Lord Lake’s campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding golundaz—Increase
of horse artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France and
Java—Bundlecund campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval pattern carriages
introduced—Additional golundaz companies—Head-quarters removed to
Dum Dum.
The conduct of the Mahrattas having rendered hostilities unavoidable,
the Governor-General determined to carry them on upon such a scale as
would completely destroy their power, and, at the same time, eradicate
the French party from the Dooab, where Mr. Perron, nominally a commander
of Scindia’s disciplined brigades, had in reality established a small
independent principality of his own.
To carry out his intentions, the Governor-General assembled forces in
the Dukhun, Guzerat, Cuttack, Mirzapoor, Allahabad, and in the Dooab;
with all of which, except the first, were portions of the Bengal
Artillery.
The main army (in Bengal) was under the personal command of the
Commander-in-Chief, General Lake; the corps composing it were put in
motion early in August, 1803, and collected, on the 13th, at Arowl, on
the Kali Muddee. They reached Coel on the 28th of the same month.
The following artillery were attached to it:—
Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Commandant. Lieutenant Brown, Brigade Major.
Lieutenant Butler, Brigade Quarter-Master.
────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│ Lascar │Captains. │Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.
│ │Companies.│ │ │
────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
1 │ 1 │19, 24, 26│T. Greene │ │
2 │ │ 2, 15 │Raban │Winbolt │
3 │ │ 6, 8 │Nelly │ │
1 │ 2 │4, 23, 28 │Constable │ │
2 │ │ 3, 13 │Hutchinson│ │
3 │ 2 │7, 21, 22 │W. Shipton│Best │Morris
4 │ │ 14, 16 │J. │ │A. Mathews
│ │ │Robinson │ │
────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────
On the 29th August, General Lake attacked Perron’s army, drawn up behind
a jheel, with their right resting on Aligurh. The attack was made by the
cavalry and gallopers, and the enemy drew off towards Agra. Mr. Perron
was left in charge of the fort, with instructions to defend it to the
last extremity.
General Lake determining to storm the fort on the 4th September, during
the night preceding two batteries of four 18–pounders each, under
Captains Greene and Robinson, were erected by Colonel Horsford at a
village in the vicinity and at Perron’s country house, to cover the
advance to the party.
Before daylight the storming party, under Colonel Monson, moved out to
within 400 yards of the fort, and there awaited the morning gun, the
signal for the advance; on its being fired, they moved on, covered by a
heavy fire from the supporting batteries. The fort had been alarmed, and
the gates were closed. The ladders proved too short. A 6–pounder was
sent for to burst the gate open, but proving insufficient, a 12–pounder
was substituted, which succeeded after four or five rounds. During this
delay, the party was exposed to a heavy fire, by which many were
wounded; among others, Captain Shipton, who commanded the guns;
notwithstanding this, he continued to advance with the party. The second
and third gates were stormed, but at the fourth, his gun was again
required, this gate resisted its fire, but the wicket being forced, the
party entered, and obtained possession of the fortress, capturing 281
pieces of ordnance of all kinds.
The artillery lost but 2 Europeans and 4 lascars killed, 7 Europeans and
1 lascar wounded, in addition to Captain Shipton. The services of the
artillery were acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief in his report to
the Governor-General:—“To Captain Shipton, of the artillery, who had
charge of the guns which forced the gate, and who, though wounded, still
remained at his post, I feel myself much indebted. To Colonel Horsford,
who commanded the artillery, as well as Captains Greene and Robinson,
who commanded the covering batteries, I feel myself under infinite
obligations, and indeed the whole corps merit my warmest praise for the
gallantry displayed on this occasion as well as in every other in which
they have been engaged.” The Governor-General in General Orders, 15th
September, 1803, “desires that his particular approbation may be
signified to Captain Shipton, of the artillery, and also to
Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Captains Robinson and Greene;” and also
says, “it is with the greatest satisfaction that the Governor-General
expresses his approbation of the bravery, discipline, and steadiness of
the corps of artillery who were employed on this occasion.”
A small detachment of half a corps, with one gun, under Lieutenant
Winbolt, at this time in the cantonment of Shekoabad or Etawah, were
attacked by a large body of horse, under a Mr. Fleury. The first attack,
on the 2nd September, was beaten off, but being renewed on the 4th
September, after several hours’ resistance, the party capitulated, and
were allowed to march off to Cawnpoor with their guns and arms.
Lieutenant Winbolt was wounded in this affair.
The army reached the Jumna, near Delhi, on the 11th, and found the
Mahrattas posted behind intrenchments, with their park of artillery in
front, the whole covered by long grass. The Commander-in-Chief moved on
to reconnoitre with the cavalry, and directed the artillery and infantry
to follow; the front alone was accessible, and the cavalry were exposed
to a heavy cannonade. They moved to the rear to avoid this, and to cover
the advance of the line, but the enemy mistaking it for a retreat, moved
out from their intrenchments. The cavalry opened to allow the infantry
to pass through, who attacked in line, the cavalry forming as a support
in their rear. The advance was made under a tremendous fire of round and
grape, without returning a shot until close, when, firing a volley, they
charged, broke into open column, and allowed the cavalry and gallopers
to pass through and complete the victory.
Colonel Horsford was employed covering the left with four guns and a
battalion from a threatened attack by a body of Seik cavalry.
The loss of the artillery consisted of 3 Europeans and 1 lascar killed,
1 subaltern, 13 Europeans, and 16 lascars wounded. Lieutenant
Mathews[57] lost his leg by a cannon-shot; 67 brass and iron guns, 37
tumbrils of ammunition (besides 24 blown up), and 2 tumbrils of
treasure, were captured on this occasion. The iron guns were of European
manufacture, the brass nearly all cast in India on French models; the
carriages were all fitted with elevating screws, strong and neat, and of
the French pattern; the tumbrils stout, but clumsy; some with modern
draught-chains, others with a trace of raw hide.
General Lake wrote to the Governor-General:—“To Colonel Horsford and
every officer of the corps of artillery I feel myself infinitely
indebted for their meritorious exertions on this occasion;” and in the
general orders of the Governor-General of 1st February we find,—“To
Colonel Horsford and the artillery the Governor-General in Council
repeats the public testimony of approbation which that meritorious corps
has uniformly deserved in every exigency of the service.”
The officers present were the same as at Aligurh, with the exception of
Captain-Lieutenant Best, who was left in charge of the ordnance in that
fortress.
The Governor-General in Council deemed “it to be the duty of the
Government to anticipate the sanction of His Majesty and the Honourable
the Court of Directors for the distribution of the treasure captured, as
a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British
Government viewed the exemplary valour, discipline, zeal, and firmness
displayed by the army;” and directed that “the general principles of
this order should constitute the proceedings of the Governor-General in
Council with respect to all prize-money captured during the progress of
the war.”
The heavy artillery and stores intended for the siege of Agra were
embarked on the Jumna in boats, the army marching down along the western
banks. On the 7th October they reached Agra, and cut off all
communication with the country, and on the 10th the enemy’s battalions
outside the fort were driven from the ravines and glacis, with a loss of
600 men and 26 guns. In this affair Lieutenants Beagham and J. Hay (who
together with Lieutenant W. Parker joined the army a little previously)
are mentioned as having distinguished themselves.
“The intrepidity and courage evinced by Lieutenant Beagham, of the
artillery, employed in the assault, calls for his Excellency’s warmest
approbation and thanks.”
“Lieutenant Hay, of the artillery, who went with a detachment of that
corps to bring off the enemy’s guns, merits my approbation for his
successful exertions in this service.”
The siege commenced, and by the 17th a breaching battery of eight
18–pounders and four howitzers, with an enfilading battery of four
12–pounders on its left and another of two 12–pounders on its right,
were ready and commenced firing, and on the 20th the fort capitulated.
Seventy-six brass and 86 iron guns, 20 tumbrils, with two lacs of rupees
and ammunition, &c. were captured; among them was the celebrated great
gun of Agra, which lay on the banks of the Jumna until some twenty years
afterwards it was broken up and sold, an attempt to carry it down the
Jumna having failed, as also a fine brass 72–pounder, now in the barrack
square at Dum-Dum.
General Lake wrote:—“I attribute the early surrender of Agra to the
great impression our breaching battery made on the walls, which opened
yesterday within 350 yards, and which would have caused a practicable
breach in a few hours more battering.
“To Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, * * * as well as to every
officer of the * * * corps, I feel myself under great obligations for
their unremitted exertions on this occasion, and to which I principally
attribute my early success against this place.”
Twenty-four lacs of rupees of prize-money were on this occasion divided
among the troops, in accordance with the principle of the General Order
1st November, 1803, above quoted.
On the 27th October the army marched from Agra, and on the 31st (having
previously left their baggage and heavy guns under a guard at Futtypoor
Sicoree) had nearly come up with the Mahrattas. In the evening, General
Lake moved on again with the cavalry, directing the infantry to follow
at three o’clock next morning, and after a march of twenty-five miles
overtook the Mahrattas at sunrise, near Laswaree, amounting to about
9,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, with 72 guns. As they appeared to be
in some confusion, he was tempted to make an attack at once, without
waiting for the artillery and infantry.
The enemy retarded this movement by cutting a bund and flooding the
road, and availed themselves of the time gained to form their line, the
right resting on Laswaree and the left on Mohalpoor, the front covered
by the guns, and, as at Delhi, the country around covered with long
grass. The cavalry charged boldly through the guns several times, the
gunners falling down as they passed and reopening on their return, while
the infantry plied them with musketry from behind an intrenchment formed
of the baggage-hackeries: the guns could not be secured from want of
infantry.
The loss having been great, and the men and horses much fatigued, the
cavalry were withdrawn to wait the arrival of the infantry, the enemy
having been effectually stopped and crippled. By noon the infantry
reached the banks of the nullah, but some slight rest was necessary
after a march of twenty-five miles; and as the enemy offered to
surrender their guns on certain terms, a favourable answer was returned,
though preparations were made for renewing the attack when the
stipulated time should expire.
The enemy threw back their right, so as almost to encircle Mohalpoor,
their whole front bristling with guns. The British infantry prepared to
attack in two columns, the right, under Major-General Ware, against
Mohalpoor, the left, under Major-General St. John, against the enemy’s
right, covered by the cavalry. All the guns which had come up were
formed with the gallopers into four distinct batteries to support these
attacks. The whole advanced under a heavy fire from the enemy’s
artillery, which were well and quickly served, and by four P.M. had
entirely routed the enemy, capturing elephants, camels, 1,600 bullocks,
72 guns, 5,000 stand of arms, 44 colours, 64 tumbrils of ammunition and
3 of treasure, and 57 carts with stores.
In this brilliant action the artillery suffered but little,—4 Europeans
and 3 lascars killed, and 6 Europeans and 5 lascars wounded: the brunt
fell upon the other branches.
From Laswaree the army returned towards Agra, sending in the wounded and
captured stores, and remained in the neighbourhood till the end of the
month, when Colonel White, with a proportion of artillery, was detached
to aid the Bundelcund force in the siege of Gwalior. The main army soon
after moved to a position near the Biana Pass, where the horse artillery
troop (formed from the experimental horse artillery), under Captain
Clement Brown, with Lieutenants Starke and Young, joined; but we must
make a slight retrospect to bring up the proceedings of the other forces
to this point.
The detachment of artillery, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s force,
destined for Bundelcund, consisted of—
Major C. Wittit, Commandant.
────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.
────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
1 │ 3 │Tomkyns │Feade │Richards.
────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
2 │ │ │Dowell │M. Brown.
│ │ │ │W. Hopper.
────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────────────┴────────────
The force reached the banks of the Caine, near Tiroha, on the 23rd
September, and on the 10th October crossed, and, after a long march over
a rough country, came in sight of Shumsheer Bahadur’s troops. A distant
cannonade was all that occurred, the enemy made off as fast as he could,
and the force proceeded against Culpee, which surrendered on the 4th
December, as soon as a battery opened against it.
Its next move was to Gwalior, where the whole or a portion joined
Colonel White, with whose detachment were Captain Green, Lieutenants
Hay, Morris, Swiney, and Pollock. Batteries were opened, and on the 5th
February, 1804, Gwalior had once again fallen into our possession.
The following General Order was issued on its capture: “The
Commander-in-Chief is particularly happy to notice the valuable services
of the artillery employed at Gwalior; and the great effect produced by
the fire of the batteries under circumstances peculiarly unfavourable
reflects the highest credit on the abilities of Captain Green, and on
the officers and men under his command.”
The detachments under Major-General Deare, of the artillery, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, at Mirzapoor and Sumbulpoor, were equally
successful, though not so brilliantly employed; their exertions
frustrated the Mahrattas’ hopes of plundering Mirzapoor and Benares.
The Balasore force met with complete success; they had chiefly, however,
to contend against the difficulty of moving guns through a swampy, heavy
country; the different towns surrendered with but little opposition. The
fort of Barabutty alone required batteries to be erected against it;
they were ready on the 13th October, and the defences being taken off,
and the enemy’s guns silenced, the storming party advanced, accompanied
by some artillerymen, under Lieutenant G. Faithfull, with a 6–pounder,
for the purpose of blowing open the gate. In passing the bridge, the
party was exposed for 40 minutes to a heavy fire of musketry ere the
gate could be forced, it was so blocked up with masses of stone: these
removed, the attack was soon successful. Lieutenant Faithfull was
wounded, though not dangerously, and his conduct, as well as that of
Captain-Lieutenant Hetzler, was praised in General Orders by the
Governor-General:—“He trusts that Lieutenant Faithfull, of the
artillery, will be speedily restored to the public service, in which his
courage and resolution has already been distinguished.
“The Governor-General expresses his sense of the conduct of Captain
Hetzler, of the Bengal artillery.”
To bring up the events of the campaign in all quarters, we must here
turn briefly to the force in Guzerat, with which was the 5th company 3rd
battalion. This force marched on the 21st August; at Bargood they met
with but a feeble resistance on the 24th, and on the 26th a battery of
two 18–pounders was completed against the fort of Baroach, and opened.
By the 29th a breach was made, but the storm was delayed till 3 P.M., in
hopes of profiting by the assistance of the _Fury_ gun-vessel (on board
which was a detail of Bengal artillery), and an armed boat, which were
hourly expected, but which were prevented by the shallowness of the
water; the storming party therefore advanced at the given signal (two
6–pounders fired in quick succession), and overcoming a vigorous
resistance, gained possession of the fort.
With this company Captain-Lieutenant Dunn and Lieutenant Drummond appear
to have been.
The main army, with the Commander-in-Chief, remained encamped near Biana
until the 9th February, when they moved in the direction of Jeypoor, to
which town a detachment under Colonel Monson was sent from Dowsah on the
18th April; on the 10th May, a second detachment, under Colonel Don, was
sent against Tonk Rampoorah from Nurwalee; and on the 18th May, the main
army broke up, and retraced its steps towards Agra, suffering much from
the extreme heat of the weather ere it reached its destination in June.
Lieutenant-Colonel Don’s force arrived before Rampoor on the 14th May,
and to avoid exciting the enemy’s suspicions and inducing him to block
up the gateways really intended to be attacked, took up its position on
the opposite side of the fort. At two A.M. on the next morning, the
storming party advanced, headed by a 12–pounder, to blow the gates open,
and followed by another, to keep in check a body of the enemy’s cavalry;
while Captain Raban, with one 12–pounder and four 6–pounders, took up a
position from which he was enabled to fire upon any point of the works
which the enemy might man to meet the attack; a picquet of the enemy was
driven in, the first gate was blown in by the gun, the second was found
open, and the third and fourth were also blown in; the storming party
entered, and the town was taken possession of.
Thanks were given to Captain Raban and every officer and soldier of the
detachment; the 2nd company 1st battalion, or a portion of it, was
employed on this duty.
Hitherto the operations of the army had been perfectly successful, but
we have now to recount two failures, in both of which, but particularly
in that in Bundelcund, the artillery suffered heavily.
The Bundelcund force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, had been
protecting that province from Holkar’s incursions, and was encamped in
May, 1804, near Kooch. A detachment of seven companies of native
infantry, under Captain N. Smith, and fifty European artillery, from
the 1st and 2nd companies 3rd battalion, under Captain-Lieutenant
Feade and Lieutenant Morris, were sent against a small fort, named
Baillah, in the neighbourhood. The guns having opened on the 21st May,
the killidar offered to surrender on the following morning if the
firing was directed to cease; his offer was accepted, but availing
himself of the respite, he immediately despatched intelligence to
Ameer Khan, who was in the vicinity, and requested him to fall on the
detachment, which he did the next morning with 8,000 cavalry, and cut
up two companies of the infantry, and the whole of the artillery,[58]
with their officers, and took possession of the guns,[59] except one,
which, with the remaining five companies, made good their retreat to
Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s head-quarters. This officer, alarmed at
the reports he received, and unequal to the emergency in which he was
placed, immediately retreated to Betwah; which movement caused much
annoyance to the Commander-in-Chief, as it opened Bundelcund to
Holkar, and left him undistracted to turn his whole force against
Colonel Monson’s detachment in Rajasthan. Lord Lake would have ordered
the command of this force to have been previously made over to
“Lieutenant-Colonel Wittit, of the artillery, a most excellent
officer; but for his ill-health;” this was very indifferent; so much
so, indeed, that he died on the 27th May. In him the regiment lost a
most valuable officer; as a subaltern he had served with his company
in Lord Cornwallis’s campaigns on the coast, and was considered by Sir
John Horsford one of the most superior officers in the regiment.
Colonel Martindell, after some changes, was appointed to the command of
the force, and in June succeeded in capturing Mahobar, and defeating the
Ram Rajah and Nagahs, and with this the campaign closed.
We must now follow Colonel Monson’s force, with which was the 2nd
company 2nd battalion of artillery, commanded by Captain Hutchinson and
Lieutenant Winbolt, in its unfortunate retreat. Advancing, after the
capture of Hinglaizgurh to the Mokundra Pass, with the object of
co-operating with Colonel Murray’s force from Guzerat, on the 7th July
Colonel Monson received intelligence of Holkar’s having crossed the
Chumbul, and moved to meet him; but almost immediately learning that
Colonel Murray had fallen back on the Myhie, he retired to the pass on
the 8th, beating off the attacks of the enemy. Fearful, however, of the
enemy getting behind him, he commenced his retreat on Kotah. On the 12th
he was again attacked, and again beat Holkar off; he pushed on for the
Janee Nuddee, but the rain falling heavily, he did not reach the ghat
till the morning of the 13th, and then finding the rivulet not fordable,
he was obliged to halt till the 15th; the state of the roads was such
that the guns sunk deep in the mud, several were abandoned, and most of
the ammunition destroyed. On the 17th the Chumbul was reached; the
Europeans were passed over on elephants, and sent on to Rampoorah, while
the main body crossed over in detachments wherever fords could be found.
On the 24th there was another severe contest with the enemy, and it was
not until the 27th that the last battalion, with Colonel Monson, reached
Rampoorah; but here this unhappy detachment found no rest,—want of
provisions forced them to push on, and after leaving a garrison under
Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, they again moved (they were
however reinforced by two battalions, four guns, and some irregular
cavalry, under Major Frith) to the Bunass. On the 22nd August they
reached its banks, and found it so swollen that the largest elephants
could scarcely pass; three boats only could be found, and in them the
treasure was sent across. On the 23rd the enemy appeared in force, and
on the 24th, the river having run off a little, the baggage was got
over, Monson covering the retreat by an attack on the enemy, which was
at first successful, but the enemy rallying, forced him back, with the
loss of his last gun; the baggage was abandoned, and, harassed by the
enemy’s cavalry, the broken army reached Koosialgurh during the night;
from hence they moved in a square to the Biana Pass, where they hoped
for some respite; but Holkar, bringing his guns to bear, forced them to
continue their flight, and parties of broken and disordered fugitives
were all of Monson’s army that arrived at Agra.
In crossing the Bunass on the 24th Lieutenant Winbolt, of the artillery,
was drowned. He was an officer of high promise, and one who stood high
in the opinion of Sir J. Horsford, in whose company he had served on the
coast in the campaigns of 1790–1–2.
To check Holkar, the army was called out again; the horse artillery and
other troops from Cawnpoor marched on Agra on the 3rd September, and
towards the end of the month the camp was formed between Agra and
Secundra. Holkar was too wary to be led into a general action, and
moving northwards with his main body, he was followed by Lord Lake, who
reached Delhi and relieved the siege on the 15th October. Holkar moved
towards Parriput, and crossed the Jumna into the Upper Dooab; Lake (with
the horse artillery, cavalry, and reserve brigade, under Colonel Don)
crossed near Delhi on the 31st, and leaving all private wheel-carriages
and all baggage that could possibly be spared, pushed on, determined to
give Holkar no rest. This rapid movement relieved Colonel Burn, who,
with some nujeebs, was shut up in the ruined fort of Shamlee by Holkar.
Following closely, Lord Lake came in sight of him near Meerut, but he
fled with all speed, by the route of Hassur to Futteygurh. On the 16th,
Lake was within sixty miles of Futteygurh, and starting again at night,
he made great exertions to come up with him. Just as he mounted his
horse, news came of the decisive victory gained by Major-General Fraser
over the Mahrattas at Deig, an inspiriting omen to his own troops. At
dawn on the 17th, they reached the skirts of the enemy’s camp; the
horses were at their picquets, the men sleeping beside them, when their
sleep was either broken or rendered final by discharges of grape poured
in upon them from the horse-artillery guns; the dragoons charged, and
the enemy took to flight,—Holkar among the first. The blowing up of a
tumbril had first alarmed him, but he was persuaded it was the morning
gun being fired at Futteygurh; but the firing continuing, the cry of
“Lord Lake’s army” arose, and a general flight followed; some took
refuge in trees, and might have escaped, but from their indiscretion in
firing on our troops, who, thus taught in what direction to look, soon
brought them down with their pistols. The pursuit continued for upwards
of 10 miles, which, added to the previous march of 58, made a total of
68 miles in 24 hours, and when it is recollected that this had been
preceded by 350 miles in a fortnight, it may be considered one of the
most surprising feats on record, and speaking more powerfully to the
state of efficiency of the regiments so employed, than words can do.
The services of the horse artillery were acknowledged by Lord Lake; in
writing to the Governor-General, he says: “I have great satisfaction in
reporting to your lordship the very meritorious conduct of Captain Brown
and the corps of horse artillery under his command, who, by the rapidity
of their movements, were able to do great execution. Captain Brown’s
great attention in the management of his corps, and his zeal and
activity when called into action, have on every occasion merited my best
acknowledgments.” And in the General Order, November 18th, he returned
his thanks “to Captain Brown, and officers and men of the horse
artillery, for their highly meritorious and intrepid behaviour in the
engagement of yesterday.”
The officers with the horse artillery were Captain C. Brown, Lieutenants
H. Starke and J. Young. The wounded were 1 European, 1 Indian, and 4
horses; the killed 1 lascar and 7 horses.
The main body of the army, which had been left at Delhi on the 1st
November, moved in the direction of Govindhur, and on the 13th attacked
the Mahratta army under the walls of Deig, gained a complete victory,
and captured 87 guns, all mounted on field-carriages, and fitted with
elevating screws and every apparatus; among them were six of the
18–pounders presented to the Mahrattas in 1791, and (which must have
been a pleasing circumstance to Colonel Monson, who fell into the
command on the death of Major-General Fraser) fourteen of the guns, nine
tumbrils, and four casts of those which had been lost in his disastrous
campaign.
In this action the artillery lost 4 Europeans and 5 natives killed; 6
Europeans and 19 natives wounded: Captain Butler had a horse killed
under him.
Lord Lake followed Holkar from Futtehgurh on the 20th; crossed the Jumna
near Muttra, on the 28th; sent on the captured guns to Agra, and ordered
out a battering-train, which joining him on the 10th, he moved towards
Deig, and on the 13th took up a position. Trenches were opened during
the night, and a breach being ready by the 23rd, the place was carried
by storm. Captain Raban accompanied the storming party with a detail of
artillery to spike the guns, and distinguished himself by the way in
which he performed this duty.
Lieutenant Groves, of the artillery, was killed on the 20th December,
and Lieutenant T. D. Smith wounded; 100 guns were taken, together with
many tumbrils.
The details of this siege, as well as those of Bhurtpoor, Gunnourie,
Komona, and Adjegurh, are so fully recorded in that valuable publication
the _East-India Military Repository_, that it would only unnecessarily
swell this work, were more than the briefest allusion made, compatible
with our object.
For this siege six or eight 18–pounders, four 8–inch and four 5½-inch
mortars were all the siege ordnance available.
The insufficient provision of ordnance and stores for siege purposes
will henceforth often strike the reader; and the question why—possessed,
as Bengal is, of an inland navigation from one extremity of the
presidency to the other, offering every facility for a speedy and cheap
conveyance of stores—ample materials had not been pushed forward to meet
our wants, must continually recur. The suddenness of the campaign cannot
be admitted as a valid reason; the war had been deliberately entered on
eighteen months before, and it was known that the enemy possessed many
strongholds which required battering-trains for their reduction. The
first campaign had given us Agra, a place admirably situated for a
depôt, with reference to the scene of war, to which an adequate
equipment should have been forwarded; but it was not done, and the want
was severely felt in the course of this campaign. If ample supplies are
not available against a fortified place, and it is absolutely necessary
to reduce it, men’s lives must be substituted for shot and shells; in
some cases, no doubt, _time_ is most precious, and it may be a matter of
calculation whether time or men can best be spared; but when near our
own frontier, there can be no excuse for the improvidence which has
failed to provide the requisite stores, and by that means to take from
the commander the choice between expenditure of his troops or of the
munitions of war.
In most we must attribute the blame to the cumbrous and inefficient
machinery of the Military Board, in whose province lies the supervision
of the magazines; but the Board, composed of many members, becomes a
screen for individual responsibility, and this must always be the case
until each member is vested with the sole control of the details of his
own department, subject only to a discussion in the Board of the general
question, that each may have the benefit of his colleagues’ opinions,
and be made aware of what is going on in other departments, that all may
work in concert.
The opinion above given of the inefficient state of our siege-trains is
fully borne out by that recorded by the Marquis of Hastings in his
“Summary,” when, speaking of Hattrass, he says, “One of my earliest
military cares on arriving in India had been to satisfy myself why we
had made so comparatively unfavourable a display in sieges.” The details
at once unfolded the cause: it is well known that nothing can be more
insignificant than shells thrown with long intervals; and we never
brought forward more than four or five mortars where we undertook the
capture of a fortified place. Hence the bombardment was futile, so that
at last the issue was to be staked on mounting a breach and fighting
hand to hand with a soldiery skilful as well as gallant, in defending
the prepared intrenchments. This was not the oversight of the Bengal
Artillery officers, for no men can be better instructed in the theory,
or more careful in the practice of their profession than they are; it
was imputable to a false economy on the part of government. The outlay
for providing for the transport of mortars, shells, and platforms in due
quantity would certainly have been considerable, and it was on that
account forborne; the miserable carriages of the country, hired for the
purpose, where a military exertion was contemplated, were utterly
unequal to the service, and constantly failed under the unusual weight
in the deep roads through which they had to pass. Therefore we never sat
down before a place of real strength furnished with the means which a
proper calculation would have allotted for its reduction.
These remarks have been particularly brought out by studying the details
of the attack on Bhurtpoor, which next employed Lord Lake’s army, but
which we shall not enter into, referring the reader to the same
authority as mentioned when speaking of the siege of Deig, and
contenting ourselves with a very concise account of the operations.
The army marched from Deig to Bhurtpoor; trenches were opened on the 4th
of January, 1805; batteries were erected, a breach effected, and an
unsuccessful storm attempted, on the 9th; other batteries were raised
and a fresh breach made, but the enemy were so active in stockading it
every night, that a second attack could not be made until the 21st:
this, also, was unsuccessful. During the storm, the British cavalry were
forced to turn out to keep off Holkar. On the 23rd, a convoy, slenderly
escorted, was plundered; a second and a larger one was successfully
brought in on the 28th, containing, among other stores, 8,000 18–pounder
shot. On the 6th February the army changed ground; Meer Khan crossed the
Jumna on the 7th, and was pursued by Major-General Smith, with all the
cavalry and horse artillery, who came up with and defeated him at
Afzulgurh, near Moradabad, on the 2nd of March; the scattered remains of
this army recrossed the Ganges, and Major-General Smith returned to camp
on the 23rd, after a march of 700 miles.
The siege had been still carried on; the Bombay army joined on the 10th
February, but the troops, although nearly exhausted, petitioned to be
allowed to finish the operation; the artillery were particularly eager,
for, though few in number, and fatigued beyond conception by working the
guns without a relief since the commencement of the siege, the thoughts
of being deprived of their post distressed them exceedingly, and they
entreated permission to be allowed to discharge the duties of their
station alone.
Regular approaches were made, and the batteries pushed on to within 400
yards of the walls, but the means of arming them were very insufficient;
six 18–pounders, four heavy mortars, four light mortars, and two
12–pounders to take off the defences, appear to have been the extent of
ordnance preparations brought against a place six or eight miles in
circumference! On the morning of the 21st, a sally made by the enemy was
driven back, and in the afternoon a storm was attempted, covered by the
artillery guns drawn out on the plain, but without success. A fourth
attack was made the following day, but it equally failed. The siege was
still continued, but the enemy offering to give up the fortress on
certain terms, it was accepted, and the army finally broke up from its
melancholy camp at Bhurtpoor on the 21st April, and after remaining a
short time on the banks of the Chumbul, watching Scindiah, retired to
Agra the following month.
During the siege, the artillery lost Lieutenant Percival, killed on 9th
January; Lieutenant Gowing, killed on 22nd February; Captain Nelly,
wounded on 21st February; Captain Pennington, wounded on 22nd February;
and Lieutenant Swiney, wounded on 21st February.
From this melancholy detail it is cheering to turn to the successful
proceedings of Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, who, it will be
recollected, was left during Monson’s retreat in command of Rampoorah,
and whose judicious application of a small force led to the most
brilliant results.
On the 17th January, 1805, he marched with his company, 2nd company 2nd
battalion (or a portion of it), 320 sipahis, a few irregulars, and two
6–pounders, against Gemeena; reaching it as the moon rose on the 18th,
he instantly commenced the attack. The road to the gate was blocked up
by loaded hackeries, their wheels removed, and thus the approach of the
guns was prevented; the hackeries were set fire to, steps were cut in
the side of the ramparts, and the sipahis mounted; their only officer,
Lieutenant Purvis, being wounded. Captain Hutchinson supplied his place,
and aided by Corporals Cross and Hislop, mounted the ramparts; a hole
was made through the parapet, and the assailants increasing in number,
the enemy were driven back on the gate; but the wicket being forced open
by the butt ends of the muskets, the place was captured with but little
loss.
Lord Lake, reporting the above to Lord Wellesley, says, “The enterprise
and gallantry this meritorious officer has on every occasion manifested
during his command at Rampoorah has never been more conspicuous than on
the present occasion, where he appears to have accomplished a most
arduous and dangerous undertaking, with a spirit and perseverance which
reflects on him the highest credit.”
On the 22nd February, he went against Bommongaon, a mud fort, with high
ramparts and a ditch; the gates built up and remarkably well defended by
a garrison of 300 men. His party consisted of his own company and 160
sipahis, with two 6–pounders and two howitzers; these light guns made no
impression, but on the 24th two 12–pounders arrived, and by the evening
a practicable breach was effected, but the assault being delayed till
morning, the garrison made off in the night.
On the 25th February he moved to Karawul, a large walled town, with a
number of bastions, four small guns, and 1,100 men as a garrison; he
placed his two 12–pounders and one 6–pounder in battery within 300 yards
of the walls; his battery was formed with empty tumbrils and
ammunition-boxes filled with earth, finished up with bags of grain; his
two howitzers and remaining 6–pounder were placed in a similar manner in
another direction. By the afternoon of the 26th a breach was made, which
he immediately stormed.
Captain Hutchinson was not unmindful of the deserts of his subordinates;
he says: “I should be proud if his Excellency General Lake would notice
Corporals Cross[60] and Hislop; they are soldiers who have distinguished
themselves more than once, and there are not two better or braver men in
the 2nd company 2nd battalion of artillery.”
His next exploit was against Darrara, a fort with a broad and deep ditch
and high ramparts, the gate defended by a ditch and covered with an
outwork. Captain Hutchinson placed his garrison in two batteries, one at
35 yards from the counterscarp, one still nearer, and by noon on the
21st March, a breach was effected; the storming party, headed by six
artillerymen, whom it would be injustice not to name,—Corporals Cross
and Hislop, Gunners Campbell and Johnstone, Matrosses Muller and
Hudson,—moved to the attack, and after overcoming a severe opposition,
succeeded in gaining possession of the fort; of the enemy between 60 and
70 were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners. Of the artillerymen,
Johnstone was killed, and Hudson shot through the body and arm, after
which he charged and killed three of the enemy.
But we must once more return to Lord Lake’s army, whom we left at Agra.
The rainy season limited their repose. Holkar’s restless spirit urged
him to collect his scattered followers, at the head of whom, equipped
with 60 guns, he approached Muttra in October; Lord Lake followed, and
Holkar moved to the north. It soon became a perfect chase. Holkar fled
into the Punjab; Lake crossed the Sutlej on the 7th December, and was on
the point of engaging him on the banks of the Beas on the 25th, but was
prevented by positive instructions from the Governor-General, who
probably wished to avoid embroiling himself with the Seikhs. A treaty
was therefore reluctantly entered into, and the army returned slowly to
Dehli.
Captain Pennington was commissary of ordnance with this force; Captain
C. Brown, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Frith and Boileau, were with the horse
artillery, and Captain T. Greene, Lieutenants Hay and Rodber, with the
1st company 1st battalion.
In closing the account of these glorious campaigns, it will not be out
of place here to record the names of the officers sharing in them, and
we fortunately have a memorandum, in Sir John Horsford’s writing, of
those entitled to share in the prize-money, which gives the necessary
information.
_1st Campaign._
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,│
Capt. Butler, │
Capt. T. Greene, │
Capt. Raban, │
Capt. Nelly, │
Capt. Constable, │
Capt. Hutchinson, │
Capt. W. Shipton, │
Capt. Best, │
Capt. J. Robinson, │
Capt. Mathews, │
Lieut. M. Browne, │
Lieut. Morris, │
─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
Lieut. S. Hay, │ Agra and Laswaree only.
Lieut. Beagham, │ 〃
Lieut. W. Parker. │ 〃
_2nd Campaign._
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,│
Capt. C. Brown, │
Capt. Raban, │
Capt. Nelly, │
Capt. Hutchinson, │
Capt. Best, │
Capt. Butler, │
Capt. Paschaud, │
Capt. Mathews, │
Lieut. M. Browne, │
Lieut. H. Starke, │
Lieut. Swiney, │
Lieut. Young, │
Lieut. Grove, │
Lieut. Gowing, │
Lieut. Pollock, │
Lieut. Parker, │
Lieut. Hay, │
Lieut. Percival, │
Lieut. T. D. Smith, │
─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
Capt. Hinde, │Bhurtpoor from January to April.
Capt. Dunn, │ 〃
Capt. Pennington, │ 〃
Lieut. W. H. Frith, │ 〃
The paucity of British troops in the ceded provinces induced several of
the zemindars to resist the revenue authorities, and, among others,
Doondia Khan, who possessed two strong mud forts in the vicinity of
Aligurh. The failure of the attacks on Bhurtpoor added to their
contumacy, but the want of power to punish, rendered it necessary to
pass it over for the time, and be content with some show of submission,
which Doondia Khan made to Major-General Smith on his return from
Afzulgurh to Bhurtpoor.
Causes of complaint continued to arise, and towards the end of 1806, the
collector reported he had strengthened Komona with a new outwork and
attacked a neighbouring zemindar.
All efforts at accommodation proving useless, a force was collected in
August, 1807, under Major-General Dickens, and proceeded against Komona
on the 12th of October. With this force were—
────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┬───────────────────────
Company.│Battalion.│Captain-Lieutenant.│ Lieutenants.
────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────
3 │ 1 │ Lindsay │MᶜQuake, Harris, Pryce,
────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────
2 │ 2 │ 〃 │Forrester, and Parlby.
────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┴───────────────────────
Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford was also present, commanding a brigade, but
also specially directing the artillery.
An assault was made on the 18th November, but proved unsuccessful, owing
to the determined opposition the enemy made, and the way in which he
defended the breach, with mines, powder-bags, burning choppahs, &c. The
assailants were beat back with heavy loss, but the enemy deserted the
place during the night.
Lieutenants Harris and MᶜQuake, acting as engineers, were wounded; 5
Europeans and 9 natives killed; 10 Europeans and 10 lascars, of the
artillery, were wounded.
From Komona the force proceeded to Gunnouree on the 22nd November, and
carried on the attack of that fort until the 11th December, when the
enemy evacuated it.
For the detail of these operations we would refer the reader to the
fourth volume of the _East-India Military Repository_.
The strength of the artillery, as fixed in 1802, having proved itself
quite insufficient for the duties of the Presidency, in August, 1805,
five companies of golundaz were raised; they were formed from the
“component parts” which remained on the alteration in 1802. These
companies were added without any officers, but in the following year
(19th June, 1806) a lieutenant-colonel and major were added to each
battalion.
The regiment, therefore, at this period consisted of—
──────────────────────────┬────
Colonels. │ 3
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Colonels │ 6
──────────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 6
──────────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 21
──────────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 21
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 42
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 42
─────────┬────────────────┼────
Horse. │Serjeants. │ 4
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Corporals. │ 4
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Gunners. │ 10
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Trumpeters. │
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Matrosses. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Foot. │Serjeants. │ 105
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Corporals. │ 105
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Gunners. │ 210
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Drummers. │ 42
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Matrosses. │1680
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Golundaz.│Native Officers.│ 10
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Havildars. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Naicks. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Drummers. │
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Lascars. │Privates. │ 500
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Serangs. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │1st Tindals. │ 81
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 81
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Lascars. │2750
─────────┴────────────────┴────
The staff are omitted in this abstract, as they would only tend to swell
the headings, and their number is trifling.
In July three additional companies of golundaz were added of similar
strength.
In Bundelcund disturbances still continued, and during several years a
force continued to find employment in that district. In February, 1806,
Gohud was taken, and in January, 1807, Chumar, near Kooch. The General
Orders on the capture of the latter, notice “the professional ability
and zealous emulation displayed by Captain Hopper, of the
artillery * * * employed on that service in preparing the way * * * for
which all are entitled to his lordship’s particular praise and thanks.”
Captain Turton and Lieutenant G. Faithfull also appear to have been in
this campaign.
The following year, towards the conclusion, the force again took the
field to reduce Adjeegurh, which Luchmun Dowlah refused to yield,
agreeably to stipulation.
A portion marched against Heerapoor, with which were Major Brooke,
Lieutenants Granishaw and C. H. Campbell, of the artillery; after
ascending the pass on the 19th December, with much difficulty, the fort
was reconnoitred, and batteries formed of fascines and sand-bags on the
20th, and by 3 P.M. a breach was made; a fire was kept up at intervals
during the night, the enemy made a feeble attack on an outpost, and
evacuated the fort during the night.
The report of the Governor-General’s agent to the secretary to
Government said, “The exertions of the pioneers and their officers, and
those of Captain Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and Campbell, the
Europeans and lascars of the artillery, in preparing the batteries and
serving and laying the guns, could not be surpassed.”
Captain Brooke’s services were also acknowledged in orders by
Major-General Martindell.
On the 22nd January the force was brought into contact with the enemy,
who, surrounded in the strong position of Rugowley, made a desperate
resistance, and, although driven to a corner, rendered it necessary to
withdraw the troops from the attack.
Major Brooke, Captain-Lieutenant Ferris, Lieutenants D. Macleod,
Granishaw, Campbell, and Marshall, were present in this action.
On the 27th January the army took up their position before Adjeegurh; a
battery was erected on the plain, but the distance was found to have
been miscalculated, probably from the overhanging appearance which forts
built on hills assume, and it was found necessary to occupy the spur up
which the road ran to the gate. Much labour was required to convey the
heavy guns to their positions, and it was not until the morning of the
11th February that they opened their fire; it continued during the 12th
and the morning of the 13th, when the whole of a wall came down; the
killidar then came out, and the fort was given up.
“To the artillery the heavy duties of the siege more particularly fell;
their exertions were great, and vied with the natural objects they had
to encounter. Their fire was inimitably well directed, and the
commanding officer must ever feel himself indebted to the officers and
men who conducted it.
“The judgment, zeal, and energy of Captain Brooke, commanding the
artillery, his personal and unremitting exertions, were so conspicuous
during the siege, that to do ample justice to the merits of that
valuable officer, the commanding officer cannot convey in terms too
strong his high sense of approbation and approval.”
A small force was also employed this year in reducing Bhowanee, a fort
in the Hurrianah country. The inhabitants had been in the habit of
plundering all travellers, and at length ventured on the baggage of a
British detachment. The chief met a representation by a peremptory
denial of reparation in terms of insolence. The force in Rewaree, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, moved out towards the end of August, and
arriving on the 27th, allowed the enemy twenty-four hours to consider.
The terms were absolutely rejected, and on the 28th batteries were
quickly erected; their fire opened the following morning, and by noon a
breach was made, and the place carried by assault after a vigorous
resistance.
“To Captain Mason, in the general command of the artillery, the very
able arrangement of that officer’s department throughout, but
particularly in conducting the duties of the breaching-batteries, with
the very heavy and well-directed fire that was so rapidly kept up, in
covering the advance and approach of the storming party to the points of
attack, entitles Captain Mason to every commendation, and reflects great
credit on the officers and men under his command.”
This detachment order was republished in the Government General Order,
detailing the service.
We have been unable to ascertain what portion of the regiment, and what
officers, were on this occasion employed.
We must now advert to two important additions which were made to the
regiment in the course of this year. In August the Governor-General,
adverting to the original establishment of the experimental horse
artillery, the success of which on various occasions in the field has
fully confirmed the judgment which was formed of the superior efficiency
of a corps of that description for service in India, determined to make
a considerable augmentation to the corps, and place it on a permanent
establishment. It was accordingly directed to be increased to three
troops; the officers and men to be drawn from the foot artillery.
──────────────────┬──────────┬──────────
│per Troop.│ Total
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captains. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Capt.-Lieutenants.│ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenant. │ 3│ 9
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Adjutant. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Riding Master. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serj.-Major. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
R. R. Sergeant. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Qr.-Master Serj. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serjeants. │ 6│ 18
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Corporals. │ 6│ 18
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Gunners. │ 10│ 30
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Matrosses. │ 80│ 240
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Trumpeters. │ 2│ 6
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Farriers. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Native Farriers. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Native Doctors. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serangs. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Tindals. │ 2│ 6
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lascars. │ 24│ 72
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Horses. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Syces. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Grass-cutters. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┴──────────┴──────────
The senior captain exercised the command over the whole, in addition to
the command of his own troop, subject to the orders of the commandant of
artillery.
In December orders were issued for the formation of a corps of
ordnance-drivers. Hitherto the drivers for the ordnance carriages had
been hired as required, and discharged when the service was over; this
system had worked so ill, and its faults had been so strongly brought to
light in the late campaigns, that it was now resolved to introduce a
better plan. An organized corps was raised, sufficient to provide a
driver to every two bullocks, and divided into companies, which were
attached to companies of artillery, in the same manner as the lascars,
with whom they were assimilated as much as possible. They were clothed
in uniform, and were not to be discharged except by the authority of the
commandant of artillery or officers commanding the principal stations of
the army.
Raised from the middle castes,—the Gwalas and Aheeas chiefly,—and
attached to the service by the regular pay, the pension when worn out,
and the treatment they received, this proved a valuable addition to the
regiment.
In November two companies of independent golundaz were raised, to take
the duties of Prince of Wales’ Island.
We have omitted to state that in May, 1808, Colonel Carnegie resigned
the command of the regiment and sailed for England. He was succeeded by
Colonel Horsford, who had, with so much credit to himself, been
commanding the artillery in the field. Colonel Horsford originally
entered the corps as a private; he was born of a good family, and well
educated, but his friends wishing him to enter the church, he evaded it
by enlisting in the Honourable Company’s service, and coming to Bengal
as a private in the artillery, under the assumed name of Rover, and in
1778 he was a serjeant in Captain Thelwall’s, or the 1st, company.
Inquiries having been made for him, it is said he was suspected by
Colonel Pearse, who had employed him in copying some papers, from his
pointing out an error in a Greek quotation; his appearance answering to
the description may also have furnished a clue. Colonel Pearse tried him
by calling out his name suddenly as he was leaving the room; the test
was successful; his confusion betrayed his identity, and he was promoted
to a cadetship in the regiment, and continued to rise by seniority. He
was employed in the campaigns against Tippoo in 1791–2 and 1799,
establishing for himself a high name, both as a practical and scientific
artillery officer; his advent to the command of the regiment was hailed
with universal pleasure and satisfaction, for much benefit was expected
to the corps by the manner in which he would exercise his authority,
increased as it was by the great personal influence which his character
had established.
In 1810 the regiment was again called on to take part in an expedition,
beyond seas. In the preceding year a force, chiefly of Madras troops,
was sent against the Isle of France, and occupied Rodriguez; it was
reinforced by Bengal troops, and directed against the remaining islands
in 1810.
The 6th company 1st battalion of artillery sailed on the expedition, but
had little opportunity of gaining distinction. Bourbon was occupied in
July, and the force sailing for the Isle of France, landed at an
unexpected point, and moved forward with rapidity and decision. Fort
Malartic was carried by assault, and the town surrendered in December.
[Illustration]
The officers in the margin[61] accompanied the artillery; and the native
troops were decorated with a medal, not so much for the service,
probably, as for the purpose of stimulating the native army to embark
with alacrity for service beyond seas.
In this year the regiment furnished a portion for a far more serious
conflict, in which native troops were once again brought into personal
contest with Europeans, an event which had not occurred since the
destruction of the French power in the Carnatic; we refer to the
expedition to Java.
The artillery detachment was as follows:—
Major Caldwell, Commandant. Lieut. J. Scott,
Adjutant.
───────────────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────
Company. │7 │1
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Battalion. │1 │2
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lascar Companies. │15, 16 │19, 24
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Captains. │W. Richards │J. Dundas
│ │H. Faithful
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Captain Lieutenants. │J. D. Smith │J. Farrington
│ │Cameron
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lieutenants. │Harris │
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.│Archer │Farnabie
│ │W. Bell
───────────────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────
3rd Independent Golundaz.
The detachment embarked on the 11th March, and reached Malacca in April,
where the Madras division joined; the expedition remained inactive till
the 11th June, almost the only event being the burning of one of the
Bengal store-ships laden with powder; and this occurred fortunately
without doing any damage to the fleet. Lieutenant Archer died on the
voyage.
On the 4th August the fleet anchored near Chillingching; the troops were
landed, and took possession of Batavia without opposition on the 8th; an
attempt by the enemy to drive them out the following night failed; and
on the 10th the British advanced and drove the enemy from their
intrenched camp at Weltervreeden. Captain Noble, with the Madras horse
artillery, performed the chief artillery duties on this occasion.
The enemy having concentrated their force in the strong lines around
Fort Cornelis, a battering-train was landed, and trenches were opened at
about 800 yards from the position. These the enemy flooded by cutting
dams on the 19th; on the 20th batteries for twelve and eight 18–pounders
and nine howitzers and mortars were commenced; on the 21st the enemy
opened a heavy fire on the unfinished batteries; but nevertheless the
guns were mounted by the 22nd, when the enemy made a vigorous sally, and
overcoming the unarmed working parties, who were not even protected by a
guard, succeeded for a moment in capturing the batteries; but they were
quickly driven back. On the 23rd and 24th a heavy fire was kept up by
the enemy from twenty-four 32–pounders on the batteries and trenches;
but although, on the 24th the fire of the nearest redoubt was repeatedly
silenced, and towards evening several of the enemy’s guns were
dismounted by the fire from the batteries, yet it became evident that
without regular approaches the place could not be carried (unless by a
_coup de main_), and this would require time, labour, and exposure in a
baneful climate, which was to be avoided by all means.
Lieutenant Farnabie was killed by a stray shot while standing in the
trench, and Captain Richards was wounded by some cartridges taking fire
in the battery during these two days.
It was determined to storm the lines on the 26th. To occupy the enemy, a
party, covered with nine guns, took post behind a rising ground on the
right, and opened their fire, while the main column, under Major-General
Gillespie, attacked the left, and after sustaining a severe loss,
finally succeeded in carrying the lines,—capturing 6,000 prisoners and
280 pieces of fine brass ordnance.
In the orders issued to the army after this exploit, no mention is made
of the artillery; and this omission has been attributed to a dislike
said to have been taken to the Bengal artillery. That some such feeling
was supposed to exist, we may conclude from the following passage, which
appears in a letter from an engineer officer on the island to Colonel
Horsford, written in October:—“You will see that the artillery were left
out in the thanks to the army on the 26th August; but allow me to say,
and that _decidedly_, that had it not been from the fire of our
18–pounders on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, I believe not a man would have
returned from the storm of the 26th without some remembrance, as the day
before the storm 130 men and 4 officers were killed and wounded by our
batteries; the consequence was, that their artillerymen positively
refused to work at the batteries, and hardly a gun was fired by the
enemy during the storm, although they had plenty of time; in short, I
declare to you that I scarcely ever saw a more destructive fire kept up
than by our batteries; indeed the killed and wounded in a hospital four
miles to the south of Cornelis showed it, as well as the number of guns
that were dismounted. I was constantly in the batteries. * * * The
effect of our artillery, when they did fire, was so conspicuous, that at
a _practice_ I never saw better firing, _especially_ of three guns on
the right of the twelve-gun battery, commanded by Lieutenant Cameron. I
declare to you I never witnessed anything like it, for every shot he
fired went into the enemy’s embrasures; the consequence was, that in an
hour and a half the redoubt which was opposed to it was silenced.”
In Sir Samuel Achmuty’s report to Lord Minto, the following mention is
made of the ordnance branches:—“I have the satisfaction to assure you
that both the artillery and engineers were actuated by the same zeal in
performing their respective duties which has been so conspicuous in all
ranks and departments, though, from deficiency of the means at their
disposal, their operations were unavoidably embarrassed with uncommon
difficulties.”
From Cornelis, General Jansens fled to Bintenzorg, and thence to
Samarang, near which town he took up a position, Jattoo, on high and
rugged hills, defended by thirty pieces of artillery, and the road cut
off by cheveux de frise; he was attacked on the 16th of September by a
detachment of 1,200 men, under Colonel Gibbs, with whom were 110
artillerymen and six guns; with the artillery were Major Caldwell,
Lieutenants Scott, Farrington, Cameron, and Ralfe. Two of the guns were
sent to the right with a force to seize on a hill which overlooked the
enemy’s left, while the remainder were placed in a position in front to
throw their shot across the valley into the enemy’s position. As soon as
the two detached guns opened their fire, the advance rushed on; the
enemy were surprised and fled, doing little execution with their
artillery, which was all taken.
This was the last effort of General Jansens; he fled to Salatiga and
capitulated; Fort Ludovick was surrendered, and the war, as far as the
Dutch were concerned, may be said to have ended; but to avoid returning
to Java again, we will here notice such other affairs as occurred during
the time the British held possession of the island. But before
continuing the narrative, we will here insert a sketch of the medal
granted to the native troops employed in the expedition; and we may also
state that medals were for this service granted to officers in H.M.’s
service, but to none under the rank of commanding officer of a corps, or
holding an important staff office.
[Illustration]
The next service on which this force was employed was the expedition
under Gillespie to the Palmsbury river, in April, 1822, in which were
Captain S. Shaw, Lieutenants Hill and Delafosse.
In June, they again started for Samarang. Major Butler, who had
previously come round, commanded the artillery; Lieutenants Farrington,
Cameron, and Hill accompanied. They reached Djocjocarta on the 17th of
June, and prepared for the attack of the “kraken,” or fortified
residence of the Sultan of Mataram, three miles in circumference, armed
with many guns, and defended by a broad wet ditch with drawbridges, by
17,000 regular troops, and an armed population of 100,000. The enemy
were kept on the alert by a heavy fire till three in the morning of the
20th, they were then allowed a respite, and two hours before daylight
the troops moved to the assault and carried the works. Major Butler, one
drummer, and eleven rank and file of the artillery, were wounded.
In the Orders, we find, “The Commander of the Forces performs a pleasing
task in recognizing the valuable services of Major Butler, commanding
the artillery, who has uniformly displayed his wonted zeal and
indefatigable exertion; the Commander of the Forces is therefore happy
in the opportunity of bearing public testimony to the professional
superiority and valuable acquirements of this excellent officer;” and
Lieutenant Cameron’s conduct is also spoken of.
Other expeditions[62] took place during the time we held possession of
the island, in which, Captain-Lieutenant Shaw, Lieutenant Farrington,
Lieutenants Cameron, Harris, and Delafosse, took part; in those against
the town of Boni, in 1814, and against Macassar, in 1816, Lieutenant
Farrington is mentioned in Orders, and attention drawn to his exertions.
Bundlecund still continued the seat of war; Gopal Sing, availing himself
of the natural fastnesses of the country, evaded our troops continually.
He was overtaken near Perereea in February (and Lieutenant Timbrell is
mentioned on this occasion), but escaping, he fled to the hills, from
whence he came out the following month, and before assistance could be
sent, burned the cantonment of Tiroha, maintaining a harassing and
desultory warfare, which, without producing any marked events, kept the
troops constantly on the move during that and the following year; and it
was only brought to a close by the siege of Callingur, in February,
1812; after which, Gopal Sing returned to his allegiance.
Callingur is a fort situated on one of those detached rocky eminences
abounding in Bundlecund, and which require little aid from art, as they
are almost natural fortifications. The rock at the summit forms a
natural scarp, of from ten to twenty feet high, and the whole side of
the hill is very difficult of access. The only entrance is in the centre
of the northern wall, and the approach to it is by a steep pathway
winding up the face of the hill; this gained, a succession of gates bar
the entrance to the fort.
The force under Colonel Martindell assembled on the 19th January; on the
21st occupied a small hill, within 800 yards, which promised to be the
most favourable point for attack. The 22nd, 23rd, and 24th were employed
in clearing the jungle and making a road for the guns, and, on the 25th,
two 18–pounders were, with great labour, got up. In the night, two more
guns and two mortars followed, and were placed in battery: two other
batteries were erected at the foot of the hill, against the main
gateway, and the whole being ready by the 28th, opened with great
effect. The enemy’s guns were immediately dismounted, and the bastion
opposed to the guns on the hill demolished.
The town was taken this day; and the batteries continuing to play till
the 2nd of February, the breach was supposed practicable, and a party
advanced to storm it, but finding a perpendicular ascent of twenty feet,
their ladders crushed and broken by the showers of large stones the
enemy rolled down, the party were forced to retire with heavy loss: the
killadar, however, was glad to come to terms, and capitulated on the 8th
February.
Major Fuller commanded the artillery in this siege, and their exertions
were acknowledged in General Orders:—“The Governor-General deems it his
duty to express his concurrence in the honourable testimony borne to the
distinguished services of the artillery and engineer departments by
Colonel Martindell.”
The neighbouring districts of Boglecund and Rewah were, during the next
year, the scenes of petty warfare, similar to what had taken place in
Bundlecund; marked by no features of great importance, yet involving
much exertion on the part of the troops, particularly the artillery
employed, from the mountainous and rugged features of the country and
the number of nullahs and rivers intersecting it. We have but few
records of this campaign, and are therefore unable to give the details,
interesting as they would be to those who are acquainted with the
country, and can, from the present state of the Heerapoor, Bisramgunge,
and Bundry ghats, easily imagine the difficulties they presented at the
time of which we are now writing.
About this period an alteration took place in the _matériel_ of the
regiment, by the introduction of the Gribeauval pattern of gun-carriage
and the long caisson for ammunition, a description of which will be
found in the fourth chapter. The _matériel_ and the means of draught
occupied much attention at this period, and there is every reason to
believe that the recently organized driver corps and the gun bullocks
about this period, under the particular care and attention of
Lieutenant-Colonel Grace, commanding the artillery in the field, were in
a most efficient state. The bullocks were carefully selected and
trained, fairly worked and well looked after, and the consequence was,
that we find the gun bullocks condemned as past their work, selling,
from the high condition they were in, for the purpose of slaughter, at a
higher rate than the good young cattle bought to replace them were
costing.
As the next war in which the army was engaged proved how insufficient
the strength of the regiment was, and caused a considerable addition to
the native portion of it, we propose here to notice the additions to the
end of 1815, although the war commenced the preceding year: by so doing,
we shall avoid breaking the thread of the narrative of the Goorkha war.
The last additions we have noticed were two companies of independent
golundaz, added in 1809; a third company was raised in February, 1812,
and a fourth in August, 1814; in 1815 four additional companies of
golundaz were raised to meet the wants of the service; so that the
regiment now consisted of 1 horse brigade of three troops, 3 European
battalions of 7 companies each, and 1 Native battalion of 16 companies,
together with lascars (42 companies) and ordnance-drivers (26
companies); but these additions to the numerical strength of the
regiment had been made without any corresponding increase to the ranks
of the commissioned officers. This was peculiarly galling; for while
struggling with the difficulties of their position, the officers had the
mortification of seeing the numbers of the infantry increased by whole
regiments at a time, bringing fair promotion with the augmentations,
while, in their own branch, from 1802 to 1815, the troops and companies
had increased from 21 to 40, yet, with the exception of the field
officers added in 1806, not an officer had been given: the infantry had
during that time risen from 25 to 31 regiments.
An important change in the location of the regiment took place in 1813.
The head-quarters had hitherto been in Fort William, and moved out to
Dum-Dum during the cold months for practice and exercise; this year,
barracks having been completed, Dum-Dum was permanently occupied as the
head-quarters of the artillery,—a change, no doubt, adding much to the
comfort of all ranks, for there can be no comparison as to the comfort
and health of men cooped up within the narrow limits of a fortress, and
those occupying an airy roomy cantonment,—even if a cantonment
surrounded with swamps, as Dum-Dum is; and in spite of which it is now
one of the most salubrious of stations for European troops. As it had
been used as a practice-ground for upwards of thirty years, many
bungalows of different degrees of stability had sprung up,—chiefly, we
believe, of mat and thatch; and as the officers doubtless were not idle
while the barracks were building, we may believe that they found plenty
of accommodation ready for them; and houses, of a more durable nature,
soon began to spring up, some on new sites, others replacing the
temporary habitations. A mess-house, we believe, had been previously
built by Government; occupying the site of the centre room of the
present building, which, by gradual additions and alterations, has
reached its present handsome proportions. These were chiefly made in
1824–5, in 1836, and in 1841–2, when the verandah was raised and the
portico added. The last improvement was made in 1845, when the roof, put
on twenty years before, requiring to be renewed, the centre rooms were
raised several feet. The other houses in the cantonment have hardly
undergone less change: brick walls first replaced the mats, and then
puckah roofs superseded the thatch; the usual additions of rooms and
verandahs taking place. The very last of the old bungalows was recently
transformed into a puckah house, and, save the old avenue, which all
declare to have been exactly in its present state when they landed half
a century ago, there is little in the present cantonment which can be
recognized by those who first occupied it permanently. The barracks had
an upper story placed on them about 1830; the church was built in 1819;
and a year or two ago a racket-court, for the men of the regiment, was
built: the officers erected one for themselves in 1834.
For many years Dum-Dum was a very favourite station; its mess, its
amateur theatre, its band, and, at one time, its pack of fox-hounds,
rendered it a place of resort to many from Calcutta and the neighbouring
stations; but the gradual change in the location of the artillery has
necessarily reduced the numbers there, and the heavy tax upon the means
of living, caused by the station being placed on half-batta in 1829,
causes all who can to avoid it; and consequently hardly any are to be
found there save the staff of the regiment of the station and the
battalions quartered there, with the young men just arrived from England
and awaiting their dispatch to the provinces.