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TRÜBNER'S
ORIENTAL SERIES.
THE
SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
OR
_REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._
BY
MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA.
TRANSLATED BY
E. B. COWELL, M.A.
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.
AND
A. E. GOUGH, M.A.
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND
PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.
LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
1882.
* * * * *
PREFACE.
I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Mádhava
Áchárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
Pandit Ísvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent edition, with no
important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pandit Táránátha
Tarkaváchaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
noticed the same thing in the Nágarí copies of Mádhava's Commentary on
the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.
As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic
Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
read it with my friend Pandit Mahesachandra Nyáyaratna, the present
Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits
of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
advantage of the help of some of the Pandits of Benares, especially of
Pandit Ráma Misra, the assistant Professor of Sánkhya, who was himself
a Rámánuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
the Benares Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
revised for their present republication.
The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical
systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
Darsanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
continually following in their track even where he does not quote
their exact words.[2]
The systems are arranged from the Vedánta point of view,--our author
having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smárta order in
the Math of Sringeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Samkara
Áchárya, the great Vedántist teacher of the eighth century, through
whose efforts the Vedánta became what it is at present--the
acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
ascending scale,--the first, the Chárváka and Bauddha, being the
lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedánta, and the last, the
Sánkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.
The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest
minds in India throughout the mediæval period of its history. Hiouen
Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les écoles philosophiques sont
constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnées s'élève
comme les flots de la mer. Les hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent
à des maîtres particuliers, et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous
au même but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the
mediæval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among
the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
trees Árhata begging monks, Svetapadas, Mahápásupatas, Pándarabhikshus,
Bhágavatas, Varnins, Kesaluñchanas, Lokáyatikas, Kápilas, Kánádas,
Aupanishadas, Ísvarakárins, Dharmasástrins, Pauránikas, Sáptatantavas,
Sábdas, Páñcharátrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets
and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in
the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Mádhava's poem on the
controversial triumphs of Samkara Áchárya, and in the spurious prose work
on the same subject, ascribed to Anantánandagiri. Well may some old poet
have put into the mouth of Yudhishthira the lines which one so often hears
from the lips of modern pandits--
Vedá vibhinnáh smritayo vibhinná,
Násau munir yasya matam na bhinnam,
Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guháyám,
Mahájano yena gatah sa pantháh.[4]
And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,
[Greek: mias toinyn ousês tês alêtheias, to gar pseudos myrias
ektropas echei, kathaper hai bakchai ta tou Pentheôs diaphorêsasai
melê hai tês philosophias tês te barbarou tês te
Hellênikês haireseis, hekastê hoper elachen, hôs pasan auchei
tên alêtheian, phôtos d', oimai, anatolê panta phôtizetai.]
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
equanimity is that of Váchaspati Misra, who wrote standard treatises
on each of the six systems except the Vaiseshika, adopting, of course,
the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
alien tenet.]
[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]
[Footnote 3: Sríharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]
[Footnote 4: Found in the Mahábh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
give them as I have heard them from Pandit Rámanáráyana Vidyáratna.]
CONTENTS.
Page
I. The Chárváka System (E. B. C.) 2
II. The Bauddha System (A. E. G.) 12
III. The Árhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.) 36
IV. The Rámánuja System (A. E. G.) 64
V. The Púrna-prajña System (A. E. G.) 87
VI. The Nakulísa-Pásupata System (A. E. G.) 103
VII. The Saiva System (E. B. C.) 112
VIII. The Pratyabhijñá or Recognitive System (A. E. G.) 128
IX. The Rasesvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.) 137
X. The Vaiseshika or Aulúkya System (E. B. C.) 145
XI. The Akshapáda or Nyáya System (E. B. C.) 161
XII. The Jaiminíya System (E. B. C.) 178
XIII. The Pániníya System (E. B. C.) 203
XIV. The Sánkhya System (E. B. C.) 221
XV. The Pátañjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.) 231
XVI. The Vedánta or System of Samkara Áchárya 273
APPENDIX--On the Upádhi (E. B. C.) 275
* * * * *
THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
THE PROLOGUE.
1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
_him_ only has this all a maker.
2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishnu, who knows all the Ágamas,
the son of Sárngapáni, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
proper meaning of the term Soul.
3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava
mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
fortunate Sáyana.
4. Having thoroughly searched the Sástras of former teachers, very
hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyana-Mádhava[5] the lord has
expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
delight in a garland strung of various flowers?
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
Vamsa-Bráhmana, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mádhava and
Sáyana. Sáyana is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born
after all the elder children have died. Mádhava elsewhere calls Sáyana
his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sáyana-Mádhavah
here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
same person. The body seems meant by the Sáyana of the third sloka.
Máyana was the father of Mádhava, and the true reading may be
_sríman-máyana_.]
CHAPTER I.
THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.
[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Siva, the
abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka,
the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
of Brihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be
eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
refrain--
While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?
The mass of men, in accordance with the Sástras of policy and
enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for
that school is Lokáyata,--a name well accordant with the thing
signified.[6]
In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original
principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are
destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Sruti
for this [Brihad Árany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the
soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.
The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
poet--
The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning
of fools;
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered
with husk and dust?[9]
If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are
only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then
again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
destructive, as the authority of the jñána-kánda is overthrown by
those who maintain that of the karma-kánda, while those who maintain
the authority of the jñána-kánda reject that of the karma-kánda; and
lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--
The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
and smearing oneself with ashes,--
Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those
who have no manliness nor sense.
Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is
the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such
phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible,
as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside
in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
body" is metaphorical "the head of Ráhu" [Ráhu being really _all
head_].
All this has been thus summed up--
In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;
And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--
Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed together;
Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the
same subject,
And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the
soul and no other,
And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.
"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"
All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.
Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or
middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does
not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by
virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this
connection's being known?
We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is
held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by
the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
implying fire].
Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their
objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."
Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal
proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.
Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege
in reply, in accordance with the Vaiseshika doctrine of Kanáda, that
this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the
child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more
reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,
&c. [which, of course, we Chárvákas reject].
And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.
Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the
means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is
to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
relation of a name to something so named.
Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as
the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal
proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself
perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying
the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal],
are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it
is established by the sloka of the great Doctor beginning
_samásama_.[23]
But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a
connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]
The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
drugs, &c.
From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can
only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
not allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become
destitute of any cause.
But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
Thus it has been said--
The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.
And all this has been also said by Brihaspati--
There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
effect.
The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and
smearing one's self with ashes,
Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
and manliness.
If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]
If the Sráddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is
needless to give provisions for the journey.
If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sráddha here,
Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the
housetop?
While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
though he runs in debt;
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
kindred?
Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have
established here
All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.
The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
All the well-known formulæ of the pandits, jarpharí, turpharí, &c.[27]
And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswamedha,
These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
presents to the priests,[28]
While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
demons.
Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
to the doctrine of Chárváka. Such is the pleasant consummation.
E. B. C.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 6: "Sankara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the
Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka"
(Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
the world" (_loka_ and _áyata_). Laukáyatika occurs in Pánini's
ukthagana.]
[Footnote 7: _Kinwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c."
Colebrooke quotes from Sankara: "The faculty of thought results from a
modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."]
[Footnote 8: Of course Sankara, in his commentary, gives a very
different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
Sabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.]
[Footnote 9: I take _kana_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunr_. Cf.
Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Asváh kaná gávas tandulá masakás tusháh._]
[Footnote 10: See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.]
[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]
[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehah_.]
[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
invariable concomitance (_vyápti_)."]
[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _nischita upádhi_ see Siddhánta
Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]
[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
(as of smoke by fire).]
[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in
every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
other place.]
[Footnote 17: See Sáhitya Darpana (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
Siddhánta-M., p. 80.]
[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the
rhetorical, argument.]
[Footnote 19: "_Upamána_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the
instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]
[Footnote 20: The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to
restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.]
[Footnote 21: '[Greek: Antistrephei] (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We
have here our A with distributed predicate.]
[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi
"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is
non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
would serve as a Mímámsaka upádhi, to establish the _vyabhichára_
fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
clause excludes it, as an upádhi must be consistent with _either_
party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being
produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi "the
nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímámsaka upádhi "the not
causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of
hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]
[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure sloka of Udayanáchárya, "where
a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,
universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the
existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus
invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
another, difficulty in the Sarva-darsana-sangraha to my old friend and
teacher, Pandit Mahesa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
College.]
[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority
of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
genus and species.]
[Footnote 25: _Adrishta_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions
which produce their effects in future births.]
[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
209.]
[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's
Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]
[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
handled in the rites."]