THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.
The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain
extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that
one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts
only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel
line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if
this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A
might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an
essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series
to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
it has been said--
"'In whatever series of successive states the original
impression of the action was produced,
"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
produced in cotton.
"'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the
citron, &c.,
"'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see
it?'"
But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
overthrown by the following dilemma:--
In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your
favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove
your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."
As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
holders of the Syád-váda[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the
indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
held to be one [throughout all"].
Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya--
"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of
memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
destruction!"
Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
and consequently the _Álambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.
29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
(_pratyaya_).[43]
If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a
definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],
and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all
our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are
applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a
mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it
represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
hopeless difficulties.
If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is
a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
constituting its character.[46]
All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the
_Prameyakamalamártanda_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
the book too much.
Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept
the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine.
The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,[47]
in his _Áptanischayálankára_.
"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the
declarer of things as they are."
But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhatta Kumárila[48]]?
1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
help us as a sign to infer his existence.
2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals
an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
passages (_arthaváda_) be applied here.
3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
repetitions (_anuváda_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
before.
4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
spurious Veda?
5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?
How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
support?
6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
point be established without some previously established foundation?
7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
words.
8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
proof, comparison (_upamána_).
9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,
if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."
We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,
&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become
omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its
hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things
remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímámsist could not maintain
that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be
the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that
universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
Púrva Mímámsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
prohibitions, as is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the Sútras,
i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it
is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior
assaults of argument can be put to flight.
But the Naiyáyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated"
necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the
latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?
according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a
maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?
Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would
include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it
would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by
intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the
third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,
because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you
mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
existence.
Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach
too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object
of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
all-pervading].
And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?
In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of
many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if
all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vítarágastuti_, or "Praise
of Jina"--
1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
whose teacher art _thou_."
And again--
2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
of yourself or all the artisans, if Íswara fabricates the three
worlds?"
Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.
Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are
impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this
universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
faults as _Anyonyásrayatá_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal
succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
much for this preliminary discussion.
The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are
thus described in the _Paramágamasára_ (which is devoted to the
exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right
knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
thus explained by Yogadeva:--
(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been
declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary
idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
_Tattvártha-sútra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right
'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.
(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
doubt; as it has been said--
"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
wise."
This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _sruta_, _avadhi_,
_manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _s_ruta,
_avadhi_, _manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The
meaning of this is as follows:--
1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the
operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
being abolished.
2. _Sruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the
obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
&c.[56]
4. _Manas-paryáya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's
thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
Thus it has been said--
"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
ways."
But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
the Arhat--
1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of
blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
the 'five vows,' _ahimsá_, _súnrita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharyá_, and
_aparigraha_.[57]
2. "The 'vow' of _ahimsá_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
_súnrita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
others and prejudicial.
4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharyá_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
one's causing another to act.
6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive
interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."
The full account of the five states of mind (_bhávaná_) has been given
in the following passage [of which we only quote one sloka]--
"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _súnrita_ uninterruptedly by the
abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.
These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,
and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce
the elixir's effect, but not severally.
Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,
_jíva_ and _ajíva_; the soul, _jíva_, is pure intelligence; the
non-soul, _ajíva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
said--
"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."
_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
_pradesa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
these."[61]
Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real
nature of the soul viewed as _parinata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];
but by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ it appears
in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence
of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
&c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]--
"The _aupasamika_, the _Ksháyika_, and the 'mixed' states are the
nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Párinámika_."
1. The _aupasamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of
past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
nut-plant,[64] &c.
2. The _Ksháyika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
3. The "mixed" (_misra_) state combines both these, as when water is
partly pure.
4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
influence on the future]. The _Párinámika_ state is the soul's innate
condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent
states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the
above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.
This has been explained in the _Svarúpa-sambodhana_--
"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some
way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;
such is the soul described to be."
If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
advocates of the _Syád-váda_) it is perfectly notorious that all
things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.
Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned
above, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; they hold that there are five _astikáyas_
or categories,--_jíva_, _ákása_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.
To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67]
as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
apply the idea of "body" (_káya_),[68] from their occupying several
parts of space.
The _jívas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),
and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _samjñá_,
_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable"
(_sthávara_).
The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as
possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be
made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are
aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which
have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,
are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of
earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]
These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense
of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
passing into any other state of existence.
_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _ákása_ are singular categories [and not
generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
the causes of a substance's change of place.
_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They
assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
Lokákása; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
_ákása_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
occupied by another.
_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the
compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_púr_), and "dissolve" (_gal_).
Although "time" is not properly an _astikáya_, because it does not
occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;
"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities
reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jíva_, form, &c., of the
body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
"demerit," and _ákása_. "Action" (_paryáya_) has thus been defined;
the actions (_paryáyáh_) of a substance are, as has been said, its
existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jíva_, the knowledge of
objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the
lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special
functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_
[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].
Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--
"The _tattvas_ are _jíva_, _ajíva_, _ásrava_, _bandha_, _samvara_,
_nirjará_, and _moksha_." _Jíva_ and _ajíva_ have been already described.
_Ásrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]
through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
_audárika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _ásrava_,
because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is
called _ásrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jíva_, heated
by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
by _yoga_. _Kasháya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
pride, delusion, and lust. _Ásrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what
is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.
These various subdivisions of _ásrava_ have been described at length
in several _Sútras_. "_Ásrava_ is the impulse to action with body,
speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Ásrava_ is the
action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
&c."[76]
_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kasháya_),
and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many
parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--
"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"
In this quotation the word "sin" (_kasháya_) is used to include the
other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
Váchakáchárya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
sin."
(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural
character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or
derived, when learned by another's teaching.
(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.
(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pramáda_) is a want of effort to practise the
five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.
(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction
that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of
bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubháva_; _yoga_ [or _ásrava_] causes
those kinds called _prakriti_ and _pradesa_.
"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakriti_, _sthiti_,
_anubháva_, and _pradesa_ are its four kinds."
1. _Prakriti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
eight _múla-prakritis_.[77]
Thus obstructions (_ávarana_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,
as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)
_jnánávarana_, or (_b_) _darsanávarana_. (_c_) An object recognised as
simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedaníya_. (_d_)
A delusion (_mohaníya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the
Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)
_Áyus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _Náman_, or
"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of
noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antaráya_
produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the
king by considerations of economy.
Thus is the _prakriti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the
eight _múla-prakritis_, with subdivisions according to the different
actions of the various subject-matter.
And thus has Umáswáti-váchakáchárya[80] declared: "The first kind of
_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
_vedaníya_, _mohaníya_, _áyus_, _náman_, _gotra_, and _antaráya_;" and he
has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
explained at full length in the _Vidyánanda_ and other works, and here is
omitted through fear of prolixity.
2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued
unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
three _múla-prakritis_, _jnánávarana_, &c., and the last, _antaráya_, have
not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of
periods of time measured by thirty _ságaropamas_."[81] This continuance is
_sthiti_.
3. _Anubháva._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there
exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies
produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubháva_)
for producing their respective effects.
4. _Pradesa._ The _bandha_ called _pradesa_ is the entrance into the
different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
consequences of actions.
_Samvara_ is the stopping of _ásrava_--that by which the influence of
past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the
soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it
is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the
acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
into five kinds, as _íryá_,[83] _bháshá_, &c., as has been explained
by Hemachandra.
1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
call _íryá_.
2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with
all people; this is called _bháshá-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of
speech.
3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshaná-samiti_.[85]
4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the
_ádána-samiti_.
5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the
_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed
as that which closes (_sam_ + _vrinoti_) the door of the stream of
_ásrava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_Ásrava_ is the cause
of mundane existence, _samvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this
is the Árhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
of this.'"
_Nirjará_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
&c. This _nirjará_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yathákála_) and
ancillary (_aupakramanika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,
_nirjará_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.
But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjará_ of
actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjará_ arises, which is
twofold, _sakámá_ and _akámá_. That called _sakámá_ belongs to
ascetics, the _akámá_ to other embodied spirits."[91]
_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are
abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjará_, there arises the
absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been
said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
(_nirjará_) of the causes of bondage and of existence."
Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_
exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.
"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _sanga_ is
merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--
"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
from the absence of _sanga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."
Hence they recite a sloka:--
"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
moon, and the rest;
"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
Álokákása."
Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
untainted by any pain or impression thereof.
Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
This has been declared in the _Siddhánta_, "_Jíva_, _ajíva_, _punya_,
_pápa_, _ásrava_, _samvara_, _nirjarana_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are
the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.
Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
_sapta-bhangí-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
and not predicable." All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:--
1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'
2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure
likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.
3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.
4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
employed simultaneously."
_Syát_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
has been said--
"This particle _syát_ is in the form of a verb, but, from
its being connected with the sense, it denotes
indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
on the implied meaning."
If, again, the word _syát_ denoted determinateness, then it would be
needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syát_,
"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathamchit_; and so it is
not really useless. As one has said--
"The doctrine of the _syád-váda_ arises from our everywhere rejecting
the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhangí-naya_,
and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
be accepted."
If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_
or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the
thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the
phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghatósti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"
would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been
declared--
"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
implies 'is;'
"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.
The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
inexplicable (_anirvachaníyatá_);[97] three other classes hold one or
other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,
when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
to the holder of the _Syád-váda_, which ascertains the entire meaning
of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syádváda-mañjarí_--
"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point
proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syád-váda_,
which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."
"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
with no partiality equally favours all sects."
The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri--
"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our
system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of
knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
(_pramána_) in the _Syád-váda_ doctrine,--sense-perception and
inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jíva_, the _ajíva_, merit and demerit,
_ásrava_, _samvara_, _bandha_, _nirjará_, _mukti_,--we will now
explain each. _Jíva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajíva_ is all other
than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
opposite; _ásrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjará_ is the
unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight
forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
included in _samvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _ásrava_.
"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is
hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
liberation is declared by Jina. The Swetámbaras are the destroyers of
all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,
they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
Jaina _Sádhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry
peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the
Jaina Rishis.
"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so
say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
between them and the Swetámbaras."[106]
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]
[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,
alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]
[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syád-vádinám_.]
[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _gráhyasya_
for _agráhyasya_.]
[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]
[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyágrahanam_ to _tasyá
grahanam_ (_tasyá_ being _jadatáyáh_).]
[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen
though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the
_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]
[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarúpam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,
_infra_.]
[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's
writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
Sánkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a
little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhát kaschid
vidyáleso játah._]
[Footnote 49: Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
proofs,--the sixth, _abháva_, being negative, is, of course, not
applicable. I understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability
of "presumption" or _arthá-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
cannot be convincing in his own.]
[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhávávedakasya_ for
_tatsadbhávádekasya_.]
[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilárthajñanát notpatty_, I
propose to read _nikhilárthajñánotpatty_.]
[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Kárya_ and equally disputed.]
[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Sarírí_), "my
hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]
[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the
_Anavasthádosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed
fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
everybody's eyes.]
[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvárthe_ for
_tattvártham_.]
[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarsanádi_ for
_asamyagdarsanádi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]
[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sútras_, ii. 30.
Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]
[Footnote 58: I read _kámánám_ for _kámánám_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 =
18).]
[Footnote 59: For _abháshana_, see Hemach. 16.]
[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,
_rasayanajñánasraddhávacháranáni_ for _rasáyanajñanam
sraddhánávaranáni_. For _avachárana_, see _Susruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,
&c. If _anávarana_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
absence of obstructions."]
[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]
[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ or
_kshayopasama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]
[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushádyákárena_ for
_kalushányákárena_. The _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ seem to
correspond to the _aupasamika_ and _ksháyika_ states about to be
described.]
[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]
[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not
really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]
[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
the eye, light, &c.]
[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'stíti_ for _sthiti_.]
[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikáya_.]
[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one
sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _sankhagandolakaprabhritayas
trasás chaturvidháh prithivyaptejo_.]
[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _teshám ajívatvát_ for _teshám
jívatvát_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
the former only are animate."]
[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatrávasthite_ for
_sarvatrávasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _álokenávachchhinne_ for
_álokenávichchhinne_.]
[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is
_upabhoga-sádhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyanuka_. This category
takes up the forms of _sthávara_ which were excluded from _jíva_.]
[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava
for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaisesh. Sútra_, i. 1, 15. _Paryáya_ is
explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Paryáya_, in p. 36, line 11
(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
_Abhidh_. 1503, _paryáyo 'nukramah kramah_.]
[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
to act.]
[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _ásravanakáranatvád_.]
[Footnote 76: The _jnána_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
by its connection with the senses and external objects.]
[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in
Govindánanda's gloss, _Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33.]
[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _ádaraníyasya_ for
_ávaraníyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _ávaraníya_ may be used for
_ávarana_ (_Pán._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga Sút._, ii. 52, where Vyása's
Comm. has _ávaraníya_.]
[Footnote 79: _Jálavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]
[Footnote 80: Umásvámi-?]
[Footnote 81: For the _ságaropama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.
309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ityádyuktakálád úrdhvam api_ for the
obscure _ityádyuktam káladurddhánavat_. I also read at the end of the
line _prachyutih sthitih_ for _prachyutisthitih_.]
[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svakáryakarane_.]
[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _írshyá_ read
_íryá_,--a bad misreading.]
[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _ápadyetá_ for _ápadyatá_.]
[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshaná_ read _saishaná_.]
[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagatítale_.]
[Footnote 87: Mádhava omits the remaining divisions of _samvara_.
Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishahá_,
"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
patience, gentleness," &c.; _bhávaná_, "conviction," such as that
worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _cháritra_, "virtuous
observance."]
[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _ásravasrotaso_.]
[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]
[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yathákála-_ for _yathá
kála-_.]
[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably
corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
_nirjará_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjará_
is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
attainment of the highest good. The former is _akámá_, "desireless,"
because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
latter is _sakámá_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]
[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
which future actions are to be performed.]
[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."]
[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhangí-naya_, see Ved. S.
Gloss., ii. 2, 23.]
[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
line, _kim vritatadvidheh_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]
[Footnote 96: Thus Govindánanda applies it (_Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33) to
"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.]
[Footnote 97: '[Greek: AkatalêpsiaAkatalêpsia]. This is
Sriharsha's tenet in the _Khandana-khanda-khádya_.]
[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _matenámisritáni_ read _matena
misritáni_.]
[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]
[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidhána-chintámani_,
72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antaráyás_, _rágadwesháv
aviratih smarah_, and _háso_ for _himsá_. The order of the eighteen
_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.]
[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartinih_.]
[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]
[Footnote 103: In last line, for _samsrave_ read _samvare_.]
[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's
_Bhagavatí_, pp. 250, 261-266.]
[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharanáh_ is explained by the _rajoharanadhárin_
(= _vratin_) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.]
[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _strím_ read _strí_.]