Prospects of the Government and of the Opposition--Mr. Disraeli's
commanding Position--Preparation of a Reform Bill--A Congress--Death
of Macaulay--The Affairs of Italy--Policy of the Emperor Napoleon--The
Commercial Treaty with France--M. de Cavour resumes Office--Opening
of Parliament--Negotiation of the Commercial Treaty--The Emperor
a Free Trader--Perplexity of Italian Affairs--Moderation of Lord
Derby--Opposition to the Commercial Treaty--The Reform Bill of
1860--Tory Opposition to Reform--Mr. Gladstone's great Budget
Speech--Opposition to the Treaty and the Budget--Triumph of Mr.
Gladstone--The Italian Correspondence--Democratic Opinions of Mr.
Gladstone--Introduction of the Reform Bill--The Annexation of Savoy
and Nice--Annexation of Tuscany to Piedmont--The Dénouement of the
Plot--Complete Apathy of the Country as to Reform--Lord Derby declines
to interfere--Lord John's adverse Declaration to France--Consequences
of Lord John's Speech against France--Our Position in Europe--Anecdote
of the Crimean War--Designs of the Emperor Napoleon in 1858--Lord
Palmerston's Distrust of Napoleon III.--Lord John's Indifference
to his own Reform Bill--Mr. Gladstone's Ascendency--Designs of the
Emperor and Cavour--Unpopularity of the Reform Bill--Correspondence
of Lord Grey and Lord John Russell--Reaction against Mr. Gladstone's
Measures--Opposition to the Repeal of the Paper Duties--Coolness with
France--Garibaldi's Expedition--Lord Palmerston attacks the Neapolitan
Minister--The Paper Duties Bill rejected by the Lords--The Reform
Bill withdrawn--Lord Palmerston adjusts the Difference between the
two Houses--Mr. Gladstone supported by the Radicals--Mr. Senior's
Conversations in Paris--A Letter from the Speaker--Mr. Cobden's Faith
in the Emperor Napoleon--Conclusion of these Journals.
[Sidenote: THE APPROACHING SESSION.]
_London, December 25th_, 1859.--The Government are getting ready
for the session which is near at hand, Palmerston with his usual
confidence, but Granville, who is not naturally desponding, and who
I dare say represents the feeling of his colleagues, is conscious of
the want of that strength and security which a commanding majority
alone can give, and, without thinking the danger great or imminent,
anticipates the possibility of their being defeated on some vital
question. The Opposition, conscious of their numerical force, but
anything but united, profess the most moderate views and intentions.
Derby professed at Liverpool to have no wish to turn out the Government
or to come into office himself. Disraeli himself told me that he and
all his party desired the Reform question to be settled quietly, and
that if the Government only offered them such a Bill as they could
possibly accept, they should be ready to give them every assistance
in carrying it through. Since this, Walpole has made a formal
communication to Granville (through Henry Lennox) of his and Henley's
disposition to the above mentioned end. We are told, moreover, that a
great number of the Conservative party will not only support a fair
and moderate Reform Bill, but support the Government generally, not
so much, however, from wishing well to the Government as from their
antipathy to Disraeli and their reluctance to see _him_ in power again.
That they will join in carrying through a safe and moderate Reform Bill
is no doubt true, but it is not probable that the division amongst them
and the hostility to Disraeli will last long, or continue a moment
after the appearance of any prospect of the return of the Conservative
party to power.
Disraeli raised himself immensely last year, more, perhaps, with
his opponents and the House of Commons generally than with his own
party, but it is universally acknowledged that he led the House with
a tact, judgement, and ability of which he was not before thought
capable. While he has thus risen, no rival has sprung up to dispute
his pre-eminence. Walpole and Henley are null, and it is evident that
the party cannot do without Disraeli, and whenever Parliament meets he
will find means of reconciling them to a necessity of which none of
them can be unconscious, and I have no doubt that whenever any good
opportunities for showing fight may occur the whole party will be found
united under Disraeli's orders.
With regard to the Reform Bill, it is being proposed by a large
committee of the Cabinet, but George Lewis has the chief management
of it. The state of public opinion admits, indeed compels, the utmost
moderation, but hitherto the anticipated difficulty has been the sort
of pledge which John Russell foolishly gave last year with reference to
the franchise, to which it has been supposed he must consider himself
bound. But there is reason to believe that he is not taking any active
part in the concoction of this Bill, probably on account of his being
so absorbed in foreign affairs, and under these circumstances we may
not unreasonably expect that a fair Bill will be produced, and the
question eventually settled.
[Sidenote: A CONGRESS PROPOSED.]
The question of still greater and more pressing interest is that of
the Congress. The nomination of Hudson met with such opposition in
the Cabinet that it was not pressed, and Lord Wodehouse was named
instead. He is a clever man, well informed, speaks French fluently,
and has plenty of courage and _aplomb_; his opinions are liberal, but
not extravagant. Clarendon, who had him down at the Grove, was pleased
and satisfied with him. Granville is much _contrarié_ that Clarendon
himself has not been asked to go, thinking justly that he would have
much more weight than any other man, and would be far more likely
to conduct our affairs in the Congress with credit and success; but
Clarendon now tells me he certainly would not have gone if it had been
proposed to him. My own conviction _was_ that he would have accepted a
proposal, and though for many reasons he would not have liked such a
mission, I think he is somewhat mortified that it was not offered to
him.
The recent appearance of the pamphlet of '_Le Pape et le Congrès_,'[1]
which has produced such a sensation and so much astonishment, has no
doubt been a great thing for us, and rendered our diplomatic course
much more easy and promising. Clarendon writes to me: 'This last
pamphlet of the Emperor's is important and I am sure authentic, as it
is simply a developement of what I have heard twenty times from his
own lips. It ought of course to have been reserved for the Congress,
but as far as we are concerned it is well timed.' It was a bold, but
a clever stroke of policy to give notice to the whole world of the
sentiments and intentions with which the Emperor enters the Congress,
and it renders a good understanding and joint action between France and
England feasible and perhaps easy, unless Palmerston spoils everything
by some obstinate and extravagant pretensions which he may insist on
his plenipotentiaries bringing forward. But if he should be so ill
advised, I believe that he would meet with an insuperable resistance
in his own Cabinet and at Court, and that Cowley certainly, perhaps
Wodehouse also, would decline being made the instruments of such a
vicious and mischievous policy.
Footnote 1: [The object of the Congress proposed by the Emperor
Napoleon was to extricate himself from the embarrassments in which he
was placed by the terms of the Peace of Villafranca with reference to
the affairs of Italy. The proposal to establish a Confederation of the
Italian States was found to be impracticable, and the unification of
Italy was a more difficult problem than the conquest and cession to
Piedmont of the Milanese territory. M. de Cavour was the only statesman
who contemplated the entire realisation of this vast scheme, which was
at last accomplished by revolutionary means, without the concurrence of
France. His views were shared and supported by Lord Palmerston, Lord
John Russell, and Mr. Gladstone.]
[Sidenote: DEATH OF MACAULAY.]
_January 2nd, 1860._--The death of Macaulay is the extinction of a
great light, and although every expectation of the completion of his
great work had long ago vanished, the sudden close of his career,
and the certainty that we shall have no more of his History, or at
most only the remaining portion of King William's reign (which it
is understood he had nearly prepared for publication), is a serious
disappointment to the world. His health was so broken that his death
can hardly create any surprise, but there had been no reason lately to
apprehend that the end was so near. I have mentioned the circumstance
of my first meeting him, after which we became rather intimate in a
general way, and he used frequently to invite me to those breakfasts
in the Albany at which he used to collect small miscellaneous parties,
generally including some remarkable people, and at which he loved
to pour forth all those stores of his mind and accumulations of his
memory to which his humbler guests, like myself, used to listen with
delighted admiration, and enjoy as the choicest of intellectual feasts.
I don't think he was ever so entirely agreeable as at his own breakfast
table, though I shall remember as long as I live the pleasant days I
have spent in his society at Bowood, Holland House, and elsewhere.
Nothing was more remarkable in Macaulay than the natural way in which
he talked, never for the sake of display or to manifest his superior
powers and knowledge. On the contrary, he was free from any assumption
of superiority over others, and seemed to be impressed with the notion
that those he conversed with knew as much as himself, and he was always
quite as ready to listen as to talk. 'Don't you remember?' he was in
the habit of saying when he quoted some book or alluded to some fact
to listeners who could not remember, because in nineteen cases out of
twenty they had never known or heard of whatever it was he alluded to.
I do not believe anybody ever left his society with any feeling of
mortification, except that which an involuntary comparison between his
knowledge and their own ignorance could not fail to engender. For some
years past I had seen little or nothing of Macaulay. His own health
compelled him to abstain in great measure from going into the world.
He bought a house at Campden Hill, from which he rarely stirred, and
to which he never invited me, nor did I ever call upon him there. I
have often regretted the total cessation of our intercourse, but what
else could be expected from the difference of our habits, pursuits,
and characters? I have only recently read over again the whole of his
'History of England' with undiminished pleasure and admiration, though
with a confirmed opinion that his style is not the very best, and
that he is not the writer whom I should be most desirous to imitate;
but what appears to me most admirable and most worthy of imitation in
Macaulay is the sound moral constitution of his mind, and his fearless
independence of thought, never sacrificing truth to any prejudice,
interest, or preconceived opinion whatever. Above all he was no
hero worshipper, who felt it incumbent on him to minister to vulgar
prejudices or predilections, to exalt the merits and palliate the
defects of great reputations, and to consider the commission of great
crimes, or the detection of mean and base motives, as atoned for and
neutralised by the possession of shining abilities and the performance
of great actions. Macaulay excited much indignation in some quarters
by the severity with which he criticised the conduct and character of
the Duke of Marlborough, and the Quakers bitterly resented his attacks
upon Penn. He was seldom disposed to admit that he had been mistaken or
misinformed, and I thought he was to blame in clinging so tenaciously
to his severe estimate of Penn's conduct after the vindication of it
which was brought forward, and the production of evidence in Penn's
favour, which might have satisfied him that he had been in error, and
which probably would have done so in any case in which his judgement
had been really unbiassed. I always regretted, not for the sake
of Penn's memory, but for the honour of Macaulay himself, that he
would not admit the value and force of the exculpatory evidence, and
acknowledge, as he very gracefully might, the probability at least
of his having been in error. But the case of the Duke of Marlborough
is very different, and reflects the highest honour on his literary
integrity and independence. Undazzled by the splendour of that great
man's career and the halo of admiration which had long surrounded his
name, he demonstrated to the whole world of what base clay the idol
was made and how he had abused for unworthy ends the choice gifts
which Nature had bestowed upon him. Macaulay no doubt held that in
proportion to the excellence of his natural endowments was his moral
responsibility for the use or abuse of them, and he would not allow
Blenheim and Ramillies to be taken as a set-off against his hypocrisy,
perfidy, and treason. Macaulay's History is the best ethical study
for forming the mind and character of a young man, for it is replete
with maxims of the highest practical value. It holds up in every page
to hatred and scorn all the vices which can stain, and to admiration
and emulation all the virtues which can adorn, a public career. It is
impossible for anyone to study that great work without sentiments of
profound admiration for the lessons it inculcates, and they who become
thoroughly imbued with its spirit, no matter whether they coincide or
not with his opinions, will be strengthened in a profound veneration
for truth and justice, for public and private integrity and honour, and
in a genuine patriotism and desire for the freedom, prosperity, and
glory of their country.
[Sidenote: THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.]
_January 7th._--In a letter from Clarendon yesterday from the Grove he
says: 'Cowley came over here last night. I had a long talk with him;
he is low and unhappy, and does not see his way out of the labyrinth;
he is not for the Congress meeting _now_, but still does not think we
should abandon the Emperor altogether in his Italian policy. The fact
is, we are in a great difficulty. If we had from the first taken the
wise part of saying that as we had had nothing to do with the war or
the peace, and should therefore not interfere with the arrangements
the Emperor thought proper to make, we should now be on velvet; but
from the moment we knew of the Villafranca arrangement we have been
thwarting the Emperor, and goading him on further than he wished to
go, and encouraging the Italians to persist in their own ideas, till
at last when he does what we want, and is prepared to throw over the
Pope and asks to be backed by us, it is rather awkward to break away
and declare we only wanted the credit of recommending a fine liberal
policy, but that we don't mean to be at any trouble or expense about
it.' All this is undoubtedly true, but it is the old inveterate habit
of Palmerston's policy, united with John Russell's crotchets, which has
brought it to this pass. Palmerston has always been Conservative at
home and Revolutionary abroad, and the gratification of a silly spite
against Austria has always been paramount to any other consideration
and object. While the enemies of the late Government accused them,
very unjustly as the documentary evidence has shown, of having unduly
favoured Austria during the recent conflict, and therefore having been
neutral only in name, it is true that the present Government, _i.e._
Palmerston and John Russell, have gone out of their way to interfere
in an underhand manner, and have been constantly patting on the back
the insurgent Italians, and, as Clarendon says, urging the Emperor to
go further than he wishes, or than he can do consistently with the
engagement he has entered into. When Cowley was here some months ago,
I remember his telling me that one day when he met Cavour, either at
Compiègne or Paris, I forget which, when it was the question of the
Congress before the war, Cavour said to him, 'So you are going to
have a Congress.' 'Yes,' said Cowley, 'thanks to you and all you have
been doing in Italy.' 'Thanks to _me_!' cried Cavour, 'I like that;
why don't you say thanks to your own Minister at Turin, to Sir James
Hudson, who has done ten times more than ever I did?'
_Hatchford, January 12th._--Clarendon writes to me (on the 10th):
Cowley dined here on Saturday and did the same at Pembroke Lodge
on Sunday. He is on very good terms with John Russell, but hardly
understands what he would be at, and for the good reason probably that
Johnny does not know himself. There is a Ministerial crisis going on
at this moment about Italy, the three confederates wanting of course
to do more than the sober-minded majority can agree to. I suppose it
will be decided at the Cabinet to-day, and that some middle course will
be discovered, as I shall not believe, till it is a _fait accompli_,
that Palmerston will allow the Government to break up on a question
which will not carry the country with him. The people dislike Austria
and wish well to the Italians, but they want not to interfere in the
affairs of either, and I doubt if they would give a man or a shilling
to help Palmerston in blotting Austria out of the map of Europe and
giving Sardinia a much larger slice of the map. That twofold object
amounts to monomania now with Palmerston, and I believe he would
sacrifice office to attain it, which is the highest test of his
sincerity. The three confederates are Palmerston, John Russell, and
Gladstone.
_London, January 22nd._--For the last three weeks the sayings and
doings of the Emperor Napoleon have occupied all thoughts in every part
of Europe, and he has wellnigh recovered in this country the confidence
and popularity which had been exchanged for distrust, suspicion, and
alarm. It would really look as if the sole or at least the main object
of his policy was to conciliate English opinion and to ingratiate
himself with the present Government; and he certainly has exhibited
great courage and above all a boundless confidence in his own power and
authority in his own country. There was a time when he paid great court
to the Catholic clergy in France, and it was supposed that his motive
in retaining the French troops in Rome (which it was known he very much
disliked) was his apprehension lest their withdrawal should expose the
Pope's person or Government to danger, which the clergy in France would
not readily forgive him for doing. When he made peace with Austria he
still evinced a desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the Pope,
and therefore nobody was the least prepared for the pamphlet of 'The
Pope and the Congress.' It fell like a thunderbolt, striking terror
into the minds of all the Papal supporters and adherents, and filling
with joy all revolted Italy, and with a more sober satisfaction all the
Liberals and ultra-Protestants here.
[Sidenote: TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH FRANCE.]
We had hardly recovered from our amazement at this great change in
the foreign policy of France, when we were still more astonished and
pleased by the publication of the Emperor's letter to Fould, in which
he announced his intention to change the whole commercial policy of
France, and to make her a country of Free Trade. In thus confronting
at once the Clerical body and the Protectionist interest in France,
he has certainly acted with enormous boldness and reliance on his own
influence and power, and it will be very interesting to see whether the
success of his policy corresponds with its audacity. The Commercial
Treaty has been in great measure the work of Cobden, who went over to
Paris under the wing of Michel Chevalier and with letters to Cowley,
who introduced him to everybody who could be of use to him in his
endeavours to forward a Free Trade policy. The scheme seems to have
been arranged between the Emperor and Fould without the knowledge or
participation of any of the other Ministers. Cobden had no mission,
but he reported his progress home, and as an acknowledgement of his
exertions he is to be made joint Plenipotentiary with Cowley in signing
the Commercial Treaty.
The return of Cavour to power looks as if there was a secret
understanding between France and England that the King of Sardinia
should be permitted to consummate the annexation of all the revolted
provinces to his dominions; for this object, which Palmerston has so
much at heart, he would gladly consent to the transference of Savoy
to France, which most people think will take place; but everything is
still and must be for some time in the greatest uncertainty in North
Italy, the only thing _apparently_ certain being that the Dukes will
not recover their Duchies, and still less the Pope his Romagna.
_January 24th._--To-day Parliament opens, and everything promises
a prosperous session for the Government. So little spirit is there
in the Opposition, that very few of them are expected to make their
appearance, and Disraeli, under the pretext of a family affliction,
gives no dinner; but the probable cause of this is not the death of
his sister, which happened two months ago, but his own uncertainty as
to whom he should invite, and who would be disposed to own political
allegiance by accepting his invitation. Such is the disorganised state
of that party.
Clarendon called on me yesterday, and told me various things more or
less interesting about passing events, about Cobden and the Commercial
Treaty. Cobden went over to Paris with letters from Palmerston to
Cowley, begging Cowley would give him all the aid he could in carrying
out his object of persuading the leading people there to adopt Free
Trade principles, saying he went without any mission and as 'a free
lance.' Cowley did what he could for him, and he went about his object
with great zeal, meanwhile putting himself in correspondence with
Gladstone, who eagerly backed him up, but all this time nothing was
said to the Cabinet on the subject. At length one day Walewski sent
for Cowley, and asked him whether he was to understand that Cobden was
an agent of the British Government, and authorised by it to say all he
was saying in various quarters. Cowley denied all knowledge of Cobden's
proceedings, but wrote a despatch to John Russell stating what had
occurred, and at the same time a private letter, saying he did not know
whether he would wish such a despatch to be recorded, and therefore to
number it and place it in the Foreign Office, or put it in the fire as
he thought fit. John Russell accepted the despatch, and at the same
time told him he might endorse whatever Cobden did in the matter of
commercial engagements.
[Sidenote: THE EMPEROR ON FREE TRADE.]
Clarendon said that when he was at Paris four years ago for the
Congress, the Emperor one day said to him, 'I know you are a great Free
Trader, and I suppose you mean to take this opportunity of advancing
Free Trade principles here as far as you can.' Clarendon said certainly
such was his intention, when the Emperor said he was happy to be able
to take the initiative with him on this subject, and that he would
tell him that it had just been settled in the Council of State that
a great change in their commercial and prohibitive system should be
proposed to the Chambers, which it was his intention to carry out as
soon as possible. But not long after the Emperor renewed the subject,
and told him he found the opposition so strong to his contemplated
measures and the difficulties so great, that he had been obliged to
abandon them for the present, and as there is no reason to doubt that
the elements of opposition will be found as strong now as they were
then, it is by no means certain that His Majesty will be able now to
do all he wishes and has announced. It has already been stated in the
French papers that something is to be done to meet the objection or
allay the apprehensions of the French Protectionists, and Clarendon
thinks it very doubtful whether the Commercial Treaty, which will
confer advantages on France immediately without any reciprocal ones to
us for eighteen months to come, will be received with much favour here,
especially as the loss to our revenue will require the imposition of
fresh taxes to a considerable amount.
We discussed the Italian question, and he said the Emperor is in a
constant state of doubt and perplexity, one while inclining to the
Congress, and another to leaving affairs to be settled without one.
Granville told me last night there appears a chance of the Pope's
consenting to enter the Congress with the expectation of being
supported there by a majority of the Powers, and deriving considerable
benefit from such support. The Emperor Napoleon, too, now shows some
signs of drawing closer to Austria again, while Austria is quite
determined never to consent to any of the schemes of revolution and
annexation which France and England are intent upon carrying out.
Apponyi told Clarendon, with tears in his eyes, that they were ruined,
and quite unable to take any active part, but that in the way of
_passive_ resistance they might still do a great deal, and that they
should not only refuse with the greatest perseverance to set their
hands to any paper acknowledging the new state of things, but that they
should solemnly protest against it on every occasion and in every way
in their power. Austria therefore never will consent to the annexation
of Central Italy to Piedmont, and if it takes place in spite of her
remonstrances and in direct violation of the conditions of Villafranca
and Zurich, she will not only _refuse_ her recognition, but proclaim
her intention of biding her time, with a view to avail herself of
future possible contingencies to redress the wrongs of which she may
justly complain. I asked Clarendon if he did not think it possible
a _mezzo termine_ might be effected by which France and Austria
might again be put _d'accord_, France saying, 'I would carry out the
stipulations of Zurich if I could, but you see it is impossible. Still
I will not consent to arrangements obnoxious to you and in direct
violation of them, such as the annexations to Piedmont; let us recur to
the formation of a Central Italian independent State.' Clarendon said
this had been his own idea, and he still thought it was not impossible
that such a compromise should be effected. It is hardly possible to
doubt that if Cavour succeeds in annexing to Piedmont all the Central
Italian States, a very short time will elapse before war will break
out again between Sardinia and Austria, and that Austria will have to
relinquish her Venetian possessions or fight for their retention.
_January 27th._--The session opened with great appearance of quiet
and prosperity for the Ministers, which nothing that passed the first
night in either House threatened to disturb. Derby made a very good and
moderate speech. When he left office the Queen entreated him not to use
the power he seemed to have from the nearly balanced state of parties
to upset this Government, urging the great objections there were to
eternal changes, and she repeated the same thing to him when he was at
Windsor on a visit not long ago. Derby expressed his entire concurrence
with her, and he promised to act in conformity with her wishes, and he
has entirely done so. Nothing could be more temperate and harmless than
the few remarks he made on Tuesday night, but leaving himself quite
unfettered on every point.
[Sidenote: OPPOSITION TO THE COMMERCIAL TREATY.]
In the meantime there is apparently a strong feeling of doubt and
quasi-hostility getting up against the Commercial Treaty, and it
looks as if the English and French Governments would both have great
difficulties in the matter. Public opinion here remains suspended till
the Treaty is produced, and till we are informed what the immediate
sacrifices may be that we shall have to make for it, and what are the
prospective advantages we obtain in return. The French Protectionists
are more impatient and have begun to pour out their complaints and
indignation without waiting to see the obnoxious Convention. Thiers
is said to be furious. So far from any Commercial Treaty like this
cementing the alliance, and rendering war between the two countries
more difficult, it is much more likely to inflame the popular antipathy
in France, to make the alliance itself odious, and render the chances
of war between the two countries more probable. In maturing his scheme
Louis Napoleon has given it all the appearance of a conspiracy, which
is in accordance with his character and his tastes. The whole thing was
carried on with the most profound secrecy, and the secret was confined
to a very few people, viz. the Emperor himself, Fould, Rouher (Minister
of Commerce), Michel Chevalier, and Cobden. All the documents were
copied by Madame Rouher, and Rouher was so afraid that some guesses
might be made if he was known to be consulting books and returns that
were preserved in the Library of the Council of State, that he never
would look at any of them, and made Chevalier borrow all that he had
occasion to refer to. Now the Emperor springs this Treaty upon his
reluctant Chambers and the indignant Protectionist interest. His manner
of doing the thing, which he thinks is the only way by which it can
be done at all, naturally adds to the resentment the measure excites.
They feel themselves in a manner taken in. The objections here are of
a different kind and on other grounds, but Gladstone kept his design
nearly as close as the Emperor did, never having imparted it to the
Cabinet till the last moment before Parliament met. I do not know how
the Cabinet looked at it, only that they were not unanimous.
[Sidenote: THE REFORM BILL OF 1860.]
While, however, it seems at least doubtful how the Government will
fare when they produce this Treaty, it appears certain that they will
get into a scrape with their Reform Bill. I had imagined from all I
heard that the Government were certain to bring forward a measure so
moderate as to insure the support or at least prevent the opposition
of the Conservatives, or certainly of a large proportion of them.
Everything rendered this probable. The assurances conveyed to the
Government by Walpole, the professions of Disraeli, the apathy of the
country, and the total failure of Bright's attempts to get up the
steam, all encouraged them to take this course, and the Duke of Bedford
told me Lord John was not so tied and bound by his declarations last
year that he would not concur in any moderate measure that the Cabinet
might frame. A few days ago, however, I asked Clarendon what the Bill
would be, and he alarmed me by his reply that 'it would be as bad as
possible,' John Russell having insisted upon the franchise being in
accordance with his pledges, and upon his consistency being entirely
preserved. This meant of course a 6_l._ franchise, which everybody
denounces as full of mischief and danger.
Just now Henry Lennox came to me and told me that all the dissensions
and jealousies of the Conservative party and the Carlton Club had been
suddenly appeased, and that from being split into little sections
and coteries, squabbling among themselves and forming plots to oust
Disraeli, and elevate one man or another in his place, they were
suddenly reunited as one man in opposition to the Bill that they hear
is to be offered to them, and that Disraeli will be higher than ever in
their confidence and support. The Government estimate their majority at
four, leaving out of calculation the Irish Catholics, who will probably
all vote against them on every question, and the Conservatives boast
of having 320 men who will cling together with immoveable constancy
in opposition to the 6_l._ clause. That they will be able to carry it
under these circumstances seems impossible. Lord John is himself to
bring on the Reform Bill. The best thing that could happen (unless they
are warned in time and alter their measure) would be that he should be
beaten on the 6_l._ franchise, go out upon it and the rest stay in; but
whether they would think themselves bound to stand or fall with him
and break up the Government for his sake, I have at present no idea.
The Queen would no doubt do all in her power to induce Palmerston to
let him go, replace him, and carry on the Government without him. His
loss would be a gain in every possible way, and the Government would be
strengthened instead of being weakened by his absence, even though he
should throw himself into the arms of Bright and join him in a Radical
opposition to his former colleagues.
_Bath, February 15th._--When I left London a fortnight ago the world
was anxiously expecting Gladstone's speech in which he was to put the
Commercial Treaty and the Budget before the world. His own confidence
and that of most of his colleagues in his success was unbounded, but
many inveighed bitterly against the Treaty, and looked forward with
great alarm and aversion to the Budget. Clarendon shook his head,
Overstone pronounced against the Treaty, the 'Times' thundered against
it, and there is little doubt that it was unpopular, and becoming more
so every day. Then came Gladstone's unlucky illness, which compelled
him to put off his _exposé_, and made it doubtful whether he would not
be physically disabled from doing justice to the subject. His doctor
says he ought to have taken two months' rest instead of two days'.
However, at the end of his two days' delay he came forth, and _consensu
omnium_ achieved one of the greatest triumphs that the House of Commons
ever witnessed. Everybody I have heard from admits that it was a
magnificent display, not to be surpassed in ability of execution, and
that he carried the House of Commons completely with him. I can well
believe it, for when I read the report of it the next day (a report I
take to have given the speech verbatim) it carried me along with it
likewise. For the moment opposition and criticism were silenced, and
nothing was heard but the sound of praise and admiration. In a day or
two, however, men began to disengage their minds from the bewitching
influence of this great oratorical power, to examine calmly the
different parts of the wonderful piece of machinery which Gladstone had
constructed, and to detect and expose the weak points and objectionable
provisions which it contained. I say _it_, for, as the Speaker writes
to me, it must be taken as a whole or rejected as a whole, and he adds
the first will be its fate.
[Sidenote: MR. GLADSTONE'S BUDGET.]
Clarendon, who has all along disapproved of the Treaty, wrote to me
that Gladstone's success was complete, and public opinion in his
favour. He says: 'I expect that the London feeling will be reflected
from the country, so that there will be no danger of rejection, though
I think that the more the whole thing is considered, the less popular
it will become. The non-provision for the enormous deficit that will
exist next year will strike people, as well as the fact that the Budget
is made up of expedients for the present year. The non-payment of the
Exchequer bonds is to all intents and purposes a loan; the war tax on
tea and sugar, the windfall of the Spanish payment, the making the
maltsters and hopgrowers pay in advance, &c., are all stopgaps. If
anybody proposes it, I shall not be surprised if an additional 1_d._
Income Tax in place of the war duties was accepted by Gladstone. He has
a fervent imagination, which furnishes facts and arguments in support
of them; he is an audacious innovator, because he has an insatiable
desire for popularity, and in his notions of government he is a far
more sincere Republican than Bright, for his ungratified personal
vanity makes him wish to subvert the institutions and the classes that
stand in the way of his ambition. The two are converging from different
points to the same end, and if Gladstone remains in office long enough
and is not more opposed by his colleagues than he has been hitherto,
we shall see him propose a graduated Income Tax.' These are only
objections to the Budget, and speculations (curious ones) as to the
character and futurity of Gladstone.
In another letter he says: 'Gladstone made a fair defence of the
Treaty, though there are things in it which deserve the severest
criticism and will get it, such as tying ourselves down about the
exportation of coal (which is a munition of war), letting in French
silks free while ours are to pay thirty per cent., and establishing a
differential duty of nearly fifty per cent. in favour of light French
wines against the stronger wines of Spain and Portugal, for that will
be the operation of the Treaty.' Since all this was written there has
been a meeting of the Conservative party, and I hear this morning
that Derby has decided to take the field with all his forces with a
Resolution against the condition about the exportation of coal, and
confining himself to that, which will very likely be carried. On the
other hand, the publicans and licensed victuallers appear to be in
arms against that part of the Budget which more immediately interests
them, and are waging a fierce war in the Press by their paper, the
'Morning Advertiser,' so that in spite of his great triumph and all the
admiration his eloquence and skill elicited, it is not all sunshine and
plain sailing with his measures. Delane writes to me that Gladstone
will find it hard work to get his Budget through, that Peel when he
brought forward his Budget had a majority of ninety, all of which he
required to do it, whereas Palmerston cannot command a majority of nine.
_London, February 22nd._--I returned to town on Monday. The same
night a battle took place in the House of Commons, in which Gladstone
signally defeated Disraeli, and Government got so good a majority that
it looks like the harbinger of complete success for their Treaty and
their Budget. Everybody agrees that nothing could be more brilliant and
complete than Gladstone's triumph, which did not seem to be matter of
much grief to many of the Conservative party, for I hear that however
they may still act together on a great field-day, the hatred and
distrust of Disraeli is greater than ever in the Conservative ranks,
and Derby himself, when he heard how his colleague had been demolished,
did not seem to care much about it. They say that he betrays in
the House of Commons a sort of consciousness of his inferiority to
Gladstone, and of fear of encountering him in debate.
_February 26th._--On Friday night Gladstone had another great triumph.
He made a splendid speech, and obtained a majority of 116, which puts
an end to the contest. He is now _the_ great man of the day, but these
recent proceedings have strikingly displayed the disorganised condition
of the Conservative party and their undisguised dislike of their
leader. A great many of them voted with Government on Friday night, and
more expressed satisfaction at the result being a defeat of Disraeli.
The Treaty and Budget, though many parts of both are obnoxious to
criticism more or less well founded, seem on the whole not unpopular,
and since their first introduction to have undoubtedly gained in
public favour. This fact and the state of the Opposition prove the
impossibility of any change of Government. Gladstone too, as he is
strong, seems disposed to be merciful, and has expressed his intention
of taking fairly into consideration the various objections that may
be brought forward, and to consent to reasonable alterations when
good cases are made out for them. There seems no doubt that his great
measures were not approved of by the majority of the Cabinet, but the
malcontents do not seem to have been disposed to fight much of a battle
against the minority, which included both Palmerston and Lord John.
It is curious how this great question has thrown into the background
all the questions about Italy and foreign policy, in regard to which
public interest seems to be for the moment suspended, while Italian
affairs are at a dead lock. It would be very inconsistent with the
Emperor's character if he had given up his design of appropriating
Savoy, but he has certainly postponed it, and will probably employ
his versatile imagination in weaving some fresh web by means of which
he may get it into his power. I have been reading the Italian Blue
Book, which is a creditable compilation. John Russell's positions
are not unsound, but he is too controversial in his tone, and though
he treats Austria with a decent consideration, and in no unfriendly
spirit, he might as well have avoided arguing with Count Rechberg upon
points and principles on which it was impossible they should ever
agree. Throughout this compilation the embarrassment and perplexity
of the Emperor Napoleon are conspicuous, and the difficulties into
which he got himself by his vacillations and incompatible objects and
obligations. His desire to adhere to the engagements he contracted at
Villafranca is obvious throughout, and the advice he gave the Pope
seems to have been the best possible, and given in all sincerity.[1]
Footnote 1: The Emperor told Metternich the other day that he had
made one great mistake, which he had never ceased to regret, that
immediately after Villafranca he ought to have marched 100,000 men
into Tuscany on the plea of embarking them at Leghorn, and continued
to occupy the country till the restoration of the Grand Duke was
accomplished, but that he had never contemplated the invincible
resistance of the whole population.--C. C. G.
[Sidenote: MR. GLADSTONE'S RADICALISM.]
_February 27th._--Gladstone is said to have become subject to much
excitement, and more bitter in controversy in the House of Commons than
was his wont. The severe working of his brain and the wonderful success
he has obtained may account for this, and having had his own way and
triumphed over all opposition in the Cabinet, it is not strange that
he should brook none anywhere else. He has not failed to show a little
of the cloven foot, and to alarm people as to his future designs.
Clarendon, who watches him, and has means of knowing his disposition,
thinks that he is moving towards a Democratic union with Bright, the
effect of which will be increased Income Tax and lowering the estimates
by giving up the defences of the country, to which Sidney Herbert will
never consent, and already these old friends and colleagues appear to
be fast getting into a state of antagonism. Aberdeen told Clarendon
that they would never go on together, and he thought Sidney Herbert
would retire from the Cabinet before the end of the session. This of
course implies that Gladstone's policy is to be in the ascendant, and
that he is to override the Cabinet.
There has been a dispute about the introduction of the Reform Bill.
Lord John's colleagues wished him to defer bringing it on, till more
progress had been made in the fiscal and commercial measures, and
represented the inconvenience of having the two discussions going on at
the same time, but nothing would induce him to postpone it, and for the
absurd reason that he wanted to bring in this Bill on the _same day_
on which he had introduced the great Reform Bill in 1831, and to this
fanciful object he insisted on sacrificing all others.
_Hatchford, March 7th._--Lord John Russell brought in his Reform Bill
last week without exciting the smallest interest, or even curiosity,
amidst profound indifference in the House and in the country. His
measure was very moderate, and his speech temperate. It produces no
enthusiasm, or satisfaction, or alarm. It will probably pass without
any violent debates, and perhaps with very slight alterations. If the
opponents should succeed in making some, Lord John is not prepared
to adhere obstinately to his measure, but will come to terms. It was
settled that no discussion should take place at the time, and nobody
was inclined for any. It hardly delayed the progress of Gladstone's
measures, so we heard no more complaints of Lord John's pertinacity in
bringing it on upon March 1st.
[Sidenote: ASCENDENCY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.]
The Treaty, the Budget, and the Reform Bill had thrown foreign affairs
into the background, but the interest in them was suddenly aroused,
and speedily absorbed every other, by the Emperor's speech and M.
Thouvenel's despatches, all so mortifying and provoking to us. Up
to this moment Palmerston had been highly elated, and he and Lord
John had been exulting in the fancied glory of being the Liberators
of Italy, and of having procured the complete success of their own
objects. As Clarendon wrote to me, 'The Emperor must greatly enjoy
the helplessness of Europe, and in feeling that he may do just what
he likes with perfect impunity. Russia is crippled, Austria rotten,
Germany disunited, and England, though growling, occupied in gnawing
the Treaty bone he has tossed to her. All must submit to the laws made
known to them through the "Moniteur."' If it were not so melancholy
to see the miserable figure which England cuts in all this, it would
be amusing to see it happen _regnante_ Palmerston, and after all his
incurable meddling and blustering to see him obliged to eat so much
dirt. He may (though probably he does not) think he has lived too long
to be reserved at the last period of his political career for such
mortification. The Emperor said to somebody, '_L'Europe boudera, mais
ne fera rien_,' and he is quite right. We seem to have arrived at the
last act of the Italian drama, but it is still very uncertain how the
_dénouement_ will be worked out and what the Emperor's final will and
pleasure will be. The Romagna seems to present the greatest difficulty;
all the rest will find a tolerably easy solution. France will take what
she wants of Savoy and give the rest to Switzerland, who upon those
conditions is desirous of annexation, and Piedmont does not seem to
care much about it. In this way the question of Savoy will be settled,
if not by general consent, at least with general acquiescence and
without any opposition.
_March 9th._--After all it is not improbable that Palmerston will have
the gratification of seeing Tuscany annexed to Sardinia. Cavour has
taken the line which Clarendon and I agreed that he would very likely
do, and sets France and Austria at defiance. We have seen France and
Sardinia joined in making war upon Austria, and now we have France
and Austria joined in diplomacy against Sardinia. Nothing can be more
curious than to see the unravelling of this web. Next week the Italian
States will severally vote their annexation to Sardinia, or their
separate existence. If, as is almost certain, the former is their
decision, the King will accept their resolution, and Piedmontese troops
will march into Tuscany. Then we shall see what the Emperor Napoleon
will do, and what he will permit Austria to do.
_Savernake, March 18th._--The affair of Savoy has been summarily
settled by the will of the Emperor and the connivance of Cavour. The
whole affair now appears to have been a concerted villainy between
these worthies, which as the plot has been developed excites here the
most intense disgust and indignation. The feeling is the stronger
because we have no choice but that of sulky and grumbling acquiescence.
The one redeeming point in the French act of violence _was_ the
apparent respect paid to Treaties and to the claims of Switzerland,
Thouvenel having only the other day said that Faucigny and Chablais
should be ceded at once to Switzerland; and now we hear that nothing
of the kind is to be done, and that France seizes everything.[1]
It is in vain that the Houses of Parliament are advised to cease
barking, as they certainly do not mean to bite, and that the 'Times'
recommends silence and moderation; such enormities as are unblushingly
exhibited to the world excite an indignation which breaks through every
restraint, and people _will not_ hold their peace, happen what may. The
Opposition have turned the current of their wrath upon our Government,
and have proved clearly enough that they had ample and timely notice
of the Emperor's intentions, and that nevertheless they continued to
urge with all their might that policy which was certain to lead to the
annexation of Savoy. That the Emperor and Cavour have been plotting
together seems now quite certain, but we are still ignorant, and may
perhaps ever remain so, of the details of their delusive operations.
[Sidenote: THE TREATY, THE BUDGET, AND THE BILL.]
The three great subjects which have occupied public attention all
this year have been the Italian and its branches, Gladstone's Treaty
and Budget, and the Reform Bill. Up to the present time the two first
have absorbed all interest, and the new Reform Bill has been received
with almost complete apathy, nobody appearing to know or care what
its effects would be, and most people misled by an apparent show
of moderation and harmlessness in its details. But in the course
of the last week the 'Times' set to work, in a series of very able
articles, to show the mischievous and dangerous effects that the
proposed franchise will produce, and these warnings, supported by
ample statistical details, have begun to arouse people from their
indifference and to create some apprehensions. I am informed that
John Russell framed his Bill in utter ignorance of these important
details, and, with the mixture of levity and obstinacy which has
always distinguished him, has plunged the country into this dilemma
for the sake of his own selfish and ambitious objects. But what is
incomprehensible is that in such a numerous Cabinet as the present,
and containing many men who certainly once had strong Conservative
opinions, he should not have met with a more strenuous opposition, and
have been forced to alter his most obnoxious propositions, and I think
those who were better informed than Lord John, and saw whither his
plan of Reform was leading them, are more to blame than himself. It is
impossible to meet with any man who approves of this Bill, and who does
not abhor the idea of any Reform whatever. All say that if the members
voted by ballot there would be almost unanimity against it, and yet
such is the disorganised state of the Conservative party, and such the
want of moral courage and independence generally, that this Bill will
most likely pass unaltered.
The prevailing hope is that the House of Lords will amend it, but Derby
told somebody (I think it was Clarendon) that if those who dreaded the
mischief of the measure in the House of Commons had not the courage and
honesty to oppose it there and correct it, the House of Lords should
not, so far as his influence went, incur the odium of doing the work
which the House of Commons ought itself to do. Lyndhurst told me the
other day that Derby had told Lady Lyndhurst he was so disgusted with
the state of affairs at home and abroad, that he had serious thoughts
of withdrawing from public life, and Clarendon told me that an eminent
Conservative, who had begged not to be quoted, had said that he knew
Derby was violently discontented with Disraeli, and prepared to
dissolve their political connexion.
Footnote 1: [It is within my own knowledge that M. Thouvenel expressed
at that time the desire of the Emperor to do anything he could _to
help Lord Palmerston_, and accordingly he proposed, unofficially, to
surrender and annex a considerable portion of the Faucigny district,
down to the Fort de l'Ecluse, in the Jura, to the Canton of Geneva,
provided the British Government would assent to the acquisition by
France of the rest of Savoy. Lord Palmerston rejected the proposal,
saying to the person who conveyed it to him, 'We shall shame them out
of it.'--H. R.]
_Wells, March 21st._--I came here from Savernake on Monday. On Friday
last in the House of Lords the Commercial Treaty and Budget, but the
latter especially, were powerfully assailed by Grey, Overstone, and
Derby, and very considerably damaged _in argument_, but probably in
nothing else. The Government are as weak in the Lords as the Opposition
are in the Commons, where, however, Disraeli seems to have made a very
good speech against the Reform Bill on Monday night.
[Sidenote: LORD JOHN DENOUNCES NAPOLEON.]
_Torquay, March 28th._--The past week has been remarkable for the
speech in which John Russell denounced in strong language the conduct
of France, declared that we could no longer trust her, and that we
must renew our intimacies with the other Powers. Whether all this was
sincere and meant all it seems to do is yet to be discovered. The week
was near being still more remarkable, for the Reform Bill was within
an ace of falling to the ground by the House being counted out in the
midst of a debate. This would have been very ridiculous, but would
have been hailed with delight by the House of Commons, and without
dissatisfaction by the country. Clarendon writes to me in a strain
of bitter hostility to the Bill and disgust at everything, complains
of the general apathy and the impossibility of rousing any spirit of
opposition to what all abhor. Derby told him that if twenty-five or
even twenty Liberals would _take the lead_ in opposing this Bill, the
whole Conservative party would support them. Clarendon wrote to me
when I was at Bath that the time would probably come when Gladstone
would propose a graduated Income Tax, and lo! it has nearly come, for
Gladstone gave notice the other night to people to be prepared for it.
The Triumvirate of Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone, who have
it all their own way, dragging after them the Cabinet, the House of
Commons, and the country, will probably be the ruin of this country.
They are playing into the Emperor Napoleon's hands, who has only to be
patient and bide his time, and he will be able to treat all Europe,
England included, in any way he pleases. Nothing but some speedy change
of Government and of system can avert the impending ruin.
_London, April 2nd._--One day last week (as mentioned above), on one
of the numerous discussions of the Savoy question in the House of
Commons, John Russell electrified the House and rather astonished the
country by delivering a very spirited speech, denouncing in strong
terms the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon, and declaring the necessity
of cultivating relations with the other Great Powers for the purpose of
putting an effectual check upon the projects of French aggrandisement
and annexation. I must own that my first impression was that this
speech was made merely to deceive the House and the country, and was
only a part of the collusive system between our Government and the
French, by virtue of which Louis Napoleon has been enabled to work out
all his objects and designs; but though it is impossible to doubt that
John Russell and Palmerston have all along been aware of the Emperor's
intentions with regard to Savoy, and that they have been more intent
upon procuring advantages for Sardinia and provoking Austria than upon
thwarting the projects of France, I am inclined to see Lord John's
speech in another light from what I hear since I came to town. He made
it without any previous consultation with his colleagues, it having
been one of those _impromptus_ which he is so apt to indulge in, and
Palmerston, seeing the way in which it was received in the House and by
the Press, approved of its tone and expressed a full concurrence with
it. Flahault, who went to Paris a few days ago, called on Palmerston
before he went and asked if he wished him to say or do anything there.
Palmerston said he might inform the Government that Lord John's speech
expressed the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet here. In my opinion his
speech was a great imprudence, and will probably involve the necessity
of our eating a great deal of humble pie. We have long ago declared
that though we disapprove very much of the annexation of Savoy,
we should take no steps to prevent it; but Lord John made a great
distinction between the question of Savoy and Nice and that of Faucigny
and Chablais, and though he did not commit himself to any positive
course, he gave it to be inferred that something more would be required
from us, in the way of opposition to the seizure of the latter, than
there was any necessity for our making to that of the former. But the
Emperor makes no such distinctions, and if, as is most probable, he
does not admit our right to draw them, we shall be in an unpleasant
fix, and have to back out of the position we have assumed in a way
neither dignified nor creditable.
[Sidenote: SCHEMES OF THE EMPEROR.]
The accounts from Paris are that this speech has made the French
very insolent, and the Emperor more popular than he has been for a
long time, as even his enemies say that they will rally round him
to chastise English impertinence. Then as to forming alliances with
the other Powers, which of course will be taken (as was intended) as
a menace to France, nothing could be more ill-advised than such an
announcement, for the other Great Powers have neither the ability nor
the inclination to join us in any coalition, present or prospective,
against France. Russia and Austria hate us, as well they may, for
we have done them both all the injury in our power, besides heaping
every sort of insult upon them. Austria is totally ruined, hopelessly
bankrupt and torn to pieces with internal disaffection and discontent.
Russia is hampered with her great serf question, and overwhelmed with
financial embarrassments, which she owes in great measure to the
Crimean War, and the unfortunate dissension and estrangement between
her and Austria are attributable to the same cause and to our policy.
Prussia, the only one of the three that is able to make any efforts,
and that has no cause of enmity against us, is always selfish and
timorous, and is more occupied in trying to supplant Austria in Germany
than in taking defensive measures against French ambition; nor is
there in Germany any such strong sentiment of national independence
as might induce the various States to sink their minor jealousies and
partisanships in a general union, to meet any aggression that may
proceed from France. Among the many schemes which the Imperial brain is
supposed to be continually engendering, it is far from impossible that
one may be the reconstruction of the kingdom of Westphalia, or at least
of some Rhenish kingdom with the concurrence of Prussia, by concluding
a bargain of partition with her. He might then replace old Jerome on
the throne, and so get rid of his obnoxious son, of course taking as
much of such acquired territory as he wanted for himself. All this
is mere vague conjectural speculation, but it is _on the cards_, and
it is at least as probable as that we should be able to form another
coalition, like that which overthrew the first Napoleon, strong enough
to cope with the present Napoleon. People are beginning at last to
doubt whether the war we waged against Russia four years ago was really
a wise and politic measure; but the whole country went mad upon that
subject, I never could understand why. Palmerston took it up to make
political capital out of it, and made himself popular by falling in
with the public humour, and making the country believe that he was the
only man really determined to make war on Russia, and able to bring the
war to a successful end. Aberdeen, who was wise enough to see the folly
of quarrelling with Russia and sacrificing all our old alliances to a
new and deceitful one with France, was unable to stem the torrent, and
fell under its violence. His fault was his not resigning office when he
found it impossible to carry out his policy and maintain peace.
_A propos_ of the Russian War, I heard lately an anecdote for the first
time that surprised me. Everybody knows that we beat up for allies and
even mercenary aid against Russia in every direction, but it is not
known that our Government earnestly pressed the Portuguese Government
to join in the war, and to send a contingent to the Crimea, and that
on the refusal of the latter to do so, the Ministers made the Queen
appeal personally to Lavradio and urge him to persuade his Government
to comply with our wishes; but Lavradio represented to Her Majesty, as
he had done to her Ministers, that Portugal had no quarrel with Russia,
and no interest in joining in the war; on the contrary, Portugal was
under obligations to the Emperor of Russia, and she therefore would
have nothing to do with the contest. This was a most extraordinary
proceeding, and it was contrary to all usage as well as all propriety
to make the Queen interpose in person on such an occasion.
[Sidenote: DANGER OF WAR WITH FRANCE.]
_April 4th._--Clarendon has just been here talking over the state of
affairs, in the course of which he alluded to what had passed in the
autumn of '58 between the Emperor and him, and between His Majesty
and Palmerston. In September he had a long conversation with the
Emperor, in the course of which he asked Clarendon, 'Supposing I find
myself compelled to go to war with Austria, what part would England
take in the contest?' Clarendon replied that it would depend upon
the circumstances of the case and the cause that would be shown for
such a war, and that he must not be misled by the language of the
English Press and the prejudice which no doubt existed in England
against Austria and her system of government, which would not be
sufficient to make us take any part against her. On comparing notes
with Palmerston afterwards, Clarendon found that Louis Napoleon had
put the same question to Palmerston, who had given him the same
answer. When they went to Compiègne in November of the same year,
they both had conversations separately of the same character, and
when they afterwards compared notes and Clarendon asked Palmerston
what impression the Emperor's words had left on his mind, Palmerston
replied he thought either that the Emperor had abandoned the design he
had certainly been meditating to go to war, or he had resolved upon
it, but did not choose to acknowledge his intentions to them, and
this Clarendon said was exactly the same opinion as he had formed.
This, however, was not above six weeks before his famous speech to the
Austrian Ambassador (which was a declaration of war), and therefore
the latter conjecture was the correct one. We talked over Lord John's
speech and his letter in answer to Thouvenel. Clarendon said that this
despatch was entirely written by Palmerston himself, that anybody as
well acquainted with their styles as he was must be quite certain of
this, but that _he_ knew it to be the case. He had a conversation with
Palmerston the other day, who praised Lord John's speech and said it
would do good, and he thought _the question of Savoy was in a very
satisfactory state_.
Palmerston, he told me, had said more to Flahault[1] than I had been
apprised of. Flahault went to him, and found him just going to the
House of Commons. Flahault asked him to let him get into his carriage,
which he did, and when Flahault asked what he should say to the
Emperor, and Palmerston told him to say that the Emperor had better
read Lord John's speech, and understand that he (Palmerston) agreed in
every word of it, Flahault said, 'Then you mean that you have no longer
any confidence in the Emperor, or place any reliance upon his word.'
Palmerston replied, 'I do mean this. After having been repeatedly
deceived and misled by his professions and assurances, it is impossible
that I can place any further confidence in him.' Then said Flahault,
'There will be war,' to which Palmerston rejoined that he hoped not,
that nobody could be more anxious to avoid war than he was.
This was very spirited and becoming, and Clarendon said he highly
approved of such a tone. I said that I had all along suspected that
there was a secret understanding and collusion between Palmerston and
the Emperor, and that Palmerston had given His Majesty to understand
that if he would set Italy free, he might do what he pleased with
regard to Savoy, but that what had recently passed seemed to negative
that idea. Clarendon replied he had no doubt Palmerston had very often
said to Persigny what, if repeated by Persigny to the Emperor with some
exaggerations and suppressions, would convey as much to His Majesty,
for Palmerston had a dozen times said to him (Clarendon) that the
liberation and settlement of Italy was of far greater consequence than
the preservation of Savoy to Piedmont.
Footnote 1: [Count de Flahault was at this time French Ambassador in
London.]
_April 8th._--To The Grove on Thursday afternoon, and returned
yesterday. On Good Friday morning George Lewis and I were left alone,
when we talked over the questions of the day, and he quite amazed me
by the way in which he spoke of his principal colleagues. I asked
him if John Russell was not exceedingly mortified at the ill-success
of his Reform Bill and its reception in the House of Commons and in
the country. George Lewis said he did not think he felt this, that
at present his mind was entirely occupied with foreign politics, and
he was rejoicing in the idea of having been largely instrumental to
the liberation of Italy; and as to Reform, that he was satisfied
with having redeemed the pledge he gave to Bright to propose a 6_l._
franchise, and having done this he did not care about the result, as he
had never pledged himself to carry it. The most strange thing to me is,
that George Lewis seemed not to be alive to the culpable levity of such
conduct, or to the censure to which his own conduct is obnoxious in
consenting to act with such a man, and to be a party to such a measure.
With regard to Palmerston, he said that Palmerston thought of nothing
but his pro-Sardinian and anti-Austrian schemes, and he was gratified
by seeing everything in that quarter turning out according to his
wishes, that in the Cabinet he took very little part and rarely spoke.
Gladstone George Lewis evidently distrusts, and his financial schemes
and arrangements are as distasteful to him as possible. He is provoked
at Gladstone's being able to bear down all opposition, and carry all
before him by the force of his eloquence and power of words, and what
I have said of his conduct in supporting John Russell is still more
applicable to it in reference to Gladstone and his measures, which he
thinks more dangerous by far than he does Lord John's Reform Bill and
6_l._ clause. I asked him what was to be the end of this Bill, and
he said he did not expect it to pass, that probably the debates on
it would be so spun out and so many delays interposed that either it
would fail in the House of Commons itself, or even if it passed, the
House of Lords would say it came up too late for them to examine and
consider it, and it would be thrown out there. I gathered in the course
of conversation that Palmerston (whose whole antecedents and recorded
opinions forbid the idea of his approving such a measure) would be glad
to see the franchise raised, and that 8_l._ and 15_l._ would in his
view improve the Bill.
[Sidenote: MACHINATIONS OF NAPOLEON.]
_May 6th._--Since I wrote the above, nearly a month ago, I have been
out of the way of hearing anything on public affairs, till a day or
two ago when I called on Clarendon, when he told me some things not
without interest, partly about domestic and partly about foreign
affairs. The latter of course related to the inexhaustible subject
of the Emperor Napoleon's projects and machinations. His Majesty, it
seems, has recently had a conversation with M. de Moustier, French
Minister at Vienna, in the course of which he told him that it was an
absolute necessity to France to carry her frontier to the Rhine. About
the same time Cavour had signified (I forget whether it was to the
same de Moustier or to some other person) that Sardinia must obtain
possession of Venetia. These necessities, it can hardly be doubted,
are expressed and resolved upon by a common accord. Austria has been
already completely crippled by the late war; if threatened in Italy
she will employ all her resources in defence of her Italian territory,
and she will be quite unable, even if she were willing, to join in any
measures of resistance to the attempts of France upon Germany. Prussia
has had the egregious folly to renew her feud with Denmark upon the
affair of Schleswig-Holstein, and is about to provoke a fresh war on
that question. Denmark thus threatened appeals to France for aid, which
France is too happy to afford, as she will thereby in all probability
find a good pretext for interference, and for the furtherance of all
her designs. There seems no doubt that a Treaty of some sort has been
concluded between France and Denmark. In this difficult and menacing
posture of affairs, England will sooner or later have to play a part of
some sort, and it is disquieting enough to reflect upon our diplomacy
being under the charge of John Russell and of Palmerston.
After lingering on for several weeks with unprecedented tardiness
and delay, and a languid uninteresting discussion--debate it cannot
be called--the second reading of the Reform Bill has at last passed
without opposition. The last nights have been remarkable for the
speeches hostile to the Bill of several Liberal members, and the
increasing proofs of its prodigious unpopularity. Everybody is sick
of the subject, and those who desire that some modified and amended
measure may pass, only do so because they have a horror of seeing
another Bill brought in next year, and they hope that they may now
purge this Bill of its worst and most dangerous defects, and close the
subject for several years to come. Some think that it is impossible
to devise any means by which this Bill can be made anything like
safe and expedient, and would therefore prefer to throw it out and
run all chances for the future. At least one half of the Government,
with Palmerston himself at the head of the dissentients, regard this
Bill with alarm and aversion, and now that the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of passing it is obvious, they are prepared to make
every sort of sacrifice, even of its most vital provisions. Palmerston
told George Lewis so, and that John Russell himself would submit to an
alteration of the franchise to the amount of 15_l._ for the counties
and 8_l._ for the towns. They know that no question of resignation
is involved in this discussion, and that whatever may be the fate of
their Bill, they will still keep their places, which no concession will
endanger, and accordingly they are ready to agree to any compromise
which will secure the Bill's passing through Parliament in any shape or
way; but notwithstanding this pliant disposition, it is very doubtful
whether the Bill can pass. It will not commence its career in Committee
till the first week in June, and it is hardly possible it can reach the
House of Lords before the middle or end of July, and the Lords may very
well decline to enter on its consideration at that late period.
[Sidenote: CONFUSION OF PARTIES.]
_May 9th._--A correspondence appears in the newspapers between Lord
Grey and John Russell, couched in terms of no small bitterness. Such a
correspondence between men of such eminence and of the same political
colour shows up to the world the insincerity with which, for political
motives at the time urgent, they have spoken in their places in
Parliament. It is no new thing that members of the same Cabinet should
often differ, and that vehemently on particular questions, and yet when
these questions come under Parliamentary discussion, that they should
exhibit to the world the semblance of an agreement and concurrence
which is remote from the truth. But though this is well understood to
be of not unfrequent occurrence, and sooner or later the details of
the truth often leak out, it is much to be regretted that men should
exhibit themselves and each other in the way which this correspondence
does, for such exhibitions cannot fail to excite suspicions of the
sincerity, conscientiousness, and truth of public men. When Governments
are entirely of one party colour, either wholly Whig or wholly Tory,
and when they are presided over by some man of supereminent authority,
such differences and consequent difficulties are not likely to happen
often; but as of late years parties have been broken up, and composite
Governments have been formed, combining men of the most opposite
original principles, and imbued with very different and incompatible
opinions on various subjects, it must be continually happening that
candid discussions and disputes in the Cabinet should be followed by
insincere and untruthful declarations and argumentations in public. The
understood practice from time immemorial has been, that a dissentient
from the general opinion of his colleagues upon any _important_
question must either consent to merge his own opinion in theirs,
or retire from office; and then the conduct of the dissentient was
regulated by his view of the _importance_ of the matter at issue. Of
course if a man were to break off from his colleagues upon every matter
of difference, however small, no Government could possibly go on for
many months or perhaps weeks, but it is impossible in these days not
to be struck with the fact that so many men are indisposed to consider
anything of sufficient importance to resign their offices rather than
sacrifice their enlightened consciences and mature judgements.
_May 12th._--Not more than three months ago Gladstone was triumphant
and jubilant; he had taken the House of Commons and the country captive
by his eloquence, and nothing was heard everywhere but songs of praise
and admiration at his marvellous success and prodigious genius. There
never was a greater reaction in a shorter time. Everybody's voice is
now against him, and his famous Treaty and his Budget are pronounced
enormous and dangerous blunders. Those who were most captivated now
seem to be most vexed and ashamed of their former fascination. They are
provoked with themselves for having been so duped, and a feeling of
resentment and bitterness against him has become widely diffused in and
out of the House of Commons, on his own side as well as on the other.
It was the operation of this feeling which caused the narrow majority
on the Paper Duties the other night, when it seems as if a little more
management and activity might have put him in a minority, and it is
the same thing which is now encouraging the House of Lords, urged on
by Derby, to throw out the Resolution when it comes before them. Derby
has announced that he shall exert himself to the utmost to procure the
rejection of the Bill in the House of Lords, and if he perseveres he
will probably obtain a very unwise and perilous success, which he will
before long have to regret.
[Sidenote: REPEAL OF THE PAPER DUTIES.]
_May 17th._--Clarendon dined with Derby about a week ago, when Derby
explained to him all his reasons for persisting in his opposition to
the Paper Duties Bill. Clarendon said he did not talk rashly and in
Rupert vein, but gave a well-considered and well-argued statement
of the grounds on which he purposed to proceed. Clarendon evidently
sympathised with him, but not without much apprehension and doubt as
to the expediency of his course. Derby appears to have taken and to be
taking prodigious pains with his case, and he said that his object was
to have a great financial debate in the Lords on the Treaty and the
Budget. Granville tells me they shall be beaten by a large majority,
and he owns that the debate will be almost all one way. There is
nothing on the Treasury Bench or behind it able to grapple with Derby,
Monteagle, Overstone, and Grey on such a question, though Granville
expects Argyll to get up the question and to speak well on it, and
he expects something from Newcastle and Ripon, but Clarendon told me
(which of course he had from Lewis) the curious fact that Palmerston
himself views with pleasure the prospect of the rejection of the
Bill. A queer state of things indeed when the Prime Minister himself
secretly desires to see the defeat of a measure so precious to his own
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Frederick Cadogan came over from Paris the other day, and told
Clarendon that Cowley was in very bad spirits about the aspect of
foreign affairs, that all intimacy and confidence between the Emperor
and him was at an end, and that it was more and more evident that
His Majesty meant to follow his own devices, whatever they might be,
without reference to anybody, or caring for the opposition or the
assent of any other Powers.
The Garibaldi expedition is supposed to have given great umbrage to
France, but not without some suspicions that secretly she is not sorry
for it, and thinks in its complications she may find matter to turn to
her own account. Everybody believes that Cavour has covertly connived
at it, though he pretends to oppose it. Certainly no resolute attempts
were made to obstruct the expedition by the Sardinian Government, and
none whatever by France, who, if she really cared to stop it, might
easily have done so by sending ships from Toulon for the purpose.
Talking of Neapolitan affairs, Pahlen told me yesterday an almost
incredible anecdote, but of which he said there was no doubt of the
truth. There is just arrived a new Neapolitan Minister, Count Ludolph,
grandson of the Ludolph who was formerly here. He has replaced the
former Minister, who by his own desire was recently recalled, and he
had begged for his recall because he had been grossly insulted by
Palmerston at the Queen's Drawing Room, his story being that in that
room, in the Queen's presence (who was of course out of hearing),
Palmerston had attacked him on the proceedings of his Government and
the conduct of the King, telling him that a revolution would probably
be the consequence thereof, which would be nothing more than they
deserved, and which would be seen in this country with universal
satisfaction. The man was so flabbergasted by this unexpected and
monstrous _sortie_ that he had not presence of mind to make a suitable
answer, and to _riposter_ with the spirit which the occasion required
of him. I must endeavour to find out if this is true. Palmerston has
always been noted for the vivacity and often acerbity of his language
in despatches, but in oral communications and in speeches he has never
been reproached with intemperance or incivility, but, on the contrary,
has always evinced self-control and gentlemanlike and polite behaviour
and language.
_May 28th._--Epsom engaged all my attention last week, and I could
not find time to notice the debate in the Lords on the Paper Duties,
and the extraordinary majority, so much greater than anybody
expected. Lyndhurst undertook to speak on the constitutional part of
the question, and got leave to speak early (between Granville and
Monteagle) that he might go home to celebrate his birthday, which fell
on that day, when he completed his eighty-eighth year. He made a very
good speech, and met with an enthusiastic reception. Lady Palmerston
was in the gallery, openly expressing her wishes that the Bill might
be rejected by a large majority. Her language on this and other
occasions so shocked some of the more zealous Whigs, that the Duke of
Bedford was asked by one or more of them to remonstrate with her on
the way she talked, but she knows very well that Palmerston is of the
same mind, though he cannot avow his real sentiments in the way she
does. Palmerston said to Gladstone, 'Of course you are mortified and
disappointed, but your disappointment is nothing to mine, who had a
horse with whom I hoped to win the Derby, and he went amiss at the last
moment.' The affair has gone off very quietly, the House of Commons
not being the least disposed to quarrel with the Lords about it. Even
John Russell, who had talked very absurdly, held moderate and prudent
language in the House.[1]