Just at the time when the Syracusans were brought to the brink of
despair, Gylippus, after so many months' delay, was on his voyage to
Sicily. While lying at Leucas, a Corinthian settlement in the Ionian
sea, he received the alarming intelligence that Syracuse was already
completely blockaded, and the report was confirmed by every vessel that
came in from the west. Deceived by these false rumours, he gave up all
hope of saving Sicily, but hoping still to forestall the Athenians in
Italy, he put out from Leucas with four ships, and steered a straight
course for Tarentum. From this city, which was friendly to Sparta and
Syracuse, he started on his mission among the Italian Greeks, and
putting in at Locri he heard for the first time that the Athenian wall
was still unfinished on the northern side of Epipolae, leaving a wide
gap, through which a relieving force might enter the town.
Two courses now lay open to Gylippus. He might sail southwards, and
make an attempt to run the blockade of Syracuse--or he might land on
the northern coast of Sicily, march across the island, and fight his
way into the city through the unwalled interval. In either case, the
enterprise seemed desperate enough. By a very moderate exertion on the
part of Nicias, employing only a fraction of the immense force at his
disposal, Gylippus might have been destroyed, before he had time to
become dangerous. But Nicias was lulled into a fatal confidence. He had
heard of the mission of Gylippus, but made no attempt to oppose his
voyage to Italy, regarding him as a mere free-booter, unworthy of
serious notice. At last, learning that Gylippus was at Locri, he was
induced to send out four triremes against him. They were instructed to
take station at Rhegium, and cut off the daring intruder as he passed
through the strait. But when they reached Rhegium, the wary Spartan was
already beyond their reach. He had decided to approach Syracuse by
land, and was now far advanced on his voyage to Himera, the only Greek
settlement on the north coast of Sicily. Himera, though an Ionic
colony, was attached to the Dorian interest, and her citizens gave a
hearty welcome to the Spartan deliverer. Before long, a little army of
about three thousand men was assembled at Himera, and ready to follow
the fortunes of Gylippus. Seven hundred of these were the sailors and
marines from his own vessels, armed as hoplites, and the Himeraeans
furnished a thousand infantry, light and heavy-armed, and a hundred
cavalry. Owing to the recent death of a powerful chieftain, who had
been a strong partisan of Athens, the northern Sicels had now changed
sides, and they sent a thousand men to serve under the Spartan leader.
Small contingents also arrived, in answer to the call of Gylippus, from
Gela and Selinus. With this little force, composed of such motley
elements, Gylippus started from Himera, and entered on his march for
the relief of Syracuse. The fate of Syracuse was already wavering in
the balance. As yet no news of approaching succour had reached the
beleaguered city, and the Syracusans had abandoned all hope. To save
themselves from a worse calamity, they resolved to surrender, and an
assembly was summoned to settle the terms of capitulation. But at this
very moment a message came to them by sea, which kindled their courage
afresh, and banished these counsels of despair. When Gylippus left
Leucas, a Corinthian fleet of some fifteen vessels was preparing to
sail from that port for Syracuse. One of the ships, commanded by a
certain Gongylus, was delayed in the harbour, and started after the
rest. But Gongylus, instead of steering the ordinary course, which
would have taken him first to Italy, made a bold dash, straight across
the sea, and just when the momentous decision was pending, his ship
came to anchor in the Little Harbour. Forthwith the joyful tidings
spread like wildfire through the city: Gylippus was coming, armed with
full authority from Sparta--Corinth had taken up their cause--Syracuse
was saved! All thought of surrender was instantly flung away, and news
arriving shortly afterwards that Gylippus was near at hand, the whole
Syracusan force marched out to meet him, and escorted him triumphantly
into the town.
Thus, without a blow being struck, an immense access of strength had
been brought to the besieged, and the grand condition of successful
resistance, on which Alcibiades had laid such weight, was fulfilled. A
Spartan officer of consummate ability was now in Syracuse, and he had
made his way into the city, not alone, not by stealth, but at the head
of an army, and before the very eyes of the enemy. Weeks must have
elapsed between the departure of Gylippus from Leucas, and his arrival
at Syracuse; and during all this time, with one trifling exception,
Nicias made no effort to oppose his progress. Prudent men might well
have regarded the enterprise of Gylippus as a wild and desperate
adventure; and such it must have proved, but for the astounding
blindness and apathy of Nicias.
At the time when Gylippus reached Syracuse the Athenian lines of
circumvallation were all but completed on the side of the Great
Harbour; but a wide interval was still left between the Circle and the
northern sea, and it was here that Gylippus had effected an entrance.
To keep this space open was a matter of supreme importance, and the
scene of action is now shifted again to the northern slope of Epipolae.
On the day after his arrival Gylippus succeeded in capturing the
Athenian fort at Labdalum, and the command of this position gave
increased facilities for the construction of a third counterwall, which
was forthwith taken in hand, and carried in the direction of Labdalum,
until it crossed the blockading line at its northern end.
If the Syracusans succeeded in completing and holding this counterwork,
the blockade of Syracuse would be rendered impossible. Yet for some
time Nicias made no attempt to interrupt its progress. As if already
convinced of his inferiority in the field, he took steps to keep his
communications open by sea, and with this object he employed a part of
his forces in fortifying the headland of Plemmyrium, which commanded
the entrance to the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts which
served as an arsenal for the Athenian stores; and henceforth Plemmyrium
became the chief station for his fleet. This removal had a disastrous
effect on the Athenian crews; for the place being almost a desert, and
the springs distant and scanty, they were compelled to go far from
their quarters in search of forage and water, and while thus engaged
they were cut off in great numbers by the Syracusan horse, who had been
posted at Polichne for this purpose. A rapid demoralization of the
crews was the consequence, and desertions became more frequent every
day.
Meanwhile the counterwall was advancing steadily up the hill, and every
day Gylippus drew up his army, to cover the operations of the workmen.
At last he determined to force on an engagement, and in the first
encounter the Syracusans, fighting in a confined space, which prevented
their cavalry from coming into action, suffered a defeat. In no wise
discouraged by this reverse, on the next day they took up a position in
the more open ground, and offered battle again. By this time the
Syracusan counterwork had almost passed the end of the Athenian wall,
and if it were carried a few yards further, the siege of Syracuse would
be brought to a standstill. Roused by the imminence of the crisis,
Nicias determined to make one more effort to regain his mastery in the
field, and led his troops to the attack. The main body of the hoplites
were soon hotly engaged on both sides, and in the midst of the action
Gylippus directed his cavalry and light-armed infantry to make a sudden
charge on the Athenian left. This movement was executed with so much
skill and resolution that the Athenians in that part of the line gave
way, and drew after them the rest of their comrades, who broke their
ranks, and fled for shelter behind the siege works.
The Syracusans lost no time in turning their victory to account. On the
very same night their wall was extended some distance beyond the
blockading line, and until this new barrier was overthrown, the
investment of Syracuse had now become impossible.
Whichever way he looked, Nicias saw himself menaced with failure and
defeat. He had sent twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian squadron
on its voyage from Leucas; but the little fleet of rescue succeeded in
avoiding the snare, and made its way into the port of Syracuse, thus
adding twelve fresh vessels to the defending force. Gylippus himself
was marching unhindered up and down the island, passing from city to
city, and raising reinforcements of ships and men; and a second embassy
had been despatched by the Syracusans, to carry the news of their
victory to Corinth and Sparta, and ask for further help. Another
ominous sign of coming events was the bustle and activity now visible
in the dockyards of Syracuse and the waters of the Little Harbour; for
the Syracusans had turned their attention seriously to their fleet, and
thought of nothing less than attacking the Athenians on their own
element.
These symptoms of renewed confidence and energy were observed by Nicias
with growing disquiet. And if he turned his eyes to his own camp, he
saw little to relieve his anxiety. For the predictions of Lamachus had
been fulfilled to the letter. By his fatal policy of procrastination
Nicias had frittered away the resources of the most splendid armament
that ever set sail from Peiraeus. His soldiers were infected by the
despondency of their leader, and many of them were stricken by the
marsh-fever which haunts the unwholesome district of the Anapus. Above
all the condition of the fleet showed the lamentable effect of long
inaction and delay. All the supplies of the Athenians came to them by
sea, and in order to keep their communications open, it was necessary
to keep the whole of the fleet on constant duty. In consequence of
this, the hulls of the triremes had become sodden with water, which
made them leaky, and difficult to row. Moreover the crews, which were
largely composed of foreign seamen, had grown restive and mutinous
under the severe strain of hardships and privation, so different from
the easy and lucrative service in the hope of which they had enlisted.
Some took the first opportunity of deserting to the enemy, while others
ran away to remote parts of Sicily; and there was no means of filling
the places thus left vacant.
Such was the burden of care and apprehension which lay heavy on the
feeble shoulders of the Athenian general. He was naturally a weak man,
haunted by superstitious terrors, irresolute, easily cast down; and
this infirmity of character was aggravated by a painful and incurable
disease. There was no longer any question of laying siege to Syracuse:
he himself was now besieged, and it was all he could do to maintain his
position within his defences, and keep the sea open for the conveyance
of supplies. In this desperate situation he determined to send a
written despatch to Athens. We are led to suppose that this was an
unusual proceeding, and that news from the seat of war was generally
sent by word of mouth. The document is given at full length, with all
its grievous confessions of incompetence and failure. After setting
forth the facts of the case as stated above, Nicias insists that one of
two things must be done: either the army now lying before Syracuse must
be recalled to Athens, or the Athenians must send out a second army,
equal in strength to the first, and a general to relieve him of his
command.
At the conclusion of his despatch Nicias peevishly complains of the
exacting temper of the Athenians, and their readiness to blame anyone
but themselves if anything untoward occurred. Whatever may be the truth
of the general charge, it was most ill-timed and ungrateful in his own
case. Towards him, at least, the conduct of his fellow-citizens was
marked by an excess of generosity, amounting to actual infatuation.
Nothing is more remarkable than the unshaken confidence of the
Athenians in their feeble general, after hearing this terrible
indictment, drawn up by his own hand. They refused to accept his
resignation, and passed a decree that large reinforcements should be
sent to Sicily, with Demosthenes and Eurymedon as generals; and in the
meantime they appointed Menander and Euthydemus, two officers already
serving before Syracuse, to share with Nicias the burden of command.
Before the winter was ended Eurymedon started with ten ships for
Sicily, to announce that effectual help was coming; while Demosthenes
was charged with the duty of enlisting troops and organizing a fleet.
Meanwhile new perils were gathering round the Athenians at home, which
should have warned them to abandon their wild plans of conquest, and
concentrate all their strength for their own defence. The Spartans had
long been restrained by a scruple of conscience from an open
declaration of war, wishing to avoid the guilt which is associated with
the first act of aggression. Eighteen years before they had refused all
offers of arbitration, and deliberately provoked an encounter with
Athens, in direct violation of the Thirty Years' Truce, which provided
for an amicable settlement of differences; and by so acting they had,
as they believed, incurred the anger of heaven, and brought on
themselves a long train of disasters. But now the position was
reversed: for in the previous year the Athenians had made descents on
the coasts of Laconia, and other districts of Peloponnesus; and they
had repeatedly turned a deaf ear to the friendly overtures of the
Spartans, who proposed to submit all disputed matters to a peaceful
tribunal.
Thus relieved of their scruples, the Spartans prepared to renew the war
in good earnest, and early in the following spring [Footnote: B.C.
413.] they summoned their allies to the Isthmus, and marched under Agis
their king into Attica. After ravaging the plain, they encamped at
Decelea, fourteen miles north of Athens, and here they established a
fortified post, which was garrisoned by contingents of the
Peloponnesian army, serving in regular order. Once more Alcibiades had
cause to exult in the success of his malignant counsels, which had sent
Gylippus to Syracuse, and had now planted this root of bitter mischief
on the very soil of Attica.
While the allies were thus engaged at Decelea, a considerable body of
troops had embarked at Taenarum and at Corinth, and sailed to take part
in the defence of Syracuse. In Greece, all the old enemies of Athens
were arming against her, and beyond the sea her prospects grew darker
and darker every day. Yet nothing, it seemed, could break the spell of
fatal delusion which rested on the doomed city. While Attica lay in the
grip of the enemy, a fleet of sixty-five triremes, carrying a great
military force, weighed anchor from Peiraeus, and steered its course,
under the command of Demosthenes, for Sicily.