I
We have already traced the steps by which the various cities composing
the Confederacy of Delos gradually became subjects and tributaries of
Athens. After this great change was effected, the only members of the
original league who retained their independence were the wealthy and
powerful communities of Chios and Lesbos. These two islands were
allowed to retain undisturbed control of their own affairs, with the
sole obligation of sending a fixed quota of ships to serve in the
Athenian Navy. It does not appear that the performance of this duty was
felt as a grievance, and no act of oppression had been committed by
Athens, such as might have provoked her allies in Lesbos or Chios to
turn against her. In both islands the general body of the citizens were
on the whole friendly to the Athenians, who afforded them an effectual
means of protection against the tyranny of the nobles, by summoning
high-born offenders to be tried before the Athenian tribunals.
[Footnote: The evidence for this statement will be found in Thucydides,
viii. 48.] It was therefore not among the people at large, but among
the privileged few, that any movement of revolt against Athens was to
be expected.
Some years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Lesbian
malcontents had solicited the Spartans to help them in throwing off the
yoke of Athens. This application, which was probably made at the time
of the revolt of Samos, found no favour with Sparta, and nothing
further was attempted on that occasion. But in the fourth year of the
war alarming rumours were brought to Athens from Tenedos, a small
island included in the Athenian alliance, whose inhabitants were
jealous of the threatened ascendancy of Lesbos in the eastern districts
of the Aegaean. There was a design, it was said, among the leading
citizens of Mytilene, the principal city of Lesbos, to unite the
inhabitants of the island by force under their rule, and renounce their
allegiance to Athens. Help was expected from Sparta, and the Boeotians,
who were of the same race as the Lesbians, were also in the plot. This
statement was confirmed by envoys from Methymna, the second city of
Lesbos, which stood apart from the conspiracy, and by certain citizens
of Mytilene, who had turned informers from motives of private revenge.
Among the Athenians at this time there was a general feeling of
despondency and exhaustion. The full hardship of the war pressed
heavily upon them, and their population was thinned by the ravages of
the plague. In such a mood the thought of undertaking a campaign
against a great island like Lesbos, then at the height of her power,
filled them with dismay. Was it possible that a favoured and privileged
ally had taken up arms against them in the hour of their distress? It
was a slander, they could not, they would not believe it. At any rate,
before proceeding to extremities, they would try the effect of a
friendly remonstrance. So they sent envoys with a pacific message to
the Mytilenaeans, hoping by fair words to deter them from their
purpose. In this, however, they were disappointed, and being at last
convinced that the Lesbians were on the brink of revolt, they sent off
forty triremes without delay, in order, if possible, to catch them
unawares. For they had been informed that the Mytilenaeans were about
to celebrate the festival of Apollo, in which the whole population took
part, outside the city walls; and if the triremes arrived in time,
there would be a fine opportunity for a surprise. At the same time they
took possession of ten Mytilenaean triremes, which had been sent to
serve in the Athenian fleet, and imprisoned the crews.
But now was seen one of the weaknesses inherent in the nature of the
Athenian constitution. These measures could not be taken without public
debate in the popular assembly, and such a method of procedure rendered
secrecy impossible. The Mytilenaeans received timely warning of their
danger, and keeping close within their walls, repaired the weak places
in their defences, and set a careful watch. Shortly afterwards the
Athenian fleet hove in sight. As the Mytilenaeans refused to obey the
summons delivered to them in the name of the imperial people,--that
they should raze their walls, and surrender their ships,--hostilities
commenced. But on neither side was much vigour displayed, for the
Athenian officers thought themselves too weak to undertake any decisive
operations with their present force, and the Mytilenaeans desired to
obtain a respite, to enable them to obtain aid from Sparta. Accordingly
they asked for an armistice, pretending that they wished to plead their
cause by their own representatives before the Athenian assembly; and
their request being granted, they sent envoys to Athens, who made a
show of carrying on negotiations. And in the meantime a trireme was
despatched in all haste to carry their petition to Sparta.
On the return of the Mytilenaean envoys from Athens, where of course
they had accomplished nothing, the siege of Mytilene began in earnest.
The city was situated on a promontory facing the Asiatic coast on the
south-eastern side of the island, and had two harbours, on its northern
and southern side. Both of these harbours were now held in close
blockade by the Athenians, who established two camps, one on either
side of the town, and patrolled the harbour-mouths with their ships.
But on the land side the investment was not yet completed, so that
supplies could still be brought into the town from the island.
Reinforcements, however, came pouring into the Athenian quarters in
answer to a summons sent to the cities of the Athenian alliance, who
were the more willing to lend help, as the Lesbians made no vigorous
effort in their own defence.
While the prospects of Athens were thus brightening, the Mytilenaean
envoys, after a stormy voyage, arrived at Sparta, and laid their
petition before the authorities. It happened that the Olympic festival
was close at hand, where representatives would be present from all the
cities of the Peloponnesian league; so the envoys received orders to go
to Olympia, and state their case in the presence of the Spartan allies.
They went, therefore, to Olympia, and when the festival was over, the
Mytilenaean orator addressed the confederates as follows:--
"Before we urge our claim for assistance we wish to combat a prejudice
which we know to be general in Greece against those who desert their
allies in time of war. For we wish not only to obtain your countenance
and support, but also to preserve your respect. To abandon an ally
without just cause in a time of peril is justly regarded as an act of
treason. But then the alliance must be a fair and equal relation
voluntarily assumed on both sides, based on mutual esteem and parity of
power. Can anyone assert that our connexion with Athens answers to this
description? Have we not seen how the confederacy of maritime cities
formed against Persia was gradually converted into an Athenian empire?
And though we and the Chians enjoyed nominal independence, we had good
reason to fear that this was only a temporary concession, which would
be withdrawn as soon as the Athenians felt themselves strong enough to
attack us. We were allowed to retain our liberty, partly because they
feared our navy, and partly because they wished to make us accomplices
in their own aggressions, and lend an appearance of equity to the acts
of violence in which we were compelled to take part. Having swallowed
up the smaller states, they were ready to pounce upon us, and were only
prevented by the outbreak of the present war. Who, then, can blame us,
if we seized the opportunity when they were weakened to repudiate this
false alliance, and anticipate the blow which they were preparing for
us? Athens, we repeat, has no just title to our allegiance; the bond
which held us together was fear on our side and interest on theirs. We
are natural enemies; and when your foe is disabled, then is the time to
strike.
"Having thus cleared ourselves from the imputation of disloyalty, we
will now make plain to you the advantages which you will gain by
espousing our cause. If you wish to inflict irreparable injury on
Athens, you must promote every hostile movement against her in those
regions which contain the sources of her power, that is to say, the
islands and coast-lands of the Aegaean. For if our revolt is
successful, others will follow our example, and the Athenians will be
stripped of their revenues, the mainstay of their empire. You can lend
us aid most effectually by summoning your allies for a second
[Footnote: Attica had already been invaded earlier in the summer.]
invasion of Attica, and thus preventing the Athenians from sending
reinforcements to Lesbos. You have a rare opportunity, for their city
is wasted by the plague, and their navies are dispersed on foreign
service. Remember, then, your proud position as champions of Greek
liberty, and put away the reproach which you have sometimes incurred by
leaving the revolted subjects of Athens to fight their battles alone.
[Footnote: As in the case of Samos.] For the cause of Lesbos is the
cause of all Greece."
It will be observed that the greater part of this remarkable speech
consists of an elaborate endeavour on the part of the Mytilenaeans to
justify themselves. The arguments employed were entirely sophistical,
for the Lesbians had no real grievance--and the statement that they
were in danger of losing their independence was a pure invention. But
they spoke to a partial audience, and the Spartans had already
prejudged the case in their favour. It was therefore decided to receive
them into the Peloponnesian alliance, and orders were issued to the
allies to assemble at the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces for
an immediate invasion of Attica. The Spartans, acting with unusual
vigour, were the first to appear at the Isthmus, where they made
preparations for hauling ships overland from the northern harbour of
Corinth, intending to attack Athens by sea and land. But the rest of
the confederates came in but slowly, as they were engaged in getting in
their harvest, and had little inclination for a second campaign.
The Spartans soon found out that they were mistaken in supposing the
energies of Athens to be exhausted. Without moving their fleet from
Lesbos, the Athenians manned a hundred triremes, raising the crews from
the whole body of the citizens, with the exception of the knights and
the wealthiest class of the Solonian census, and pressing even resident
foreigners into the service; and with this imposing force they made an
armed demonstration before the eyes of their enemies at the Isthmus,
and then, coasting along Peloponnesus, made descents wherever they
pleased. This spirited conduct produced the desired effect. For the
Spartans, who were still waiting for their allies at the Isthmus, saw
themselves baffled in all their calculations, and concluded that they
had been misinformed by the Lesbians as to the state of affairs at
Athens; and hearing that their own coast-lands were being ravaged by
the Athenian fleet, they hastily decamped, and the plan of a second
invasion came to nothing.
The summer was now drawing to a close, and as yet no progress had been
made with the siege of Mytilene. The town was still blockaded by sea,
but the Mytilenaeans had free egress on the land-side, and marched up
and down the island, confirming the other towns which had joined in the
revolt, and threatening Methymna, which still remained loyal to the
Athenian alliance. When the Athenians were informed of this state of
things, they sent a thousand hoplites under Paches to reinforce the
besieging army; and on their arrival the investment of Mytilene was
completed by a wall drawn from sea to sea, and cutting off the town
from the rest of the island. The Mytilenaeans now began to despair, for
their supplies were failing, and there seemed no hope of relief. But
during the winter a ray of hope reached them from outside, and
encouraged them to persevere in their resistance. There was a weak
point in the Athenian wall, where it closed a ravine; and through this
interval a Spartan named Salaethus, who had sailed to Lesbos in a
trireme, and crossed the island on foot, succeeded in making his way
into the town. Salaethus announced himself as an agent sent from
Sparta, to inform the distressed garrison that, as soon as the season
permitted, forty triremes would be sent to their assistance, and that
Attica would be invaded at the same time, to keep the enemy occupied at
home. At this welcome news the hopes of the Mytilenaeans revived, and
all thoughts of surrender were laid aside.