IV

At last the great day arrived, and in the first light of a mid-summer

dawn, a vast multitude was seen pouring along the broad highway which

led, between the Long Walls, from Athens to Peiraeus. The Upper City

was almost deserted by its inhabitants, for there was hardly one

Athenian who had not some cherished comrade, or some near relation,

enrolled for service in Sicily, and the crowd was swelled by thousands

of strangers, who came as spectators of that memorable scene. Little

now appeared of that sanguine and joyous temper which had prevailed

among the Athenians when they first voted for the expedition. Their

feelings had lately been fearfully harrowed by the mutilation of the

Hermae, and now that the moment of parting was at hand, all the perils

and uncertainties of their grand enterprise rose up vividly before

them. They were restored, however, to some degree of cheerfulness, when

they reached the harbour of Peiraeus, and saw the magnificent fleet

riding at anchor. Nearly all the vessels lying in the bay were

Athenian; for the main body of the allies, and the commissariat ships,

had been ordered to muster at Corcyra. The triremes furnished by Athens

numbered a hundred, of which sixty were fully equipped as war-galleys,

while forty were employed as transports. These numbers had been

equalled more than once before during the war; but in efficiency, in

splendour of appearance, and in the quality of the crews, this was by

far the finest fleet that ever sailed from Peiraeus. Only the bare

hulls of the ships were provided by the state, and each vessel was

assigned to some wealthy citizen, who defrayed all the expense of

fitting her for active service. Sometimes the cost of equipping a ship

was divided between two or more citizens, and at ordinary times this

form of taxation must have been felt by the rich as a heavy burden. But

such was the popularity of the Sicilian expedition that the wealthy

Athenians who were charged with this duty went far beyond what was

required of them, each striving to surpass the others by the superior

beauty and speed of his own ship. The crews were all composed of picked

men, attracted by the double rate of pay which was furnished from the

state exchequer; and in addition to this, the trierarchs [Footnote:

Citizens charged with the duty of equipping a trireme.] paid special

premiums to the petty officers and to the highest class of rowers. The

same spirit of emulation extended to the whole body of Athenians

enrolled in the army and fleet; every man felt that whatever he spent

on his own personal equipment was spent for the honour and glory of

Athens. And the effect produced on the public mind in Greece was, in

fact, prodigious: after all the ravages of the plague, and ten years of

exhausting warfare, Athens, it seemed, was stronger than ever, and in

the mere exuberance of energy was making this imposing display of

wealth and power. As to the ostensible object of the expedition--the

conquest of Sicily--few doubted that it must follow as a matter of

course.

The last farewell had been spoken, the troops were all embarked, and

the rowers sat ready at their oars. The trumpet sounded, commanding

silence, and the voice of the herald was heard, repeating a solemn

prayer, which was taken up by the whole multitude on sea and on shore,

while the captains and soldiers poured libations of wine from goblets

of silver and gold. When this act of worship was ended, the crews

raised the paean, and at a given signal the whole fleet was set in

motion, and passed, in single file, out of the harbour. On reaching the

open water, they quitted this order, and engaged in a friendly contest

of speed as far as Aegina. Then the crews settled down to their work,

and the great armament swept on, high in heart and hope, to join the

allied contingents, and commissariat fleet, now assembled at Corcyra.

As yet only general rumours of the intended invasion had reached

Syracuse, and few of the citizens were aware of the imminent peril in

which they stood. Among those who were better informed was Hermocrates,

a Syracusan of high rank, who for many years had been the guiding

spirit in Sicilian politics. Speaking at a public assembly, about the

time when the Athenian fleet sailed from Peiraeus, he urged the

necessity of taking prompt measures for placing the city in a thorough

state of defence. He had no fear, he said, of the ultimate triumph of

Syracuse in the approaching struggle: only let them be on their guard,

and not underrate the power of the enemy whom they would have to face.

The words of Hermocrates, who enjoyed a high reputation for valour,

patriotism, and sagacity, were not without their effect, and it was

resolved that the generals should at once set about organizing the

military resources of Syracuse, and providing all things necessary for

the public safety. Some steps in this direction they had already taken;

and tidings soon arrived at Syracuse which caused them to redouble

their exertions.

For in the meantime the Athenians had reached Corcyra, where they held

a final review of all their forces. The total number of the triremes

was a hundred and thirty-four, and with these sailed a vast fleet of

merchant ships, and smaller craft, laden with stores of all kinds, and

carrying a whole army of bakers, masons, and carpenters, with the tools

of their crafts, and all the engines required for a siege. Besides

these, there was a great number of other vessels, small and great,

fitted out by private speculators for purposes of trade. The military

force was on a corresponding scale, comprising five thousand, one

hundred hoplites, of whom fifteen hundred were full Athenian citizens,

four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes,

and a hundred and twenty exiles from Megara, equipped as light-armed

troops. The force of cavalry was but small, being conveyed in a single

transport.

The whole armament now weighed anchor from Corcyra and sailed in three

divisions, each commanded by one of the generals, to the opposite coast

of Italy. On arriving at Rhegium, an Ionic city on the Italian side of

the strait, they received permission to beach their ships, and form a

camp outside the walls; and here they waited for the return of three

fast-sailing triremes, which had been sent forward from Corcyrato carry

the news of their approach to Egesta, and claim the promised subsidy,

and at the same time to sound the temper of the Greek cities in Sicily.

Before long the ships came back with their report, and the Athenians

now learned to their great chagrin that all the fabled wealth of Egesta

had dwindled to the paltry sum of thirty talents.

The three generals now held a council of war, to decide on a plan of

campaign. It was evident that no help was to be obtained from Egesta,

and the attitude of the Rhegini, who declined to enter their alliance,

boded ill for the success of the expedition. As their prospects were so

discouraging, Nicias proposed to confine their operations within the

narrowest limits, to patch up a peace between Selinus and Egesta, to

aid the Leontines, if it could be done without risk or expense, and

after making a display of the Athenian power, to sail home to Athens.

Alcibiades protested strongly against such a course, as disgraceful to

Athens, and unworthy of the splendid armament entrusted to their

command. Let them try first what could be effected by negotiation with

the Greek cities and native tribes of Sicily, and after gaining as many

allies as possible in the island, let them proceed to the attack of

Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus, on the other hand, a plain, downright

soldier, was for sailing straight to Syracuse, and striking immediately

at the heart of Sicily. The city, he argued, would be found unprepared,

and if they acted at once, in the first terror of their presence, they

were certain of victory; but if they waited, their men would lose

heart, the efficiency of the fleet would be impaired, and the

Syracusans would gather strength and courage from the delay.

How true was the forecast of Lamachus was proved by the event; but his

bold plan was distasteful alike to the timid temper of Nicias, and to

the tortuous, intriguing spirit of Alcibiades. Finding, therefore, that

he had no hope of convincing his colleagues, he voted for the middle

course, and accordingly the plan of Alcibiades, unquestionably the

worst of the three, was adopted.

In pursuance of this fatal policy Alcibiades crossed over to Messene,

and tried to win over that city to the side of Athens. Meeting with no

success, he returned to Rhegium, and immediately afterwards he and one

of his colleagues sailed with a force of sixty triremes to Naxos. Here

the Athenians found a hearty welcome, but at Catana, which was then

under the influence of Syracuse, their overtures were rejected, so they

continued their voyage southwards, and made their camp for the night at

the mouth of the river Terias. Starting early next day, they proceeded

along the coast, and, crossing the bay of Thapsus, came in sight, for

the first time, of their great enemy, Syracuse. The main body of the

fleet remained in the offing, but ten triremes were sent forward to

reconnoitre the Great Harbour, and get a nearer view of the

fortifications. When the little squadron came within hearing of the

walls, a herald proclaimed in a loud voice that any of the Leontines

now present in Syracuse should leave the city without fear, and come

over to their faithful kinsmen and allies, the Athenians. After this

futile demonstration, better calculated; to excite laughter than

terror, the reconnoitring triremes withdrew, and the whole fleet sailed

back in the direction of Rhegium. On their return voyage the Athenians

succeeded, by a lucky accident, in gaining the adherence of Catana,

which henceforth became the head-quarters of the whole armament. Soon

after they had effected this important change of station the Salaminian

state trireme arrived with momentous news from Athens. We have seen

what a panic of superstitious fear had been caused among the Athenians

by the mutilation of the Hermae. Arrested for the moment by the

all-absorbing interest of the Sicilian expedition, the excitement broke

out with renewed violence after the departure of the fleet. The enemies

of Alcibiades saw that the time was now ripe for bringing up against

him the charge of violating the mysteries, and pressing for a judgment.

A formal indictment was laid before the senate, and it was decided that

he should come home and stand his trial. But it was necessary to

proceed with caution, for Alcibiades was popular with the troops

serving in Sicily; and it was possible that, if any violence were

attempted against his person, they might break out into mutiny.

Accordingly the captain of the Salaminian trireme was instructed to

treat him with all respect, and allow him to return to Athens in his

own vessel. On receiving the summons Alcibiades affected to obey, and

set sail from Catana, with the state trireme in attendance. The two

ships remained in company as far as Thurii, a Greek town of southern

Italy, but there the great criminal disappeared, and after searching

for him in vain the officers of the Salaminia were obliged to return to

Athens without him. When the news of his flight was brought to Athens,

he was arraigned in his absence, and condemned to death. But if his

enemies supposed that they had heard the last of Alcibiades, they soon

learnt how deeply they were mistaken.

V

The conduct of the campaign in Sicily was thus left in the feeble hands

of Nicias; for though Lamachus nominally held an equal command, his

poverty and political insignificance prevented him from holding the

position to which his military talents entitled him. The few remaining

weeks of summer were frittered away in trivial operations on the

western coasts of the island, and then the Athenians withdrew into

winter quarters at Catana. The predictions of Lamachus now began to be

fulfilled: seeing that Nicias, with the vast force at his disposal,

attempted nothing against them, the Syracusans began to despise their

enemy, and thought of taking the offensive. Horsemen from Syracuse rode

repeatedly up to the Athenian outposts at Catana, and tauntingly

inquired if the Athenians had come to found a colony in Sicily. At last

even Nicias felt that some display of activity was necessary to save

himself from contempt. He had learnt from certain Syracusan exiles that

there was a convenient place for landing troops, on the low-lying shore

where the river Anapus flows into the Great Harbour. Here he determined

to make a sudden descent, and in order to avoid disembarking in the

face of an enemy, he contrived a stratagem to remove the whole

Syracusan force out of reach. A citizen of Catana, who was attached to

the Athenian interest, was sent with a message to the Syracusan

generals, which held out a tempting prospect of gaining an easy and

decisive advantage over the Athenian army. Professing to come from the

partisans of Syracuse still remaining in Catana, he promised on their

behalf that if the Syracusans made a sudden assault on the Athenian

camp, their friends in Catana would simultaneously fall upon the

Athenian troops, who were in the habit of deserting their quarters and

straggling about the town, and set fire to their ships.

This plausible story found ready credence with the Syracusan generals,

and they named a day on which they promised to appear in full force

before the walls of Catana. When the time appointed drew near, they

marched out with the whole Syracusan army, leaving the city to be

garrisoned by their allies, and took up a position within easy reach of

Catana. Thereupon Nicias, who was fully informed of their movements,

embarked his troops by night, sailed down the coast past Syracuse, and

entering the Great Harbour, came to land near the outlying suburb of

Polichne, where stood the great temple of the Olympian Zeus. Here he

planted a breastwork of palisades to defend his ships, and drew up his

army on ground which offered many obstacles to the advance of the

Syracusan cavalry. Then, having broken down the bridge over the Anapus,

he waited for the enemy to appear.

Meanwhile the Syracusan generals had marched upon Catana, and finding

that they had been duped, returned with all speed to the defence of

their own city. After a long and fatiguing march, they came in view of

the Athenian position, and drew up their forces for battle. But Nicias

declined the challenge, and the day being now far advanced, they fell

back and encamped for the night in the open field.

Next morning Nicias, acting with unusual vigour, drew up his army in

two equal divisions, and leaving one half to defend the camp, and act

as a reserve, with the other he advanced rapidly upon the enemy. The

Syracusans, who had perhaps reckoned too much on the known indolence of

Nicias, were taken by surprise. Their discipline was lax, and many of

them had left their posts, and gone off into the town. Nevertheless,

they met the attack with firmness: those who were on the spot hastened

to assume their weapons, which they had laid aside, while the

stragglers came running back, and took their stand wherever they saw a

gap in the ranks. After some preliminary skirmishing between the

light-armed troops, the heavy masses of the hoplites came to close

quarters, and a fierce hand to hand struggle ensued. While the issue

was still uncertain, a violent thunderstorm broke over the contending

armies, and struck terror into the Syracusans, who regarded it as an

omen of defeat. But the seasoned soldiers of Nicias saw nothing unusual

in an autumn tempest, and perceiving the enemy to waver, they pressed

their attack, and broke through the opposing lines. The whole Syracusan

army now fell back upon Syracuse, but they retired without haste or

disorder, and their retreat was covered by a numerous and efficient

body of cavalry, so that their total loss amounted only to two hundred

and sixty.

The victory thus remained with the Athenians; but the moral advantage

was entirely on the side of the Syracusans. With an army composed of

raw recruits, they had met the flower of the Athenian forces, trained

by years of warfare, and led by experienced generals, in fair fight,

and though attacked at a disadvantage, they had fought with spirit, and

retreated with coolness and deliberation. They had good reason to be

satisfied with the result of their first encounter with the invader,

and they might well share the high and confident hopes expressed by

their most eminent citizen, Hermocrates. Speaking at a general

assembly, immediately after the battle, the great patriot congratulated

his countrymen on the courage which they had displayed, and at the same

time pointed out the necessity of improving their discipline and

military organization. One important reform should be made at once; the

number of the generals, which had hitherto been fifteen, should be

greatly reduced, and those appointed to the supreme command should be

given absolute power, so that they might act with secrecy and despatch.

Further, let the whole adult male population be placed under arms, and

kept in constant drill all through the winter. If these measures were

vigorously carried out, they might successfully defy the Athenians to

do their worst.

Acting on this advice, the Syracusans deposed the existing generals,

and chose Hermocrates, with three others, to fill their place. The

reform of the army was at once taken in hand, and ambassadors were sent

to Corinth and Sparta to ask for aid. Corinth, as the mother-city of

Syracuse, might well respond to the call, and it was hoped that the

Spartans would be induced to declare open war on Athens, so as to

compel the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Sicily, or at least

prevent them from sending reinforcements.

Various defensive works were undertaken by the Syracusans during the

winter. The most important of these was a new wall, extending from the

northern sea to the Great Harbour, and taking in a wide space of

ground, outside the old line of wall, to the west of the city. By thus

increasing the area of Syracuse, they made it much more difficult for

Nicias to draw his line of blockade, when the siege began in the

following spring. They also constructed a fort, with a permanent

garrison, to guard the temple of Zeus in the suburb of Polichne, and

drove piles into the sea at all the landing-places of the Great Harbour.

Soon after the battle Nicias shifted his winter quarters to Naxos, and

learning this the Syracusans marched in full force to Catana, laid

waste the territory, and burnt the deserted huts of the Athenians. The

insult was tamely endured, and shortly afterwards the ever-active

Hermocrates had an opportunity of thwarting the Athenian intrigues

among the Greek cities of Sicily. The scene of this diplomatic

encounter was Camarina, a Dorian city which had hitherto wavered

between its hatred of Syracuse and its fear of Athens. Early in the

winter Athenian envoys appeared at Camarina with overtures of alliance,

and Hermocrates was sent to represent the interests of Syracuse.

Speaking first in the debate, Hermocrates set himself to unmask the

designs of the Athenians, who, under the thin pretence of helping the

Ionic cities of Sicily, had come (he said) to make a conquest of the

whole island. The Ionians of Greece had long groaned under their yoke,

and the same fate was in store for the Ionians of Sicily, if they

allowed themselves to be beguiled by specious lies. The plea of

friendship and goodwill might pass with the degenerate Greeks of Asia

and the Aegaean, born to be cajoled and enslaved; but the Camariaeans

were of the stout Dorian race, the hereditary foes of tyranny, too wise

and too brave to lend themselves as tools to a bare-faced scheme of

aggression. If not, let them beware: Syracuse was fighting in a

righteous cause, and must prevail in the end; help was coming from

Peloponnesus, and if the Camariaeans stood aloof, the day would come

when they would regret their disloyalty.

There can be no doubt that Hermocrates was right in his view of the

motive which brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the arguments of

Euphemus, the advocate for Athens, who strove to confute him, will not

bear examination. But the people of Camarina were in a difficult

position; their city had suffered many things in the past at the hands

of Syracuse, and they had reason to fear that her oppressions might be

renewed, if she emerged triumphant from the present struggle. On the

other hand, if the Athenians were victorious, they might forfeit their

independence altogether. In this dilemma they determined to play a

waiting game, and when the time came for action, to throw their weight

on the winning side. For the present they answered that they chose to

remain neutral.

The debate at Camarina, though interesting and instructive from the

light which it throws on the passions and motives of the combatants,

had little influence on the final issue of the war. But about the same

time a scene was being enacted in another part of the Greek world,

which led to most momentous consequences. Early in the winter the

Syracusan envoys arrived at Corinth, and made an earnest appeal for

help. The Corinthians were warmly attached to their famous colony,

which had never wavered in its allegiance to the mother-city, and

moreover they were the implacable enemies of Athens. They therefore

took up the cause of Syracuse with enthusiasm, and they sent the envoys

on to Sparta, accompanied by delegates of their own, to urge the

immediate resumption of hostilities against Athens, and the sending of

prompt aid to Sicily.

At Sparta they found an able and unscrupulous ally, the very last whom

they had expected to meet there. This was the outlaw Alcibiades, who,

after eluding the vigilance of the Athenian officers at Thurii, had

crossed over in a merchant ship to Cyllene, the port of Elis. While

staying there, he received an invitation from the Lacedaemonians to

proceed to Sparta, and made his way thither, having first stipulated

for a safe-conduct; for he dreaded the vengeance of the Spartans, to

whom he had done much mischief by raising the coalition which led to

the battle of Mantinea. So there he was, the guest of his old enemies,

burning with all an exile's hatred, and ready to strike some deadly

blow against the city which had cast him out.

At first the Spartans gave but a cool and qualified response to the

application of the envoys from Corinth. They were prepared to lend

moral support to the Syracusans, by sending an embassy to encourage

them in their resistance, but of more substantial aid they said little

or nothing. Now was the time for Alcibiades to play his part. He knew,

far better than any of his hearers, all the vulnerable points of

Athens, and had no scruple in using his knowledge for her ruin. Having

obtained permission from the magistrates, he rose to address the

Spartan assembly; and his speech is given at full length by the

historian, who was himself an exile at the time, and may possibly have

been present [Footnote: The suggestion is made by Grote.] on this

important occasion.

The Spartans might smile when they heard this accomplished traitor

professing friendship towards themselves, and zeal for their service;

they might be disgusted at the flippant sophistries by which he strove

to defend his unexampled villainy. But far different feelings must have

been awakened, when he went on to unfold the gigantic scheme of

conquest, to which, as he pretended, the invasion of Sicily was no more

than a prelude. According to this statement, the Athenians intended,

after subjugating the Greeks of Sicily, to turn their arms against the

Italian Greeks, and finally to attack Carthage. If all these designs

were successful, they would build a great number of new ships, taking

their materials from the forests of Italy, raise a vast military force,

both of Greeks and barbarians, and then return, backed by the whole

power of the West, and draw a ring of war round Peloponnesus. With such

resources they would be irresistible, and all Greece must inevitably

fall under their sway.

"Such," continued Alcibiades, "is the secret history of the Sicilian

expedition, which you have heard from the mouth of him who knows it

best. Remember, then, that the issue before you concerns not Syracuse

only, but Sparta also: for if Syracuse falls--and fall she must, if

left without support--all Sicily will be under the heel of Athens; then

will come the turn of Italy, and after that you will soon have the

enemy at your own doors. Now learn what you must do, if you would avert

all the evils which I have foretold. You must send a fleet to Sicily at

once, with hoplites who can row the ships themselves, and serve in the

army as soon as they land, and with them a Spartan commander, to

organize the fighting men of Sicily, and compel those who are hanging

back to do their duty. Such a man will be a host in himself, and will

infuse new life and energy into the defence. Further, you must

establish a fortified camp at Decelea, a position which commands the

whole territory of Attica; for by so doing you will reduce Athens to a

state of siege, and compel the whole male population to serve on

garrison duty; you will deprive the Athenians of their revenues from

the silver-mines at Laurium, and you will put new heart into the cities

subject to Athens, and encourage them to withhold their tribute. Let

these measures be carried out with promptitude and vigour, and you will

soon reap your reward, in the humiliation of Athens, and the honour and

gratitude of all Greece."

At these words of Alcibiades the sluggish Spartans took fire, and

recognizing the importance of his advice they determined to follow the

course which he had indicated. Gylippus, a Spartan of high rank,

received orders to proceed at once to Syracuse, and assume the control

of the war, and the Corinthians were directed to provide ships for the

conveyance of troops. But after this brief display of energy the

Spartans relapsed into their wonted torpor. Many months elapsed before

Gylippus was able to embark for Sicily, and meanwhile important events

had been occurring at the seat of war. We return, therefore, to the

head-quarters of Nicias, which had once more been removed from Naxos to

Catana.