The Signory, seeing their adversaries disarmed, continued to negotiate

an arrangement by means of the pope; but at the same time sent secretly

to the mountains of Pistoia for infantry, which, with what other forces

they could collect, were brought into Florence by night. Having taken

possession of all the strong positions in the city, they assembled the

people in the piazza and created a new balia, which, without delay,

restored Cosmo and those who had been exiled with him to their country;

and banished, of the opposite party, Rinaldo degli Albizzi, Ridolfo

Peruzzi, Niccolo Barbadoro, and Palla Strozzi, with so many other

citizens, that there were few places in Italy which did not contain

some, and many others beyond her limits were full of them. By this and

similar occurrences, Florence was deprived of men of worth, and of much

wealth and industry.

The pope, seeing such misfortunes befall those who by his entreaties

were induced to lay down their arms, was greatly dissatisfied, and

condoled with Rinaldo on the injuries he had received through his

confidence in him, but advised him to be patient, and hope for some

favorable turn of fortune. Rinaldo replied, "The want of confidence in

those who ought to have trusted me, and the great trust I have reposed

in you, have ruined both me and my party. But I blame myself principally

for having thought that you, who were expelled from your own country,

could preserve me in mine. I have had sufficient experience of the

freaks of fortune; and as I have never trusted greatly to prosperity, I

shall suffer less inconvenience from adversity; and I know that when she

pleases she can become more favorable. But if she should never change, I

shall not be very desirous of living in a city in which individuals

are more powerful than the laws; for that country alone is desirable in

which property and friends may be safely enjoyed, not one where they may

easily be taken from us, and where friends, from fear of losing their

property, are compelled to abandon each other in their greatest need.

Besides, it has always been less painful to good men to hear of the

misfortunes of their country than to witness them; and an honorable

exile is always held in greater esteem than slavery at home." He then

left the pope, and, full of indignation, blaming himself, his own

measures, and the coldness of his friends, went into exile.

Cosmo, on the other hand, being informed of his recall, returned to

Florence; and it has seldom occurred that any citizen, coming home

triumphant from victory, was received by so vast a concourse of people,

or such unqualified demonstrations of regard as he was upon his

return from banishment; for by universal consent he was hailed as the

benefactor of the people, and the FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY.

BOOK V

CHAPTER I

The vicissitudes of empires--The state of Italy--The military factions

of Sforza and Braccio--The Bracceschi and the Sforzeschi attack the

pope, who is expelled by the Romans--War between the pope and the duke

of Milan--The Florentines and the Venetians assist the pope--Peace

between the pope and the duke of Milan--Tyranny practiced by the party

favorable to the Medici.

It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they

are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a

state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing

them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their

greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner,

having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of

depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend;

and thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again

return to good. The reason is, that valor produces peace; peace, repose;

repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from

order virtue, and from this, glory and good fortune. Hence, wise men

have observed, that the age of literary excellence is subsequent to that

of distinction in arms; and that in cities and provinces, great warriors

are produced before philosophers. Arms having secured victory, and

victory peace, the buoyant vigor of the martial mind cannot be enfeebled

by a more excusable indulgence than that of letters; nor can indolence,

with any greater or more dangerous deceit, enter a well regulated

community. Cato was aware of this when the philosophers, Diogenes and

Carneades, were sent ambassadors to the senate by the Athenians; for

perceiving with what earnest admiration the Roman youth began to follow

them, and knowing the evils that might result to his country from this

specious idleness, he enacted that no philosopher should be allowed

to enter Rome. Provinces by this means sink to ruin, from which, men's

sufferings having made them wiser, they again recur to order, if they

be not overwhelmed by some extraordinary force. These causes made Italy,

first under the ancient Tuscans, and afterward under the Romans, by

turns happy and unhappy; and although nothing has subsequently arisen

from the ruins of Rome at all corresponding to her ancient greatness

(which under a well-organized monarchy might have been gloriously

effected), still there was so much bravery and intelligence in some of

the new cities and governments that afterward sprang up, that although

none ever acquired dominion over the rest, they were, nevertheless, so

balanced and regulated among themselves, as to enable them to live in

freedom, and defend their country from the barbarians.

Among these governments, the Florentines, although they possessed a

smaller extent of territory, were not inferior to any in power and

authority; for being situated in the middle of Italy, wealthy, and

prepared for action, they either defended themselves against such as

thought proper to assail them, or decided victory in favor of those

to whom they became allies. From the valor, therefore, of these new

governments, if no seasons occurred of long-continued peace, neither

were any exposed to the calamities of war; for that cannot be called

peace in which states frequently assail each other with arms, nor can

those be considered wars in which no men are slain, cities plundered,

or sovereignties overthrown; for the practice of arms fell into such a

state of decay, that wars were commenced without fear, continued without

danger, and concluded without loss. Thus the military energy which is

in other countries exhausted by a long peace, was wasted in Italy by

the contemptible manner in which hostilities were carried on, as will be

clearly seen in the events to be described from 1434 to 1494, from which

it will appear how the barbarians were again admitted into Italy, and

she again sunk under subjection to them. Although the transactions of

our princes at home and abroad will not be viewed with admiration of

their virtue and greatness like those of the ancients, perhaps they may

on other accounts be regarded with no less interest, seeing what

masses of high spirited people were kept in restraint by such weak and

disorderly forces. And if, in detailing the events which took place

in this wasted world, we shall not have to record the bravery of the

soldier, the prudence of the general, or the patriotism of the citizen,

it will be seen with what artifice, deceit, and cunning, princes,

warriors, and leaders of republics conducted themselves, to support a

reputation they never deserved. This, perhaps, will not be less useful

than a knowledge of ancient history; for, if the latter excites the

liberal mind to imitation, the former will show what ought to be avoided

and decried.

Italy was reduced to such a condition by her rulers, that when, by

consent of her princes, peace was restored, it was soon disturbed by

those who retained their armies, so that glory was not gained by war nor

repose by peace. Thus when the league and the duke of Milan agreed to

lay aside their arms in 1433, the soldiers, resolved upon war, directed

their efforts against the church. There were at this time two factions

or armed parties in Italy, the Sforzesca and the Braccesca. The leader

of the former was the Count Francesco, the son of Sforza, and of the

latter, Niccolo Piccinino and Niccolo Fortebraccio. Under the banner

of one or other of these parties almost all the forces of Italy were

assembled. Of the two, the Sforzesca was in greatest repute, as well

from the bravery of the count himself, as from the promise which the

duke of Milan had made him of his natural daughter, Madonna Bianca, the

prospect of which alliance greatly strengthened his influence. After

the peace of Lombardy, these forces, from various causes attacked Pope

Eugenius. Niccolo Fortebraccio was instigated by the ancient enmity

which Braccio had always entertained against the church; the count was

induced by ambition: so that Niccolo assailed Rome, and the count took

possession of La Marca.

The Romans, in order to avoid the war, drove Pope Eugenius from their

city: and he, having with difficulty escaped, came to Florence, where

seeing the imminent danger of his situation, being abandoned by the

princes (for they were unwilling again to take up arms in his cause,

after having been so anxious to lay them aside), he came to terms with

the count, and ceded to him the sovereignty of La Marca, although, to

the injury of having occupied it, he had added insult; for in signing

the place, from which he addressed letters to his agents, he said in

Latin, according to the Latin custom, _Ex Girfalco nostro Firmiano,

invito Petro et Paulo_. Neither was he satisfied with this concession,

but insisted upon being appointed Gonfalonier of the church, which was

also granted; so much more was Eugenius alarmed at the prospect of a

dangerous war than of an ignominious peace. The count, having been

thus been reconciled to the pontiff, attacked Niccolo Fortebraccio, and

during many months various encounters took place between them, from

all which greater injury resulted to the pope and his subjects, than to

either of the belligerents. At length, by the intervention of the duke

of Milan, an arrangement, by way of a truce, was made, by which both

became princes in the territories of the church.

The war thus extinguished at Rome was rekindled in Romagna by Batista

da Canneto, who at Bologna slew some of the family of the Grifoni, and

expelled from the city the governor who resided there for the pope,

along with others who were opposed to him. To enable himself to retain

the government, he applied for assistance to Filippo; and the pope,

to avenge himself for the injury, sought the aid of the Venetians and

Florentines. Both parties obtained assistance, so that very soon two

large armies were on foot in Romagna. Niccolo Piccinino commanded for

the duke, Gattamelata and Niccolo da Tolentino for the Venetians and

Florentines. They met near Imola, where a battle ensued, in which the

Florentines and Venetians were routed, and Niccolo da Tolentino was sent

prisoner to Milan where, either through grief for his loss or by some

unfair means, he died in a few days.

The duke, on this victory, either being exhausted by the late wars, or

thinking the League after their defeat would not be in haste to resume

hostilities, did not pursue his good fortune, and thus gave the pope and

his colleagues time to recover themselves. They therefore appointed

the Count Francesco for their leader, and undertook to drive Niccolo

Fortebraccio from the territories of the church, and thus terminate

the war which had been commenced in favor of the pontiff. The Romans,

finding the pope supported by so large an army, sought a reconciliation

with him, and being successful, admitted his commissary into the

city. Among the places possessed by Niccolo Fortebraccio, were Tivoli,

Montefiascone, Citta di Castello, and Ascesi, to the last of which, not

being able to keep the field, he fled, and the count besieged him there.

Niccolo's brave defense making it probable that the war would be of

considerable duration, the duke deemed to necessary to prevent the

League from obtaining the victory, and said that if this were not

effected he would very soon have to look at the defense of his own

territories. Resolving to divert the count from the siege, he commanded

Niccolo Piccinino to pass into Tuscany by way of Romagna; and the

League, thinking it more important to defend Tuscany than to occupy

Ascesi, ordered the count to prevent the passage of Niccolo, who was

already, with his army, at Furli. The count accordingly moved with his

forces, and came to Cesena, having left the war of La Marca and the care

of his own territories to his brother Lione; and while Niccolo Piccinino

was endeavoring to pass by, and the count to prevent him, Fortebraccio

attacked Lione with great bravery, made him prisoner, routed his forces,

and pursuing the advantage of his victory, at once possessed himself of

many places in La Marca. This circumstance greatly perplexed the count,

who thought he had lost all his territories; so, leaving part of his

force to check Piccinino, with the remainder he pursued Fortebraccio,

whom he attacked and conquered. Fortebraccio was taken prisoner in the

battle, and soon after died of his wounds. This victory restored to the

pontiff all the places that had been taken from him by Fortebraccio, and

compelled the duke of Milan to sue for peace, which was concluded by the

intercession of Niccolo da Esta, marquis of Ferrara; the duke restoring

to the church the places he had taken from her, and his forces retiring

into Lombardy. Batista da Canneto, as in the case with all who retain

authority only by the consent and forces of another, when the duke's

people had quitted Romagna, unable with his own power to keep possession

of Bologna, fled, and Antonio Bentivogli, the head of the opposite

party, returned to his country.

All this took place during the exile of Cosmo, after whose return,

those who had restored him, and a great number of persons injured by the

opposite party, resolved at all events to make themselves sure of the

government; and the Signory for the months of November and December, not

content with what their predecessors had done in favor of their party

extended the term and changed the residences of several who were

banished, and increased the number of exiles. In addition to these

evils, it was observed that citizens were more annoyed on account of

their wealth, their family connections or private animosities, than

for the sake of the party to which they adhered, so that if these

prescriptions had been accompanied with bloodshed, they would have

resembled those of Octavius and Sylla, though in reality they were not

without some stains; for Antonio di Bernardo Guadagni was beheaded, and

four other citizens, among whom were Zanobi dei Belfratelli and Cosmo

Barbadori, passing the confines to which they were limited, proceeded to

Venice, where the Venetians, valuing the friendship of Cosmo de' Medici

more than their own honor, sent them prisoners to him, and they were

basely put to death. This circumstance greatly increased the influence

of that party, and struck their enemies with terror, finding that such

a powerful republic would so humble itself to the Florentines. This,

however, was supposed to have been done, not so much out of kindness to

Cosmo, as to excite dissensions in Florence, and by means of bloodshed

make greater certainty of division among the citizens, for the Venetians

knew there was no other obstacle to their ambition so great as the union

of her people.

The city being cleared of the enemies, or suspected enemies of the

state, those in possession of the government now began to strengthen

their party by conferring benefits upon such as were in a condition

to serve them, and the family of the Alberti, with all who had been

banished by the former government, were recalled. All the nobility,

with few exceptions, were reduced to the ranks of the people, and the

possessions of the exiles were divided among themselves, upon each

paying a small acknowledgment. They then fortified themselves with new

laws and provisos, made new Squittini, withdrawing the names of their

adversaries from the purses, and filling them with those of their

friends. Taking advice from the ruin of their enemies, they considered

that to allow the great offices to be filled by mere chance of drawing,

did not afford the government sufficient security, they therefore

resolved that the magistrates possessing the power of life and death

should always be chosen from among the leaders of their own party,

and therefore that the _Accoppiatori_, or persons selected for the

imborsation of the new Squittini, with the Signory who had to retire

from office, should make the new appointments. They gave to eight of the

guard authority to proceed capitally, and provided that the exiles, when

their term of banishment was complete, should not be allowed to return,

unless from the Signory and Colleagues, which were thirty-seven in

number, the consent of thirty-four was obtained. It was made unlawful

to write to or to receive letters from them; every word, sign, or action

that gave offense to the ruling party was punished with the utmost

rigor; and if there was still in Florence any suspected person whom

these regulations did not reach, he was oppressed with taxes imposed for

the occasion. Thus in a short time, having expelled or impoverished the

whole of the adverse party, they established themselves firmly in the

government. Not to be destitute of external assistance, and to deprive

others of it, who might use it against themselves, they entered into a

league, offensive and defensive, with the pope, the Venetians, and the

duke of Milan.

CHAPTER II

Death of Giovanni II.--René of Anjou and Alfonso of Aragon aspire to

the kingdom--Alfonso is routed and taken by the Genoese--Alfonso being

a prisoner of the duke of Milan, obtains his friendship--The Genoese

disgusted with the duke of Milan--Divisions among the Genoese--The

Genoese, by means of Francesco Spinola, expel the duke's

governor--League against the duke of Milan--Rinaldo degli Albizzi

advises the duke to make war against the Florentines--His discourse to

the duke--The duke adopts measures injurious to the Florentines--Niccolo

Piccinino appointed to command the duke's forces--Preparations of the

Florentines--Piccinino routed before Barga.

The affairs of Florence being in this condition, Giovanna, queen

of Naples, died, and by her will appointed René of Anjou to be her

successor. Alfonso, king of Aragon, was at this time in Sicily, and

having obtained the concurrence of many barons, prepared to take

possession of the kingdom. The Neapolitans, with whom a greater number

of barons were also associated, favored René. The pope was unwilling

that either of them should obtain it; but desired the affairs of Naples

to be administered by a governor of his own appointing.

In the meantime Alfonso entered the kingdom, and was received by the

duke of Sessa; he brought with him some princes, whom he had engaged in

his service, with the design (already possessing Capua, which the prince

of Taranto held in his name) of subduing the Neapolitans, and sent his

fleet to attack Gaeta, which had declared itself in their favor. They

therefore demanded assistance of the duke of Milan, who persuaded the

Genoese to undertake their defense; and they, to satisfy the duke their

sovereign, and protect the merchandise they possessed, both at Naples

and Gaeta, armed a powerful fleet. Alfonso hearing of this, augmented

his own naval force, went in person to meet the Genoese, and coming up

with them near the island of Ponzio, an engagement ensued, in which the

Aragonese were defeated, and Alfonso, with many of the princes of his

suite, made prisoners, and sent by the Genoese to the Filippo.

This victory terrified the princes of Italy, who, being jealous of the

duke's power, thought it would give him a great opportunity of being

sovereign of the whole country. But so contrary are the views of men,

that he took a directly opposite course. Alfonso was a man of

great sagacity, and as soon as an opportunity presented itself

of communicating with Filippo, he proved to him how completely he

contravened his own interests, by favoring René and opposing himself;

for it would be the business of the former, on becoming king of Naples,

to introduce the French into Milan; that in an emergency he might have

assistance at hand, without the necessity of having to solicit a passage

for his friends. But he could not possibly secure this advantage without

effecting the ruin of the duke, and making his dominions a French

province; and that the contrary of all this would result from himself

becoming lord of Naples; for having only the French to fear, he would be

compelled to love and caress, nay even to obey those who had it in their

power to open a passage for his enemies. That thus the title of king

of king of Naples would be with himself (Alfonso), but the power and

authority with Filippo; so that it was much more the duke's business

than his own to consider the danger of one course and the advantage of

the other; unless he rather wished to gratify his private prejudices

than to give security to his dominions. In the one case he would be a

free prince, in the other, placed between two powerful sovereigns, he

would either be robbed of his territories or live in constant fear, and

have to obey them like a slave. These arguments so greatly influenced

the duke, that, changing his design, he set Alfonso at liberty, sent

him honorably to Genoa and then to Naples. From thence the king went

to Gaeta, which as soon as his liberation had become known, was taken

possession of by some nobles of his party.

The Genoese, seeing that the duke, without the least regard for them,

had liberated the king, and gained credit to himself through the dangers

and expense which they had incurred; that he enjoyed all the honor of

the liberation, and they were themselves exposed to the odium of the

capture, and the injuries consequent upon the king's defeat, were

greatly exasperated. In the city of Genoa, while in the enjoyment of her

liberty, a magistrate is created with the consent of the people, whom

they call the Doge; not that he is absolutely a prince, or that he alone

has the power of determining matters of government; but that, as the

head of the state, he proposes those questions or subjects which have

to be considered and determined by the magistrates and the councils. In

that city are many noble families so powerful, that they are with great

difficulty induced to submit to the authority of the law. Of these,

the most powerful are the Fregosa and the Adorna, from whom arise the

dissensions of the city, and the impotence of her civil regulations; for

the possession of this high office being contested by means inadmissible

in well-regulated communities, and most commonly with arms in their

hands, it always occurs that one party is oppressed and the other

triumphant; and sometimes those who fail in the pursuit have recourse to

the arms of strangers, and the country they are not allowed to rule they

subject to foreign authority. Hence it happens, that those who govern in

Lombardy most commonly command in Genoa, as occurred at the time Alfonso

of Aragon was made prisoner. Among the leading Genoese who had been

instrumental in subjecting the republic to Filippo, was Francesco

Spinola, who, soon after he had reduced his country to bondage, as

always happens in such cases, became suspected by the duke. Indignant at

this, he withdrew to a sort of voluntary exile at Gaeta, and being

there when the naval expedition was in preparation, and having conducted

himself with great bravery in the action, he thought he had again

merited so much of the duke's confidence as would obtain for him

permission to remain undisturbed at Genoa. But the duke still retained

his suspicions; for he could not believe that a vacillating defender of

his own country's liberty would be faithful to himself; and Francesco

Spinola resolved again to try his fortune, and if possible restore

freedom to his country, and honorable safety for himself; for he was

there was no probability of regaining the forfeited affection of

his fellow-citizens, but by resolving at his own peril to remedy the

misfortunes which he had been so instrumental in producing. Finding the

indignation against the duke universal, on account of the liberation

of the king, he thought the moment propitious for the execution of his

design. He communicated his ideas to some whom he knew to be similarly

inclined, and his arguments ensured their co-operation.

The great festival of St. John the Baptist being come, when Arismeno,

the new governor sent by the duke, was to enter Genoa, and he being

already arrived, accompanied by Opicino, the former governor, and many

Genoese citizens, Francesco Spinola thought further delay improper; and,

issuing from his house with those acquainted with his design, all armed,

they raised the cry of liberty. It was wonderful to see how eagerly the

citizens and people assembled at the word; so that those who for any

reason might be favorable to Filippo, not only had no time to arm, but

scarcely to consider the means of escape. Arismeno, with some Genoese,

fled to the fortress which was held for the duke, Opicino, thinking that

if he could reach the palace, where two thousand men were in arms, and

at his command, he might be able either to effect his own safety, or

induce his friends to defend themselves, took that direction; but before

he arrived at the piazza he was slain, his body divided into many pieces

and scattered about the city. The Genoese having placed the government

in the hands of free magistrates, in a few days recovered the castle,

and the other strongholds possessed by the duke, and delivered

themselves entirely from his yoke.

These transactions, though at first they had alarmed the princes of

Italy with the apprehension that the duke would become too powerful,

now gave them hope, seeing the turn they had taken, of being able to

restrain him; and, notwithstanding the recent league, the Florentines

and Venetians entered into alliance with the Genoese. Rinaldo degli

Albizzi and the other leading Florentine exiles, observing the altered

aspect of affairs, conceived hopes of being able to induce the duke

to make war against Florence, and having arrived at Milan, Rinaldo

addressed him in the following manner: "If we, who were once your

enemies, come now confidently to supplicate your assistance to enable

us to return to our country, neither you, nor anyone, who considers the

course and vicissitudes of human affairs, can be at all surprised; for

of our past conduct toward yourself and our present intentions toward

our country, we can adduce palpable and abundant reasons. No good man

will ever reproach another who endeavors to defend his country, whatever

be his mode of doing so; neither have we had any design of injuring

you, but only to preserve our country from detriment; and we appeal to

yourself, whether, during the greatest victories of our league, when you

were really desirous of peace, we were not even more anxious for it than

yourself; so that we do not think we have done aught to make us despair

altogether of favor from you. Nor can our country itself complain that

we now exhort you to use those arms against her, from which we have so

pertinaciously defended her; for that state alone merits the love of

all her citizens, which cares with equal affection for all; not one that

favors a few, and casts from her the great mass of her children. Nor are

the arms that men use against their country to be universally condemned;

for communities, although composed of many, resemble individual bodies;

and as in these, many infirmities arise which cannot be cured without

the application of fire or of steel, so in the former, there often occur

such numerous and great evils, that a good and merciful citizen, when

there is a necessity for the sword, would be much more to blame in

leaving her uncured, than by using this remedy for her preservation.

What greater disease can afflict a republic than slavery? and what

remedy is more desirable for adoption than the one by which alone it can

be effectually removed? No wars are just but those that are necessary;

and force is merciful when it presents the only hope of relief. I know

not what necessity can be greater than ours, or what compassion can

exceed that which rescues our country from slavery. Our cause is

therefore just, and our purpose merciful, as both yourself and we may

be easily convinced. The amplest justice is on your side; for the

Florentines have not hesitated, after a peace concluded with so much

solemnity, to enter into league with those who have rebelled against

you; so that if our cause is insufficient to excite you against them,

let your own just indignation do so; and the more so, seeing the

facility of the undertaking. You need be under no apprehension from the

memory of the past, in which you may have observed the power of

that people and their pertinency in self-defense; though these might

reasonably excite fear, if they were still animated by the valor of

former times. But now, all is entirely the reverse; for what power can

be expected in a city that has recently expelled the greatest part of

her wealth and industry? What indomitable resolution need be apprehended

from the people whom so many and such recent enmities have disunited?

The disunion which still prevails will prevent wealthy citizens

advancing money as they used to do on former occasions; for though men

willingly contribute according to their means, when they see their own

credit, glory, and private advantage dependent upon it, or when there

is a hope of regaining in peace what has been spent in war, but not when

equally oppressed under all circumstances, when in war they suffer the

injuries of the enemy, and in peace, the insolence of those who govern

them. Besides this, the people feel more deeply the avarice of their

rulers, than the rapacity of the enemy; for there is hope of being

ultimately relieved from the latter evil, but none from the former.

Thus, in the last war, you had to contend with the whole city; but now

with only a small portion. You attempted to take the government from

many good citizens; but now you oppose only a few bad ones. You then

endeavored to deprive a city of her liberty, now you come to restore

it. As it is unreasonable to suppose that under such disparity of

circumstances, the result should be the same, you have now every reason

to anticipate an easy victory; and how much it will strengthen your own

government, you may easily judge; having Tuscany friendly, and bound by

so powerful an obligation, in your enterprises, she will be even of more

service to you than Milan. And, although, on former occasions, such an

acquisition might be looked upon as ambitious and unwarrantable, it will

now be considered merciful and just. Then do not let this opportunity

escape, and be assured, that although your attempts against the city

have been attended with difficulty, expense, and disgrace, this will

with facility procure you incalculable advantage and an honorable

renown."

Many words were not requisite to induce the duke to hostilities against

the Florentines, for he was incited to it by hereditary hatred and blind

ambition, and still more, by the fresh injuries which the league with

the Genoese involved; yet his past expenses, the dangerous measures

necessary, the remembrance of his recent losses, and the vain hopes of

the exiles, alarmed him. As soon as he had learned the revolt of Genoa,

he ordered Niccolo Piccinino to proceed thither with all his cavalry

and whatever infantry he could raise, for the purpose of recovering

her, before the citizens had time to become settled and establish a

government; for he trusted greatly in the fortress within the city,

which was held for him. And although Niccolo drove the Genoese from

the mountains, took from them the valley of Pozeveri, where they had

entrenched themselves, and obliged them to seek refuge within the walls

of the city, he still found such an insurmountable obstacle in the

resolute defense of the citizens, that he was compelled to withdraw. On

this, at the suggestion of the Florentine exiles, he commanded Niccolo

to attack them on the eastern side, upon the confines of Pisa in the

Genoese territory, and to push the war with his utmost vigor, thinking

this plan would manifest and develop the course best to be adopted.

Niccolo therefore besieged and took Serezana, and having committed great

ravages, by way of further alarming the Florentines he proceeded to

Lucca, spreading a report that it was his intention to go to Naples

to render assistance to the king of Aragon. Upon these new events Pope

Eugenius left Florence and proceeded to Bologna, where he endeavored

to effect an amicable arrangement between the league and the duke,

intimating to the latter, that if he would not consent to some treaty,

the pontiff must send Francesco Sforza to assist the league, for the

latter was now his confederate, and served in his pay. Although the pope

greatly exerted himself in this affair, his endeavors were unavailing;

for the duke would not listen to any proposal that did not leave him the

possession of Genoa, and the league had resolved that she should remain

free; and, therefore, each party, having no other resource, prepared to

continue the war.

In the meantime Niccolo Piccinino arrived at Lucca, and the Florentines,

being doubtful what course to adopt, ordered Neri di Gino to lead their

forces into the Pisan territory, induced the pontiff to allow Count

Francesco to join him, and with their forces they halted at San Gonda.

Piccinino then demanded admission into the kingdom of Naples, and this

being refused, he threatened to force a passage. The armies were

equal, both in regard of numbers and the capacity of their leaders, and

unwilling to tempt fortune during the bad weather, it being the month of

December, they remained several days without attacking each other. The

first movement was made by Niccolo Piccinino, who being informed that if

he attacked Vico Pisano by night, he could easily take possession of

the place, made the attempt, and having failed, ravaged the surrounding

country, and then burned and plundered the town of San Giovanni alla

Vena. This enterprise, though of little consequence, excited him to make

further attempts, the more so from being assured that the count and Neri

were yet in their quarters, and he attacked Santa Maria in Castello and

Filetto, both which places he took. Still the Florentine forces would

not stir; not that the count entertained any fear, but because, out of

regard to the pope, who still labored to effect an accommodation, the

government of Florence had deferred giving their final consent to the

war. This course, which the Florentines adopted from prudence, was

considered by the enemy to be only the result of timidity, and with

increased boldness they led their forces up to Barga, which they

resolved to besiege. This new attack made the Florentines set aside

all other considerations, and resolve not only to relieve Barga, but

to invade the Lucchese territory. Accordingly the count proceeded in

pursuit of Niccolo, and coming up with him before Barga, an engagement

took place, in which Piccinino was overcome, and compelled to raise the

siege.

The Venetians considering the duke to have broken the peace, send Giovan

Francesco da Gonzaga, their captain, to Ghiaradadda, who, by severely

wasting the duke's territories, induced him to recall Niccolo Piccinino

from Tuscany. This circumstance, together with the victory obtained over

Niccolo, emboldened the Florentines to attempt the recovery of Lucca,

since the duke, whom alone they feared, was engaged with the Venetians,

and the Lucchese having received the enemy into their city, and allowed

him to attack them, would have no ground of complaint.

CHAPTER III

The Florentines go to war with Lucca--Discourse of a citizen of Lucca to

animate the plebeians against the Florentines--The Lucchese resolve

to defend themselves--They are assisted by the duke of Milan--Treaty

between the Florentines and the Venetians--Francesco Sforza, captain of

the league, refuses to cross the Po in the service of the Venetians

and returns to Tuscany--The bad faith of the Venetians toward the

Florentines--Cosmo de' Medici at Venice--Peace between the Florentines

and the Lucchese--The Florentines effect a reconciliation between the

pope and the Count di Poppi--The pope consecrates the church of Santa

Reparata--Council of Florence.

The count commenced operations against Lucca in April, 1437, and the

Florentines, desirous of recovering what they had themselves lost before

they attacked others, retook Santa Maria in Castello, and all the places

which Piccinino had occupied. Then, entering the Lucchese territory,

they besieged Camaiore, the inhabitants of which, although faithful

to their rulers, being influenced more by immediate danger than by

attachment to their distant friends, surrendered. In the same manner,

they obtained Massa and Serezana. Toward the end of May they proceeded

in the direction of Lucca, burning the towns, destroying the growing

crops, grain, trees, and vines, driving away the cattle, and leaving

nothing undone to injure the enemy. The Lucchese, finding themselves

abandoned by the duke, and hopeless of defending the open country,

forsook it; entrenched and fortified the city, which they doubted not,

being well garrisoned, they would be able to defend for a time, and

that, in the interim, some event would occur for their relief, as had

been the case during the former wars which the Florentines had carried

on against them. Their only apprehension arose from the fickle minds

of the plebeians, who, becoming weary of the siege, would have more

consideration of their own danger than of other's liberty, and would

thus compel them to submit to some disgraceful and ruinous capitulation.

In order to animate them to defense, they were assembled in the public

piazza, and some of the eldest and most esteemed of the citizens

addressed them in the following terms: "You are doubtless aware that

what is done from necessity involves neither censure nor applause;

therefore, if you should accuse us of having caused the present war, by

receiving the ducal forces into the city, and allowing them to commit

hostilities against the Florentines, you are greatly mistaken. You are

well acquainted with the ancient enmity of the Florentines against you,

which is not occasioned by any injuries you have done them, or by fear

on their part, but by our weakness and their own ambition; for the one

gives them hope of being able to oppress us, and the other incites them

to attempt it. It is then vain to imagine that any merit of yours can

extinguish that desire in them, or that any offense you can commit, can

provoke them to greater animosity. They endeavor to deprive you of your

liberty; you must resolve to defend it; and whatever they may undertake

against us for that purpose, although we may lament, we need not wonder.

We may well grieve, therefore, that they attack us, take possession of

our towns, burn our houses, and waste our country. But who is so simple

as to be surprised at it? for were it in our power, we should do just

the same to them, or even worse. They declare war against us now, they

say, for having received Niccolo; but if we had not received him, they

would have done the same and assigned some other ground for it; and if

the evil had been delayed, it would most probably have been greater.

Therefore, you must not imagine it to be occasioned by his arrival, but

rather by your own ill fortune and their ambition; for we could not have

refused admission to the duke's forces, and, being come, we could

not prevent their aggressions. You know, that without the aid of some

powerful ally we are incapable of self-defense, and that none can render

us this service more powerfully or faithfully than the duke. He restored

our liberty; it is reasonable to expect he will defend it. He has always

been the greatest foe of our inveterate enemies; if, therefore, to avoid

incensing the Florentines we had excited his anger, we should have lost

our best friend, and rendered our enemy more powerful and more disposed

to oppress us; so that it is far preferable to have this war upon our

hands, and enjoy the favor of the duke, than to be in peace without it.

Besides, we are justified in expecting that he will rescue us from the

dangers into which we are brought on his account, if we only do not

abandon our own cause. You all know how fiercely the Florentines have

frequently assailed us, and with what glory we have maintained our

defense. We have often been deprived of every hope, except in God

and the casualties which time might produce, and both have proved our

friends. And as they have delivered us formerly, why should they not

continue to do so. Then we were forsaken by the whole of Italy; now we

have the duke in our favor; besides we have a right to suppose that the

Venetians will not hastily attack us; for they will not willingly see

the power of Florence increased. On a former occasion the Florentines

were more at liberty; they had greater hope of assistance, and were more

powerful in themselves, while we were in every respect weaker; for then

a tyrant governed us, now we defend ourselves; then the glory of our

defense was another's, now it is our own; then they were in harmony, now

they are disunited, all Italy being filled with their banished citizens.

But were we without the hope which these favorable circumstances

present, our extreme necessity should make us firmly resolved on our

defense. It is reasonable to fear every enemy, for all seek their

own glory and your ruin; above all others, you have to dread the

Florentines, for they would not be satisfied by submission and tribute,

or the dominion of our city, but they would possess our entire substance

and persons, that they might satiate their cruelty with our blood, and

their avarice with our property, so that all ranks ought to dread them.

Therefore do not be troubled at seeing our crops destroyed, our towns

burned, our fortresses occupied; for if we preserve the city, the rest

will be saved as a matter of course; if we lose her, all else would be

of no advantage to us; for while retaining our liberty, the enemy can

hold them only with the greatest difficulty, while losing it they would

be preserved in vain. Arm, therefore; and when in the fight, remember

that the reward of victory will be safety, not only to your country, but

to your homes, your wives, and your children." The speaker's last words

were received with the utmost enthusiasm by the people, who promised one

and all to die rather than abandon their cause, or submit to any terms

that could violate their liberty. They then made arrangements for the

defense of the city.

In the meantime, the Florentine forces were not idle; and after

innumerable mischiefs done to the country took Monte Carlo by

capitulation. They then besieged Uzzano, in order that the Lucchese,

being pressed on all sides, might despair of assistance, and be

compelled to submission by famine. The fortress was very strong, and

defended by a numerous garrison, so that its capture would be by no

means an easy undertaking. The Lucchese, as might be expected, seeing

the imminent peril of their situation, had recourse to the duke, and

employed prayers and remonstrances to induce him to render them aid.

They enlarged upon their own merits and the offenses of the Florentines;

and showed how greatly it would attach the duke's friends to him to

find they were defended, and how much disaffection it would spread among

them, if they were left to be overwhelmed by the enemy; that if they

lost their liberties and their lives, he would lose his honor and his

friends, and forfeit the confidence of all who from affection might be

induced to incur dangers in his behalf; and added tears to entreaties,

so that if he were unmoved by gratitude to them, he might be induced

to their defense by motives of compassion. The duke, influenced by his

inveterate hostility against the Florentines, his new obligation to

the Lucchese, and, above all, by his desire to prevent so great

an acquisition from falling into the hands of his ancient enemies,

determined either to send a strong force into Tuscany, or vigorously to

assail the Venetians, so as to compel the Florentines to give up their

enterprise and go to their relief.

It was soon known in Florence that the duke was preparing to send forces

into Tuscany. This made the Florentines apprehensive for the success

of their enterprise; and in order to retain the duke in Lombardy, they

requested the Venetians to press him with their utmost strength. But

they also were alarmed, the marquis of Mantua having abandoned them and

gone over to the duke; and thus, finding themselves almost defenseless,

they replied, "that instead of increasing their responsibilities, they

should be unable to perform their part in the war, unless the Count

Francesco were sent to them to take the command of the army, and with

the special understanding that he should engage to cross the Po in

person. They declined to fulfil their former engagements unless he were

bound to do so; for they could not carry on the war without a leader,

or repose confidence in any except the count; and he himself would be

useless to them, unless he came under an obligation to carry on the

war whenever they might think needful." The Florentines thought the war

ought to be pushed vigorously in Lombardy; but they saw that if they

lost the count their enterprise against Lucca was ruined; and they knew

well that the demand of the Venetians arose less from any need they had

of the count, than from their desire to frustrate this expedition. The

count, on the other hand, was ready to pass into Lombardy whenever

the league might require him, but would not alter the tenor of his

engagement; for he was unwilling to sacrifice the hope of the alliance

promised to him by the duke.

The Florentines were thus embarrassed by two contrary impulses, the

wish to possess Lucca, and the dread of a war with Milan. As commonly

happens, fear was the most powerful, and they consented, after the

capture of Uzzano, that the count should go into Lombardy. There still

remained another difficulty, which, depending on circumstances beyond

the reach of their influence, created more doubts and uneasiness

than the former; the count would not consent to pass the Po, and the

Venetians refused to accept him on any other condition. Seeing no other

method of arrangement, than that each should make liberal concessions,

the Florentines induced the count to cross the river by a letter

addressed to the Signory of Florence, intimating that this private

promise did not invalidate any public engagement, and that he might

still refrain from crossing; hence it resulted that the Venetians,

having commenced the war, would be compelled to proceed, and that the

evil apprehended by the Florentines would be averted. To the

Venetians, on the other hand, they averred that this private letter was

sufficiently binding, and therefore they ought to be content; for if

they could save the count from breaking with his father-in-law, it was

well to do so, and that it could be of no advantage either to themselves

or the Venetians to publish it without some manifest necessity. It was

thus determined that the count should pass into Lombardy; and having

taken Uzzano, and raised bastions about Lucca to restrain in her

inhabitants, placed the management of the siege in the hands of the

commissaries, crossed the Apennines, and proceeded to Reggio, when

the Venetians, alarmed at his progress, and in order to discover his

intentions, insisted upon his immediately crossing the Po, and joining

the other forces. The count refused compliance, and many mutual

recriminations took place between him and Andrea Mauroceno, their

messenger on this occasion, each charging the other with arrogance

and treachery: after many protestations, the one of being under no

obligation to perform that service, and the other of not being bound to

any payment, they parted, the count to return to Tuscany, the other to

Venice.

The Florentines had sent the count to encamp in the Pisan territory, and

were in hopes of inducing him to renew the war against the Lucchese, but

found him indisposed to do so, for the duke, having been informed that

out of regard to him he had refused to cross the Po, thought that by

this means he might also save the Lucchese, and begged the count to

endeavor to effect an accommodation between the Florentines and the

Lucchese, including himself in it, if he were able, declaring, at

the same time, the promised marriage should be solemnized whenever he

thought proper. The prospect of this connection had great influence with

the count, for, as the duke had no sons, it gave him hope of becoming

sovereign of Milan. For this reason he gradually abated his exertions

in the war, declared he would not proceed unless the Venetians fulfilled

their engagement as to the payment, and also retained him in the

command; that the discharge of the debt would not alone be sufficient,

for desiring to live peaceably in his own dominions, he needed some

alliance other than that of the Florentines, and that he must regard his

own interests, shrewdly hinting that if abandoned by the Venetians, he

would come to terms with the duke.

These indirect and crafty methods of procedure were highly offensive

to the Florentines, for they found their expedition against Lucca

frustrated, and trembled for the safety of their own territories if ever

the count and the duke should enter into a mutual alliance. To induce

the Venetians to retain the count in the command, Cosmo de' Medici went

to Venice, hoping his influence would prevail with them, and discussed

the subject at great length before the senate, pointing out the

condition of the Italian states, the disposition of their armies, and

the great preponderance possessed by the duke. He concluded by saying,

that if the count and the duke were to unite their forces, they (the

Venetians) might return to the sea, and the Florentines would have to

fight for their liberty. To this the Venetians replied, that they were

acquainted with their own strength and that of the Italians, and thought

themselves able at all events to provide for their own defense; that

it was not their custom to pay soldiers for serving others; that as the

Florentines had used the count's services, they must pay him themselves;

with respect to the security of their own states, it was rather

desirable to check the count's pride than to pay him, for the ambition

of men is boundless, and if he were now paid without serving, he would

soon make some other demand, still more unreasonable and dangerous. It

therefore seemed necessary to curb his insolence, and not allow it to

increase till it became incorrigible; and that if the Florentines, from

fear or any other motive, wished to preserve his friendship, they must

pay him themselves. Cosmo returned without having effected any part of

his object.

The Florentines used the weightiest arguments they could adopt to

prevent the count from quitting the service of the League, a course he

was himself reluctant to follow, but his desire to conclude the marriage

so embarrassed him, that any trivial accident would have been sufficient

to determine his course, as indeed shortly happened. The count had

left his territories in La Marca to the care of Il Furlano, one of his

principal condottieri, who was so far influenced by the duke as to

take command under him, and quit the count's service. This circumstance

caused the latter to lay aside every idea but that of his own safety,

and to come to agreement with the duke; among the terms of which compact

was one that he should not be expected to interfere in the affairs of

Romagna and Tuscany. The count then urged the Florentines to come to

terms with the Lucchese, and so convinced them of the necessity of this,

that seeing no better course to adopt, they complied in April, 1438, by

which treaty the Lucchese retained their liberty, and the Florentines

Monte Carlo and a few other fortresses. After this, being full

of exasperation, they despatched letters to every part of Italy,

overcharged with complaints, affecting to show that since God and men

were averse to the Lucchese coming under their dominion, they had made

peace with them. And it seldom happens that any suffer so much for the

loss of their own lawful property as they did because they could not

obtain the possessions of others.

Though the Florentines had now so many affairs in hand, they did not

allow the proceedings of their neighbors to pass unnoticed, or neglect

the decoration of their city. As before observed, Niccolo Fortebraccio

was dead. He had married a daughter of the Count di Poppi, who, at

the decease of his son-in-law, held the Borgo San Sepolcro, and other

fortresses of that district, and while Niccolo lived, governed them in

his name. Claiming them as his daughter's portion, he refused to give

them up to the pope, who demanded them as property held of the church,

and who, upon his refusal, sent the patriarch with forces to take

possession of them. The count, finding himself unable to sustain the

attack, offered them to the Florentines, who declined them; but the pope

having returned to Florence, they interceded with him in the count's

behalf. Difficulties arising, the patriarch attacked the Casentino, took

Prato Vecchio, and Romena, and offered them also to the Florentines, who

refused them likewise, unless the pope would consent they should restore

them to the count, to which, after much hesitation, he acceded, on

condition that the Florentines should prevail with the Count di Poppi

to restore the Borgo to him. The pope was thus satisfied, and the

Florentines having so far completed the building of their cathedral

church of Santa Reparata, which had been commenced long ago, as to

enable them to perform divine service in it, requested his holiness

to consecrate it. To this the pontiff willingly agreed, and the

Florentines, to exhibit the wealth of the city and the splendor of the

edifice, and do greater honor to the pope, erected a platform from

Santa Maria Novella, where he resided, to the cathedral he was about to

consecrate, six feet in height and twelve feet wide, covered with rich

drapery, for the accommodation of the pontiff and his court, upon which

they proceeded to the building, accompanied by those civic magistrates,

and other officers who were appointed to take part in the procession.

The usual ceremonies of consecration having been completed, the pope, to

show his affection for the city, conferred the honor of knighthood upon

Giuliano Davanzati, their Gonfalonier of Justice, and a citizen of the

highest reputation; and the Signory, not to appear less gracious than

the pope, granted to the new created knight the government of Pisa for

one year.

There were at that time certain differences between the Roman and the

Greek churches, which prevented perfect conformity in divine service;

and at the last council of Bâle, the prelates of the Western church

having spoken at great length upon the subject, it was resolved that

efforts should be made to bring the emperor and the Greek prelates to

the council at Bâle, to endeavor to reconcile the Greek church with the

Roman. Though this resolution was derogatory to the majesty of the Greek

empire, and offensive to its clergy, yet being then oppressed by the

Turks, and fearing their inability for defense, in order to have a

better ground for requesting assistance, they submitted; and therefore,

the emperor, the patriarch, with other prelates and barons of Greece,

to comply with the resolution of the council, assembled at Bâle, came

to Venice; but being terrified by the plague then prevailing, it was

resolved to terminate their differences at Florence. The Roman and Greek

prelates having held a conference during several days, in which many

long discussions took place, the Greeks yielded, and agreed to adopt the

ritual of the church of Rome.

CHAPTER IV

New wars in Italy--Niccolo Piccinino, in concert with the duke of

Milan, deceives the pope, and takes many places from the church--Niccolo

attacks the Venetians--Fears and precautions of the Florentines--The

Venetians request assistance of the Florentines and of Sforza--League

against the duke of Milan--The Florentines resolve to send the count to

assist the Venetians--Neri di Gino Capponi at Venice--His discourse to

the senate--Extreme joy of the Venetians.

Peace being restored between the Lucchese and Florentines, and the duke

and the count having become friends, hopes were entertained that the

arms of Italy would be laid aside, although those in the kingdom of

Naples, between René of Anjou and Alfonso of Aragon, could find repose

only by the ruin of one party or the other. And though the pope was

dissatisfied with the loss of so large a portion of his territories,

and the ambition of the duke and the Venetians was obvious, still it was

thought that the pontiff, from necessity, and the others from weariness,

would be advocates of peace. However, a different state of feeling

prevailed, for neither the duke nor the Venetians were satisfied with

their condition; so that hostilities were resumed, and Lombardy and

Tuscany were again harassed by the horrors of war. The proud mind of

the duke could not endure that the Venetians should possess Bergamo and

Brescia, and he was still further annoyed, by hearing, that they were

constantly in arms, and in the daily practice of annoying some portion

of his territories. He thought, however, that he should not only be able

to restrain them, but to recover the places he had lost, if the pope,

the Florentines, and the count could be induced to forego the Venetian

alliance. He therefore resolved to take Romagna from the pontiff,

imagining that his holiness could not injure him, and that the

Florentines, finding the conflagration so near, either for their own

sake would refrain from interference, or if they did not, could not

conveniently attack him. The duke was also aware of the resentment

of the Florentines against the Venetians, on account of the affair of

Lucca, and he therefore judged they would be the less eager to take

arms against him on their behalf. With regard to the Count Francesco,

he trusted that their new friendship, and the hope of his alliance would

keep him quiet. To give as little color as possible for complaint, and

to lull suspicion, particularly, because in consequence of his treaty

with the count, the latter could not attack Romagna, he ordered Niccolo

Piccinino, as if instigated by his own ambition to do so.

When the agreement between the duke and the count was concluded, Niccolo

was in Romagna, and in pursuance of his instructions from the duke,

affected to be highly incensed, that a connection had been established

between him and the count, his inveterate enemy. He therefore withdrew

himself and his forces to Camurata, a place between Furli and Ravenna,

which he fortified, as if designing to remain there some time, or till a

new enterprise should present itself. The report of his resentment being

diffused, Niccolo gave the pope to understand how much the duke was

under obligation to him, and how ungrateful he proved; and he was

persuaded that, possessing nearly all the arms of Italy, under the

two principal generals, he could render himself sole ruler: but if

his holiness pleased, of the two principal generals whom he fancied

he possessed, one would become his enemy, and the other be rendered

useless; for, if money were provided him, and he were kept in pay, he

would attack the territories held of the church by the count, who being

compelled to look to his own interests, could not subserve the ambition

of Filippo. The pope giving entire credence to this representation,

on account of its apparent reasonableness, sent Niccolo five thousand

ducats and loaded him with promises of states for himself and his

children. And though many informed him of the deception, he could not

give credit to them, nor would he endure the conversation of any who

seemed to doubt the integrity of Niccolo's professions. The city of

Ravenna was held for the church by Ostasio da Polenta. Niccolo finding

further delay would be detrimental, since his son Francesco had, to the

pope's great dishonor, pillaged Spoleto, determined to attack Ravenna,

either because he judged the enterprise easy, or because he had a secret

understanding with Ostasio, for in a few days after the attack, the

place capitulated. He then took Bologna, Imola, and Furli; and (what

is worthy of remark) of twenty fortresses held in that country for the

pope, not one escaped falling into his hands. Not satisfied with these

injuries inflicted on the pontiff, he resolved to banter him by his

words as well as ridicule him by his deeds, and wrote, that he had only

done as his holiness deserved, for having unblushingly attempted to

divide two such attached friends as the duke and himself, and for having

dispersed over Italy letters intimating that he had quitted the duke

to take part with the Venetians. Having taken possession of Romagna,

Niccolo left it under the charge of his son, Francesco, and with the

greater part of his troops, went into Lombardy, where joining the

remainder of the duke's forces, he attacked the country about Brescia,

and having soon completely conquered it, besieged the city itself.

The duke, who desired the Venetians to be left defenseless, excused

himself to the pope, the Florentines, and the count, saying, that if the

doings of Niccolo were contrary to the terms of the treaty, they were

equally contrary to his wishes, and by secret messengers, assured them

that when an occasion presented itself, he would give them a convincing

proof that they had been performed in disobedience to his instructions.

Neither the count nor the Florentines believed him, but thought, with

reason, that these enterprises had been carried on to keep them at

bay, till he had subdued the Venetians, who, being full of pride, and

thinking themselves able alone to resist the duke, had not deigned to

ask for any assistance, but carried on the war under their captain,

Gattamelata.

Count Francesco would have wished, with the consent of the Florentines,

to go to the assistance of king René, if the events of Romagna and

Lombardy had not hindered him; and the Florentines would willingly have

consented, from their ancient friendship to the French dynasty, but the

duke was entirely in favor of Alfonso. Each being engaged in wars near

home, refrained from distant undertakings. The Florentines, finding

Romagna occupied with the duke's forces, and the Venetians defeated, as

if foreseeing their own ruin in that of others, entreated the count to

come to Tuscany, where they might consider what should be done to resist

Filippo's power, which was now greater than it had ever before been;

assuring him that if his insolence were not in some way curbed, all the

powers of Italy would soon have to submit to him. The count felt the

force of the fears entertained by the Florentines, but his desire to

secure the duke's alliance kept him in suspense; and the duke, aware

of this desire, gave him the greatest assurance that his hopes would

be realized as shortly as possible, if he abstained from hostilities

against him. As the lady was now of marriageable age, the duke had

frequently made all suitable preparations for the celebration of the

ceremony, but on one pretext or another they had always been wholly set

aside. He now, to give the count greater confidence, added deeds to his

words, and sent him thirty thousand florins, which, by the terms of the

marriage contract, he had engaged to pay.

Still the war in Lombardy proceeded with greater vehemence than ever;

the Venetians constantly suffered fresh losses of territory, and the

fleets they equipped upon the rivers were taken by the duke's forces;

the country around Verona and Brescia was entirely occupied, and the

two cities themselves so pressed, that their speedy fall was generally

anticipated. The marquis of Mantua, who for many years had led the

forces of their republic, quite unexpectedly resigned his command, and

went over to the duke's service. Thus the course which pride prevented

them from adopting at the commencement of the war, fear compelled them

to take during its progress; for knowing there was no help for them but

in the friendship of the Florentines and the count, they began to make

overtures to obtain it, though with shame and apprehension; for they

were afraid of receiving a reply similar to that which they had

given the Florentines, when the latter applied for assistance in the

enterprise against Lucca and the count's affairs. However, they found

the Florentines more easily induced to render aid than they expected, or

their conduct deserved; so much more were the former swayed by hatred of

their ancient enemy, than by resentment of the ingratitude of their

old and habitual friends. Having foreseen the necessity into which the

Venetians must come, they had informed the count that their ruin must

involve his own; that he was deceived if he thought the duke, while

fortune, would esteem him more than if he were in adversity; that the

duke was induced to promise him his daughter by the fear he entertained

of him; that what necessity occasions to be promised, it also causes to

be performed; and it was therefore desirable to keep the duke in that

necessity, which could be done without supporting the power of the

Venetians. Therefore he might perceive, that if the Venetians were

compelled to abandon their inland territories, he would not only lose

the advantages derivable from them, but also those to be obtained from

such as feared them; and that if he considered well the powers of

Italy, he would see that some were poor, and others hostile; that the

Florentines alone were not, as he had often said, sufficient for his

support; so that on every account it was best to keep the Venetians

powerful by land. These arguments, conjoined with the hatred which the

count had conceived against Filippo, by supposing himself duped with

regard to the promised alliance, induced him to consent to a new treaty;

but still he would not consent to cross the Po. The agreement was

concluded in February, 1438; the Venetians agreeing to pay two-thirds of

the expense of the war, the Florentines one-third, and each engaging to

defend the states which the count possessed in La Marca. Nor were these

the only forces of the league, for the lord of Faenza, the sons of

Pandolfo Malatesti da Rimino and Pietro Giampagolo Orsini also joined

them. They endeavored, by very liberal offers, to gain over the marquis

of Mantua, but could not prevail against the friendship and stipend of

the duke; and the lord of Faenza, after having entered into compact with

the league, being tempted by more advantageous terms, went over to him.

This made them despair of being able to effect an early settlement of

the troubles of Romagna.

The affairs of Lombardy were in this condition: Brescia was so closely

besieged by the duke's forces, that constant apprehensions were

entertained of her being compelled by famine to a surrender; while

Verona was so pressed, that a similar fate was expected to await her,

and if one of these cities were lost, all the other preparations for the

war might be considered useless, and the expenses already incurred as

completely wasted. For this there was no remedy, but to send the count

into Lombardy; and to this measure three obstacles presented themselves.

The first was, to induce him to cross the Po, and prosecute the war in

whatever locality might be found most advisable; the second, that the

count being at a distance, the Florentines would be left almost at the

mercy of the duke, who, issuing from any of his fortresses, might with

part of his troops keep the count at bay, and with the rest introduce

into Tuscany the Florentine exiles, whom the existing government already

dreaded; the third was, to determine what route the count should take to

arrive safely in the Paduan territory, and join the Venetian forces. Of

these three difficulties, the second, which particularly regarded the

Florentines, was the most serious; but, knowing the necessity of the

case, and wearied out by the Venetians, who with unceasing importunity

demanded the count, intimating that without him they should abandon all

hope, they resolved to relieve their allies rather than listen to the

suggestions of their own fears. There still remained the question about

the route to be taken, for the safety of which they determined the

Venetians should provide; and as they had sent Neri Capponi to treat

with the count and induce him to cross the Po, they determined that the

same person should also proceed to Venice, in order to make the benefit

the more acceptable to the Signory, and see that all possible security

were given to the passage of the forces.

Neri embarked at Cesena and went to Venice; nor was any prince ever

received with so much honor as he was; for upon his arrival, and the

matters which his intervention was to decide and determine, the safety

of the republic seemed to depend. Being introduced to the senate, and

in presence of the Doge, he said, "The Signory of Florence, most serene

prince, has always perceived in the duke's greatness the source of ruin

both to this republic and our own, and that the safety of both states

depends upon their separate strength and mutual confidence. If such had

been the opinion of this illustrious Signory, we should ourselves have

been in better condition, and your republic would have been free from

the dangers that now threaten it. But as at the proper crisis you

withheld from us confidence and aid, we could not come to the relief of

your distress, nor could you, being conscious of this, freely ask us;

for neither in your prosperity nor adversity have you clearly perceived

our motives. You have not observed, that those whose deeds have once

incurred our hatred, can never become entitled to our regard; nor can

those who have once merited our affection ever after absolutely cancel

their claim. Our attachment to your most serene Signory is well known to

you all, for you have often seen Lombardy filled with our forces and

our money for your assistance. Our hereditary enmity to Filippo and his

house is universally known, and it is impossible that love or hatred,

strengthened by the growth of years, can be eradicated from our minds

by any recent act either of kindness or neglect. We have always thought,

and are still of the same opinion, that we might now remain neutral,

greatly to the duke's satisfaction, and with little hazard to ourselves;

for if by your ruin he were to become lord of Lombardy, we should still

have sufficient influence in Italy in free us from any apprehension on

our own account; for every increase of power and territory augments

that animosity and envy, from which arise wars and the dismemberment

of states. We are also aware what heavy expenses and imminent perils we

should avoid, by declining to involve ourselves in these disputes;

and how easily the field of battle may be transferred from Lombardy to

Tuscany, by our interference in your behalf. Yet all these apprehensions

are at once overborne by our ancient affection for the senate and people

of Venice, and we have resolved to come to your relief with the same

zeal with which we should have armed in our own defense, had we been

attacked. Therefore, the senate of Florence, judging it primarily

necessary to relieve Verona and Brescia, and thinking this impossible

without the count, have sent me, in the first instance, to persuade

him to pass into Lombardy, and carry on the war wherever it may be most

needful; for you are aware he is under no obligation to cross the Po. To

induce him to do so, I have advanced such arguments as are suggested by

the circumstances themselves, and which would prevail with us. He, being

invincible in arms, cannot be surpassed in courtesy, and the liberality

he sees the Florentines exercise toward you, he has resolved to outdo;

for he is well aware to what dangers Tuscany will be exposed after

his departure, and since we have made your affairs our primary

consideration, he has also resolved to make his own subservient to

yours. I come, therefore, to tender his services, with seven thousand

cavalry and two thousand infantry, ready at once to march against the

enemy, wherever he may be. And I beg of you, so do my lords at Florence

and the count, that as his forces exceed the number he has engaged to

furnish you, out of your liberality, would remunerate him, that he may

not repent of having come to your assistance, nor we, who have prevailed

with him to do so." This discourse of Neri to the senate was listened

to with that profound attention which an oracle might be imagined to

command; and his audience were so moved by it, that they could not

restrain themselves, till the prince had replied, as strict decorum

on such occasions required, but rising from their seats, with uplifted

hands, and most of them with tears in their eyes, they thanked the

Florentines for their generous conduct, and the ambassador for his

unusual dispatch; and promised that time should never cancel the

remembrance of such goodness, either in their own hearts, or their

children's; and that their country, thenceforth, should be common to the

Florentines with themselves.

CHAPTER V

Francesco Sforza marches to assist the Venetians, and relieves

Verona--He attempts to relieve Brescia but fails--The Venetians routed

by Piccinino upon the Lake of Garda--Piccinino routed by Sforza;

the method of his escape--Piccinino surprises Verona--Description of

Verona--Recovered by Sforza--The duke of Milan makes war against the

Florentines--Apprehensions of the Florentines--Cardinal Vitelleschi

their enemy.

When their demonstrations of gratitude had subsided, the Venetian

senate, by the aid of Neri di Gino, began to consider the route the

count ought to take, and how to provide him with necessaries. There were

four several roads; one by Ravenna, along the beach, which on account of

its being in many places interrupted by the sea and by marshes, was not

approved. The next was the most direct, but rendered inconvenient by a

tower called the Uccellino, which being held for the duke, it would be

necessary to capture; and to do this, would occupy more time than could

be spared with safety to Verona and Brescia. The third was by the brink

of the lake; but as the Po had overflowed its banks, to pass in this

direction was impossible. The fourth was by the way of Bologna to Ponte

Puledrano, Cento, and Pieve; then between the Bondeno and the Finale

to Ferrara, and thence they might by land or water enter the Paduan

territory, and join the Venetian forces. This route, though attended

with many difficulties, and in some parts liable to be disputed by the

enemy, was chosen as the least objectionable. The count having received

his instructions, commenced his march, and by exerting the utmost

celerity, reached the Paduan territory on the twentieth of June. The

arrival of this distinguished commander in Lombardy filled Venice and

all her dependencies with hope; for the Venetians, who only an instant

before had been in fear for their very existence, began to contemplate

new conquests.

The count, before he made any other attempt, hastened to the relief of

Verona; and to counteract his design, Niccolo led his forces to Soave, a

castle situated between the Vincentino and the Veronese, and entrenched

himself by a ditch that extended from Soave to the marshes of the Adige.

The count, finding his passage by the plain cut off, resolved to proceed

by the mountains, and thus reach Verona, thinking Niccolo would imagine

this way to be so rugged and elevated as to be impracticable, or if

he thought otherwise, he would not be in time to prevent him; so, with

provisions for eight days, he took the mountain path, and with his

forces, arrived in the plain, below Soave. Niccolo had, even upon this

route, erected some bastions for the purpose of preventing him, but they

were insufficient for the purpose; and finding the enemy had, contrary

to his expectations, effected a passage, to avoid a disadvantageous

engagement he crossed to the opposite side of the Adige, and the count

entered Verona without opposition.

Having happily succeeded in his first project, that of relieving Verona,

the count now endeavored to render a similar service to Brescia. This

city is situated so close to the Lake of Garda, that although besieged

by land, provisions may always be sent into it by water. On this account

the duke had assembled a large force in the immediate vicinity of the

lake, and at the commencement of his victories occupied all the places

which by its means might relieve Brescia. The Venetians also had galleys

upon the lake, but they were unequal to a contest with those of the

duke. The count therefore deemed it advisable to aid the Venetian fleet

with his land forces, by which means he hoped to obtain without much

difficulty those places which kept Brescia in blockade. He therefore

encamped before Bardolino, a fortress situated upon the lake, trusting

that after it was taken the others would surrender. But fortune opposed

this design, for a great part of his troops fell sick; so, giving up

the enterprise, he went to Zevio, a Veronese castle, in a healthy and

plentiful situation. Niccolo, upon the count's retreat, not to let slip

an opportunity of making himself master of the lake, left his camp at

Vegasio, and with a body of picked men took the way thither, attacked

the Venetian fleet with the utmost impetuosity, and took nearly the

whole of it. By this victory almost all the fortresses upon the lake

fell into his hands.

The Venetians, alarmed at this loss, and fearing that in consequence

of it Brescia would surrender, solicited the count, by letters and

messengers, to go to its relief; and he, perceiving that all hope of

rendering assistance from the lake was cut off, and that to attempt

an approach by land, on account of the ditches, bastions, and other

defenses erected by Niccolo, was marching to certain destruction,

determined that as the passage by the mountains had enabled him to

relieve Verona, it should also contribute to the preservation of

Brescia. Having taken this resolution, the count left Zevio, and by way

of the Val d'Acri went to the Lake of St. Andrea, and thence to Torboli

and Peneda, upon the Lake of Garda. He then proceeded to Tenna, and

besieged the fortress, which it was necessary to occupy before he could

reach Brescia.

Niccolo, on being acquainted with the count's design, led his army to

Peschiera. He then, with the marquis of Mantua and a chosen body of men,

went to meet him, and coming to an engagement, was routed, his people

dispersed, and many of them taken, while others fled to the fleet, and

some to the main body of his army. It was now nightfall, and Niccolo

had escaped to Tenna, but he knew that if he were to remain there till

morning, he must inevitably fall into the enemy's hands; therefore, to

avoid a catastrophe which might be regarded as almost fatal, he resolved

to make a dangerous experiment. Of all his attendants he had only with

him a single servant, a Dutchman, of great personal strength, and who

had always been devotedly attached to him. Niccolo induced this man

to take him upon his shoulders in a sack, as if he had been carrying

property of his master's, and to bear him to a place of security. The

enemy's lines surrounded Tenna, but on account of the previous day's

victory, all was in disorder, and no guard was kept, so that the

Dutchman, disguised as a trooper, passed through them without any

opposition, and brought his master in safety to his own troops.

Had this victory been as carefully improved as it was fortunately

obtained, Brescia would have derived from it greater relief and the

Venetians more permanent advantage; but they, having thoughtlessly let

it slip, the rejoicings were soon over, and Brescia remained in her

former difficulties. Niccolo, having returned to his forces, resolved by

some extraordinary exertion to cancel the impression of his death,

and deprive the Venetians of the change of relieving Brescia. He was

acquainted with the topography of the citadel of Verona, and had learned

from prisoners whom he had taken, that it was badly guarded, and might

be very easily recovered. He perceived at once that fortune presented

him with an opportunity of regaining the laurels he had lately lost, and

of changing the joy of the enemy for their recent victory into sorrow

for a succeeding disaster. The city of Verona is situated in Lombardy,

at the foot of the mountains which divide Italy from Germany, so that

it occupies part both of hill and plain. The river Adige rises in the

valley of Trento, and entering Italy, does not immediately traverse the

country, but winding to the left, along the base of the hills, enters

Verona, and crosses the city, which it divides unequally, giving much

the larger portion to the plain. On the mountain side of the river are

two fortresses, formidable rather from their situation than from their

actual strength, for being very elevated they command the whole place.

One is called San Piero, the other San Felice. On the opposite side of

the Adige, upon the plain, with their backs against the city walls, are

two other fortresses, about a mile distant from each other, one called

the Old the other the New Citadel, and a wall extends between them that

may be compared to a bowstring, of which the city wall is the arc. The

space comprehended within this segment is very populous, and is called

the Borgo of St. Zeno. Niccolo Piccinino designed to capture these

fortresses and the Borgo, and he hoped to succeed without much

difficulty, as well on account of the ordinary negligence of the guard,

which their recent successes would probably increase, as because in

war no enterprise is more likely to be successful than one which by the

enemy is deemed impossible. With a body of picked men, and accompanied

by the marquis of Mantua, he proceeded by night to Verona, silently

scaled the walls, and took the New Citadel: then entering the place with

his troops, he forced the gate of S. Antonio, and introduced the whole

of his cavalry. The Venetian garrison of the Old Citadel hearing an

uproar, when the guards of the New were slaughtered, and again when the

gate was forced, being now aware of the presence of enemies, raised an

alarm, and called the people to arms. The citizens awaking in the

utmost confusion, some of the boldest armed and hastened to the rector's

piazza. In the meantime, Niccolo's forces had pillaged the Borgo of San

Zeno; and proceeding onward were ascertained by the people to be the

duke's forces, but being defenseless they advised the Venetian rectors

to take refuge in the fortresses, and thus save themselves and the

place; as it was more advisable to preserve their lives and so rich a

city for better fortune, than by endeavoring to repel the present evil,

encounter certain death, and incur universal pillage. Upon this the

rectors and all the Venetian party, fled to the fortress of San Felice.

Some of the first citizens, anxious to avoid being plundered by the

troops, presented themselves before Niccolo and the marquis of Mantua,

and begged they would rather take possession of a rich city, with honor

to themselves, than of a poor one to their own disgrace; particularly as

they had not induced either the favor of its former possessors, or

the animosity of its present masters, by self-defense. The marquis and

Niccolo encouraged them, and protected their property to the utmost of

their power during such a state of military license. As they felt sure

the count would endeavor to recover the city, they made every possible

exertion to gain possession of the fortresses, and those they could not

seize they cut off from the rest of the place by ditches and barricades,

so that the enemy might be shut out.

The Count Francesco was with his army at Tenna; and when the report was

first brought to him he refused to credit it; but being assured of

the fact by parties whom it would have been ridiculous to doubt, he

resolved, by the exertion of uncommon celerity, to repair the evil

negligence had occasioned; and though all his officers advised the

abandonment of Verona and Brescia, and a march to Vicenza, lest he

might be besieged by the enemy in his present situation, he refused, but

resolved to attempt the recovery of Verona. During the consultation, he

turned to the Venetian commissaries and to Bernardo de' Medici, who was

there as commissary for the Florentines, and promised them the recovery

of the place if one of the fortresses should hold out. Having collected

his forces, he proceeded with the utmost speed to Verona. Observing his

approach, Niccolo thought he designed, according to the advice he had

received, to go to Vicenza, but finding him continue to draw near, and

taking the direction of San Felice, he prepared for its defense--though

too late; for the barricades were not completed; his men were dispersed

in quest of plunder, or extorting money from the inhabitants by way of

ransom; and he could not collect them in time to prevent the count's

troops from entering the fortress. They then descended into the city,

which they happily recovered, to Niccolo's disgrace, and with the loss

of great numbers of his men. He himself, with the marquis of Mantua,

first took refuge in the citadel, and thence escaping into the country,

fled to Mantua, where, having assembled the relics of their army, they

hastened to join those who were at the siege of Brescia. Thus in four

days Verona was lost and again recovered from the duke. The count, after

this victory, it being now winter and the weather very severe, having

first with considerable difficulty thrown provisions into Brescia,

went into quarters at Verona, and ordered, that during the cold season,

galleys should be provided at Torboli, that upon the return of spring,

they might be in a condition to proceed vigorously to effect the

permanent relief of Brescia.

The duke, finding the war suspended for a time, the hope he had

entertained of occupying Brescia and Verona annihilated, and the money

and counsels of the Florentines the cause of this, and seeing that

neither the injuries they had received from the Venetians could alienate

them, nor all the promises he had made attach them to himself, he

determined, in order to make them feel more closely the effects of the

course they had adopted, to attack Tuscany; to which he was strenuously

advised by the Florentine exiles and Niccolo. The latter advocated this

from his desire to recover the states of Braccio, and expel the count

from La Marca; the former, from their wish to return home, and each

by suitable arguments endeavored to induce the duke to follow the plan

congenial to their own views. Niccolo argued that he might be sent into

Tuscany, and continue the siege of Brescia; for he was master of

the lake, the fortresses were well provided, and their officers were

qualified to oppose the count should he undertake any fresh enterprise;

which it was not likely he would do without first relieving Brescia, a

thing impossible; and thus the duke might carry on the war in Tuscany,

without giving up his attempts in Lombardy; intimating that the

Florentines would be compelled, as soon as he entered Tuscany, to recall

the count to avoid complete ruin; and whatever course they took, victory

to the duke must be the result. The exiles affirmed, that if Niccolo

with his army were to approach Florence, the people oppressed with

taxes, and wearied out by the insolence of the great, would most

assuredly not oppose him, and pointed out the facility of reaching

Florence; for the way by the Casentino would be open to them, through

the friendship of Rinaldo and the Count di Poppi; and thus the duke,

who was previously inclined to the attempt, was induced by their joint

persuasions to make it. The Venetians, on the other hand, though the

winter was severe, incessantly urged the count to relieve Brescia with

all his forces. The count questioned the possibility of so doing, and

advised them to wait the return of spring, in the meantime strengthening

their fleet as much as possible, and then assist it both by land and

water. This rendered the Venetians dissatisfied; they were dilatory in

furnishing provisions, and consequently many deserted from their army.

The Florentines, being informed of these transactions, became alarmed,

perceiving the war threatening themselves, and the little progress made

in Lombardy. Nor did the suspicion entertained by them of the troops of

the church give them less uneasiness; not that the pope was their enemy,

but because they saw those forces more under the sway of the patriarch,

who was their greatest foe. Giovanni Vitelleschi of Corneto was at first

apostolic notary, then bishop of Recanati, and afterward patriarch of

Alexandria; but at last, becoming a cardinal, he was called Cardinal of

Florence. He was bold and cunning; and, having obtained great influence,

was appointed to command all the forces of the church, and conduct all

the enterprises of the pontiff, whether in Tuscany, Romagna, the kingdom

of Naples, or in Rome. Hence he acquired so much power over the pontiff,

and the papal troops, that the former was afraid of commanding him, and

the latter obeyed no one else. The cardinal's presence at Rome, when

the report came of Niccolo's design to march into Tuscany, redoubled the

fear of the Florentines; for, since Rinaldo was expelled, he had become

an enemy of the republic, from finding that the arrangements made by his

means were not only disregarded, but converted to Rinaldo's prejudice,

and caused the laying down of arms, which had given his enemies an

opportunity of banishing him. In consequence of this, the government

thought it would be advisable to restore and indemnify Rinaldo, in case

Niccolo came into Tuscany and were joined by him. Their apprehensions

were increased by their being unable to account for Niccolo's departure

from Lombardy, and his leaving one enterprise almost completed, to

undertake another so entirely doubtful; which they could not reconcile

with their ideas of consistency, except by supposing some new design had

been adopted, or some hidden treachery intended. They communicated their

fears to the pope, who was now sensible of his error in having endowed

the cardinal with too much authority.

CHAPTER VI

The pope imprisons the cardinal and assists the Florentines--Difference

of opinion between the count and the Venetians respecting the management

of the war. The Florentines reconcile them--The count wishes to go into

Tuscany to oppose Piccinino, but is prevented by the Venetians--Niccolo

Piccinino in Tuscany--He takes Marradi, and plunders the neighborhood

of Florence--Description of Marradi--Cowardice of Bartolomeo

Orlandini--Brave resistance of Castel San Niccolo--San Niccolo

surrenders--Piccinino attempts to take Cortona, but fails.

While the Florentines were thus anxious, fortune disclosed the means of

securing themselves against the patriarch's malevolence. The republic

everywhere exercised the very closest espionage over epistolary

communication, in order to discover if any persons were plotting against

the state. It happened that letters were intercepted at Monte Pulciano,

which had been written by the patriarch to Niccolo without the pope's

knowledge; and although they were written in an unusual character, and

the sense so involved that no distinct idea could be extracted, the

obscurity itself, and the whole aspect of the matter so alarmed the

pontiff, that he resolved to seize the person of the cardinal, a duty he

committed to Antonio Rido, of Padua, who had the command of the castle

of St. Angelo, and who, after receiving his instructions, soon found

an opportunity of carrying them into effect. The patriarch, having

determined to go into Tuscany, prepared to leave Rome on the following

day, and ordered the castellan to be upon the drawbridge of the fortress

in the morning, for he wished to speak with him as he passed. Antonio

perceived this to be the favorable moment, informed his people what they

were to do, and awaited the arrival of the patriarch upon the bridge,

which adjoined the building, and might for the purpose of security be

raised or lowered as occasion required. The appointed time found him

punctual; and Antonio, having drawn him, as if for the convenience

of conversation, on to the bridge, gave a signal to his men, who

immediately raised it, and in a moment the cardinal, from being a

commander of armies, found himself a prisoner of the castellan. The

patriarch's followers at first began to use threats, but being informed

of the pope's directions they were appeased. The castellan comforting

him with kind words, he replied, that "the great do not make each other

prisoners to let them go again; and that those whom it is proper to

take, it is not well to set free." He shortly afterward died in prison.

The pope appointed Lodovico, patriarch of Aquileia, to command his

troops; and, though previously unwilling to interfere in the wars of

the league and the duke, he was now content to take part in them, and

engaged to furnish four thousand horse and two thousand foot for the

defense of Tuscany.

The Florentines, freed from this cause for anxiety, were still

apprehensive of Niccolo, and feared confusion in the affairs of

Lombardy, from the differences of opinion that existed between the count

and the Venetians. In order the better to become acquainted with the

intentions of the parties, they sent Neri di Gini Capponi and Giuliano

Davanzati to Venice, with instructions to assist in the arrangement of

the approaching campaign; and ordered that Neri, having discovered how

the Venetians were disposed, should proceed to the count, learn

his designs, and induce him to adopt the course that would be most

advantageous to the League. The ambassadors had only reached Ferrara,

when they were told that Niccolo Piccinino had crossed the Po with six

thousand horse. This made them travel with increased speed; and, having

arrived at Venice, they found the Signory fully resolved that Brescia

should be relieved without waiting for the return of spring; for they

said that "the city would be unable to hold out so long, the fleet could

not be in readiness, and that seeing no more immediate relief, she would

submit to the enemy; which would render the duke universally victorious,

and cause them to lose the whole of their inland possessions." Neri then

proceeded to Verona to ascertain the count's opinion, who argued, for

many reasons, that to march to Brescia before the return of spring would

be quite useless, or even worse; for the situation of Brescia, being

considered in conjunction with the season, nothing could be expected to

result but disorder and fruitless toil to the troops; so that, when the

suitable period should arrive, he would be compelled to return to Verona

with his army, to recover from the injuries sustained in the winter, and

provide necessaries for the summer; and thus the time available for the

war would be wasted in marching and countermarching. Orsatto Justiniani

and Giovanni Pisani were deputed on the part of Venice to the count at

Verona, having been sent to consider these affairs, and with them it was

agreed that the Venetians should pay the count ninety thousand ducats

for the coming year, and to each of the soldiers forty ducats; that he

should set out immediately with the whole army and attack the duke, in

order to compel him, for his own preservation, to recall Niccolo into

Lombardy. After this agreement the ambassadors returned to Venice; and

the Venetians, having so large an amount of money to raise, were very

remiss with their commissariat.

In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino pursued his route, and arrived in

Romagna, where he prevailed upon the sons of Pandolfo Malatesti to

desert the Venetians and enter the duke's service. This circumstance

occasioned much uneasiness in Venice, and still more at Florence;

for they thought that with the aid of the Malatesti they might resist

Niccolo; but finding them gone over to the enemy, they were in fear lest

their captain, Piero Giampagolo Orsini, who was in the territories of

the Malatesti, should be disarmed and rendered powerless. The count also

felt alarmed, for, through Niccolo's presence in Tuscany, he was

afraid of losing La Marca; and, urged by a desire to look after his

own affairs, he hastened to Venice, and being introduced to the Doge,

informed him that the interests of the League required his presence in

Tuscany; for the war ought to be carried on where the leader and forces

of the enemy were, and not where his garrisons and towns were situated;

for when the army is vanquished the war is finished; but to take towns

and leave the armament entire, usually allowed the war to break out

again with greater virulence; that Tuscany and La Marca would be lost if

Niccolo were not vigorously resisted, and that, if lost, there would be

no possibility of the preservation of Lombardy. But supposing the

danger to Lombardy not so imminent, he did not intend to abandon his own

subjects and friends, and that having come into Lombardy as a prince, he

did not intend to return a mere condottiere. To this the Doge replied,

it was quite manifest that, if he left Lombardy, or even recrossed the

Po, all their inland territories would be lost; in that case they were

unwilling to spend any more money in their defense. For it would be

folly to attempt defending a place which must, after all, inevitably

be lost; and that it is less disgraceful and less injurious to lose

dominions only, then to lose both territory and money. That if the loss

of their inland possessions should actually result, it would then be

seen how highly important to the preservation of Romagna and Tuscany

the reputation of the Venetians had been. On these accounts they were of

quite a different opinion from the count; for they saw that whoever was

victor in Lombardy would be so everywhere else, that conquest would be

easily attainable now, when the territories of the duke were left almost

defenseless by the departure of Niccolo, and that he would be ruined

before he could order Niccolo's recall, or provide himself with any

other remedy; that whoever attentively considered these things would

see, that the duke had sent Niccolo into Tuscany for no other reason

than to withdraw the count from his enterprise, and cause the war, which

was now at his own door, to be removed to a greater distance. That if

the count were to follow Niccolo, unless at the instigation of some very

pressing necessity, he would find his plan successful, and rejoice in

the adoption of it; but if he were to remain in Lombardy, and allow

Tuscany to shift for herself, the duke would, when too late, see the

imprudence of his conduct, and find that he had lost his territories in

Lombardy and gained nothing in Tuscany. Each party having spoken, it

was determined to wait a few days to see what would result from the

agreement of the Malatesti with Niccolo; whether the Florentines could

avail themselves of Piero Giampagolo, and whether the pope intended to

join the League with all the earnestness he had promised. Not many

days after these resolutions were adopted, it was ascertained that the

Malatesti had made the agreement more from fear than any ill-will toward

the League; that Piero Giampagolo had proceeded with his force toward

Tuscany, and that the pope was more disposed than ever to assist

them. This favorable intelligence dissipated the count's fears, and he

consented to remain in Lombardy, and that Neri Capponi should return

to Florence with a thousand of his own horse, and five hundred from the

other parties. It was further agreed, that if the affairs of Tuscany

should require the count's presence, Neri should write to him, and he

would proceed thither to the exclusion of every other consideration.

Neri arrived at Florence with his forces in April, and Giampagolo joined

them the same day.

In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino, the affairs of Romagna being

settled, purposed making a descent into Tuscany, and designing to go by

the mountain passes of San Benedetto and the valley of Montone, found

them so well guarded by the contrivance of Niccolo da Pisa, that his

utmost exertions would be useless in that direction. As the Florentines,

upon this sudden attack, were unprovided with troops and officers, they

had sent into the defiles of these hills many of their citizens,

with infantry raised upon the emergency to guard them, among whom was

Bartolomeo Orlandini, a cavaliere, to whom was intrusted the defense

of the castle of Marradi and the adjacent passes. Niccolo Piccinino,

finding the route by San Benedetto impracticable, on account of the

bravery of its commander, thought the cowardice of the officer who

defended that of Marradi would render the passage easy. Marradi is a

castle situated at the foot of the mountains which separate Tuscany from

Romagna; and, though destitute of walls, the river, the mountains, and

the inhabitants, make it a place of great strength; for the peasantry

are warlike and faithful, and the rapid current undermining the banks

has left them of such tremendous height that it is impossible to

approach it from the valley if a small bridge over the stream be

defended; while on the mountain side the precipices are so steep and

perpendicular as to render it almost impregnable. In spite of these

advantages, the pusillanimity of Bartolomeo Orlandini rendered the men

cowardly and the fortress untenable; for as soon as he heard of the

enemy's approach he abandoned the place, fled with all his forces, and

did not stop till he reached the town of San Lorenzo. Niccolo, entering

the deserted fortress, wondered it had not been defended, and, rejoicing

over his acquisition, descended into the valley of the Mugello, where

he took some castles, and halted with his army at Pulicciano. Thence he

overran the country as far as the mountains of Fiesole; and his audacity

so increased that he crossed the Arno, plundering and destroying

everything to within three miles of Florence.

The Florentines, however, were not dismayed. Their first concern was

to give security to the government, for which they had no cause for

apprehension, so universal was the good will of the people toward Cosmo;

and besides this, they had restricted the principal offices to a few

citizens of the highest class, who with their vigilance would have kept

the populace in order, even if they had been discontented or desirous of

change. They also knew by the compact made in Lombardy what forces

Neri would bring with him, and expected the troops of the pope. These

prospects sustained their courage till the arrival of Neri di Gino, who,

on account of the disorders and fears of the city, determined to set out

immediately and check Niccolo. With the cavalry he possessed, and a body

of infantry raised entirely from the people, he recovered Remole from

the hands of the enemy, where having encamped, he put a stop to all

further depredations, and gave the inhabitants hopes of repelling

the enemy from the neighborhood. Niccolo finding that, although the

Florentines were without troops, no disturbance had arisen, and learning

what entire composure prevailed in the city, thought he was wasting

time, and resolved to undertake some other enterprise to induce them to

send forces after him, and give him a chance of coming to an engagement,

by means of which, if victorious, he trusted everything would succeed to

his wishes.

Francesco, Count di Poppi, was in the army of Niccolo, having deserted

the Florentines, with whom he was in league, when the enemy entered the

Mugello; and though with the intention of securing him as soon as they

had an idea of his design, they increased his appointments, and made him

commissary over all the places in his vicinity; still, so powerful is

the attachment to party, that no benefit or fear could eradicate the

affection he bore toward Rinaldo and the late government; so that as

soon as he knew Niccolo was at hand he joined him, and with the utmost

solicitude entreated him to leave the city and pass into the Casentino,

pointing out to him the strength of the country, and how easily he might

thence harass his enemies. Niccolo followed his advice, and arriving

in the Casentino, took Romena and Bibbiena, and then pitched his camp

before Castel San Niccolo. This fortress is situated at the foot of the

mountains which divide the Casentino from the Val d'Arno; and being in

an elevated situation, and well garrisoned, it was difficult to take,

though Niccolo, with catapults and other engines, assailed it without

intermission. The siege had continued more than twenty days, during

which the Florentines had collected all their forces, having assembled

under several leaders, three thousand horse, at Fegghine, commanded by

Piero Giampagolo Orsini, their captain, and Neri Capponi and Bernardo

de' Medici, commissaries. Four messengers, from Castel San Niccolo, were

sent to them to entreat succor. The commissaries having examined the

site, found it could not be relieved, except from the Alpine regions,

in the direction of the Val d'Arno, the summit of which was more easily

attainable by the enemy than by themselves, on account of their greater

proximity, and because the Florentines could not approach without

observation; so that it would be making a desperate attempt, and might

occasion the destruction of the forces. The commissaries, therefore,

commended their fidelity, and ordered that when they could hold out no

longer, they should surrender. Niccolo took the fortress after a siege

of thirty-two days; and the loss of so much time, for the attainment

of so small an advantage, was the principle cause of the failure of his

expedition; for had he remained with his forces near Florence, he would

have almost deprived the government of all power to compel the citizens

to furnish money: nor would they so easily have assembled forces and

taken other precautions, if the enemy had been close upon them, as

they did while he was at a distance. Besides this, many would have been

disposed to quiet their apprehensions of Niccolo, by concluding a peace;

particularly, as the contest was likely to be of some duration. The

desire of the Count di Poppi to avenge himself on the inhabitants of

San Niccolo, long his enemies, occasioned his advice to Piccinino, who

adopted it for the purpose of pleasing him; and this caused the ruin

of both. It seldom happens, that the gratification of private feelings,

fails to be injurious to the general convenience.

Niccolo, pursuing his good fortune, took Rassina and Chiusi. The Count

di Poppi advised him to halt in these parts, arguing that he might

divide his people between Chiusi, Caprese, and the Pieve, render himself

master of this branch of the Apennines, and descend at pleasure into the

Casentino, the Val d'Arno, the Val di Chiane, or the Val di Tavere,

as well as be prepared for every movement of the enemy. But Niccolo,

considering the sterility of these places, told him, "his horses could

not eat stones," and went to the Borgo San Sepolcro, where he was

amicably received, but found that the people of Citta di Castello, who

were friendly to the Florentines, could not be induced to yield to his

overtures. Wishing to have Perugia at his disposal, he proceeded

thither with forty horse, and being one of her citizens, met with a kind

reception. But in a few days he became suspected, and having attempted

unsuccessfully to tamper with the legate and people of Perugia, he took

eight thousand ducats from them, and returned to his army. He then set

on foot secret measures, to seduce Cortona from the Florentines, but

the affair being discovered, his attempts were fruitless. Among the

principal citizens was Bartolomeo di Senso, who being appointed to the

evening watch of one of the gates, a countryman, his friend, told him,

that if he went he would be slain. Bartolomeo, requesting to know what

was meant, he became acquainted with the whole affair, and revealed it

to the governor of the place, who, having secured the leaders of the

conspiracy, and doubled the guards at the gates, waited till the time

appointed for the coming of Niccolo, who finding his purpose discovered,

returned to his encampment.

CHAPTER VII

Brescia relieved by Sforza--His other victories--Piccinino is

recalled into Lombardy--He endeavors to bring the Florentines to an

engagement--He is routed before Anghiari--Serious disorders in the

camp of the Florentines after the victory--Death of Rinaldo degli

Albizzi--His character--Neri Capponi goes to recover the Casentino--The

Count di Poppi surrenders--His discourse upon quitting his possessions.

While these events were taking place in Tuscany, so little to the

advantage of the duke, his affairs in Lombardy were in a still worse

condition. The Count Francesco, as soon as the season would permit, took

the field with his army, and the Venetians having again covered the lake

with their galleys, he determined first of all to drive the duke from

the water; judging, that this once effected, his remaining task would be

easy. He therefore, with the Venetian fleet, attacked that of the duke,

and destroyed it. His land forces took the castles held for Filippo,

and the ducal troops who were besieging Brescia, being informed of

these transactions, withdrew; and thus, the city, after standing a three

years' siege, was at length relieved. The count then went in quest

of the enemy, whose forces were encamped before Soncino, a fortress

situated upon the River Oglio; these he dislodged and compelled to

retreat to Cremona, where the duke again collected his forces, and

prepared for his defense. But the count constantly pressing him more

closely, he became apprehensive of losing either the whole, or the

greater part, of his territories; and perceiving the unfortunate step

he had taken, in sending Niccolo into Tuscany, in order to correct his

error, he wrote to acquaint him with what had transpired, desiring him,

with all possible dispatch, to leave Tuscany and return to Lombardy.

In the meantime, the Florentines, under their commissaries, had drawn

together their forces, and being joined by those of the pope, halted at

Anghiari, a castle placed at the foot of the mountains that divide the

Val di Tavere from the Val di Chiane, distant four miles from the

Borgo San Sepolcro, on a level road, and in a country suitable for the

evolutions of cavalry or a battlefield. As the Signory had heard of the

count's victory and the recall of Niccolo, they imagined that without

again drawing a sword or disturbing the dust under their horses' feet,

the victory was their own, and the war at an end, they wrote to the

commissaries, desiring them to avoid an engagement, as Niccolo could

not remain much longer in Tuscany. These instructions coming to the

knowledge of Piccinino, and perceiving the necessity of his speedy

return, to leave nothing unattempted, he determined to engage the enemy,

expecting to find them unprepared, and not disposed for battle. In this

determination he was confirmed by Rinaldo, the Count di Poppi, and other

Florentine exiles, who saw their inevitable ruin in the departure of

Niccolo, and hoped, that if he engaged the enemy, they would either

be victorious, or vanquished without dishonor. This resolution being

adopted, Niccolo led his army, unperceived by the enemy, from Citta di

Castello to the Borgo, where he enlisted two thousand men, who, trusting

the general's talents and promises, followed him in hope of plunder.

Niccolo then led his forces in battle array toward Anghiari, and

had arrived within two miles of the place, when Micheletto Attendulo

observed great clouds of dust, and conjecturing at once, that it must

be occasioned by the enemy's approach, immediately called the troops to

arms. Great confusion prevailed in the Florentine camp, for the ordinary

negligence and want of discipline were now increased by their presuming

the enemy to be at a distance, and they were more disposed to fight than

to battle; so that everyone was unarmed, and some wandering from the

camp, either led by their desire to avoid the excessive heat, or in

pursuit of amusement. So great was the diligence of the commissaries and

of the captain, that before the enemy's arrival, the men were mounted

and prepared to resist their attack; and as Micheletto was the first to

observe their approach, he was also first armed and ready to meet them,

and with his troops hastened to the bridge which crosses the river at a

short distance from Anghiari. Pietro Giampagolo having previous to the

surprise, filled up the ditches on either side of the road, and leveled

the ground between the bridge and Anghiari, and Micheletto having taken

his position in front of the former, the legate and Simoncino, who led

the troops of the church, took post on the right, and the commissaries

of the Florentines, with Pietro Giampagolo, their captain, on the left;

the infantry being drawn up along the banks of the river. Thus, the only

course the enemy could take, was the direct one over the bridge; nor

had the Florentines any other field for their exertions, excepting that

their infantry were ordered, in case their cavalry were attacked in

flank by the hostile infantry, to assail them with their cross bows, and

prevent them from wounding the flanks of the horses crossing the bridge.

Micheletto bravely withstood the enemy's charge upon the bridge; but

Astorre and Francesco Piccinino coming up, with a picked body of men,

attacked him so vigorously, that he was compelled to give way, and

was pushed as far as the foot of the hill which rises toward the Borgo

d'Anghiari; but they were in turn repulsed and driven over the bridge,

by the troops that took them in flank. The battle continued two hours,

during which each side had frequent possession of the bridge, and their

attempts upon it were attended with equal success; but on both sides of

the river, the disadvantage of Niccolo was manifest; for when his people

crossed the bridge, they found the enemy unbroken, and the ground

being leveled, they could manoeuvre without difficulty, and the weary

be relieved by such as were fresh. But when the Florentines crossed,

Niccolo could not relieve those that were harassed, on account of the

hindrance interposed by the ditches and embankments on each side of the

road; thus whenever his troops got possession of the bridge, they were

soon repulsed by the fresh forces of the Florentines; but when the

bridge was taken by the Florentines, and they passed over and proceeded

upon the road, Niccolo having no opportunity to reinforce his troops,

being prevented by the impetuosity of the enemy and the inconvenience of

the ground, the rear guard became mingled with the van, and occasioned

the utmost confusion and disorder; they were forced to flee, and

hastened at full speed toward the Borgo. The Florentine troops fell upon

the plunder, which was very valuable in horses, prisoners, and military

stores, for not more than a thousand of the enemy's cavalry reached the

town. The people of the Borgo, who had followed Niccolo in the hope of

plunder, became booty themselves, all of them being taken, and obliged

to pay a ransom. The colors and carriages were also captured. This

victory was much more advantageous to the Florentines than injurious to

the duke; for, had they been conquered, Tuscany would have been his own;

but he, by his defeat, only lost the horses and accoutrements of his

army, which could be replaced without any very serious expense. Nor was

there ever an instance of wars being carried on in an enemy's country

with less injury to the assailants than at this; for in so great a

defeat, and in a battle which continued four hours, only one man died,

and he, not from wounds inflicted by hostile weapons, or any honorable

means, but, having fallen from his horse, was trampled to death.

Combatants then engaged with little danger; being nearly all mounted,

covered with armor, and preserved from death whenever they chose

to surrender, there was no necessity for risking their lives; while

fighting, their armor defended them, and when they could resist no

longer, they yielded and were safe.