VI

For the next year and a half [Footnote: Spring 414--autumn 413 B.C.]

the scene of our narrative lies almost entirely in the immediate

neighbourhood of Syracuse, so that it now becomes necessary to describe

in some detail the site of that city, and the character of the adjacent

country. Mention has already been made of the island of Ortygia, the

site of the original colony, connected with the mainland of Sicily by a

bridge or causeway. At the southern extremity of Ortygia there is a

narrow strip of land, pointing like a finger towards the rocky

peninsula of Plemmyrium; and between these two points lies the entrance

to a spacious bay, already alluded to under the name of the Great

Harbour. At the western end of the bay there is a long stretch of low,

marshy ground, intersected by the little rivers Cyana and Anapus, and

infested with fever during the heats of summer. On a rising ground,

south of the Anapus, stood the suburb of Polichne, with its great

temple, sacred to the Olympian Zeus. A little to the north of Ortygia

the coast rises abruptly in a bold line of cliffs, facing eastwards,

and forming the base of a triangular plateau, which slopes upwards from

the sea, and gradually grows narrower until it ends in a point, called

the hill of Euryelus. This plateau, which bore the name of Epipolae, is

guarded on all its three sides by rocky precipices, only to be ascended

at two or three places. Its eastern end, called Acheadina, from the

wild pear-trees which once flourished there, was occupied by a new

city, now included with Ortygia in the same wall of defence. Here were

situated the famous stone-quarries, which afterwards acquired so tragic

an interest from the sufferings of the captive Athenians; and

southwards from this district the ground shelves gently to the shores

of the Little Harbour, a sheltered inlet at the northern end of Ortygia.

At the opening of spring the operations against Syracuse began in good

earnest. The first object of Nicias was to obtain possession of the

heights of Epipolae, for since the construction of the new Syracusan

wall it had become impossible for him to draw his line of blockade from

the side of the Great Harbour. His preparations were already far

advanced, when the Syracusan generals resolved to anticipate him, by

occupying all the approaches to Epipolae. With this intention they

issued an order for a full muster of troops in a meadow by the Anapus,

and after a general review and inspection of arms they appointed a

picked body of six hundred hoplites to guard the heights of Epipolae,

and hold themselves ready for any other pressing service. But the

precaution was taken too late. On the night before the review Nicias

set sail with his whole army from Catana, and landed at a place called

Leon, not more than six or seven furlongs from the northern side of

Epipolae. The fleet then took up its station in the sheltered water

behind the peninsula of Thapsus, while the land forces, advancing at a

run, crossed the level ground, and then, breasting the ascent, gained

the summit of Euryelus.

News of their approach presently reached the Syracusans, who were still

mustered by the Anapus, and breaking off the review, they marched in

haste towards Epipolae, hoping still to dislodge the Athenians from

their position. But in their rapid advance over a distance of nearly

three miles their ranks became disordered, and their attack was so

straggling and ineffectual that they were easily repulsed, and driven

back with considerable loss into the town. On the following day Nicias

led his troops down the slope, and offered battle before the walls of

Syracuse; but the challenge was declined, and the Syracusans remained

within their defences, leaving the Athenians in undisputed possession

of Epipolae.

After this important success the Athenian generals prepared at once to

form the siege of Syracuse. They first constructed a fort at a place

called Labdalum, on the northern verge of Epipolae, and near its

western extremity, to serve as a safe depositary for their baggage and

money. Then, taking up a position near the centre of Epipolae, they

built a circular wall, covering a considerable space of ground, and

defended on the side towards the city by an outer breastwork, a

thousand feet long. This enclosure, which was called the Circle, was

intended as a shelter for the men employed on construction of the

blockading wall, which started from either side of the Circle, and was

to be carried north and south until it reached the sea. The work made

rapid progress, and greatly alarmed the Syracusans, who saw themselves

in danger of being cut off from all hope of succour on the land side.

Dismayed by this prospect, they resolved to make one more effort to

drive the Athenians from their position, and marching out in full

force, offered battle. Advancing in haste and disorder, they would

certainly have suffered a crushing defeat, but for the prudent caution

of their generals, who were so much impressed by the superior

discipline of the Athenians, that they gave the order to retire, and

led their troops back into the city, leaving only a detachment of horse

to skirmish with the besiegers. But the Athenians had now an efficient

force of cavalry, which had been raised by successive reinforcements to

the number of six hundred and fifty men; and these, backed by a small

force of infantry, soon drove the horsemen of Syracuse from the field.

The Athenians then completed the building of their Circle, and began to

lay the materials for the northern line of wall. By the advice of

Hermocrates the Syracusans made no further attempt to attack them in

full force, but began to build a counterwall, running out from the city

in a direction south of the Athenian Circle, so as to cross the line to

be followed by the wall of blockade, and prevent it from reaching the

Great Harbour. The work proceeded without interruption, for the

Athenians were engaged in their building operations north of the

Circle, and did not choose to divide their forces. When it was

completed, this counterwork consisted of a solid stone wall, crowned

with wooden towers, and defended in front by a palisade. The blockade

of Syracuse was thus rendered impossible, as long as the defenders

could keep possession of their counterwall. But unfortunately the

guards left in charge of the new wail soon began to neglect their duty,

and erected tents in the shade, where they passed the hot hours of the

afternoon, while some even left their posts, and went off to refresh

themselves in the city. The Athenian generals did not fail to take

advantage of this negligence. Watching their opportunity, when most of

the Syracusan guards were reposing under the shelter of the tents, they

sent a chosen troop of some three hundred men to make a sudden assault

on the counterwall. Then, having divided the main body of the Athenian

army between them, they disposed their forces so as to prevent any

rescue from the town. One division was drawn up before the principal

gate in the new Syracusan wall, while the other proceeded to a

postern-gate, at the point where the counterwall started from the city.

The combined movement was completely successful; the three hundred

carried the stockade and cross-wall by storm, and compelled the

defenders to take refuge within the ramparts of Syracuse. The whole

Athenian army then marched up to the counterwall and stockade, which

they speedily demolished, carrying off the materials for their own use.

Wishing to prevent any second attempt on the part of the Syracusans to

cut them off from the southern slope of Epipolae, the Athenian generals

now fortified that part of the cliff which looks towards the Great

Harbour. By occupying this point they obtained a new centre, commanding

the space between the Circle and the southern edge of the cliff, and

placing them in communication with the level valley of the Anapus,

across which they had to carry their line of blockade. For the present

building operations were suspended on the northern side of the Circle,

as they wished first of all to complete the investment of Syracuse

towards the south.

Perceiving their intention, the Syracusans began a second counterwork,

consisting of a stockade and ditch, which started at the point of

junction between the old city-wall and the new, and ran across the low

swampy ground as far as the Anapus. Thus the Athenians were confronted

by a new obstacle, which had to be removed, before they could make any

further progress. Acting with energy and decision, they sent orders to

the fleet, which was still lying at Thapsus, to sail round into the

Great Harbour; and without waiting for its arrival, before daybreak

Lamachus led his troops down the cliff, and advanced against the

stockade. His men carried hurdles and planks, to secure their footing

in the most treacherous parts of the swamp, and, proceeding thus, in

the first light of dawn they came up to the stockade. They found the

Syracusans assembled in force to resist them, and an engagement ensued,

which speedily ended in favour of the Athenians. The right wing of the

Syracusan army fled back into the city, while the left wing retreated

towards the suburb of Polichne, hotly pursued by the picked troop

[Footnote: P. 203.] of Athenian hoplites, who wished to cut them off

before they reached the river. By this rash movement the Athenians came

near to forfeiting the advantage which they had gained, and brought

upon themselves an irreparable loss. For the Syracusan cavalry turned

on their pursuers, and drove them back in disorder upon the Athenian

right. The sudden reverse created something like a panic in that part

of the line, and Lamachus, who was in command of the left wing,

hastened to their relief, and threw himself, with a handful of men,

between the Syracusan cavalry and the fugitives. This gallant action

turned the tide of battle once more, and gave the Athenians on the

right wing time to rally; but Lamachus and his followers, pushing

forward too hotly, were attacked by the enemy in a place where their

retreat was cut off by a ditch, and slain to a man.

Meanwhile the Syracusans who had fled into the city, observing the

temporary defeat of the Athenians, had taken courage again, and they

returned to the field, having first sent a detachment to attack the

Athenian Circle, where Nicias, who was disabled by sickness, had been

left in charge with a small garrison. Thinking to make an easy capture,

the party sent on this service ran up the slope of Epipolae, and

reached the breastwork of the Circle, which they took and demolished.

With the scanty force at his disposal, Nicias had little hope of

repelling the attack, so he had recourse to a desperate expedient. He

ordered the camp-servants to set fire to a great pile of timber, which

was lying, together with a number of siege engines, in front of the

wall. They did as he directed, and a great flame arose, which drove

back the assailants, and gave warning of his danger to the Athenians in

the plain below, where the whole Syracusan army was now in full

retreat. Almost at the same moment the Athenian fleet was seen sailing

into the Great Harbour, and a strong contingent from the victorious

army came swarming up the hill to the rescue. Thereupon the storming

party from Syracuse turned and fled back to the city, where they found

the streets thronged by their beaten and dispirited comrades.

The result of this battle was to leave the Athenian in undisputed

possession of the whole country round Syracuse. Lamachus, indeed, had

fallen, and the loss of that daring and active spirit soon made itself

severely felt. But for the present the fortunes of Athens were in the

ascendant, and everything seemed to promise a speedy triumph. The

Syracusans were thoroughly cowed by their defeat, and looked passively

on, while a double wall of blockade crept steadily forwards from the

southern edge of Epipolae towards the Great Harbour, where the Athenian

fleet had now taken up its permanent station. The native Sicels, who

had hitherto held back through fear of Syracuse, now joined the

Athenians in great numbers. Even the distant Etruscans, the ancient

enemies of Syracuse, sent three war-galleys to take part in the sack of

the great Dorian city.

Day by day the spirits of the Syracusans sank lower and lower. They now

began to feel the actual pressure of a siege. Months had passed since

their envoys had sailed for Greece, and there was still no sign of help

from Corinth or Sparta. They had lost all hope of saving themselves by

their own unaided efforts, and no course seemed left to them but to

make the best terms they could with Nicias. Negotiations were

accordingly opened with the Athenian general, but after much discussion

no definite result was attained. In this hour of weakness and distress,

the Syracusans became divided against themselves, and every man

suspected his neighbour of treason. Then they turned upon their

generals, who, after holding out such high promises, had brought them

to this pass, either by mismanagement, or by deliberate treachery.

Hermocrates and his colleagues were deposed from their command, and

three other generals succeeded to their place.

In the eyes of all those who were watching the struggle, the fate of

Syracuse was sealed; she was destined to fall a prey to the devouring

ambition of Athens. But at this very moment a little cloud was

approaching from the east, which was fraught with disaster and ruin to

the besieging army.