THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.
Ánanda-tírtha (Púrna-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rámánuja
system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
dependency upon the Pañcha-rátra, the reality of plurality in the
universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the
tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
new explication of the Brahma-Mímánsá (or Vedánta).
For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--
"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;
"The independent is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from
imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vádins): Why predicate of the
absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not
so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
Bráhman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being
irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishnu-tattva-nirnaya:
"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
Sánkhya-káriká, v. vii.)--
"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
defect in the organs, from instability of the common
sensory,
"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
and from aggregation of similars."
There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
similars.
Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
trouble.
Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring
as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
been said:--
"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
all that they desire."
Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vádins) in their thirst to be one
with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishnu is like a
mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishnu
they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same
thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
Mahábhárata-tátparya-nirnaya:--
"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishnu's anger is waxed
great;
"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
decide blindly."
This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.
Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
weapons of Náráyana (or Vishnu) as a memorial of him, and as a means
of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
of the Sákalya-samhitá:--
"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
Vishnu, which is the might of the gods,
"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuntha)
which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:
"The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
gods entered that heaven;
"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
world, that weapon Bráhmans wear (stamped upon them);
"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
Vishnu;
"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishnu), let
us become beatified."
Again, the Taittiríyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
particular parts to be branded are specified in the Ágneya-purána:--
"On his right hand let the Bráhman wear Sudarsana,
"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
Veda declared."
In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
branded with the discus:--
"Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,
"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
Vishnu.
"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
hand of Vishnu,
"Adored by all the gods; O Pánchajanya, to thee be
adoration."
(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
names as Kesava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
Lord.
(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
dedication to Náráyana of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
been said:--
"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
of ten kinds."
Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
the truth, O Bráhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."
Again:--
"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,
"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
perish not" (Bhagavad-gítá, xiv. 2).
According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."
Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
Bráhman devoutly a Súdra becomes a Bráhman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.
If any one urge that according to the text:--
"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"
this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue
of the testimony of many such passages as:--
"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
"The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O
Infinite.
"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
because it produces ideas;
"The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed
(_avidyá_) ignorance:
"Styled (_máyá_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
the name _máyá_ is used of the pre-eminent;
"The excellent knowledge of Vishnu is called, though one
only, by these names;
"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
by spontaneous beatitude."
That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).
If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
Vishnu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
Accordingly, the grand revelation:--
"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
between the unsentient and the Lord,
"A difference among souls, and a difference of the
unsentient and the soul each from the other.
"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
the world with its five divisions.
"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
beginning it would have an end:
"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
illusorily imagined:
"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
ceases.
"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
that lack knowledge;
"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
and sustained by Vishnu."
The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
excellence of Vishnu. With this in view the Lord declared:--
"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
the imperishable;
"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
unmodified.
"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
Spirit,
"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
worlds.
"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
the imperishable (soul),
"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
of persons (_Purushottama_);
"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
all-knowing worships me in every wise.
"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
(Arjuna):
"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
has to do, O Bhárata" (Bhagavad-gítá, xv. 16-20).
So in the Mahá-varáha--
"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
spouse of Sri;
"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
must be subordinate."
It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
excellence of Vishnu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,
according to the text of the Bhállaveya Upanishad: While merit,
wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu, according to the
text of the Náráyana Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
Vishnu-purána--
"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
emancipation."
And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only through the
knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
the real purport.
"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
unknown,
"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
be one?"
And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
revelation:--
"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
similarity of cognition,
"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
place of the individual;
"Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
different,
"The difference being independence and completeness (in the
Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
individual spirit)."
Or to propose another explanation of the text, _Átmá tat tvam asi_,
That art thou, it may be divided, _átmá tat tvam asi_. He alone is
soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--
"Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be
well got rid of."
According, therefore, to the Tattva-váda-rahasya, the words in the
nine examples (in the Chhándogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--
"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
trees;
"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;
"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;
"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.
"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
the supreme Hari
"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
individual spirit, though he is its actuator;
"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
he is bound."
And again--
"Brahmá, Siva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
decay of their bodies;
"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
for the sustentation of Lakshmí.
"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,
"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
him."
And again:--
"Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
from transmigration,
"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.
"Vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
ruler.
"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."
That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
Advaita-vádins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_
and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,
cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.
Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or
transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
author of the Nyáya-nirvána: The proof of the permanence of the
transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
And in the Tárkika-rakshá--
"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
or not such and such,
"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
called Nitya-sama."
With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.
If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.
The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to
purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.
Accordingly it is stated in the Gáruda-purána:--
"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
regularly; what then is the reason of this?
"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
the most excellent?
"Tell me this, Brahmá, that I may know it truly."
Thus addressed by Nárada, the most excellent Brahmá replied:--
"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
in an auspicious sense,
"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."
It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Náráyana,
and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
words of the Skanda-purána--
"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"
and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
Kaurma-purána--
"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case
"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
evidence;
"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
revelation and tradition,
"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
hesitation."
What a Sástra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
the Skanda-purána:--
"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the
Atharva-veda, the Mahábhárata, the Pañcha-rátra, and the
original Rámáyana, are called Sástras.
"That also which is conformable to these is called Sástra.
"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
heterodoxy."
According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
has said:--
"I ever laud Náráyana, the one being to be known from
genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
excellences."
It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth
aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
construction, in the Brihat-samhitá:--
"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
purport is ascertained."
It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the
Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
remains may be sought from the Ánandatírtha-bháshya-vyákhyána (or
exposition of the Commentary of Ánanda-tírtha). We desist for fear of
giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
promulgated by Púrna-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
third incarnation of Váyu:--
"The first was Hanumat, the second Bhíma,
"The third Púrna-prajña, the worker of the work of the
Lord."
After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
following stanza at the conclusion of his work:--
"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
text of the Veda, sufficiently
"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
splendour of the Veda;
"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
the words of Ráma (Hanumat); the second was Bhíma;
"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
composed in regard to Kesava."
The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
texts.
The purport of this is that Vishnu is the principle above all others
in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]
A. E. G.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 111: For a further account of Ánanda-tírtha or Madhva see
Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
Brahma-sútras has been printed in Calcutta.]