Artillery, one of the brigades of the army—An Infantry Officer,
Brigade-Major—Succeeded by an Artillery Officer—Dress—School
orders—School—Inoculation—Companies numbered by seniority—Method of
exploding mortar-shells on reaching the ground—Fire in
the arsenal—Death of Colonel Pearse—Lieut.-Colonel G.
Deare, Commandant—War in the Carnatic—Second Battalion of
Artillery sent—Sattimungulum—Bangalore—Retreat from
Seringapatam—Nundydroog—Savendroog—Attack on fortified camp at
Seringapatam—Return to Bengal.
Although so recent, the formation with which the last chapter closed was
soon modified. In April, 1787, the artillery was constituted one of the
brigades of the army,—a change made probably with the view of placing
Colonel Pearse on an equality with other officers of his rank, though
junior to him in standing. But a curious circumstance is connected with
this formation, in the nomination of an infantry officer, “Lieutenant
Peter Cullen, brigade-major to Colonel MacLeod, to act as brigade-major
to the artillery, with the rank of captain, conformably to the orders of
the Court of Directors, until a vacancy happens in that staff-line in
the infantry to which he is to succeed.” The reason of this appointment
is, however, clearly shewn in a subsequent order: “The Honourable
Captain T. Maitland, H. M.’s 72nd regiment, is appointed major of
brigade, to do duty under Colonel MacLeod vice Lieutenant Cullen.” In
March, 1788, however, Captain Grace, of the artillery, succeeded to this
appointment.
Several changes took place at this period in the army, at which we need
only glance. The colonels were detached from their brigades, and placed
in a situation similar to that of general officers of divisions and
brigades in the present day; tent allowance was given to officers in all
situations; fuzils and spontoons were superseded with infantry officers
by swords; the dress of the army was altered, as was that of the
artillery, and it is amusing to find that what is ordered in 1844 should
be little more than reverting to the orders of 1786; for what is the
order directing white covers to be worn on caps, but the principle of
“White hats may be worn on the line of march, or black hats with white
linen folded round them?” though, in truth, there may be little doubt
whether the round hat so prepared was not a far preferable head-dress to
the present shako.
The formation of a regimental school was an object of much interest with
Colonel Pearse; as early as 1770 some orders were issued on the subject;
but we learn from subsequent orders, in 1778, that these had “for
various causes been neglected and forgotten, but that the commanding
officer now resolves to carry them into execution;” and accordingly,
rules are laid down for conducting the school duties,—the amount each
man is to pay for being taught, what stoppages are to be carried to the
school fund, and, finally, that any deficiency is to be borne, half by
the commanding officer, and half by the captains. Again, in the year
1787, “Colonel Pearse, having the welfare of his soldiers at heart, and
being desirous to do for their benefit any thing that lies in his power,
has thought proper to establish a school for their instruction; that, by
teaching them to read, he may enable them to learn their duty as
Christians from books of their religion, and as soldiers, from the
orders and regulations laid down for their guidance. It is his intention
to visit it from time to time, and by his authority, to make it
seriously a matter of attention.” Then follow some rules for the school,
and as an encouragement to the non-commissioned officers to qualify
themselves, he directs that every “serjeant employing a man to write and
read for him shall pay him 6 rupees a month, or to write for him, 4
rupees a month, and he shall not read on parade, or be excused his
duties.” The number allowed to attend the school from each company was
limited, and the order has remained so nominally till late years,
although, in reality, none wishing for instruction have been refused;
but of late years the recruits for the regiment have been from a better
class, and a very large proportion are able to read and write when they
join the regiment. This may be partly caused by the more general
diffusion of education in all classes, or from the crowded state of all
lines in England, impelling a class to enlist who formerly found
occupation in other professions.
As another instance of the interest which Colonel Pearse took in the
welfare of his corps may be quoted the following order; it shews, too,
how just were his views on questions of duty and discipline: “The rules
of duty, as laid down, may seem extremely rigorous to those who do not
properly consider the consequence; Colonel Pearse hopes that there are
not any; but lest there should be, he desires that they will carefully
remember that military discipline can only be really made easy by being
enforced with precision in every part, however minute it may appear;
that strictness with mildness will make the soldiers love their officers
as their parents, and create in their minds a desire to be highest in
esteem, and an emulation to deserve the preference, and the fear of
losing it; then it will habituate the officers to regard the soldiers as
the object of their attention, and lead them to watch over their morals
with that pleasing anxiety which naturally arises from the desire to
produce superior excellence in those who are immediately under them; and
lastly, that in the corps in which these principles are most
conspicuous, courts-martial and punishments are very rare; the lash is
only heard when it falls on the really worthless and abandoned, whom the
rest shun and detest for having brought disgrace upon them, and who are,
of course, discharged soon after.”
Vaccination had not at this time been introduced, but, to lessen the
danger from small-pox, inoculation on a large scale appears to have been
first tried on Europeans in India this year. In February, 1787, 1
officer, 20 artillery, 26 infantry, and 53 children of artillerymen and
lascars, were admitted into the artillery hospital at Dum-Dum, and
inoculated; the party were left under the charge of Captain Rattray when
the regiment marched into Fort William, and a report of the result was
published in orders in April, from which it appeared that 90 took the
infection and recovered; of the remainder who did not take it, some had
been previously inoculated in England, but without such effect as to
induce the supposition that they had had the small-pox; from the result
above detailed, there is, however, little doubt but that they must have
taken it.
In September, a general order having been issued directing the companies
of artillery to be numbered in the different battalions, Colonel Pearse
searched into the records of the corps as far back as 1770, at which
time only 5 companies existed, and ascertained the exact seniority of
each company; he laid a plan before Lord Cornwallis, which was approved
of and published. Hitherto, the companies had stood on the returns
agreeably to the seniority of their captains, or the order for field
duty; this led to constant changes, for on the promotion, for instance,
of a captain to a majority, his company would be given to the captain
just promoted, and the company would be moved from the first to the last
in the battalion. In the accompanying tabular arrangement these
successive changes could not all be shewn, though it is believed that it
will be found essentially correct; however, from this period there can
be no doubt of the identity of the different portions of the regiment,
and for the valuable materials from which it has been arranged, the
author is indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant, for many years
assistant adjutant-general of artillery, and at a time when documents,
which have since crumbled away, were accessible.
In March, 1789, Lord Cornwallis attended at Dum-Dum, to witness the
results of some experiments carried on by Lieutenant Hill, with a view
to insure the ignition of the powder in a shell on the moment of its
touching the ground; the success seems to have been complete, for “Lord
Cornwallis has been pleased to desire Colonel Pearse to communicate to
Lieutenant Hill, that his lordship has received the utmost satisfaction
from the experiments this day carried on before him, and from the
successful endeavours of Lieutenant Hill to fire the powder within
shells the instant they touch the ground. Colonel Pearse adds his own
hearty congratulations on this success, and feels the utmost pleasure
that what has so long been sought for by artillerists, has at length
been discovered by an officer of the Bengal Artillery under his
command.”
[Illustration]
Lieutenant Hill’s plan, from an incidental notice in the third number of
the _East-India Military Repository_, seems to have been the same as
that of an Englishman named W. Wilton, which was tried at Woolwich in
1784. The wood of a common fusee is partly cut away to about half its
thickness on both sides, and the space filled up by two small wedges of
brass; a washer of leather being placed under them, a hole is drilled
through them and the fusee, a brass or copper wire is inserted, and
riveted firmly on both sides. The wire, when heated, becomes as brittle
as glass, and the shock of the shell touching the ground breaks it off;
the little wedges fall into the shell, and the fire finds two lateral
vents into the powder. “A fusee similar to Mr. Wilton’s (_East-India
Military Repository_), with the leaden pins (four small ones to give
additional security to the brass wedges), was produced by the conductor
of the Expense Magazine, _amongst several other kinds_ said to have been
invented by the late Colonel Hill, of the Bengal Artillery. These
specimens are now in the model-room at Dum-Dum, but we have never seen
any invention for the purpose more simple or more perfect than Mr.
Wilton’s fusee.” Of eight shells fired with the fusees at Woolwich, in
1784, six ignited at the moment of the shell touching the ground.
At the beginning of this month a fire broke out in the Arsenal, at
night, consuming the workshops, and all they contained, “except a number
of carriages of different kinds, which, by the unparalleled efforts of
the officers and soldiers, were preserved from the flames.” Colonel
Pearse was present, and his presence stimulated their exertions to the
utmost, but there is reason to believe that his own end was hastened by
the exposure to this night, under the influence of mercury, as we find
was the case from his own correspondence. Early in April he gave over
the command of the garrison to the next senior officer, and proceeded
down the river for a change of air, in the hope of restoring himself to
health, but without the desired effect, and on the 15th June he ended
his life; a garrison order by the Governor-General thus announces it:—
“It is with the utmost concern that Earl Cornwallis has occasion to
prepare the mournful duties of a last tribute of military honour to the
remains of Colonel Pearse, in whose demise the army has lost a zealous
and most respectable officer.
“On the corpse being brought into garrison the colours are to be lowered
half-staff, and to remain so until the corpse is interred.
“The brigade of artillery is to furnish the funeral party, which is to
consist of such part of the late Colonel Pearses own battalion as is in
the garrison, completed to the strength of a battalion, and commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare; the remainder of the brigade, with the 4th
battalion European infantry, are to attend the interment with their
side-arms, in such disposition as the senior officer present may
direct.”
He was buried in the great burial-ground of Calcutta, and a handsome
pillar of the Corinthian order raised to his memory at Dum-Dum.
The inscription given below is cut on a tablet let into the base of the
pillar:—
COLONEL PEARSE’S MONUMENT.
[Illustration:
TO THE MEMORY OF
THOMAS DEANE PEARSE,
COLONEL COMMANDANT OF ARTILLERY,
THIS COLUMN IS
ERECTED BY THE OFFICERS OF THE BRIGADE
IN TESTIMONY OF THEIR RESPECT,
MDCCXC.]
In Colonel Pearse the regiment lost a commandant devoted to its welfare;
of a high order of talent, fitted, in no common degree, for command,
fond of his profession, and anxious for distinction in it, his whole
energies were directed to the performance of his duties; his intercourse
with his officers and men was marked by an earnest desire for their
happiness and comfort, and an endeavour to raise the tone of manners and
habits to be found existing in both ranks. Although a personal friend of
Warren Hastings, his influence never seems to have been used for any
private end; the good of the service was emphatically his guide; from
his duty he never swerved, and in it he was influenced always by
high-souled and chivalrous feelings. That he would have won for himself
high honours, had an opportunity been afforded, who can doubt who has
carefully considered his conduct when in command of the detachment to
the coast; and that he had not opportunity must be in part attributed to
the prejudice or jealousy of Coote.
For twenty years he commanded the regiment, and under his eye it grew
from infancy to maturity, and passed through many trials, yet always
winning for itself thanks and praises; to his exertions in instructing
all parties in the details of their duties, it owed its excellence, and
long as the regiment may last, and high as its fame may rise, the name
of Pearse ought always to be gratefully associated with it.
The command of the artillery brigade now devolved upon
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Deare (who joined the corps as a 2nd lieutenant
when Pearse commanded it); he was at this time at Cawnpoor, commanding a
battalion, and the duties of the brigade were carried on till he could
join by “the brigade-major, Captain Grace, referring for advice to
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commissary of stores, and brother to the
commandant.”
There being a paucity of artillery officers, such officers as chose to
volunteer from the line and were approved of by the commandant of
artillery were appointed. The following, this year, joined the corps
from the infantry:—Lieutenants Drummond, Jones, H. Green, Clements
Brown, Winbolt, Matthews, and Hopper; others joined in a similar manner
previously, but their names have not been ascertained, though from a
correspondence three years afterwards, we find Lieutenants Macalister
and R. Browne were among them.
From the return of the two great detachments from Western India and the
coast in 1785, the corps does not appear to have been called on to take
the field; but this calm was soon to be at an end, and the Carnatic once
again became the field of battle. Tippoo inherited with his dominions
all his father’s hatred and jealousy of the British, and from the time
of his succession it was evident that he would take the earliest
favourable opportunity to renew the war; with such feelings on his part,
and jealousy and fear on the part of the British, peace could not long
remain.
The war having recommenced with Tippoo in the Carnatic, assistance was
called for from the Bengal Government, and in January, 1790, the whole
of the second battalion of artillery was directed to be in readiness to
embark for Madras on the shortest notice; and to economize the store of
gunpowder, its issue was prohibited, save for service and artillery
practice; country powder was ordered to be purchased by agents, and
supplied for all other purposes.
The men of the 2nd battalion, unequal to the fatigues of field service,
were removed to the 1st and 3rd battalions, and their places supplied by
volunteers from them; twelve companies of lascars were attached, and the
whole marched from Dum-Dum on the 5th February, and embarked on the 16th
on the “Houghton” and “Chesterfield” Indiamen, and sloop “Lucnow,”
except a detachment of one-half of the 2nd company, which marched with
the infantry of the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, and
which was afterwards joined at Masulipatam by a complete company in
addition, from the 1st battalion.
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare was at this time commissary of stores in Fort
William, but giving over charge of the arsenal to Lieutenant Humphries,
secretary to the Military Board, he took command of his battalion.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commandant; Lieutenant Johnson,
adjutant; Lieutenant Balfour, quartermaster; and Conductor Johnson.
──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────
Lascar │ │ │ │ │Lieutenant- │Non-com.
Companies.│Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Fireworkers.│Officers
│ │ │ │ │ │and Men.
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
1, 7 │ 1 │ 2 │Ellwood │Horsburgh │Butler │ 74
│ │ │ │Macpherson │C. Brown │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
│ 2 │ 2 │ │Nash │Feade │ 37
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
3, 4, 13 │ 3 │ 2 │Horsford │Tomkyns │Winbolt │ 74
│ │ │ │Nelly │H. Green │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
2, 5 │ 4 │ 2 │Smith │Wittit │Dowell │ 74
│ │ │ │Clarke │Matthews │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
6, 15, 16 │ 5 │ 2 │Sampson │Hardwicke │Dunn │ 71
│ │ │ │Cranch │Jones │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────
The 2nd battalion was probably selected for this service from its being
complete at the presidency; but the officers of the other battalions
seem to have thought they had been wronged by a departure from the
regular roster, and accordingly Major Greene, 5 captains, and 20
subalterns appealed to Lord Cornwallis, that their juniors, or others
out of turn, should not be sent. Lord Cornwallis, in general orders,
commented on their proceedings, exculpating the subalterns on the plea
of inexperience, but blaming the seniors for attempting to dictate to
Government on such a point.
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare, his staff the 1st, 5th, and a quarter of the
2nd company, under Lieutenant Nash; the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 13th, and 16th
companies of lascars, with one-half the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on board the “Houghton,” while Major Woodburn,
with the 3rd, 4th, and a quarter of the 2nd company, under
Lieutenant-Fireworker Feade; the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 15th companies
of lascars, with the remainder of the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on the “Chesterfield;” a party, however, of 150
lascars from 2nd and 5th companies, with Lieutenants Horsburgh and
Wittit, proceeded in the “Lucnow.”
The former ships had a fair passage for that season, and reached Madras
before the end of March; the companies landed, and the headquarters,
with 1st, 3rd, and 5th companies, immediately marched for Conjeveram,
where, on the 30th March, they joined Colonel Musgrave’s detachment, _en
route_ to Trichinopoly, the rendezvous of the grand army, and arrived
there on the 29th April; the 4th company remained at Conjeveram.
The “Lucnow” was delayed in the river till 6th March, and did not leave
the pilot till the 10th; their passage was so slow, that on the 3rd
April it became necessary to reduce the allowance of water to each man;
however, on the 19th April she reached Madras; the detachment of the 2nd
company was landed and marched to the Mount, where it joined the part
under Lieutenants Nash and Feade; Lieutenant Horsford marched for
Trichinopoly, to join his company, and Lieutenant Wittit, with the
lascars, set out for Wallajabad, where he arrived on the 2nd May, and
gave them over to Captain Smith, commanding the Bengal artillery, with
the force at that station, under Colonel Kelly.
The King’s ships being all withdrawn, an armament, consisting of four
Company’s ships and two coasting vessels, was fitted out under command
of Commodore Mitchell, who was knighted for his conduct in this
expedition, succeeded in capturing two privateers, equal in size to
small frigates, and in engaging and beating off two large frigates and
another stout ship.
At this time a circumstance occurred which caused the relative
precedence of the different arms of the service in the King’s and
Company’s service to be set at rest by general orders.
Lieutenant Wittit, being for picket duty with a party of artillerymen,
was proceeding to take the right of the party from H. M.’s 74th
regiment, when the adjutant on duty directed him to parade on the left;
to this he objected, but on being told it was Colonel Kelly’s positive
order, he reluctantly obeyed, and reported the circumstance to his
commanding officer, Captain Smith, and Captain Speediman, commanding the
artillery at the station. In forwarding the statement, Captain Smith
mentioned a case having occurred in Bengal, between Captain Montague and
Colonel MacLeod, of H.M.’s 73rd regiment, and requested that it might be
referred to Earl Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief, which was done, and
his lordship decided that “H.M.’s cavalry takes post of the Company’s
cavalry, H.M.’s artillery of the Company’s artillery, and H.M.’s
infantry of the Company’s infantry; but the artillery takes post of the
infantry, without considering the service to which they belong.”
The relative precedence of the troops of the three presidencies was also
decided at the same time: the Bengal troops are always to be on the
right; the Madras and Bombay to take the right of each other in their
own presidency, but to draw lots for the post when they meet on neutral
ground.
The main body of the army was now assembled, to the number of 15,000
fighting men, at Trichinopoly; to each European battalion were attached
two 12–pounders, and to each native battalion two 6–pounder guns, while
a park of four iron and four brass 18–pounders, and four howitzers, for
field service, accompanied, together with a large train of battering
guns.
General Meadows arrived and reviewed the army on the 24th May, and on
the 26th it commenced its march, the plan of the campaign being to enter
Mysore by the Guzelhutty Pass, securing a communication by occupying, as
a line of posts and depôts, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Carrore, Erroad, and
Sattimungulum.
On the 15th June, the army reached Carrore, which they found evacuated,
and, to lighten their march, deposited the iron and two of the brass
18–pounders, two of the howitzers, and about 1,200 sick in the fort.
Daropooram was taken; Coimbatore evacuated by the end of July; Erroad
was taken early in August, but want of carriage was even thus early
felt; officers were all directed to double up in their tents, and the
battering guns, stores, and convalescents were left in Coimbatore. In
the attack on Erroad the Bengal Artillery was employed under Colonel
Deare. Dindigul and Palacatcherry were taken, and Sattimungulum
surrendered to a detachment under Colonel Lloyd, with which was Captain
Sampson’s company of artillery; in the two former, the artillery of the
coast were employed, and at Dindigul Colonel Moorhouse, an officer much
respected, met his death.
It has been said that a detachment of the 2nd company 2nd battalion
marched with Colonel Cockerell’s division from Bengal; they joined the
division at Balasore on the 24th March, and a complete company, in
addition, from the 1st battalion, was sent by sea, and overtook them on
the 20th June at Masulipatam; the officers were as follows:—
──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬────────────┬─────────
Lascar │Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant- │ No. of
Companies.│ │ │ │ │Fireworkers.│Privates.
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼─────────
11, 12 │ 2 │ 2 │Montagu │Douglas │Briscoe │ 37
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼─────────
23, 29, 30│ 5 │ 1 │Barton │Hinde │Tulloh │ 74
│ │ │ │Toppin │Hill │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────┴────────────┴─────────
With the former were four 6–pounders and eight tumbrils, with spare
carriages, and with the latter were ten 6–pounders and two 12–pounders.
The division reached Conjeveram on the 1st August. The 2nd company 2nd
battalion, now completed by the other half joining, was attached, to the
1st brigade; the 5th company 1st battalion to the 2nd brigade, and a
Madras company to the 3rd or reserve, Major Woodburn commanding the
artillery.[27] This division marched under Colonel Kelly, by Wandiwash
to Arnee, which place they had reached by the end of August, and were
thus ready to penetrate the valley of Baramahl.
Thus far the campaign had been successful; a line of communication had
been established, and the main body and centre division were ready to
fall on Tippoo’s dominions from two points—the Baramahl Valley and the
Guzelhutty Pass.
The advanced division, under Colonel Lloyd, with which were the 1st,
3rd, and 5th companies of the 2nd battalion artillery was at
Sattimungulum, the main body, under General Meadows, at Coimbatore, 60
miles in rear, and the rear division under Colonel Stewart at
Palacatcherry, 30 miles in rear of the main body, while Colonel Kelly’s
with the centre army was at Baramahl.
Such were the positions of the British army, when, on the 11th
September, Tippoo with his whole force descended by the Guzelhutty Pass.
His movements had been unknown; want of intelligence, partly caused by
the numbers of cavalry who enveloped Tippoo’s movements, and partly from
want of arrangements, was a prevailing misfortune in these campaigns,
and the first intelligence of this movement was received by Colonel
Lloyd on the 12th from some battalions sent out to collect grain.
On the 13th, a cavalry party sent out to reconnoitre, fell in with the
advance of Tippoo’s army, and falling back on their supports, kept the
enemy at bay till he drew off, and then returned to camp. Tippoo soon
followed, but Colonel Floyd took up a position which confined his attack
to a cannonade, commencing with three pieces, which he advanced under
cover of the hedges, and which, from being at a distance, and the supply
of ammunition with the British being short, were not at first molested,
he gradually increased them until, by 2 o’clock, there was a semicircle
of 15 pieces playing with much execution on the British line; but it may
be as well to extract, from a letter of Lieutenant Hardwicke, who was in
the action with Captain Sampson’s company, to Lieutenant Wittit:—“The
enemy advanced so fast, that the camp was struck a second time, and all
baggage thrown into a place of security. The line formed and advanced,
and about 10 o’clock the enemy’s guns opened upon us, and by 11 o’clock
we had taken our position and returned the fire. The enemy extended his
line so as to form a crescent, and opened guns to bear upon us in every
situation, and so well were they served that every shot did
execution. * * * On the right of our line an 18, two 12, and two
6–pounders kept up a smart fire, against which the enemy returned a most
galling one. About 12 o’clock our commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles
Deare,[28] received a shot in his breast, and expired immediately. Half
an hour afterwards, Captain Sampson, our second in command, while
speaking to me, received a very dangerous wound in the head, from a
stone which a shot, that at this moment killed my horse, had raised;
whole files of the grenadiers were swept away; half our gun bullocks
fell; and the desertion of all the drivers increased the confusion. The
cannonade continued till the close of day, and before it was quite dark
we could perceive they were drawing off their guns. The two 12–pounders
were rendered useless very early in the day by the axletrees giving way;
the 18–pounder limber received a shot and blew up; both my 6–pounders
were so damaged by shot that one only could travel; except the left of
the line, every part of the ordnance suffered much, and it appeared
impossible to bear such a cannonade till relief could come from the
grand army; to stand another day seemed likely to lessen our means of
getting off, and while we had guns to defend ourselves in a retreat,
that measure was thought most advisable.”
The day had been disastrous, many killed and wounded, and three guns
disabled, but Colonel Floyd reported that the “rest of the guns fired
with excellent aim, but sparingly, for the stock of ammunition was not
great. H. M.’s regiments and the artillery did themselves justice with
their accustomed valour.”
A council of war followed at night, and, as might be expected (for when
did a council of war ever recommend an energetic plan?), a retreat to
Coimbatore, sacrificing baggage and followers, was resolved on. It
certainly does appear strange, with a fort at hand and the main army
within 60 miles, the resolution of holding the fort till help arrived
was not determined on.
The intention of abandoning the followers got abroad, and they all fled,
so that no artificers could be found to repair the damaged carriages;
however, the experience of the officers, with the aid of the Europeans,
supplied the deficiency, and by 1 A.M. of the 14th they were in a
serviceable state; by 4 A.M. the army was in retreat, but from the loss
of bullocks one 18, two 12, and three 6–pounders were left behind.
Crossing the “Bavani” in basket-boats, the retreat commenced unmolested,
but “about 10 o’clock (and here we again quote Lieutenant Hardwicke’s
letter) we could discern the enemy’s line of march, and at 1 o’clock
they opened their guns upon us, moving parallel with our line and taking
advantage of every situation which gave them a view of the line. About 3
o’clock their infantry and horse crowded on the rear, an advantage the
nature of the country or badness of the road gave them; they enfiladed
us from behind hedges, buildings, &c., and at 5 o’clock they appeared in
all quarters and advanced with a ‘ding’ in crowds. The battalions
reserved their fire, and gave it almost on the point of the bayonet with
surprising effect; some faced to the rear and resisted the attacks
there. * * * A 6–pounder and two tumbrils were, however, here lost, but
it was astonishing the havoc the remaining 6–pounder in that quarter
made at this time; so severe did they feel our fire, that theirs
slackened, and a charge made by the whole of our cavalry gave a turn to
the fate of the day. Night closed on the bloody scene, and we continued
our march till 9 o’clock. By the lights in the enemy’s camp we could
tell they were not far off, and it was thought prudent, weakened as we
were by two such days’ fatigue, to continue our march; we accordingly
set off again at 3 o’clock, and directed our route towards the hills,
expecting to meet a reinforcement from the general; we crept along all
the day, suffering almost as much from fatigue, heat, and want of
sustenance, as we had before from the enemy. * * * We lost in all six
guns and the greatest part of our baggage. Lieutenant Horsborough was
slightly wounded in the head, and Lieutenant Winbolt in the arm.”
The artillery lost in these actions—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 corporal, 6
lascars killed, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 10 Europeans, and 15 lascars
wounded.
The whole army was now collected at Coimbatore, and on it moving
forwards, Tippoo made an unsuccessful attempt on the place.
On Colonel Kelly’s death, on the 24th September, the centre army fell
under Colonel Maxwell’s command, and entered the Baramahl valley; but
the operations of this division only once brought them into contact with
the enemy, on the 12th of November, on which occasion the good position
taken up, and the correct fire of a gun, prevented an attack by the
overwhelming numbers opposed.
A junction took place with the main army on the 10th November, and both
armies followed Tippoo, to relieve Trichinopoly, and after some
desultory operations, the campaign concluded.
In November and December Lieutenants Jones and Nash, of the artillery,
died, and Lieutenants T. Green, Exshaw, McLeod, Drummond, and Buchan
came round from Bengal to join the battalion.
By Lieutenant-Colonel Deare’s death, Captain Montague was promoted to a
majority, but directed to remain with the 2nd battalion; Lieutenant
Glass to a company, and joined; Colonel Duff was ordered round to
command the Bengal artillery, and arrived about the middle of December.
These promotions were made subject to the Court of Directors’ approval,
because Colonel Duff had memorialized to be allowed to command the
artillery brigade as senior officer. The regimental formation having
taken place, his claim was not allowed by the Indian Government, but
referred home, where it was finally negatived, and these promotions
confirmed, in the Courts letter, 4th August, 1791.
On the 12th December Lord Cornwallis arrived, and assumed command of the
army; fresh energy was instilled into every department, and by the 5th
February the march commenced.
The park consisted of eleven 18–pounders, six 12–pounders, and eight
mortars, with an ample supply of ammunition and stores.
Lieutenant-Colonel Giels (Madras artillery) commanded artillery of right
wing; Major Moorhouse, left wing; Major Woodburn, heavy park; Major
Montague, of the advance.
The plan of the campaign was to penetrate Mysore by the line of Vellore,
Ambore, and Bangalore; and to meet the British, Tippoo moved off from
Pondicherry (where he had been intriguing with the French), and was
ready to oppose them by the usual routes; but Lord Cornwallis, marching
in the direction of Ambore, turned suddenly to the north, and gained the
foot of the Mooglee pass on the 17th February, and by the 21st the whole
army had ascended, and were encamped in Mysore before Tippoo could
oppose them; the ghat presented but few difficulties; the heavy guns,
with the aid of men and elephants, gave little trouble.
On the 24th marched for Bangalore, in three columns: the artillery on
the right, infantry in the centre, and cavalry on the left; to keep the
enemy’s cavalry at a distance, the European regiments were equipped with
the iron 12–pounders from the park, and on several occasions their
services were found very useful on the march to Bangalore, before which
the army took up their position on the 5th March. On the next day the
cavalry went out on a _reconnaisance_, in which they were worsted by
Tippoo’s troops, and but for the opportune arrival of Major Gowdie and
Major Montague, with assistance, and contrary to orders, our loss would
have been severe. On the 7th the pettah was attacked and carried, and
Tippoo’s endeavour to retake it repulsed; the fort was now attacked; on
the 12th, a 10–gun, a 2–gun, a mortar battery, and a 9–gun battery in
the ditch of the pettah were commenced, and opened on the 15th; on the
16th a breach appeared, but two guns, an 18–pounder and a 24–pounder,
were disabled. On the night of the 17th a 4–gun battery was erected
against the gateway. “So just was the aim of our artillery,” Major Dirom
says, “that on the 18th, notwithstanding the strength of the wall, the
breach was considered practicable by several qualified to judge from the
experience of several years’ service; another parallel, however, was
laid out and completed within 200 yards, and its batteries armed.
“On the 19th, the 4–gun battery opened; this and the others kept up a
constant cannonade on the breach and neighbouring towers, replied to
sharply by musketry from covert way and outworks; to keep which down,
additional batteries were erected in the advanced parallel, and were
ready by daylight.
“On the 20th the fire widened the breach, and rendered it easier of
access, although its defences were still numerous, and at dusk a working
party opened a sap from the advanced battery to the crest of the glacis;
the enemy employed in attempting to stockade the breach.”
On the 21st the enemy meditated an attack on the British camp, but,
being met, retreated; they however advanced again in the evening.
At 11 o’clock at night the storming party prepared to move forward, and
for about an hour previous a heavy cannonade was kept up on the breach,
and as this intimidated the defenders from remaining there, it was kept
up with blank cartridges while the storming party advanced; the party
gained the top of the breach without very much opposition, and wheeled
off to the right and left, overcoming a considerable resistance at
different points.
The whole of the Bengal artillery (six companies) it is believed were
employed in this service. The casualties, from 7th to 21st March,
amounted to only 8 Europeans and 2 gun lascars killed; and the following
extract from the general orders of the 22nd March records the
satisfaction they gave. “The judicious arrangements made by Colonel
Duff, in the artillery department, his exertions and those of the other
officers and soldiers of that corps in general, in the service of the
batteries, are entitled to his lordship’s perfect approbation; to which
he desires to add, that he thinks himself much obliged to
Lieutenant-Colonel Giels (Madras establishment) for the able manner in
which he conducted the fire during the day of the 21st.”
The army remained in Bangalore till the 4th May, during which time every
exertion was used to collect carriage,—every expedient that could be
suggested was tried: private cattle were obtained by leaving behind camp
equipage and every necessary; a reward was given to camp-followers of 1½
rupees for every 24–pounder, and 1 rupee for every 18–pounder shot they
would carry to Seringapatam; every nerve was strained, that an attack
might be made at once upon the capital; the train was put in order, but
beyond bullocks for 52 field-pieces and a few howitzers, sufficient for
only 15 battering-guns could be collected. Thus equipped, on the 4th the
army marched, and after much difficulty, from the state of the carriage
cattle, reached Arakerry, on the river Cavery, a few miles below
Seringapatam, on the 13th May; the river was found unfordable, and no
place nearer than Caniambaddy, eight miles above the fort, could be
found. Tippoo, with his army, was encamped about six miles off, with his
right to the river, and left to a rugged mountain. While attempting to
render the ford passable, on the 14th, the army halted, and Lord
Cornwallis conceived the idea of attacking Tippoo by a night march, and
cutting him off from a retreat on Seringapatam. The attempt was made,
but a heavy storm overtaking the army soon after it started, the way was
lost, and the troops got entangled, so that they were forced to halt
till daylight; the effect of a surprise was lost; the enemy, however,
were defeated with loss. The artillery had Lieutenant Macpherson, one
European, and four lascars wounded; but the chief part were probably
left behind, under Colonel Duff, with the camp, heavy guns, and stores.
Lieutenant Macpherson died of his wounds on the 21st May.
On the 20th the army had reached the ford at Caniambaddy, but in such a
state, from deficiency of food, carriage, and material, and the state of
the weather, that Lord Cornwallis found it would be impossible to move
the battering-train from where it was, and that he must give up the hope
of taking Seringapatam for the present. On the 22nd, three 24–pounders
and eight 18–pounders were burst, all the stores were buried or
destroyed, and the whole of the public grain distributed among the
troops, and the whole army were in motion on their melancholy retreat on
the 26th May; they moved slowly back to Bangalore, which they reached on
the 11th July, putting all their spare tumbrils and stores into
Bangalore (Lieutenant Douglas was appointed commissary of ordnance). The
army moved lightly on the 15th, to cover the passage of a convoy from
below the ghats. Ossoor surrendered and Captain Glass’s (2nd company 2nd
battalion) company of artillery was thrown into it, with a battalion of
Bengal volunteers as a garrison. This company, with heavy guns, was
employed in September in escorting a convoy to Bangalore.
In September, a detachment under Major Gowdie was sent against
Nundydroog, a hill fort, which, if left in the enemy’s possession, would
have given trouble to the army on their advance to Seringapatam, for
which every thing was now nearly ready. With Major Gowdie’s detachment
was a detachment of artillery under Major Montague, four iron
12–pounders and two small mortars. This detail was probably from the 5th
company 1st battalion, as Lieutenant T. Hill’s name is mentioned during
the subsequent operations, and to that company he belonged.
On the road to Nundydroog the hill fortress of Raymanghur was taken.
“The indefatigable exertion of Major Montague in getting four 6–pounders
and two mortars on a rock which completely flanked the proposed point of
attack, his firing with great effect, and throwing shells with much
judgment,” are acknowledged by Major Gowdie, as contributing to the
early capture of the place.
From Raymanghur the division proceeded against Nundydroog, a hill
fortress of great strength, situated on ground most difficult of
approach, where, on the 29th, they were joined by two 24–pounder guns
and four mortars, with a quantity of stores.
With astonishing labour and exertion, Major Montague, on the night of
the 2nd October, got two 24–pounders into the battery by means of ropes
fastened round posts driven into the ground, and trees, and all the
resources which an artillery officer must bring into play in such
circumstances; and on the 4th, this and a mortar battery from the pettah
opened, but the height was too great, for the mortars, and the guns were
unable to make any impression on the solid blocks of stone of which the
walls were formed; regular approaches were resolved on, and an 8–gun
battery (18–pounders) got ready up the hill, into which, on the 11th
October, the guns were drawn by two elephants each, aided by four
drag-ropes and crowds of men. On the 12th this battery opened with
excellent effect, and soon silenced all the guns in its direction,
except one on the south-east angle, which did much mischief; a traverse
was raised against this, and an advanced battery for two 6–pounders;
into this, with infinite labour, a 12–pounder was also conveyed, and the
angle gave way to a few well-directed shots by Major Montague, and the
troublesome gun came tumbling down the rock. The ammunition running
short, the fire was slack until the 16th, when a fresh supply arrived
from Bangalore.
The breach being now practicable, on the 18th the army moved up, and on
that evening the assault took place. An artillery officer, with a party
of men and a small mortar, to be used as a petard for blowing open the
gate of the inner wall, accompanied the storming party. The resistance,
though great at first, was not continued, and the place was won without
a heavy loss.
Lieutenant T. Hill, of the artillery, was wounded, during the siege, in
the thigh by the bursting of a shell, and Lieutenant Cranch slightly in
the shoulder.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart’s division now proceeded against Savendroog,
a hill fortress on a rocky mountain, half a mile high, and eight or ten
miles in circumference; on the 10th December, the division was within
three miles of it, the Commander-in-Chief covering the siege with the
main army; the hill was surrounded by a deep belt of jungle, composed of
bamboos and trees, interspersed with large masses of rock; a narrow path
was the only road, and this was rendered difficult from barriers. A road
for the guns was with great labour formed through this forest, and they
were transported with much difficulty through; the enemy offered little
or no interruption, confident in the strength of their post and the
fearful ally, malaria, which haunted the jungle, and, which Tippoo
affirmed, would destroy one-half of the army, while he would slaughter
the other. On the 17th December, two batteries opened, one of three
18–pounders, at 800 yards, at an elevation of 23°, and the other of
three 12–pounders and two 18–pounders, at 700 yards; the artillery was
under Major Montague, but we are unable to ascertain what company.
The wall being formed of solid slabs of stone fastened together by iron
rivets, and the guns firing at an elevation, the effect of the
12–pounders did not at first answer the expectations formed. Two 2–gun
batteries were pushed on to within 250 yards, and the 12–pounders were
replaced by 18–pounders drawn from the main army, and their continued
fire soon opened a breach in the upper wall. On the 20th, the breach was
reconnoitred, and Major Montague not considering it sufficiently open,
kept up an incessant and well-directed fire upon it all day, and before
dark the breach was widened, and the outer wall shattered to its
foundation.
On the 21st the storm took place; the signal was to be given when the
fogs, which daily rise from the low ground and ascend the hill, should
wrap the fortress in their sombre mantle, hiding from the besieged the
besiegers’ intentions. At about 11 o’clock A.M. the signal-guns were
fired, and the enemy moved down to defend the breach, but the batteries
opened a deadly fire of grape, under cover of which the storming party
advanced, and rapidly drove the enemy back, entering the citadel with
them, and gaining possession of the place. Major Montague’s successful
exertions in bringing his guns into battery, and his professional skill
in directing their fire, again earned the praises of the
Commander-in-Chief in Government Orders.
Other fortresses fell—Ramghurry, Sheriaghurry, and Outredroog, with
little resistance; Lieutenant Shipton, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Charles
Brown and Butler, were present at their taking; but now all attention
was turned to the main object of the campaign, the siege of
Seringapatam.
During the operations above detailed, convoys of stores and ordnance had
been arriving, and every care taken to put the _matériel_ of the army on
the best possible footing; every thing was collected in Bangalore, and
the train under Colonel Duff arrived there on the 12th January, 1792, in
high order; “the draught cattle were in such high order” (to quote from
a letter of that period), “that they literally came in with the heavy
guns on a gallop.”
The train consisted of—
4 24–pounders,
24 18–pounders,
4 12–pounders,
60 6–pounders,
3 8–inch howitzers,
4 5½-inch howitzers,
6 5½ and 4⅕ mortars,
1 8–inch mortar,
60 6–pounder tumbrils,
206 store tumbrils,
9 spare carriages,
225 carts.
The Bengal Artillery during the last few months had been weakened by the
loss of officers: Captain Smith and Lieutenant Horsborough died in
October, 1791, at Bangalore, and Captain Sampson early in January, 1792;
but Captains Howell and Burnett supplied their vacancies.
On the 1st February, the army marched from Bangalore, the troops on the
right, the battering-train in the centre, and the baggage on the left;
the cattle and the carriages were so good that the train moved without
difficulty, and on the 5th February, the army came in sight of
Seringapatam. Tippoo had drawn his army into a fortified camp on the
north side of the Cavery; Lord Cornwallis, on the 6th, reached
Seringapatam, and resolved to attack the enemy that night. The army
marched at 7 o’clock in the evening, in three divisions, for this
purpose, leaving their artillery in camp, protected by the cavalry,
quarter, and rear-guards, under the command of Colonel Duff. No guns
accompanied the army; but with Lord Cornwallis’s division were Major
Montague (Captain Ross, Royal Artillery), and subalterns, and 50
European artillerymen; with General Meadows, Captain Howell, 2
subalterns, and 50 European artillerymen; 150 lascars went with each
division to carry the scaling-ladders; and with Lieutenant-Colonel
Maxwell were 2 subalterns, 30 European artillerymen, and 50 lascars. In
spite of the opposition and the difficulties the nature of the ground
presented, the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief were carried out,
and the morning of the 7th found the British army in possession of the
camp; but several attempts were made by Tippoo to dislodge them from
some of the redoubts they had taken, particularly the one called,
hitherto, the Sultan’s redoubt, but from this day Sibbald’s, in
compliment to the gallant man who, with a very small force, held it this
day against Tippoo’s repeated attacks. In this defence, the life of a
valuable officer of the Bengal Artillery, Lieutenant Buchan, was lost,
one to whose resources in the hour of emergency its successful defence
was indebted.
The detachment with Major Montague was actively employed in securing the
field-artillery in the enemy’s camp; instead of spiking the guns, Major
Montague directed that they should be thrown off their carriages and the
wheels rolled different ways, by which means the guns taken were secured
without being damaged, and the parts afterwards easily collected:
upwards of sixty guns were thus taken.[29] The chief loss fell on the
lascars, of whom eight were killed and twenty-two wounded or missing.
The fortress was now invested by the combined armies, and preparations
made for the siege; in this Lieutenant Hind, of the Bengal Artillery,
with 300 lascars assisted, collecting and preparing materials for
gabions and fascines; but a treaty formed with Tippoo rendered these
useless, and in May the army broke up.
The artillery marched to the coast, where Colonel Duff left them, and
sailed for England in the “Dutton,” Indiaman, with General Meadows: the
rest embarked in the “Ardesir,” “Mary,” “Hero,” and “Juliana Maria,” and
reached Bengal early in July.
The following tabular statement, compiled from the Prize-money
Distribution Statements, will shew more clearly the officers who were
present in these campaigns, as each officer had not been mentioned at
the time of his joining.
───────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────┬─────────────────────────
│ │Proportion of │
Rank. │ Name. │ Shares for │ Remarks.
│ │ Companies. │
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┬────┬────┼─────────────────────────
〃 │〃 │ 90│ 91│ 91½│〃
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼─────────────────────────
Colonel │P. Duff Staff │ │full│full│
Lieut.-Col.│C. R. Deare Staff │ ¾│ │ │killed at Sattimungalum.
Major │W. Woodburn Staff │full│full│full│
Major │E. Montague Staff │full│full│full│
Captain │P. Cranell Staff │full│full│full│died at Madras.
Captain │T. Hardwicke Staff│full│full│full│
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼─────────────────────────
Captain │T. Ellwood │full│full│full│
Captain │G. Howell │ │ ¾│full│
Captain │A. Glass │ │full│full│
Captain │J. Horsford │full│full│full│
Captain │J. Smith │ │full│ │
Captain │G. F. Sampson │full│full│ │
Captain │J. Burnett │ │ │full│
Captain │C. Wittit │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Horsborough │full│full│ │
Lieutenant │D. McPherson │full│ ½│ │
Lieutenant │H. Douglas │ │ ¼│full│
Lieutenant │J. R. Exshaw │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │T. Greene │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Tomkyns │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Nelly │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │E. Clarke │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │T. Hardwicke │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │H. Balfour │full│full│ │
Lieutenant │W. Shipton │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │T. Hill │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │J. P. Drummond │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │T. Dowell │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │R. Tulloh │ │ │full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Dunn │ ½│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. McLeod │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Buchan │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Mathews │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│W. Winbolt │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│H. Green │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│W. Feade │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│E. Butler │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│Charles Brown │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│J. J. Briscoe │full│full│full│
Cadet │J. P. Keeble │ │ │full│Inf. Invalided Lt.Co.
│ │ │ │ │1820.
Cadet │P. Fortnham │ │ │full│resigned Aug 1800.
Cadet │J. Gore │ │ │full│Inf., died at sea 97–8.
───────────┴──────────────────┴────┴────┴────┴─────────────────────────
During these campaigns the following officers lost their lives, either
in action or from disease:—Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, killed;
Captains Smith and Sampson; Lieutenants Macpherson and Buchan, killed.
Lieutenants Horsborough, Nash, and Jones, and several others, were
forced to seek health in a sea-voyage.
The services of the native troops, including the artillery lascars, on
this occasion, were rewarded by a medal, and six months’ batta was given
to all the officers and troops.
[Illustration]
────────────────────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────
│1788│1789│1790│1791│1792│1793│1794│1795
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Strength on 1st Nov.│ 969│ 980│1176│1155│1162│1083│ 844│ 755
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Died │ 51│ 80│ 133│ 146│ 102│ 83│ 65│ 65
Deserted │ 3│ 6│ 7│ 11│ 14│ 10│ 10│ 8
Discharged │ 25│ 30│ 9│ 7│ 10│ 11│ 5│ 7
Invalided │ 26│ 15│ 21│ 25│ 35│ 31│ 15│ 37
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Total │ 105│ 131│ 170│ 189│ 161│ 135│ 95│ 117
────────────────────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────
It will not be uninteresting at this period to examine the casualties of
the regiment, with a view to ascertaining the relative health enjoyed in
those days and at present: fortunately, the long rolls of the regiment
are tolerably perfect at this period, and the following is an abstract,
giving an average of 138 casualties per annum to a strength of 1,016, or
about 13 per cent. per annum,—almost the same proportion of casualties
as have taken place from the same causes during the last three years:
their amount is 368, and the strength of the regiment in Europeans maybe
taken as 3,000. The average, however, of a longer period will be more
favourable to modern times, as the losses during the Afghanistan war,
the destruction of the 1st troop, and the mortality from disease at
Sukkhur, all tend to swell these years beyond their predecessors; but
this subject will be adverted to hereafter, when abstracts of longer
periods have been made.
In August, 1793, five companies of artillery, the 2nd and 4th of 1st
battalion, the 1st of 2nd battalion, and the 4th and 5th of 3rd
battalion, under command of Major Bruce, sailed for the coast, forming
part of an expedition against Pondicherry. The troops do not appear to
have been employed, and the artillery returned in October.
The allowances of officers of similar rank and in similar commands, at
this time and fifty years later, form a contrast much in favour of the
liberality of the old scale.
The allowances to Major Bruce in │The allowances to a Major similarly
1793 were fixed at │ placed in 1843 would be
│
Pay as Major Rs. 180 0 0│Pay as Major Rs. 182 10 0
Batta as Colonel 1,200 0 0│Batta as Major 456 9 0
½ Table allowance 600 0 0│Tentage as Major 120 0 0
Field allowance 120 0 0│Horse allowance 30 0 0
————— —— —│Command allow. 300 0 0
Total 2,100 0 0│ ————— —— —
│ Total 1,089 3 0
But it must be allowed that the juniors of the army are in much better
circumstances than they were then.
The whole of the officers employed were to receive full batta at Madras,
and the difference of full and double full batta to be audited to them
in Bengal.
A detachment of 105 Europeans and 230 lascars, under Captain Frazer,[30]
embarked in October on board Commodore Mitchell’s fleet as marines, and
served for nearly a year. Their good conduct, and the unanimity which
prevailed between them and the crews of the different ships, were
eulogized by the Commander-in-Chief in General Orders on their return.
The regiment was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert
Abercrombie, in February, and by the Governor-General, Sir John Shore,
in March, 1794, and elicited, on both occasions, praises for its
appearance, discipline, and performance of exercises and evolutions.
From the General Orders of 9th June of this year, we learn that, “at the
recommendation of the commandant of artillery and chief engineer, the
Rev. W. Paul Limerick, chaplain, was appointed teacher of mathematics to
the corps of artillery and engineers, with the allowance of 500 rupees
per mensem, formerly received by W. Burroughs in a similar situation.”
A detail under Captain Carnegie accompanied the force commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine, which proceeded to Chittagong in February
and returned in June; and a detachment of 36 matrosses proceeded in
June, under Captain Howell to Bencoolen, and were lost on the passage.
Another detachment of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies, 2nd battalion,
proceeded to the coast, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hussey, returning,
however, in October.
The only portion of the regiment which was engaged in active service
this year, 1794, was the 3rd battalion, three companies of which were
employed with the army under Sir R. Abercrombie, in Rohilcund, in the
short campaign against Gholam Mohummud, who had murdered his brother,
and usurped the government of the district of Rampoor.
The following are the companies and officers employed:—
Major C. Green, Commanding.
──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬───────────────────────
Lascar │Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
Companies.│ │ │ │ │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
1, 9, 20│ 1│ 3│Hardwicke│Watkins & │C. Brown
│ │ │ │Macleod │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
8, 17, 28│ 2│ 3│Mordaunt │Baker, A. │Hoffer, Tilfer
│ │ │ │Dunn │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
18, 19, 25│ 3│ 3│Macintyre│W. Shipton │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┴────────────┼───────────────────────
│ │ │Lt.-Firew. Clem. Brown│F. Maynard (doubtful).
│ │ │was Adj. │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴──────────────────────┴───────────────────────
On the 26th October, the line (consisting of one European regiment, ten
native, two weak regiments of native cavalry, and the artillery above
mentioned and 28 pieces of ordnance) was under arms before daylight. The
Commander-in-Chief and staff rode forwards to reconnoitre the enemy,
whom they found some miles in advance, near Bittowrah. The line came up,
the artillery in the intervals, and the Rohillas pressing forwards, the
reserve was brought up into line; they moved so fast, that the artillery
attached to the reserve were unable to keep up, and fell into the rear.
The enemy at this time were in the jungle on the front and flanks, and
some lamentable error committed by Captain Ramsay, commanding the
cavalry on the right, wheeled it to the left, and brought it upon the
infantry, throwing both into confusion, which was instantly taken
advantage of by the enemy, who charged in a most daring and gallant
manner (though suffering severely from the fire of grape, which was well
directed, and caused great havoc), cutting up the regiments on the right
fearfully. Lieutenant Tilfer and the artillerymen and lascars at the
guns were cut down to a man. The confusion was great for a time; and the
enemy in part reached the centre and rear. However, by strenuous
exertions, the tide of victory was stayed, and turned in favour of the
British, but not without a heavy loss, as is attested by a monument at
the village of Futteygunge, erected by the order of the Governor-General
in Council to the memory of Colonel Burrington and fourteen British
officers who fell in the action, among whom were Captain Mordaunt,
Lieutenant Baker, and Lieutenant-Fireworker Tilfer, of the artillery.
One serjeant, 2 gunners, and 20 matrosses, and 27 lascars also fell; and
from the casualties being all in the same company (2nd company 3rd
battalion), it was probably on the right where the confusion occurred.
The officers of the army considered that Rampoor ought to have been
plundered, and probably made their opinion known, for in this case, as
in the similar one of 1774, as a sort of compensation for plunder, the
Nawab presented to the Governor-General for distribution among the
troops engaged 11 lacs of rupees, and one lac for the families of the
officers who fell. The division was made on a scale drawn up by the
junior auditor-general, giving each person engaged a sum equal to 328
days’ batta of his rank; the amount of the shares is annexed.
Colonels Rs. 16,400 0 0
Lieut.-Colonels 13,120 0 0
Majors 9,840 0 0
Captains 3,936 0 0
Lieutenants 2,624 0 0
Lt.-Fireworkers 1,968 0 0
Conductors 1,312 0 0
Serjeants 218 0 8
Gunners 109 0 0
Serangs 54 10 8
Tindals 43 11 0
Lascars 21 13 10
The lac of rupees devoted to the families of deceased officers was
divided—40,000 to Colonel Burrington’s; 20,000 to Captain Bolton’s
widow; and 10,000 to Captain Mawbey’s children; the remainder was
reserved for such purpose as the Governor-General might determine
hereafter.
In September, 1795, a complete company of European artillery (5th
company 1st battalion), with two companies (29th and 30th) of lascars,
attached under command of Captain Barton, embarked for Madras, and a
second (5th company 2nd battalion), under Captain Clark, soon followed.
The following officers joined the force under General Stewart in the
expedition against the Dutch possessions in Ceylon:—
Fifth company 1st battalion, Captain Barton, Lieutenants Humphries and
Winbolt, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Clarke and Graham. Fifth company 2nd
battalion, Captain Clark.
The first service they were engaged in was the siege of Trincomalee, in
January, 1796, in which the artillery suffered both from climate and
fatigue, and from a daring, and for a time successful attack the enemy
made on the batteries, spiking the guns, and killing some of the
artillerymen. The fort capitulated after a siege of three weeks.
Jaffna next surrendered, and the troops then proceeded to Negumbo, where
they landed in February, 1796, and meeting no resistance, General
Stewart marched on towards Colombo, a portion of the artillery
accompanying his force. During this march, though the road ran through a
jungle, and was intersected by many rivers, the army was unmolested by
the Dutch. Not even at the Matwal river, a strong natural position which
they had taken up, did they offer any resistance, but retired in the
night, alleging afterwards as a reason their fear of a landing being
effected from the shipping in their rear. The English passed the river
without opposition; but the following morning were attacked unexpectedly
before daylight by a party of Malays, under Colonel Raymond, a Frenchman
in the Dutch service thoroughly ashamed of his associates: the attack
was beaten off, and Colombo in a day or two capitulated.
The Indian Government granted medals to the native troops employed in
this service, probably more as a reward for embarking on service beyond
seas, than for the arduousness of its nature. A sketch of the medal is
given on the opposite page.
[Illustration:
CEYLON MEDALS.]
The year 1796 is a memorable one in the annals of the Indian army, its
constitution having been entirely remodelled, and many advantages
granted it at that time, placing it on a footing of respectability which
it had not held before; but the subject will be reverted to in a future
chapter.
The artillery was converted into a regiment of three battalions, of five
companies each, with thirty companies of lascars attached.
The command of the regiment was vested in the senior colonel, and a
brigade-major was allowed as his staff officer.
The chief alteration from the organization of 1786 consists in the
addition of three colonels and fifteen captain-lieutenants, and the
reduction of fifteen lieutenant-fireworkers. The allowance of officers
per company was five, and the rank of captain-lieutenant was a
compensation for the necessarily slower promotion in a large than a
small seniority regiment, thus keeping the artillery on a level with the
infantry of the army.
──────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────
│ per │ per │ Total. │ Returns
│ Company. │Battalion.│ │Dec. 1796.
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 2
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieut.-Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Majors. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captains. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenants. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 29
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 14
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serjeants. │ 4│ 20│ 60│ 50
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Corporals. │ 4│ 20│ 60│ 59
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Drummers. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Gunners. │ 8│ 40│ 120│ 120
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Matrosses. │ 56│ 280│ 840│ 512
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serangs. │ 1│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
1st Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
2nd Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lascars. │ 56│ 560│ 1680│ 1733
──────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────