THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.
At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid
down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
accordingly been said--
"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not
through the mere observation of the desired result in
similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
dissimilar cases."[29]
On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and
non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that
uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30]
1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.
2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For
reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
can reference to the same object take place where there is a
reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.
It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).
If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
_pramána_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
term. Conformably it has been said by Tathágata--
"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
its being present to the understanding of others.
"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
negation by a certain person."
All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.
These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mádhyamika,
Yogáchára, Sautrántika, and Vaibháshika, these Buddhists adopt
respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects
(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
and so forth, according to their several inclinations.
It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.
Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)
like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one
object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary
succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--
"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
alternative;
"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
repugnance in the very statement."[33]
And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.
Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.
You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there
is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:
"What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
is on the skin of man;
"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
produced upon it."
Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_
its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in
infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another
auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on
the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.
Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
regression is firmly set up.
In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
your embarrassment.
Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the
supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
_kurvad rúpa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
its fruit.
Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.
That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
to those times.
(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jñána-srí--
"What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
things;
"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);
"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
the work of another;
"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
true in regard to that which we have to prove."
Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
Vaiseshikas and Naiyáyikas, that existence is a participation in the
universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
universal) could have no existence.
Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for
such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_
existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.
Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Prasasta-páda
has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.
Conformably it has been said--
"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
place, engages without moving from that place in producing
itself in another place.
"This entity (universality) is not connected with that
wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
that place: great is this miracle.
"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
of difficulties!"
If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.
That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
pain, and pain alone.
If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
all is like itself alone, like itself alone.
In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular
nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon
that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection
between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be
unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
objects of the negation; the Mádhyamikas excellently wise explain as
follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
reality.
The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four
alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.
If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
is said--
"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
like, for instance;
"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
of the sky and the like, for instance."
The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
Buddha in the Alankárávatára[34]--
"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
ascertained;[35]
"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
natureless."
And again--
"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."
That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--
"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."
In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be
taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
their conventional designation of Mádhyamikas (or mediocre).
Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogácháras, because while they
accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent
cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakírti: "To one
who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."
An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the
following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a
complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
been said--
"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
have six surfaces;
"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
body of atomic dimension."
Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is
shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous
with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--
"There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
cognition ulterior thereto;
"There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
intellect shines forth of itself alone."
The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
beginning and without interruption; as it has been said--
"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
cognition thereof are identical;
"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."
And again--
"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
reason of illusory perceptions,
"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
of percipient."
Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the
energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
has been said--
"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,
"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
percipient;
"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
the like,
"Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
percipient and percept."
Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.
When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).
Others again (the Sautrántikas) hold that the position that there is
no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they
proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because
inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the
cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
so it has been said--
"This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
portion,
"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
illusion."
And again--
"The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
as if it were external."
To this we reply (say the Sautrántikas): This is untenable, for if
there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and
your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.
If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrántikas) reply that this
objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--
"If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They
recognise perceptibility,
"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
its imposition of its form."
To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
be inferred. Therefore it has been said--
"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
without losing the nature of a half;
"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
is the nature of the knowable."
For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as
it has been said--
"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
about the Ego:
"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
the rest."
Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
presentments resulting from ideation.
According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vijñánavádin_),
ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,
the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been
equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
its modifications.
So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
these, the sensible world (_rúpa-skandha_) is the sense organs and
their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
discriminated (_rúpyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the
stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words
"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.
Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
said--
"The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36]
In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism
comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
Tathágatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathágata
Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
between the cause and effect, results from production or from
non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_
(in the word _sthitita_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,
from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
unduly prolix.
Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrántika arose from
the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism
(_sútra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
Sautrántikas."
Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to
produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
venerated Buddha styled Práthamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the
internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddhá
bháshá_), and are known under the designation of Vaibháshikas. Their
technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of
inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--
"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
were aught else,
"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."
Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
fully discussed in describing the Sautrántikas (cf. p. 27), and
therefore need not here be further detailed.
It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according
to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--
"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
(of those who are to be taught),
"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
plurality of methods.
"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
superficial,
"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
universal void which is a negation of duality."
It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
inner seats (_áyatana_) is conducive to felicity.
"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats
"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
aught else below?
"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,
"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
the wise as the twelve inner seats."
The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
Viveka-vilása:--
"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
universe is momentarily fluxional;
"The following four principles in order are to be known by
the name of the noble truths:--
"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
held,[38]
"And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
heard in order.
"Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are
declared to be five,--
"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.
"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
and the rest, the common sensory,
"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the
twelve inner seats.
"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
it arises in the heart of man.
"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
aggregate.
"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,
"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
emancipation.
"Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
perception and inference.
"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
the Vaibháshikas and the rest.
"The Vaibháshika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
cognition;
"The Sautrántika allows no external object apprehensible by
perception;
"The Yogáchára admits only intellect accompanied with forms;
"The Mádhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.
"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
emancipation,
"Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of
cognitions and impressions.
"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
single meal in the forenoon,
"The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
Bauddha mendicants."[39]
A. E. G.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 29: This sloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
read more correctly, _'darsanán na na darsanát_.]
[Footnote 30: Kusumánjali, iii. 7.]
[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--
(1.) Mádhyamikas or Nihilists.
(2.) Yogácháras or Subjective Idealists.
(3.) Sautrántikas or Representationists.
(4.) Vaibháshikas or Presentationists.]
[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth
part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in
another."]
[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]
[Footnote 34: Query, Lankávatára?]
[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_
the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."]
[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read
_samudaya_?]
[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
agency."]
[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
30.]
[Footnote 39: Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudáya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem
to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]