The Government determine to dissolve the Parliament--Apathy of the
Country--Hopes and Fears as to the War--The Congress a Trick--Disraeli
on the approaching Elections--War declared--Mr. Greville resigns the
Clerkship of the Council--Result of the Elections--Mistakes of the
Austrian Government--Policy of the Opposition--Reconciliation of Lord
Palmerston and Lord John Russell--The Reconciliation doubtful--Meeting
of the Liberal Party--Resolution of the Meeting--Debate on the
Resolution of Want of Confidence--Defeat of Ministers--Lord Derby
resigns--Lord Granville sent for by the Queen--Lord Granville does not
form a Government--Lord Palmerston sent for--Lord Palmerston's Second
Administration--The Queen confers the Garter on Lord Derby--Successful
Progress of the French in Italy--Causes of Lord Granville's
Failure--Lord John claims the Foreign Office--Lord Clarendon declines
to take Office--Lord Clarendon's Interview with the Queen--Mr.
Cobden declines to take Office--The Armistice of Villafranca--Peace
concluded--The Terms of Peace--Position of the Pope--Disappointment of
Italy--Conference of the Emperors--Alleged Sensitiveness of the Emperor
Napoleon--Details of the War--A Visit to Ireland--Irish National
Education--Dublin--Howth Castle--Waterford--Killarney--Return from
Ireland--Numerous Cabinets--A Dispute with China--Lord Palmerston and
Lord John Russell--Lord Clarendon at Osborne--Spain and Morocco--The
Duc d'Aumale--Perplexity of the Emperor Napoleon--The Emperor Napoleon
and the 'Times.'
[Sidenote: DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.]
_April 7th_, 1859.--The determination of the Government, announced
in both Houses on Monday evening, took the world by surprise. Nobody
thought there would be a dissolution. Derby's speech was very bad,
much below his usual level. The attack on John Russell which formed
a chief part of it was merely a _réchauffé_ of that of Disraeli, but
very inferior to it in every respect. Disraeli in the other House spoke
much better, and with more taste and temper. The Opposition leaders are
evidently much taken aback; the Derbyites assert that they have reason
to expect a gain of forty votes, but nobody believes it. Many think a
much more Radical and an angry Parliament will be returned, but there
is no excitement, and it seems to me more probable that those are right
who think the relative proportions will not be materially altered. The
Whig chiefs are very angry with John Russell for committing himself as
he did on Monday night by his speech and announcement of his own plan
of Reform. Great attempts were made to dissuade him from doing this,
but he would not listen to reason. Palmerston made a speech clearly
indicative of disagreement with Lord John, though with a semblance of
union. The Resolutions on one side and the Dissolution on the other
have both been great faults, of which the mischievous consequences may
be very serious, but which cannot be made manifest till we see the
result of the election.
_April 15th._--I have been reading over to George Lewis my account
of what took place about the Reform Bill of 1832, to assist him in
reviewing that period of history, and in so doing it is impossible
not to be struck with the contrast between the public excitement
which prevailed then and the apathy and absence of interest which we
witness now. At every general election there is a great deal of bustle,
activity, party zeal, and contention, but there are not more of these
now than on ordinary occasions, if anything less. Both parties are
confident that they shall gain, and the Derbyites are making great
efforts, and have collected a very large sum of money. Derby has given
20,000_l._ to the fund, but candidates are slack in coming forward
with the prospect of the new Parliament not lasting many months. The
question of peace or war is still in abeyance, but inclines rather
towards war; the public securities oscillate like a barometer, and
people are puzzled and unable to form any opinion.
_April 20th._--The long promised statements were made in both Houses
on Monday night, but they told us nothing that was not already known,
and merely expressed hopes that war might still be averted. Disraeli
in the Commons was more sanguine than Malmesbury and Derby in the
Lords. Clarendon and Derby both made excellent speeches, the former
particularly; all he said was sound and true. The most striking thing
in both Houses was the extreme caution and reserve of the speakers on
both sides, and particularly their reticence and forbearance about
France. Not one word of blame of the Emperor of the French; no more
about him, his sayings and doings, than about the Emperor of Russia,
or than if he had had nothing whatever to do with the present state
of things. This was probably politic, but it was lamentable and
disgraceful that we should be obliged, or think ourselves obliged, to
abstain from speaking the truth, for fear of offending this rascally
adventurer, who by the egregious folly and cowardice of the French
nation has been invested with such an awful power of mischief, and whom
neither fear nor shame deters from pursuing his own wicked ends at the
expense of any amount of misery and desolation which he may inflict
upon mankind. One cannot help contrasting the extreme delicacy and
forbearance exhibited towards him with the violence and abuse which
were directed against the Emperor Nicholas in 1854.
[Sidenote: MR. DISRAELI'S EXPECTATIONS.]
I met Disraeli yesterday afternoon, when he told me they had got such
satisfactory news from the Continent that he considered the affair as
virtually settled and the danger at an end. God grant it may be so,
but I am far from being satisfied that the danger is over. On the eve
of great resolutions, and as the moment of taking an irrevocable step
draws near, the actors in great events have generally some misgivings,
and pause upon the brink, and so probably will these quasi-belligerents
do now; but I believe the concessions which France expresses herself
willing to make to our entreaties to be a part of her game. Clarendon
or Derby said that if Cowley had been allowed to work out his purpose
of mediation, probably all would have been settled, and that the
proposition of Russia for a Congress had been mischievous, and only
involved the question in fresh doubt and delay. But it appears evident
that this was a French trick, and that Russia proposed the Congress at
the instigation of France, who sought it for the purpose of delay, and
most likely in order to extract from it a plausible cause of quarrel.
Derby in his speech attributed a great deal to the menacing and
disturbing speech of the King of Sardinia in opening his Chambers, but
nobody said a word of Napoleon's _sortie_ to the Austrian Minister on
the 1st January, nor was any allusion made to various important facts
which were well known to many people in both Houses. No reproaches were
cast upon Sardinia, but a good many upon Austria; no comment made upon
the flagrant breach by Sardinia of the treaties existing between her
and Austria, and of the forbearance of the latter in not making that
breach a _casus belli_, as she might well have done.
I went to a Council on Monday for the prorogation, when I had some
conversation with Disraeli, and asked him what his real belief was as
to their prospects in the election. He said there was so much luck in
these matters that it was difficult to speak positively, but that he
had endeavoured to ascertain the true probabilities of the result,
and his conclusion was that _if they had luck_ they should gain sixty
votes; and what, I asked, if there was no luck on one side or the
other? Then, he said, they should gain forty. I told him the Opposition
calculators did not believe the Government would gain at all, or at
most not above eight or ten, if so many, and asked if he was confident
they should gain from twenty to thirty anyhow. He said from the day
of their taking office they had looked forward to a dissolution, that
their organisation was excellent, they had plenty of candidates and
of money, and he was quite confident they should gain that number and
more; he added that there was in no part of the country the slightest
desire for Reform, and he had altered the address he had first intended
to put forth, in consequence of finding what the prevailing sentiment
was on that question. I suppose they hold this language to justify
their dissolution, for it is difficult to believe they can really
expect such results, or that their opponents, who tell such a different
story, can be so completely mistaken.
_April 24th, Newmarket._--Disraeli's information on Tuesday last, when
I met him at Lady Jersey's, might well have warranted me in believing
that no war would take place, but I have never been able to persuade
myself that this calamity would be averted, and it appears that my
apprehensions were well founded, for now the die seems to be really
cast, and at the moment when I am writing it is probably actually
declared and begun. Though Austria is perfectly justified in declining
to wait any longer while France is maturing her preparations, and
cannot justly be blamed for bringing the affair to a crisis, she is
certain to be exposed to every sort of obloquy and misrepresentations
even in this country, and of course much more in France.
_April 27th._--On Monday we heard that the Austrians had sent their
ultimatum to Sardinia, and there was a complete panic in the City.
Yesterday we were informed that she had given fourteen days' grace
to Sardinia, and everything was up again. But this morning we were
undeceived, and found this latter report had no foundation. Meanwhile
the clamour against Austria has been senseless and disgraceful; nothing
could be more unworthy than Derby's allusion to her in his speech at
the Mansion House dinner on Monday. It was a claptrap, and meant to
obtain popularity and assist the Ministerial interest at the election.
Nothing has ever disgusted me more than to see the readiness with
which everybody finds fault with Austria, and the care with which they
avoid any notice of France, not, however, that this can or will last.
What sort of relations we shall continue to have with France I cannot
imagine. We have been treated in a manner which puts an end to the
possibility of any amicable feelings between the two countries. We
can never trust the Emperor again, and must take measures for our own
security as best we may; but unhappily the Indian war has so materially
diminished our power and absorbed our resources, and France has so
enormously gained upon us in point of naval strength, that we are not
in a condition to hold the language and play the part that befit the
dignity and the honour of the country. We can revile Austria with
impunity, for we know that we are in no danger of an attack from her,
but, on the contrary, that she has so much need of our good will that
she will endure our taunts and reproaches, and not quarrel with us even
in words. It was a prophetic saying of Mackintosh forty years ago at
Roehampton that it remained to be proved whether the acquisition of our
Indian Empire was in reality a gain to us, and we must hope that the
remark will not be illustrated in our days by seeing England herself
placed in danger by her exertions to retain or reconquer India, whose
value is so problematical and of which nothing is certain but the
immense labour and cost of her retention.
[Sidenote: WAR IN ITALY.]
_May 14th._--Another severe fit of the gout, principally in the right
hand, has prevented my writing a line for the last fortnight, during
which war has broken out, and the general election has been begun
and ended, and, what is most important to myself, I have resigned my
office. Hitherto the war and the election have equally disappointed
the expectations they gave rise to. The Austrians committed a blunder
in plunging into the war, and have not taken the only advantage such
a measure seemed to promise, viz. that of overpowering the Sardinians
before the French could join them, and now nobody can make out what
their tactics are, or when and where the contest will begin in earnest.
Meanwhile _we_ are taking an imposing attitude of armed and prepared
neutrality. Disraeli's anticipated sixty votes have dwindled down to a
gain of twenty, but Malmesbury told Cowley that they should have force
sufficient to maintain their ground, which I see their opponents do not
believe.
_May 17th._--The elections are nearly if not quite over, and, as well
as can be collected from the conflicting calculations of the rival
parties, they present a gain of nearly thirty for the Government.
With this they evidently hope and their opponents fear they will be
able to go on at least to the end of the session, and I incline to
think so likewise. Their Government is miserably weak and incapable,
their numbers respectable, but their staff deplorable. It is expected
they will propose to Lord Elgin to take Lytton's place. The general
election has been eminently satisfactory in this, that it has elicited
the completely Conservative spirit of the country. Palmerston, who
predicted that the consequence would be a large increase of Radical
strength, has been altogether mistaken. It may be added (whether this
is a good or an evil) that it has also manifested the indifference of
the country to all parties and to all political ties and connexions. In
the last general election the cry was all for Palmerston, in this there
has been no cry for anybody, neither for Palmerston nor Derby, and less
than all for John Russell or Bright. And yet John Russell is flattering
himself he shall have an opportunity of forming a Government, and talks
of his regret at being obliged to leave out so many of his friends.
It is remarkable that the Catholics have supported the Government,
and that they have done so under orders from Rome. Archbishop Cullen
is there, and has signified to the priests the pleasure of the Pope
that the Derby Government should be supported. Clarendon told me this
yesterday, and that the reason is because they think this Government
more favourably inclined to Austria than any other, especially than
either Palmerston or John Russell would be. The Papal Government have
never forgiven the Whigs for the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and this
accounts for the otherwise strange support given by the Catholics to
those who have always been their bitterest enemies.
The war still languishes, and nobody can make out what the Austrian
plans are. A great sensation has been made by the retirement of Buol
and the appointment of Rechberg. The first report was that it was a
sacrifice made to appease the resentment of Russia, but Clarendon told
me yesterday he did not believe this, but that it was rather to satisfy
some of the German Powers whom Buol had deeply offended. Nothing could
have exceeded the stupid blundering and misconduct of the Austrian
Government during the last few critical weeks, and their want of tact
towards Prussia and the German Powers. The Archduke Albrecht was sent
to Germany for the purpose of stirring up the German Powers, and
professedly to procure such a demonstration as should be the means of
preventing war, and then, while the Archduke was still at Berlin, they
blurted out their ultimatum (which was a declaration of war) without
letting Prussia know what they were about. The Archduke was obliged
to declare his own ignorance of the intentions of his Government, and
Prussia consequently to announce her disapprobation of the measure
and to signify the same to France, which was just what suited the
Emperor Louis Napoleon. I hear also that his departure from Paris was
accelerated by the necessity of repairing as speedily as possible to
the seat of war, in order to quiet the dissensions and quarrels which
were already raging between the French generals. Not a very promising
beginning of the campaign. This used to be the case formerly in the
great Napoleon's time wherever he was not present. His presence
silenced these quarrels, but it remains to be seen whether this man
will have equal authority over unruly subordinates, who cannot possibly
regard him with the same deference with which the old marshals looked
up to their mighty master.
[Sidenote: RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS.]
_May 24th._--The elections are all over, and the Opposition leaders
are already busy in devising the means of attacking the Government. On
Friday Palmerston went to Pembroke Lodge, and had a long conference
with John Russell. On Sunday there was a gathering there, attended
by Granville, George Lewis, Charles Wood, and probably others. The
question immediately to be decided is whether an Amendment shall or
not be moved to the Address. A very nice point of political strategy.
The Whig leaders are impatient to drive the Government to resignation,
without, as I believe, knowing how they are to form a Government likely
to be durable and strong. As matters stand, the Government appear to
be too strong to be driven out, and not strong enough to count upon
staying in. A greater fix can hardly be seen.
_May 26th._--Palmerston and John Russell have now made up all their
differences, and have come to a complete understanding and agreement
on all points, so that the schism may be considered at an end. Upon
Reform, upon foreign policy, upon the mode of opposition, they are
fully agreed, and even upon their respective personal pretensions.
Both are resolved not to quit the House of Commons, and Lord John
himself says that the question of the Primacy must be determined by the
Queen herself, and that whomever she may send for and charge with the
formation of a Government must necessarily be Premier. There is not
much doubt that this will be Palmerston, but what post Lord John would
require for himself I have not heard. It may possibly be the Foreign
Office, which Palmerston could hardly refuse to him, particularly as
they are agreed on foreign policy, and Clarendon is not inclined to
share their opinion. This reconciliation will be very favourable to
Granville's pretensions, and secure to him the lead of the House of
Lords, and not improbably, at some not very distant day, lead to his
being Prime Minister. In this age of political Methuselahs it is an
enormous advantage to be little more than forty years old. This state
of affairs I heard at Brooks's from the Duke of Bedford. It was Lord
John who took the initiative in their approaches to each other. He
wrote to Palmerston, on which Palmerston repaired to Pembroke Lodge,
where they had a long conversation, with the result aforesaid. Soon
afterwards I met Disraeli in the street. He did not appear to me to
be in very high spirits, and talked of the position and chances of
his Government without any expressions of confidence, though without
despondence. He said he hoped that they would move an Amendment to
the Address, as it was better to fight it out at once and bring the
question of strength to a crisis.
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL.]
_May 29th._--It seems not unlikely that the Government may be after all
relieved from the immediate danger of an Amendment by the divisions
amongst the Opposition, or rather between the rival leaders. After
all I was told of the meeting between Palmerston and Lord John, and
the agreement they had come to on all the important points, I was
astonished at hearing on Friday evening that everything was again
thrown into uncertainty because Lord John would not say what he
intended to do. On the important question of who should be Premier he
would make no frank statement. He had, indeed, before said that the
Queen must decide it, and the man she sent for would naturally be at
the head of the Government; but he refused to say whether, supposing
Palmerston to be sent for, he would take office with and under him,
or even whether he would sit in the House of Commons on or behind the
Treasury Bench--in short he would give no clear and positive assurance
of his intentions. This is naturally very disgusting to the Whigs, and
throws everything into doubt and confusion. The Duke of Bedford is to
go down to him and tell him the plain truth, which no one else would
venture to do, pointing out to him the effect of his conduct on the
sentiments of the Liberal party and on his own position, with regard
to which his conduct is indefensible and suicidal. It remains to be
seen whether any effect will be produced on his mind, but in any case
nothing can look more hopeless than it does, or promise worse for the
future. Even though Lord John should consent to act under Palmerston
(and nobody expects that it is Lord John for whom the Queen would
send), there seems little hope of any cordial or lasting union between
them, or of his being satisfied with any position in which he might
consent to place himself, for his mind is evidently in a sour and
jaundiced state. The majority of the Whig and Liberal party who are
come up full of resentment from the elections are certainly desirous
of attacking the Government, but there is a considerable number of
them who are averse to joining in any vote of want of confidence, or
any other move which may turn the Government out without first being
assured that another Government can be formed, and that the union is
sufficiently complete to promise that such new Government would be
strong enough to maintain itself when formed.
_June 6th._--As I was at Epsom every day this week, I have heard
nothing of what has been going on, except the fact that there is to
be a great meeting of the Liberals at Willis's Rooms this afternoon,
called by a list of people which includes Palmerston and Lord John and
Milner Gibson, whose signature betokens the assent of the Radicals to
the object of it, which I conclude to be an agreement as to the attack
to be made on the Government to-morrow, and certain explanations as to
the intentions and sentiments of the Whig leaders. I see that there are
many dissentients from the course that is going to be adopted, many who
think this attempt to oust the Government at once neither patriotic
nor politic. Without any very decided opinion, or the means of forming
one, I am rather inclined to think that it would be better to leave
them alone, and to trust to their furnishing good cause for turning
them out, as they probably will do. The Government does not appear to
be obnoxious to any serious reproach and objection, except about their
mismanagement of foreign affairs. But it is very questionable whether
another Government might not give us a policy equally or still more
mischievous.
_June 7th._--The meeting of the Opposition yesterday at Willis's Rooms
went off as well as they could expect or desire. The two leaders gave
the required assurances that each would serve under the other, in the
event of either being sent for. There was a general concurrence in the
plan of attacking the Government at once, in which even Bright and
Ellice joined, the former disclaiming any desire for office in his own
person, but claiming it for his friends. The result promised is that
with very few exceptions all the opponents or quasi-opponents of the
Government will unite in supporting the vote of want of confidence, and
they are very confident of success. On the other hand, the Derbyites
do not despair of having a majority, and they comfort themselves with
the certainty that the division must be so close, that the successful
Whigs will be able to form no Government which will have a certain
working majority, and, not impossibly, that the majority itself may be
turned into a minority by the events of the re-elections. This is not
very probable, and it is rather more likely that if Palmerston forms
a Government, he will have the support of a good many of those who
will vote with the Government, as long as they remain in. There were,
however, some rather ominous manifestations made at this meeting. It
seemed to be agreed that the new Government should embrace not only
Whigs and Peelites, but 'advanced Liberals,' _i.e._ the followers of
Bright, and this, besides introducing the seeds of disunion, will
probably frighten away the Liberal Conservatives, who would like to
support Palmerston, inasmuch as a Government so formed would afford
little security for the maintenance of Conservative measures. Then
Palmerston in no ambiguous terms announced his pro-Gallican sympathies,
and the neutrality he declared for in every possible case which he
could contemplate, together with his desire for a cordial union with
France, can mean nothing but that under his rule England should look
quietly on while France crushes Austria, and accomplishes all her
ambitious and revolutionary objects. That this policy will be hateful
to many who will be his colleagues cannot be doubted, but what is
doubtful is whether those who will object to it will have virtue and
firmness enough to decline office rather than be parties to such a
policy.
_June 9th._--There is great excitement about this debate and the
probable division, and equal confidence on both sides of a majority.
The Opposition is the favourite, but their friends will not lay any
odds. Everybody says it must be very close, and on either side the
majority will not exceed ten. On the first night Disraeli made a
capital speech, and nobody else on their side would speak at all.
This was a sort of manoeuvre and attempt to bring about a division
that night, for they found out that seventeen of the Opposition had
not taken their seats, which would have secured a majority to the
Government. The Whigs therefore refused to divide, and put up one man
after another to keep the debate open, and eventually obtained an
adjournment. Palmerston's speech was in accordance with his declaration
at Willis's, and with his ancient practice; it was violently
pro-French and anti-Austrian, and it was full of gross falsehoods and
misrepresentations, which he well knew to be such. In his seventy-fifth
year, and playing the last act of his political life, he is just what
he always was.
[Sidenote: RESIGNATION OF LORD DERBY.]
_June 12th._--After a not very remarkable debate, the division
yesterday morning gave a majority of thirteen to the Opposition,
which was more than either side expected.[1] Derby resigned at eleven
o'clock, and the Queen immediately after marked her sense of his
conduct by sending him an extra Garter in an autograph letter. Much
to his own surprise she sent for Granville (and for nobody else) and
charged him with the formation of a Government. What passed between Her
Majesty and him I know not, but he accepted the commission and has been
busy about it ever since. How he is to deal with Palmerston and Lord
John, and to make such a project palatable to them I cannot imagine.
What the Queen has done is a very significant notice to them of her
great reluctance to have either of them at the head of affairs, and it
cannot but be very mortifying to them to be invited to accept office
under a man they have raised from the ranks, and who is young enough to
be son to either, and almost to be grandson of the elder of the two.
Nor will the mortification be less, after they have both so publicly
avowed their expectations that one or other of them must be sent for,
and their having, in what they consider a spirit of self-sacrifice,
consented to serve under each other, but without ever saying or
dreaming that it could be necessary to say they would take office under
any third party. Nobody, indeed, has ever thought of the possibility
of any but one of them being called upon by Her Majesty, and the only
question has been which it would be.
Footnote 1: [The Amendment to the Address, implying a want of
confidence in Ministers, was moved by the Marquis of Hartington. The
votes on the division were: For the amendment 323, against it 310.]
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION.]
_June 13th._--Lord Granville told me yesterday evening what had passed,
and that his mission was at an end, and Palmerston engaged in forming a
Government. The account of it all appears in the 'Times' this morning
quite correctly. Granville was rather disappointed, but took it gaily
enough, and I think he must have been aware from the first of the
extreme difficulty of his forming a Government which was to include
these two old rival statesmen. Palmerston had the wisdom to accede at
once to Granville's proposal, probably foreseeing that nothing would
come of Granville's attempt, and that he would have all the credit of
his complaisance and obtain the prize after all. The transaction has
been a very advantageous one for Granville, and will inevitably lead
sooner or later to his gaining the eminence which he has only just
missed now, which would have been full of difficulties and future
embarrassments at the present time, but will be comparatively easy
hereafter. Lord John's conduct will not serve to ingratiate him with
the Queen, nor increase his popularity with the country.[1]
Footnote 1: [It was the refusal of Lord John Russell to serve under
Lord Granville which rendered the formation of a Cabinet by that
statesman impossible. At the same time Lord John Russell expressed his
willingness to serve under Lord Palmerston on condition of his taking
the department of Foreign Affairs.]
_June 26th._--All the time that the formation of the new Government
was going on I was at a cottage near Windsor for the Ascot races, and
consequently I heard nothing of the secret proceedings connected with
the selection of those who come in, and the exclusion of those who
belonged to Palmerston's last Government, nor have I as yet heard what
passed on the subject.[1] The most remarkable of the exclusions is
Clarendon's, who I was sure, when the Foreign Office was seized by John
Russell, would take nothing else; and of the admissions, Gladstone's,
who has never shown any good will towards Palmerston, and voted with
Derby in the last division. This Government in its composition is
curiously, and may prove fatally, like that which Aberdeen formed in
1852, of a very Peelite complexion, and only with a larger proportion
of Radicals, though not enough, it is said, to satisfy their organs,
and Bright is displeased that he has not been more consulted, and
probably at office not having been more pressed upon him. It is still
very doubtful whether Cobden will accept the place offered to him.
The Tories are full of rancour, and express great confidence that this
Government will not last, and that they shall all be recalled to power
before the end of the year. Derby had a large gathering at Salisbury's
house, when he made them a speech recommending union and moderation,
the first of which recommendations they seem more likely to adopt than
the second. The affair of his Garter was in this wise. On resigning he
wrote to the Queen and besought her to bestow Red Ribands on Malmesbury
and Pakington. She wrote him an answer acceding to his request, and
adding that she could not allow him to retire a second time from
her service without conferring upon him a mark of her sense of his
services, and she therefore desired him to accept the Garter, though
none was vacant. He told me this, and said it was the only way in which
he could have taken it, as he never should have given it to himself,
and I believe if a vacancy had occurred he meant to have given it to
the Duke of Hamilton.
While we have been settling our Government for good or for evil,
the war has continued to pursue its course of uninterrupted success
of the Allies, and unless something almost miraculous should occur,
the Austrian dominion in Italy may be considered as at an end. The
sentiments of people here are of a very mixed and almost contradictory
character, for they are on the whole anti-Austrian, anti-French,
and though more indulgent than they deserve to the Sardinians, not
favourable to them. The most earnest and general desire is that we
should keep out of the _mêlée_, and any termination of the war would be
hailed with gladness, because we should thereby be relieved from our
apprehensions of being involved in it. We should not be sorry to see
the Austrians driven out of Italy for good and all, though most people
would regret that the Emperor Louis Napoleon should be triumphant, and
that such a course of perfidy, falsehood, and selfish ambition should
be crowned with success. The Austrians deserve their fate, for nothing
can exceed the folly of their conduct, first in rushing into the war,
and thereby playing the whole game of their adversaries, and secondly
in placing in command men evidently incapable, and who have committed
nothing but blunders since the first day of the campaign.
Footnote 1: [Lord Palmerston's second Administration consisted of the
following members:--
First Lord of the Treasury Viscount Palmerston
Lord Chancellor Lord Campbell
Lord President Earl Granville
Lord Privy Seal Duke of Argyll
Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. Gladstone
Home Secretary Sir George C. Lewis
Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell
Colonial Secretary Duke of Newcastle
War Secretary Mr. Sidney Herbert
Indian Secretary Sir Charles Wood
Duchy of Lancaster Sir George Grey
Postmaster-General Earl of Elgin
Admiralty Duke of Somerset
Board of Trade Mr. Milner Gibson
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland Earl of Carlisle
Irish Secretary Mr. Cardwell
This Administration lasted until the death of Lord Palmerston on October
18, 1865.]
_June 27th._--Yesterday I went to Kent House, where I found Clarendon
and his sister alone, and we had a long talk, in the course of which he
told me all that had passed (especially with regard to himself) about
the formation of the Government. Although he spoke very good-naturedly
about Granville and his abortive attempt, I saw clearly that he thought
Granville had been in the wrong to undertake it, and that he ought at
once to have told the Queen it was impossible, and have declined it.
Though Palmerston had given a qualified consent to act with him, it
was with evident reluctance, and he had guarded it by saying it must
be subject to his approbation of the way in which the Government was
composed. Lord John's consent was still more qualified, and he annexed
to it a condition which at once put an end to the attempt. This was, as
I had suspected, that he should be leader of the House of Commons. To
this Palmerston refused to agree, and so the whole thing fell to the
ground. Granville, by Clarendon's advice, at once reported his failure
to the Queen, gave her no advice as to whom she should send for, and of
her own accord she sent for Palmerston.
[Sidenote: LORD JOHN RUSSELL FOREIGN MINISTER.]
Previously to this, and I think before the vote, Palmerston and
Clarendon had discussed the probability of Palmerston's forming a
Government, when Palmerston told him he should expect him to return to
the Foreign Office. As soon as Palmerston had been with Her Majesty,
he went off to Pembroke Lodge, and saw Lord John; told him all that
had happened, and that he would of course take any office he pleased.
Lord John said, 'I take the Foreign Office.' Palmerston said he had
contemplated putting Clarendon there again, enumerating his reasons and
Clarendon's claims, but that if he insisted on the Foreign Office as a
right, he must have it. Lord John said, 'I do insist on it,' and so it
was settled.
I ought to have inserted that when Palmerston and Clarendon talked the
matter over at first, Clarendon begged him not to think of him, and
that if, as was probable, John Russell desired the Foreign Office, he
_must_ give it him, for if he did not, or even made any difficulty,
an immediate breach would be the consequence, and John Russell would
get up a case against Palmerston which would be very embarrassing.
Palmerston at first said he should certainly insist on Clarendon's
not being put aside to please Lord John, but in the end Clarendon
persuaded him not to adhere to that resolution. After all was settled
there was a small gathering at Cambridge House, when Palmerston told
Clarendon that he might have the choice of any other office, but
Clarendon replied that he was not conversant with Colonial, Indian,
or War affairs, and he would not take an office for which there would
be many candidates, while he much preferred being out, and Palmerston
would not have half offices enough to satisfy the demands for them.
Palmerston said he would not take this as his last word, and the next
day the Queen sent for Clarendon, by Palmerston's own desire, to try
and persuade him to take office. He went to Buckingham Palace and had
an audience, or rather interview, of three hours with Her Majesty and
the Prince, in which she treated him with the most touching kindness
and confidence, and exhausted all her powers of persuasion to induce
him to join the Government, but he was firm and would not. She then
said, in the event of a vacancy of the Foreign Office, 'You must
promise me you will take it,' to which he replied, 'Your Majesty knows
I would do anything in the world for your service; but you must allow
me, in any case which may occur, to exercise my own discretion under
the circumstances, and to rest assured that I shall in every case be
actuated solely by a desire to do what is best for your Majesty, and
most conducive to your pleasure and interest.' The Queen talked to
Clarendon of the publication in the 'Times' with much indignation, and
said, 'Whom am I to trust? These were my own very words.' Clarendon,
however, endeavoured to convince her that the article had in fact
(however indecorous it might appear) been eminently serviceable to her,
inasmuch as it negatived any suspicion of intrigue or underhand dealing
in any quarter, and represented her own conduct in a manner to excite
universal approbation. He dilated on this in a way which made great
impression both on the Prince and on her, and ultimately satisfied her
that all had been for the best, thereby acting a very good-natured part
and a very wise one.
[Sidenote: MR. COBDEN DECLINES OFFICE.]
_July 4th._--Cobden has declined to take office, though he was advised
by his friends to accept, and he approves of Milner Gibson and Charles
Villiers having joined the Government. The reasons he gives are that
he has always been a strenuous opponent of Palmerston, and that his
conduct will be liable to reproach in taking office under him, that he
has been the advocate of economy and low establishments, and would find
himself obliged to act very inconsistently, or to oppose his colleagues
in a policy respecting which popular opinion would be against him; but
he expresses great satisfaction with Palmerston, who he says is a much
better fellow than he was aware of, and he means to give the Government
all the support in his power. These reasons do not seem sufficient
for his not joining, which he had better have done. Granville laments
Clarendon's having declined to take office as a Secretary of State, and
that he will not be in the Cabinet to throw into the scale of foreign
policy his political weight. I said I knew nothing of his motives,
but assuming that he did not see foreign affairs in the same light as
Palmerston and John Russell, he would be placed in an awkward position
before long. Granville said this might be true, but he thought before
very long he would be at the Foreign Office again. What he meant by
that I do not know.
_July 12th._--On Friday morning the world was electrified by reading
in the 'Times' that an armistice had been agreed upon between the
belligerent Emperors in Italy, and the subsequent announcement that
they were to have a personal meeting yesterday morning, and the
armistice to last for five weeks (till August 15), led to a pretty
general conclusion that peace would be the result.[1] The Stock
Exchange take the same view, for everywhere and in all securities
there has been a great rise. I saw George Lewis on Sunday and asked
him if the Government had any intelligence, when he told me that the
only thing, besides what had appeared in the papers, was that France
had proposed to us to interpose our mediation on the basis of Austria
giving up everything, and Prussia had made the same proposal on the
basis of Austria giving up nothing, both which proposals we had very
naturally declined.
Footnote 1: [The battle of Solferino was fought on June 24, and an
armistice between the Emperors of France and Austria was signed at
Villafranca on July 7.]
[Sidenote: THE ARMISTICE OF VILLAFRANCA.]
_July 13th._--We had scarcely had time to begin discussing and
speculating on the probable results of the armistice, before the news
of peace being actually concluded burst upon us. As yet we have only
the great fact itself and the skeleton of the arrangement, and we
shall probably be for some time without materials for judging as to
the merits of the Treaty of Peace and its probable consequences, but
the first impressions and the first ideas that present themselves may
be worth recording. There is no denying that the Emperor Napoleon has
played a magnificent part, and whatever we may think of his conduct,
and the springs of his actions, he appears before the world as a very
great character.[1] Though he can lay no claim to the genius and
intellectual powers of the first Napoleon, he is a wiser and a soberer
man, with a command over himself and a power of self-restraint, and
consequently of moderation in pursuit of objects, which the other did
not possess, and therefore while the towering genius of the uncle led
him on through magnificent achievements and stupendous vicissitudes
to his ruin, it appears highly probable that the better regulated
mind and the habitual prudence of the nephew will preserve him from
the commission of similar errors, and render his career somewhat less
splendid, but more durable and infinitely more beneficial to his
country.
With regard to the present affair, the first thing we must be struck
with is the way in which the King of Sardinia has been treated.
Napoleon, indeed, tosses him a large share of the spoils, but not
only was he not admitted to the Conference which led to peace, but he
does not appear to have been consulted upon it any more than any of
the French generals; the only notice that was taken of the King (so
far as we know) being that he was ordered, upon the conclusion of the
armistice, to desist from the siege of Peschiera. I had heard before
that the Emperor was extremely disgusted with his ally and Cavour,
and at all that the latter had said and done, at the proclamations
and other documents he had put forth, and at the audacious manner
in which that Government had annexed every scrap of territory they
could lay their hands on, and assumed the government of every State
that they could manage to revolutionise, and all without the sanction
and concurrence of the Emperor. Nothing is more likely than that the
Italian War will not be closed without much bickering and heartburning
between the two allies, and that the King and his Cavour will find, in
spite of all they are to obtain, that they will have no bed of roses to
repose upon after their fatigues and labours.[2]
Then, so far as we can judge of the settlement, it seems one that
is likely to give more offence and disappointment than satisfaction
to the bulk of the Italian people, and to imagine that affairs will
relapse or resolve themselves into a peaceable and quiescent state is
a mere delusion. What passed between the two Emperors we may perhaps
never know, though the effects of their interview may one day become
dangerously apparent; but it is not unreasonable to conjecture that
Napoleon exerted all his arts and blandishments to make a friend of
Francis Joseph, and to persuade him that a cordial alliance with France
would be more advantageous to him than one with England, and he might
with every appearance and much of the reality of truth tell him that
England had done nothing for him; that neither the Government nor the
nation had any sympathies with Austria, whom, so far from assisting,
they had gladly seen defeated in Italy; and that the forbearance of the
Emperor in leaving Austria in possession of any part of Italy would be
unpalateable to Palmerston and John Russell, and generally unpopular.
One cannot but suspect that an alliance was at least projected, if
not formed, between the three great despotic Powers, France, Austria,
and Russia, for the purpose of domineering over Europe, and dealing
with the several States according to their pleasure, or the pleasure
of France, and with the ultimate object of attacking, weakening, and
humbling England.
[Sidenote: THE CONFERENCE OF THE EMPERORS.]
Of all the provisions of this Treaty that which regards the sovereignty
of the Pope is the most curious and seems the most difficult to carry
out; it is indicative of the necessity under which the Emperor thinks
he is placed of disarming the hostility and consulting the prejudices
of the Catholic party and the Church in France. Whether the Pope
will accept the temporal office assigned to him may be doubted, but
it can hardly be doubted that his supremacy will not be willingly
accepted and acknowledged by the Italians generally, to whom the
Papal rule is already odious.[3] One cannot but feel glad at the deep
mortification and disappointment which will overtake the Republicans
and Socialists, the Mazzinis, Garibaldis, Kossuths, _et hoc genus
omne_, at a pacification so ruinous to all their hopes and designs.
Clarendon told me he believed the account in the 'Times' of the compact
between the Emperor and Kossuth, and nothing is more likely than that
at the beginning of the contest he employed Kossuth in the way stated,
and gave him all sorts of promises, and when he found he could do
everything _sine tali auxilio_, and that he had a stronger interest in
making friends with Austria, he threw Kossuth over without scruple or
hesitation. This is exactly the course he would be likely to follow.[4]
Footnote 1: [The conclusion of the peace after the battle of Solferino
was creditable to the Emperor Napoleon, but was no indication of
a great character. His motives were that he had not the means of
undertaking a siege of the great fortresses of the Quadrilateral,
and that if the war had been prolonged it was not improbable that
the forces of the Germanic Confederation, including Prussia, would
have taken the field against France. He therefore acted wisely in
terminating the war, and if the Austrians had withdrawn within the
Quadrilateral and refused to treat, the Emperor Napoleon might have
been placed in great difficulties. As it was, he broke his engagement
to Cavour to liberate Italy from the Alps to the sea, and to Kossuth to
support a Hungarian insurrection. Italy eventually owed the liberation
of Venice, not to France, but to Prussia, as the reward for her
combined action with that Power in the war of 1866.
Cf. the account of the manner in which the peace was concluded in Lord
Malmesbury's 'Autobiography,' vol. ii p. 200.]
Footnote 2: [M. de Cavour bitterly resented the prompt conclusion of
peace, and for a time quitted the Ministry of which he was the head.]
Footnote 3: [It was proposed by the Sovereigns to place the Pope at the
head of an Italian Confederation--a wild scheme, which entirely failed.]
Footnote 4: [This was so. The details of Kossuth's negotiations with
the Emperor have been published by Kossuth himself in his memoirs.]
_July 15th._--The news of the peace took everybody so much by surprise,
that people had no time to arrange their thoughts upon it; but in the
midst of the general satisfaction that the war is over, it is already
apparent that there is an explosion of disappointment and resentment to
come. All the Italian sympathisers here are in despair, Palmerston is
much dissatisfied, and the anti-Austrian Press is indignant. The King
of Sardinia has not openly testified any ill-humour, and has published
an Address to his new Lombard subjects in a joyful style, but it is
impossible he should not deeply feel and resent the contemptuous way in
which he has been treated by his Imperial ally, and the resignation of
Cavour is a clear manifestation of _his_ feelings on the subject.
When it was announced that an interview was to take place between the
two Emperors, everybody predicted that the elder of the two would have
as much success in diplomacy over his rival as he had already obtained
in arms, but the result does not appear to bear out that expectation,
though we do not yet know what the real motives of the Emperor Napoleon
were in concluding such an extraordinary peace. Granville told me that
at this interview the Austrian Emperor had taken a very high line, and
shown little disposition to concession. He said to Napoleon, 'You have
conquered Lombardy, and I do not contemplate making any attempt to
recover it. I am therefore quite ready to cede it to _you_, and _you_
will deal with it as you please. I have nothing to say to the King of
Sardinia, and make no concessions to him. With regard to Venetia, and
the country of which I remain in possession, I have nothing to concede
or to offer, _all that_ I mean to retain, but I have no objection to
my Venetian dominions forming part of the Italian Confederation.' They
appear to have had a vast deal of conversation and discussion, for they
are said to have been together for above twelve hours. What they talked
about it would be interesting to know, but which they will neither of
them tell us. The field for speculation is as wide as can well be. How
the settlement of Italy is to be accomplished, how the Italians are
to be contented, and how peace in that country is to be permanently
secured, are questions enough to puzzle the acutest politicians.
We congratulate ourselves at having kept entirely clear both of the
war and the peace, but no doubt Palmerston is mortified, and I think
England generally will be provoked that changes of such importance
should have been made without any consultation or even communication
with us.
The friends of the Emperor Napoleon say that they believe his motive
for making peace on any terms he could get to have been principally
that he was so shocked and disgusted at the fearful scenes of pain and
misery that he had to behold after the battle of Solferino in addition
to the other battle-fields, and at the spectacle of thousands of killed
and wounded presented to his eyes, that his nerves could not bear it.
Lady Cowley told me that he was so tenderhearted that he could not bear
the sight of pain, much less being the cause of inflicting it, and she
had seen him quite upset after visiting hospitals at the sufferings
he had witnessed there, which of course are not to be compared with
the horrible scene of a battle-field. It is impossible to say that
this may not be true wholly or in part, it is impossible to account
for human idiosyncrasies; but it is quite certain that the man who
is said to shrink with horror from the sight of suffering does not
scruple to inflict it in quite as bad a form when he does not himself
witness the infliction. He has hundreds and thousands of people torn
from their families, and without form of trial or the commission of any
crime sends them to linger or perish in pestilential climates, when he
fancies it his interest to do so, and for _their_ sufferings he evinces
no pity or any nervous sensations.
_August 7th._--I have found it impossible to collect anything to
record in this book for the last month almost. The session is drawing
to a close, having glided on without difficulty for the Government,
and almost without opposition. The Election Committees have made
great havoc in Palmerston's small majority, having unseated no less
than seven Liberal members. I am told, perhaps on no good authority,
that Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone are anxious to join in a
Congress to mix themselves up in the settlement of Italian affairs,
but that they cannot have their way, the majority of the Cabinet being
opposed to it, and the House of Commons and the country (as represented
by the Press) being decidedly against any such interference.[1]
[Sidenote: THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.]
I met Edward Mildmay the other day, who gave me some account of his
own personal experiences during the last Italian campaign, when he was
attached to the Austrian Army. He confirmed all previous accounts of
the excellence of that army and the incompetency of its chiefs; that
nothing could have saved the French Army at Magenta if the Austrians
had been tolerably commanded; that Giulai, who had never seen any
service, had been allowed to retain the command by the influence of
General Grünne, whose friend he is, and that the indignation and
disgust of the army at having been thus sacrificed to Court favour and
partiality had been extreme. He told me that at Solferino the Austrian
loss was (within a fraction of) 20,000, the French 19,000, and the
Sardinians 9,000 men; Benedek is the ablest of the Austrian generals,
and if he had had the command probably affairs would have taken a very
different turn. Mildmay has no doubt that peace was much more necessary
to the French than to the Austrians, and he still believes that if the
war had continued the tide of victory would have been rolled back, as
the latter had 90,000 fresh troops coming into line. It is probably
better as it is than if the Austrians had recovered all their losses;
the Emperor Napoleon seems likely to be satisfied with his military
exploits, and to be really intending to revert to his peaceful policy.
He is certainly doing all he can to persuade the world that such is his
intention, and there seems a disposition here to take him at his word.
Footnote 1: [I think it was at this time that Lord Palmerston and
Lord John Russell proposed to the Cabinet that England should enter
into a Treaty of Alliance with France and Sardinia, but the proposal
was negatived by their colleagues. The feelings of these Ministers,
however, speedily changed when the cession of Savoy and Nice, and the
manner in which it was brought about, were known, and their language
became so hostile that it gave great offence to the Emperor Napoleon.
See Lord Malmesbury, 'Autobiography,' vol. ii. p. 225.]
_Viceregal Lodge, Phoenix Park, August 22nd._--I have at last
accomplished the object I have desired for so many years, and find
myself in Ireland. I have seized the first opportunity of being my
own master to come here. I left London the week before last, and went
to Nun Appleton, thence to Grimstone, and on Saturday I came here,
railing through York and Manchester to Holyhead; crossed over on a
beautiful evening, with sea as smooth as glass, but it was too dark
to see the Bay of Dublin. Most hospitably received by Lord Carlisle,
and very comfortably lodged. Passed the day in Dublin yesterday; twice
at church, in the morning at Christ Church, afternoon St. Patrick's,
attracted by the celebrity of the choir and the performance of the
cathedral service, which was finely done, though the best voices (three
brothers Robinson) were absent. I am greatly struck by the fineness of
the town of Dublin, and of the public buildings especially.
[Sidenote: EDUCATION IN IRELAND.]
_Dublin, August 23rd._--On Monday morning the Lord-Lieutenant went to
pay his first visit since his return to the National School and took me
with him. I was much gratified at the sight, and with the appearance
of the children and their intelligence. There was a grand gathering
of Commissioners and others to meet Carlisle, but no Catholics except
Lord Bellew and Dean ----, who alone of all the Catholic ecclesiastics
has had courage and resolution to adhere to the system. Not one
Catholic Bishop now remains on the board. Bishop Denver was the last
to resign, which it is believed he did reluctantly, but it seems that
the rule of their Synod is, that when a majority has decided, those who
are in the minority give in their adhesions, and produce unanimity.
The National System is apparently in the crisis of its fate, and a
desperate struggle is being made by the Popish clergy to destroy it,
while the ultra-Protestants will join them (for different reasons
and with different objects) for the same end. I earnestly hope these
factions will fail. The most encouraging circumstance is found in the
return which was given me of the 'Central Model Schools,' in which the
number of pupils seeking admission is 1,179, an evident proof of the
popularity of the system, and that up to this time the priests have
not been able to deter their flocks from giving their children its
benefits. This return is sufficiently interesting to be copied into
this journal:--
Males Females Infants
Number of pupils on roll 564 447 375
Pupils in attendance 436 348 311
Seeking admission 203 866 110
Carlisle was received with great enthusiasm by both pupils and
teachers. After this we went to the Hill of Killinie, whence there is a
grand panoramic view of the Bay of Dublin and the surrounding country,
and then to my old friend Lady Campbell[1] (Pamela Fitz-Gerald), whose
beautiful daughters are as well worth seeing as anything in Ireland.
Footnote 1: [Lady Campbell was the daughter of Pamela and Lord Edward
Fitz-Gerald.]
_Dublin, August 24th._--Yesterday in the morning a review in the
Phoenix Park, after which Bagot took me to Howth Castle, which I was
curious to see, but it is not very remarkable, though very ancient. It
has a modernised appearance, and is a comfortable house, said to be the
oldest _inhabited_ house in Ireland, and one of the towers of fabulous
antiquity. I remarked that the hall door was left open, according to
the traditional obligation. One of the Ladies St. Lawrence told me the
story as follows: An old woman, 'the Granawhile,' came to the castle
and asked for hospitality or alms, and was refused and driven away. She
was the wife of a pirate. On the seaside she found the young heir with
his nurse, whom she seized and carried off. Afterwards she brought the
boy back, and consented to restore him on condition that henceforward
no beggar should be refused admittance, that the hall door should be
kept continually open, and that at dinner a place should be kept and
a plate laid for any stranger who might appear. The beggars are kept
away by not being admitted through the lodge gates; the hall door is
open, but there is another door behind it, and the vacant place has by
degrees fallen into disuse. I know not how old the story is, but there
is enough to show that it had a foundation of some sort, and that it
retains a relic in the customs of the family. On returning to Dublin
I went to see Trinity College, and the beautiful museum erected a few
years ago. Dublin is, for its size, a finer town than London, and I
think they beat us hollow in their public buildings. We have no such
squares as Merrion Square, nor such a street as Sackville Street.
[Sidenote: VISIT TO IRELAND.]
_Bessborough, August 26th._--I came here on Wednesday viâ Kilkenny.
A very nice place, comfortable, and in as good order as any place
in England. People apparently well off, and cottages clean and not
uncomfortable.
_August 28th._--Went yesterday to Waterford; pretty good town, but
looking very foreign. They showed me a hill, to which it is said
Cromwell advanced, but found the town too strong to be attacked; hence
Waterford has been called the _Urbs invicta_. I doubt the story, for he
would have stormed Waterford easily enough if he had chosen. Saw the
National School; a very good establishment, boys absent on holidays,
but a very civil intelligent master, a Roman Catholic. The clergy
of neither persuasion will come near the school, except the Dean of
Waterford, who still supports it. Went on to Curraghmore, a vast and
magnificent park, but a mean house.
_August 31st._--Went on Tuesday to Woodstock; very pretty place, and in
admirable trim. Weather changing, and I fear I shall see Killarney in
rain and cold.
_Viceregal Lodge, September 6th._--Went to Muckrosson Thursday last;
passed three days there in exquisite enjoyment of the beautiful scenery
of Killarney; weather was perfect, and I went over and round all the
lakes; returned here on Monday, and went yesterday to the Curragh.
_Jervaulx Abbey, Sunday, September 11th._--Crossed over from Kingstown
to Holyhead on Thursday last; beautiful passage. Passed the last day,
Wednesday, in Dublin with William Fitzgerald seeing the town. He took
me over the old Leinster House, now the Royal Institution, and then
to the Bank to see the old House of Lords; a fine room, exactly as it
was, and what was the House of Commons, now completely altered and not
retaining a vestige of the famous locality where Flood and Grattan
and Plunket once shook the walls with their eloquence. I left Ireland
with regret, for I spent several very happy days there, interested and
amused even more than I expected, and treated with great kindness and
hospitality. Went from Holyhead to Manchester, and on to Worsley to
sleep; came here on Friday. The old Abbey is very picturesque, and very
perfect as a ruin. It reminds me, place and all, of Bolton Abbey.
_London, September 26th._--I stayed three days at Jervaulx, then
to Doncaster, Bretby, and to town. All the Ministers in London,
having passed their lives during the last fortnight in the railway
or in Cabinets, which have been very numerous, as well they may,
for they have plenty to occupy them in the Italian, Chinese, and
American questions, all, in their several ways and degrees, extremely
embarrassing. I have not the slightest conception what our Government
are doing about the Italian question, but I suppose trying to keep well
with Napoleon III., and to obtain good terms for the Italian Duchies.
At present it looks as if a Congress would be got together to untie
this complicated knot, but I fear we are not likely to play in it a
part which will be consistent with our principles, or creditable to our
national character, and I wish we could abstain from having anything to
do with it. The incident about the American Boundary is awkward, but I
feel confident it will be amicably settled.
[Sidenote: DISPUTES WITH CHINA.]
The Chinese affair is the most serious, and one can see no solution of
it that is not full of objections and embarrassments.[1] In the first
place it looks at present very much as if our case was a bad one. We
had no business to go with an armament and force our way up the river,
and even if we were upon any ground justified in such an extreme
measure, it was to the last degree impolitic and unwise to exercise
such a right. The object for which Bruce was sent to China was to
conclude a peace, and to establish amicable relations with the Chinese
Government, and it might have occurred to him that the employment of
force, even if it was ever so successful, must infallibly defeat his
object. It required no great sagacity to perceive that the arrival at
Pekin of a victorious Ambassador, who had forced his way to the capital
at the head of an imposing force, would not serve to make his reception
a friendly one, or to establish permanent harmonious relations between
the English and the Chinese Governments. As long as there was a
possibility of procuring access to Pekin by peaceful means and by
negotiation, it would have been better to be patient and to wait any
time than to employ force; and besides the political objections that
seem conclusive against the adoption of such a course, it seems highly
probable that no such force as that which we employed on this occasion
could have been pushed on into the heart of the country without
imminent danger of its being cut off and eventually destroyed. The
mere fact of destroying again the Peiho forts would be deemed by the
Chinese as the renewal of the war, and the perpetrator of the outrage
would not have been received in the sacred character of an Ambassador,
but would have been looked on as an invader, and treated accordingly.
This is the first view of the question which presents itself. Then
comes that of vindicating our honour, and retrieving the disaster we
have suffered, which involves the necessity of rushing into war again
and scattering havoc and desolation through the country, massacring
thousands of people who can make no effectual resistance to our power,
and making territorial conquests, which will only embarrass us, and
which we shall have more difficulty in getting rid of than we shall
have in making their acquisition. In short, we are going to be engaged
in a contest in which failure will be disgraceful, and success will be
inconvenient, and to place additional obstacles in the way of that good
understanding which it is so much our interest to establish with China.
Nor are our difficulties diminished by the fact of being connected
with, and therefore more or less dependent on the French, and in a less
degree with the Russians and the Americans in this unfortunate contest.
This local and accidental alliance impairs our freedom of action, and
of necessity introduces delays and complications of all sorts into the
affair.
Footnote 1: [Mr. Bruce having been detained in his mission to Pekin,
which was of a pacific character, Admiral Hope made an attempt to
force the passage by reducing the forts at the mouth of the Peiho. The
attack failed, with a loss of nearly 400 men killed and wounded in
the storming party and the gunboats. The 'Plover' and 'Lee' gunboats
grounded, and the 'Cormorant' was so damaged by the enemy's fire that
she sank soon afterwards. The whole proceeding was injudicious and
disastrous.]
_October 19th._--Nearly a month and nothing to record, besides the
events of the day, of which I know nothing more than the newspapers
report. I only take up my pen now because Clarendon called on me,
and it is worth while to recollect the little he told me during a
very short visit. I had not seen him since his visit to Osborne in
the summer, and he began by giving me an account of it. The Queen
was delighted to have him with her again and to have a good long
confidential talk with him, for it seems she finds less satisfaction
in her intercourse with either Palmerston or Lord John. The relations
of these two are now most intimate and complete, and Palmerston has
obtained an entire influence and authority over Lord John, who only
sees with his eyes and without any contest submits to be entirely
guided and controlled by Palmerston. The _jeu_ of the thing is rather
amusing. Palmerston, who is thoroughly versed in foreign affairs
(while Lord John knows very little about them), in every important
case suggests to Lord John what to do. Lord John brings it before the
Cabinet as his own idea, and then Palmerston supports him, as if the
case was new to him.
But to return to the Queen and Clarendon. He was unfortunately attacked
by gout and confined to his room. He was sitting there with Lady
Clarendon, when Lady Gainsborough came in and told him that she was
desired by the Queen to beg he would if possible move into the next
room (the Lady-in-waiting's room) and establish himself there; that the
Queen would come in, when all the ladies present were to go away and
leave her _tête-à-tête_ with him. All this was done, and she remained
there an hour and a half, talking over everything, pouring all her
confidences into his ears, and asking for his advice about everything.
He said he had endeavoured to do as much good as he could by smoothing
down her irritation about things she did not like. As an example, he
mentioned that while the Prince was with him a box was brought in with
a despatch from Lord John, which the Prince was to read. He did so with
strong marks of displeasure, and then read it to Clarendon, saying
they could not approve it, and must return it to Lord John. Clarendon
begged him not to do this, that it was not the way to deal with him,
and it would be better to see what it contained that really was good
and proper, and to suggest emendations as to the rest. He persuaded the
Prince to do this, advised him what to say, and in the end Lord John
adopted all the suggestions they had made to him. On another occasion
the Queen had received a very touching letter from the Duchess of Parma
imploring her protection and good offices, which she sent to Lord John
desiring he would write an answer for her to make to it. He sent a very
short, cold answer, which the Queen would not send. She asked Clarendon
to write a suitable one for her, which he did, but insisted that she
should send it to Lord John as her own. She did so, Lord John approved,
and so this matter was settled.
[Sidenote: WAR BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO.]
_Newmarket, October 21st._--Clarendon told me, and has since written
to me, that Government regard in a very serious light the approaching
war between Spain and Morocco, which they think will have the effect
of putting Gibraltar in peril;[1] that Spain is playing the part of
catspaw to France, who wants to get possession of Morocco, giving
Tangier to Spain, which would give her, and France through her, the
command of both sides the Straits, and as we depend upon Tangier for
supplies to Gibraltar, it would be difficult for us to hold the place
when this scheme is accomplished. He writes to-day: 'No news to-day
except that things look very fishy with Spain and Morocco, and I
suspect we are going to be vigorous, which, though it may be expedient,
may also be productive of much trouble.'
He was lately at Broadlands, and had much talk with Palmerston, who
was very friendly and confidential, told him everything, and appeared
very anxious to have his opinions and advice. He says that Palmerston's
hatred of Austria amounted to a monomania, and this of course produces
a divergence between the present policy of France and ours. He talked
about America. When Clarendon was lately at Clumber he discussed that
affair with the Duke of Newcastle and offered to write to Buchanan,
with whom it seems he is in correspondence, and say to him what it
is desirable should be said, unofficially; and he suggested that he
should hold out to Buchanan the prospect of a visit from the Prince of
Wales, who it seems is going to Canada some time or other. This the
Duke mentioned at the Cabinet, where the proposal was highly approved,
but when it was broached to the Queen, Her Majesty objected to anything
being said about the Prince of Wales going to the United States, so it
fell to the ground.[2]
Footnote 1: [On October 22, Spain declared war on Morocco, on the
ground that further territory was required for the protection of her
settlements on the North African coast. Tetuan was captured by the
Spaniards on February 4, 1860, and peace was signed on April 27, the
Emperor of Morocco paying an indemnity of twenty million piastres.
Marshal O'Donnell, who had commanded the expedition, was created Duke
of Tetuan.]
Footnote 2: [Whatever may have been the objection to the mention of
the Prince of Wales's visit to the United States at this moment, the
project did not fall to the ground, for on July 9 in the following year
(1860) the Prince started on a visit to Canada and the United States,
accompanied by the Duke of Newcastle, where he was entertained by
President Buchanan on October 25.]
[Sidenote: EMPEROR NAPOLEON ON ITALY.]
_London, October 30th._--Clarendon came to town yesterday morning on
his way to Windsor and called here. He told me that we were going to
send a representative to the Congress, and I was not a little surprised
to perceive that he would not be at all disinclined to go there
himself. He did not indeed say so, but unless I am greatly deceived
this is in his mind, though not without feeling the difficulty of
his acting with John Russell. Clarendon says that the preparations
going on in France are on the most enormous scale, and can have no
object but one hostile to this country, and that the feeling against
England is fomented by the Government and extending all over France.
He is persuaded that the fixed purpose of Louis Napoleon is to humble
this country, and deprive her of the great influence and authority
she has hitherto exercised over the affairs of Europe. He is bent
upon getting us to take part in the Congress, and that in order to
persuade us he will pretend to be entirely agreed with us in opinion,
and only wishing to concert the most proper means of carrying out our
common objects, and when he has thus cajoled us into a participation
he will throw us over, and place us under the necessity of agreeing to
what we disapprove, or of putting ourselves _en désaccord_ with all
Europe. He told me that John Russell is supposed on the Continent to
be the implacable enemy of the Catholic religion, and this will be a
great disqualification for his acting at a Congress mainly composed
of Catholic Powers; that this opinion, which is rife in Ireland, is
propagated all over the world, and that the recollections of the Durham
Letter and the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill are still as strong as
ever.[1]
Footnote 1: [The Congress which it was proposed to hold had reference
to the affairs of Italy, which were extremely perplexing to the
Emperor Napoleon himself. But Lord Clarendon's apprehensions were
certainly unfounded, for it deserves to be remarked that about this
time negotiations were opened between the Emperor and Mr. Cobden
for a commercial treaty, which was intended to strengthen, and did
strengthen, the amiable and pacific relations of France and England.]
_November 18th._--- Last week at the Grove to meet the Duc d'Aumale,
who is one of the most enlightened and agreeable Princes I ever met,
very simple and natural, and full of information and knowledge of all
sorts.
I do not remember to have gathered anything particularly interesting
from Clarendon in our various conversations, except that in the event
of our consenting to join the Congress he would not be unwilling to go
to it, and that he thinks he might be able to effect an arrangement.
This confidence has in great measure been produced by a letter from
Cowley which he showed me, containing an account of his visit to
Biarritz and his communications with the Emperor. He said he had
resolved not to say a word to His Majesty of Italian affairs, thinking
the Emperor would abstain from talking of them to him, but as soon as
they met he began to talk, and went at length into the whole subject.
The upshot was that he found the Emperor in such a state of perplexity
and embarrassment, and so fully conscious of the scrape into which he
had got himself, that he did not know what to do or which way to turn;
his object evidently is to get us to help him out of his difficulty,
and Clarendon thinks that he should be able to draw him into such
measures as we could support if the matter was well managed.
A day or two ago the Duke of Bedford, whom I have not seen or
communicated with for a long time, called on me. He told me one curious
anecdote, which he had heard from his brother. Persigny called on Lord
John one day, and told him he was come in strict confidence to show him
the letter which the Emperor had written to the King of Sardinia, but
which he must not mention even to his own colleagues, except of course
to Palmerston. Lord John promised he would not, and a day or two after
he read the letter in the 'Times.' He sent for Persigny and asked for
an explanation. Persigny said he could not explain it, but would write
to Walewski. John Russell also wrote to Cowley, who spoke to Walewski
about it. Walewski declared he could not account for it, and that it
must have been sent from Turin, and he would write to that Court to
complain of the indiscretion and would also speak to the Emperor. He
went to the Emperor, told him what had passed, and showed him what he
proposed to write to Turin, when the Emperor said: 'No, don't write
at all, take no notice of the publication. The fact is, I sent the
letter myself to the "Times" Correspondent.' It was Mocquard who took
it to him. A most extraordinary proceeding, and showing the extreme
difficulty of all diplomatic dealing between the two Governments.
The Emperor is by way of being indignant with the 'Times,' and never
fails to pour forth complaints and abuse of the paper to whomever he
converses with. He did so, for instance, to Cobden, to whom he gave
an audience at Paris. But who can tell whether this is not a pretence
and a deceit, and whether he may not all the time have a secret
understanding with the 'Times'? Such a supposition would seem to be
inconsistent with their articles and his conduct, and the comments of
the former upon the latter; but how difficult it is to form any certain
judgement upon a policy so tortuous as his, and upon designs so close
and councils so crooked!