THE AKSHAPÁDA (OR NYÁYA) DARSANA.
The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of
pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
particular tenet[205] of the Nyáya school, as is declared by the
author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
Nyáya Sástra. Now the Nyáya Sástra consists of five books, and each
book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_váda_). In the first
daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mímámsakas as
separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first
daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravritti_),
the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to
the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
of futility (_játi_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
for rebuke" (_nigrahasthána_, or "unfitness to be argued with").
In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pramána_) is
first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of
knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes
the peculiar tenet of the Nyáya School that God is a source of right
knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
chapter of the Kusumáñjali:
"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
school, the being separated from all absence thereof.
"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being
swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Siva, is my authority; what
have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
with rising doubts?"
"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant
qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The
thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.
"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]
A "tenet" (_siddhánta_) is something which is accepted as being
authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the
showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
of a false major[211] (cf. Sút. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of
eleven kinds, as _vyágháta_, _átmásraya_, _itaretarásraya_, &c.
"Ascertainment" (_nirnaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_váda_) is
a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only
wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitandá_) is the talk of a man
who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
43). "Dialogue" (_kathá_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
or "mistimed" (Sút. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing
forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
(_játi_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyáya
aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.
But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,
are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
of the Nyáya Sástra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Nyáya_, or logic,
properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
Nyáya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyáya from its
establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
action;"[212] and by Pakshila Swámin, "This is the science of
reasoning (_ánvíkshikí_) divided into the different categories,
'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
the declarations of science."[213]
But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
"No," for it is said in the second Nyáya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of
these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;
by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity"
produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,
as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,
by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right
activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced
it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his
mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyáya Sútras:
"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the
successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
them] final beatitude."
"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,
'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this
continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
Mádhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,
we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued
succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?
(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyáyikas allow
that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish
cognition as a cause of _pravritti_ or action[220]], for who would
oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,
then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,
again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive
to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].
"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
intelligence [_i.e._, the Yogácháras and the Sautrántikas[222]], that
'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
recognition of the real nature of things.
And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and
when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now
liberated.
Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and
error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of
a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has
parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
agent possessing form?[227]
Again, if we take the Chárváka's view "that the only bondage is
dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
equalled.[228]
Again, the Sánkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's
remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.
Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the
manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Sruti as the
proof, we reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is
precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its
authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
as floating stones.[230]
"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of
pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of
perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is
inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
Sruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.
But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Sruti? Certainly
perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,
must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor
can Sruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be
sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for
comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a
moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had
a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a
doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may
adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the
"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]
(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal
proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].
(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikánta_), since it is never
found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in
the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor
again is it precluded (_bádhita_ or _kálátyayopadishta_), for there is no
superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it
counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be
any such equally valid antagonist.
If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this
pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
argument thus involves the fallacy called _vyápyatvásiddhi_].[239] Nor
can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
to limitation by any suggested condition (_upádhi_),[240] [such as
"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
There is a rule laid down by Sankara-kinkara which applies directly to
the present case--
"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
establish its validity,
"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
major term."
If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
not.[241]
As has been said by Udayana Áchárya [in the Kusumáñjali, iii. 5]--
"If Sruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
ever."
Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
being known or unknown.[242]
"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
create the world." This has been said by Bhattáchárya--
"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;
"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
be left undone by Him?"--
We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for
a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this
there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
Svetásvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your
deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It
cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_
endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tívra_,[246] &c.)
Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
obtained; thus everything is clear.
E. B. C.
* * * * *
NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.
We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvábhásas_
of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhántamukt._, § 71, _Tarkasamgr._,
55-67), viz., _anaikánta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kálátyayopadishta_
or _bádhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first
of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichára_ or "erratic,"
_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sádhyasama_ or "unproved," and
_atítakála_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list
of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_
corresponds imperfectly to _prakaranasama_. The _prakaranasama_ or
"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is
non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one
which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
is a product."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.]
[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyáya Sút. iv.
68).]
[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include
the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right
knowledge.]
[Footnote 208: Ísvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramána_)
according to the definition, because he is _pramáyá ásrayah_.]
[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.]
[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
i. p. 315.]
[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is
the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).
Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
(_vyápaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyápya_").]
[Footnote 212: Action (_pravritti_) follows after the ascertainment of
the truth by _nyáya_.]
[Footnote 213: Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
reads _prakírtitá_ for _paríkshitá_.]
[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]
[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for
_tannivartakam_.]
[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the
stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki's
_Nítisára_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p.
3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.]
[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
lick her ear."]
[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road
through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with
tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]
[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
during the second, and ceases in the third.]
[Footnote 220: See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.]
[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have
sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
line 11.]
[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]
[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,
all is unreal.]
[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _klesas_ or "afflictions."]
[Footnote 225: _Ávarana_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]
[Footnote 226: But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,
mind (Bháshá P. § 83).]
[Footnote 227: The reading _múrtapratibandhát_ is difficult, but I
believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyápti_, as it does in Sánkhya
Sútras, i. 100.]
[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be
_niratisaya_,--incapable of being added to.]
[Footnote 229: _Yogyánupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and
yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
light, &c.]
[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_grávánah plavanti_,"
see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _asmánah plavanti_ occurs
in Shadv. Br. 5, 12.]
[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."]
[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]
[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
to reveal the existence of God.]
[Footnote 234: The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under
inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
relation of a name to the thing named.]
[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]
[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
_visesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"
excludes ether, &c.]
[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
eternal substances being the one or the other.]
[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where
the major term is.]
[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the
mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
validity of the assumed middle term."]
[Footnote 240: For the _upádhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]
[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
to the fault of _ásrayásiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your
subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as
that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]
[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparáhatatvát_, and then begin
the next clause with _syád etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparáhatah
syát tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]
[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
Hiranyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
constitutes his gross body (viráj).]
[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]
[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyásraya_ fallacy, see
_Nyáyasútra vritti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]
[Footnote 246: For _tívra_ cf. _Yoga sútras_, i. 21, 22.]