THE JAIMINI-DARSANA.
An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how
is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mímámsá by the
holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímámsá consists of twelve books.[248] In
the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),
"explanatory passage" (_arthaváda_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition
(_smriti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
[as _e.g._, on _apúrva_] relating to the difference of various rites,
refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
third, _Sruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_linga_), "context"
(_vákya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent
opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karmáni_,
things mentioned incidentally (_anárabhyádhíta_), things accessory to
several main objects, as _prayájas_, &c., and the duties of the
sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhú_ being
made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which
form subordinate parts of the _rájasúya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the
relative order of different passages of _Sruti_, &c., the order of
different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
_vájapeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
the respective force of the words of _Sruti_, order of mention, &c.,
in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the
different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_úha_), the
adaptation of _sámans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions
connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _sámans_,
and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined
into one], and _ávápa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In
the twelfth, a discussion on _prasanga_ [where the rite is performed
for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.
Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the
Púrva-Mímámsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the
subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _primâ facie_ argument, (_d._)
the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sangati_).
The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
whether the study of Jaimini's _sástra_ concerning duty, beginning
with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
_anváhárya_," is to be commenced or not. The _primâ facie_ argument is
that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning
of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,
for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would
present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
baked flour cake called _purodása_ is made only of rice prepared by
being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
the principal _apúrva_, by means of the various minor effects or
subordinate _apúrvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of
the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apúrva_ of the
unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
no injunction to study the Púrva Mímámsá as a means of knowing the
sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
Visvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
offer the Visvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
present case also. As it has been said--
"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
analogy of the Visvajit, &c."
Thus, too, we shall keep the Smriti rule from being violated: "Having
read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
house to read the Mímámsá discussions, and thus the idea of no
interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three
reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mímámsá is not enjoined, (_b._) that
heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)
that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
we maintain that the study of the Mímámsá discussions on duty is not
to be commenced.
The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhánta_), however, is as
follows:--
We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been
adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be
rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us
is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _apúrva_,
produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
establishes the subordinate _apúrvas_ produced by the inferior
sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _apúrva_
produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
_apúrva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which
prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this
future influence called _apúrva_, the same doubt might equally
invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same
level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Visvajit_
offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--
"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of
a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."
But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
who reads the Veda with its _angas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this
knowledge, the study of Mímámsá will be useless." But this is not
true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will
determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mímámsá discussion that the true
meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of
Mímámsá is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
passage of Smriti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
the injunction we conclude that the study of the Púrva Mímámsá Sástra,
consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic
is connected with the main subject of the Sástra as being a subsidiary
digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
which helps to establish the main subject."[257]
I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhákara.
In the Smriti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct
him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
since, by Pánini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ní_ is used in the
_átmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a
teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Bráhman who girds his pupil with the
sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
_angas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_áchárya_)."
Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuváda_
or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _primâ facie_
argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
another way to suit this new view.
Now the _primâ facie_ argument was that the study of Mímámsá, not
being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
authoritatively enjoined.
Now the upholders of the former or _primâ facie_ view argue as
follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
sufficient, the Mímámsá discussions in question will have no subject
or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mímámsá
is not to be commenced."
We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _angas_, and
has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old
objection will recur with full force that the study of Mímámsá will
have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mímámsá
discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
Mímámsá _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.
"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyáya], "but how can
the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged
characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those
who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of
tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former
supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is
inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda
must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
character of sentences like those of Kálidása and other writers. And,
again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.
But [ask the Mímámsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
This reasoning, however [the Naiyáyikas answer], cannot rise to the
height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahábhárata was preceded by
an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
of the Mahábhárata, which must have been the same in former times as
now." But [the Mímámsakas will ask whether there is not a difference
between these two cases, since] the Smriti declares that [Vishnu
incarnate as] Vyása was the author of the Mahábhárata, in accordance
with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be the maker
of the Mahábhárata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
Smriti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
since those words of the Purushasúkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
sprang the Rich and Sáman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.
Further [proceed the Naiyáyikas] we hold that sound is
non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]
"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)
as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as
in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mímámsaka] how
can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara, who has
no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyáyika] is
not happy, because, though Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he
can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."
I shall now [says the Mímámsaka] clear up the whole question. What is
meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]
which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)
from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with
a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of
proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)
The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Málatímádhava
[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line
21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just
as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
if we granted that Paramesvara might assume a body in sport, in order
to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhákara] when he
refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--
"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]
it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
of form."
Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Rich and Sáman verses"]. For the
rule of Pánini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
grammatical affixes with which such names as Káthaka, Kálápa, and
Taittiríya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
"uttered by" Katha, Kalápin, &c., though we maintain that these names
have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.
Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,
because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this
idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises
from the latter reason, we Mímámsakas, who hold that the Veda is its
own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--
"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
mass of doubts."
(_b._) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somasarman is reading'?" This
objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
[the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímámsaka doctrine
of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
teacher--
"The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species
is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
of species is useless."
And again--
"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
non-eternity."
This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyáyika] treatise
by Vágíswara, entitled _Mána-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the
fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."
We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the
[Sánkhya and Vedánta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if
we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no
dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)
the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upádhi_] of
_asrávanatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at
great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply
[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises
from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
story, the demon Tála went away [as well as Betála] when the offering
of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised
by the author of the _Nyáyabhúshana_,[279] that, if sound were
eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyáyika) argument against the
existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
the soul.[282]
Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
duty.
"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how
about another well-known controversy? It is said--
"'The Sánkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
are self-proved; the followers of the Nyáya hold that both are proved by
something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
this discussion, how do the Mímámsakas accept as established their tenet
that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that
authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the
right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the
instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge
in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right
knowledge?
"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of
cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness
cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if
knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)
It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general
characteristic (_upádhi_) or a species (_játi_);[287] for if we call
it an _upádhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we
all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)
Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
Mímámsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong
knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask
whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which
produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
followers of the Nyáya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that
authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter
alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same
time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that
non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumáñjali,
i. 10]--
"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
as well as an effect.'
"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge
depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,
from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through
something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises
in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
non-authoritativeness.
"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
and recognised by means of something external, the Mímámsá tenet that
'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
rotten."
This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase
"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other
cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be
brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being
knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless
complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
it a _guna_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]
"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--
"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
_gunas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence
the non-existence of the two kinds of
non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general
conclusion."[300]
(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this
view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
&c.
As for your argument [O Naiyáyika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines
17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some
other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.
As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumáñjali, when he
tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mímámsá idea of
the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
controversy; since it has been said--
"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
(authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]
Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
divergency between the two great Mímámsá schools]:--The Veda is
composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_),
"explanatory passages" (_arthaváda_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and
by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third
person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
opinion of the followers of Bhatta Kumárila, who maintain that words
signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the
sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhákara, on the contrary, hold
that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 247: Mádhava here calls it the _práchí Mímámsá_.]
[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyáyamálávist_, pp. 5-9.]
[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;
but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
thus it must be a case of _ávápa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately
(_J. Nyáyamálá_, xi. 1, 13).]
[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshana-drishtaphala_.]
[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter
a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprápto niyamah pákshike
sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisamkhyá vidhíyate_.]
[Footnote 252: The Mímámsá holds that the potential and similar
affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one
they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
root-meaning (_artha-bhávaná_); by the other an enforcing power in the
word (_sabda-bhávaná_). Thus in _svargakámo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies
"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
course of action.]
[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
six _vikáras_ mentioned in Sankara's Vajrasúchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,
_jáyate_, _vardhate_, _viparinamate_, _apakshíyate_, _nasyati_. I do
not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
_apúrva_, sc. _phala_, _samudáya_, _utpatti_, and _anga_, described in
Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]
[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yáska's
_nirukta_.]
[Footnote 255: See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.]
[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]
[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the
_samgati_.]
[Footnote 258: Cf. Asvaláyana's Grihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.]
[Footnote 259: The _anuváda_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,
which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
authority. The _anuváda_ in the present case is the passage which
mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
_vidhi_ as to teaching.]
[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamánasya_, and so
the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamánasya_.]
[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently
borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
iii. p. 88.]
[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive
transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]
[Footnote 263: Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though
unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598,
from the MS. anthology called the _Subháshitárnava_. For _muktaka_,
see _Sáh. Darp._, § 558.]
[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
Mímámsá that sound is eternal.]
[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _visesha_, not
_sámánya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiseshika school than to the
Nyáya.]
[Footnote 266: The Mímámsaka allows that the _uchchárana_ or utterance
is non-eternal.]
[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]
[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
composition of Manu, &c."]
[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
material limitations.]
[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
developments (_atisayáh_) in their saints.]
[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
"manifest" the always existing sound.]
[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_náda_) is these
'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mímámsá Aphorisms_, i. 17.]
[Footnote 273: The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively
special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
course, have its corresponding special quality.]
[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshásiddheh_.]
[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darsana) for the
_upádhi_. The _upádhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle
term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects
that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes
found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in
_sound_ itself, according to the Mímámsá doctrine. To obviate this he
proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while
not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímámsá and
the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]
[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwamsa_ of sound, in
the latter its _prágabháva_.]
[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samápohi_,
_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _úh_.]
[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two
demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the
Simhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]
[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's
_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]
[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the
vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _samskrita_
here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]
[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,
_samskárakasamskáryabhávábhávánumánam_.]
[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichára_. The Naiyáyika
argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus
manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
manifested by the species. But the Mímámsá rejoins that this would
equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
sure that I rightly understand the argument.]
[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _púrva-paksha_, from p. 131, line
18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]
[Footnote 284: This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118).
The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_prámánya_),
which resides in it as its characteristic.]
[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
and therefore a substance.]
[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]
[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
"action," are called _játis_ or species; the last four, "genus,"
"_visesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
_upádhis_ or "general characteristics."]
[Footnote 288: The Púrva Mímámsá denies that recollection is right
knowledge.]
[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]
[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshábháva_ there is _pramá_; if
not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshábhávatvena_ for
_doshábhávasahakritatvena_.]
[Footnote 291: _Anyathásiddhatvam_ means _niyatapúrvavartitve sati
anávasyakatvam_.]
[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshábháva_.]
[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshábháva_ or the presence of a
"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]
[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramátva_) can only reside in
knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in
a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes
than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it
is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also
produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has
nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in
Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass
muster. The jar is not
produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-
at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]
[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
the previous long púrva-paksha.]
[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect"
(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former
alone.]
[Footnote 297: The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
_guna_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]
[Footnote 298: The _guna_ (or [Greek: beltistê hexis]) of an organ is not
properly a cause of _pramá_ but rather _doshábháva-bodhaka_.]
[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained
non-authoritativeness" (_nischitáprámánya_).]
[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not
necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]
[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _prámánya_.]
[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]
[Footnote 303: I read _tat-práchuryam_ for _tatpráchurye_ in p. 134,
line 7.]
[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mímámsá
school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]
[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _sakti_; _siddhe_
means _ghatádau_.]
[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mímámsá schools. The former, called
_abhihitánvaya-vádinah_, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by
themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidhá_ or
"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitábhidhána-vádinah_, hold that
words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
with an action. In _gám ánaya_, _gám_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but
_ánayanánvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with
"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
and _vice versâ_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative
Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]