Defects in the Commissary department.... Distress of the
army at Valley Forge.... The army subsisted by
impressments.... Combination in congress against General
Washington.... Correspondence between him and General
Gates.... Distress of the army for clothes.... Washington's
exertions to augment the army.... Congress sends a committee
to camp.... Attempt to surprise Captain Lee.... Congress
determines on a second expedition to Canada.... Abandons
it.... General Conway resigns.... The Baron Steuben
appointed Inspector General.... Congress forbids the
embarkation of Burgoyne's army.... Plan of reconciliation
agreed to in Parliament.... Communicated to congress and
rejected.... Information of treaties between France and the
United States.... Great Britain declares war against
France.... The treaties with France ratified by congress....
Complaints of the treatment of prisoners.... A partial
exchange agreed to.
{1777}
The army under the immediate command of General Washington was engaged
through the winter in endeavouring to stop the intercourse between
Philadelphia and the country. To effect this object General Smallwood
was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel Morgan was
placed on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill; and General
Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old
camp at White Marsh. Major Jameson, with two troops of cavalry, and
M'Lane's infantry, was directed to guard the east, and Captain Lee
with his troop, the west side of that river. General Count Pulaski, a
Polish nobleman who commanded the horse, led the residue of the
cavalry to Trenton, where he trained them for the ensuing campaign.
{December 22.}
One of the first operations meditated by General Washington after
crossing the Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quantity of hay
which remained in the islands above the mouth of Derby Creek, within
the power of the British. Early in the morning after his orders for
this purpose had been given, Sir William Howe marched out in full
force, and encamped between Derby and the middle party, so as
completely to cover the islands; while a foraging party removed the
hay. Washington, with the intention of disturbing this operation, gave
orders for putting his army in motion, when the alarming fact was
disclosed, that the commissary's stores were exhausted, and that the
last ration had been delivered and consumed.
Accustomed as were the continental troops to privations of every sort,
it would have been hazarding too much to move them, under these
circumstances, against a powerful enemy. In a desert, or in a garrison
where food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits of
discipline, enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinary
situations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a country
abounding with provisions, requires something more than fortitude; nor
can soldiers readily submit, while in such a country, to the
deprivation of food. It is not therefore surprising that, among a few
of the troops, some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more
astonishing that the great body of the army bore a circumstance so
irritating, and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur.
On receiving intelligence of the fact, General Washington ordered the
country to be scoured, and provisions, for supplying the pressing
wants of the moment, to be seized wherever found. In the mean time,
light parties were detached to harass the enemy about Derby, where Sir
William Howe, with his accustomed circumspection, kept his army so
compact, and his soldiers so within the lines, that an opportunity to
annoy him was seldom afforded even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee.
After completing his forage, he returned, with inconsiderable loss, to
Philadelphia.
That the American army, while the value still retained by paper bills
placed ample funds in the hands of government, should be destitute of
food, in the midst of a state so abounding with provisions as
Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which can not fail
to excite attention.
[Sidenote: Defects in the Commissary Department.]
Early in the war, the office of commissary general had been confirmed
on Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman fitted by his
talents, activity and zeal, for that important station. Yet, from the
difficulty of arranging so complicated a department in its
commencement, without the advantages of experience, complaints were
repeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies.
The subject was taken up by congress; but the remedy administered, as
well from the time of its application, as from the ingredients of
which it was composed, served only to increase the disease. The system
was not completed until near midsummer; and then its arrangements were
such that Colonel Trumbull refused to accept the office assigned to
him; and new men were to be called into service at a time when the
strongest necessity required the exertions of those who understood the
plan of supplies for the campaign in all its modifications. In
addition to the commissary of purchases, and a commissary general of
issues, each to be appointed by congress, the new plan contemplated
four deputies in each department, also to be appointed by that body,
who were not accountable to, nor removeable by the head of the
department, but might be suspended, and accused before congress who
should examine the charge, and either remove the accused from his
office, or reinstate him in it.
[Sidenote: Distress of the American army at Valley Forge for
provisions.]
This _imperium in imperio_, erected in direct opposition to the
opinion of the Commander-in-chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from the
army. Congress, however, persisted in the system; and the effects of
deranging so important a department as that which feeds the troops, in
the midst of a campaign, were not long in unfolding themselves. In
every military division of the continent, loud complaints were made of
the deficiency of supplies. The success of Gates appears to have been
more endangered by this cause, than by the movement of Sir Henry
Clinton up the Hudson. The army of General Washington was often
greatly embarrassed, and his movements not unfrequently suspended, by
the want of provisions. The present total failure of all supply was
preceded, for a few days, by the issuing of meat unfit to be eaten.
Representations on this subject were made to the Commander-in-chief,
who, on the morning that Sir William Howe moved out to Derby, and
before intelligence of that movement had been received, communicated
them to congress.
[Sidenote: The army subsisted in a great measure by impressments.]
That body had authorized the Commander-in-chief to seize provisions
for the use of his army within seventy miles of head quarters; and
either to pay for them in money, or in certificates, for the
redemption of which the faith of the United States was pledged. The
odium of this measure was increased by the failure of the government
to provide funds to take up these certificates when presented.
At the same time, the provisions carried into Philadelphia were paid
for in specie at a good price. The inhabitants of that part of
Pennsylvania were not zealous in support of the war, and the
difference between prompt payment in gold or silver, and a
certificate, the value of which was often diminished by depreciation
before its payment, was too great not to influence their wishes and
their conduct. Such was the dexterity they employed that,
notwithstanding the rigour of the laws, and the vigilance of the
troops stationed on the lines, they often succeeded in concealing
their provisions from those who were authorized to impress for the
army, and in conveying them privately into Philadelphia.
{December 10.}
General Washington exercised the powers confided to him with caution,
but he did exercise them; and by doing so, acquired considerable
supplies. Congress appeared as much dissatisfied with the lenity of
the Commander-in-chief, as the people were with his rigour, in
consequence of which the subject was taken into consideration, his
forbearance disapproved, and instructions given for the rigorous
exertions in future of the powers with which he was invested. In reply
to the letter communicating these resolves, the General stated the
conduct he had observed, insisted that provisions had been taken very
extensively, and repeated his opinion, that such measures would be
much more readily submitted to if executed by the civil authority.
In obedience, however, to the will of congress, he issued a
proclamation, requiring the farmers within seventy miles of head
quarters, to thrash out one half of their grain by the first of
February, and the residue by the first of March, under the penalty of
having the whole seized as straw.
The success of this experiment did not correspond with the wishes of
congress. It was attended with the pernicious consequences which had
been foreseen by the General, to avoid which he had considered this
system as a dernier ressort, of which he was to avail himself only in
extreme cases. In answer to a letter on this subject from the board of
war, he said, "I shall use every exertion that may be expedient and
practicable for subsisting the army, and keeping it together; but I
must observe, that this never can be done by coercive means. Supplies
of provisions and clothing must be had in another way, or it can not
exist. The small seizures that were made of the former some time ago,
in consequence of the most pressing and urgent necessity--when the
alternative was to do that or dissolve--excited the greatest alarm and
uneasiness imaginable, even among some of our best and warmest
friends. Such procedures may relieve for an instant, but eventually
will prove of the most pernicious consequence. Besides spreading
disaffection and jealousy among the people, they never fail, even in
the most veteran armies, to raise in the soldiery a disposition to
licentiousness, plunder, and robbery, which it has ever been found
exceeding difficult to suppress; and which has not only proved ruinous
to the inhabitants, but, in many instances, to the armies themselves."
In a subsequent letter to congress, he added, "I regret the occasion
which compelled us to the measure the other day, and shall consider it
as among the greatest of our misfortunes to be under the necessity of
practising it again. I am now obliged to keep several parties from the
army thrashing grain, that our supplies may not fail; but this will
not do."
[Sidenote: Combination formed in Congress against General Washington.]
About this time, a strong combination was forming against the
Commander-in-chief, into which several members of congress, and a very
few officers of the army are believed to have entered.
[Sidenote: General Gates supposed to be concerned in it.]
[Sidenote: Correspondence on this subject between the two generals.]
The splendour with which the capture of a British army had surrounded
the military reputation of General Gates, acquired some advocates for
the opinion that the arms of America would be more fortunate, should
that gentleman be elevated to the supreme command. He could not be
supposed hostile himself to the prevalence of this opinion; and some
parts of his conduct would seem to warrant a belief that, if it did
not originate with him, he was not among the last to adopt it. After
the victory of the seventh of October had opened to him the prospect
of subduing the arms of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicate
his success to General Washington, but carried on a correspondence
with General Conway, in which that officer expressed great contempt
for the Commander-in-chief. When the purport of this correspondence
was disclosed to General Washington, Gates demanded the name of the
informer in a letter far from being conciliatory in its terms, which
was accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of being
passed through congress.[97] The state of Pennsylvania too, chagrined
at the loss of its capital, and forgetful of its own backwardness in
strengthening the army, which had twice fought superior numbers in its
defence, furnished many discontented individuals. They imputed it to
General Washington as a fault that, with forces inferior to his enemy
in numbers, and in every equipment, he had not effected the same
result which had been produced in the north, by a continental army, in
itself, much stronger than its adversary, and so reinforced by militia
as to treble his numbers. On the report that General Washington was
moving into winter quarters, the legislature of that state addressed a
remonstrance to congress on the subject, manifesting, in very
intelligible terms, their dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-chief.
About the same time, a new board of war was created, of which General
Gates was appointed the President; and General Mifflin, who was
supposed to be of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of its
members. General Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the
army that had joined this faction, was appointed inspector general,
and was promoted, above senior brigadiers, to the rank of major
general. These were evidences that, if the hold which the
Commander-in-chief had taken of the affections and confidence of the
army and of the nation could be loosened, the party in congress
disposed to change their general, was far from being contemptible in
point of numbers. But to loosen this hold was impossible. The
indignation with which the idea of such a change was received even by
the victorious troops who had conquered under Gates, forms the most
conclusive proof of its strength. Even the northern army clung to
Washington as the saviour of his country.
[Footnote 97: See note No. XI. at the end of the volume.]
These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of the
Commander-in-chief, could not escape his notice. They made, however,
no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of his
measures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism, of
apprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. His desire
to remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the conviction
that his retaining that station would be useful to his country, rather
than from the gratification his high rank might furnish to ambition.
When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and
sentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr. Laurens, the
president of congress, and his private friend, who, in an unofficial
letter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to him as
president, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-chief, he
said, "I can not sufficiently express the obligation I feel towards
you for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I am
deeply interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction had
been for some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I am
of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes
of the trusts reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a
personal account; but my chief concern arises from an apprehension of
the dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to
the common cause.
"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am
unambitious of honours not founded in the approbation of my country, I
would not desire, in the least degree, to suppress a free spirit of
inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deem
reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many serious
charges, and it is my wish that it may be submitted to congress. This
I am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may
possibly involve you in embarrassment hereafter, since it is uncertain
how many, or who, may be privy to the contents.
"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy
of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defence
I might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I
can not combat their insinuations, however injurious, without
disclosing secrets it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why
should I expect to be free from censure, the unfailing lot of an
elevated station? Merit and talents which I can not pretend to rival,
have ever been subject to it. My heart tells me it has been my
unremitted aim to do the best which circumstances would permit. Yet I
may have been very often mistaken in my judgment of the means, and may
in many instances deserve the imputation of error."[98]
[Footnote 98: See note No. XII. at the end of the volume.]
Fortunately for America, these combinations only excited resentment
against those who were believed to be engaged in them.
{December.}
{December 23.}
Soon after being informed of the unfavourable disposition of some
members of congress towards him, and receiving the memorial of the
legislature of Pennsylvania against his going into winter quarters,
the General also discovered the failure already mentioned in the
commissary department. On this occasion, he addressed congress in
terms of energy and plainness which he had used on no former occasion.
In his letter to that body he said, "Full as I was in my
representation of the matters in the commissary's department
yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons oblige me to add that I am
now convinced beyond a doubt that, unless some great and capital
change suddenly takes place in that line, this army must inevitably be
reduced to one or other of these three things--to starve, dissolve, or
disperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that this
is not an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason to
suppose what I say.
"Saturday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force,
had left the city, and were advancing towards Derby with apparent
design to forage, and draw subsistence from that part of the country,
I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give every
opposition in my power; when, to my great mortification, I was not
only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on
account of a want of provisions; and that a dangerous mutiny, begun
the night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by the
spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended
from the want of this article.
"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this
camp, and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not
a single hoof of any kind to slaughter, and not more than twenty-five
barrels of flour! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when I
add that he could not tell when to expect any.
[Sidenote: Distress of the American army for clothes.]
"All I could do under these circumstances, was to send out a few light
parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were
instantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as much
provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiers;
but will this answer? No, sir. Three or four days of bad weather would
prove our destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter?
And if we are now as often without provisions as with them, what is to
become of us in the spring, when our force will be collected, with the
aid perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before
the enemy can be reinforced? These are considerations of great
magnitude, meriting the closest attention, and will, when my own
reputation is so intimately connected with, and to be affected by the
event, justify my saying, that the present commissaries are by no
means equal to the execution of the office, or that the disaffection
of the people surpasses all belief. The misfortune, however, does, in
my opinion, proceed from both causes; and, though I have been tender
heretofore of giving any opinion, or of lodging complaints, as the
change in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and the
consequences thereof were predicted; yet, finding that the inactivity
of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other
essentials, is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar,
but by those in power; it is time to speak plain in exculpation of
myself. With truth, then, I can declare that no man, in my opinion,
ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of
the army. Since the month of July, we have had no assistance from the
quartermaster general; and to want of assistance from this department,
the commissary general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I
am to add that, notwithstanding it is a standing order (often
repeated) that the troops shall always have two days provisions by
them, that they may be ready at any sudden call; yet, scarcely any
opportunity has ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy, that
has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded, on this
account; and this, the great and crying evil is not all. Soap,
vinegar, and other articles allowed by congress, we see none of, nor
have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The
first, indeed, we have little occasion for; few men having more than
one shirt, many, only the moiety of one, and some, none at all. In
addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit from a clothier
general, and at the same time, as a farther proof of the inability of
an army under the circumstances of this to perform the common duties
of soldiers, we have, by a field return this day made, besides a
number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in
farmers' houses on the same account, no less than two thousand eight
hundred and ninety-eight men, now in camp, unfit for duty, because
they are bare-foot, and otherwise naked. By the same return, it
appears that our whole strength in continental troops, including the
eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General
Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts
to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty;
notwithstanding which, and that since the fourth instant, our number
fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone,
particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near two
thousand men, we find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was
really going into winter quarters or not, (for I am sure no resolution
of mine would warrant the remonstrance), reprobating the measure as
much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones,
and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they
conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the
disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means
exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well appointed
and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia,
and to cover from depredation and waste the states of Pennsylvania,
Jersey, &c. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my
eye is, that these very gentlemen, who were well apprised of the
nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their
own soldiers worse clad than others, and advised me, near a month ago,
to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in
consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong
assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days,
agreeably to a decree of the state; (not one article of which by the
by is yet to come to hand,) should think a winter's campaign, and the
covering of their states from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and
practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a
much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a
comfortable room, by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold bleak
hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets.
However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and
distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul
pity those miseries which it is not in my power either to relieve or
to prevent."
The representations made in this letter were not exaggerated. The
distresses of the army, however, so far as respected clothing, did not
arise from the inattention of congress. Measures for the importation
of clothes had been adopted early in the war, but had not produced the
effect expected from them. Vigorous but ineffectual means had also
been taken to obtain supplies from the interior. The unfortunate
non-importation agreements which preceded the commencement of
hostilities, had reduced the quantity of goods in the country below
the ordinary amount, and the war had almost annihilated foreign
commerce. The progress of manufactures did not equal the consumption;
and such was the real scarcity, that exactions from individuals
produced great distress, without relieving the wants of the army. A
warm blanket was a luxury in which not many participated, either in
the camp or in the country.
In the northern states, where the sea coast was too extensive, and the
ports too numerous to be completely guarded, and where the people were
more inclined to maritime enterprise, supplies both of arms and
clothes were attainable in a more considerable degree than in those
farther south; but the large sums of money expended in that part of
the union for the support of the army, had lessened the value of the
currency there more rapidly than elsewhere, and a consequent high
nominal price was demanded for imported articles. Congress deemed the
terms on which some large contracts had been made by the clothier
general in Massachusetts, so exorbitant, as to forbid their execution;
and at the same time, addressed a letter to the state government,
requesting that the goods should be seized for the use of the army, at
prices to be fixed by the legislature, in pursuance of a resolution of
the 22d of November.
These recommendations from congress, so far as they exhorted the
states to supply the wants of the soldiers, were strongly supported by
the General. In his letters to the several governors, he represented
the very existence of the army, and the continuance of the contest, as
depending on their exertions in this respect.
{1778}
[Sidenote: General Washington's exertions to increase his force, and
to place it on a respectable footing before the ensuing campaign.]
To recruit the army for the ensuing campaign became again an object of
vital importance; and the Commander-in-chief again pressed its
necessity on congress, and on the states. To obtain a respectable
number of men by voluntary enlistment had, obviously, become
impossible. Coercion could be employed only by the state governments;
and it required all the influence of General Washington to induce the
adoption of a measure so odious in itself, but so indispensable to the
acquirement of means to meet the crisis of the war, which, in his
judgment, had not yet passed away. He enclosed to each state a return
of its troops on continental establishment, thereby exhibiting to each
its own deficiency. To those who had not resorted to coercive means,
he stated the success with which they had been used by others; and he
urged all, by every motive which could operate on the human mind, to
employ those means early enough to enable him to anticipate the enemy
in taking the field.
To the causes which had long threatened the destruction of the army,
the depreciation of paper money was now to be added. It had become so
considerable that the pay of an officer would not procure even those
absolute necessaries which might protect his person from the extremes
of heat and cold. The few who possessed small patrimonial estates
found them melting away; and others were unable to appear as
gentlemen. Such circumstances could not fail to excite disgust with
the service, and a disposition to leave it. Among those who offered
their commissions to the Commander-in-chief, were many who, possessing
a larger portion of military pride, and therefore feeling with
peculiar sensibility the degradation connected with poverty and rags,
afforded the fairest hopes of becoming the ornaments of the army. This
general indifference about holding a commission; this general opinion
that an obligation was conferred, not received by continuing in the
service, could not fail to be unfavourable, not only to that spirit of
emulation which stimulates to bolder deeds than are required, but to a
complete execution of orders, and to a rigid observance of duty.
An officer whose pride was in any degree wounded, whose caprice was
not indulged, who apprehended censure for a fault which his
carelessness about remaining in the army had probably seduced him to
commit, was ready to throw up a commission which, instead of being
valuable, was a burden almost too heavy to be borne. With extreme
anxiety the Commander-in-chief watched the progress of a temper which,
though just commencing, would increase, he feared, with the cause that
produced it. He was, therefore, early and earnest in pressing the
consideration of this important subject on the attention of congress.
{January 10.}
[Sidenote: Congress send a committee of their own body to the army.]
The weak and broken condition of the continental regiments, the strong
remonstrances of the General, the numerous complaints received from
every quarter, determined congress to depute a committee to reside in
camp during the winter, for the purpose of investigating the state of
the army, and reporting such reforms as the public good might require.
This committee repaired to head quarters in the month of January. The
Commander-in-chief laid before them a general statement, taking a
comprehensive view of the condition of the army, and detailing the
remedies necessary for the correction of existing abuses, as well as
those regulations which he deemed essential to its future prosperity.
This paper, exhibiting the actual state of the army, discloses defects
of real magnitude in the existing arrangements. In perusing it, the
reader is struck with the numerous difficulties, in addition to those
resulting from inferiority of numbers, with which the American general
was under the necessity of contending. The memorial is too long to be
inserted, but there are parts which ought not to be entirely
overlooked. The neglect of the very serious representation it
contained respecting a future permanent provision for the officers,
threatened, at an after period, to be productive of such pernicious
effects, that their insertion in this place will not, it is presumed,
be unacceptable.
He recommended as the basis of every salutary reform, a comfortable
provision for the officers, which should render their commissions
valuable; to effect which the future, as well as the present, ought to
be contemplated.
"A long and continual sacrifice of individual interest for the general
good, ought not," he said, "to be expected or required. The nature of
man must be changed, before institutions built on the presumptive
truth of such a principle can succeed.
"This position," he added, "is supported by the conduct of the
officers of the American army, as well as by that of all other men. At
the commencement of the dispute, in the first effusions of zeal, when
it was believed the service would be temporary, they entered into it
without regard to pecuniary considerations. But finding its duration
much longer than had been at first expected, and that, instead of
deriving advantage from the hardships and dangers to which they are
exposed, they were, on the contrary, losers by their patriotism, and
fell far short of even a competency for their wants, they have
gradually abated in their ardour; and, with many, an entire
disinclination to the service, under present circumstances, has taken
place. To this, in an eminent degree, must be ascribed the frequent
resignations daily happening, and the more frequent importunities for
permission to resign, from some officers of the greatest merit.
"To this also may be ascribed the apathy, inattention, and neglect of
duty, which pervade all ranks; and which will necessarily continue and
increase, while an officer, instead of gaining any thing, is
impoverished by his commission, and conceives he is conferring, not
receiving a favour, in holding it. There can be no sufficient tie on
men possessing such sentiments. Nor can any method be adopted to
compel those to a punctual discharge of duty, who are indifferent
about their continuance in the service, and are often seeking a
pretext to disengage themselves from it. Punishment, in this case,
would be unavailing. But when an officer's commission is made valuable
to him, and he fears to lose it, you may exact obedience from him.
"It is not indeed consistent with reason or justice that one set of
men should make a sacrifice of property, domestic ease, and happiness;
encounter the rigours of the field, the perils and vicissitudes of
war, without some adequate compensation, to obtain those blessings
which every citizen will enjoy in common with them. It must also be a
comfortless reflection to any man, that, after he may have contributed
to secure the rights of his country, at the risk of his life, and the
ruin of his fortune, there will be no provision made to prevent
himself and his family, from sinking into indigence and wretchedness."
With these and other arguments, General Washington recommended, in
addition to present compensation, a half pay and pensionary
establishment for the army.
"I urge my sentiments," said he, "with the greater freedom, because I
can not, and shall not, receive the smallest benefit from the
establishment; and can have no other inducement for proposing it, than
a full conviction of its utility and propriety."
The wants and distresses of the army, when actually seen by the
committee of congress, made a much deeper impression than could have
been received from any statement whatever. They endeavoured to
communicate to congress the sentiments felt by themselves, and to
correct the errors which had been committed. But a numerous body, if
it deliberate at all, proceeds slowly in the conduct of executive
business; and will seldom afford a prompt corrective to existing
mischiefs, especially to those growing out of its own measures.
{February 5.}
Much of the sufferings of the army was attributed to mismanagement in
the quartermaster's department, which, notwithstanding the repeated
remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, had long remained without a
head. This subject was taken up early by the committee, and proper
representations made respecting it. But congress still remained under
the influence of those opinions which had already produced such
mischievous effects, and were still disposed to retain the subordinate
officers of the department in a state of immediate dependence on their
own body. In this temper, they proposed a plan which, not being
approved in camp, was never carried into execution.
While congress was deliberating on the reforms proposed, the
distresses of the army approached their acme, and its dissolution was
threatened. Early in February, the commissaries gave notice that the
country, to a great distance, was actually exhausted; and that it
would be impracticable to obtain supplies for the army longer than to
the end of that month. Already the threatened scarcity began to be
felt, and the rations issued were often bad in quality, and
insufficient in quantity. General Washington found it necessary again
to interpose his personal exertions to procure provisions from a
distance.
In the apprehension that the resources of the commissary department
would fail before the distant supplies he had taken measures to obtain
could reach him, and that the enemy designed to make another incursion
into the country around Philadelphia, for the purpose of gleaning what
yet remained in possession of the inhabitants, he detached General
Wayne, with orders to seize every article proper for the use of an
army within fifteen miles of the Delaware, and to destroy the forage
on the islands between Philadelphia and Chester.
To defeat the object of this foraging party, the inhabitants concealed
their provisions and teams, and gave to the country every appearance
of having been entirely pillaged. Before any sufficient aid could be
obtained by these means, the bread, as well as the meat, was
exhausted, and famine prevailed in camp.
In an emergency so pressing, the Commander-in-chief used every effort
to feed his hungry army. Parties were sent out to glean the country;
officers of influence were deputed to Jersey, Delaware and Maryland;
and circular letters were addressed to the governors of states by the
committee of congress in camp and by the Commander-in-chief,
describing the wants of the army, and urging the greatest exertions
for its immediate relief.
Fortunately for America, there were features in the character of
Washington which, notwithstanding the discordant materials of which
his army was composed, attached his officers and soldiers so strongly
to his person, that no distress could weaken their affection, nor
impair the respect and veneration in which they held him. To this
sentiment is to be attributed, in a great measure, the preservation of
a respectable military force, under circumstances but too well
calculated for its dissolution.
Through this severe experiment on their fortitude, the native
Americans persevered steadily in the performance of their duty; but
the conduct of the Europeans, who constituted a large part of the
army, was, to a considerable extent, less laudable; and at no period
of the war was desertion so frequent as during this winter. Aided by
the disaffected, deserters eluded the vigilance of the parties who
watched the roads, and great numbers escaped into Philadelphia with
their arms.
In a few days, the army was rescued from the famine with which it had
been threatened, and considerable supplies of provisions were laid up
in camp. It was perceived that the difficulties which had produced
such melancholy effects, were created more by the want of due exertion
in the commissary department, and by the efforts of the people to save
their stock for a better market, than by any real deficiency of food
in the country.
This severe demonstration seems to have convinced congress that their
favourite system was radically vicious, and the subject was taken up
with the serious intention of remodeling the commissary department on
principles recommended by experience. But such were the delays
inherent in the organization of that body, that the new system was not
adopted until late in April.
At no period of the war had the situation of the American army been
more perilous than at Valley Forge. Even when the troops were not
entirely destitute of food, their stock of provisions was so scanty
that a quantity sufficient for one week was seldom in store.
Consequently, had General Howe moved out in force, the American army
could not have remained in camp; and their want of clothes disabled
them from keeping the field in the winter. The returns of the first of
February exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundred
and eighty-nine men in camp, unfit for duty for want of clothes.
Scarcely one man of these had a pair of shoes. Even among those
returned capable of doing duty, many were so badly clad, that exposure
to the cold of the season must have destroyed them. Although the total
of the army exceeded seventeen thousand men, the present effective
rank and file amounted to only five thousand and twelve.
While the sufferings of the soldiers filled the hospitals, a dreadful
mortality continued to prevail in those miserable receptacles of the
sick. A violent putrid fever swept off much greater numbers than all
the diseases of the camp.
If then during the deep snow which covered the earth for a great part
of the winter, the British general had taken the field, his own army
would indeed have suffered greatly, but the American loss is not to be
calculated.
[Illustration: Washington's Headquarters at Valley Forge
_Here on December 17, 1777, after the Battles of Brandywine and
Germantown and the occupation of Philadelphia by the British,
Washington established his headquarters for what may be paradoxically
termed the darkest winter of the Revolutionary War. The American
Commander-in-Chief chose this place partly for its defensibility and
partly to protect Congress, then in session at York, Pennsylvania,
from a sudden British attack. It was here that Washington and Baron
Steuben planned the reorganization of the American army, and it was
here, May 1, 1778, that news reached Washington of the consummation of
the French alliance._]
[Sidenote: Attempt to surprise Captain Lee's corps, and the gallant
resistance made by him.]
{March 28.}
Happily, the real condition of Washington was not well understood by
Sir William Howe; and the characteristic attention of that officer to
the lives and comfort of his troops, saved the American army.
Fortunately, he confined his operations to those small excursions that
were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own soldiers, who,
notwithstanding the favourable dispositions of the neighbouring
country, were much distressed for fuel, and often in great want of
forage and fresh provisions. The vigilance of the parties on the
lines, especially on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted a
large portion of the supplies intended for the Philadelphia market;
and corporal punishment was frequently inflicted on those who were
detected in attempting this infraction of the laws. As Captain Lee was
particularly active, a plan was formed, late in January, to surprise
and capture him in his quarters. An extensive circuit was made by a
large body of cavalry, who seized four of his patrols without
communicating an alarm. About break of day the British horse appeared;
upon which Captain Lee placed his troopers that were in the house, at
the doors and windows, who behaved so gallantly as to repulse the
assailants without losing a horse or man. Only Lieutenant Lindsay and
one private were wounded. The whole number in the house did not exceed
ten.[99] That of the assailants was said to amount to two hundred.
They lost a sergeant and three men with several horses, killed; and an
officer and three men wounded.
[Footnote 99: Major Jameson was accidentally present, and
engaged in this skirmish.]
The result of this skirmish gave great pleasure to the
Commander-in-chief, who had formed a high opinion of Lee's talents as
a partisan. He mentioned the affair in his orders with strong marks of
approbation; and, in a private letter to the captain, testified the
satisfaction he felt. For his merit through the preceding campaign,
congress promoted him to the rank of major, and gave him an
independent partisan corps to consist of three troops of horse.
[Sidenote: Congress determine upon a second expedition against
Canada.]
While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from the
alarming depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself in all
the military departments, a plan was matured in congress, and in the
board of war, without consulting the Commander-in-chief, for a second
irruption into Canada. It was proposed to place the Marquis de
Lafayette at the head of this expedition, and to employ Generals
Conway and Starke, as the second and third in command.
This young nobleman, possessing an excellent heart, and all the
military enthusiasm of his country, had left France early in 1777, in
opposition to the will of his sovereign, to engage in the service of
the United States. His high rank, and supposed influence at the court
of Versailles, secured him the unlimited respect of his countrymen in
America; and, added to his frankness of manners and zeal in their
cause, recommended him strongly to congress. While the claims of
others of the same country to rank were too exorbitant to be
gratified, he demanded no station in the army; would consent to
receive no compensation, and offered to serve as a volunteer. He had
stipulated with Mr. Deane for the rank of major general without
emolument; and, on his arrival in America, that rank was conferred on
him, but without any immediate command. In that capacity, he sought
for danger, and was wounded at the battle of Brandywine. He attached
himself with the ardour of youth to the Commander-in-chief, who
smoothed the way to his receiving a command in the army equal to his
rank.
The first intimation to General Washington that the expedition was
contemplated, was given in a letter from the president of the board of
war of the 24th of January, inclosing one of the same date to the
Marquis, requiring the attendance of that nobleman on congress to
receive his instructions. The Commander-in-chief was requested to
furnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly composed of Canadians, for
the expedition; and in the same letter, his advice and opinion were
asked respecting it. The northern states were to furnish the necessary
troops.
Without noticing the manner in which this business had been conducted,
and the marked want of confidence it betrayed, General Washington
ordered Hazen's regiment to march towards Albany; and the Marquis
proceeded immediately to the seat of congress. At his request, he was
to be considered as an officer detached from the army of Washington,
to remain under his orders, and Major General the Baron de Kalb was
added to the expedition; after which the Marquis repaired in person to
Albany to take charge of the troops who were to assemble at that place
in order to cross the lakes on the ice, and attack Montreal.
[Sidenote: Before its execution, it is abandoned.]
On arriving at Albany, he found no preparations made for the
expedition. Nothing which had been promised being in readiness, he
abandoned the enterprise as impracticable. Some time afterward,
congress also determined to relinquish it; and General Washington was
authorized to recall both the Marquis de Lafayette, and the Baron de
Kalb.
{February 27.}
While the army lay at Valley Forge, the Baron Steuben arrived in camp.
This gentleman was a Prussian officer, who came to the United States
with ample recommendations. He was said to have served many years in
the armies of the great Frederick; to have been one of the aids de
camp of that consummate commander; and to have held the rank of
lieutenant general. He was, unquestionably, versed in the system of
field exercise which the king of Prussia had introduced, and was well
qualified to teach it to raw troops. He claimed no rank, and offered
to render his services as a volunteer. After holding a conference with
congress, he proceeded to Valley Forge.
[Sidenote: General Conway resigns. Duel between him and General
Cadwallader.]
[Sidenote: The Baron Steuben appointed inspector general.]
Although the office of inspector general had been bestowed on Conway,
he had never entered on its duties; and his promotion to the rank of
major general had given much umbrage to the brigadiers, who had been
his seniors. That circumstance, in addition to the knowledge of his
being in a faction hostile to the Commander-in-chief, rendered his
situation in the army so uncomfortable, that he withdrew to York, in
Pennsylvania, which was then the seat of congress. When the expedition
to Canada was abandoned, he was not directed, with Lafayette and De
Kalb, to rejoin the army. Entertaining no hope of being permitted to
exercise the functions of his new office, he resigned his commission
about the last of April, and, some time afterwards, returned to
France.[100] On his resignation, the Baron Steuben, who had, as a
volunteer, performed the duties of inspector general, much to the
satisfaction of the Commander-in-chief, and of the army, was, on the
recommendation of General Washington, appointed to that office with
the rank of major general, without exciting the slightest murmur.
[Footnote 100: General Conway, after his resignation,
frequently indulged in expressions of extreme hostility to
the Commander-in-chief. These indiscretions were offensive
to the gentlemen of the army. In consequence of them, he was
engaged in an altercation with General Cadwallader, which
produced a duel, in which Conway received a wound, supposed
for some time to be mortal. While his recovery was despaired
of, he addressed the following letter to General Washington.
_Philadelphia, July 23d, 1778._
Sir,--I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few
minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere
grief for having done, written, or said any thing
disagreeable to your excellency. My career will soon be
over, therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my
last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good
man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of
these states, whose liberties you have asserted by your
virtues.
I am with the greatest respect, sir,
Your excellency's most obedient humble servant,
PHS. CONWAY.]
This gentleman was of real service to the American troops. He
established one uniform system of field exercise; and, by his skill
and persevering industry, effected important improvements through all
ranks of the army during its continuance at Valley Forge.
{1777}
While it was encamped at that place, several matters of great interest
engaged the attention of congress. Among them, was the stipulation in
the convention of Saratoga for the return of the British army to
England. Boston was named as the place of embarkation. At the time of
the capitulation, the difficulty of making that port early in the
winter was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as some time
must elapse before a sufficient number of vessels for the
transportation of his army could be collected, its embarkation might
be delayed until the ensuing spring.
{November 25.}
On receiving this unwelcome intelligence, he applied to General
Washington to change the port of embarkation, and to substitute
Newport, in Rhode Island, or some place on the Sound, for Boston. If
any considerations not foreseen should make this proposal
objectionable, he then solicited this indulgence for himself and his
suite. This request was communicated to congress, in terms favourable
to that part of the application which respected General Burgoyne and
his suite; but the objections to any change in the convention which
might expedite the transportation of the army, were too weighty to be
disregarded; and the General pressed them earnestly on congress. This
precaution was unnecessary. The facility with which the convention
might be violated by the British, and the captured army be united to
that under General Howe, seems to have suggested itself to the
American government, as soon as the first rejoicings were over; and
such was its then existing temper, that the faith and honour of
British officers were believed to be no securities against their
appearing again in the field. Under this impression, a resolution had
passed early in November, directing General Heath to transmit to the
board of war a descriptive list of all persons comprehended in the
convention, "in order that, if any officer, soldier, or other person
of the said army should hereafter be found in arms against these
states in North America, during the present contest, he might be
convicted of the offence, and suffer the punishment in such case
inflicted by the law of nations."
No other notice was taken of the application made by General Burgoyne
to congress through the Commander-in-chief, than to pass a resolution
"that General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne that
congress will not receive, nor consider, any proposition for
indulgence, nor for altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga,
unless immediately directed to their own body."
{December.}
Contrary to expectation, a fleet of transports for the reception of
the troops reached Rhode Island, on its way to Boston, in the month of
December. But, before its arrival, the preconceived suspicions of
congress had ripened into conviction several circumstances combined to
produce this result. General Burgoyne, dissatisfied with the
accommodations prepared for his officers in Boston, had, after a
fruitless correspondence with General Heath, addressed a letter to
General Gates, in which he complained of the inconvenient quarters
assigned his officers, as a breach of the articles of the convention.
This complaint was considered by congress as being made for the
purpose of letting in the principle, that the breach of one article of
a treaty discharges the injured party from its obligations.
This suspicion was strengthened by the indiscreet hesitation of
General Burgoyne to permit the resolution requiring a descriptive list
of his troops to be executed. His subsequent relinquishment of the
objection did not remove the impression it had made.
It was also alleged, that the number of transports was not sufficient
to convey the troops to Europe; nor was it believed possible that Sir
William Howe could have laid in, so expeditiously, a sufficient stock
of provisions for the voyage.
These objections to the embarkation of Burgoyne's troops were
strengthened by some trivial infractions of the convention, which, it
was contended, gave congress a strict right to detain them. It was
stipulated that "the arms" should be delivered up; and it appeared
that several cartouch boxes and other military accoutrements, supposed
to be comprehended in the technical term _arms_, had been detained.
This was deemed an infraction of the letter of the compact, which, on
rigid principle, justified the measures afterwards adopted by
congress.
[Sidenote: Congress forbid the embarkation of the British troops taken
at Saratoga.]
The whole subject was referred to a committee who reported all the
circumstances of the case, whereupon congress came to several
resolutions, enumerating the facts already mentioned, the last of
which was in these words: "Resolved, therefore, that the embarkation
of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and the troops under his command, be
suspended, until a distinct and explicit ratification of the
convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of
Great Britain to congress."
These resolutions, together with the report on which they were
founded, were transmitted to the several states, and to General
Washington. Two copies of them were sent to General Heath, with
directions to deliver one of them to General Burgoyne, and with
farther directions, "to order the vessels which may have arrived, or
which shall arrive, for the transportation of the army under
Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to quit, without delay, the port of
Boston."
[Sidenote: Burgoyne permitted to depart.]
On receiving these resolutions, General Burgoyne addressed a letter to
congress, containing papers, on which he founded a defence of his
conduct, and insisted on the embarkation of his army, as stipulated in
the convention; but the committee, to whom these papers were referred,
reported their opinion, after the most attentive consideration of
them, to be, "that nothing therein contained was sufficient to induce
congress to recede from their resolves of the 8th of January last,
respecting the convention of Saratoga." This application was
accompanied by another letter from General Burgoyne, to be delivered
if the army should still be detained, in which, in consideration of
the state of his health, he solicited permission to return to England.
This request was readily granted.
The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation of
Burgoyne, notwithstanding the persevering temper of the king, at
length made its way into the cabinet, and produced resolutions in
favour of pacific measures.
{1778}
{February.}
After the rejection of repeated motions made by the opposition members
tending to the abandonment of the American war, Lord North gave
notice, in the House of Commons, that he had digested a plan of
reconciliation which he designed shortly to lay before the house.
[Sidenote: Plan of reconciliation with America agreed to in
Parliament.]
In conformity with this notice, he moved for leave to bring in,
"first, A bill for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning
taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies and
plantations of North America.
"Second. A bill to enable his Majesty to appoint commissioners with
sufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of
quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies of
North America."
The first contained a declaration that Parliament will impose no tax
or duty whatever payable within any of the colonies of North America,
except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for the
purposes of commerce, the net produce of which should always be paid
and applied to and for the use of the colonies in which the same shall
be respectively levied, in like manner as other duties collected under
the authority of their respective legislatures are ordinarily paid and
applied.
The second authorized the appointment of commissioners by the crown,
with power to treat either with the existing governments, or with
individuals, in America; provided that no stipulations which might be
entered into should have any effect until approved in Parliament,
other than is afterward mentioned.
It is then enacted, that the commissioners may have power "to proclaim
a cessation of hostilities in any of the colonies, to suspend the
operation of the non-intercourse law; and farther, to suspend, during
the continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts of
Parliament which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, as
relates to the colonies.
"To grant pardon to any number or description of persons, and to
appoint a governor in any colony in which his majesty had heretofore
exercised the power of making such appointments."
These bills passed both houses of Parliament with inconsiderable
opposition.
Intelligence of the treaty between the United States and France having
been received by the minister about the time of their being
introduced, copies of them, before they had gone through the requisite
forms, were hurried to America, to be laid before congress and the
public, in the hope and expectation that they might counteract the
effects which it was feared the treaty with France would produce.
{April.}
General Washington received early information of their arrival, and
entertained serious fears of their operation. He was apprehensive that
the publication of a proposition for the restoration of peace on the
terms originally required by America, would greatly increase the
numbers of the disaffected; and immediately forwarded the bills to
congress in a letter suggesting the policy of preventing their
pernicious influence on the public mind by all possible means, and
especially through the medium of the press.
[Sidenote: Communicated to, and rejected by Congress.]
{April 22.}
This letter was referred to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Morris,
Drayton, and Dana, by whom a report was made, investigating the bills
with great acuteness as well as asperity. This report, and the
resolutions upon it, were ordered to be published. Other resolutions
were passed the succeeding day, recommending it to the states to
pardon under such limitations as they might think proper to make, such
of their misguided fellow-citizens as had levied war against the
United States.
This resolution was accompanied by an order directing it to be printed
in English and in German, and requesting General Washington to take
such measures as he should deem most effectual for circulating the
copies among the American recruits in the enemy's army.[101]
[Footnote 101: This request afforded the Commander-in-chief
a fair retort on Major General Tryon. That officer had
addressed a letter to him enclosing the bills brought into
Parliament, and containing, to use the language of General
Washington himself, "the more extraordinary and impertinent
request" that their contents should be communicated through
him to the army. General Washington now acknowledged the
receipt of this letter, and, in return, enclosed to Governor
Tryon copies of the resolution just mentioned, with a
request that he would be instrumental in making them known
to the persons on whom they were to operate.]
During these transactions, the frigate _La Sensible_ arrived with the
important intelligence that treaties of alliance and of commerce, had
been formed between the United States of America and France. The
treaties themselves were brought by Mr. Simeon Deane, the brother of
the American Minister in Paris.
This event had long been anxiously expected, and the delay attending
it had been such as to excite serious apprehension that it would never
take place.
France was still extremely sore under the wounds inflicted during the
war which terminated in 1763. It was impossible to reflect on a treaty
which had wrested from her so fair a part of North America, without
feeling resentments which would seek the first occasion of
gratification.
The growing discontents between Great Britain and her colonies were,
consequently, viewed at a distance with secret satisfaction; but
rather as a circumstance which might have some tendency to weaken and
embarrass a rival, and which was to be encouraged from motives of
general policy, than as one from which any definite advantage was to
be derived. France appears, at that time, to have required, and wished
for, repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war had
so deranged her finances, that the wish to preserve peace seems to
have predominated in her cabinet. The young monarch, who had just
ascended the throne, possessed a pacific unambitious temper, and the
councils of the nation were governed by men alike indisposed to
disturb the general tranquillity. The advice they gave the monarch
was, to aid and encourage the colonies secretly, in order to prevent a
reconciliation with the mother country, and to prepare privately for
hostilities, by improving his finances, and strengthening his marine;
but to avoid every thing which might give occasion for open war. The
system which for a time regulated the cabinet of Versailles, conformed
to this advice. While the utmost attention was paid to the Minister of
Britain, and every measure to satisfy him was openly taken, intimation
was privately given to those of the United States, that these measures
were necessary for the present, but they might be assured of the good
will of the French government.
During the public demonstration of dispositions favourable to England,
means were taken to furnish aids of ammunition and arms, and to
facilitate the negotiation of loans to the United States; and the
owners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes,
or to procure their condemnation, found means to dispose of them
privately.
Meanwhile, another party was formed in the cabinet, to whose political
system subsequent events gave the ascendency. Its avowed object was to
seize the present moment to revenge past injuries, humble the haughty
rival of France, and dismember her empire.
Matters remained in a fluctuating state until December, 1777.
Privately encouraged, but discountenanced publicly, the prospects of
the American Ministers varied according to the complexion of American
affairs.
Intelligence of the convention of Saratoga reached France early in
December, 1777. The American deputies took that opportunity to press
the treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelve
months; and to urge the importance, at this juncture, when Britain
would, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation,[102] of
communicating to congress, precisely, what was to be expected from
France and Spain.
[Footnote 102: Congress, in their first instructions to
their commissioners, directed them to press the immediate
declaration of France in favour of the United States, by
suggesting that a reunion with Great Britain might be the
consequence of delay.--_Secret Journals of Congress_, v. ii.
p. 30.]
They were informed by M. Girard, one of the secretaries of the king's
council of state, that it was determined to acknowledge the
independence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them.
That his Most Christian Majesty was resolved not only to acknowledge,
but to support their independence. That in doing this, he might
probably soon be engaged in a war; yet he should not expect any
compensation from the United States on that account; nor was it
pretended that he acted wholly for their sakes; since, besides his
real good will to them, it was manifestly the interest of France that
the power of England should be diminished by the separation of her
colonies. The only condition he should require would be that the
United States, in no peace to be made, should give up their
independence, and return to their obedience to the British government.
On determining to take this decisive course, the cabinet of Versailles
had despatched a courier to his Catholic majesty with information of
the line of conduct about to be pursued by France. On his return, the
negotiation was taken up in earnest, and a treaty of friendship and
commerce was soon concluded. This was accompanied by a treaty of
alliance eventual and defensive between the two nations, in which it
was declared, that if war should break out between France and England
during the existence of that with the United States, it should be made
a common cause; and that neither of the contracting parties should
conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal
consent of the other, first obtained; and they mutually engaged "not
to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States
shall have been formally, or tacitly assured by the treaty, or
treaties that shall terminate the war."
It was the wish of the ministers of the United States to engage France
immediately in the war; and to make the alliance, not eventual, but
positive. This proposition, however, was rejected.
In a few weeks after the conclusion of these negotiations, the Marquis
de Noailles announced officially to the court of London, the treaty of
friendship and commerce France had formed with the United States. The
British government, considering this notification as a declaration of
war, published a memorial for the purpose of justifying to all Europe
the hostilities it had determined to commence.
Soon after their commencement, the Count de Vergennes received private
intelligence that it was contemplated in the cabinet of London to
offer to the United States an acknowledgment of their independence as
the condition of a separate peace. He immediately communicated this
intelligence to the American ministers, requesting them to lose no
time in stating to congress that, though war was not declared in form,
it had commenced in fact; and that he considered the obligations of
the treaty of alliance as in full force; consequently that neither
party was now at liberty to make a separate peace. Instructions of a
similar import were given to the minister of France in the United
States.
[Sidenote: Information received of treaties of alliance and commerce
being entered into between France and the United States.]
The despatches containing these treaties were received by the
president on Saturday the second of May, after congress had adjourned.
That body was immediately convened, the despatches were opened, and
their joyful contents communicated.
In the exultation of the moment, the treaty of alliance, as well as
that of commerce and friendship was published; a circumstance which,
not without reason, gave umbrage to the cabinet of Versailles; because
that treaty, being only eventual, ought not to have been communicated
to the public but by mutual consent.
From this event, which was the source of universal exultation to the
friends of the revolution, the attention must be directed to one which
was productive of very different sensations.
Among the various improvements which struggling humanity has gradually
engrafted on the belligerent code, none have contributed more to
diminish the calamities of war, than those which meliorate the
condition of prisoners. No obligations will be more respected by the
generous and the brave; nor are there any, the violation of which
could wound the national character more deeply, or expose it to more
lasting or better merited reproach.
In wars between nations nearly equal in power, and possessing rights
acknowledged to be equal, a departure from modern usage in this
respect is almost unknown; and the voice of the civilized world would
be raised against the potentate who could adopt a system calculated to
re-establish the rigours and misery of exploded barbarism. But in
contests between different parts of the same empire, those practices
which mitigate the horrors of war yield, too frequently, to the
calculations of a blind and erring resentment. The party which
supports the ancient state of things, often treats resistance as
rebellion, and captives as traitors. The opposite party, supporting
also by the sword principles believed to be right, will admit of no
departure from established usage, to its prejudice; and may be
expected, if possessing the power, to endeavour, by retaliating
injuries, to compel the observance of a more just and humane system.
But they participate in the fault imputable to their adversaries, by
manifesting a disposition to punish those whom they deem traitors,
with the same severity of which they so loudly and justly complain,
when they are themselves its victims.
General Gage, as Commander-in-chief of the British army, in the
harshness of spirit which had been excited while governor of
Massachusetts, not only threw all his prisoners into a common jail,
but rejected every proposition for an exchange of them. When the
command devolved on Sir William Howe, this absurd system was
abandoned, and an exchange[103] took place to a considerable extent.
But the Americans had not made a sufficient number of prisoners to
relieve all their citizens, and many of them still remained in
confinement. Representations were continually received from these
unfortunate men, describing in strong terms, the severity of their
treatment. They complained of suffering almost the extremity of
famine, that even the supply of provisions allowed them was unsound,
and that they were crowded into prison-ships, where they became the
victims of disease.
[Footnote 103: In the execution of this agreement, the
inconveniences arising from having committed the custody of
prisoners to the several states, was severely felt. In
addition to the delay inseparable from the necessity of
inquiring for them, and collecting them from different
places, they were often sent in without the knowledge of
General Washington; and, in some instances, they passed
unobserved, with permits from a state government, through
his camp, into that of the enemy. These irregularities, and
the remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, at length,
induced congress to appoint a commissary of prisoners.]
When charged with conduct so unworthy of his character and station,
Sir William Howe positively denied its truth.
It would be unjust to ascribe this excess of inhumanity to an officer
who, though perhaps severe in his temper, did not mingle cruelties in
his general system, which would excite universal indignation in other
wars. It must be admitted that his supplies of provisions were neither
good nor abundant; and that the American soldiers, in their own camp,
were unhealthy. But the excessive mortality prevailing among the
prisoners can be accounted for on no ordinary principles; and the
candid, who were least inclined to criminate without cause, have ever
been persuaded that, if his orders did not produce the distress which
existed, his authority was not interposed with sufficient energy, to
correct the abuses which prevailed.
The capture of General Lee furnished an additional ground of
controversy on the subject of prisoners. As he had been an officer in
the British service, whose resignation had not, perhaps, been received
when he entered into that of America, a disposition was, at first,
manifested to consider him as a deserter, and he was closely confined.
On receiving information of this circumstance, congress directed
General Howe to be assured that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and five
Hessian field-officers, should be detained, and should experience
precisely the fate of General Lee. These officers were taken into
close custody, and informed that the resolution announced to General
Howe should be strictly enforced.
The sentiments of the Commander-in-chief on the subject of
retaliation, seem to have been less severe than those of congress. So
great was his abhorrence of the cruelties such a practice must
generate, that he was unwilling to adopt it in any case not of
absolute and apparent necessity. Not believing that of General Lee to
be such a case, he remonstrated strongly against these resolutions.
But congress remained inflexible; and the officers designated as the
objects of retaliation, were kept in rigorous confinement until
General Lee was declared to be a prisoner of war.[104]
[Footnote 104: See note No. XIII. at the end of the volume.]
The resolutions of congress respecting the prisoners taken at the
Cedars, were also the source of much embarrassment and chagrin to the
Commander-in-chief. Alleging that the capitulation had been violated
on the part of the enemy, and that the savages had been permitted to
murder some of the prisoners, and to plunder others, they withheld
their sanction from the agreement entered into by General Arnold with
Captain Forster, and refused to allow other prisoners to be returned
in exchange for those liberated under that agreement, until the
murderers should be given up, and compensation made for the baggage
said to have been plundered. As the fact alleged was not clearly
established, Sir William Howe continued to press General Washington on
this subject. Reminding him of the importance of a punctilious
observance of faith, plighted in engagements like that made by General
Arnold, he persisted to hold the Commander-in-chief personally bound
for an honourable compliance with military stipulations entered into
by an officer under his authority.
General Washington, feeling the keenness of the reproach, pressed
congress to change their resolution on this subject; but his
remonstrances were, for a long time, unavailing.
After the sufferings of the prisoners in New York had been extreme,
and great numbers had perished in confinement, the survivors were
liberated for the purpose of being exchanged; but so miserable was
their condition, that many of them died on their way home. For the
dead as well as the living, General Howe claimed a return of
prisoners, while General Washington contended that reasonable
deductions should be made for those who were actually dead, of
diseases under which they laboured when permitted to leave the British
prisons.
Until this claim should be admitted, General Howe rejected any partial
exchange. General Washington was immoveable in his determination to
repel it; and thus all hope of being relieved in the ordinary mode
appeared to be taken from those whom the fortune of war had placed in
the power of the enemy.
[Sidenote: Complaints made by General Washington of the treatment of
American prisoners in possession of the enemy.]
In the mean time, the sufferings of the American prisoners increased
with the increasing severity of the season. Information continued to
be received, that they suffered almost the extremity of famine.
Repeated remonstrances, made on this subject to the British general,
were answered by a denial of the fact. He continued to aver that the
same food, both in quantity and quality, was issued to the prisoners,
as to British troops when in transports, or elsewhere, not on actual
duty; and that every tenderness was extended to them, which was
compatible with the situation of his army. He yielded to the request
made by General Washington to permit a commissary to visit the jails,
and demanded passports for an agent to administer to the wants of
British prisoners.
When Mr. Boudinot, the American commissary of prisoners, who was
appointed by General Washington to visit the jails in Philadelphia,
met Mr. Ferguson, the British commissary, he was informed that General
Howe thought it unnecessary for him to come into the city, as he would
himself inspect the situation and treatment of the prisoners. There is
reason to believe that their causes of complaint, so far as respected
provisions, did not exist afterwards in the same degree as formerly;
and that the strong measures subsequently taken by congress, were
founded on facts of an earlier date.
But clothes and blankets were also necessary, and the difficulty of
furnishing them was considerable. General Howe would not permit the
purchase of those articles in Philadelphia; and they were not
attainable elsewhere.
[Sidenote: Proceedings of congress on this subject.]
To compel him to abandon this distressing restriction, and to permit
the use of paper money within the British lines, congress resolved,
that no prisoner should be exchanged until all the expenditures made
in paper for the supplies they received from the United States, should
be repaid in specie, at the rate of four shillings and sixpence for
each dollar. They afterwards determined, that from the 1st day of
February, no British commissary should be permitted to purchase any
provisions for the use of prisoners west of New Jersey, but that all
supplies for persons of that description should be furnished from
British stores.
Sir William Howe remonstrated against the last resolution with great
strength and justice, as a decree which doomed a considerable number
of prisoners, far removed into the country, to a slow and painful
death by famine; since it was impracticable to supply them immediately
from Philadelphia. The severity of this order was in some degree
mitigated by a resolution that each British commissary of prisoners
should receive provisions from the American commissary of purchases,
to be paid for in specie, according to the resolution of the 19th of
December, 1777.
About the same time, an order was hastily given by the board of war,
which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment; and exposed
the Commander-in-chief to strictures not less severe than those he had
applied to the British general.
General Washington had consented that a quartermaster, with a small
escort, should come out of Philadelphia, with clothes and other
comforts for the prisoners who were in possession of the United
States. He had expressly stipulated for their security, and had given
them a passport.
{January 26.}
While they were travelling through the country, information was given
to the board of war that General Howe had refused to permit provisions
to be sent in to the American prisoners in Philadelphia by water. This
information was not correct. General Howe had only requested that
flags should not be sent up or down the river without previous
permission obtained from himself. On this information, however, the
board ordered Lieutenant Colonel Smith immediately to seize the
officers, though protected by the passport of General Washington,
their horses, carriages, and the provisions destined for the relief of
the British prisoners; and to secure them until farther orders, either
from the board or from the Commander-in-chief.
General Washington, on hearing this circumstance, despatched one of
his aids with orders for the immediate release of the persons and
property which had been confined; but the officers refused to proceed
on their journey, and returned to Philadelphia.[105]
[Footnote 105: They alleged that their horses had been
disabled, and the clothing embezzled.]
This untoward event was much regretted by the Commander-in-chief. In a
letter received some time afterwards, General Howe, after expressing
his willingness that the American prisoners should be visited by
deputy commissaries, who should inspect their situation, and supply
their wants required, as the condition on which this indulgence should
be granted, "that a similar permit should be allowed to persons
appointed by him, which should be accompanied with the assurance of
General Washington, that his authority will have sufficient weight to
prevent any interruption to their progress, and any insult to their
persons." This demand was ascribed to the treatment to which officers
under the protection of his passport had already been exposed.
General Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange of
prisoners, which had hitherto appeared to be insuperable; and made
repeated, but ineffectual efforts to remove it. General Howe had
uniformly refused to proceed with any cartel, unless his right to
claim for all the diseased and infirm, whom he had liberated, should
be previously admitted.
At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from that high
ground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished it of his own
accord, and acceded completely to the proposition of General
Washington for the meeting of commissioners, in order to settle
equitably the number to which he should be entitled for those he had
discharged in the preceding winter. This point being adjusted,
commissaries were mutually appointed, who were to meet on the 10th of
March, in Germantown, to arrange the details of a general cartel.
{March 4.}
The Commander-in-chief had entertained no doubt of his authority to
enter into this agreement. On the fourth of March, however, he had the
mortification to perceive in a newspaper, a resolution of congress
calling on the several states for the amounts of supplies furnished
the prisoners, that they might be adjusted according to the rule of
the 10th of December, before the exchange should take place.
On seeing this embarrassing resolution, General Washington addressed a
letter to Sir William Howe, informing him that particular
circumstances had rendered it inconvenient for the American
commissioners to attend at the time appointed, and requesting that
their meeting should be deferred from the 10th to the 21st of March.
The interval was successfully employed in obtaining a repeal of the
resolution.
It would seem probable that the dispositions of congress on the
subject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of General
Washington. From the fundamental principle of the military
establishment of the United States at its commencement, an exchange of
prisoners would necessarily strengthen the British, much more than the
American army. The war having been carried on by troops raised for
short times, aided by militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged,
returned to their homes as citizens, while those of the enemy again
took the field.
General Washington, who was governed by a policy more just, and more
permanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to congress,
urging, as well the injury done the public faith, and his own personal
honour, by this infraction of a solemn engagement, as the cruelty and
impolicy of a system which must cut off for ever all hopes of an
exchange, and render imprisonment as lasting as the war. He
represented in strong terms the effect such a measure must have on the
troops on whom they should thereafter be compelled chiefly to rely,
and its impression on the friends of those already in captivity. These
remonstrances produced the desired effect, and the resolutions were
repealed. The commissioners met according to the second appointment;
but, on examining their powers, it appeared that those given by
General Washington were expressed to be in virtue of the authority
vested in him; while those given by Sir William Howe contained no such
declaration.
This omission produced an objection on the part of the United States;
but General Howe refused to change the language, alleging that he
designed the treaty to be of a personal nature, founded on the mutual
confidence and honour of the contracting generals; and had no
intention either to bind his government, or to extend the cartel
beyond the limits and duration of his own command.
This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners,
and General Howe persisting in his refusal to make the required
alteration in his powers, the negotiation was broken off, and this
fair prospect of terminating the distresses of numerous unfortunate
persons passed away, without effecting the good it had promised.
Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general cartel,
Sir William Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchangeable
should be sent in to the nearest posts, and returns made of officer
for officer of equal rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers
would admit; and that if a surplus of officers, should remain, they
should be exchanged for an equivalent in privates.
[Sidenote: A partial exchange agreed to.]
On the representations of General Washington, congress acceded to this
proposition, so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer,
and soldier for soldier; but rejected the part which admitted an
equivalent in privates for a surplus of officers, because the officers
captured with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of General
Howe. Under this agreement, an exchange took place to a considerable
extent; but as the Americans had lost more prisoners than they had
taken, unless the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation,
many of their troops were still detained in captivity.
NOTES.
NOTE--No. I. _See Page 5._
It will not be unacceptable to the reader to peruse this first report
of a young gentleman who afterwards performed so distinguished a part
in the revolution of his country, it is therefore inserted at large.
I was commissioned and appointed by the Hon. Robert Dinwiddie, Esq.
Governor &c. of Virginia, to visit and deliver a letter to the
commandant of the French forces on the Ohio, and set out on the
intended journey on the same day: the next, I arrived at
Fredericksburg, and engaged Mr. Jacob Vanbraam to be my French
interpreter, and proceeded with him to Alexandria, where we provided
necessaries. From thence we went to Winchester, and got baggage,
horses, &c. and from thence we pursued the new road to Wills' Creek,
where we arrived the 14th November.
Here I engaged Mr. Gist to pilot us out, and also hired four others as
servitors, Barnaby Currin, and John M'Quire, Indian traders, Henry
Steward, and William Jenkins; and in company with those persons left
the inhabitants the next day.
The excessive rains and vast quantity of snow which had fallen,
prevented our reaching Mr. Frazier's, an Indian trader, at the mouth
of Turtle creek, on Monongahela river, until Thursday the 22d. We were
informed here, that expresses had been sent a few days before to the
traders down the river, to acquaint them with the French general's
death, and the return of the major part of the French army into winter
quarters.
The waters were quite impassable without swimming our horses, which
obliged us to get the loan of a canoe from Frazier, and to send
Barnaby Currin and Henry Steward down the Monongahela, with our
baggage, to meet us at the forks of Ohio, about ten miles; there, to
cross the Alleghany.
As I got down before the canoe, I spent some time in viewing the
rivers, and the land in the fork, which I think extremely well
situated for a fort, as it has the absolute command of both rivers.
The land at the point is twenty, or twenty-five feet above the common
surface of the water; and a considerable bottom of flat, well timbered
land all around it very convenient for building. The rivers are each a
quarter of a mile or more across, and run here very nearly at right
angles; Alleghany, bearing northeast; and Monongahela, southeast. The
former of these two is a very rapid and swift running water, the other
deep and still, without any perceptible fall.
About two miles from this, on the southeast side of the river, at the
place where the Ohio company intended to erect a fort, lives Shingiss,
king of the Delawares. We called upon him, to invite him to council at
the Loggstown.
As I had taken a good deal of notice yesterday of the situation at the
fork, my curiosity led me to examine this more particularly, and I
think it greatly inferior, either for defence or advantages;
especially the latter. For a fort at the fork would be equally well
situated on the Ohio, and have the entire command of the Monongahela,
which runs up our settlement, and is extremely well designed for water
carriage, as it is of a deep, still nature. Besides, a fort at the
fork might be built at much less expense than at the other places.
Nature has well contrived this lower place for water defence; but the
hill whereon it must stand being about a quarter of a mile in length,
and then descending gradually on the land side, will render it
difficult and very expensive to make a sufficient fortification there.
The whole flat upon the hill must be taken in, the side next the
descent made extremely high, or else the hill itself cut away:
otherwise, the enemy may raise batteries within that distance without
being exposed to a single shot from the fort.
Shingiss attended us to the Loggstown, where we arrived between
sun-setting and dark, the twenty-fifth day after I left Williamsburg.
We travelled over some extremely good and bad land to get to this
place.
As soon as I came into town, I went to Monakatoocha (as the half king
was out at his hunting cabin on Little Beaver creek, about fifteen
miles off) and informed him by John Davidson, my Indian interpreter,
that I was sent a messenger to the French general; and was ordered to
call upon the sachems of the Six Nations to acquaint them with it. I
gave him a string of wampum and a twist of tobacco, and desired him to
send for the half king, which he promised to do by a runner in the
morning, and for other sachems. I invited him and the other great men
present, to my tent, where they stayed about an hour and returned.
According to the best observations I could make, Mr. Gift's new
settlement (which we passed by) bears about west northwest seventy
miles from Wills' creek; Shanapins, or the forks, north by west, or
north northwest about fifty miles from that; and from thence to the
Loggstown, the course is nearly west about eighteen or twenty miles:
so that the whole distance, as we went and computed it, is, at least,
one hundred and thirty-five or one hundred and forty miles from our
back inhabitants.
25th. Came to town, four of ten Frenchmen, who had deserted from a
company at the Kuskuskas, which lies at the mouth of this river. I got
the following account from them. They were sent from New Orleans with
a hundred men, and eight canoe loads of provisions, to this place,
where they expected to have met the same number of men, from the forts
on this side of lake Erie, to convoy them and the stores up, who were
not arrived when they ran off.
I inquired into the situation of the French on the Mississippi, their
numbers, and what forts they had built. They informed me, that there
were four small forts between New Orleans and the Black Islands,
garrisoned with about thirty or forty men, and a few small pieces in
each. That at New Orleans, which is near the mouth of the Mississippi,
there are thirty-five companies of forty men each, with a pretty
strong fort mounting eight carriage guns; and at the Black Islands
there are several companies and a fort with six guns. The Black
Islands are about a hundred and thirty leagues above the mouth of the
Ohio, which is about three hundred and fifty above New Orleans. They
also acquainted me, that there was a small pallisadoed fort on the
Ohio, at the mouth of the Obaish, about sixty leagues from the
Mississippi. The Obaish heads near the west end of lake Erie, and
affords the communication between the French on the Mississippi and
those on the lakes. These deserters came up from the lower Shannoah
town with one Brown, an Indian trader, and were going to Philadelphia.
About three o'clock this evening the half king came to town. I went up
and invited him with Davidson, privately, to my tent; and desired him
to relate some of the particulars of his journey to the French
commandant, and of his reception there; also, to give me an account of
the ways and distance. He told me, that the nearest and levelest way
was now impassable, by reason of many large miry savannas; that we
must be obliged to go by Venango, and should not get to the near fort
in less than five or six nights sleep, good travelling. When he went
to the fort, he said he was received in a very stern manner by the
late commander, who asked him very abruptly, what he had come about,
and to declare his business: which he said he did in the following
speech:
"Fathers, I am come to tell you your own speeches; what your own
mouths have declared. Fathers, you, in former days, set a silver basin
before us, wherein there was the leg of a beaver, and desired all the
nations to come and eat of it, to eat in peace and plenty, and not to
be churlish to one another: and that if any such person should be
found to be a disturber, I here lay down by the edge of the dish a
rod, which you must scourge them with; and if your father should get
foolish, in my old days, I desire you may use it upon me as well as
others.
"Now, fathers, it is you who are the disturbers in this land, by
coming and building your towns; and taking it away unknown to us, and
by force.
"Fathers, we kindled a fire a long time ago, at a place called
Montreal, where we desired you to stay, and not to come and intrude
upon our land. I now desire you may despatch to that place; for be it
known to you, fathers, that this is our land and not yours.
"Fathers, I desire you may hear me in civilness; if not, we must
handle that rod which was laid down for the use of the obstreperous.
If you had come in a peaceable manner, like our brothers the English,
we would not have been against your trading with us, as they do; but
to come, fathers, and build houses upon our land, and to take it by
force, is what we can not submit to.
"Fathers, both you and the English are white, we live in a country
between; therefore, the land belongs to neither one nor the other. But
the great Being above allowed it to be a place of residence for us;
so, fathers, I desire you to withdraw, as I have done our brothers the
English; for I will keep you at arm's length. I lay this down as a
trial for both, to see which will have the greatest regard to it, and
that side we will stand by, and make equal sharers with us. Our
brothers, the English, have heard this, and I come now to tell it to
you; for I am not afraid to discharge you off this land." This he said
was the substance of what he spoke to the general, who made this
reply.
"Now, my child, I have heard your speech: you spoke first, but it is
my time to speak now. Where is my wampum that you took away, with the
marks of towns in it? This wampum I do not know, which you have
discharged me off the land with: but you need not put yourself to the
trouble of speaking, for I will not hear you. I am not afraid of flies
or musquitoes, for Indians are such as those: I tell you down that
river I will go, and build upon it, according to my command. If the
river was blocked up, I have forces sufficient to burst it open, and
tread under my feet all that stand in opposition, together with their
alliances; for my force is as the sand upon the sea shore: therefore
here is your wampum; I sling it at you. Child, you talk foolish; you
say this land belongs to you, but there is not the black of my nail
yours. I saw that land sooner than you did, before the Shannoahs and
you were at war; Lead was the man who went down and took possession of
that river. It is my land, and I will have it, let who will stand up
for, or say against it. I will buy and sell with the English
(mockingly). If people will be ruled by me, they may expect kindness,
but not else."
The half king told me he had inquired of the general after two
Englishmen, who were made prisoners, and received this answer:
"Child, you think it a very great hardship that I made prisoners of
those two people at Venango. Don't you concern yourself with it: we
took and carried them to Canada, to get intelligence of what the
English were doing in Virginia."
He informed me that they had built two forts, one on lake Erie, and
another on French creek, near a small lake, about fifteen miles
asunder, and a large wagon road between. They are both built after the
same model, but different in size: that on the lake the largest. He
gave me a plan of them of his own drawing.
The Indians inquired very particularly after their brothers in
Carolina gaol.
They also asked what sort of a boy it was who was taken from the south
branch; for they were told by some Indians, that a party of French
Indians had carried a white boy by Kuskuska town, towards the lakes.
26th. We met in council at the long house about nine o'clock, when I
spoke to them as follows:
"Brothers, I have called you together in council, by order of your
brother the governor of Virginia, to acquaint you, that I am sent with
all possible despatch, to visit and deliver a letter to the French
commandant, of very great importance to your brothers the English; and
I dare say to you, their friends and allies.
"I was desired, brothers, by your brother the governor to call upon
you, the sachems of the nations, to inform you of it, and to ask your
advice and assistance to proceed the nearest and best road to the
French. You see, brothers, I have gotten thus far on my journey.
"His honour likewise desired me to apply to you for some of your young
men to conduct and provide provisions for us on our way; and be a
safeguard against those French Indians who have taken up the hatchet
against us. I have spoken thus particularly to you, brothers, because
his honour our governor treats you as good friends and allies, and
holds you in great esteem. To confirm what I have said, I give you
this string of wampum."
After they had considered for some time on the above discourse, the
half king got up and spoke.
"Now, my brother, in regard to what my brother the governor had
desired of me, I return you this answer.
"I rely upon you as a brother ought to do, as you say we are brothers,
and one people. We shall put heart in hand and speak to our fathers,
the French, concerning the speech they made to me; and you may depend
that we will endeavour to be your guard.
"Brother, as you have asked my advice, I hope you will be ruled by it,
and stay until I can provide a company to go with you. The French
speech belt is not here; I have it to go for to my hunting cabin.
Likewise, the people whom I have ordered in are not yet come, and can
not until the third night from this; until which time, brother, I must
beg you to stay.
"I intend to send the guard of Mingos, Shannoahs, and Delawares, that
our brothers may see the love and loyalty we bear them."
As I had orders to make all possible despatch, and waiting here was
very contrary to my inclination, I thanked him in the most suitable
manner I could; and told him that my business required the greatest
expedition, and would not admit of that delay. He was not well pleased
that I should offer to go before the time he had appointed, and told
me, that he could not consent to our going without a guard, for fear
some accident should befall us, and draw a reflection upon him.
Besides, said he, this is a matter of no small moment, and must not be
entered into without due consideration; for I intend to deliver up the
French speech belt, and make the Shannoahs and Delawares do the same.
And accordingly he gave orders to king Shingiss, who was present, to
attend on Wednesday night with the wampum; and two men of their nation
to be in readiness to set out with us next morning. As I found it was
impossible to get off without affronting them in the most egregious
manner, I consented to stay.
I gave them back a string of wampum which I met with at Mr. Frazier's,
and which they sent with a speech to his honour the governor, to
inform him, that three nations of French Indians, viz. Chippoways,
Ottoways, and Orundaks, had taken up the hatchet against the English;
and desired them to repeat it over again. But this they postponed
doing until they met in full council with the Shannoah and Delaware
chiefs.
27th. Runners were despatched very early for the Shannoah chiefs. The
half king set out himself to fetch the French speech belt from his
hunting cabin.
28th. He returned this evening, and came with Monakatoocha, and two
other sachems to my tent; and begged (as they had complied with his
honour the governor's request, in providing men, &c.) to know on what
business we were going to the French? This was a question I had all
along expected, and had provided as satisfactory answers to as I
could; which allayed their curiosity a little.
Monakatoocha informed me, that an Indian from Venango brought news, a
few days ago, that the French had called all the Mingos, Delawares,
&c. together at that place; and told them that they intended to have
been down the river this fall, but the waters were growing cold, and
the winter advancing, which obliged them to go into quarters; but that
they might assuredly expect them in the spring, with a far greater
number; and desired that they might be quite passive, and not
intermeddle unless they had a mind to draw all their force upon them:
for that they expected to fight the English three years (as they
supposed there would be some attempts made to stop them) in which time
they should conquer. But that if they should prove equally strong,
they and the English would join to cut them all off, and divide the
land between them: that though they had lost their general, and some
few of their soldiers, yet there were men enough to reinforce them,
and make them masters of the Ohio.
This speech, he said, was delivered to them by one Captain Joncaire,
their interpreter in chief, living at Venango, and a man of note in
the army.
29th. The half king and Monakatoocha, came very early and begged me to
stay one day more: for notwithstanding they had used all the diligence
in their power, the Shannoah chiefs had not brought the wampum they
ordered, but would certainly be in to night; if not, they would delay
me no longer, but would send it after us as soon as they arrived. When
I found them so pressing in their request, and knew that returning of
wampum was the abolishing of agreements; and giving this up was
shaking off all dependence upon the French, I consented to stay, as I
believed an offence offered at this crisis, might be attended with
greater ill consequence, than another day's delay. They also informed
me, that Shingiss could not get in his men; and was prevented from
coming himself by his wife's sickness; (I believe, by fear of the
French) but that the wampum of that nation was lodged with Kustalogo,
one of their chiefs, at Venango.
In the evening, late, they came again, and acquainted me that the
Shannoahs were not yet arrived, but that it should not retard the
prosecution of our journey. He delivered in my hearing the speech that
was to be made to the French by Jeskakake, one of their old chiefs,
which was giving up the belt the late commandant had asked for, and
repeating nearly the same speech he himself had done before.
He also delivered a string of wampum to this chief, which was sent by
king Shingiss, to be given to Kustalogo, with orders to repair to the
French, and deliver up the wampum.
He likewise gave a very large string of black and white wampum, which
was to be sent up immediately to the Six Nations, if the French
refused to quit the land at this warning; which was the third and last
time, and was the right of this Jeskakake to deliver.
30th. Last night, the great men assembled at their council house, to
consult further about this journey, and who were to go: the result of
which was, that only three of their chiefs, with one of their best
hunters, should be our convoy. The reason they gave for not sending
more, after what had been proposed at council the 26th, was, that a
greater number might give the French suspicions of some bad design,
and cause them to be treated rudely: but I rather think they could not
get their hunters in.
We set out about nine o'clock with the half king, Jeskakake, White
Thunder, and the Hunter; and travelled on the road to Venango, where
we arrived the fourth of December, without any thing remarkable
happening but a continued series of bad weather.
This is an old Indian town, situated at the mouth of French creek, on
Ohio; and lies near north about sixty miles from the Loggstown, but
more than seventy the way we were obliged to go.