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together at the end of the last chapter.
Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,
From the Formation of the Corps to The Present Time,
with Some Account of Its Internal Organization.
By the late
CAPTAIN E. BUCKLE,
Assist. Adj.-Gen., Bengal Artillery.
Edited By J. W. Kaye, Late Lieut. Bengal Artillery.
London:
Wm. H. Allen & Co., 7, Leadenhall Street.
1852.
Printed by
Cox (Brothers) and Wyman, Great Queen Street,
Lincoln’S-Inn Fields.
TO
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR GEORGE POLLOCK, G.C.B.
OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,
THIS MEMOIR
OF THE SERVICES OF A CORPS
OF WHICH HE IS SO DISTINGUISHED A MEMBER,
IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED BY
HIS SINCERE FRIEND AND ADMIRER,
THE EDITOR.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADVERTISEMENT BY THE EDITOR.
The circumstances under which the greater portion of this Memoir was
written, are set forth so truthfully in the following passages, taken
from an Indian periodical, that I cannot do better than transcribe
them:—
“It was well known for some years before Captain Buckle, driven
homewards by the pressure of ill-health, resigned the important
regimental office which he had held so creditably to himself and so
advantageously to his corps, that he had long been collecting materials
for a Memoir of the Bengal Artillery, and had been engaged, in brief
intervals of leisure, in their arrangement and reproduction in the form
of an elaborate work of military history. In the immediate circle of his
own private friends it was known, moreover, how deep was the interest
that he took in the progress of this work; how laboriously he pursued
his investigations into the past history of his regiment; and what
gratification it afforded him, in the midst of much that was necessarily
dull and thankless, to exhume, out of a mass of long-buried records, or
a heap of printed volumes with the damp of years upon them, some
neglected historical fact, some forgotten statistics, or some
illustrative anecdote which had never reached the ears of the present
generation. It was emphatically a labour of love. It was the recreation,
after hours of office drudgery, of the last few years of his sojourn in
India,—of the last few years of his life. His health had been for some
time perceptibly failing; and for many months before he finally
determined to turn his back upon Dum-Dum, he had suffered under one of
the most distressing and most fatal disorders of the country. Like many
others, who have been buoyed up by such delusive hopes, he thought that
he could weather it out a little longer. Intervals of seeming
convalescence gave him new confidence and courage; and he was
disinclined to anticipate the date at which he had originally designed
to visit Great Britain. But the hot weather of 1846 tried him severely;
his disorder was aggravated; and at last he reluctantly determined to
strike his tent, and to seek renewed health beneath the milder sun of
his native country. He embarked on board the steamer leaving Calcutta in
September; and it was hoped that the sea-breeze would check the progress
of his malady; but as the vessel steamed down the bay, he grew worse and
worse, and on the 19th of that month, off the island of Ceylon, he
rendered back his soul to his Maker.
“It was, we believe, one of his last expressions of earthly solicitude,
that the manuscript of the Memoir of the Bengal Artillery, on which he
had been so long and anxiously employed, should be given over to his
executor, an old brother officer and most esteemed friend, to be dealt
with as might seem best to him. It was the known wish of the deceased,
that the work should be published: indeed, the thought of laying before
the world a fitting memoir of the distinguished regiment to which he was
attached, had often, in hours of sickness and weariness, been a solace
and a stimulant to him. It is an ambition worthy of any soldier, to be
the historian of his corps.”[1]
The manuscript was placed in my hands by Captain Buckle’s executor, and
I undertook to see it safely through the press. The Memoir was brought
down by the author to the close of the Afghan war; but during the
interval which had elapsed since he laid down the pen, the Sikhs had
crossed the Sutlej, and the battles of Moodkhee, Ferozshuhur, Aliwal,
and Sobraon had been fought. It seemed desirable that some record of
these engagements should be added to the Memoir, and I attempted to
supply what was wanting to complete the work. But whilst the sheets
containing the annals of this campaign were passing through the press,
the second Sikh war broke out, and the further necessity of bringing
down the chronicle to the close of that memorable campaign which
resulted in the annexation of the Punjab, was imposed upon the editor.
Others would have done this more effectively and more expeditiously. My
qualifications for the due performance of the work intrusted to me were
mainly the cheerfulness with which, both from respect for the memory of
the deceased author and affection for the regiment of which I was once a
member, I undertook the labours it entailed; and such aptitude as may be
supposed to result from a life spent in literary pursuits. For the three
last chapters I alone am responsible. I am indebted to others for the
information they contain; but if any errors should appear in them, they
must be laid to the account of my misuse of the materials placed at my
disposal.
That, valuable and interesting as are many of the details of this
Memoir, it would have been more interesting and more valuable if Captain
Buckle had lived to complete it, is no mere conjecture of mine. The
marginal pencil notes which appear on the face of the manuscript,
indicate the writer’s intention of furnishing fuller information on many
important points already touched upon, and of supplying many additional
details which in the progress of the work had escaped his notice, but
which subsequent inquiries, or, in some instances, the suggestions of
friends, had enabled him to introduce, and which would have been
introduced had he lived to superintend the passage of his Memoir through
the press. It is certain, too, that the details in the concluding
chapters would have been more accurate and more complete. I have
followed the original manuscript, as far as it went, with scarcely the
alteration of a word; and I have endeavoured, in the concluding
chapters, as nearly as possible to retain the manner of the original
work.
Some apology is due for the delay which has occurred in placing the
Memoir before the public. This has been occasioned partly by the
necessity of obtaining original information relative to the events of
the Sikh campaign, and partly by the pressure of other literary
engagements which have absorbed the editor’s time. In the record of the
great victory of Goojrat, the history of the achievements of the Bengal
Artillery has a fitting termination; and I can hardly regret the delay
which has enabled me to chronicle, however inefficiently, the services
of so many of my distinguished cotemporaries in the course of the last
few memorable years.
J. W. K.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st Company in
Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation of 1st
Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company raised—Campaigns of Colonel
Calliaud, Major Adams, &c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company
raised—Major Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to
brigades—Artillery Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of
Ordnance—Practice-ground near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of Artillery
raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the Establishment—Artillery
formed into a Brigade, _p._ 1–53.
CHAPTER II.
Reduction of Golundaz Battalion—Formation of Regiment into Two
European Battalions with Ten Battalions of Lascars—Goddard’s
Expedition—Popham’s Capture of Gwalior—Insurrection at
Benares—Attacks on Pateeta, Luteefpoor, and Siege of
Bidgegurh—Colonel Pearse’s Expedition to the Coast—Reduction of
Golundaz Companies—Transport Train, Foundry, Powder-works—Reduction
in Establishment—Pay—Artillery formed into One European Battalion of
Ten Companies—Lascar Battalions abolished—Battalion Guns—Artillery
formed into Three European Battalions, Lascars into Thirty
Companies, _p._ 54–106.
CHAPTER III.
Artillery, one of the brigades of the army—An Infantry Officer,
Brigade-Major—Succeeded by an Artillery Officer—Dress—School
orders—School—Inoculation—Companies numbered by seniority—Method of
exploding mortar-shells on reaching the ground—Fire in
the arsenal—Death of Colonel Pearse—Lieut.-Colonel G.
Deare, Commandant—War in the Carnatic—Second Battalion of
Artillery sent—Sattimungulum—Bangalore—Retreat from
Seringapatam—Nundydroog—Savendroog—Attack on fortified camp at
Seringapatam—Return to Bengal, _p._ 107–162.
CHAPTER IV.
Matériel organization, and its successive changes—Guns
and carriages first used—Royal pattern—Madras
pattern—Ammunition-carriages—Tumbrils—Horse Artillery
ammunition-carriage—Elevating-screws—Ordnance in
use—Siege-carriages—Howitzer and Mortar combined
carriage—Gribeauval’s pattern—French caisson—Hardwicke’s
pattern—Horse Artillery guns—Mountain-train
carriages—Siege-carriages and ordnance—Royal pattern (block
trail)—Gun and Ammunition carriages introduced, _p._ 163–198.
CHAPTER V.
Reorganization in 1796 of the army—Successive additions to Artillery
companies—Ceylon—Seringapatam—Introduction of Horse
Artillery—Egypt—Deficiency of Artillery—Organization of
1801–2—Composition of the regiment—Foreign service—Sieges of
Sarsnee, Bidgygurh, and Cutchwarah, _p._ 199–248.
CHAPTER VI.
Lord Lake’s Campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding Golundaz—Increase
of Horse Artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France and
Java—Bundlecund Campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval pattern carriages
introduced—Additional Golundaz companies—Head-quarters removed to
Dum-Dum, _p._ 249–311.
CHAPTER VII.
Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment of
Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance General Officers
debarred the General Staff—Conceded to them—Guns formed into
Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun
Carriage Agency—Ordnance Commissariat Department—Commandants’
position improved—Model Department—Select Committee formed—Reduction
of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion system introduced into
Bengal—Burmese War—Siege of Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment, _p._
312–391.
CHAPTER VIII.
Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of Colonel given
to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations in uniform—Shekawuttee
Campaign—Establishment of Retiring Fund—The Afghan Campaign—Capture
of Ghuznee—Services of the Artillery—March to Bamean—Our disasters
at Caubul—Nichol’s troop—The Army of Retribution—Pollock’s
force—Honours to the Artillery, _p._ 392–451.
CHAPTER IX.
State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle of
Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The Battle of Punniah—The Gwalior
contingent—Honours conferred on the Artillery—The Ordnance
Commissariat remodelled—The Artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the
Regiment—Increase of horse-batteries, _p._ 452–466.
CHAPTER X.
The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the Artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures taken for its
prevention—The Artillery reinforced—Affair at Buddowal—Battle of
Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours conferred on the Artillery—The
Occupation of Lahore, _p._ 467–516.
CHAPTER XI.
Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling
of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall of
Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours to the
Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks, _p._ 517–571.
MEMOIRS
OF
THE BENGAL ARTILLERY.
CHAPTER I.
Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st Company in
Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation of 1st
Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company raised—Campaigns of Colonel
Calliaud, Major Adams, &c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company
raised—Major Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to
Brigades—Artillery Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of
Ordnance—Practice-ground near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of Artillery
raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the Establishment—Artillery
formed into a Brigade.
Adepts in natural history, from a few fossil bones and teeth, are able
to delineate the animal to which they belonged, and from comparing the
analogy of the parts, to clothe their skeleton with appropriate
covering, thus making, as it were, the animal kingdom of by-gone ages
pass in review before the present generation.
A similar talent would be necessary, effectively to rake up the early
history of a regiment. Old records preserved in public offices form the
fossil bones; and the “fleshy tenement” with which these are to be
clothed must be culled from many a quarter ere the “animal” can be
completed; and when this is done, there still remains the difficult task
of giving him life and spirit, or, to drop the metaphor, of rendering
the record useful and entertaining.
Much difficulty besets the undertaking; and, though we are conscious of
our want of ability to do full justice to the present task, yet, as we
believe that a good deal of information not generally known, and
collected from sources inaccessible to the majority, is contained in the
following pages, and which will be acceptable for its own sake, without
reference to the form in which it appears, we have been induced to give
publicity to our rough notes.
The first company of Bengal Artillery was raised in 1749; the orders
were received, it is believed, from Bombay, then the chief presidency. A
company was ordered, at the same time, at each presidency, in the Court
of Directors’ general letter of 17th June, 1748. A copy of the warrant
for that at Madras will be found in the “Artillery Records” for October,
1843, and for Bombay in one of a series of papers entitled “Three Years’
Gleanings,” which appeared in the _E. I. United Service Journal_ in
1838, and some extracts from which are made hereafter in these pages:
the entire warrants are too voluminous for insertion. A similar one was
most probably sent to Bengal, but all records perished when Calcutta was
taken.
Admiral Boscawen was requested to supply such aid in raising the
companies as he could spare from the fleet, for gunners; and the master
gunner was appointed to the Bombay company. The companies were to be
completed as early as possible, and all the gun-room’s crew, who were
qualified, were to be included.
The “gun-room’s crew” appears to have been the denomination given to a
certain number of men set apart for the duties of the artillery; their
officers were called gunners, gunners’ mates, &c., and combined the
magazine duties with the more properly-called duties of artillerymen.
The new company was to consist of one captain, one second captain, one
captain-lieutenant, and three lieutenant-fireworkers; four serjeants,
four corporals, three drummers, and one hundred gunners; the established
pay was as noted below:—
Captain and chief engineer £200 per annum.
2nd captain and 2nd engineer 150 per annum.
Captain-lieutenant, and director of laboratory 100 per annum.
1st lieutenant fireworker 75 per annum.
2nd lieutenant fireworker 60 per annum.
3rd lieutenant fireworker 50[2] per annum.
Serjeant 2_s._ per diem.
Corporal 1_s._ 6_d._ per diem.
Gunner 1_s._ per diem.
The want of artillery during the wars on the coast from 1746 to 1754,
and the impossibility of forming a sufficient number on the spot,
induced the Court of Directors to obtain and send out two companies of
Royal Artillery to Bombay; and, when the war broke out in 1756, three
companies more were sent, with the reinforcements under Clive, to
Bombay, and were afterwards distributed among the presidencies.
With Colonel Aldercron’s regiment (39th Foot,—“primus in Indis”) at
Madras, there were also forty artillerymen, on its arrival in 1754;
these he considered part of his regiment, and they were most probably
borne on its rolls, and allotted to the duties of the field-pieces
attached.
At Madras, attention seems to have been earlier paid to the military
establishment than in Bengal. A field train had been organized in 1755,
to which Lieutenant Jennings was appointed adjutant (this officer was
afterwards transferred to the Bengal presidency), but in Bengal in 1756,
on the war with France breaking out, the whole force amounted to only
300 European troops, including the company of artillery raised in 1749.
In 1756 the company of artillery was commanded by Captain Witherington,
and stationed in Fort William, with detachments at the smaller
factories, such as Dacca, Balasore, Cossimbazar, Patna, &c. On the siege
of Fort William by Sooraj-ul-Dowlah, only forty-five artillerymen were
in the garrison, and these, with their commanding officer, perished in
the Black Hole.
The character of Capt. Witherington is sketched in Mr. Holwell’s
interesting “Narrative” as “a laborious active officer, but confused.
There would have been few objections to his character, diligence, or
conduct, had he been fortunate in having any commander-in-chief to have
a proper eye over him, and take care that he did his duty.” One point,
however, is clear—that whatever his talents or character may have been,
he perished at his post, whilst others deserted theirs.
An instance of devotion highly honourable is also recorded by Mr.
Holwell of a man named Leech, an artificer, most probably of the
artillery, “and clerk of the parish, who had made his escape when the
Moors entered the fort, and returned just as it was dark to tell me he
had provided a boat, and would insure my escape if I would follow him
through a passage few were acquainted with, and by which he had entered.
I thanked him in the best terms I could, but told him it was a step I
could not prevail on myself to take, as I thereby should very ill repay
the attachment the gentlemen and garrison had shewn me; that I was
resolved to share their fate, be it what it would, but pressed him to
secure his escape without loss of time, to which he gallantly replied
that ‘then he was resolved to share mine, and would not leave me.’”[3]
The remnants of the company were probably collected together at Fultah,
and joined the force with which Clive afterwards avenged our disgrace on
its reaching the Hooghly. In the arrangements made for retaking
Calcutta, it was intended that the guns sent from Madras on the
_Marlborough_ should have been worked by the artillerymen of Aldercron’s
regiment. This plan was, however, frustrated by the colonel refusing to
allow them to go, unless he accompanied with his regiment, or, in other
words, unless the command of the expedition was vested in him. The want
of artillerymen was therefore supplied by a detail from the Madras
company under Lieutenant Jennings. The actual strength is not known; but
as in February 1757, in the attack on the Nawab’s troops near Omichund’s
garden, we find from Orme that Clive mustered about 100 artillerymen,
and as not more than 20 or 30 of the old company can be supposed to have
escaped, it must have been at least half a company.
The expedition reached Fultah on the 20th December, 1756, and met with
but little opposition (a night attack on the troops landed near Fort
Marlborough being the chief) in the progress to Calcutta, which was
retaken, after a short cannonade from the shipping, on the 2nd January,
1757.
To protect Calcutta from the incursions of the Nawab’s army, Clive
formed a fortified camp, with outposts around it, about a mile north of
the town, and half a mile from the river, on the spot now called
Chitpore. This situation was well chosen, as it was impossible for the
enemy, when coming from the northward, to enter Calcutta without passing
between the camp and salt-water lake (then more extensive than at
present), within sight of the camp. Towards the end of January the field
artillery was completed by the arrival of the _Marlborough_,[4] which
had the greatest part on board.
On the 3rd February the Nawab’s army passed along the Dum-Dum road,
leaving it near the turning at the Puckah-bridges, and spreading
irregularly over the plain to the eastward of the Mahratta ditch, the
Nawab’s own camp being pitched in Omichund’s garden, the ground now
called “Nunden Bagh.”
Surrounded by so numerous an enemy, Clive would soon have been
straitened for provisions. To prevent this inconvenience, and to alarm a
timorous enemy, he resolved to surprise their camp before daylight, and
for this purpose he marched out from his camp—the artillery, 100 men,
and six 6–pounder guns in the rear; the ammunition on lascars’ heads,
guarded by sailors; the sipahis and European battalion leading. At dawn,
they came upon the enemy’s advanced posts, placed in the ditches of the
Dum-Dum road, whom they easily dispersed, and continued their march
parallel to the Mahratta ditch until they came opposite Omichund’s
garden, when the fog, usual at that season, came on and obscured every
thing before them; they proceeded onwards, however, the field-pieces in
the rear firing round shot obliquely outwards, until they reached a
causeway which ran from the ditch towards the lake, and on which was a
barrier; mounting the causeway, the troops wheeled and marched along it,
which brought them under the fire of their own guns, and caused
considerable confusion. In order to avoid this, Clive ordered all the
troops to cross the causeway and lie down till the firing from the rear
could be stopped. Some guns from the ramparts of the Mahratta ditch also
opened on them, and made great havoc, so that Clive was forced to
continue his march until he reached the Bally-a-ghat road, when, turning
to his right, he marched up the Boitaconnah and Salt Bazaar to the old
fort, abandoning two of his guns, whose carriages broke down, and in the
evening regained his camp by the road along the river.
This expedition, though ill-planned, produced the desired effect on the
Nawab, who eagerly desired to enter into terms of accommodation with the
British, whose activity he feared.
In March, the reinforcements arrived from Bombay, and an attack on the
French settlement of Chandernagore was resolved on; it was attacked both
by land and from the river, the chief attack being made by the ships of
war; the artillery had but a comparatively small part to play.
The political events which followed, and the intrigues which led to our
subsequent hostilities with Sooraj-ul-Dowlah, it is not our province to
detail. We purpose only to relate events with which the corps is
connected, and accordingly we next join Clive on the 21st June at
Cutwah. With his little army, we find 100 artillerymen, eight 6–pounder
guns, and two howitzers, commanded by Captain Jennings. In the council
of war which sat, Captain Jennings’s vote was given for an immediate
attack (as recorded in the Life of Clive, while in Sir Eyre Coote’s
evidence before the Secret Committee, the names and votes of the members
are found very differently recorded. Sir Eyre Coote’s is more probably
the correct list, as he spoke from memoranda); the majority were for
delay, but Clive, after dissolving the council, followed the dictates of
his own bold spirit, and directed the army to cross the river, which was
done, and by midnight of the 22nd, the army had reached Plassey.
The next day the battle took place; it was chiefly a distant cannonade.
The guns were placed three on each flank of the Europeans, and the
remainder about 200 yards in advance of the left division of sipahis,
sheltered by some brick-kilns, to check the fire of the enemy’s guns,
manned by the French party, and posted at a tank in front. The shot from
the British guns which missed those opposed to them, took effect on the
bodies of cavalry and infantry in the rear. The cannonade was sustained
till noon, when rain falling damaged the enemy’s ammunition, and forced
them to slacken their fire. The English fire continued, and Major
Kirkpatrick, advancing with a party, drove the French from the tank, and
the English guns were pushed on.
Meer Jaffier, with his troops, at this time advanced, intending to join
the British, but was opposed and driven back by a party and the fire of
a field-gun, under Mr. Johnston, a volunteer.
The whole of the guns now cannonaded the enemy’s camp from the high
banks of the tank; the enemy came out, and Clive advanced, posting half
his troops and guns at a smaller tank in advance, and the rest on a
rising ground about 200 yards to their left; the French field-pieces
renewed their fire, and the enemy’s cavalry prepared to charge, but were
always driven back by the quick firing of the English field artillery;
the enemy beginning to draw off, the whole British army advanced, and
driving them from a redoubt and mound, part of the intrenchment of their
camp, about five in the afternoon completed the victory which laid the
foundation of our Eastern empire.
The volunteer, Mr. Johnston, above noticed, was one of the fugitives
collected at Fultah. His name is mentioned among those saved at Dacca;
he not improbably belonged to the artillery, and was employed as a clerk
in some confidential office, for, in a letter dated in 1765, from
himself to Lord Clive, he endeavours to exculpate himself from a charge
of disclosing confidential transactions from his office, preferred
against him by Governor Drake. In this letter, he mentions his having
been “remanded to the artillery, his former” occupation, and serving
with the army till 1765, when he returned to Calcutta; the date of his
removal is, however, uncertain.[5]
A detachment was sent forwards towards Patna, under Major Coote,
consisting of 230 Europeans, 300 sipahis, 50 lascars, and two
6–pounders, but much delay occurred in starting, owing to the
debaucheries ensuing on the plunder gained at Plassey. It was protracted
by a mutinous spirit on the way, so that the French party had, by the
time they arrived, rendered their position at Patna too strong, and the
detachment returned to Cossimbazaar in September. The remainder of the
army was removed to Chandernagore.
Towards the close of the year 1757, a second advance, with a stronger
party, and Clive at its head, was made, and an arrangement satisfactory
to the British having been concluded, he returned to Moorshedabad in
May, 1758.
His first care was to organize the army, and in doing this, the coast
army was taken as a model; a company of artillery was raised in Fort
William, 29th June, from the men who had served at Plassey. Lieutenant
Jennings was promoted to its captaincy, and this may be considered as
the first company of the present establishment, and bears at present,
after many changes of numbers in the successive formations of the
regiment, the denomination of 1st company, 4th battalion.
A second company was raised at Cossimbazaar on the 19th September, the
party mentioned above as being left there most probably having been
incorporated in it: Captain Broadbridge or Broadburn, from the Royal
Artillery, was its captain.
The company of Royal Artillery[6] which came from Bombay accompanied
Colonel Forde’s detachment to Masulipatam in April, 1759, and aided in
that brilliant operation, but did not return with the detachment after
the campaign. Since that period no Royal Artillery have served in
Bengal, except in 1798, when a company was in Fort William; but this
probably was a temporary arrangement, the company coming to Bengal _en
route_ to Ceylon.
In 1759, a combination having been entered into against the British, the
English troops, aided by Meer Jaffier, marched towards Patna, against
the Shahzadah; Patna was taken, a garrison left, and Clive returned to
Calcutta, Colonel Calliaud having joined him first at Berhampoor, with
300 Europeans, 1,000 sipahis, 50 artillerymen, and 6 guns. The
artillerymen, there is reason to suppose, belonged to the 2nd company.
The battalion of sipahis left at Patna with two 6–pounders and 70
Europeans, under Lieutenant Cochrane, was defeated in an engagement into
which they were forced, in assisting our ally Ramnarain against the
Emperor’s forces, in January, 1760.
The conduct of the European troops is spoken of as highly creditable.
The European officers of the sipahis all fell, and the sipahis were cut
to pieces or dispersed. The English who remained fought their way back
to the city under Doctor Fullerton. “Other English officers may have
been present,” says the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, “whose names
I know not, who ranged them in order, and as one of their guns was to be
left behind on the field of battle, they found means to render it of no
avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye; the other being
in good condition, they took it with them, together with its ammunition;
and that handful of men had the courage to retire in the face of a
victorious army, without once shrinking from their ranks; during their
journey, the car of ammunition chanced to receive some injury, the
Doctor stopped unconcernedly, and after having put it in order, he
bravely pursued his route again.”
Lieutenant Buck, of the artillery, was killed in this action.
Calliaud’s advance having been delayed by his allies, he did not engage
the enemy till the 22nd February, near Sooraj, and the same cause
prevented his following up the advantage.
The 50 artillerymen of the 2nd company were engaged in this action, and
the carriages of four of their guns broke down during the engagement,
causing some delay in repairing them.
After his defeat, the Emperor fled, and endeavoured to double back and
surprise Moorshedabad ere Calliaud could overtake him. In this, however,
he failed; the British pursued in boats, and coming up with him, he
struck across the Currukpoor hills. The British disembarked and followed
him. After a difficult march, the Emperor emerged from the hills, about
30 miles from Moorshedabad. The English and Jaffier had, however,
joined, and on their attacking him, he set fire to his camp and fled.
To secure Patna, a detachment of 200 Europeans, a battalion of sipahis,
and four field-pieces, marched from Moorshedabad, under Captain Knox, in
May, 1760, and, marching with the utmost rapidity, reached it in
thirteen days. Crossing the river, this little band attacked and
defeated the army of the Naib of Purneah, who had come to the Emperor’s
assistance, near Mozufferpore, on the 27th May.
A third company of artillery was formed on the 26th May, 1760,[7] in
Fort William, promoting Captain-Lieutenant Kinch; but there is reason to
believe he remained with the second company, until Captain Broadbridge’s
death, in 1761, gave him the command.
Colonel Calliaud having been succeeded by Major Carnac, returned to
Calcutta; the latter pursued the Emperor’s forces to Gyah Maunpoor,
where he overtook and completely routed him in January, 1761. Mr. Law,
the head of the French party, was captured in this engagement.
The 2nd company of artillery, under Captain Broadbridge and
Captain-Lieutenant Kinch, shared in these transactions, and remained as
part of the garrison of Patna.
It forms no part of our plan to enter into the history of such
occurrences as those which led to the dismissal of the members of
council from the Company’s service, and placed Mr. Ellis in charge of
the factory at Patna; or to examine whether our subsequent misfortunes
are attributable to his mismanagement. For information on such points we
must refer the reader to the histories of the times.
Many points of difference arose with the Nawab, Meer Cossim, which led
to various misunderstandings; they were brought to a crisis by the
British, on Mr. Ellis’s order, surprising and seizing Patna, on the 26th
June, 1763. Mr. Amyatt was attacked and killed near Moorshedabad, by
order of Cossim Ali, whom he had left only two days before, having been
deputed to him at Monghyr by the Council, and this brought on open war.
The energy shewn at first was, however, suffered to die away, and the
troops in Patna dispersing for plunder, the late governor of the city
rallied his men, and, being joined by a reinforcement from Monghyr,
attacked and drove out the British, who, spiking their guns, retired to
Bankipore, and afterwards fled in boats to their factory at Manjee, near
Chuprah; where the whole, and among them the company of artillery, were
taken prisoners.
The prisoners taken were sent to Monghyr, and there confined with others
captured at Cossimbazar, which factory was plundered about the same
time.
On the news of these disasters, the English army, under Major Adams,
moved from their cantonments at Ghyrettee early in July. The first
company of artillery was with this force, under the command of Captain
Jennings.
In the present day it would scarcely be deemed possible to march a force
at the season in which this army moved through Bengal—in the middle of
the rains, when the whole land is a swamp, and every stream full to
overflowing; yet, in spite of the difficulties presented, this gallant
band, about 800 Europeans (including the artillery) and 2,000 sipahis,
forced its way, and came in contact with Meer Cossim’s troops at
Gheriah, near Sooty, on the 2nd August.
A severe action was fought, lasting nearly four hours, and at one time
two of the British guns were taken possession of by the enemy; victory
at length decided in favour of the British.
The artillery lost one officer, killed during the action, Lieutenant
Kaylor.
Undaunted by his defeat, Meer Cossim again disputed the advance of the
British at the pass of Oudenullah, a little to the south of Rajmahl,
where the road is confined between the river and spurs of hills. This
pass had been intrenched with walls and towers at short distances, and
several strong posts raised on eminences along its front. The army was
detained before these intrenchments for nearly a month. At length, by an
attack on the hill forming the right of the lines, and a feint on the
river end, they were carried with severe loss on 5th September,
Captain-Lieutenant Green, of the artillery, acting as field engineer.
Meer Cossim left his troops the next night, and retired to Monghyr in
haste, thence carrying his prisoners with him to Patna.
[Illustration]
In October Monghyr was invested, breached, and capitulated. Meer Cossim,
driven into a paroxysm of rage by this event, directed the massacre of
all his English prisoners. In this horrid act he found a ready tool in
Sumroo, the German,[8] whose widow, the Begum Sumroo, has rendered his
name notorious in history. All were massacred save Mr. Fullerton, the
surgeon, who, in the exercise of his profession, appears to have gained
a place in the esteem and affections of Meer Cossim.
Whether Captain Kinch and his subalterns perished in the attack on Patna
or in this massacre we are unable to say, but in one or other he fell.
The bodies of all were thrown into a large well, over which a tomb has
been since built, but no record of the names of those who perished
exists on it.[9]
After avenging the fate of their comrades by the reduction of Patna, the
army followed Meer Cossim, who threw himself on the protection of the
Nawab of Oude, as far as the banks of the Carumnassa. Here Major Adams
left them, and the command devolved on Major Jennings, of the artillery.
The force was cantoned on the frontier of the Nawab’s territories, in
the expectation that he would give up Meer Cossim, and also to watch the
Emperor’s troops, which, under the pretence of preparing an expedition
against the Boondelas, remained in the vicinity of Allahabad.
In the month of December, 1763, a fourth company of artillery was raised
in the field, probably at Patna.
In February, 1764, an alarming state of dissatisfaction shewed itself in
the English army, still in its cantonments at Sant. The troops were
dissatisfied with the rewards bestowed upon them for having regained the
provinces from Meer Cossim. The English battalion seized the park and
marched towards the Carumnassa. The sipahis were also in motion; but by
the exertions of Major Jennings and the other officers, the English and
sipahis were nearly all induced to return. The French and foreigners, to
the number of 150, went off, under Serjeant Delamar, to Allahabad. Few
of the artillery joined in this affair.
The seeds of this mutinous disposition still remained when Major Carnac
arrived in March and assumed the command. Provisions were scarce; and
though the Government instructions were to carry the war into the
Nawab’s territories (whose hostility was now open), he agreed with his
officers, that, in the then temper of the troops, it would not be safe
to proceed.
On the enemy’s forces crossing the river, the English fell back and
encamped under Patna, where, on the 3rd May, 1764, they were attacked.
Sumroo, with a large body of the Nawab’s cavalry and infantry, assailed
the front. The engagement lasted till sunset, when the enemy withdrew
with a heavy loss; and although he hung about the neighbourhood till the
end of the month, did not venture on another action.
A detachment, under Colonel Munro (whose army had joined Major Carnac’s
at Patna), marched after one of the sipahi battalions, which had
deserted, with four guns. Colonel Munro sent on 100 Europeans, one
sipahi battalion, and two guns. This force overtook them at Chuprah, and
coming on them while asleep, took them all prisoners. Colonel Munro, on
receiving them, considered that strong measures were necessary to check
the spirit of insubordination which had arisen, and accordingly selected
fifty of the worst for execution. Twenty-four were blown from the guns
at Patna and other stations. On this occasion it was that the grenadiers
claimed precedence in death—an anecdote familiar to all acquainted with
the early history of our Indian army.
The whole army now advanced towards the Soane. The advance was covered
by Colonel Champion with a detachment and four guns, who was attacked by
large bodies of the enemy’s horse near Mooneah, at the junction of the
Soane and Ganges, whom they beat off, and Colonel Munro coming up
crossed the river immediately. The march to Arrah was a good deal
harassed, and the guns frequently called into play to keep off the
enemy’s horse.
At Buxar, on the 22nd October, they came up with the enemy, and on the
following morning, about 8 o’clock, the enemy marched out to attack
them. The British were drawn up in line with their guns, twenty
field-pieces and seventy-one artillerymen of the 1st company, on the
flanks of battalions. The enemy were repulsed, and about 12 o’clock they
retired slowly, blowing up their tumbrils of ammunition. One hundred and
thirty-three pieces of artillery, mostly with English carriages, and
among them twenty-seven which had been lost the previous year at Patna,
were the trophies on this occasion.
In the acknowledgment of this victory, written by Mr. Vansittart and his
council, 16th November, 1764, to Munro, he was requested “to return
thanks to the field-officers and commandant of artillery (Major
Jennings) for their care and diligence in preserving the disposition for
attack, and taking every advantage over the enemy.”
Captain Winwood and Lieutenant Duff of the artillery are mentioned “as
meriting particular notice, and having gained great honour.”
A detachment of two battalions failed in November, in an attempt to take
the fortress of Chunar; in January, 1765, however, Sir Robert Fletcher
succeeded in gaining possession of it, and in February he breached
Allahabad, when the garrison evacuated it. On the 3rd May a battle was
fought near Korah,[10] against the vizier, aided by the Mahrattas; these
latter were quickly dispersed by the fire of the artillery, and they
separated from the vizier and retired towards the Jumna with
precipitation. These events placed the southern part of the Dooab under
British rule.
The army was this year (1765) divided into three brigades, and the
companies of artillery attached one to each, while the remaining company
was stationed in Fort William.[11]
─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────
1st Brigade │1st Company │Monghyr.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
2nd ditto │2nd ditto │Allahabad.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
3rd ditto │4th ditto │Bankipore.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Ditto │3rd ditto │Fort William.
─────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────
In addition to the guns with the park, each battalion of infantry was
equipped with two six-pounders or three-pounders, worked by the men of
the regiment, assisted by native officers and lascars from the
artillery.
A major was this year allowed to the artillery, to command the corps,
and a practice-ground formed at Sulkeah.
In 1766 the alarming mutiny on the part of the officers of the army,
caused by the reduction of allowances, broke out, and was only
suppressed by the firmness and decision of Lord Clive and Colonel Smith.
The part taken in this by artillery officers cannot now be fully traced;
but Captain Duff, Captain-Lieutenant Clifton, and Lieutenant Black,
appear to have taken prominent parts. Many, we learn from the army-list,
were dismissed about that time, most probably on account of the mutiny;
others resigned. Nearly all, in every branch of the army, were, however,
restored to the service, and placed in the position they would have
held, had they remained in it.
Insubordinate as the conduct of a large portion of the officers of the
army was on this occasion, and deservedly as it has been stigmatized,
yet it must be borne in mind that they failed of success by
conscientiously not admitting the soldiery to a knowledge of or
participation in the measures they had taken to secure the batta, though
solicited by the latter to accept of their support, as soon as it was
known that Government had resolved to persist in enforcing their
resolution to deprive them of their allowance.
In 1768 a lieutenant-colonel and a major were added to the regiment,
and, in consequence of the Court of Directors being desirous of
obtaining, not only cadets but officers from Woolwich, Major Pearse was
nominated to command the corps, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He
was, however, superseded by Captain Martin, to whom the command was
given by the Indian Government, and again by Major Kindersley, whose
commission as major was antedated by the local government, on the
vacancy being caused by Captain Fleming’s removal to the engineers, from
which he came. On the death, however, of Major Kindersley, which
occurred in 1769, he succeeded to the command of the regiment.
The application for a supply of officers and cadets from the Royal
Artillery originated in a difficulty of finding candidates, the
artillery service being neither so lucrative, nor holding out the same
prospects, as the infantry. In the Secret Committee’s letter of 30th
September, 1765, to the Court of Directors, it is stated that “it would
be of the utmost benefit to our plan that you should send out, every
year, six or seven gentlemen from the academy at Woolwich for artillery
officers; this being a service which suffers extremely for want of
persons properly instructed in the business, since no officer who knows
the benefit of the infantry service here will choose to quit it for any
advantages the artillery offers.”[12]
On the death of Major Kindersley, 28th October, 1769, Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearse succeeded to the command of the regiment, and, as its
organization is much indebted to that officer, it is fortunate that we
are able to quote from letters to his early friends his record of the
state in which he found it:—
“When I first came into command of the corps I was astonished at the
ignorance of all who composed it. It was a common practice to make any
midshipman who was discontented with the India ships an officer of
artillery, from a strange idea that a knowledge of navigation would
perfect an officer of that corps in the knowledge of artillery. They
were almost all of this class, and their ideas consonant to the elegant
military education which they had received. But, thank God! I have got
rid of them all but seven.”
The strange idea above referred to appears to have affected the Home
Government at a still earlier period, as, on the first formation of
artillery companies, “such assistance as the fleet could spare” was
given. To this idea are we indebted for many terms which have hung about
the corps till the present day: our tindals, lascars, serangs, cossibs,
all came from the naval nomenclature, and their etymology would most
probably be found in the Portuguese dialect, which has retained its
influence on shipboard; from the same fountain of “English (not)
undefiled” must have been drawn the “bankshall,” a name by which our
gun-sheds are known throughout the regiment, but a term of considerable
mystification to the uninitiated.
In March, 1770, a fifth company of artillery was raised in Fort William,
and in May the companies were formed into a battalion, to which an
adjutant was allowed. In September the lascars were divided into 28
companies, of which seven (consisting of 2 serangs, 2 tindals, and 100
lascars each) were attached to each of the three companies, with the
brigades, and to one of those in Fort William.
The embodying the companies of artillery into one battalion must have
increased the efficiency of the army, by introducing uniformity of
system into their management, and a more effectual supervision than
could have existed in their scattered state.
The regiment at this time, supposing no change had occurred in the
strength of companies, would have consisted of—
─────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────
│ By calculation │By returns of 1772[13]
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Lieut.-Col. Comm. │ 1│ 1
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Major. │ 1│ 1
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Adjutant. │ 1│
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Captains. │ 5│ 4
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
2nd Captains. │ 5│ 4
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
1st Lieutenants. │ 5│ 16
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
2nd Lieutenants. │ 5│ 16
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Fireworkers. │ 5│ 11[14]
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Serjeants. │ 20│ 30
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Corporals. │ 20│ 20
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Drummers. │ 20│ 18
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Bombardiers. │ 40│ 340
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Gunners. │ 120│ 〃
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Matrosses. │ 300│
──────────┬──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Lascars. │Serangs. │ 56│ 48
──────────┼──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
〃 │Tindals. │ 56│ 200
──────────┼──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
〃 │Privates. │ 2800│ 2350
──────────┴──────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────
Of the officers of the corps a description was given in Colonel Pearse’s
letter, above quoted. It was written in 1775, and refers to the period
now described. An extract from one written in 1772 contains a very
graphic picture of a _fast_ man of those days, specimens of whom long
continued:—
“To be a gentleman you must learn to drink by all means—a man is
honoured in proportion to the number of bottles he can drink: keep a
dozen dogs, but in particular if you have not the least use for them and
hate hunting and shooting. Four horses may barely suffice; but if you
have eight, and seven of them are too vicious for the syce to feed, it
will be much better.
“By no means let the horses be paid for; and have a palanquin covered
with silver trappings—get 10,000 rupees in debt, but 20,000 would make
you an honester man, especially if you are convinced that you will never
have the power to pay. Endeavour to forget whatever you have
learnt—ridicule learning of all sorts—despise all military
knowledge—call duty a bore—encourage your men to laugh at orders—obey
such as you like—make a joke of your commanding officer for giving those
orders you do not like, and, if you obey them, let it be seen that it is
merely to serve yourself.
“These few rules will make you an officer and a gentleman, and they are
the first lessons which young men take when they arrive in this
country.”
With officers of this stamp, and the class of men from whom the
Company’s European troops were then recruited, we cannot suppose that
much discipline existed. Drunkenness—the bane of the European soldier in
India—was rife, and its natural consequences, disease and death,
followed. To this cause, too, must be added the want of good barracks
and internal economy, which of late years have gone far to remove the
idea of the climates of India being deadly to the European constitution.
The lascars were employed in dragging and assisting the Europeans to
work the guns; a detail also was detached with each infantry regiment,
to assist in working the guns attached to it, for two 6–pounders formed
part of the equipment of each battalion, and thirty sipahis were set
apart for their service. These duties, with those of the park, would
account for the number of lascars being so large in comparison with the
establishment of the present day. They were in many respects native
artillerymen, and in the subsequent successive changes from lascars to
golundaz and back again, the change was often rather in name, and
increase and decrease of pay, than of the men themselves.
They were a most efficient and useful body—a class on whom, perhaps,
more of the hard work of the service and fewer of its substantial
rewards have fallen than any other of the native army. At all times
accompanying the European artillery, they have borne a part in every
expedition which has left the shores of India. On land and on board
ship, hard service has been their lot, and all who have been brought
into contact with them join in testifying to the willingness, courage,
and patience they have exhibited.
A large body of artificers was also at this time attached to the corps;
these, with the quartermaster’s establishment, completed the regiment as
to its _personnel_.
The _matériel_ appears to have been as bad as possible. At this time
Colonel Pearse complains that “the fuzees burnt from nineteen to
forty-eight seconds, though of the same nature; the portfires were
continually going out; the tubes would not burn; the powder was
infamous; the cartridges were made conical, and, when necessary to prime
with loose powder, a great quantity was required to fill the vacant
cavity round the cartridge; the carriages flew to pieces with common
firing in a week.” The contractor who furnished the carriages, and the
laboratory in which the fuzees were made, appear to have been beyond his
control: “I have no more to do with it than his Holiness at Rome,” are
his words. The iron guns were all very indifferent: “two 12–pounders
burst on the ramparts in 1770 in firing the morning and evening gun, and
one 12–pounder on a rejoicing day, in firing salutes.”
It was under such circumstances that Colonel Pearse took command, and
set himself to work to improve the state of the regiment. To weed the
inefficient from the officers; to teach the remainder and the new-comers
their duty; to introduce an efficient internal economy and discipline
into the ranks, and to obtain a proper control over the _matériel_ of
the regiment, were his first duties. That his endeavours were in some
degree successful may be gathered from his correspondence, for in 1772
he writes,—“Now I have got all the laboratory implements with me at
practice, and am going to teach my officers what they never saw.”
Steadily he pursued his object through difficulties and disappointments,
and was rewarded, ere his death, by seeing the corps raised to a high
state of discipline and efficiency. At a review of it by General
Clavering in November, 1774, he expressed himself as delighted with the
corps, and astonished at its performance, being superior to any thing he
could have expected in India, and so much to his satisfaction, that
Colonel Pearse, in a letter to an old friend, writes, “the performances
at the review would not have been a disgrace to dear old Woolwich.”
The years 1771–2 afforded leisure to attend to the discipline of the
corps, for it seems not to have been called on for any field service. In
1773 the expedition under Captain Jones proceeded against the hill fort
of Delamcotta, situated on the pass by which the Durla river, which runs
into the Teestah, emerges from the mountains, and not far from the
present sanatarium, Darjeeling. Lieutenant R. Bruce, of the artillery,
was present at the attack, but with what portion of the corps is
unknown.
This year the army was again called into the field to check the
Mahrattas, but after a cannonade across the Jumna at Ramghat, near
Delhi, they retired, and our army went into cantonments at Sultanpoor,
Oude.
In 1774 a portion of the army under Colonel Champion was sent to assist
the vizier in his attack on the Rohillas. An action was fought on the
23rd April, in which the 2nd company of artillery was present. In his
report Colonel Champion says, “The Rohillas made repeated attempts to
charge; but our guns being so much better served than theirs, kept so
constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance, and where they
were closest was the greatest slaughter.” Captain W. A. Baillie was
wounded in this action. Lieutenant G. Deare, Lieutenant B. Doxat, and
Lieutenant W. W. Hussey were also present.
The action was followed by much severe marching and exposure in the hot
and rainy season, in the jungles of the Pillibeet district. While
encamped near Pillibeet, a report reached Colonel Champion of four
crores of rupees being concealed in the fort; and in a letter to
Government he suggests “the propriety of examining into the truth of the
report, in duty both to the Company and to the army:” a naïve
suggestion, which, considering the British were there as allies of the
vizier, the Government negatived. However, as a compensation to the
army, the vizier granted a donation of 10½ lacs, which was divided among
the 2nd brigade in August, 1779, agreeably to a scale laid down by a
committee of officers. This scale gave a sipahi two-thirds of a European
soldier’s share,—a proportion which has been adhered to ever since in
distributing prize-money. The scale there fixed is here given:—
─────────────────────────────────┬──────
Colonel. │19,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Lieut.-Colonel. │16,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Major. │13,700
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Captain. │ 6,850
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Subaltern. │ 3,425
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Cadet. │ 1,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Conductor. │ 300
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Serj.-Major. │ 90
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Serjeants. │ 60
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Corporals. │ 45
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Privates. │ 30
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Commandants. │ 300
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Soobahdars. │ 131
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Jemadars, Serangs. │ 65
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Havildars, Tindals. │ 40
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Naicks. │ 30
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Privates, Lascars, Black Doctors.│ 20
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Bheesties, &c. │ 10
─────────────────────────────────┴──────
In 1775 an alteration took place in the arrangements for the _matériel_
of the army; a Board of Ordnance was formed, and magazines established,
at the principal fixed stations of the army.
The Board consisted of the “Governor-General as president, the
Commander of the Forces, the members of the Supreme Council, the
Commissary-General of Comptrol; the Commandant of Artillery; the Chief
Engineer; the Commissary of Stores, and the Military Store-keeper, as
members; with a secretary, and such assistants as might be found
necessary.”
To this Board returns of all ordnance and military stores were to be
made by commanding officers of garrisons and cantonments, artillery
officers, and all others in charge; all contracts for the supply of
stores, proofs of ordnance and powder, plans for new construction of
ordnance, reports of powder-works, laboratory and arsenal, were to be
submitted: in short, the general control of the stores for the army was
vested in this Board.
Magazines were established at the fixed stations of Berhampore,
Dinapore, and Chunar; a commissary, a deputy-commissary, and two
conductors were appointed to them, and placed under the control of the
Board; they were to be paid by the Board-office, and receive
instructions for carrying on their duties and office from the Board,
independent of any other control but that consistent with the general
regulations of the army, which required that they should be subordinate
to the commanding officer in the field or fixed stations, and the
commanding officer of the artillery under whose immediate control they
were placed.
To the commissaries were intrusted the ordnance stores, camp equipage,
&c., for the use of corps; and an officer of the department was to
accompany the army, when moving on service, to superintend their issues.
A return was to be made monthly of all receipts and issues; and no issue
was to be made without the orders of the Board, or commanding officer.
Carriages for the ordnance were to be constructed in Fort William by the
military storekeeper. No repairs of magnitude involving large contingent
bills were to be made in the field, but the articles required supplied
on indent.
The establishments for the magazines were furnished by a reduction of
the artificers and lascars attached to the artillery; the lascars were
reduced to a small number, and the surplus applied to the magazines.
2 Serangs, }
4 Tindals, } on the peace establishment;
100 Lascars, }
──────────────────────────────────────────
7 Serangs, }
16 Tindals, } on the war establishment;
400 Lascars, }
were the number retained with the regiment.
The appointment of this Board appears to have interfered with the
control which the commandant of artillery had previously exercised over
his department, and Colonel Pearse attributed its formation to a
personal motive, on the part of General Clavering, to lower him. In
writing to an old friend, after other complaints he goes on to say:
“General Clavering instituted a Board of Ordnance, and made me a member
of it; took all my authority away, and made me a cipher. I was hurt, and
complained, as he had put into the Board a Lieutenant-Colonel Dow, the
translator of a miserable history of Hindustan, and the author of two
wretched plays. This man is commissary-general, and, as such, controller
of military accounts. He uniformly attacked me and my department, and I
defended myself and officers. This created disputes, and, as I was
wounded, I was warm; and thus, because my opinions were always contrary
to Dow’s (and D—— is the general’s tongue, brains, head, and heart), it
was as bad as attacking the general himself.”
Of the working of the cumbrous machinery of the Board of Ordnance, in
its original formation and in the successive changes which have been
made from time to time, in the vain attempts to obtain energy and
celerity from a body of men without individual power or responsibility,
it will often, in the course of these pages, be necessary to speak, for
to the want of arrangement on their part must be attributed, in many
instances, the inefficient state of the siege-trains with the armies.
At this time the head-quarters of the regiment were quartered in Fort
William, moving out during the cold months to a practice-ground at
Sulkeah, nearly opposite the western mouth of the Circular Canal: the
powder-works were between the canal and Cossipoor. The dress of the
regiment consisted of a blue coat, faced with scarlet, and cut away in
the fashion of the time; white cloth waistcoat and breeches, with
buckles at the knees; and gaiters, or half-spatterdashes, as they were
called; red leathern belt, with swivels; black silk stock; buff gloves,
and regimental hat, supposed to be a plain cocked, in the fashion of
George the Second’s time. The hair was worn greased, powdered, and tied
in a queue, false hair being substituted when the natural was not long
enough.
The hours for parades, and, in fact, for every thing, were early:
parades were before gun-fire in the cold season; dinners were in the
middle of the day, not only in private houses, but on public occasions;
and invitations were given on a scale of hospitality only practicable in
a small society. The orderly book was the common channel of invitation
used by the Governor-General and officer commanding the garrison. Many
such entries as the following will be found in it:—“The Honourable the
Governor-General requests to be favoured with the company of officers
and gentlemen belonging to the army now in the garrison of Fort William
and the Chitpoor cantonment and the presidency on Monday next to dinner,
at the Court House, and in the evening to a ball and supper. The
Governor-General requests that gentlemen will not bring any servants to
dinner, nor their hookahs to the ball at night.”
Or, “Lieutenant-Colonel Wilding presents his compliments to all the
officers in Fort William, staff of the garrison, and surgeons, and
requests their company to breakfast, and dinner at half-past two
o’clock.”
A good account of the manners and habits of the people at this period
would be interesting, and probably materials for the purpose could be
found, were a qualified person to undertake the task:[15] they are only
noticed above incidentally, as likely to affect the discipline of the
regiment. The early dinner was too much followed by a long sederunt over
the bottle, and the absence of ladies’ society gave a tone of grossness
to the habits, which are happily much improved in modern days.
This year a number of memorials were presented to the Board by artillery
officers, as to the relative rank of cadets; and it was decided that
those appointed expressly to the artillery should have the full benefit
of the Court of Directors’ order, that all cadets appointed in India
were to rank below those of the same year appointed in England, but that
the time of service was to date from arrival in Bengal; and all those
who were in the infantry, and entered as cadets in the artillery, were
to rank above all who were cadets in the artillery at the same time.
This, and the circumstance of several who resigned in the mutiny of 1766
being allowed to return to their original standing, will partly account
for the supersessions which will appear on consulting the gradation
list.
At the conclusion of the year 1775 three companies of artillery, to be
commanded by European officers, were ordered to be raised for the Nawab
of Oude and attached to the brigade of disciplined troops raised for his
service; officers were nominated to them, and struck off the strength of
the regiment; but whether the companies were ever raised seems doubtful.
In the following year they were directed to be formed into a battalion,
under command of Major Patrick Duff, and then to be transferred to the
regular army, and fresh ones raised of native artillery in August, 1777.
If the companies first ordered had been European, it is difficult to say
what became of them, because the sixth, seventh, and eighth companies
were raised by minutes of council, July 13th and 24th, 1778; the two
former, however, may have been raised from the men of the Oude
companies.
The artillery, in 1775, appear first to have used Dum-Dum as a
practice-ground, and to have been encamped there, when, their tents
being wanted for the use of a brigade marching to Patna, they were
ordered into Fort William, and their practice cut short with one
fortnight instead of two months. In the following year, however, in
December, they marched out with their tents and stores, and began the
practice (as the orders record) by firing “a royal salute, and after
that one of 19 guns, for the Company.”
It is not easy to ascertain what Dum-Dum was previous to its occupation
by the artillery. The first mention made of it is by Orme, in the
account of the action near Omichund’s garden, in 1757. He speaks of
Clive crossing “the Dum-Dum road:” this road, however, was only a
cutcha-bund[16] leading to Dum-Dum, the name of the place now occupied
by Dum-Dum House, the origin of which building is enveloped in mystery.
It is said to have been built by a Mr. or Colonel Home,[17] but who he
was, or the date, cannot be ascertained. Supernatural aid has been
called into play, and the mound on which it stands is reported to have
been raised by some spirit of the ring or camp, in the course of a
single night, and to this day visions of ghosts haunt the grounds.
At the practice season the officers inhabited the house, and the men’s
tents were pitched in the compound, and the natives in the “Montague
lines,” the ground now occupied by the Nya Bazaar, called after
Lieutenant Montague, the adjutant who marked them out. The name is known
to the present day.
It was not until 1783 that the cantonment was marked out by Colonel
Duff, who is said to have made, or rather widened, the road from
Shambazar to Barasut,[18] and to have planted the avenue of mulseery
trees now running along the southern end of the small exercising-ground.
Many villages were scattered over the ground occupied by the cantonment;
their sites were purchased up, from time to time, by Government; the
last, that of Deiglah, in 1820.
From 1775 to 1778 the corps does not appear to have been called into the
field, and Colonel Pearse occupied himself in improving its internal
economy. A regimental school for the instruction of the native officers
and gunners was established in 1775—an institution which, with all the
faults which still exist in it, has been of much use, both in teaching
the elements of knowledge and affording a rational employment to some of
the many hours which hang heavily on the soldier.
That the corps had attained a respectable proficiency in its peculiar
duties we may believe from an extract of one of his letters, dated
March, 1777: “I have had my corps reviewed twice; first by the governor,
who was excessively pleased, and thanked us in orders; and next by the
general, who also thanked us. It was our good performance forced the
general’s thanks; he would have been better pleased to have found
fault—first, because we pleased the governor; and next, because I
commanded and had disciplined them myself.” ... “Not one circumstance
had I to lessen the pleasure I received from the good performance of my
corps, as a battalion of infantry, as a battalion of artillery with
sixteen cannons, and as a body of artillery on service in their
batteries; for we went through all these exercises equally well. The
Saturday following, General Clavering reviewed us, and what gave me most
satisfaction was, to hear that he had said in private he had reviewed
most of the King’s regiments, and never saw any perform better.”
In May, 1778, General Leslie’s force marched from Culpee, on its
expedition to assist the Bombay Government; it consisted of six infantry
and one cavalry corps, some European artillery, and the 1st company of
golundaz, raised for the Nawab’s service. A short account of this
detachment will be given when we come to speak of its return, in 1784.
The formation of the three native or golundaz companies for the Oude
service was most probably recommended by Colonel Pearse, and the
experiment answered so well that in August, 1778, a new organization of
the artillery was ordered, in which the golundaz were to form a
considerable part.
Hitherto, as want dictated, company after company of artillery had been
added to the establishment; but the artillery was now formed into an
independent brigade of one European regiment and three native
battalions. The European consisted of seven field and one mounted, or
garrison, company, and the native battalions of eight companies each:
the former was to be completed by drafts of fifty men from each of the
three European infantry regiments (and possibly the Oude companies), and
the latter by all fit for the service who might volunteer from the two
native companies, with the temporary (Oude) brigade and their lascars,
from the lascars of European companies and with the guns of infantry
regiments, and from the eight companies of lascars at the Presidency.
The lascars were all reduced.
The European regiment, exclusive of garrison company, consisted of seven
companies:—
────────────────────┬────
Lieut.-Colonel. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Adjutant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Master. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Serjt.-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Qr.-Master Serjt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Drill Serjeant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Drill Corporals. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Drum-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Fife-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Serjeants. │ 42
────────────────────┼────
Corporals. │ 42
────────────────────┼────
Drummers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Bombardiers. │ 56
────────────────────┼────
Gunners. │ 168
────────────────────┼────
Matrosses. │ 361
────────────────────┴────
The three golundaz battalions consisted of eight companies each, in all—
────────────────────┬────
Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Jemadars. │ 48
────────────────────┼────
Havildars. │ 192
────────────────────┼────
Naicks. │ 192
────────────────────┼────
Drummers. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Fifers. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Golundaz. │2400
────────────────────┼────
Soobahdars Commt. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Ditto Adjutant. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Havildars Major. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Adjutant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Master. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Serjt.-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Qr.-Master Serjt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Native Doctors. │ 9
────────────────────┼────
Sircars. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Armourers, Master. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Ditto Workmen. │ 9
────────────────────┼────
Chucklers. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Watermen. │ 24
────────────────────┴────
The European commissioned officers of the artillery brigade were—
────────────────────┬────
Lt.-Col. Commt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Colonel. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 10
────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 45
────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Major of Brigade. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Aide-de-Camp. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Adjutants. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Masters. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Head Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeons. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 6
────────────────────┼────
Paymaster. │ 1
────────────────────┴────
The staff and artificers of the field-train will be referred to shortly,
when another formation of the corps renders it necessary to advert to
the subject.
In the above formation we find the great error which has pervaded the
service ever since—the supposition that companies of Native do not
require as many officers as companies of European artillery; and while
the establishment of officers of the latter was fixed at a proportion
which shews that the wants of the branch were then better understood
than they have been in later times, the former was left ridiculously
unprovided with officers.
The officers of a company of artillery should be proportioned to the
number of guns it is intended to man. No officer can do justice to more
than two pieces; and as the companies were then adapted to eight
field-pieces, four officers, with a fifth to command the whole, is the
number which ought to have been _present_ in the field. On this subject,
however, it will be necessary to dwell more, as the successive changes
pass under review.