THE PÁNINI-DARSANA.[307]
If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is
notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great
Commentary," is "_atha sabdánusásanam_," "Now comes the exposition of
words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new
topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
meant the system of grammar put forth by Pánini. Now a doubt might
here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle
implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
exclusion of everything else.
The word "exposition" (_anusásana_), as here used, implies that thereby
Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no devír abhishtaye_,[308]
&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of
the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly
formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
the object [_sabdánusásanam_ standing for _sabdasyánusásanam_], and as
there is a rule of Pánini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
phrase _sabdánusásanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised
compound.
Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
alleged rule of Pánini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object
alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this
limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprápti_ in the sútra as a
_bahuvríhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
the Kásiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the
teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once
understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any
such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,
this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the
genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_
compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _palása-sátana_,
&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
_shashthítatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in
accordance with Pánini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for
by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase
against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
hence Bhartrihari in his _Vákyapadíya_ has shown that these rules are
mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this
effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána--
"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
employed.
"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pánini's sútras,
since
"He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and
_tatprayojakah_."[314]
Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
(of the _Mahábháshya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
concerning words' are now commenced."
"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
the employment of such a word as _sabdánusásanam_, the sense of which
can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were
no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,
it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda.
Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
haste to say--
"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
common life,
"And therefore grammar is useless?"
Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the
Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that
grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now
it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of
the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabdánusásanam_ and not _atha
vyákaranam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that
Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much
less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,
practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not
established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix
_an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakára_, "a potter,"
_kándaláva_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special
rule (iii. 2, 3), _áto 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_
is to be used after a root that ends in long _á_ when there is no
_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But
since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the
one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the
principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--
"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
austerities,
"The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda."
Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,
of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is
preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]
Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
according to the _sástra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda
itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly
understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
Thus (they say)--
"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;
"But those who use such false forms as _achíkramata_ must
trudge thither on foot."[320]
Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of
words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
(_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._,
from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the
word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the
great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters
mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.
The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the
world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in
the part of his book called the Brahmakánda--
"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
essence of speech,
"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
springs the creation of the world."
"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírnaka--
"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
fivefold,
"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
like."
Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including
_karmapravachaníyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaníyas_ distinguish a
connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
(_upasargas_).[324]
"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
_sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
word is a false perception.
Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as
otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which
arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal
sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or
revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by
the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
_sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two
etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage
commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
wished]," and ending, "The _Vákyapadíya_ has established at length
that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed
by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]
Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed
to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself
manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has
been said by Bhatta in his Mímámsá-sloka-várttika--
"The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the
letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
difficulty."
The truth is, that, as Pánini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both
lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as
in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in
_ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would
not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
said by Tautátita--
"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
be the meaning which they convey."
Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
view having been shown to be irrelevant].
All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]
could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a
horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
_sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is
only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this
_sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that
the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to
assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct
category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus"
(_játi_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose
characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]
(Brahman).
"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--
"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
and not by combination."
"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
trouble of refuting."
All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is
variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
various conventional words which arise from the different
species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum
genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have
the following authoritative testimony--
"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
possessing that colour."
And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with
different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Pánini v. 1, 119).
"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,
horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really
different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and
_asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum
genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
of the stem-word (_prátipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as
that which expresses _bháva_;[333] now, as _bháva_ is "existence," the
meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root
should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriyá_); but here
again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
line--
"Others say that action (_kriyá_) is a genus, residing in
many individuals."
So, too, if we accept Pánini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we
speak of the nature (_bháva_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _tá_ [as _asvatva_ and
_asvatá_] are used in the sense of _bháva_, that they do express
"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
Such is the meaning of Hari's two _kárikás_ quoted above. So, too, it
is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that
the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose
characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
Substance.
"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
[without owners] is expressed."[336]
So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the
Várttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of
horse," &c.]
According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words
mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides
by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,
denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"
we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly
denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c.,
since we find here a meaning common to all who read.
In the doctrine of Vyádi, who maintained that words meant individual
things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]
Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pánini; since in i. 2, 58,
he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured,"
which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the
plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a
dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is
that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.
As it has been said--
"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."
Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the
nature of this true meaning--
"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who
know the end of the three Vedas."
So too in his description of substance, he says--
"_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of
modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they
call the Supreme Nature."
The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.
"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
souls."[344]
The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted
by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us--
"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
development of illusion likewise."
When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best
defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the
"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.
Thus it has been said--
"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
science of sciences."[347]
And so again--
"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
travellers to emancipation."
Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sástra of grammar should be
studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 307: Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímámsá school that
sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his
Jaimini chapter.]
[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]
[Footnote 309: _Sabdánusásana_, if judged by the apparent sense of
Pánini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as
_ácháryena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _áscharyo
godoho sikshitena gopálena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
can we say _áscharyo gavám doho' sikshitasya gopálasya_ (as it would
violate ii. 3, 66).]
[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprápti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a
_bahuvríhi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pánini.]
[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Pánini, ii.
2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]
[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_
(_i.e._, _shashthí-sambandha_).]
[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]
[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Pánini's own sútras (i. 4, 30,
and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
_shashthí seshe_.]
[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabdánusásanam_ implies the
Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.]
[Footnote 316: Compare Max Müller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is
quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.]
[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3
after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabdánám_.]
[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]
[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahábháshya_, pp. 12, 64.]
[Footnote 320: _Achíkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form
of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.]
[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.]
[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _sámyam_,
but the Mahábháshya has _nah sámyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]
[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases
of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]
[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaníyas_ imply a verb other than the one
expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Sákalyasamhitám anu
právarshat_, "he rained after the Sákalya hymns," _anu_ implies an
understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]
[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]
[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might
mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]
[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]
[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _viná_ after _nimittam_.]
[Footnote 329: The ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are
collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddesyásiddhi_.]
[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphotakabhávam_ for
_sphotábhávam_.]
[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9,
32.]
[Footnote 332: The Mímámsâ holds that a word means the genus (_játi_)
and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyáya holds that a word means
an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]
[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Prátis. xii. 5.]
[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]
[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]
[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really
meant, the one abiding existence.]
[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.]
[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _asvattha_.]
[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical
categories, _játi_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sanjná_, and _kriyá_.]
[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.]
[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that
the Mímámsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
since otherwise there would be _vyabhichára_ and _ánantya_ (cf. also
Mahesachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakása, p. 10). If a word is
held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as
it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an
endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]
[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmát
dvayam satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmád
advayam satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]
[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
exists.]
[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jíva_) and Brahman.]
[Footnote 345: The _Samvriti_ of the text seems to correspond to the
_ávarana_ so frequent in Vedánta books.]
[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi.
22.]
[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
it is explained by [']Samkara as _vidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanam tad
adhividyam_.]