OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN
ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY.
1. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil
society, nor any action to which they have not under seal
consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the
beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to
protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there
is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive
power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice
is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the
chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8.
All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is
his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of
the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination of all
doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the
command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what
proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the
city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to
anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we
come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17.
The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there
should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18. The
marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a
man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as
the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme
command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by
whose compacts it was first constituted.
[Sidenote: There can no right be attributed to a multitude,
considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which
they have not given their particular consents.]
1. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude[8] of men,
gathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is;
namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one
hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things
that may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single
man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say _this is
mine_, the other, _that is his_; yet will there not be anything of
which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man,
can rightly say, this is _mine_, more than another’s. Neither must
we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or
more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions
as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said,
that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of
those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city,
which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever,
therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done
by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being
in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the
things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing.
Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that
manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in
which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for _meum_
and _tuum_, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that
that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be
necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.
Footnote 8:
_Multitude, &c._] The doctrine of the power of a city over its
citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the
difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a
multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a
multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but
may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which
difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first
article; but by the objections of many against those things which
follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to
the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few
things.
By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more
than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The
same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one
thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude
be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each
a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to
be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise,
contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the
like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there
must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men.
Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same
multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man,
or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received
for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued
with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are
commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and
so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude.
We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or
multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that
the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the
concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly.
But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men,
whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly
of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that
is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one
will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and
subjects, but not a city.
[Sidenote: The beginning of a city is the right of the major part
agreeing.]
2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by
whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must
agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be
propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the
will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise
there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills
and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent,
the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the
city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city
retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the
right of war, as against an enemy.
[Sidenote: That every man retains a right of protecting himself
according to his own judgment, as long as he is not
secured.]
3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article,
that there was required to the security of men, not only their
consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as
were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and
subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in
this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed,
and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in
the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and
common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a
man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that
he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to
fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men
altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or
injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within
deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear;
for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others;
which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself
to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that
there was a care had of his security.
[Sidenote: That a coercive power is necessary for security.]
4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those
who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest,
either by words or writing, _not to steal_, _not to kill_, and to
observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is
manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little
(removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through
conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our
security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then
sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments
appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to
have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity
of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.
[Sidenote: What the sword of justice is.]
5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any
one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be
punished. But I will call this right, _the sword of justice_. But
these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part,
till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.
[Sidenote: That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the
chief command.]
6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by
consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of
using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or
council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to
have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth
at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which
he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
[Sidenote: That the sword of war belongs to him also.]
7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend
themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to
protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united.
And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars,
that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to
arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers
and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against
the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as
he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must
understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their
whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that
this right, which we may call _the sword of war_, belongs to the
same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no
man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the
expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not
obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice,
even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong
to the chief command.
[Sidenote: The power of judicature belongs to him.]
8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have
power by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that
the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the
power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another,
nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could
not execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of
another, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but
that other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore,
in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who
hath the supreme authority.
[Sidenote: The legislative power is his also.]
9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to
peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being
risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the
opinions of men differ concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, _just_ and
_unjust_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _good_ and _evil_,
_honest_ and _dishonest_, and the like; which every man esteems
according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to
make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by
which every man may know what may be called his, what another’s,
what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what
evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in
our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually
called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the
commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the
_civil laws_ (that we may define them) are nothing else but _the
commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for
direction of the future actions of his citizens_.
[Sidenote: That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to
him also.]
10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war
and peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one
council without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it
appertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it
belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into
neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands
warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly
exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend
on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and
in peace.
[Sidenote: The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.]
11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their
beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the
will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good
and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall
receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are
ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary
inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest
of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by
which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the
laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to
whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist
him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for
him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done
under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of
eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the
citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but
that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve
two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we
believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey
for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one,
whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme
power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions[9] and
doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be
taught.
Footnote 9:
_Judge what opinions, &c._ There is scarce any principle, neither
in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may
not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war
itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the
principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to
themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such
dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be
restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove
no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions,
therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain
doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe
that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they
may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and
dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or
more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given
to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed.
I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living
under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of
Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church,
bishops require in their’s to be given to them; and last of all,
on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence
of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was
there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from,
or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of
doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not,
and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be
taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since
there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those
things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest
that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its
peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those
opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the
city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
[Sidenote: Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.]
12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath
submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city,
so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows
manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must
not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish
him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right
hath not sufficient power.
[Sidenote: That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his
citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto
him.]
13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every
perfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his
faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or
where the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme
power in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred
by men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself.
But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a
man, we call _absolute_.[10] For whosoever hath so submitted his
will to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing,
make laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own
pleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right;
truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted.
This same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which
are or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man
or council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command
and always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war;
and then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those
seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so
much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing
this power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion
of all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this
absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for
the government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of
his may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although
for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a
greater cannot be performed, we will call it _simple_. But the
obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract,
by which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately
from hence, that without obedience the city’s right would be
frustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted.
For it is one thing if I say, _I give you right to command what you
will_; another, if I say, _I will do whatsoever you command_. And
the command may be such, as I would rather die than do it.
Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed,
much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If
therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it.
For though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not
frustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not
refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have
contracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man
to kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived
that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a
parent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law;
since there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son
will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There
are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be
done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed
by these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that
absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is
the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to
obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them
from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than
right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is,
against God.
Footnote 10:
_Absolute._] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion,
and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of
many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the
unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet
monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have
their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer
their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but
not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is
contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object
against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right,
the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they
think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts
it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed.
But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have
a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some
few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without
injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that
is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And
therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which
princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no
account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should
desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied,
but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But
grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not
absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the
injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for
thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he
that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to
oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human
affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this
inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government.
For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command,
that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature,
there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive
power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the
Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all
monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who
have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and
what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not
the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their
citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of
what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform
their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes
sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit
somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
[Sidenote: That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.]
14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already
supposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to
himself; for the same party being both _the obliged_ and _the
obliger_, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it
were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he
can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is
already actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied
to the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by
which, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself.
Neither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will,
he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she
wills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended
in the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she
pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a
council, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of
the city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular
citizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this
is to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.
[Sidenote: That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against
him who hath the supreme power.]
15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution
of a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing
which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same
right, claim as his own; for where all things are _common_, there
can be nothing _proper_ to any man; it follows, that _propriety_
received its beginning[11] when cities received their’s, and that
that only is _proper_ to each man, which he can keep by the laws and
the power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief
command is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular
citizen hath a _propriety_ to which none of his fellow-citizens hath
right, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no
propriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws,
whose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single
person is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But
although there be many things which the city permits to its
citizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their
chief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to
natural equity. Neither is it concerning what[12] by right he may do
who hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be
done; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity
of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong
judgment.
Footnote 11:
_Propriety received its beginning, &c._] What is objected by some,
that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of
cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain;
because I have already declared, that a family is a little city.
For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted
them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the
sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father
himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject
neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all
things.
Footnote 12:
_What by right he may do, &c._] As often as a citizen is granted
to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the
city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by
right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by
the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the
declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money
from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt;
in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there
can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute;
in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing
from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require,
all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place,
saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free
themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.
[Sidenote: It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder,
adultery, and injury are.]
16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries, are forbid by the
laws of nature; but what is to be called _theft_, what _murder_,
what _adultery_, what _injury_ in a citizen, this is not to be
determined by the natural, but by the civil law. For not every
taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only another
man’s goods, is theft; but what is our’s, and what another’s, is a
question belonging to the civil law. In like manner, not every
killing of a man is murder, but only that which the civil law
forbids; neither is all encounter with women adultery, but only that
which the civil law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an
injury, where the promise itself is lawful; but where there is no
right to make any compact, there can be no conveyance of it, and
therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the
second chapter, Article 17. Now what we may contract for, and what
not, depends wholly upon the civil laws. The city of Lacedæmon
therefore rightly ordered, that those young men who could so take
away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should go
unpunished; for it was nothing else but to make a law, that what was
so acquired should be their own, and not another’s. Rightly also is
that man everywhere slain, whom we kill in war or by the necessity
of self-defence. So also that copulation which in one city is
matrimony, in another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts
which make up marriage in one citizen, do not so in another,
although of the same city; because that he who is forbidden by the
city, that is, by that one man or council whose the supreme power
is, to contract aught, hath no right to make any contract, and
therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence no
marriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was
therefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither adds it any force
to any unlawful contracts, that they were made by an oath or
sacrament;[13] for those add nothing to the strengthening of the
contract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. Art. 22. What therefore
theft, what murder, what adultery, and in general what injury is,
must be known by the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who
hath the supreme authority.
Footnote 13:
_That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c._] Whether
matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by
some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I
say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live
together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a
sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that
copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it
is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There
were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the
Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those
who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be
broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the
city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony
is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to
be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to
consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the
office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what
contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.
[Sidenote: The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where
there should not be any one endued with absolute power.]
17. This same supreme command and absolute power, seems so harsh to
the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them;
which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what human nature
and the civil laws are; and partly also through their default, who,
when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to
their own lust. That they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme
authority, some of them will have a city well enough constituted, if
they who shall be the citizens’ convening, do agree concerning
certain articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and
approved, and do command them to be observed, and punishments
prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To which
purpose, and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy, they appoint
a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that
suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not
in a city thus constituted, that the assembly who prescribed those
things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or
from time to time have a certain day and place of meeting, that
power will be perpetual. But if they wholly dissolve, either the
city dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of
war: or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who
shall transgress the laws, whosoever or how many soever they be that
have it; which cannot possibly be without an absolute power. For he
that by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what
citizens he pleaseth, hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly
be given by any citizens.
[Sidenote: The notes of supreme authority.]
18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city there is some one
man, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over
each single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of
that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited only
by the strength and forces of the city itself, and by nothing else
in the world. For if his power were limited, that limitation must
necessarily proceed from some greater power. For he that prescribes
limits, must have a greater power than he who is confined by them.
Now that confining power is either without limit, or is again
restrained by some other greater than itself; and so we shall at
length arrive to a power, which hath no other limit but that which
is the _terminus ultimus_ of the forces of all the citizens
together. That same is called the supreme command; and if it be
committed to a council, a supreme council, but if to one man, the
supreme lord of the city. Now the notes of supreme command are
these: to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, to
know and judge of all controversies, either by himself, or by judges
appointed by him; to elect all magistrates, ministers, and
counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by right can do some
one action, which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do
beside himself, that man hath obtained the supreme power. For those
things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens,
the city itself can only do. He therefore that doth those things,
useth the city’s right; which is the supreme power.
[Sidenote: If the city be compared with a man, he who hath the
supreme command is in order to the city, as the human
soul is to the man.]
19. They who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his
members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the
city is in relation to the whole city, such as the head is to the
whole man. But it appears by what hath been already said, that he
who is endued with such a power, whether it be a man or a court,
hath a relation to the city, not as that of the head, but of the
soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man hath a will,
that is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme
power, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will
or nill. A court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the
head, or one counsellor, whose only counsel (if of any one alone)
the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the
office of the head is to counsel, as the soul’s is to command.
[Sidenote: That the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by
their consents, by whose compacts it was constituted;]
20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the
compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with
the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the
contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken:
perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the
subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away.
Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would
thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is
supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any
one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he
is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me,
do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not
to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that
all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine
against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in
chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority.
If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only
on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it
might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion
under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the
command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men
think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the
greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature
that the consent of the major part should be received for the
consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from
civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court
which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of
the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power
of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part
of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed,
to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who
is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should
dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he
declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his
government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the
consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few,
provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole
city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may
by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of
citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government
be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars,
yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another
tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with
his fellow, says thus: _I convey my right on this party, upon
condition that you pass yours to the same_: by which means, that
right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own
advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council
for the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each
one hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which
every man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is
upheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which
is due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their
prince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any
right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even
without his own consent.
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