and were suffered to join their comrades

in Maloun.

Before following this division to its victorious conclusion, we shall

find it more convenient to glance at the proceedings of the other

forces, which were acting against the Goorkha line of frontier.

Major-General J. S. Wood’s division left Gorukpoor late in December: the

5th company 2nd battalion artillery was attached to it.[67] In January

it entered the Teraie, and, coming suddenly on a stockade at Jeilgurh,

carried it at once, in which operation Captain McDowall was wounded.

Fearing that he could not retain the stockade if attacked, Major-General

Wood retired to Nichloul, and, though reinforced by more troops,

remained inactive till the end of the season, when he made an attempt

with his guns on Bootwul, and retired to Gorukpoor.

To the eastward, Major Bradshaw, with the advance of Major-General

Marley’s army, on the 25th November attacked and carried the post of

Burhurwa, on the Baghmuttee, on which the Goorkhas evacuated the Teraie,

and Major Bradshaw occupied posts at Boragurhee, Sumunpoor, and Pursa.

Major-General Marley, with the main army, arrived on the 12th December:

the 6th company 2nd battalion, and detachment, were with this force, and

the artillery officers noticed in the margin,[68] and a small train of

heavy guns, some field and mountain train guns, and wall pieces. The

force moved in four columns; the main one towards the Bicheea-koh and

Hetounda passes; the second towards Hurheehurpoor; the third by the

Sookturdurree pass and Joorgooree; while the fourth was kept in

Jusspoot. The end of the month of December found the main body at

Puchroutee Tuppah, with the posts of Pursa and Sumunpoor twenty miles on

the left and right flanks of the army, the posts in the same state they

had been three weeks previously, and no steps taken to strengthen them.

They were garrisoned by about 500 men each, and Pursa had, in addition,

a single 6–pounder, commanded by Lieutenant Mathison. On the night of

the 17th January, 1815, both posts were attacked by the Goorkhas; the

party at Sumunpoor was taken by surprise and cut to pieces; that at

Pursa was a little better prepared, and, aided by Mathison’s gun,

defended themselves for some time; but the enemy, availing themselves of

the shelter the trees afforded, picked off nearly every artilleryman.

Mathison then proposed to charge the enemy, but the sepoys refused, and

a retreat was attempted, Lieutenant Mathison serving the gun by himself,

when all his men were killed or wounded, by which the enemy were kept

back; the gun being lost, the retreat became a flight, and had the enemy

followed, all must have perished.

Lieutenant Mathison, in his report, says, “I cannot refrain from

particularly mentioning the persevering bravery displayed by Matross

William Levey, who, though wounded by a musket-ball through one leg and

one arm, yet gallantly continued to keep his station until the

priming-pouch was blown away from his side, and his wounds becoming too

painful to endure, obliged him to sit down. ‘Sillaree,’ gun-lascar of

the 42nd company, is also deserving of particular mention; who, although

wounded in both hand and foot, continued alone to assist me to the last,

and was the person who seized and carried away with him the silver spear

planted by the enemy close to the gun at the commencement of the action,

and now in the possession of Major-General Marley.”

In the orders of the day, the Major-General “expressed his best thanks

to Lieutenant Mathison for his gallant conduct in defending his gun till

every man, European and native, fell around it, and all the ammunition

was expended.”

The artillery in this unhappy affair lost 4 Europeans and 6 natives

killed, and 6 Europeans and 11 natives wounded; and it is probable that

many of the wounded died afterwards. Want of foresight in not

strengthening the position, and want of proper information of the

enemy’s movements, seem to have been the chief causes of this

catastrophe: we may add another,—the detaching a single gun. Two guns

mutually support each other, and in case of a misfire occurring, the

second gun is ready to pour in its fire, should it be attempted to carry

the first by a rush; and we have heard it said that Lieutenant Mathison

declared on this occasion, that had he had another gun he could have

beaten off the enemy. A general order has since prohibited the practice

by declaring that never less than two are to be detached.

After this, Major-General Marley gave up all idea of penetrating the

hills; he strengthened the post of Baragurhee, and never again entered

the forest. On the 10th February he left his division, and Major-General

G. Wood arrived on the 20th, but the season passed away in inactivity.

In February detachments of irregulars under Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner

and Major Hearsey advanced on Almorah from Kasheepore and Pilheebheet,

and were followed by a small division of regulars under Colonel Nicolls,

with which was a detachment of European artillerymen under Lieutenants

C. H. Bell and R. B. Wilson, with ten pieces of artillery. On the 5th

April the force entered the hills, and heard of the defeat of the

irregulars before Almorah; on the 23rd, a detachment from it overtook

Hastee-Dull with his troops, near Gunnanath; an action followed, in

which the Goorkhas were beaten and their leader slain. On the 25th the

whole force attacked the breastworks on the Seetolee heights, and,

following up their success, drove the enemy into Fort Almorah, and

formed a lodgment on the ridge. “With considerable exertion on the parts

of the officers of artillery, Lieutenants Bell and Wilson, the small

mortars were laid in the battery, and opened at six in the evening, and

the larger ones (8–inch) at midnight.” Several shells were thrown into

the fort, which compelled the garrison to remain concealed; many

Goorkhas and Cassiahs having quitted the fort, it was supposed that the

garrison had fled, but during the night a sharp attack on the outposts

proved that they had determined to make a last effort; this failing, on

the 27th they evacuated the fort.

In Colonel Nicolls’s report he says, “I feel much indebted to

Lieutenants Bell and Wilson for their activity in laying and bringing

these mortars into use so soon,” and in the General Orders the

Governor-General records that these officers “are mentioned in terms of

strong commendation.”

This well-executed expedition materially affected the aspect of the war;

in the language of the Goorkha chief, it “broke the camel’s back,” it

separated the extremities of the frontier, and prevented reinforcements

being sent from Katmandoo to Maloun, and it stood out in brilliant

contrast with the other events of the campaign; but we must now return

to the divisions employed against Nahun and Maloun.

Major-General Martindell’s force, which we left in front of Nahun,

remained inactive till February; its subsequent operations were marked

by vacillation; with great labour, 18–pounders were carried up the

hills, and, after the time and labour thus expended, no further result

was obtained than levelling a stockade, which was found to be of no use

to the general plan of the campaign. Operations were commenced against

Jythuck, and a position taken up on the ridge on the 1st April, although

opposed by the enemy; this advantage was followed up, and Punchul Point

seized; other positions were taken up, which straitened the enemy’s

post, and would have eventually forced him to evacuate the fort, had not

the operations at Maloun caused the Goorkhas to leave the province. To

these operations we must now turn.

We left Major-General Ochterlony in possession of Ramgurh, with his

forces interposed between the enemy on the Maloun ridge and Belaspore.

Great exertions were made by the artillery in moving the ordnance up the

heights; but on the 10th March a battery was raised against Taragurh; on

the 11th a breach was practicable, and the enemy fled; Chumba was

attacked and breached by the 16th, and the garrison capitulated; other

forts were reduced, and the detachments joined the main body which was

in front of the Goorkha lines. These extended from the forts of Maloun

to Soorujgurh, all the peaks crowned with stockades, except those of

Ryla and Deothul, the former, convenient for future operations against

Soorujgurh, the latter, in the heart of the Goorkha line, within 1,000

yards of Maloun. The main attack was against Deothul, while a second was

made on Kyla, while other columns moved, as if against Maloun, to

distract the enemy.

Five columns were prepared, and on the night of the 14th April, Kyla was

occupied, and on a signal made, two other detachments moved to that

point; this done, two other columns moved on at night and occupied

positions till daylight, when they attacked Deothul from opposite sides:

with these columns were two field-guns, to assist in holding the height

when gained, as considerable efforts were expected from the enemy. The

position was carried after a severe contest, and much desultory fighting

continued till evening; but on the morning of the 16th the Goorkhas,

2,000 in number, made a furious attack on the hill; the artillerymen

were nearly all killed at their guns, and at one time, Lieutenant

Cartwright, with one artilleryman only, was left; but, aided by

Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Armstrong of the

Native Infantry, they kept up a fire which tended materially to check

the Goorkha onset; and reinforcements and ammunition arriving

opportunely from Ryla, their efforts slackened, and they were driven

back by a charge headed by Major Lawrie.

A road was made for heavy artillery to Deothul, and with incredible

labour the 18–pounders were placed in battery against Maloun early in

May; but news of the fall of Almorah having arrived, the Goorkhas urged

their chief, Ummer Sing, to yield, and on his refusing, they left him,

and he was forced to capitulate on the 5th May.

The exertions of the artillery in this campaign were acknowledged in the

following General Orders. “The unwearied alacrity, the labour, the

conspicuous gallantry, and the skill, displayed by the whole of the

artillery, engineers, and pioneer departments throughout the course of

the service, have been pointed out to the special notice of the

Governor-General, and His Excellency accordingly expresses his earnest

sense of the meritorious conduct exhibited by Major McLeod, commanding

the artillery, and by Captain Webbe, of the same corps.”

Early in the following year it became evident that the court of Nepal

intended evading the treaty they had agreed to, and the force was

assembled again in the neighbourhood of Dinapore, and placed under Sir

D. Ochterlony’s command, with the object of occupying the capital.

In addition to the former artillery, the 7th company 2nd battalion, and

3rd company 3rd battalion, with the following officers,[69] joined the

force. On the 10th February the main body entered the Sal forest, and

took up a position at Bicheea-koh; four days were spent in reconnoitring

and inquiry, when it was discovered that the regular road, which was

fortified, might be turned by some very difficult passes in the

Chooriaghati range; on the 14th, at night, a battalion (3rd) marched,

and entering a ravine, called Baleekola, followed its course five or six

miles, then striking up a water-course, came to a steep acclivity of 300

feet in height; the advance clambered up, and were followed by the

brigade, and the heights were gained. The other brigade (4th) marched by

the direct road on the 15th, and the Goorkhas, hearing that the ghat was

turned, retreated on Muckwanpore with but little resistance. Lieutenant

Walcote of the artillery was wounded severely in reconnoitring the

stockaded position. On the 27th the two brigades united at Mukwanpore; a

reconnoitring party came in contact with the enemy, and Lieutenant

Pickersgill with difficulty regained the camp; but reinforcements

proceeding from each side brought on a general action, which was eagerly

contested; the artillery came into full play, and the effect of the guns

upon the enemy’s masses moving on the opposite ridge considerably aided

in the victory gained.

The only other action was that in which Colonel Kelly’s brigade was

engaged in the attack on Hurryhurpore Hill. The infantry were engaged

from six to eleven, when “two 6–pounders and two 5½-inch howitzers being

brought up on elephants, in a few minutes decided the affair, and left

us in possession of an almost natural redoubt.” “Amongst the wounded you

will see Captain Lindsay; although his wounds are not severe, I fear I

shall lose his active service for a time, which I lament exceedingly,

having found Captain Lindsay a most zealous, able officer, both as an

artillerist and engineer,” are the words of Colonel Kelly in reporting

the affair.

With this campaign the war ended; the pride of the Nepalese was

effectually humbled for the time, on finding a British force in full

march on their capital, and they were compelled to execute the treaty;

but since that period they never ceased to look forward to the arrival

of the time when an opportunity of revenge might offer.

The services of the native troops were rewarded by a medal to all native

officers who had served within the hills, and to such of the native

infantry officers and privates as had distinguished themselves by their

gallantry or energy. This medal we have never seen, though by the

records we observe several were given to the native branches of the

regiment. The sketch here given is copied from one which appeared in the

East-India United Service Journal, in 1837.

[Illustration]

In the early part of the present century the attention of the Ordnance

department in England was turned towards a weapon which had long been in

use with the native armies in India—the rocket; and, under Sir William

Congreve’s superintendence, rockets of a large size and great power of

flight had been manufactured and used with much success in the

bombardment of Boulogne and Copenhagen. Experience suggested improvement

in details, and the results seemed so satisfactory, that a troop

equipped with cars for firing volleys and tripods for single rockets was

added to the corps of Royal Artillery, and employed with considerable

effect at the battles of Leipsic and Waterloo. Acting upon this example,

and considering that it would be advantageous to beat our Indian enemies

at their own weapons, the Government decided this year on adding a

rocket troop to the Bengal Artillery. It was ordered in September, and

consisted of European artillerymen mounted on camels, and volley-cars

drawn by horses. Its strength is detailed in the margin.[70]

Captain Whish, Lieutenants G. N. Campbell and G. Brooke, and

Lieutenant-Fireworker Cartwright were posted to this troop, and it was

soon in a state of efficiency. It was attached to the horse brigade,

which was at this time commanded by Major Pennington, who was retained

in the command, although “his promotion to the rank of major rendered

him in excess to the establishment of officers attached to it, at the

recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in

consideration of his general merits as an officer and his particular

qualifications for the command of the corps of horse-artillery, which

had attained such an eminent degree of discipline under his

superintendence.”

The dress of the regiment in January underwent some change; the

dress-jacket had embroidered button-holes on its scarlet facings; the

breastplate was gilt, with the Company’s arms embossed in silver; the

pantaloon continued to be worn as dress with the Hessian boots; but

trousers or overalls were worn on all duties; the chako was introduced,

displacing the bearskin cap. There are pictures in existence which give

a good idea of the dress at particular periods, and in them all the

changes may be traced.

A large portion of the regiment was this year called into the field

against Diaram, the zemindar of Hattrass, whose fort and territory had

been ceded by Scindia to the British in 1803, at which time no terms

were made exempting Diaram from the general laws in force in the

Company’s territories; but, in the expectation that, finding no

necessity for armed followers, his force would gradually have dissolved

and his fort gone to ruin, the Government took no steps to break it up

at once. Mistaking this forbearance, in spite of several warnings, he

persisted in a course of aggrandizement and opposition to the civil

officers, which drew down on him the powerful hand of Government, who

determined that no ill-timed economy should interfere with the rapid and

complete reduction of his power. Lord Hastings directed the preparations

to be made on such a scale to convince all that our failures heretofore

were caused not from a want of skill or resources, but from our failing

to bring them forward, and being more lavish of the blood of our troops

than the _matériel_ of our magazines.

For this siege two troops of horse artillery and the rocket-troop, seven

companies of European, and four of native artillery, and eighteen

companies of lascars, moved from different points and collected before

Hattrass, together with a battering train of six 24–pounders, fourteen

18–pounders, four 8–inch howitzers, six 10–inch mortars, fourteen 8–inch

mortars, and twenty-two 5½-inch mortars; total, 20 guns, 8 howitzers,

and 42 mortars. The general command of the artillery was held by

Major-General Sir J. Horsford; Captain C. H. Campbell, M. B.; Major

Pennington, commanding horse artillery; Lieutenant Lumsden, adjutant and

quarter-master; Majors Mason, McLeod, and Butler, fort adjutants.

─────────┬──────────┬────────────────────┬────────────┬───────────────────────

Troop. │Captains. │Captain-Lieutenant. │Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.

─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────

1 │ Boileau │ │G. Gowan │Morland, Pennington

│ │ │Hyde │

3 │J. Brooke │Rodber │MacAlister │

│ │ │Sconce │

Rocket │ Whish │ │G. Brooke │Cartwright

─────────┴──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────┴───────────────────────

Company. │Battalion.│Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.

2 │ 2 │Fraser │Croxton │G. R. Scott

│ │ │ │R. B. Wilson

3 │ 2 │Curphy │Pereira │Hele, Vanrenen

4 │ 2 │Pryce │Carne │Sanders, Crommelin

6 │ 2 │Lindsay │Roberts │Coulthard

4 │ 3 │ │L. Lawrence │Smith, Whinfield

6 │ 3 │Battine │Fordyce │R. Dickson, Delafosse

7 │ 3 │Tollemache │Timbrell │Wood, E. P. Gowan

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies of golundaz battalion; 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th,

12th, 18th, 20th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 44th,

and 45th companies of gun lascars.

The force assembled on the 11th February, and from that time till the

21st was employed in collecting and preparing _matériel_ for the siege

and waiting for the train; on its arrival, three batteries were erected

against the kuttra, which opened on the 22nd, and continued firing

during the 23rd: a breach was effected, and during the night the enemy

left the kuttra.

On the 25th, batteries were commenced against the fort, three armed with

guns, and two with mortars from the kuttra, and on the right, two guns,

and three mortar batteries, one of the latter of sixteen 5½-inch

mortars; the trenches were pushed up to within 50 yards of the ditch, a

rocketbattery was erected between the kuttra and fort; much delay

occurred from want of fuses or from those sent turning out bad, so that

fresh had to be driven and materials sent for from Agra; the time was

employed in completing the batteries and approaches; a slight fire was

kept up till the 2nd March, when preparations being all made, the

bombardment commenced, at a signal from the rocketbattery, by a general

salvo. “The effect and sight (an eye-witness writes) was beautiful, and

was only excelled by a spectacle which took place about 5 in the

afternoon. While in the battery watching the flight of a shell, it

scarcely touched the ground before an explosion took place, the most

awful and grand I ever beheld—a powder-magazine had been exploded. It is

hardly possible to give an accurate description of it; it was more like

an immense column of red smoke, forming itself like an enormous chattah

in rolls, continually changing form as it ascended to an incredible

height: several fragments fell in the trenches and hurt some people.”

Another writes, “The effect of our shells and the ruins they have

occasioned, are indescribable; the house and zenana of Diaram is a

complete riddle—shot and shell holes in every direction; the mortality

is great, men and horses lying in the gateway and works.”

For the details of this operation, the first in India in which artillery

was used on a large scale, we would refer our readers to a journal of

the siege, which appeared in the East-India United Service Journal, in

1837, and content ourselves with adding the orders issued on the

occasion.

Major-General Marshall’s order says, “The science and skill displayed by

the engineers and artillery department were eminently conspicuous, and

the bombardment and explosion of the enemy’s principal magazine, which,

without derogating from the merits of others, must be allowed to have

given us almost immediate possession of the place, will long be regarded

as the most memorable among the brilliant events of the last fortnight,

and as demonstrative of the extent and soundness of that judgment and

penetration which, in the avowed anticipation of the very consequences,

enabled the army, by the provision of adequate means, to insure them.

The practice of the artillery has answered the expectations of that high

authority to which the Major-General has ventured to allude in the

forgoing observations. Another motive for them is to bring forward and

illustrate the fact more closely, that where the means are equal to the

science and practical knowledge known to pervade every branch of this

army, the results must invariably be rapid and successful, even against

such strong and formidable forts as Hattrass proved to be.” * * *

We cannot refrain from quoting the order issued to the artillery by

Major-General Sir John Horsford; the more so, as it proved the last he

was permitted to pen to the corps, his valuable life having terminated

suddenly, soon after returning to Cawnpoor from this service:—

“Major-General Sir John Horsford, commanding the artillery brigaded

before Hattrass, performs with pleasure the last exercise of his command

in conveying to the horse and foot artillery and rocket-troop his

congratulations on the brilliant services which their united exertions

have effected for the state, Government having through their means

principally been placed in possession of Hattrass, the rapid reduction

of which has caused the surrender of the important fortress of Morsaum

and eleven other forts.

“The acknowledgments of Major-General Marshall, commanding the army, and

the favourable sentiments entertained by the army at large, must be much

more satisfactory to the artillery than any tribute of praise which Sir

John Horsford could bestow in confirmation of their meritorious

services.

“But the Major-General considers public acknowledgments due to Major

Mason, commanding the foot artillery, who, with Majors MacLeod and

Butler, superintended in turn the several batteries. He begs to offer

his best thanks to Major Mason and the experienced field-officers above

mentioned, for their several important services.

“The Major-General duly appreciates the labour and exertions of every

officer and man employed in the batteries before the kuttra and fort,

and more particularly the heavy duty all had to perform on the 2nd

instant during the general bombardment. To the officers commanding

batteries, and to their juniors doing duty under them, the

Major-General’s notice is particularly due. The state of the fort after

its capture evinced to all that the means employed for its reduction had

been directed by hands well acquainted with their use. Where every

officer was equally zealous, the Major-General hopes he will be excused

for not naming all who deserve his praise and thanks.

“The mature judgment of Major Pennington was displayed on every occasion

which offered itself.

“The spirit and conduct of the officers and men of the horse artillery

throughout the service deserve the Major-General’s warmest approbation.

“The zeal evinced by Captain Whish, the officers and men of the

rocket-troop, require the Major-General’s notice in public orders.

“The Major-General’s personal feelings are much gratified by the

important consequences which have resulted from the unanimity which

prevailed amongst every branch of the artillery to forward the objects

of the service. The preparations which were made caused much to be

expected from their exertions, and the Major-General is satisfied that

the expectations of the most sanguine have been realized. It is a source

of great pleasure for the Major-General to reflect that the last period

of his service with a corps in which he has long served, should be

distinguished by events which call forth the admiration of all who

witnessed them, and by services which conspicuously increase the credit

and the established high character of the regiment of Bengal Artillery.”

From Hattrass Sir John Horsford returned to Cawnpoor, and on the 20th

April closed his honourable career. His death was sudden, and it is

believed was occasioned by a disease of the heart. To his public

character the Governor-General bore testimony in the following

order:—“The Governor-General cannot direct the succession in the

regiment of artillery without expressing his deep concern at the loss

the Honourable Company’s service has suffered by the death of

Major-General Sir John Horsford, K.C.B. The ardent spirit, the science,

and the generous zeal of that admirable officer, were in no less degree

an advantage to the public interest than an honour to himself. It is

consolatory to think that when sinking under the malady which so early

deprived his country of an energy incessantly devoted to her glory, he

had the consciousness of having just displayed with signal triumph the

skill and superiority of the corps which he had so materially

contributed to fashion and perfect.”

The part Sir John Horsford had borne in some of the severest service the

regiment had been engaged in, his thorough knowledge of the profession,

his high talents and commanding character, gave him great influence in

the regiment, and secured for his opinions great weight with the

authorities; and, had he been spared to exercise the command for a few

years more, the regiment would undoubtedly have been placed on a far

more efficient footing than it hitherto had been. From the time of

Pearse’s death to Horsford’s succession to the command, no man of talent

or influence had been at its head; and the consequence was, that while

the other branches of the army were increased on a scale more adequate

to their wants, the artillery was added to by driblets, kept in the

lowest state, and its organization made a subject of continual

experiment.

Just before his death, Sir John Horsford submitted to the Marquis of

Hastings a memoir, pointing out the faults which had thus been

committed, and detailing the principles upon which the corps of

artillery ought to be formed; going on from these principles through all

the details, he presented a complete scheme of a regiment of artillery

adapted to the wants of Bengal. His character insured attention to the

subject, and the result was, that in the following year the corps was

reorganized, not indeed upon the scale Sir John Horsford proposed, but

upon the most efficient it had yet been.

Major-General Hardwicke was appointed commandant in succession to

Major-General Sir John Horsford.

We must pause at this point for a time to consider a circumstance which

was of great importance to the regiment,—the question of general

officers of the ordnance branch being eligible to the general staff of

the army. In the arrangements for remodelling the army in 1796, no doubt

existed on the point. In the Minutes of Council, 5th June, 1797, it was

directed that the artillery regimental command was to be held by the

senior officer present, “not being a general officer,” and several

artillery general officers had been employed on the general staff; such

was the state of the case up to 1814, when the Court of Directors

thought proper to annul the existing orders, for reasons which may be

briefly thus stated:—

1st. That the services of the artillery and engineer generals are

required by the state in their own departments.

2nd. That the practice, though not the theory (so to speak), of His

Majesty’s service excludes ordnance generals from any employment on the

staff.[71]

To the first, it might be replied, that even supposing one artillery and

one engineer general are wanted at the heads of the corps, it is no

reason why the others should not be employed on the general staff during

the period they are not required with their own. That till now a general

officer was never allowed to serve in this position; and if while

debarred from the general staff and holding the regimental command on

the regimental allowances, his position would be a very unfavourable

one, as contrasted with that of a general officer of cavalry or

infantry.

To the second we would say, that if true, some compensation would be

found to the Royal Ordnance general officers in the numerous regimental

superiorities they enjoy in Europe over regiments of the line; such as

rising regimentally to colonelcies, the greater proportion of field

officers, higher pay, the use of a horse, superior regimental rank,

ordnance staff offices, and many other points which it would require

more space than we can afford to go fully into; but, in reality, Royal

Ordnance officers were not excluded, and at the time of publication of

the order there were twelve or fifteen of them employed on the home and

foreign staff of the army.

Feeling that their prospects were much blighted by being thus debarred

from those honourable and lucrative commands to which every officer

hopes (though few live) to succeed, the officers of the ordnance corps

in Bengal (and also in Madras and Bombay) memorialized the Court of

Directors, praying for a revision of the orders in question, and their

reply was published in August, 1817. The Court did not enter into the

question; they refused the point at issue, but directed that general

officers of artillery and engineers in command of their regiments should

be placed on a similar footing as to allowances with other general

officers serving on the army staff. But although at this time the

representations of the ordnance officers had no effect, there is little

doubt that they were subsequently reconsidered and their justice

admitted, for in the general remodelling of the military system in 1824,

“an additional general officer on the Honourable Company’s establishment

was authorized for the staff of each presidency, and the generals of

artillery and engineers were rendered eligible to the staff, the command

of those corps devolving on the senior colonels or field-officers.”

The comparative efficiency of guns collected into batteries kept in

order and directed by officers of the artillery, and of the same

scattered as battalions and galloper-guns, had been proved so strongly

in favour of the former, that the Government now resolved on following

up the practice of European powers. The gallopers from six native

regiments were directed to be embodied into two troops of native horse

artillery at Meerut and Cawnpoor, and placed under the command of

Captains G. Gowan and Biggs in July, and those of the two remaining

regiments were some months later withdrawn and formed into a third troop

at Nagpoor under Lieutenant George Blake, and subsequently Captain

Rodber. The horses and troopers accompanied the guns; and as the best

horses had generally been given to the galloper-guns, these troops were

exceedingly well provided with draught cattle. For officers the

foot-artillery was again indented on, but this time not without an

augmentation, for, “adverting to the number of officers withdrawn from

the foot to the horse artillery, and to the total inadequacy of the

number of officers which would remain with the battalions of foot

artillery, and for the numerous and important duties required of them,

the Governor-General was pleased to determine that the officers actually

attached to the horse artillery should be struck off the strength of the

foot artillery, and the vacancies supplied by promotion;” and

accordingly one major and six captains were now (25th October) added to

the corps.

Before adverting to the campaigns which the Marquis of Hastings’s grand

combinations against the Pindarees caused, we will notice the additions

made to the regiment previous to its reorganization in October, 1818,

and detail its strength when that change had taken place, and then

succinctly refer to those well-planned operations which with very little

bloodshed rooted out the Pindarees, and humbled the Mahratta power.

In continuation of the system of collecting guns in batteries, an

experimental horse field-battery was formed in November, and placed

under Captain Battine with the 6th company 3rd battalion. The battery

consisted of eight guns and eight waggons (two 12–pounders, two 5½-inch

howitzers, and four 6–pounders), and ninety-six horses were allowed to

drag it; these horses were led by “Syce drivers,” a class of syces

placed on the same footing as lascars with respect to pay, clothing, and

pension.

The rocket-troop was modified as to the numbers of its men and cattle,

but camels were still continued with it, nor was it till 1822 that they

were superseded by horses, and two additional companies of independent

golundaz were raised for the Islands and Bengal. Colonel Sherwood was

appointed acting commandant during Major-General Hardwicke’s absence on

sick leave.

The regiment now was composed of the horse artillery, consisting of

seven troops, including the rocket-troop; three European battalions of

seven companies each, twelve regular and six irregular companies of

golundaz, forty-five lascar and twenty-six driver companies. The new

organization directed it to consist of seven troops of horse artillery,

three European battalions, of eight companies each, one native battalion

of fifteen companies, with a company of lascars attached to each

company, European or native (39), and seventeen bullock and two horse

field-batteries, each of eight pieces, with a driver company to each.

The officers were allotted to the different portions of the regiment in

the following proportion:—

──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬─────────────────┬───────

Horse Artillery. │3 European Battalions.│Native Battalion.│Total.

──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼─────────────────┼───────

1 Colonel │ 3│ ...│ 4

2 Lieutenant-Colonels│ 6│ ...│ 8

2 Majors │ 6│ 1│ 9

7 Captains │ 24│ 13│ 44

28 1st Lieutenants │ 48│ 4│ 80

— 2nd Lieutenants │ 48│ 4│ 2

──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴─────────────────┴───────

The rank of 2nd captain was abolished, and that of 2nd lieutenant

substituted for lieutenant-fireworker; serangs of gun-lascars were made

jemadars; serang-major, soobahdar; 1st and 2nd tindals, havildars and

naiks; gunners were styled bombardiers, and matrosses, gunners.

──────────────────────────┬────────────────────┬───┬───

European Troop or Company.│Serjeants. │ 7│ 6

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Corporals. │ 6│ 5

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Bombardiers. │ 10│ 10

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Trumpeters. │ 2│ 2

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Farriers. │ 2│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Rough-riders. │ 2│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Gunners. │ 80│ 80

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Jemadars, Havildars.│ 1│ 12

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Naiks. │ 2│ 2

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Lascars. │ 24│ 70

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

Native Troop or Company. │Soobahdars. │ 1│ 1

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Jemadars. │ 1│ 2

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Havildars. │ 6│ 8

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Naiks. │ 6│ 8

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Trumpeters. │ -│ 2

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Rough-riders. │ -│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Farriers. │ -│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Troopers. │ 90│100

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Staff-Serjeants. │ -│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Jemadars, Havildars.│ 1│ 12

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Naiks. │ 2│ 2

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Lascars. │ 24│ 70

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Sirdars. │ 4│ -

──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───

〃 │Drivers. │ 85│ -

──────────────────────────┴────────────────────┴───┴───

The whole regiment consisted of

ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENT.

│ │ │ │Returns

│ │ │ │ Dec.

│ │ │ │ 1818.

────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────

│ │Colonels. │ 4│ 4

│ │Lieutenant-Colonels. │ 8│ 8

│ │Majors. │ 9│ 9

│ │Captains. │ 44│ 44

│ │1st Lieutenants. │ 80│ 75

│ │2nd Lieutenants. │ 52│ 43

HORSE ARTILLERY.│EUROPEAN.│Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ 7

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 52│ 46

〃 │ 〃 │Bombardiers and Gunners. │ 320│ 321

〃 │ 〃 │Farriers, Rough-riders, │ 24│ 13

│ │Trumpeters. │ │

〃 │ 〃 │Native Officers. │ 6│ 6

〃 │ NATIVE. │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 56

〃 │ 〃 │Troopers. │ 270│ 246

〃 │ 〃 │Farriers, Rough-riders, │ 18│ 12

│ │Trumpeters. │ │

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 21│ -

〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 168│ -

FOOT ARTILLERY. │EUROPEAN.│Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ 23

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 264│ 249

〃 │ 〃 │Bombardiers and Gunners. │ 2160│ 1469

〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 48│ 37

〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 45│ 39

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ -

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 240│ 245

〃 │ 〃 │Privates. │ 1500│ 1632

〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 30│ 32

〃 │LASCARS. │Native Officers. │ 39│ 49

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 156│ 190

〃 │ 〃 │Privates. │ 2730│ 3261

〃 │DRIVERS. │Sirdars. │ 76│ 129

〃 │ 〃 │Drivers. │ 1615│ 2640

────────────────┴─────────┴──────────────────────────┴────────┴────────

Forming a total of 8,094, including lascars, and excluding drivers.

The infantry of the army at this period amounted to about 64,000 men, or

nearly in the proportion of eight infantry to one artilleryman, bringing

the relative numbers of the two branches pretty much to what they were

in 1796, at which time the infantry were 7½ to one artilleryman.

In a preceding page we have alluded to the operations of the

Governor-General for the purpose of rooting out the Pindaree hordes by

whom Central India was overrun, and the Company’s provinces yearly

threatened, and in some instances plundered. Their numbers may have

reached some 20,000 horse, undisciplined, and prepared to run rather

than fight, and were scattered about in small durras or bands, so that

no large bodies of troops would have been necessary to overcome them had

it not been for the tacit protection afforded these freebooters by the

Mahratta powers, and whose attitude was such, that preparations were

forced to be made on a scale sufficient to meet their armies, and this

called a far larger portion of the armies of India into the field than

would otherwise have been required.

The Bengal divisions took the field about November, 1817. The masterly

position taken up by Lord Hastings, with the centre division of the

grand army threatening Scindeah’s capital, his park and magazines, in

case he ventured to move from Gwalior to join the Mahratta confederacy,

completely paralyzed him; but the Peshwah and Nagpoor rajah being unawed

by any sufficient body of troops at hand, attacked the residents at

their courts, and it was only by the heroic exertions of the small

escorts, and which have immortalized the names of Poonah and

Seetabuldee, that the posts were made good till reinforcements could

arrive.

Many portions of the regiment were employed with the five divisions of

Bengal troops, and in operations extending over so great a space, must

necessarily have undergone much severe marching; but as the actual

service was partial, and we do not pretend to enter into a detailed

account of the whole campaigns, we shall only refer to the occasions on

which they came in contact with the enemy.

We have already mentioned that the galloper-guns of the cavalry

regiments were incorporated into troops of horse artillery; the

gallopers of two regiments employed on the Nerbudda were formed into a

troop under Lieutenant G. Blake, and, with a squadron of native cavalry,

detached by Colonel Adams to Nagpoor on the first news of the expected

attack on the residency, to share in the noble defence of Seetabuldee;

they arrived too late, but they joined Brigadier Doveton’s force on the

16th December, and were employed in the action fought against the Arabs,

who formed the chief strength of the Nagpoor army.

In the battle of Mahidpoor, fought by Sir T. Hyslop’s army on the 21st

December against Holkar and the Peshwah’s forces, one Bengal Artillery

officer was present—Lieutenant Sotheby, commanding the golundaz company

of the Russell brigade.

Major-General Brown was detached with a column from the grand army

against Jawud, and on the 20th January, 1818, attacked the troops of

Holkar, drawn up under the walls, and drove them into the fort by a

charge of cavalry, supported by a fire of shrapnell from two guns of the

2nd troop horse artillery under Lieutenant Mathison,[72] silencing the

enemy’s guns. This success was followed up by an immediate attack; the

guns of Captain Biggs’s native troop were drawn up on the right and left

to destroy the defences of the entrance, while a 12–pounder, under

Mathison, was dragged up by the European artillery and pioneers to blow

open the gate, and which was not effected until the third round, during

which time the party were exposed to a heavy and galling fire.

In the field orders issued on this occasion, “the major-general desired

to express his particular satisfaction at the manner in which the

artillery under Captain Biggs and Lieutenant Mathison was served, and at

the soldier-like manner in which Lieutenant Mathison took up his

12–pounder to force open the gate.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Pennington, in writing to Lieutenant Mathison on this

occasion, said, “Accept my best thanks for the great credit you brought

the horse artillery by the ability and gallantry you displayed in the

attack on Jeswunt Rao Bhao and his town, and my cordial congratulations

on your personal safety.”

The next action we have occasion to notice was that of

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams at Seonee on the 16–17th April, in which

Captain Rodber’s troop (who had been appointed to the troop lately

engaged at Nagpoor under Lieutenant Blake) did good service.

The Peshwah’s army flying from Brigadier Doveton’s division, was

intercepted by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, who immediately attacked with

the cavalry and horse artillery, driving the enemy from position to

position.[73] “Great praise,” says Colonel Blacker, “has been given to

the horse artillery on this occasion, and, from a comparison of several

accounts of this affair, whatever loss was sustained by the enemy is

chiefly attributable to their fire. The ground was unfavourable for

cavalry, yet the guns, by admirable exertion, were advanced and the

cavalry may be said to have only covered them.”[74] It must be borne in

mind, too, that these exertions were preceded by a march of unparalleled

length. Captain Rodber was sent from Nagpoor to join Colonel Adams’s

force, and in a letter written many years afterwards, he says, “I could

not have gone less than ninety miles. At 1 A.M., on the 16th April, I

commenced my march (after going the previous day eighteen miles over an

execrable road, large loose stones and hills) to join Colonel Adams at

Hingun ghat; on the road I received a letter, informing me that Colonel

Adams had marched and encamped at Alundaboo; this information obliged me

to retrace my road for some distance; I reached the colonel’s camp

between 2 and 3 P.M. (I am quite positive to the time exactly); I could

not have gone less than fifty-six miles, as I pushed on. At 8 P.M., same

day, I mounted again, and moved with the detachment in pursuit of the

Peshwah, and was not dismissed till between 12 and 1 next day. About six

of the last miles were over a succession of wooded heights covered with

large loose stones, and hollows deep and wide enough to hide both gun

and horses in. From what we see of roads in any part of India I have

visited, no notion can be formed of the ways here; in a march sometimes

you have to cross seven or eight nullahs with swampy bottoms and

difficult approaches.”

In the same letter Captain Rodber, speaking of this service, says, “I

dined with Jenkins (at Nagpoor) the night before I marched, and late

some of his hurkarus came in and reported that the Peshwah’s army had

got round Colonel Adams, and was in full march on Nagpoor, said to have

eighty guns, and 10,000 Arabs, and a number of horse. It was not for me

to say a word about my little party marching into the very jaws of this

host, but I thought it very inconsiderate allowing me to move. I

remember one morning, when quite dark, a trooper from the advance guard

coming into the line, and declaring he heard the noise of horses’ feet,

and when I had satisfied myself of the fact, I put all in the most

defensible position, firmly believing it was the van of the Peshwah’s

army; it proved, however, a large body of the Nizam’s horse, sent to me

by the colonel; I do not know that I ever felt greater relief.”

Major-General Marshall’s division occupied Sagur in March, 1818, and a

portion of the force moved out against Dhamoney, a small fortress about

thirty miles distant, at the head of a ravine or valley leading to the

Dussan river, the neighbouring country being very rugged and broken. The

detachment took possession of the town on the 20th March, and by the

24th had raised batteries against the fort, in which two 24–pounders,

four 18–pounders, one 12–pounder, and two 5½-inch howitzers, were

placed; a mortar-battery also was completed to the rear. These opened on

the 24th March, and after six hours’ firing the killidar surrendered.

The 4th company 2nd battalion artillery was employed in this

service,—Captain Hetzler, Captain Lindsay, Captain-Lieutenant Coulthard,

Lieutenants Carne, W. Bell, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Saunders, Crommelin,

and Patch.

This force then marched, _viâ_ Dumoh, to Jubbulpoor, and proceeded

against “Mundlah,” on the Nerbudda, and by the 25th, batteries had been

formed for thirty-two pieces of artillery; they were immediately armed,

and by the next day a breach was open, which was successfully stormed.

The artillery operations were directed by Captain Hetzler. The following

officers were present:—Captain Lindsay, Lieutenants Dickson, Carne,

Saunders, Patch, D’Oyley, Kirby, and Crommelin.

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams’s division was employed against the fortress of

Chandah in May, 1818. Both Bengal and Madras artillery were with him; of

the former, the three native troops of horse artillery, under Captain

Rodber, Lieutenant Twemlow, the 5th company 2nd battalion, Captain

MacDowell, Lieutenant Crawford, acting field engineer, Lieutenant

Walcott, commissary of ordnance.

On the 9th May the force arrived, and on reconnoitring, it was found to

be nearly six miles in circumference, and mounting eighty guns; the

ordnance available for the attack consisted of three 18–pounders, four

brass 12–pounders, six howitzers, and twelve 6–pounders. On the night of

the 13th, a battery was raised on an eminence to the south of the fort,

from which four pieces of ordnance, to divert the enemy’s attention,

played on the town with shells and hot shot, while materials were being

collected, and a thorough reconnoissance made. The south-east angle was

finally determined on for the breach. On the 17th, the four 12–pounders

were placed in battery to destroy the flanking defences, as well as the

howitzers and three 6–pounders. During the night of the 18th, the three

18–pounders were placed in a breaching battery within 250 yards of the

place, and opened their fire on the 19th. By 4 P.M., the breach was

practicable; the assault was, however, delayed till the following

morning, but a fire was kept up at intervals during the night to prevent

the enemy retrenching the breach, which they attempted. In the morning

the assault took place; the storming party was accompanied by a detail

of artillerymen with spikes and sponges for spiking or turning the

enemy’s guns. The storming party were completely successful, and

obtained possession of the town and fort after overcoming a very serious

resistance.

In noticing this action, the General Order says: “The rapid demolition

of the enemy’s defences, and the speed with which a breach was effected,

would sufficiently testify the service of * * * Lieutenant Crawford,

Bengal Artillery, acting as engineer, in indicating the positions for

the batteries, even had not Lieutenant-Colonel Adams professed his

obligations to those officers so warmly.”

“Captain Rodber, Captain MacDowell, * * * and Lieutenant Walcott, seem

to have highly deserved the praise their commander bestows upon them.

Indeed, the efforts of all the officers and men of the artillery appear

to have been highly laudable.”

The Sagur troops under Brigadier-General Watson, in October, 1818, again

took the field against Urjun Sing, Rajah of Gunakota, who refused to

give up his fort, agreeably to treaty. It was situated about thirty

miles from Sagur, on the banks of the Sonar, at a point where a small

nullah ran into it, so that the river and nullah formed ditches on two

sides, while the third, in which was the gateway, had a well-formed

artificial ditch; but it was not a place of any strength. On the 23rd

October, a battery of fourteen mortars and four howitzers was formed on

the opposite bank of the Sonar, near the city of Hardynugger, and opened

its fire on the fort. An accident occurred next day in the battery,

which caused several casualties. The shells for expenditure had been

placed in the rear of the mortars covered by paulins, and by some

mischance[75] a spark got among and ignited them, upwards of one hundred

blowing up. On the 26th, a breaching battery was ready, and opened from

two 24–pounders, four 18–pounders, and two 12–pounders, to which two

more 24–pounders were added on the 29th. The battery was 900 yards from

the wall, but a breach was soon accomplished, and the enemy capitulated

without standing an assault.

The 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion artillery were present, with

Captain Hetzler, Captain-Lieutenant Coulthard, Lieutenants Pew,

Saunders, D’Oyley, Patch, Kirby, and Crommelin.

In June a detachment from the 4th company 2nd battalion, with

Lieutenants Carne and Saunders, were sent with a column against the fort

of Satunwaree; a breach was effected by the 18–pounders on the 8th June,

and assaulted, but unsuccessfully; the place, however, was evacuated

during the night.

The unsuccessful assault led to a report that the breach had not been

sufficiently cleared, and charges were preferred against Lieutenant

Carne for bad practice of the artillery, for serving out an excess of

liquor to the men on duty, leading to their intoxication, and for being

intoxicated himself. Of the first and third he was acquitted by a

general court-martial, and partially of the second; the fact probably

was, that the men, being much exposed and overworked under the burning

sun of June, a small quantity of liquor, which in other circumstances

would have been taken with perfect impunity, flew to their heads.

The Nagpoor subsidiary force, under Major-General Doveton, marched

against Assurghur to receive charge of it from Scindia’s killidar, but

the killidar, according to the native custom, pretended to have received

no orders, and it therefore became necessary to proceed against it; all

the available trains were sent for, including those from Sagur and

Hoshunabad, and when collected, amounted to the number detailed in the

margin;[76] but the siege commenced with those with the force. Many

difficulties were experienced in carrying on the approaches up the steep

sides of the hills; an accident, though fortunately attended with but

little loss, occurred, by the magazine in rear of the breaching battery,

containing 130 barrels of powder, exploding on the 21st March. Towards

the end of the month, half of the 5th company 2nd battalion under

Lieutenant Debrett arrived with the Hoshunabad train, and on the 31st,

the Sagur force, with the 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion and 22

heavy guns; from this time the siege was pressed with vigour, and on the

9th April the garrison surrendered, having made a very stout resistance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Crossdill, of the Madras Artillery, commanded the

artillery. Captains Coulthard and Pew, Lieutenants Debrett and Counsell,

appear to have been present at this siege; the latter officer was

slightly wounded.

Having thus brought our history to the close of the Pindaree war and its

consequent service, we may notice such internal changes as were going on

in the regiment and ordnance department generally, following their

chronological occurrence until held service shall again call for our

attention.

Originally the gun-carriages were constructed by a contractor in Fort

William, under the inspection of the commissary of stores; in 1800, the

system was altered, and an agency for this purpose was formed with a

superintendent on a staff salary of Rs. 1,200 per mensem and his

military pay and allowances. The agency was established at Cossipoor,

and connected with it was another for the supply of seasoned timber. In

1814, a second agency was found necessary to meet the wants of the

department, now scattered over a very extended space, and established at

Allahabad, under Major Clement Brown. In 1817, it was transferred to

Futteygurh; this agency was dependent on a half-wrought _matériel_ yard

at Cawnpoor. The Honourable Company’s timber-yards at Cossipoor and

Cawnpoor were annexed to the gun-carriage agencies in 1823 and 1825

respectively, and in the year 1829, the Cossipoor agency was

incorporated with that at Futteygurh.

In May, 1818, the ordnance commissariat officers were organized into a

department upon the principles which had governed the previous formation

of an army commissariat department; it was made one generally of

seniority, and a provision was made for a certain number of warrant

officers in the grade of deputy commissary, as well for two other ranks

above that of conductor.

To carry out the reorganization of the regiment, adverted to in a former

page, in November, the 8th company to each European battalion was added;

a draught of 100 men from the European regiment was taken for this

purpose. Two companies of golundaz (11th and 12th[A]) and five companies

(41st to 45th[77]) of gun lascars were reduced. The driver companies

were reduced to nineteen, two for the horse, and seventeen for the

bullock batteries; nine were reduced (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th,

10th, and 12th), and transferred to the commissariat; each company was

fixed at four sirdars and eighty-six drivers, and the batteries

consisted of eight pieces. The lascar companies were strengthened by the

addition of one havildar and fourteen privates to each company, with

European battalions, and by one havildar with the companies attached to

the 4th battalion.

The field-train establishments, which in 1809 were placed entirely under

the control and care of commanding officers of artillery at Agra and

Cawnpoor, were now transferred to the magazines, and kept in order by

the commissaries under the general control of the commanding officer of

artillery.

The horse field-batteries were increased to three, and considered part

of the permanent establishment, making the number, fourteen bullock and

three horse-batteries. Another bullock-battery was shortly added, on

Mhow becoming a Bengal station.

The Governor-General, adverting to the important, responsible, and

laborious duty which the recent signal alterations in the constitution

of the artillery have imposed on the commandant, and considering the

staff salary at present allowed to him, when not a general officer, to

bear no proportion to the extent and variety of his command, was pleased

to sanction a personal allowance, in addition, of Rs. 500 per mensem;

and also, on the same principle, the commanding officer of artillery in

the field was allowed to draw 600, and all field commanding divisions,

300. The major of brigade was raised to an assistant adjutant-general of

the regiment, and a brigade-major permanently sanctioned in the field.

A model department was formed at Dum-Dum under Captain Parlby, and the

establishment for bouching guns and preparing tangent-scales was

attached to it. In this department a very valuable collection of models

was made up, and which, on the breaking up of the establishment in 1829,

were transferred to the expense magazine, and thence to the regimental

mess in 1839, the regiment having added a room for their reception.

A permanent select committee was formed, consisting of certain

regimental and staff officers of artillery, at Dum-Dum and in the

neighbourhood, to whom every question involving change in the _matériel_

equipment of the department was to be submitted in the first instance,

and their opinion was to be forwarded to assist Government in coming to

a decision, and they were soon fully occupied with the important

questions of windage, brass ordnance, and patterns of light

field-carriages.

In August the lascars of the regiment were very much reduced; the use of

drag-ropes as a means of moving guns, except for trifling distances, or

out of a difficulty, was given up, and with that, the necessity of such

strong bodies of lascars with artillery companies ceased. They were

reduced to a detail of one havildar, two naiks, and twenty-four

privates, to each troop and European company, and taken away entirely

from the native battalions; the men thus struck off from the regiment

were formed into sixteen companies of store lascars, each consisting of

one subahdar, one jemadar, four havildars, four naiks, and eighty

privates, and were posted to the different magazines. But this

arrangement was not found to answer, and the lascar companies were, on

the war breaking out in 1824, increased to forty privates, partly,

perhaps, from the insufficiency of Europeans to keep the companies up to

their proper strength.

An interpreter was allowed to the regiment at head-quarters, and

attached to the golundaz companies at Dum-Dum.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. MacLeod was appointed commandant on Major-General

Hardwicke’s sailing for Europe in December, and with Colonel MacLeod the

command of the artillery in the field ceased; the brigade-majorship was

also abolished, and Captain Tennant, who held it, was appointed

assistant secretary to the Military Board.

In February five companies were added to the golundaz battalion, raising

its number to twenty companies, to meet the exigency of the war with

Ava. In June, to meet the deficiency of Europeans, three additional

companies of lascars of eighty-four men each were raised; four privates

were added to each golundaz company, and the lascar companies increased,

as above mentioned, to forty men each, those who had been transferred to

the store lascars being taken back again.

In May, a fundamental change took place in the Indian army; the

battalions were formed into regiments, and the officers of all branches

of the service were placed on the same footing as to the chances of

promotion, by the regiments being of equal strength in this particular.

This new organization caused a considerable degree of promotion

throughout the army, and in this the artillery shared. The officers of

the regiment continued, as previously, to rise in one general gradation

list, and the regiment was to be composed of

────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┬────────────────

3 brigades of horse artillery, │each consisting of│ 3 European and

│ │ 1 Native troop.

────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────

5 battalions of European foot artillery;│each consisting of│ 4 companies.

1 battalion of Native foot artillery │each consisting of│20 companies.

────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────┴────────────────

The rocket-troop was to form one of the troops of a brigade.

Lascar details were attached to the troops, and a company to each

European company, and a driver company to each field-battery.

These changes, however, were not even nominally carried into effect

until the middle of the next year, owing to the scattered state of the

regiment, the occupation the Burmese war gave, and the difficulty in

obtaining a sufficient supply of European recruits to meet the demand.

In reality, some of the troops of horse artillery were not formed until

the end of 1826; we therefore shall not in this place give a tabular

statement of the strength of the regiment, but reserve it until we

arrive at the year 1826, when a reorganization of the native battalion

made another change, and the state of the regiment, before and after its

alteration, will then be seen at one glance.

The aggression of the Burmese on our frontiers, and the contempt with

which they treated all remonstrances, forced the Indian Government

reluctantly to declare war in 1824. Unfortunately, little was known of

the country, and a most injudicious plan of operations was drawn out,

which, by seizing Rangoon and the numerous native craft the maritime

capital was expected to furnish, embarking the troops in them, and

sailing up the Irawaddy in the rainy season, and threatening Amerapoora,

was to terminate the war in one campaign. With this intention the

expedition sailed in April, and was joined by the Madras portion early

in May at Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands.

Two companies of the Bengal Artillery with their lascars accompanied the

expedition.

Major Pollock, Commandant; Lieutenant Laurenson, Adjutant; Lieutenant B.

Brown, Deputy Quarter-master General.

────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────┬──────────┬────────────┬────────────

Company.│Battalion.│afterwards│Company.│Battalion.│ Captains. │Lieutenants.

────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────────┼────────────

│ │ │ │ │ │G. R. Scott,

7 │ 3 │ │ 3 │ 5 │Timbrell │ Rawlinson,

│ │ │ │ │ │ R. G.

│ │ │ │ │ │ MacGregor.

│ │ │ │ │ │ Counsell,

8 │ 3 │ │ 4 │ 5 │Biddulph[78]│ E. Blake,

│ │ │ │ │ │ O’Hanlon,

│ │ │ │ │ │ McDonald.

────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────┴──────────┴────────────┴────────────

On the 10th May the fleet reached Rangoon, and, overcoming a very faint

resistance by a few broadsides from the _Liffey_, the troops landed and

took possession. They found it deserted by its inhabitants, and

incapable of affording either subsistence or the means of advancing. No

choice was left; nothing could be done till the cold weather, except

shelter themselves against the approaching rainy season, to which the

Bengal monsoon is but as summer showers in comparison. During this

season, the troops suffered much from exposure, from bad and

insufficient supplies, harassment by the enemy, and continual petty

attacks on stockades, so that when the season for operations arrived, it

found an army of invalids, instead of one fit to take the field.

The Burmese recalled their army under Bundoola from Arracan, and it

arrived in the vicinity of Rangoon in November. Rangoon was invested,

but, awaiting reinforcements and supplies, Sir Archibald Campbell

offered little opposition, contenting himself with strengthening his own

position and placing all his artillery in battery, to bear on the

enemy’s trenches. Things remained thus till the 5th December, when the

guns all opening, the columns moved out under cover of their fire,

attacked and overcame the enemy’s left; Bundoola, however, rallied

again, and pushed on his attack on the Shevé-da-gon pagoda. On the

morning of the 7th the attack was renewed; every gun that would bear on

the enemy was opened, and continued firing till noon, when the infantry

moving out, completely routed the enemy. He rallied in a strong position

at Kokaing, from which, on the 13th, he was with difficulty dislodged,

and in which action the regiment lost a fine young officer, Lieutenant

O’Hanlon, who, volunteering with the body-guard, was shot in a gallant

charge, made to cover a column hard pressed by the enemy.

This action cleared the vicinity of Rangoon of the enemy, and

reinforcements, stores, and supplies arriving, health was restored to

the army, and preparations for an advance were strenuously made. Among

the reinforcements, were a troop of horse artillery and half the

rocket-troop, “corps which excited great hopes, and never disappointed

them.”

────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬───────────────

Troop. │ Brigade. │ Captains. │Lieutenants.│Sub-Lieutenant.

────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼───────────────

│ │ │Thompson, │

1 │ 1 │Lumsden │Timmings, │

│ │ │C. Grant. │

2 │ 2 │Graham │Paton, │Allen.

│ │ │G. Campbell │

────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴───────────────

But, leaving the force at this point, let us trace the steps of the

other divisions, and then return to the Rangoon column, on which the

chief exertions of the war fell.

The small advanced party at Ramoo, unsupported by the force at

Chittygong, fell an easy prey to Bundoola’s force, which gradually

closed on and cut it up; a detail of artillery, with two 6–pounders

under Lieutenant J. W. Scott, formed part. Lieutenant Scott, severely

wounded, was placed on an elephant and carried into Chittygong, whither

the few who escaped fled.

After this reverse, the force at Chittygong was strengthened and formed

into a division, under Major-General Morrison, for the purpose of

driving the Burmese out of Arracan, crossing the Yemidong mountains and

joining the Rangoon force about Prome. With it were two companies of

artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Commandant; Lieutenant

Kirby, Adjutant.

────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────────

Company. │ Battalion. │ Captains. │Lieutenants.

────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────

│ │ │Lawrence,

│ │ │Fenning,

3 │ 2 │Rawlings │Lewin,

│ │ │Greene,

│ │ │Dyke.

────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────

│ │ │Cardew,

4 │ 2 │Hall │Fordyce,

│ │ │Gaitskell,

│ │ │Hotham.

────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────

Lieutenant J. W. Scott was attached to the

pioneers.

This column marched in the cold weather slowly, for it experienced much

difficulty both from the wild and swampy country it traversed, and from

the breadth of the rivers it had to cross, which, from its route being

as near the coast as possible, were complete estuaries. Transporting the

guns and stores over these deep and rapid streams required no small

exertions from the artillery, as also in traversing the swampy delta of

the Koladine river, leading to the capital. No opposition was offered

until the army reached the Padhna pass, on the 25th March, 1825; there

the advanced guard was fired upon, and it became necessary to drive the

enemy from the heights. On the 28th, the army debouched into an open

plain, under a line of hills, covering the town of Arracan. The foot of

these hills was a swampy thicket, the upper part cleared from jungle and

strengthened by a breastwork. Without much reconnoissance, the guns were

pushed on into battery under the hills, and a general assault took

place. It was unsuccessful; such as effected their way through the

tangled thicket at the foot were driven back by the musketry and volleys

of stones of the defenders. The guns were abandoned for the time, and

withdrawn under cover of the night. During the night of the 31st, some

troops with two 9–pounders on elephants ascended the ridge to the right

of the enemy’s position, moved along the crest at daylight, and bringing

the guns into play, the enemy fled, leaving the city at our mercy. And

here the operations of this army may be said to terminate; disease,

engendered by the pestilential locality, soon raged most fearfully, and

converted the town into a large cemetery. Small detachments were sent

against Ramree; Lieutenant Hotham, with two guns, engaged in the attack,

which was at first unsuccessful; it was, however, finally occupied, as

was Aeng, a station on the pass leading through the hills.

In the following cold season reinforcements were sent, among them the

4th company 4th battalion, Lieutenants Rutherfurd and Buckle, and it was

intended that the force should attempt the passage of the hills, and for

that purpose it was partially collected at Amherst Island; but the

difficulties and want of transport were too great, and the idea was

abandoned. Arracan was evacuated, and the troops located at Ackyab, an

island at the mouth of the Koladine and Myoo rivers, Cheduba, Ramree,

and Sandoway, and finally withdrawn in 1826.

That the passage of the hills was possible, there is no doubt; two

regiments from Prome succeeded in the attempt by the Aeng pass, while

Lieutenant B. Browne; Lieutenant Brady, of artillery; and Captain Trant,

deputy quarter-master general, reached Arracan by another, early in

1826.

In 1823, a squadron of gun-boats was sent to cruise on the Burrampooter,

probably with the intention of protecting that frontier from threatened

incursions of the Burmese. Captain Timbrell, Lieutenants Bedingfield and

Burton, were with this flotilla.

On the Sylhet frontier detachments of the 6th battalion were with the

army, Captain J. Scott, Captain C. Smith, Lieutenants Brind and Lane,

Lieutenant Turton, adjutant; but this force never came in contact with

the enemy. The country proved impassable.

Lieutenant Huthwaite was with a detail of native artillery employed

against Munneypoor, and engaged in the successful attack on the enemy’s

blockaded position at Daoudputlee.

Let us now return to the Rangoon army. Such preparations as

circumstances admitted of being made, the army advanced on the 11th

February, 1825, in two columns, one by land and one by water: the main

portion of the artillery was with the former; with the latter,

Lieutenant Paton and some of the rocket-troop were placed in the _Diana_

steamer. The inadequacy of the supplies of the land column may be easily

imagined when it is stated that it was with the utmost difficulty

Captain Lumsden obtained four bullocks for his forge-cart!—its value,

however, was repeatedly acknowledged, and its aid gladly sought, almost

daily, to repair public carriages of every department.

To the water column was intrusted the operations of dislodging Bundoola

from his strong position at Donabeu, while the land column pushed on as

rapidly as possible for the capital. The enemy were driven from their

stockade below Donabeu, but on approaching that position, it was found

far more formidable than represented. The attack on it proved

unsuccessful, and Sir Archibald was forced to retrograde to assist in

its capture. On the 1st April, the attack was renewed by land and by

water; from the latter, a brisk cannonade and effectual flights of

rockets were poured in, and the batteries on the land side were equally

effectual; the rockets, however, then failed; the heat and shaking they

had been exposed to in the march rendered them nearly or worse than

useless. One, however, is claimed as having decided the day, by killing

Bundoola. His energy alone kept the enemy together, and after his death

they fled from the stockades during the night. The march was resumed,

and Prome occupied by the army for the rainy season. Here Lieutenant

Thompson died on the 11th May.

During the rains, Lieutenant Timmings came round to Dum-Dum for his own

health, and returned in October, carrying back with him reinforcements

in men and horses for the artillery; Lieutenants G. Graham, Daniell,

Begbie, and Brady also accompanied him.

The enemy rallied, and towards the middle of October had nearly

surrounded Prome with stockades. On the 2nd December, Sir Archibald

Campbell attacked and defeated them, following up his success the next

day. The horse artillery were pushed on in advance through nullahs and

over rocks, to obtain a position bearing well on the enemy at Nassadee,

and during the cannonade an howitzer missing fire twice, Captain Lumsden

directed the shell to be withdrawn; this was done, but the fuze having

ignited, the shell burst, just as it reached the muzzle, killing a

lascar, wounding a gunner and Captain Lumsden; but he immediately

rallied, and continued, in spite of his wound, directing the operations

of his battery. Six guns, manned by the 3rd company 5th battalion, with

Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, Captain Biddulph, and Lieutenant Laurenson,

were also engaged in this successful attack.

The enemy retired on Melloon, a stockaded position on the opposite bank

of the river, there about 500 yards wide. Negotiations commenced on

their part, and an armistice was concluded, to last till the 18th

January, 1826. The ratified treaty not having been received, at midnight

preparations for the attack commenced; batteries for the guns were got

ready; boats in waiting for the troops, and at 11 A.M., when the fog

cleared up, the whole of the guns, mortars, rockets, heavy and light,

opened with a salvo. The range was hit at once, and shot, shells, and

rockets flew into all parts of the stockades, the interior of which,

from their being planted on the side of a rising ground, was distinctly

visible. The “hurtling of this iron shower” continued for about an hour

and a half, when the storming columns crossed in the boats of the

flotilla, and were soon masters of the place.

The rocket practice was particularly efficient, scarce a rocket failed;

a strong contrast to the rockets carried by land, which had proved

worthless on several occasions: those used at Melloon were brought up

with the flotilla, and perhaps never has there been an occasion since

the invention of the weapon where they were more successful, or their

effects could be so distinctly seen, as when blazing and roaring, their

long trails of smoke marking their course, they plunged into the

stockades of Melloon and raked them from side to side in their eccentric

courses after grazing.

The army pressed on, allowing no respite. “Officers’ chargers were put

in requisition to drag the guns of the invaluable horse brigade;” horses

of the rocket-troop were similarly employed, and their place supplied by

Burmah ponies. The horse artillery, body-guard, and H.M.’s 13th light

infantry now formed the advance guard, and on the 9th February came up

with the enemy at Pagahen-Meen; the guns immediately opened, and the

enemy were soon broken, but, in pursuing them too rashly, the 13th

regiment got entangled in the difficult ground, and the main body coming

up, in endeavouring to debouch from a defile, got wedged together,

artillery, rockets, guns, and carriages. Of this confusion and delay the

enemy took advantage and rallied, and had they not been held in check by

the gallant conduct of the horse artillery, body-guard, and the 13th,

much mischief might have been done. The confusion was soon remedied, and

a complete victory rewarded the troops.

This was the last action. The enemy, thoroughly humbled, now opened

negotiations in earnest, which were soon concluded. A deputation

proceeded to the “Golden Fort,” at Amerapoora, and returned with the

ratified treaty of peace. Among those selected for this distinguished

duty was Captain Lumsden, than whom and his gallant troop, none had

borne a more honourable and useful part during these laborious

campaigns.

A silver medal, of the annexed pattern, was awarded to all the native

troops engaged in the war, either in Rangoon, Arracan, or Sylhet.

[Illustration]

Among the General Orders we find, “The Governor-General entertains the

highest sense of the efficient services and honourable exertions of

Captains * * * Timbrell of the artillery;” and “the services of the

Bengal * * * foot artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, and of

the Bengal rocket-troop and horse artillery, under Captains Graham and

Lumsden, demand also the special acknowledgments of Government.”

Early in 1825, British interference[79] in the state of Bhurtpoor became

necessary, and Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, the agent to the

Governor-General at Delhi, exercising the authority vested in him,

ordered the assembly of a force for the purpose. It was disapproved by

the Governor-General, and many portions of the regiment had in

consequence the _désagrémens_ of a useless march in the months of April,

May, and June.

In the cold weather, however, affairs in Bhurtpoor continuing the same,

and those in Ava more satisfactory, the project was resumed, and a force

ordered to collect at Agra and Muttra, in November, under the command of

Lord Combermere, who had just been appointed to the chief command in

India.

For this army the whole of the available artillery was drawn together

and the provinces were denuded. The field batteries were thrown into the

magazines, and their bullocks appropriated to the siege-trains, and yet

when collected, the whole were barely sufficient to work the guns in

battery, without one single relief. In like manner the magazines from

Cawnpore to Kurnal poured forth all their munitions of war, but this

afforded only 114 siege-pieces, with about 1,000 rounds of shot per gun,

and 500 shells per mortar and howitzer, with a proportion of shrapnell

and case.[80] A reserve was formed at Allahabad to be pushed on as

opportunity offered.

The _personnel_ consisted of five and a-half troops of European, and two

of native horse artillery, nine companies of European, and five of

native foot artillery,[81] forming a total of about 1,200 Europeans, and

700 native artillerymen, with 500 lascars, but of these only 1,100 were

foot artillery, barely sufficient to man the guns, even when augmented

by a body of horse artillery recruits, who, just drafted into that

branch on the augmentation, were not qualified for the duties of mounted

artillerymen.

The following officers were present:—

Brigadier MᶜLeod, C. B., Commanding; Captain Tennant, Assistant

Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Dashwood, Aide-de-Camp.

Brigadier C. Brown, Commanding Horse Artillery; Lieutenant Winfield,

Major of Brigade.

Brigadier R. Hetzler, Commanding Foot Artillery and Park; Lieutenant

Johnson, Major of Brigade.

_Horse Artillery._

Lieutenant-Colonel Stark, Commanding 2nd Brigade.

Major Whish, Commanding 1st Brigade.

Captain J. Scott, Commanding 3rd Brigade.

Capt. Hyde,

Capt. N. Campbell,

Capt. Farrington,

Capt. Blake,

Capt. R. Roberts,

Capt. W. Bell,

Capt. Wood,

Lieut. Moreland,

Lieut. Nicholl,

Lieut. Pennington, Adjutant 3rd Brigade

Lieut. Bingley,

Lieut. Mackay, Adj. 1st Brig.

Lieut. Cullen,

Lieut. Maidman,

Lieut. MacLean,

Lieut. Ewart,

Lieut. MᶜMorine,

Lieut. Garbett, Adj. 2nd Brig.

Lieut. Wakefield,

Lieut. Alexander,

Lieut. W. Anderson,

Lieut. Wiggins,

Lieut. Backhouse,

2nd Lieut. Pillans,

2nd Lieut. Grote,

2nd Lieut. Boileau.

_Foot Artillery._

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, Commanding 6th Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs, Commanding 3rd Battalion.

Major Battine,

Capt. Pereira, Commissary,

Capt. Curphey,

Capt. Pew,

Capt. Woodroofe,

Capt. Brooke, Commissary,

Capt. Oliphant,

Lieut. R. C. Dixon,

Lieut. Huthwaite,

Lieut. Sanders, Adj. 3rd Bat.

Lieut. Hughes,

Lieut. Rotton,

Lieut. A. Abbott,

Lieut. Torckler,

Lieut. Cautley,

Lieut. Garrett,

Lieut. Horsford, Adj. 4th Bat.

Lieut. Wade,

Lieut. Clerk, Adj. 6th Bat.

Lieut. Mowatt,

Lieut. McGregor,

Lieut. Edwards, Adj. 1st Bat.

Lieut. Ellis,

2nd Lieut. J. Abbott,

2nd Lieut. Bazely,

2nd Lieut. Duncan,

2nd Lieut. Todd,

2nd Lieut. Sage.

The trains and stores were collected at Agra and Muttra, and started, in

two divisions, on the 9th December. On the 17th they were united before

Bhurtpoor, and the grand park formed. The cavalry and horse artillery

had preceded the army and secured the bund of the lake, just as the

enemy were about to cut it, to flood the ditch of the fortress.

The laboratory tents were pitched on the 16th, and the preparation of

the platforms and stores commenced upon. On the 23rd, the first battery

was armed, and it opened its fire on the 24th; daily the approaches,

parallels, and batteries were extended, under a fire from the enemy

always hot, and generally well directed. In addition to

breaching-batteries, a mine was driven under the N.E. bastion, and

sprung, but without effect, on the 7th January, the charge being too

small. The gun breach was by this time practicable, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Stark and his adjutant ascended it; the firing was

directed to be continued, to improve it, but the shot buried themselves,

pounding the earth into fine dust. On the 9th a depôt of ammunition,

formed to supply the batteries, was blown up by a shot from the enemy

passing through a tumbril; the whole was consumed with a fearful

explosion; but although the enemy kept up a heavy fire all night, from

every gun which would bear upon the spot, clearly indicated by the

burning stores, the casualties were few. A mine was sprung in the

counterscarp opposite the gun breach, making the descent into the ditch

easy. On the 12th, a mine was commenced under the long-necked bastion;

it was ready and loaded by the 18th January, and the firing it was to be

the signal for the assault. A heavy fire was kept up from all the

batteries on the morning of the 18th; the mine was sprung, and scarcely

had the heavy mass of dust and smoke cleared away, when the columns

moved out to the assault and were shortly in possession of the place.

The artillery casualties in this siege were remarkably few; the labours

undergone by both officers and men in the batteries for twenty-six days

were extreme, but borne with the utmost cheerfulness and good temper.

The ammunition expended was,

24–pounder round shot 18,331

24–pounder shrapnell 345

24–pounder case 639

18–pounder round shot 22,533

18–pounder shrapnell 524

18–pounder case 391

Shells, 13–inch 236

Shells, 10–inch 4,506

Shells, 8–inch 13,720

Shells, 8–inch shrapnell 119

Grand Total 61,446

The average rate of firing was forty-eight rounds per gun, and twelve

per mortar per diem; the greatest, 142 and 20. Nine 24–pounders, sixteen

18–pounders, one 10–inch and seven 8–inch mortars, were rendered

unserviceable, and the carriages of six 8–inch (brass) howitzers broke

down during the siege.[82]

General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief:—“To Brigadier MacLeod, C.B.,

in the general command of the artillery, and Brigadiers Hetzler and

Brown, commanding the siege and field artillery respectively, the

Commander-in-Chief feels greatly indebted for their highly creditable

exertions, as, also, to the whole of the officers and men of the

artillery, for the excellent display of scientific correctness in the

batteries, as well as for their commendable endurance of fatigue which

the nature of the service necessarily exposed them to.”

The Commandant issued the following regimental order:—“The Commandant

begs to offer to officers and men of that part of the regiment engaged

in the field under his more immediate command his best thanks for their

conduct and exertions during the siege, which have, in General Orders

to-day published, obtained the approbation of the Right Honourable the

Commander-in-Chief; and to Brigadiers Hetzler, C.B., and C. Brown, he

has more especially to tender his acknowledgments for the assistance he

has derived from them in their respective commands.”

“To Captain Tennant, the assistant adjutant-general of the arm, he feels

much indebted for his able assistance on this and many other occasions,

for which he is entitled to his warmest acknowledgments and thanks. To

Lieutenant Dashwood, his aide-de-camp, he also tenders his best thanks

for his conspicuously useful exertions.”

In a former page we stated our intention of reserving a tabular

statement of the organization of 1824, until we reached the year 1827,

when a fresh arrangement of the native artillery took place; we have now

reached that period, for the year 1826 has little to be recorded, except

that in November four companies of golundaz and three of lascars (those

raised in 1824) were reduced.

In September, 1827, an additional battalion of officers was added to the

regiment, and the native artillery divided into two battalions, of eight

companies each, denominated the 6th and 7th battalions.

────────────────┬─────────┬──────────────────────────┬────┬────┬────────

│ │ │ │ │ On

│ │ │1824│1827│Returns,

│ │ │ │ │1st Dec.

│ │ │ │ │ 1827

────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────

│ │Colonels. │ 9│ 10│ 10

│ │Lieutenant-Colonels. │ 9│ 10│ 10

│ │Majors. │ 9│ 10│ 10

│ │Captains. │ 45│ 50│ 50

│ │1st Lieutenants. │ 90│ 100│ 100

│ │2nd Lieutenants. │ 45│ 50│ 50

HORSE ARTILLERY.│EUROPEAN.│Brigade Staff. │ 27│ 27│ 27

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 207│ 207│ 218

〃 │ 〃 │Trumpeters, Farriers, │ 54│ 54│ 57

│ │Rough-riders. │ │ │

〃 │ 〃 │Gunners. │ 720│ 720│ 732

〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 6│ 6│ 7

〃 │ 〃 │Brigade Staff │ 6│ 6│ 6

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 36│ 36

〃 │ 〃 │Trumpeters, Farriers, │ 28│ 28│ 28

│ │Rough-riders. │ │ │

〃 │ 〃 │Troopers. │ 270│ 270│ 270

〃 │LASCARS. │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 36│ 36

〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 288│ 288│ 288

FOOT ARTILLERY. │EUROPEAN.│Battalion Staff. │ 43│ 46│ 46

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 424│ 424│ 436

〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 40│ 40│ 40

〃 │ 〃 │Gunners. │1620│1600│ 1600

〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 60│ 48│ 50

〃 │ 〃 │Battalion Staff. │ 3│ 6│ 6

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 320│ 256│ 293

〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 40│ 32│ 32

〃 │ 〃 │Privates │2080│1664│ 1700

〃 │LASCARS. │Native Officers. │ 20│ 20│ 21

〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 80│ 80│ 82

〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 800│ 800│ 921

────────────────┴─────────┴──────────────────────────┴────┴────┴────────

Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization · 第 7 / 12 章