Reduction of Golundaz Battalion—Formation of Regiment into Two
European Battalions with Ten Battalions of Lascars—Goddard’s
Expedition—Popham’s Capture of Gwalior—Insurrection at
Benares—Attacks on Pateeta, Luteefpoor, and Siege of
Bidgegurh—Colonel Pearse’s Expedition to the Coast—Reduction of
Golundaz Companies—Transport Train, Foundry, Powder-works—Reduction
in Establishment—Pay—Artillery formed into One European Battalion of
Ten Companies—Lascar Battalions abolished—Battalion Guns—Artillery
formed into Three European Battalions, Lascars into Thirty
Companies.
The formation detailed in the preceding chapter was not destined to
remain, for in March, 1779, Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote arrived
from England with the commission of commander-in-chief, and soon after
his arrival it was rumoured that he had brought authority to disband the
golundaz.
From representations grounded in error and party views, alarm had been
taken by the Court of Directors and the Government at the supposed
danger of teaching the natives the use of artillery, and in August the
golundaz were ordered to be disbanded, the men having the option allowed
them of entering infantry regiments or joining the lascars.
To this corps, having been raised at his suggestion and disciplined by
himself, Colonel Pearse was much attached, and, both on public grounds
and private feelings, was averse to its being broken up. He
unfortunately had many enemies in high rank in Calcutta;—the consequence
of the feelings of rancour which had so long disturbed the settlement,
and which were still kept up by Mr. Francis’s and General Clavering’s
faction and Warren Hastings’s adherents. Among these was Colonel Watson,
commanding the engineers, who vowed the overthrow of the golundaz, and,
having considerable influence, urged Sir Eyre Coote to proceed in this
ill-judged measure.
Those readers, who may recollect the golundaz at Cawnpore under Major
Hay, may well conceive how deeply it must have wounded Colonel Pearse to
see a similar corps sacrificed to jealousy and party views; and there is
every reason to suppose that Colonel Pearse’s golundaz were equal to
Major Hay’s, which is saying every thing, for there never was a corps
better disciplined than the latter.
Colonel Pearse determined that the golundaz should not be reduced, if
any exertions on his part could save them; and accordingly, as soon as
the rumours reached him, addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief,
in which he urged the necessity of employing native artillery, from the
impossibility of keeping up sufficient European artillery for the
service of our extended empire, liable to be attacked at both
extremities, and at such a distance as to preclude the possibility of
assistance. He combated the argument of danger from native artillerymen
deserting and teaching their art to the golundaz of native powers, by
proving that, at that time and previously, the native states had
artillerymen not inferior to ours in the mere gun exercise and
preparation of common stores, and that, were this not the case, the
desertion of a few European artillerymen would render all precautions
useless; that in reality for many years past there were thirty men
nominally infantry, but in reality artillerymen attached to each
battalion, for the service of the two field guns, which arrangement
entailed the possibility of all the evils now feared, though without the
advantages which a regular corps of native artillery would give. He
deprecated the system of battalion guns as useless, the guns being
without officers to manage them so as to produce the best effect, by
attending to the advantages of ground and selection of ammunition best
adapted to the occasion; the two European artillerymen detached with
each battalion for this purpose being ignorant of the higher—the more
scientific parts of the profession, which knowledge is confined in
general to the officers; that it ruined the discipline of these men,
who, though they went out good men, returned, in general, drunken
vagabonds; that the lascars sent, though of the artillery, were only
employed in dragging the guns, and were unarmed and undisciplined, but
that they served for menial offices, which made them desirable to
captains commanding the infantry battalions. He recommended that the
guns should be collected in small brigades, or batteries, and brought to
the points wanted, instead of being frittered away along the line; that
the discipline of the men working them, from being under their own
officers, would be better preserved, and that cannon would be better
looked after, and their fire produce more effect in action, by being
under the exclusive command of an officer bred up to the profession. He
concluded by urging that, even should the artillery desert and take
service with native powers, there was in reality little to fear, for
though the country powers have infantry formed like ours, they are
inferior in every respect: their irregularity of pay is the grand
foundation of it; their want of sufficient instruction and of the
essential knowledge of our discipline, will long keep them so; and such
as their sipahis are to ours their artillery will be to our artillery,
though the men should desert in equal proportion, which he did not think
would occur, particularly if the golundaz had a small increase of pay
over the infantry, which was the case in all other services.
On the receipt of the order, Colonel Pearse again attempted to prevent
this ill-judged measure, by a respectful representation to Government,
in which he pointed out that the European artillery numbered but 370 in
all, of whom only 150 were at the presidency; that two ships of the
season had come in without a single recruit; that it would therefore be
impossible to complete the corps till the next year, and that, even, was
doubtful, from the scarcity of recruits, his Majesty’s regiments being
filled by pressing; that if an attack was made, the European artillery
were insufficient even for the defence of Fort William, much more were
they unable to furnish the detachments which would be necessary; that
the golundaz were good artillerymen; the name and service the highest in
repute among the natives; and that they would not, even if the pay were
equal, enter the ranks of the lascars; so that raw and ignorant men must
be enlisted for that class, who would require instruction, and, till
they were taught, the presidency would be almost destitute of artillery.
He submitted that, under these circumstances, the execution of the order
should be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be consulted, lest
any ill consequences should follow the immediate execution of it.
Colonel Pearse’s endeavours were, however, looked upon by Sir Eyre Coote
as arising from a spirit of insubordination, which never had a place in
his breast; and they drew forth a severe and cutting letter from the
commander-in-chief, taxing him with unmilitary and unprecedented
conduct, tending to sap subordination and obedience to its foundation,
and telling him that he was called upon for obedience and not for an
opinion, and that he was in nowise answerable for the results.
It must, however, be stated, in justice to Colonel Pearse, that, during
the command of General Stibbert, several important military transactions
occurred, and General Stibbert being absent in the field, Colonel Pearse
obtained permission from him, as commander-in-chief, to address the
Government direct on urgent occasions; and it was in the spirit of this
permission, considering the disbanding the golundaz as a measure fraught
with danger, that Colonel Pearse addressed the representation to
Government.
To the commander-in-chief’s letter Colonel Pearse replied, regretting he
had fallen under his displeasure, and detailing circumstances, such as
the rumour of a body of Mahrattas being in the neighbourhood of Burdwan;
the arrival of the ships without any recruits, of which he believed the
commander-in-chief to have been in ignorance when the order was
dictated, and which seemed to call for the exercise of some discretion
on his part, in carrying into execution an order which would cramp the
means of defence; that he had, in the exercise of what he deemed a sound
discretion, stated the facts to Government, who could at once determine
whether orders might with safety be instantly carried into execution, or
whether they should be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be
consulted; he deprecated any unguarded expressions, if such there were,
in his former letter, being construed into a want of respect; and
concluded by begging that the step he had taken might be considered as
founded in error of judgment, and not in want of obedience; and
entreated the commander-in-chief to overlook his error, and entertain a
more favourable opinion of him than that expressed in the letter with
which he had been honoured.
The appeal to Government was ineffectual, and the minutes of Council of
23rd November, 1779, “ordered that the native officers of the golundaz
corps, at the presidency, be paid up to the end of this month and
immediately discharged from the service; that the commandant of
artillery be directed to repeat the offers already made to the men, and
those who still decline to accept of them be immediately discharged.”
Those who feared the native powers training up good artillerymen by
means of deserters from the British service, do not appear to have
considered that without the material which is provided and kept up at a
heavy expense, the best artillerymen would be useless; and that,
although artillerymen are _taught_ the preparation of stores, still very
few have that intimate knowledge which only results from constantly
handling and making them up; and which is, in reality, found in a much
greater degree in the magazine workmen—a class who come and go at their
pleasure, and appear to be little thought of, although the practical
information they could carry to an enemy would be worth more than
hundreds of mere well drilled artillerymen.
The Court of Directors, however, must be excepted, for in their warrant
(17th June, 1748) they direct that “no Indian, black, or person of a
mixed breed, nor any Roman Catholic, of what nation soever, shall, on
any pretence, be admitted to set foot in the laboratory, or any of the
military magazines, either out of curiosity, or to be employed in them,
or to come near them, so as to see what is doing or contained therein.”
And to such an extent did this fear then carry them, that another
paragraph runs: “And if any person belonging to the company of artillery
marry a Roman Catholic, or his wife become a Roman Catholic after
marriage, such person shall immediately be dismissed from the company of
artillery, and be obliged to serve the remainder of his time in one of
the other companies, or be removed to another of the Company’s
settlements, to serve it out there, if the Council think fit,” &c. And
again, in their military letter to Bombay (6th April, 1770), they say:
“As it is very essential that the natives should be kept as ignorant as
possible, both of the theory and practice of the artillery branch of the
art of war, we esteem it a very pernicious practice to employ the people
of the country in working the guns; and, if such practice is in use with
you, we direct that in future you attach European artillerymen to the
service of the guns which may belong to sipahi corps, and that no native
be trusted with any part of this important service, unless absolute
necessity should require it.”
With these views it is not to be wondered at that the Home Government
should have directed the golundaz to be reduced; but Indian experience
might even then have taught that no more dangerous ally can be found for
a native army than a large and imperfectly-equipped artillery. A native
power will hardly bear the heavy _continued_ expense required to keep it
efficient; or, if the state should supply the means, the want of
integrity in its agents will divert them from their proper course; and
consequently, in the hour of emergency, the army is forced to fight a
pitched battle to protect the unwieldy train of cannon, which becomes an
incumbrance instead of a support: so it had been at Plassey and Buxar,
and so it has been in every general action since. Assye, Argaum,
Laswaree, Mahidpoor, would have been avoided, had there been no
artillery in the native armies; unencumbered, they could have evaded the
British; but the necessity of protecting their trains, and, perhaps, the
confidence which their presence inspired, induced them to try the result
of a battle.
Instead of discouraging native powers from organizing large parks of
artillery, our policy should have been the reverse, resting confident
that native parsimony and dishonesty would insure inefficiency in that
branch.
In the new organization of the artillery now ordered, it was formed into
two European battalions of five companies each, and to each company was
attached a battalion of six companies of lascars, under the command of
the same officer; they were to perform the whole duty dependent on the
corps of artillery, and to be instructed in the usual services of
artillery, with the exception “of pointing and loading guns and
mortars.” They were dressed in uniform, and armed with a light pike, so
constructed as to form a cheveux-de-frise.
ORGANIZATION of 1779.
──────────────────────────────┬────────┬──────────┬──────┬────────────────────
│ per │ per │Total.│ On returns 1 Feb.
│Company.│Battalion.│ │ 1780.
──────────────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┬─────────
Colonel Commandant. │ │ │ 1│Effective.│Invalids.
─────────┬────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
EUROPEAN.│Lieutenant-Colonels.│ │ 1│ 2│ 2│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Majors. │ │ 1│ 2│ 2│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Captains. │ 1│ 5│ 10│ 10│ 1
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Captain-Lieutenants.│ 1│ 5│ 10│ 9│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieutenants. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 29│ 2
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 30│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Adjutants. │ │ 1│ 3│ 4│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Aides-de-Camp. │ │ │ 1│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serjeant-Majors. │ │ 1│ 2│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Qr.-Master │ │ 1│ 2│ │
│ Serjeants. │ │ │ │ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drill Serjeants. │ │ 1│ 2│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drill Corporals. │ │ 2│ 4│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Pay Serjeants. │ 1│ 5│ 10│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serjeants. │ 6│ 30│ 60│ 44│ 17
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Corporals. │ 6│ 30│ 60│ 41│ 10
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drummers. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 31│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Bombardiers. │ 8│ 40│ 80│ 529│ 43
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Gunners. │ 24│ 120│ 240│ 〃│ 〃
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Matrosses. │ 53│ 265│ 530│ 〃│ 〃
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
LASCARS. │Serangs Commandant. │ │ 1│ 10│ 3│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serangs. │ 1│ 6│ 60│ 53│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Tindals. │ 2│ 12│ 120│ 106│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Cossibs. │ 2│ 12│ 120│ 87│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lascars. │ 50│ 300│ 3000│ 2272│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Sircars. │ 1│ 10│ 10│ 8│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Native Doctors. │ 2│ 20│ 20│ 16│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Doolies. │ 3│ 30│ 30│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Havildars. │ 1│ 10│ 10│ 8│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Bheesties. │ 6│ 60│ 60│ 48│
─────────┴────────────────────┴────────┴──────────┴──────┴──────────┴─────────
The regiment was to be commanded by a colonel, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearse was to hold the rank of lieutenant-colonel commandant, “until the
lieutenant-colonel in the army next above him was disposed of by
promotion or otherwise; and then, in conformity with the custom in
Bengal, and the concurrence of the Court of Directors, to be promoted to
the rank of colonel;” the promotion of the additional lieutenant-colonel
and major, to complete the new establishment, to take place on the
arrival of the recruits of the season.
The brigade-majorship was abolished, and his duties performed by a
regimental adjutant.
These changes were not completed until April, 1780, as far as relates to
the European portion. The golundaz were discharged in December, 1779,
very few taking service in the ranks of the lascars.
The golundaz considered themselves belonging to the most honourable
branch of the army, and were unwilling to enter an inferior service; the
difference of pay was another, and a stronger reason, and we accordingly
find, that from 2,438 golundaz of all ranks who were on the rolls of the
regiment in November, 1779, in December 1,783 took their discharge. The
returns for the next months are incomplete, and it therefore cannot now
be ascertained what became of the remaining 650 men; but it is probable
some were those who were entertained from the lascars in 1778, and had
less objection to return.
It has been said before, that a company of golundaz from the Oude
Brigade accompanied General Leslie’s detachment. The force marched from
Culpee in May, 1778, on what appeared to many the wild expedition of
crossing India and effecting a diversion in favour of the Bombay
Government, heavily pressed by the Mahrattas.
After crossing the Jumna, the force was soon brought into contact with
the enemy; the Boondeelas met them at M’how, near Chatterpoor, but they
were beaten, with the loss of their guns; all of which that were
serviceable were taken on by General Leslie, who found his own train of
four 12–pounders, twelve 6–pounders, and two howitzers insufficient.
Leslie remained in Bundelcund until October, when his death devolved the
command on Colonel Goddard, who pushed on to Hoshungabad, which place he
reached on 30th November, and remained at until the middle of January,
awaiting a reply from Bombay.
That the sipahis looked on this service with some dread and dislike we
may conclude from the desertions which took place, and which called
forth strong reprehension from Colonel Goddard in the orders of 1st
November; after pointing out the ingratitude for all the former
indulgences they had received, and the unmilitary nature of their
conduct, in quitting their colours in their present situation, with the
daily expectation of being engaged with an enemy, he concluded with the
following high compliment to the golundaz:—
“The commanding officer, with much pleasure, excepts the corps of
artillery in the foregoing observations. Their steadiness, fidelity, and
military conduct claim his particular thanks; and he desires the
commanding officer will assure himself that he will make proper mention
of their merits to the Honourable the Governor-General in Council.”
Leaving Hoshungabad on 16th January, this gallant band continued their
route through an unknown country until, on the 9th February, 1780,
Colonel Goddard received a letter from the Bombay field deputies,
directing his return to Bengal, in consequence of a treaty they had
negotiated with the Mahrattas. This mandate he declined obeying, urging
that his orders were from the Supreme Government, and he continued his
march to Surat, which he reached on the 25th February.
The following are the Artillery officers who served with the force:—
Major W. A. Baillie, on the returns till April,
1781—retired in 1802.
Captain — Sears, joined detachment in March, 1781—returned in
1784.
Lieutenant R. Bruce, promoted to Captain in 1781 and joined
Major Popham’s detachment.
Lieutenant A. Forbes, died in 1779.
Lieutenant L. Kempt, returned in 1784.
Lieutenant — Hamilton, ditto.
Lieutenant J. Harris, died October 15, 1780.
Lieutenant W. Rattray, returned in 1784.
Lieutenant H. Cotes, died in 1782 in China, whither he must have
gone sick.
Lieutenant A. Rattray, joined detachment October, 1779—died at
sea 1782.
Lieut. Fireworker McLean, joined detachment March, 1781—returned in
1784.
Lieut. Fireworker Boyce, joined detachment December, 1782—returned sick
in March, 1783.
In January, 1780, this force took the field again, and, crossing the
Taptee, attacked the fortress of Dubhoy, in Guzerat, on the 19th, and
took possession of the province; on the 10th February the army was
before Ahmedabad, and stormed it on the 15th, and it was intended to
have attacked the combined camps of Holkar and Scindia at night; but
intimation that the Mahrattas were willing to treat prevented its being
carried into execution; evasion followed, and all attempts to bring them
to action were fruitless, till on the 3rd April, marching at 2 A.M.,
Colonel Goddard, with four European companies, four grenadier sipahi
battalions, and twelve field-pieces, entered the camp at dawn, and
quickly threw the Mahrattas into confusion; they attempted to take up a
position near, but on being again attacked, fled and dispersed. In this
attack Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the artillery, led the first line.
The detachment returned to Surat, and in October, 1780, moved against
Bassein, a fort on the mainland opposite the northern extremity of
Bombay Island. The detachment was increased by a body of Europeans from
Madras. A battery was opened on the 16th November of six guns and six
mortars, at 900 yards, and a second of nine heavy guns at 500 yards on
9th December, together with twenty mortars to bombard the works; on the
10th, the breach being practicable, the enemy offered to surrender, but
some demur taking place, the fire was renewed, and on the 11th they
yielded at discretion.
From Bassein, in the middle of January, 1781, the detachment marched for
the Bore ghat, and reached it on the 8th February. Holkar and the Poonah
armies were encamped on the top, but Goddard struck awe into them by
storming the pass the night of his arrival, and by 5 A.M. the next day
gained complete possession. It was not deemed advisable to carry the war
further into the Mahrattas’ territories, so the detachment remained
holding the ghats until the middle of April, when they descended without
disturbance, but were a little harassed by the enemy in the three days’
march to the coast, during which Lieutenant W. Rattray, of the
artillery, was wounded.
The detachment continued in the Bombay Presidency until the cold
weather, 1783, when it set out on its return to Bengal, under Colonel
Charles Morgan (Brigadier-General Goddard having sailed sick for
England), and reached Caunpoor in April, 1784.
The European artillerymen who returned with it were posted to the
company at Caunpoor, and the golundaz were also cantoned at that
station. All the lascars entertained previous to 1783 were retained in
the service, the worst from the battalions being discharged to make room
for them. The remainder were discharged.
The orders which were issued by Government, on this occasion, will be
noticed when the return of Colonel Pearse’s detachment is mentioned, and
in the mean time it is necessary to look back a little, to relate the
part the regiment took in other operations then going on.
With the detachment under Captain Popham, collected in 1779, for the
purpose of reinforcing Colonel Goddard, was a portion of the 2nd company
1st battalion, being under the command of Captain Mayaffre, Lieutenants
Legertwood and Vernon. The original destination of this force being
changed, it was employed in aiding the Ranee of Gohud against the
Mahrattas. In February, 1780, it crossed the Scind, and in April
besieged Lahar. From want of a sufficient battering train, the breach
made was imperfect, and on this, as on many future occasions, the want
of _matériel_ was supplied by the spirit of the troops. Lahar was
successfully stormed on the 21st April. To this succeeded, on the 3rd
August, the dazzling enterprise of the escalade of Gwalior. In this
attack the advance of two companies of sipahis was followed by twenty
Europeans, artillerymen of Captain Mayaffre’s detachment.
Captain Popham’s detachment was replaced towards the end of the year by
one under Colonel Carnac, with which was the 1st company 2nd battalion
of artillery, with the officers noted in the margin.[19] The detachment
pushed on to Seronje, where, surrounded by a powerful enemy, and their
supplies cut off, they were reduced to great distress, and would have
perished, had not the bold resolution of attacking Scindia’s camp by
night, on 24th March, 1781, been taken and successfully carried out,
rewarding the victors with guns, elephants, and grain, the “spolia
opima” of an Indian camp.
The difficulties being removed, the detachment fell back towards
Gwalior, and met Colonel Muir’s brigade coming to their assistance at
Antree, on 4th April. The detachments then moved into cantonments.
When Captain Popham’s detachment was broken up, Captain Mayaffre with
his company (2nd company 1st battalion) was stationed at Mirzapoor, and
on the massacre of the force placed by Warren Hastings over the Rajah of
Benares, on the 16th August, 1781, an order was sent to him, as senior
officer at Mirzapoor, to march, with the company of artillery, remaining
four companies of Popham’s battalion, and the French Rangers (sending
his guns and stores by water to Chunar), upon Ramnagur, _viâ_ Chunar,
and wait further orders; and also by Major Popham, with a caution to
avoid hostilities, and attend to the safety of the whole party until
Major Popham should arrive.
On receiving the order from Warren Hastings, on 17th August, Captain
Mayaffre immediately set out, replying, that he would march, “observing
his directions in every respect, and otherwise acting to the best of his
judgment for the good of the service.”
Colonel Blair, commanding at Chunar, was also directed to send four
6–pounders, two tumbrils of ammunition, an 8 and 10–inch mortar with 100
shells and 200 fuzes each, with powder, &c. to Chota Mirzapoor on the
20th, where Captain Mayaffre was expected to be. These were intended to
have been used from an open space on the shore opposite, selected by
Major Popham to bombard Ramnagur, and there is little doubt that a place
so particularly ill-adapted for defence against such a mode of attack
would have proved an easy conquest.
On reaching Ramnagur, however, without waiting for the arrival of Major
Popham or further orders, without plan, without inquiry, and contrary to
the advice of the officers with him, Captain Mayaffre, on the morning of
the 20th August, marched precipitately into the narrow streets, where,
in an instant, the leading party was annihilated. Captain Mayaffre, and
Captain-Lieut. Doxat, with thirty-three of the Rangers, fell at once,
and the detachment was forced to retreat with a loss of 107 killed and
72 wounded, two field-pieces and a howitzer remaining in the enemy’s
possession.
It is most probable that Captain Mayaffre was urged to his precipitate
and rash attack by the recollection of the successful enterprise against
Gwalior, in which he had shared the preceding year; the hope of
acquiring reputation led him to disregard the maxims of prudence,
forgetting that, although he staked his own life upon the issue, he also
hazarded his Government’s safety unnecessarily.
This failure raised the whole country in arms, and rendered Mr.
Hastings’s flight to Chunar imperative—a flight which gave rise to the
memorable but oft misquoted distich—
Ghora per howdah, hat’hee per zeen,
Juldee bagh gee’a, Warren Hasteen.
Lieuts. F. W. Grand[20] and Sand, doing duty with Major Popham’s
detachment, accompanied W. Hastings to Chunar.
Active measures were taken to collect troops, and on the 3rd September a
party was sent out to surprise the enemy’s camp, which was formed at
Pateeta (about seven miles from Chunar), but being retarded by the bad
bullocks and drivers with the two 6–pounders which accompanied it, at
daylight it found the enemy, to the number of 4,000 infantry and 400
cavalry and six guns, drawn up; the fire of our artillery and infantry
was, however, so quick and effective, that the enemy fled, leaving four
guns, among which was the one left by Captain Mayaffre at Ramnagur, in
our possession.
With the enemy’s guns, was all the usual apparatus of artillery, such as
portfires, tubes, chain-shot, quilted grape, equal or nearly equal to
the production of an European laboratory; the artillery, however, was
not equal to the stores: one gun, a modern cast, was pretty good; the
others old and indifferent; the carriages of all much worn and bad.
The conduct and activity of Lieut. Baillie, of the artillery, was
particularly acknowledged by the commanding officer.
On the 10th September, a brigade from Caunpoor, under Major Crabb,
arrived, with which were thirty European artillerymen (1st company 2nd
battalion), four 6–pounders and 1 howitzer, under Captain Hill.
The enemy had collected in force at the strong holds of Pateeta and
Luteefpoor, the former seven miles, the latter fourteen miles from
Chunar, and from information received, it was deemed advisable to drive
them from those positions, rather than attack Ramnagur; two detachments
were therefore got ready, one under Major Crabb, and the other under
Major Popham; the former, accompanied by four 6–pounders and one
howitzer, under Lieut. Baillie, with the ammunition, carried on
bullocks, marched, on the night of 15th September, by a route through
the hills, to take Luteefpoor in reverse, under the guidance of a
native, named Bandoo Khan, who had proposed the plan of attack; and as
the chief difficulties of this march were caused by the guns, it will
not be out of place to give an abstract of Major Crabb’s interesting
journal of the expedition:—
“15th.—The stores and ammunition being ready by ten P.M., the detachment
marched at that hour, but was very shortly brought up at a nullah, the
water in which was deep, and the limber ammunition-boxes forced to be
taken off and carried over on the lascars’ heads: a delay of two hours.
The road led along a plain through low jungle, a ghat with sharp
turnings caused a long delay, and it was sunrise ere the guns reached
the top. A low thick jungle continued for about a coss, and was
succeeded by an extensive plain, slightly cultivated and with two small
villages. About a coss in advance, two hours’ delay was caused by a
narrow deep nullah, and three-fourths of a coss further, a second, with
rocky beds and banks, occupied an hour and a half in crossing. The road
led along the bank under a high hill, for about a mile, full of rocks.
Recrossed the river with more difficulty than before; the banks very
high, and forced to cut a road for the guns, and it was two P.M. ere all
were over; the jungle thick, ground broken, hills on both sides. Came
upon a small nullah, its bed full of rocks and the opposite sides a
steep pass; the cattle were knocked up, and the sipahis were put on to
the drag-ropes to aid them; over by four P.M., and then no water to be
found nearer than a lake three miles in front, which they reached by
sunset and halted, after twenty hours’ marching and about six coss from
Chunar.
“17th.—Under arms at four A.M.; marched through a thick jungle, crossed
a small river by a steep and narrow road, up a long steep pass with a
deep gully on the right, the ascent very difficult from large smooth
stones, on which the cattle could not retain their footing; the sipahis
again at the drag-ropes, and by ten A.M. the top was gained. A large
level but rocky plain, studded with large trees, now opened; about a
mile further a river, bed full of large rocks, and the guns were moved
with much labour.—One P.M.; after moving over rocky ground, the country
opened, and about a coss from the river, an extensive plain near the
village of Korada; several villages scattered over the plain, whose
inhabitants fled. The country was cultivated, chiefly rice khets. At
sunset encamped: computed distance, six coss.
“18th.—Started three A.M., over a plain full of deep holes, difficult
and dangerous for the cattle; before daylight, entered a thick jungle
with many deep dry nullahs—forced to cut roads for guns; no trace of a
road. About two P.M., entered a large plain with several small villages,
whose inhabitants fled. At three P.M., encamped by a large lake, and set
smiths and carpenters to mend yokes and pintles of two guns, broken:
distance, five coss.
“19th.—Marched at four A.M., at first over a plain, then through swamps
and rice-fields; the high banks retarded the detachment much. Passed a
large deserted village, Muddoopoor; had the intelligence that the
Rajah’s troops were in front, with guns, at the village of Loorah;
encamped: day’s march, three coss.
“20th.—Moved at daylight, for one coss through jungle, in parts thick;
by sunrise, the advance guard was clear of jungle, and saw the enemy
drawn up, about 2,000 in number, in a good situation, guns on their
right, immediately opposite the road out of the jungle, on a rising
ground, and with a small bank thrown up in front. Tope and village of
Loora on their left, and a deep morass in front. The enemy’s guns opened
on the troops emerging into the plain, and fired briskly until all had
cleared the jungle and formed, the advanced guard returning it from one
gun. When formed, the detachment advanced as quickly as the ground would
admit, firing the 6–pounder until near enough for small-arms. A party
was detached to the (enemy’s) right, under Lieut. Polhill, to carry the
guns, and the enemy fled, leaving their guns, 150 dead, and 20 wounded,
and made for Luteefpoor, distant about four coss, through the jungle.
The ammunition was destroyed and the guns spiked and buried, there being
no means to carry them off. The road to Luteefpoor ran through the
jungle, rugged and steep, and no water; pursued them to the pass of
Succroot, about a coss from Loora, and halted to bury the dead and
collect the wounded, amounting to thirty-four; two and a half coss.
“21st.—Marched at four A.M., road good but jungly for two coss; a dry
nullah, descent rugged and ascent still more so; road narrow and
winding, full of large stones and rocks; the guns were lifted over
these, and gained the summit with much labour. The fort visible about
three miles off; the road now along the side of hill was worse than
ever; from the bottom of hill to fort very narrow though level, through
thick jungle; at noon, entered town of Luteefpoor, which had been
evacuated and plundered by the Rajah’s people while the detachment was
getting down the hill; six pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition
were found; three pieces were taken on the hills, intended to defend the
entrance from Pateeta.
“The fort of Luteefpoor stands in a bottom, surrounded on three sides by
high steep hills, with thick jungle close up to the ditch, which is deep
on the Pateeta side, where, too, the wall is of stone with loopholes; on
the other sides it is part stone and part mud; the guns, on wooden
swivels in the centre of bastions; the citadel has a high stone wall,
with deep ditch and loopholes, in many places much cracked.”
In concluding his report, Major Crabb says, “Lieut. Fireworker Baillie,
of artillery, in particular I beg leave to recommend to your notice, for
the very great attention he shewed in his particular department.”
The other detachment under Major Popham marched against Pateeta on the
16th, but, on arriving, he found it so strong, that he sent back for the
two battering-guns and one mortar, originally intended for Ramnagur;
these reached him, and Captain Hill either accompanied these or was with
the original detachment. After five days’ firing he made no impression;
he ordered a storm, which took place successfully on the 20th, about the
same time that Major Crabb defeated the enemy at Loora Succroot.
After these defeats the Rajah fled to Bidjegurh, through the hills, and
was followed by Major Popham.[21]
On the 4th November, a battery of two 18–pounders opened against the
fort, but probably from the rapidity of the firing, one of the guns
burst, and it became necessary to send back to Chunar for others; in the
mean time a mine was opened, which it was hoped would be ready to be
sprung on the 6th.
On the 11th the place was taken, and the spoil divided among the captors
on the spot, giving a large amount of prize-money to officers of all
ranks,—a proceeding highly disapproved of by the Governor-General,
though not unwarranted by his instructions. All attempts, and there were
several subsequently made to recover the amount for the use of
Government, were ineffectual. The total value of the prize was estimated
at twenty-five lacs.[22]
The officers in the margin[23] took a part in these exciting
proceedings, and those marked§ shared in the prize-money of Bidjegurh.
Lieut. Balfour claimed a share for bringing up the heavy ordnance, but
they probably arrived too late, and his claim was not allowed.
The misfortunes which had occurred in the Madras Presidency in the war
with Hyder Ali, and particularly by the defeat of Colonel Baillie’s
detachment and retreat of Colonel Munroe, rendered assistance from the
Supreme Government necessary: a detachment, consisting of two European
companies of artillery (5th company 1st battalion, and 4th company 2nd
battalion), with their battalions of lascars, and 350 European infantry,
was prepared, and sailed in October, 1780, under the command of Sir Eyre
Coote. The detachment reached Madras early in November, and shared in
the relief of Wandewash and Cuddalore in January and February, 1781, in
the unsuccessful attack on the fortified pagoda at Chillambram, and the
victory near Porto Novo.
Another detachment, under the command of Colonel Pearse, of the
artillery, consisting of one European (5th company 2nd battalion), and
one Native (2nd golundaz) company of artillery, with their lascars, and
three additional companies raised for the service, one company of
gentlemen volunteers, about forty or fifty, and six battalions of native
infantry, and 16 field-pieces, followed by land.
The golundaz company raised for this service was most probably formed
from the remnants of the old golundaz battalions, reduced in the
preceding year; so soon had the inexpediency of that measure forced
itself into notice.
Much delay occurred in preparing camp equipage, and it was not until the
middle of January, 1781, that Colonel Pearse joined the detachment at
Midnapoor.
Before starting, he complained of the inadequacy of his artillery
(twelve 6–pounders, two 12–pounders, and two howitzers), and indented
for six more 6–pounders; but whether these were furnished is not known.
Soon after the detachment started, we find Colonel Pearse complaining of
the absurdity of the Board of Ordnance expecting regular and minute
returns of all articles expended in a train while on service with the
same punctuality as within a settled cantonment; and pointing out that
all stores issued to a train on service should be struck off the Board’s
books, and an account rendered when the service was over.
The detachment reached Ganjam in March, where it suffered severely from
cholera, then a new disease, and which gave an impression that the water
had been poisoned.
In April they had reached Vizianagram, Ellore on 20th May, Pulicat on
1st August, and joined Sir E. Coote’s army at St. Thomas’s Mount on the
3rd August, 1781.
Immediately after their arrival, the Bengal division was broken up and
divided among the other brigades; an ill-judged and rash measure,
causing much desertion, which resulted from ill-feeling on the part of
Sir Eyre Coote towards Colonel Pearse, partly, perhaps, on account of
the correspondence regarding the golundaz, but chiefly, no doubt, from
Colonel Pearses being a friend of Warren Hastings, against whom he
expressed himself very strongly in a letter to the Supreme Government in
March, 1781, objecting to Colonel Pearses detachment accounts being kept
separate, as likely to cause expense and unnecessary staff appointments;
to his being entrusted with permanent authority in any shape, as unjust
to himself, and assuming a privilege (on the Governor-General’s part) in
military details, which cannot be vindicated; and complaining that the
instructions given Colonel Pearse were a direct indignity offered to his
authority. He concludes by observing, “that he sees the newspapers are
replete with promotions and arrangements in the military department in
Bengal, without any reference to him as commander-in-chief: he protests
against the whole as irregular, unmilitary, and entailing enormous
unnecessary expense, and has the satisfaction of committing to record in
this place, that he ascribes these encroachments on the authority of the
commander-in-chief to the Governor-General, who now unites in his person
the whole powers of Government.”
The officers and companies of the regiment employed in this service were
as follows, as well as can be gleaned from the records. Unfortunately,
from July, 1780, to April, 1781, the returns are left blank, and these
companies are not included in the returns until their rejoining in 1785.
No. 2.
4th Company 2nd Battalion.
Captain Elliott, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Woodburn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Wilkinson, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Holland, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Groat, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Turton, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Dunn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker McDonald, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Neish, rejoined May, 1784.
No. 5.
5th Company 1st Battalion.
Captain Hussey, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Carnegie, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Maud, died August, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Douglas, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Exshaw, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker J. Green, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Robinson, rejoined June, 1784.
The above sailed with Sir Eyre Coote’s detachment.
No. 10.
5th Company 2nd Battalion and 2nd Golundaz.
Captain C. R. Deare, rejoined June, 1784.
Captain-Lieutenant E. Montague, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Horsburgh, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Blundel, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant W. Bruce, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Tomkyns, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant J. Walker, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker McDermott, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Hardwicke, rejoined November, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Nelly, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Barton, rejoined December, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Macbeagh, died August, 1781.
Commandant’s Company of Volunteers.
Captain-Lieutenant W. Harris, rejoined June, 1784.
Staff to Colonel Pearse.
Captain-Lieutenant C. Green, Aide-de-Camp, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Herbert, Quarter-Master, died December, 1781.
Lieutenant Brown, Adjutant, rejoined May, 1784.
Joined Detachment at Madras.
Lieutenant Constable, December, 1783, went on sick leave and
joined detachment.
Lieutenant Addison, March, 1783.
Lieutenant Flemyng, March, 1783, returned June, 1784, with
5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant Nash, November, 1781, returned June, 1784, with
5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant Fireworker Hollingsbury, 1782.
Lieutenant Syme, died June, 1784.
On the 16th August, 1781, the army marched from the Mount, and reached
Tripassore on the 18th, and took possession of it after only three days’
siege. 27th.—Engaged Hyder Ali’s army on the spot where Baillie had been
defeated, and were forced to retire to the Mount from want of
provisions. On the 19th September the army again took the field, and on
the 23rd the Fort of Pollom surrendered to it. Hyder’s army was in
sight; the two next days were spent in collecting grain, and on the
27th, Sir E. Coote went out to reconnoitre, and found the enemy’s whole
force in camp near Cuppoor, about five miles off. He then advanced to
attack them, Colonel Pearse commanding the left wing, which, from having
to pass through much broken ground, bore the heaviest part of the
action. Hyder endeavoured to turn it, but his attempts were frustrated
by Colonel Pearse’s movements, and his cavalry driven back by discharges
of grape. The two wings were much separated, and Colonel Pearse was at
one time nearly captured, from his horse taking fright and running away
with some of Hyder’s horsemen, who charged through an interval in the
line; in endeavouring to get back, he was followed by a horseman, whom
his aide-de-camp shot. The action lasted from three till dark, and it
was eleven p.m. before the army had encamped at Cuppoor, on Hyder’s
ground.
In October, the army marched into the Pollams, and a detachment of six
battalions with two 6–pounders from the artillery, the whole under the
command of Captain Owen, were sent to secure provisions and intercept a
convoy of Hyder’s. Captain Owen conceived the quixotic design of
storming the fort of Chittoor, but, unluckily, Hyder marched suddenly
and attacked him, on the 23rd October, in his camp, and drove him back
with heavy loss. One of the guns fell into the enemy’s hands, but was
retaken by a gallant effort made by Captain Moore, with forty Bengal
grenadiers, whom an artilleryman informed of the loss.
After this, the whole army moved against Chittoor, on the 7th November.
On the 8th, a battery of two guns and two howitzers fired from a hill
against the fort, but without effect. On the 19th, a battery of two
18–pounders was formed on the banks of an artificial lake, within three
hundred yards of a ruinous round tower, in which a breach was made
before night, and the enemy offered to capitulate. Their terms were
refused, and firing renewed, and the next day, the troops being ready to
storm, the fort surrendered.
Hyder had, in the mean time, taken Poloor, in which were four
18–pounders, and surprised Polipett, where the baggage was left under
charge of a battalion with three 6–pounders, and carried off all, and
moved against Tripassore.
The army marched to relieve Tripassore, and arrived just in time, as a
breach was just made. After destroying the works, they moved into
Poonamalee on the 30th November.
Early in January, 1782, the army marched to the relief of Vellore, and
on the 9th, encamped near Hyder’s troops. On the 10th, Hyder attacked
the rear, while the main body was moving through the dry bed of a lake.
Beyond this was a wet one, and the main body crossed this also, but the
carts and followers were in the swamp when Hyder reached the bank of the
dry lake. Colonel Pearse, who was commanding the rear, formed up three
battalions, and his guns, consisting of one 12–pounder, one howitzer, and
six 6–pounders, which checked the enemy, who opened a cannonade from
upwards of twenty heavy guns, but, with little effect. The position was
held for upwards of an hour, until the baggage had all crossed, when
Colonel Pearse crossed also, and joined Sir Eyre Coote, and after a
little desultory firing Hyder withdrew.
Having thrown his convoy into Vellore, Sir Eyre Coote returned on the
13th, and on reaching his old ground, at the swamp, was again attacked.
The passage was covered by a heavy cannonade from the 12 and
18–pounders, and when across, Hyder fell back, but made another attempt
at sunset, which was beaten off. The succeeding days were spent in
manœuvres on both sides, without coming to an action.
The detachment was engaged in no further service of any consequence
until the unsuccessful and mismanaged attack on Cuddalore, in June,
1783, in which Colonel Pearse was wounded, whence they returned to
Madras, and remained encamped till April of the next year,—the death of
Hyder Ali, and conclusion of a peace with Tippoo, rendering their
further services unnecessary.
On the 22nd April the detachment made their first march homewards, and
the European artillery accompanied them as far as Musulipatam, where,
about the middle of May, they embarked with guns and stores, and reached
Calcutta in June, 1784. The strength of each company on its return is
annexed.[24] There must, however, have been some recruits sent during
the service; but as from the day of their quitting Bengal, the companies
were struck off the strength of the regiment, it is impossible to trace
their actual loss. Captain Hussey and Lieutenant Brown appear to have
suffered from wounds, for in Mem. C. 19th July, 1784, on Lieutenant
Browns promotion to Captain-Lieut., “The Board observes that this
promotion occasions the number of artillery officers to exceed the
establishment, which they have been induced to admit, in consequence of
the peculiar situations of Captain Hussey and Lieutenant Brown, by the
wounds they received while on service in the Carnatic.”
The following order was issued by Government the 5th July, 1784:—“The
Board having received ample testimony from the late Sir Eyre Coote, from
Colonel Pearse, and from the President and Council of Fort St. George,
of the uniform good conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, and the
officers and men of the artillery, who have served under his command in
the Carnatic, have much pleasure in expressing to this part of the
Bengal detachment, the high sense they entertain of their gallant
behaviour, and the important service which they have rendered to the
Company, during the course of the war.
“The Board trust that this special mark of their approbation will be
remembered as an animating example to the Bengal troops, whenever the
public service may call for similar exertions.”
The golundaz company, when the Europeans embarked, continued its march
with the detachment, and the whole reached Ghyretti in January, 1785,
where Warren Hastings honoured them with a visit, and testified the
approbation of Government, in general orders, which after expressing
thanks to the commander and troops, for “their gallant behaviour, and
useful services in the defence of the Company’s territories,” direct
that, “as a lasting mark of their approbation, a pair of honorary
standards be bestowed on each sipahi regiment; on each soobadar a gold,
and on each of the jemadars, a silver medal, with such device, motto,
and description as shall be judged applicable to the occasion; and
medals of the same sort to the officers of the golundaz company; also
similar badges of inferior value, to such of the men, warrant officers
and privates, as have served with the detachment from the commencement
of the expedition until its return to the provinces.
“The Governor-General and council further direct, that in acknowledgment
of the services of the two great detachments, which have served in the
Carnatic, and the West of India, an additional pay of two rupees per
month be granted to each non-commissioned officer and private of the
European corps, and one rupee per month to each non-warrant officer and
sipahi of the native corps, composing those detachments, who were
originally attached to the same, on the march to their respective
destinations, and returned with them.”
The Governor-General likewise issued an order on the occasion of his
visiting the detachment, and one of the last acts of his government was
a proposal in Council that “a sword should be given to Col. Pearse and
the two officers next in command; that all officers holding commands in
the detachment of infantry battalions should be confirmed in them,
notwithstanding the general rules of appointment, and that the names of
all the officers be entered on record, for such future marks of the
favour of Government as the rules of the service may admit;” and to
these propositions the Council readily agreed.
It was also ordered, that the lascars of the artillery who were with
these detachments should receive medals, in like manner as the sipahi
regiments.
[Illustration]
We are not sure whether medals for these services can now be found; we
have been able to obtain a medal, the reverse of which is illegible,
which we are induced to believe was given to one of these detachments,
probably Colonel Goddard’s, and the fort in the distance, representing
Ahmedabad: a drawing of it is annexed. We have also been informed by an
old native officer, that the medal was of the same pattern for both
detachments.
The 1st golundaz company, which marched with Colonel Leslie’s
detachment, was raised in 1777; the 2nd, which marched with Colonel
Pearse, in 1780; and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th were raised in 1782, at the
Presidency, Chunar, and Dinapore. But the same feeling, before spoken
of, prevented their retention, and accordingly, in August, 1784, the 3rd
and 4th golundaz companies were reduced, with the option to the men of
the former of entering the lascars, and the latter, the 9th or 14th
regiments, which were at the same station. In March, 1785, the 5th
company followed, the native officers being allowed the option of
half-pay at Chunar, or three months’ gratuity and discharge, and the
men, after completing the 2nd company, of enlisting in the infantry.
In 1779, the necessity of a train of draught-bullocks for the artillery
was pressed on the Government by Sir Eyre Coote, and 4,000 were directed
to be kept at certain stations for this purpose: they were to be from
four to six years old, of fifty inches high, and to be condemned at
twelve years old, and able to draw ordnance, as in annexed
statement.[25] The commanding officers of artillery and of trains were
to be inspectors of all bullocks received into the service, and
responsible that none but proper cattle were admitted, and they were to
be marked in the presence of an artillery officer. They were reduced to
600 at Caunpoor, 400 at Futteygurh, and 250 at Chunar, by Mem. of
Council, 14th February, 1785, and the contract given to Sir Charles
Blunt.
A gun-foundry existed at this time, for, in 1781, we find that “two
12–pounders and ten 6–pounders were ordered to be cast (if none
available) for the use of the ship ‘Betsey,’ Captain Giddes, going with
opium to China.” It was probably under the commissary of stores.
Powder-works also existed on the banks of the river, near Cossipoor. The
gun-carriages were all constructed by the commissary of stores at Fort
William.
On the reduction of the artillery brigade, Captain C. R. Deare, the
major of brigade, was appointed regimental adjutant, but the
brigade-majorship was restored in April, 1781, to be again, however,
reduced to a regimental adjutant in 1785. Captain G. Deare resigned it
in October, 1784, and Captain C. R. Deare was appointed.
In July, 1784, the adjutancy to the train in the field was abolished,
but each company in the field appears to have had an adjutant and
quarter-master attached to it.
In March, 1785, at the recommendation of Colonel Ironside, commanding at
Caunpoor, tatties were first allowed to the European troops at Caunpoor.
Colonel Pearse at this time resumed command of the corps, Colonel Duff
having temporarily held it while he was employed with the army on the
coast; and earned the acknowledgments of the Council and General Orders,
for the state of discipline it was in.
In this year many reductions were made in the army, by abolishing staff
appointments, fixing the rate of pay and allowances to all classes, and
laying the foundation of a code of regulations to guide all.
The commissaries of ordnance were reduced from five to two, and the
deputies from eight to four; the brigade-majorship of artillery was
altered to an adjutancy; the general command of artillery in the field
was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Duff; his station was not fixed, but he
was to move as his judgment prompted, was to inspect the field magazines
and report on their state, but in these tours he was to exercise no
command (though entitled by seniority) in the stations which he visited.
The following was the rate of pay allowed to all classes of the
regiment:—
──────────────┬────────┬──────────────┬────────┬────────┬──────────────
│Colonel │Lieut.-Colonel│ Major │Captain │Captain-Lieut.
│Commdt. │ │ │ │
──────────────┼────────┼──────────────┼────────┼────────┼──────────────
Full Batta. │ 750│ │ │ │
Half Batta. │ │ 300│ 225│ 90│ 90
Offreckonings.│ 150│ 150│ 150│ 36│ 36
Table │ 1,200│ │ │ │
Allowance. │ │ │ │ │
Writers, &c. │ 645│ 105│ │ │
Pay. │ 310│ 248│ 186│ 140│ 90[26]
House-Rent. │ 120│ 120│ 120│ 90│ 90
──────────────┼────────┼──────────────┼────────┼────────┼──────────────
Total. │ 3,175│ 923│ 681│ 356│ 306
──────────────┴────────┴──────────────┴────────┴────────┴──────────────
──────────────┬───────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────
│ Lieutenant. │ Lieutenant Fireworker.
──────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
Half Batta │ 60│ 45
Gratuity │ 24│ 24
Pay │ 101│ 91
House-rent │ 60│ 60
──────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
│ 245│ 220
──────────────┴───────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────
─────────────────────────────────────
Serjeant 20
Corporal 17
Bombardier 16
Drummer 15
Gunner 15
Matross 10
Serang 21 0 0
1st Tindal 14 5 3
2nd Tindal 11 5 3
Lascar 5 12 0
Serang Commandant 51 0 0
Jemadar 20/8, Drummer 11, Havildar
14, Naick 11/4, Golundaz 7 rupees.
─────────────────────────────────────
The scale of pay differs but little from the present day; but the
subject will more properly be touched on when the effect of placing the
army in certain stations on half batta in 1828 comes to be noticed.
In conjunction with the reductions above noticed, on the 30th January,
1786, it was resolved in Council to incorporate the two battalions of
artillery into one, of ten companies; but that the establishment of
commissioned and non-commissioned officers attached to them should
remain as at present until vacancies and casualties reduced them to the
necessary establishment; but afterwards (March), all in excess to the
latter were permitted to reside wherever they pleased within the
Company’s territories, drawing the pay and half batta of their ranks,
and, such as were entitled to them, the gratuity and additional
allowance.
────────────────────┬─────────┬─────────
│Necessary│Temporary
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Colonel. │ │ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieut-Col. Commt. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Majors. │ 1│ 2
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Captains. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Capt-Lieutenants. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieutenants. │ 20│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 30│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Serjeants. │ 60│ 60
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Corporals. │ 60│ 60
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drummers. │ 30│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Bombardiers. │ 80│ 80
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Gunners. │ 240│ 240
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Matrosses. │ 530│ 530
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Adjutant. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Quarter-Master. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Surgeons. │ 2│ 2
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Assist-Surgeons. │ 6│ 6
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Serjeant-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Qr.-Master Serjeant.│ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drum-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Fife-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Pay Serjeants. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drill Serjeant. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drill-Corporals. │ 2│ 2
────────────────────┴─────────┴─────────
In making these arrangements, the original numbering was restored to
companies. Lascars were to be attached to each company; in the field, 1
serang, 6 tindals, 6 cossibs, and 156 lascars; and in the provinces, 1
serang and half the number of tindals and lascars. The battalions of
lascars were broken up. Two six-pounders were attached to each infantry
regiment, with 5 European artillerymen, and 24 lascars to point and work
them. The remainder of the lascars were paid up and discharged, and
grants of waste land in the Rhotas district given to all who would
settle on them.
A slight alteration was made in two months, viz. substituting golundaz,
1 havildar or naik, and 6 golundaz in lieu of the European artillerymen,
who were in the first instance furnished by reducing the 1st and 2nd
golundaz companies, the companies which marched with Goddard and Pearse,
and the sole remnants of the golundaz battalions; the men were divided
among the regiments, and in April directed to be enrolled as privates;
the commissioned officers were retained in the service, and stationed, 1
soobodar at Caunpoor, and 1 jemadar at Futteygurh, Chunar, Dinapoor,
Berhampoor, and Barrackpoor, to be employed at the discretion of the
commanding officer.
As, however, in the case of the organization in 1779, the Home
authorities appear to have entered upon the same subject at the same
time as the Indian, and in consequence, the above arrangement was hardly
completed when the order of the Court of Directors (sess. 85) was
received, and published in Minutes of Council, 2nd June, 1786,
re-forming the whole military establishment, and directing the artillery
to be formed into three battalions of five companies each; each company
to consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenant-fireworkers; 4
serjeants, 4 corporals, 8 gunners, 56 matrosses, 2 drummers, 2
puckalies. The lascars to consist of 30 companies, each having 1 serang,
2 first tindals, 2 second tindals, 56 lascars, 1 puckalie.
Each infantry regiment, when in the field, to be equipped with 1
European non-commissioned officer, and 8 privates, for pointing the
guns, and 2 tindals and 28 lascars, to work them, while with each
brigade there were to be, in addition to the battalion guns, 4 guns
attached to the grenadiers, making a total of 16 guns, exclusive of the
field train, and one company of European artillery and four of lascars.
An additional company of artillery was raised for service at Fort
Marlborough, but not brought on the establishment.
Colonel Pearse, although a colonel and the officer next in seniority in
the Company’s service to the commander-in-chief, was declared available
to command a battalion, thus lowering him from the command of a brigade,
which the artillery had hitherto been, to that of a battalion, a command
below what his rank entitled him to. This indignity was not, however,
long continued, for in August he was appointed to the general command of
the artillery stationed at the Presidency, and allowed an aide-de-camp.
The lascars lately broken up and dispersed among the regiments were
withdrawn, to reform the companies, the first 6 of which were stationed
at Caunpoor, the next 4 at Futteygurh, next 4 at Dinapoor, next 4 at
Berhampoor, 6 with first battalion, and 6 with third battalion, at the
Presidency; the tindals lately discharged were re-entertained; all
lascars in excess of the establishment were discharged, and none in
future were to be entertained, except such as were _seamen_ or _boatmen_
by profession; and in March, 1787, 5 feet 6 inches was the standard
fixed for them.
The artillery companies were stationed, 10 at the Presidency, 1 at
Berhampoor, 1 at Dinapoor, 2 at Caunpoor, and 1 at Futteygurh, and the
companies were enrolled in the battalions according to the seniority of
their captains at first; this, however, was shortly altered, by making
the first and second battalions change numbers.
The regiment now stood, according to this arrangement—
──────────────────────────────┬─────────────┬──────────────────
│Establishment│Actual
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Colonel. │ │ 1
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lieut-Colonels. │ 3│ 2
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Majors. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Captains. │ 15│ 15
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Capt-Lieutenants. Lieutenants.│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 30│ 30
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Adjutants. │ 3│ 3 non-eff.
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Quarter-Masters. │ 3│ 3 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serj-Major. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Qr.-Master Serj. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drill Serjeants. │ 3│ non-effect.
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drill-Corporals. │ 5│ 〃 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drum-Major. │ 3│ 2
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Fife-Major. │ 3│ 1
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serjeants. │ 60│ 71
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Corporals. │ 60│ 59
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Gunners. │ 120│ 825
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Matrosses. │ 840│ 〃 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drummers. │ 30│ 32
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serangs. │ 30│ 27
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
1st Tindals. │ 60│ 60
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
2nd Tindals. │ 60│ 54
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lascars. │ 1680│ 1679
──────────────────────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────────
The right hand line is actual strength, taken from the returns of the
regiment for August, 1786.