THE SÁNKHYA-DARSANA.
"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _púrva_ and _uttara_
Mímámsá schools], when the system of development propounded by the
Sánkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
the Sástra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,
that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is
only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
the evolvent (_prakriti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
expressed [in the Sánkhya Káriká], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a
_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued
series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the
hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the Sánkhya Káriká (§ 3),
"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great
principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute
of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhimána_), is the evolute
of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
by Ísvara Krishna in his Kárikás[351] (§ 24-27), "Self-consciousness
is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the
class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with
them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher
Váchaspati Misra in the Sánkhya-tattva-kaumudí.
(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,
and the eleven organs, as said in the Káriká, "The evolute consists of
sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents
of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different
"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are
not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of
dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs
has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sánkhya
Káriká (§ 22)--
"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
proceed the five gross elements."
(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the Káriká, "The soul is
neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Káriká (§ 4).
"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode
of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
which is to be proven."
Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from
the non-existent; the Naiyáyikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent
is produced from the existent; the Vedántins, that all effects are an
illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
existent; while the Sánkhyas hold that the existent is produced from
the existent.
(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
identical.
(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the
cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are
not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
the production of a thing previously non-existent.
Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's
existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sánkhya
teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
apply here].
From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate
threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and
are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gítá (ii. 16)--
"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
non-existence for the existent."
And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakriti_). This has
been said [in the Káriká, § 9]--
"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]
Nor can we say [with the Vedántin] that the world is an illusory
emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _primâ
facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of
the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material
cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
(_i.e._, _prakriti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
happiness is found in his wife Satyavatí, because the quality of
"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused,"
since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
in the Svetásvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--
"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
her when once she has been enjoyed."
Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally
possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
concealing.
Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some
intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
has been said in the Káriká (§ 57)--
"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."
But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply
that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be
no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He
had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of
the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union
of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or
absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]
travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
dependent. This has been said in the Káriká (§ 21)--
"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."
"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply,
that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
the Káriká (§ 59)--
"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
manifested herself to Soul."
For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
of the atheistic Sánkhya School, been propounded.
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]
[Footnote 349: Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.]
[Footnote 350: One great defect in the Sánkhya nomenclature is the
ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddhí_) and those for
mind (_manas_). Mádhava here applies to the former the term
_antahkarana_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
have ventured to alter it in the translation.]
[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sánkhya
authority, and not the Sánkhya Sútras.]
[Footnote 352: _Vaikrita_ is here a technical term meaning that
goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká,
comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sánkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.]
[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
reading _samkalpavikalpátmakam_ must be corrected by the Sánkhya
Káriká.]
[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanmátras_
will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
elements.]
[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]
[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabháva_) cannot be
altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]
[Footnote 357: I take _arthántaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.
Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumudí_, p. 47).]
[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]
[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.]
[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of
beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
caused their misery at all.]
[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only
_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.
_Sánkhyapravachanabháshya_, i. 58).]
[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in
the Gesta Romanorum.]