THE RÁMÁNUJA SYSTEM.
This doctrine of the Árhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
should there not be an alternation between existence and
non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that
alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ganesa
and of the incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for the
elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different
relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
_bhangas_ (Árhata tenets).
Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhangas_, which lies at
the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for
the neck of the Syád-Vádin.
An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Árhata
system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
whether it be ninefold or not!
In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Árhatas
say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul
for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
and evil unmerited.
As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.
Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyása accordingly
propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rámánuja with the
express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
of Rámánuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as
soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
Thus it has been said--
"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
(Vishnu)
"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
world is not-soul."
Others, again (the followers of Sankaráchárya), maintain that pure
intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,
pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
thinking themselves very wise, the Sánkaras will not tolerate this
division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This
might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
(to explain the views of the Sánkara)--
"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
knowledge,
"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."
This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
who leans on the arm of Prabhákara, or one to whom Kumárila-bhatta
gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--
"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
existent and non-existent,
"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.
"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
else is observed."
They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and
knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Sánkaras continue) as the
foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
ignorance.
All this (the Rámánuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance
accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
cognition allowed by us both.
Well, then (the Sánkaras may contend), let the form of cognition
evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior
non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
We dismiss further prolixity.
The counterposition (of the Rámánujas) is as follows:--The illusion
under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any
one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not
start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,
constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,
as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,
while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
like texts.
It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
(_anrita_); for the word untruth (_anrita_) denotes that which is
other than truth (_rita_). The word _rita_ has a passive sense, as
appears from the words, Drinking _rita_. _Rita_ means works done
without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
question, untruth (_anrita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is
obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the
entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such
texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_máyá_) to be the primary
emanative cause (_prakriti_), the term (_máyá_) designates the
emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guna_), and
creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
inexplicable illusion (for which the Sánkaras contend).
In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_máyá_) of the barbarian were
swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
(_máyá_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vádin may
reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
This suggestion (the Rámánujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
"implication" (_lakshaná_, both This and That being used in their
denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be
inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
will be triumphant.
We have, therefore (the Rámánujas continue), laid it down in this
question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
is the body.
Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are
designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
Hence--
God, Man, Yaksha, Pisácha, serpent, Rákshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they
what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktávalí and in the Chaturantara--
"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
than That, called the established entity,
"Of this there is much significant and undoubted
exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;
"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
form of gods, mortals, and the rest
"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
a diversity of names and forms in the world."
In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that
it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all
words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
Rámánuja in the Vedártha-sangraha, when analysing the Vedic text about
names and forms.
Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
there is no proof of these positions.
Nor is there an absurdity (as the Sánkaras would say), on the
hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
cause (_prakriti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute
spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
cognition all cognition would be sublated.
It is laid down (by the Rámánujas) that retractation into the universe
(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
and the originant (_prakriti_), returns to its imperceptible state,
unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyása)
treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]
What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the
essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
not to be confounded.
Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
divine.
Venkata-nátha has given the following distribution of things:--
"Those who know it have declared the principle to be
twofold, substance and non-substance;
"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.
"The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'
(_parák_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
Lord;
"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
principle some have called the unsentient primary."
Of these--
"Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;
"Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and
cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;
"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
characterised by goodness;
"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
summarily recounted."
Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kanáda, iii. 2, 20),
Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
of souls is often spoken of in revelation--
"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
it again cease to be;
"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gítá, ii. 20).
Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25): Because
no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
atomic is well known from revelation--
"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
hundred times,
"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
capable of infinity."
And again--
"Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
atomic."
The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vásudeva
(a patronymic of Krishna), and the like.
"Vásudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
auspicious attributes,
"The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
animator of spirits."
This same Vásudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
(_archá_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vyúha_), "the
subtile" (_súkshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Ráma,
and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vásudeva,
Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vásudeva. His
attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
has, therefore, been said--
"Vásudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
desired by each,
"According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
recompense.
"For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
embodiments;
"Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
'emanations;'
"As Sankarshana, Vásudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
is the entire six attributes;
"That self-same called Vásudeva is styled the Supreme
Spirit;
"The internal controller is declared as residing in the
soul, the actuator of the soul,
"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
as 'Who abiding in the soul.'
"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
defilement becomes a qualified votary;
"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,
"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
to behold the 'internal controller.'"
The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcha-rátra as
consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishnu, the
commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no
future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
traditionary text--
"When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
having attained to the supreme consummation.
"Vásudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
return."
After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedánta aphorisms by
the venerated Bodháyanachárya too prolix, Rámánuja composed a
commentary on the Sárírakamímánsá (or Vedánta theosophy). In this the
sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism
means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because
one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
the latter Mímánsá constitute one system of institutes. On this
account the glossator has described this system as one with the
sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
Pañcharátra-rahasya--
"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,
"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.
"These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
Subtile, the Internal Controller,
"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
knowledge.
"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,
"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
embodiment.
"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
traditional,
"By the aforesaid worship Vásudeva becomes propitious to
mankind.
"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
meditation,
"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
aggregate of works.
"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
transmigration has vanished,
"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.
"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
the Lord,
"Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
Deity.
"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;
"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."
It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
desire is predominant (in the word _jijñásitavya_), and desired
knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
_shadangena vedo'dhyeyo jñeyascha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,
is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.
"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,
"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
Highest and Lowest,"
because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
the representations. The author of the Vákya has treated of all this
in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--
"To them always devoted, who worship me with love,
"I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
me."
And again--
"That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
unwavering."
But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
other means. As is said by the author of the Vákya: Attainment
thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),
practice (_abhyása_), observance (_kriyá_), excellence (_kalyána_),
freedom from despondency (_anavasáda_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),
according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gítá) by (Rámánuja) the
author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
(Vaikuntha) is attained. Thus Yámuna says: Attainable by the final and
absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
the devotion of works and knowledge.
In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to
be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmá
to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
omniscient, and omnipotent.
In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.
Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is
the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
from the original (viz., Rámánuja's Bháshya on the Vedánta aphorisms);
we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
and thus all is clear.[110]
A. E. G.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
297, 298.]
[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
the plaything of God.]
[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._]
[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Rámánuja and his system,
see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
The _Tattva-muktávalí_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;
but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]