THE PATANJALI-DARSÁNA.
We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the
system of the Theistic Sánkhya philosophy. This school follows the
so-called Yoga Sástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four
chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sánkhya Pravachana," or
detailed explanation of the Sánkhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof
the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the
Yoga Sástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
Meditation (_samádhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of
aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet
thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,
contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
"subjugation" (_samyama_), and also the various superhuman powers
which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five
principles [of the Sánkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme
Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and
is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
of mundane existence.
"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
declared--
"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
torment,[365]
And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."
It has been also said by Patañjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer,
which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
object which is developed and transferred experiences the
modifications thereof."
Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or
reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it
experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,
being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.
The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_
is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now
(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'
Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly
suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for
it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence
[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
something else; and since this is at once understood without any
direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet
these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold
that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
(_anusásana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,
divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the
rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,
in accordance with the words of Sruti: "Therefore having become
tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word
_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it
is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we
have such a passage of the Sruti as that [in the Katha Upanishad, ii.
12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the
Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smriti as that [in the
Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body
strong].
But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism,
"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Sankara Áchárya
has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of
the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of
tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
so-called "means."[370]
"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why
should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is
in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore
it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary
meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply,
that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."
"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
the beginning of a Sástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
it has been said by the wise, 'Those sástras become widely famous
which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies
'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smriti which says,
"'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the
ancient time,
"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
are both auspicious.'
"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying
'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vriddhi_' used by Pánini in his
opening sútra '_vriddhir ád aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is
untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious
influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is
auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used
here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such
other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smriti, since the smriti
will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
only that they produce an auspicious effect.
Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a
previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sútra,
the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
Tándya Bráhmana, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
this is the Visvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as
signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the
exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga
Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and
also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this
_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
after a successful understanding of the sástra through the attainment of
the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
the smriti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiranyagarbha is the promulgator of the
Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher
thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
Patañjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
Puránas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
_anusásana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which
followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
the system.
Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this
institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.
The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the
producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_
and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
well known from Sruti and Smriti, as I have before shown. And it is
established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a
wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to
establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the word
_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
the context. Hence it has been said, "When Sruti comes [as the
determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
"_sruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into
collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
summed up--
"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
precluded by any of the preceding modes;
"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
precludes, depends on circumstances."
Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
preliminaries, the study of the Sástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of
Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
the Sástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Sástra,
especially directed thereto, this Sástra is the means for its
production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up
and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than
to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in
his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Sástra as his primary
object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
that the commencing the Yogasástra is that which primarily claims our
attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sástra. "But as we read
in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of
'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean
'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
Yájñavalkya:[381]--
'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
called _yoga_.'"
This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
Vaiseshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
Mímámsá [or Vedánta], our Yogasástra would be rendered nugatory by this
concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
be produced by our Sástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here
in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--
"Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all
held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
are their evidence."
Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert
in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samádhi_." Nor does this
contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,
may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--
"_Samádhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and
supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
_samádhi_ of the individual soul."
It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the
Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samádhi_."
An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samádhi_ is
used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and
the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
we see in the _darsapúrnamása_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites
the _prayájas_, and therefore _samádhi_ cannot be the meaning of
_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
although the term _samádhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to
express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to
go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i.
2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the
suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
second or principal sense of _samádhi_ will therefore be quite
distinct from the first or inferior.]
"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the
modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in
accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument
to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this
soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this
which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or
want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of
the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Sruti, "Desire,
volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchasikha
declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The
modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from
the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the
understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of
"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the
understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the
perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.
[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the
suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply
also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,
_múdha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.
For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is
restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed
about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _múdha_,
'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].
It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here,
however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Krishna, is fickle, turbulent,
violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind
are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by
the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
laid down as the definition of _yoga_.
We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _múdha_, and
_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two
conditions called _ekágra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and
attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now
by _ekágra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.
Now this _samádhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
in which there is distinct recognition" (_samprajñáta_), and "that in
which distinct recognition is lost" (_asamprajñáta_) [Yoga S., i. 17,
18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]
is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajñáyate_) as distinct from Nature. It
has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichára_, _sánanda_, and
_sásmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhávaná_),
which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
pondered is of two kinds, being either Íswara or the twenty-five
principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not
senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are
senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in
the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
(_savichára_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
(_sánanda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object
the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sásmita_),
because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual
faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].
But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.
"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
and the "stock of deserts."[400]
The "afflictions" (_klesa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidyá_,
"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayíbháva_
compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadháraya_]
compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvríhi_ compound, where both portions are
dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
_avidyá_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the
express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,
as _avidyá_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very
form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
characterised by (_a_ + _vidyá_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and
cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vritti,[403]
"there is a _bahuvríhi_ compound which is formed with some word
meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvríhi_
compound _avidyá_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as
_avidyá_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidyá_
existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidyá_
could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the
other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were
associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and
were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sásmita_ meditation].
Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be
dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
This has been expressed by Váchaspati Misra, in his Gloss on Vyása's
Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:--
"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but
existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the
'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
with worldly objects."
"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidyá_ as a
_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,
because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]
the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
would be overthrown."
[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryudása_ [where
the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidyá_ means a
contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidyá_;
and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
said--
"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
[or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
thus the words _abráhmana_ and _adharma_ respectively
signify, 'what is other than a Bráhman' and 'what is
contrary to justice.'"
And again--
"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
from the use in which it has been already employed."
Váchaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings
depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter
portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
here too [in _avidyá_] the real meaning is something contrary to
_vidyá_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said
in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is
defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413]
[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining
the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a
proverbial couplet[415]--
"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its
composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from
death [as even a Bráhman's body defiles],--and from the fact
that it has to be made pure by rites."
So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through
the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the
idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands,
sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said--
"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;
"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
liberation."
Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]
But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
should there not be given some general definition applying to them
all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be
established? For thus it has been said by Bhatta Kumárila--
"'Without some general definition, a more special definition
cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
mentioned here.'"
This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
"Egoism" (_asmitá_) is the notion that the two separate things, the
soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said
(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
sight." "Desire" (_rága_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the
feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).
Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
word _anusayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _krit_ affix _nini_ in
the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the
sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _nini_
cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anusí_;
for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the Sútra, iii. 2, 4,
and has been exerting its influence in the following sútras, this word
must have been introduced a second time in the Sútra, iii. 2, 78,
_supy ajátau ninis táchchhílye_,[419] on purpose to exclude
prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sútra, vii.
2, 115, _acho ñniti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to
_vriddhi_, and so the word must be _anusáyin_, in accordance with the
analogy of such words as _atisáyin_, &c. Nor is the latter view
tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since
_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--
'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable
nor a _krit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
a word in the locative case;'
and the word _anusaya_ is clearly a _krit_ formation as it ends with
the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word
_anusayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be
admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
essential importance. Hence the author of the Vritti has said--
"The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular
acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]."
Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _káryin_,
_káryika_ [where the affixes are added after a _krit_ formation],
_tandulin_, _tandulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning
"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
_krit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anusaya_ is formed by
a _krit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.
The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
(_abhinivesa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as
the "afflictions" (_klesa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
upon it various mundane troubles.
[We next describe the _karmásaya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or
forbidden actions, as the _jyotishtoma_ sacrifice, bráhmanicide, &c.
"Stock" (_ásaya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not
considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the
thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
described hereafter], _madhumatí_, _madhupratíká_, _visoká_, and
_samskáraseshatá_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its
etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed
(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]
"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to
practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Krishna in the
Bhagavad Gítá [vi. 3]--
"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
_yoga_;
But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
the means."
Patañjali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical
concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yájñavalkya has described "mortification"--
"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
chándráyana fast, &c.,
"Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
mortifications."[429]
"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
_gáyatrí_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and
Tántrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
chanted. Those chanted are the _sámans_; those not chanted are either
in metre, _i.e._, the _richas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yajúmshi_,
as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _rich_ in which
by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _pádas_
[or portions of a verse]; the name _sáman_ is applied to chanted
portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_
are called Tántrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again
threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--
"The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and
neuter:
"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,
the exclamation _sváhá_); the neuter those which end in
_namas_;
"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."
They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all
defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.
Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_samskára_) are ten, and
they have been thus described in the _Sáradá-tilaka_--
"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
to _mantras_ efficacy:
"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
consecrated.
"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
'awakening,'
"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.
"The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the
_mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.
"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
_mantra_, each united to Om,
"According to the number of the letters. This they call the
'vivifying' (_jívana_).
"Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite
each with sandal-water,
"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is
called the 'smiting' (_tádana_).
"Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike
them with oleander flowers,
"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
'awakening' (_bodhana_).
"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
own special _tantra_,
"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
(_abhisheka_).
"Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him
consume by the _jyotir-mantra_
"The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the
'purification' (_vimalí-karana_).
"The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and
the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,
"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
of kusa grass,
"With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this
is held to be the 'fattening' (_ápyáyana_).
"The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with
_mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpana_).
"The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of
Máyá[434] and Ramá[435] is called its 'illumining'
(_dípana_).
"The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being
muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).
"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
_tantras_;
"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
obtains his desire;
"And _ruddha_, _kílita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _sapta_, and
the rest,
"All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by
these excellent consecrations."
But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries
connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an
unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]
The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord"
(_ísvara-pranidhána_), is the consigning all one's works, whether
mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
Supremely Venerable. As it has been said--
"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."
This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
sung in the Bhagavad Gítá [ii. 47]--
"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
fruits;
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
attached to inaction."
The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
by the venerable Nílakantha-bháratí--
"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
by desire,
"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
has been licked by a dog."
Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for
producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words
called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
a motive. This has been declared in the _Kávya-prakása_ [ii. 9]--
"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."
Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter
_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
the feminine _sá_] would have signified some neuter word, like
"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
indicated." But _sá_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
with _lakshaná_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is
put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
been explained by Kaiyata, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kusala_) in
business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
_kusala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed
etymologically as _kusam_ + _láti_, "one who gathers kusa grass for
the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--
"Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
their immediate significance, just as is the case in
'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."
Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
the author of the Kávya-prakása used the expression, "This is
'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as
"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2.
indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent
indication, as "the man of the Panjáb is an ox" [here the object is
not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
5. pure superimponent indication, as "_ghí_ is life;" 6. pure
introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
all explained in the Kávya-prakása [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.
This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
(_anga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not
wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
32]; and these are described in the Vishnu Purána [vi. 7, 36-38]--
"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
Brahman, practises, void of all desire,
"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
and non-coveting;
"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
purification, contentment, and austerity,
"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
Brahman.
"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
the five 'religious observances;'
"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."
"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _víra_, _svastika_, _dandaka_,
_sopásraya_, _paryanka_, _krauñchanishadana_, _ushtranishadana_,
_samasamsthána_. Yájñavalkya has described each of them in the passage
which commences--
"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
but in reverse order,
"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Bráhmans,
on his thighs;
"This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all."
The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this
steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _púraka_, and _kumbhaka_." We
reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of
the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _púraka_, which is the
[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,
when the vital air, called _prána_, remains motionless like water in a
jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
is needless.
Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghatikás_ and a
half[440] in each artery[441] (_nádi_), like the revolving buckets on
a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are
produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said
by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning
the transmission of the _ajapámantra_[443]--
"Six hundred to Ganesa, six thousand to the self-existent
Brahman,
"Six thousand to Vishnu, six thousand to Siva,
"One thousand to the Guru (Brihaspati), one thousand to the
Supreme Soul,
"And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
performed muttering."
So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different
colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
thus explained by the wise--
"Let each artery convey the air two _ghatís_ and a half from
sunrise.
"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]
to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
place [in the hour],
"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
six hundred in a day and night.
"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guna_
letters,[445]
"That time elapses while the air passes along in the
interval between two arteries.
"There are five elements in each of the two conducting
arteries,--
"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
the self-restrained.
"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;
"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.
"They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;
"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
arteries.
"The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,
"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
"Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,
"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
"There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has
fifty _palas_,
"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
five properties of earth
"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
and these decrease one by one.
"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
the influence of 'quiet,'
"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]
"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
ether are now declared;--
"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
the second arises desire;
"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
of mind;
"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
impressions of latent merit.
"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
finger in each nostril,
"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
of his eyes,
"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
earth and the other elements within him,
"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol."
When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
said--
"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
breath."[450]
And again--
"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
the breath."[451]
Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
attain "self-mastery" (_samyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_pratyáhára_).
"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to
the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered
nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
to it (_á_ + _hri_), away from them (_pratípa_).
"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say
is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are
restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
the Vishnu-purána [vi. 7, 43, 44]--
"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
ever tend to pursue external objects,
"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
mind;
"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
senses;
"If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish
his _yoga_."[454]
"Attention" (_dháraná_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
the _sushumná_ artery, &c., or something external, as Prajápati,
Vásava, Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
say the followers of the Puránas--
"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
restraint the senses,
"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
his mind."[455]
The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
"contemplation" (_dhyána_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--
"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
that kind and desiring no other,
"This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first
six of the ancillary things."
We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_samádhi_, see p.
243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a
long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
names Madhumatí and the rest.
"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
words from the dialects of Karnáta, Gauda,[456] and Láta?"[457] We do
not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
i. The _Madhumatí_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,
called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c.
Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to
the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._,
when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are
well known to be of four kinds, viz.,--
i. The _práthamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]
but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubhúmika_,
who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
_prajñájyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
_atikránta-bhávaníya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.
ii. The _Madhupratíká_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.
These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the
attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
state is called _Madhupratíká_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].
iii. The _Visoká_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all
existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished],
and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is
"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of
mind]."
iv. The _Samskáraseshatá_ state is also called _asamprajñáta_, _i.e._,
"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object]
which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which
distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _samskárasesha_,
i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
into the primal _prakriti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure
intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with
existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation
is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have
consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,
or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
possibility. And so, too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
dumb man praised it."[465]
Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
Yoga-sástra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-sástra also
treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same
fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
other Sástras also. Thus all has been made clear.
The system of Sankara, which comes next in succession, and which is
the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
is therefore left untouched here.[467]
E. B. C.
* * * * *
NOTE ON THE YOGA.
There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
Raivataka in Mágha (iv. 55):--
"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
(_maitrí_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully
abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."
It is curious to notice that _maitrí_, which plays such a prominent
part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=
_prasádhaka_) in Vyása's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
borrowed by Mágha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in
themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.
* * * * *
NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
For the word _vyákopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
_infra_), cf. Kusumáñjali, p. 6, l. 7.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sánkhya Pr. Bhásh., p.
20; S. Sára, p. 11.]
[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
in the arts of life.]
[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means
rather "susceptible of suffering."]
[Footnote 366: This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.]
[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]
[Footnote 368: Satapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]
[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbháve'pi_,
understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is
supposed to assume as being necessarily present.]
[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]
[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself
_sukha_.]
[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious,"
why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]
[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
some other word to complete the construction.]
[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya
(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]
[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vriddhih_ is
placed at the beginning of the first sútra, while _gunah_ in the
second is placed at the end (_ad en gunah_), in order to ensure an
auspicious opening, _vriddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."]
[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chandí, we have an interesting
list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman,
a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
_dúrvá_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
a guana (_godhiká_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
all sástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]
[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
officiating Bráhmans.]
[Footnote 378: He is here called _phanipati_, "lord of
snakes,"--Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented
as a snake in mythology.]
[Footnote 379: Cf. Sankara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.]
[Footnote 380: This is the Mímámsá rule for settling the relative
value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
_Sruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Linga_, "a sign,"
or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _Vákya_, "the being
mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I
cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakarana_, "the
subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
parts," as in the _darsa-púrnamása_ sacrifice, where the _prayája_
ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
a mystic influence (_apúrva_) which helps forward that influence of
the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakarana_
proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sthána_ (or _krama_), "relative
position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Sundhadhvam_, &c.,
"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
of the _sánnáyya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Samákhyá_,
"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima
facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
first, _sruti_, being the most important; the last, _samákhyá_, the
least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14; _Mímámsáparibháshá_, pp. 8,
9.]
[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of the
_Yájñavalkya-gítá_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl.
Catal._, p. 87 _b_.]
[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriyâ_, which properly
belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashtri_.]
[Footnote 383: _Scil. samádhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses
to profound contemplation.]
[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
meditation (_samádhi_)."]
[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa
samádhih_.]
[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the
destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
intimate relation (_samaváya-sambandha_).]
[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavyánám_ for _nirodhánám_.]
[Footnote 388: _Chit-sakti_ and _chiti-sakti_ = soul.]
[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]
[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]
[Footnote 391: Váchaspati explains _lakshana_ as _kálabheda_.]
[Footnote 392: I take _ádi_ as meaning _asphutatva_. The change of state
takes place between the several moments of the _lakshana-parináma_. Cf.
the Commentaries on iii. 13.]
[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the
thinking principle, _chittabhúmayas_ or _avasthás_. Cf. Commentary, i.
2, 18.]
[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,
demons, and gods.]
[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]
[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?]
[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the
elements or the elements the senses, &c.]
[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprakásamayasya_.]
[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _sattámátra_ for
_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmitá_ from _ahamkára_.]
[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]
[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
English translation.]
[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called
_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the
_paryudása_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
as, _e.g._--
(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
The former corresponds to the logician's _atyantábháva_, the latter to
_anyonyábháva_ or _bheda_.]
[Footnote 403: Cf. the _várttika_ in Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.]
[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-mánadhana_, with
_vidyamána_ omitted in the compound.]
[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]
[Footnote 406: As it is _avidyá_ after all.]
[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Váchaspati's
Gloss), _sarvavrittinirodhasampannáyá api tathátvaprasangát_.]
[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavastháscha_ with the printed edition of
Váchaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdháscha_ is correct, it must mean
_tanutvena dagdháh_.]
[Footnote 409: As in _rámalakshmanau_, Ráma and Lakshmana.]
[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]
[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.]
[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other
hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."]
[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.]
[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _káyádau_ for
_káryádau_.]
[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga
Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of
it; he calls it _vaiyásakí gáthá_.]
[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]
[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."]
[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]
[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _nini_ be used after a root in the sense
of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a
word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."]
[Footnote 420: "Let _vriddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a
vowel, when that which has an indicatory _ñ_ or _n_ follows;" _nini_
has an indicatory _n_.]
[Footnote 421: Sc. _anusaya_ + _ini_ = _anusayin_.]
[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _than_, which respectively leave _in_ and
_ika_; thus _danda_ gives _dandin_ and _dandika_. The line is quoted
by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pán. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
the _Kásiká_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
the examples:--(1.) _svaván_, _khaván_; (2.) _kárakaván_; (3.)
_vyághraván_, _simhaván_; (4.) _dandavatí sálá_ (_i.e._, _dandá asyám
santi_).]
[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]
[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]
[Footnote 425: See the _Kásiká_ on Pán. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshártha_
(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pán. ii. 2, 27.
The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamártha_.]
[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vritter abhávah_, but
_abhávasyásryah_.]
[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,
_prakásapravrittiniyamarúpa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]
[Footnote 428: See Kásiká, ii. 3, 36.]
[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yájñavalkya-gítá_
of Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
note.]
[Footnote 430: Mímámsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.]
[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kámya_.]
[Footnote 432: The _víja_ of air is the syllable _jam_.]
[Footnote 433: The _víja_ of water is the syllable _bam_.]
[Footnote 434: _Hrím._]
[Footnote 435: _Srím._]
[Footnote 436: _Tándava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Siva and his
votaries.]
[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Boeotiæ caput est," _Livy_, xlii.
44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]
[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
translation of the Sáhitya-darpana.]
[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of
longevity.]
[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghatiká_ being twenty-four
minutes.]
[Footnote 441: The _nádís_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
_nádís_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]
[Footnote 442: Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
passage in the Aitareya Bráhmana (iii. 29), where the relation of the
vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
waterwheel (_ghatíyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their
course."]
[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
as their sound expresses the word _so'ham_ (i.e., _hamsah_), "I am
he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
it is called the _ajapámantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without
voluntary muttering.]
[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
breath.]
[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarnánám_ for
_gunavarnánám_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarna_ is a
_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_
make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
fifth act of the _Málatímádhava_.]
[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghatiká_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghatikás_ or one hour).]
[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]
[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]
[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhándogya Up._, viii. 6;
_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]
[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.]
[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Sloka 7 of the _Amrita-náda
Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]
[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting
of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
attention, and meditation.]
[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]
[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
reading of the Bombay edition of the Purána (only reading in line 3
_chalátmanám_).]
[Footnote 455: Vishnu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]
[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]
[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
is the [Greek: Larikê] of Ptolemy.]
[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravritta_ for
_pravritti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's
Comm.)]
[Footnote 459: Read _vikaranabhávah_; Váchaspati explains it as
"_videhánám indriyánám karanabhávah_."]
[Footnote 460: Vyása has _karanapañchakarúpajaya_; Váchaspati explains
_rúpa_ by _grahanádi_ (cf. iii. 47).]
[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám_,
from Vyása's Comm.]
[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]
[Footnote 463: _Visoká._]
[Footnote 464: This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent
impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
_vyutthána_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by
the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
this in 'egoism' (_asmitá_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,
_prakriti_)." _Prakriti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in
equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
becomes predominant.]
[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áranyaka
i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
quotes the Svetásv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takes _avindat_ as "he
pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
Comm.]
[Footnote 466: This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]
[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pañchadasí. A Calcutta
Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivarana-sangraha (cf.
Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmana, p.
x), but, if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha, it is
by Bháratítírthavidyáranya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
88).]
APPENDIX.
ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
[As the _upádhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí,
which treat of it.]
cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term
(sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set
forth._
Our author now proceeds to define the _upádhi_ or condition,[468]
which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The
meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
produced from wet fuel," as an _upádhi_, since "wet fuel" is
necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]
"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be
dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being
produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch
as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have
nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the
argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the
site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and
therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
"emergent," _dvamsábháva_], inasmuch as perishability is found in
antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
included in any positive category of existence."
We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to
determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from
feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is
discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,
"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]
(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
that this is produced at all.]
But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably
accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or
else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is
determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]