OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT.
1. That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2.
That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. 3.
That the security of living according to the laws of nature,
consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of
many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. 5. The
reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm
in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent,
but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7.
What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to
one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11.
What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject
12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
[Sidenote: That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation
of peace.]
1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the
will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall
see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the
breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate
them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and
self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may
disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we
may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do
not instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently,
that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others,
there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence
by such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right
to all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the
fulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to
embrace peace when it may be had.
[Sidenote: That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are
silent.]
2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of
war, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but
also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind,
but to the actions of men, by chap. iii. art. 27. And we mean such a
war, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of
nature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean
was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a
manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they
called ληστρικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the
law of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those
who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was,
taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for
plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is
not so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of
nature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by
too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.
[Sidenote: That the security of living according to the laws of
nature, consists in the agreement of many.]
3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for
the preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural
law security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what
that is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else
can be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet
helps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so
dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to
meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three
cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of
one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the
victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is
therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be
obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual
assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the
enemy’s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to
assure the victory.
[Sidenote: That the agreement of many is not constant enough to
preserve a lasting peace.]
4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on
self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some
excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own
manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done;
because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance
to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action,
through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through
diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which
men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will
neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be
constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the
consent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already
defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions
to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the
society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security
which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the
above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done,
that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and
mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again
dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from
the common good.
[Sidenote: Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in
concord alone, and not so of men.]
5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not
man only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though
they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit
to government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say,
ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions
to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any
seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government,
and therefore those animals not to be termed political; because
their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one
object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is
very true, that in those creatures living only by sense and
appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need
of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace
among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the
case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of
honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and
envy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among
beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the
like creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good,
which among them differs not from their private. But man scarce
esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the
enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those
creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see
none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude
of men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others,
endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways;
which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute
creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify
their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words
which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby
good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in
truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition:
and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant
speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece
itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between _injury_ and
_harm_; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they
blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the
republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to
contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over
hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures
is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial.
It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for
men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or
contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men
may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up
that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural
justice.
[Sidenote: That not only consent, but union also, is required to
establish the peace of men.]
6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth
not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is
requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and
self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be
done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one,
to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those
things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for
the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now
the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be
done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which
I call a _council_.
[Sidenote: What union is.]
7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one
man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth
himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will
of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that
is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength
against any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a
right of defending himself against violence: and this is called
_union_. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which
is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council
consists.
[Sidenote: In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.]
8. But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the
beginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to
act); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and
compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys
to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as
when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted,
hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills
of particular men unto unity and concord.
[Sidenote: What civil society is.]
9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also
a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be
esteemed for one person; and by the word _one_, it is to be known
and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights
and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them
together, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all),
is to be accounted a city. A _city_ therefore, (that we may define
it), is _one person_, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to
be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power
and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace,
and for common defence.
[Sidenote: What a civil person is.]
10. But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil
person is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the
permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the
doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the
companies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are
not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the
company simply and in all things, but in certain things only
determined by the city, and on such terms as it is lawful for any
one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the
sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the
city. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate
to the city.
[Sidenote: What it is to have the supreme power, what to be
subject.]
11. In every city, that man or council, to whose will each
particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is
said to have the _supreme power_, or _chief command_, or _dominion_.
Which power and right of commanding, consists in this, that each
citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or
council; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power
in a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his
right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil
person, is called the _subject_ of him who hath the chief command.
[Sidenote: Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.]
12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner
and by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of
preserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a
civil person, whom we have called a _city_. But they who submit
themselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear,
or some other whom they confide in for protection. They act
according to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they
may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet
overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives
its beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural
beginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of
those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence
it is that there are two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as
the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be
also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself
such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own
wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or one
company of men, endued with the command in chief. But we will speak,
in the first place, of a city political or by institution; and next,
of a city natural.
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