_THE WAR ADVANCES NORTHWARD_
I.
LEE'S PROTEST.
General Lee remained in front of Richmond, watching General McClellan,
but intelligence soon reached him from the upper Rappahannock that
another army was advancing in that quarter, and had already occupied
the county of Culpepper, with the obvious intention of capturing
Gordonsville, the point of junction of the Orange and Alexandria and
Virginia Central Railroads, and advancing thence upon Richmond.
The great defeat on the Chickahominy had only inspired the Federal
authorities with new energy. Three hundred thousand new troops
were called for, large bounties were held out as an inducement to
enlistment, negro-slaves in regions occupied by the United States
armies were directed to be enrolled as troops, and military commanders
were authorized to seize upon whatever was "necessary or convenient
for their commands," without compensation to the owners. This
indicated the policy upon which it was now intended to conduct the
war, and the army occupying Culpepper proceeded to carry out the new
policy in every particular.
This force consisted of the troops which had served under Generals
Banks, McDowell, and Fremont--a necleus--and reënforcements from the
army of McClellan, together with the troops under General Burnside,
were hastening to unite with the newly-formed army. It was styled the
"Army of Virginia," and was placed under command of Major-General John
Pope, who had hitherto served in the West. General Pope had procured
the command, it is said, by impressing the authorities with a high
opinion of his energy and activity. In these qualities, General
McClellan was supposed to be deficient; and the new commander, coming
from a region where the war was conducted on a different plan, it was
said, would be able to infuse new life into the languid movements in
Virginia. General Pope had taken special pains to allay the fears of
the Federal authorities for the safety of Washington. He intended
to "lie off on the flanks" of Lee's army, he said, and render it
impossible for the rebels to advance upon the capital while he
occupied that threatening position. When asked if, with an army like
General McClellan's, he would find any difficulty in marching through
the South to New Orleans, General Pope replied without hesitation, "I
should suppose not."
This confident view of things seems to have procured General Pope his
appointment, and it will soon be seen that he proceeded to conduct
military operations upon principles very different from those
announced by General McClellan. War, as carried on by General Pope,
was to be war _à l'outrance._ General McClellan had written: "The war
should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces
... all private property, taken for military use, should be paid for;
pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary
trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military
toward citizens promptly rebuked." The new commander intended to act
upon a very different principle, and to show that he possessed more
activity and resolution than his predecessor.
General Pope's assumption of the command was signalized by much pomp
and animated general orders. He arrived in a train decked out with
streamers, and issued an order in which he said to the troops: "I
desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry
to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of taking strong
positions and holding them, _of lines of retreat and bases of
supplies_. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position which
a soldier should desire to occupy is the one from which he can most
easily advance upon the enemy. Let us study the probable line of
retreat of our opponents, _and leave our own to take care of itself.
Let us look before, and not behind. Disaster and shame look in the
rear_." The result, as will be seen, furnished a grotesque commentary
upon that portion of General Pope's order which we have italicized. In
an address to the army, he added further: "I have come to you from the
West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies--from an army
whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when
found--where policy has been attack, and not defence. I presume I have
been called here to pursue the same system."
Such was the tenor of General Pope's orders on assuming
command--orders which were either intended seriously as an
announcement of his real intentions, or as a blind to persuade the
Confederates that his force was large.
Unfortunately for the region in which he now came to operate, General
Pope did not confine himself to these flourishes of rhetoric. He
proceeded to inaugurate a military policy in vivid contrast to General
McClellan's. His "expatriation orders" directed that all male citizens
disloyal to the United States should be immediately arrested; the oath
of allegiance to the United States Government should be proffered
them, and, "if they furnished sufficient security for its observance,"
they should be set free again. If they refused the oath, they should
be sent beyond the Federal lines; and, if afterward found within his
lines, they should be treated as spies, "and shot, their property
to be seized and applied to the public use." All communication
with persons living within the Southern lines was forbidden; such
communication should subject the individual guilty of it to be treated
as _a spy_. Lastly, General Pope's subordinates were directed to
arrest prominent citizens, and hold them as hostages for the good
behavior of the population. If his soldiers were "bushwhacked"--that
is to say, attacked on their foraging expeditions--the prominent
citizens thus held as hostages were to _suffer death_.
It is obvious that war carried on upon such principles is rapine.
General Pope ventured, however, upon the new programme; and a foreign
periodical, commenting upon the result, declared that this commander
had prosecuted hostilities against the South "in a way that cast
mankind two centuries back toward barbarism." We shall not pause to
view the great outrages committed by the Federal troops in Culpepper.
They have received thus much comment rather to introduce the following
communication to the Federal authorities, from General Lee, than
to record what is known now to the Old World as well as the New.
Profoundly outraged and indignant at these cruel and oppressive acts,
General Lee, by direction of the Confederate authorities, addressed,
on the 2d of August, the following note to General Halleck:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE C.S., /
NEAR RICHMOND, VA., _August_ 2, 1862.;
_To the General commanding the U.S. Army, Washington_:
GENERAL: In obedience to the order of his Excellency, the
President of the Confederate States, I have the honor to make you
the following communication:
On the 22d of July last a cartel for a general exchange of
prisoners was signed by Major-General John A. Dix, on behalf of
the United States, and by Major-General D.H. Hill, on the part of
this government. By the terms of that cartel it is stipulated that
all prisoners of war hereafter taken shall be discharged on parole
until exchanged. Scarcely had the cartel been signed, when the
military authorities of the United States commenced a practice
changing the character of the war, from such as becomes civilized
nations, into a campaign of indiscriminate robbery and murder.
A general order issued by the Secretary of War of the United
States, in the city of Washington, on the very day that the cartel
was signed in Virginia, directs the military commanders of
the United States to take the property of our people, for the
convenience and use of the army, without compensation.
A general order issued by Major-General Pope, on the 23d of July
last, the day after the date of the cartel, directs the murder of
our peaceful citizens as spies, if found quietly tilling their
farms in his rear, even outside of his lines.
And one of his brigadier-generals, Steinwehr, has seized innocent
and peaceful inhabitants, to be held as hostages, to the end that
they may be murdered in cold blood if any of his soldiers
are killed by some unknown persons whom he designates as
"bushwhackers." Some of the military authorities seem to suppose
that their end will be better attained by a savage war in which no
quarter is to be given, and no age or sex is to be spared, than by
such hostilities as are alone recognized to be lawful in modern
times. We find ourselves driven by our enemies by steady progress
toward a practice which we abhor, and which we are vainly
struggling to avoid.
Under these circumstances, this Government has issued the
accompanying general order, which I am directed by the President
to transmit to you, recognizing Major-General Pope and his
commissioned officers to be in the position which they have chosen
for themselves--that of robbers and murderers, and not that of
public enemies, entitled, if captured, to be treated as prisoners
of war. The President also instructs me to inform you that we
renounce our right of retaliation on the innocent, and will
continue to treat the private soldiers of General Pope's army as
prisoners of war; but if, after notice to your Government that
they confine repressive measures to the punishment of commissioned
officers who are willing to participate in these crimes, the
savage practices threatened in the orders alluded to be persisted
in, we shall reluctantly be forced to the last resort of accepting
the war on the terms chosen by our enemies, until the voice of an
outraged humanity shall compel a respect for the recognized usages
of war. While the President considers that the facts referred to
would justify a refusal on our part to execute the cartel by which
we have agreed to liberate an excess of prisoners of war in our
hands, a sacred regard for plighted faith, which shrinks from the
semblance of breaking a promise, precludes a resort to such an
extremity, nor is it his desire to extend to any other forces of
the United States the punishment merited by General Pope and such
commissioned officers as choose to participate in the execution of
his infamous order.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R.E. LEE, _General commanding_.
This communication requires no comment. It had the desired effect,
although General Halleck returned it as couched in language too
insulting to be received. On the 15th of August, the United States War
Department so far disapproved of General Pope's orders as to direct
that "no officer or soldier might, without proper authority, leave his
colors or ranks to take private property, or to enter a private house
for the purpose, under penalty of death."
II.
LEE'S MANOEUVRES.
General Pope had promptly advanced, and his army lay in Culpepper, the
right reaching toward the Blue Ridge, and the left extending nearly to
the Rapidan.
The campaign now became a contest of brains between Lee and the
Federal authorities. Their obvious aim was to leave him in doubt
whether a new advance was intended under McClellan from James River,
or the real movement was to be against Richmond from the North. Under
these circumstances, General Lee remained with the bulk of his army
in front of Richmond; but, on the 13th of July, sent Jackson with two
divisions in the direction of Gordonsville. The game of wits had thus
begun, and General Lee moved cautiously, looking in both directions,
toward James River and the Upper Rappahannock. As yet the real design
of the enemy was undeveloped. The movement of General Pope might or
might not be a real advance. But General McClellan remained inactive,
and, on the 27th of July, A.P. Hill's division was sent up to
reënforce Jackson--while, at the same time, General D.H. Hill,
commanding a force on the south bank of the James River, was directed
to make demonstrations against McClellan's communications by opening
fire on his transports.
The moment approached now when the game between the two adversaries
was to be decided. On the 2d of August, Jackson assumed the offensive,
by attacking the enemy at Orange Court-House; and, on the 5th, General
McClellan made a prompt demonstration to prevent Lee from sending him
further reinforcements. A large Federal force advanced to Malvern
Hill, and was drawn up there in line of battle, with every indication
on the part of General McClellan of an intention to advance anew upon
Richmond. Lee promptly went to meet him, and a slight engagement
ensued on Curl's Neck. But, on the next morning, the Federal army had
disappeared, and the whole movement was seen to have been a feint.
This state of indecision continued until nearly the middle of August.
An incident then occurred which clearly indicated the enemy's
intentions. General Burnside was known to have reached Hampton Roads
from the Southern coast with a considerable force, and the direction
which his flotilla now took would show the design of the Federal
authorities. If a new advance was intended from the James, the
flotilla would ascend that river; if General Pope's army was looked to
for the real movement, General Burnside would go in that direction.
The secret was discovered by the afterward celebrated Colonel John S.
Mosby, then a private, and just returned, by way of Fortress Monroe,
from prison in Washington. He ascertained, when he disembarked, that
Burnside's flotilla was about to move toward the Rappahannock, and,
aware of the importance of the information, hastened to communicate
it to General Lee. He was admitted, at the headquarters of the latter
near Richmond, to a private interview, and when General Lee had
finished his conversation with the plain-looking individual, then
almost unknown, he was in possession of the information necessary to
determine his plans. The Rappahannock, and not the James, was seen
to be the theatre of the coming campaign, and General Lee's whole
attention was now directed to that quarter.
Jackson had already struck an important blow there, coöperating
vigorously, as was habitual with him, in the general plan of action.
General McClellan had endeavored by a feint to hold Lee at Richmond.
By a battle now, Jackson hastened the retreat of the army under
McClellan from James River. With his three divisions, Jackson crossed
the Rapidan, and, on the 9th of August, attacked the advance force of
General Pope at Cedar Mountain. The struggle was obstinate, and at
one time Jackson's left was driven back, but the action terminated at
nightfall in the retreat of the Federal forces, and the Confederate
commander remained in possession of the field. He was too weak,
however, to hold his position against the main body of the Federal
army, which was known to be approaching; he accordingly recrossed
the Rapidan to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and here he was
soon afterward joined by General Lee, with the great bulk of the
Confederate army.
Such were the events which succeeded the battles of the Chickahominy,
transferring hostilities to a new theatre, and inaugurating the great
campaigns of the summer and autumn of 1862 in Northern Virginia and
Maryland.
III.
LEE ADVANCES FROM THE RAPIDAN.
General Lee, it will thus be seen, had proceeded in his military
manoeuvres with the utmost caution, determined to give his adversaries
no advantage, and remain in front of the capital until it was free
from all danger. But for the daring assault upon General McClellan,
on the Chickahominy, his critics would no doubt have charged him with
weakness and indecision now; but, under any circumstances, it is
certain that he would have proceeded in the same manner, conducting
operations in the method which his judgment approved.
At length the necessity of caution had disappeared. General Burnside
had gone to reënforce General Pope, and a portion of McClellan's army
was believed to have followed. "It therefore seemed," says
General Lee, "that active operations on the James were no longer
contemplated," and he wisely concluded that "the most effectual way to
relieve Richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would
be to reënforce General Jackson, and advance upon General Pope." In
commenting upon these words, an able writer of the North exclaims:
"Veracious prophecy, showing that _insight_ which is one of the
highest marks of generalship!" The movement, indeed, was the right
proceeding, as the event showed; and good generalship may be defined
to be the power of seeing what is the proper course, and the decision
of character which leads to its adoption.
General Lee exhibited throughout his career this mingled good judgment
and daring, and his cautious inactivity was now succeeded by one
of those offensive movements which, if we may judge him, by his
subsequent career, seemed to be the natural bent of his character.
With the bulk of his army, he marched in the direction of General
Pope; the rest were speedily ordered to follow, and active operations
began for driving the newly-formed Federal "Army of Virginia" back
toward Washington.
We have presented Lee's order for the attack on General McClellan, and
here quote his order of march for the advance against General Pope,
together with a note addressed to Stuart, commanding his cavalry, for
that officer's guidance.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
_August_ 19, 1862.
SPECIAL ORDER No. 185.
I. General Longstreet's command, constituting the right wing of
the army, will cross the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, and move in the
direction of Culpepper Court-House. General Jackson's command,
constituting the left wing, will cross at Summerville Ford, and move
in the same direction, keeping on the left of General Longstreet.
General Anderson's division will cross at Summerville Ford, follow the
route of General Jackson, and act in reserve. The battalion of light
artillery, under Colonel S.D. Lee, will take the same route. The
cavalry, under General Stuart, will cross at Morton's Ford, pursue the
route by Stevensburg to Rappahannock Station, destroy the railroad
bridge, cut the enemy's communications, telegraph line, and,
operating toward Culpepper Court-House, will take position on General
Longstreet's right.
II. The commanders of each wing will designate the reserve for their
commands. Medical and ammunition wagons will alone follow the troops
across the Rapidan. The baggage and supply trains will be parked under
their respective officers, in secure positions on the south side, so
as not to embarrass the different roads.
III. Cooked rations for three days will be carried in the haversacks
of the men, and provision must be made for foraging the animals.
Straggling from the ranks is strictly prohibited, and commanders will
make arrangements to secure and punish the offenders.
IV. The movements herein directed will commence to-morrow, 20th
instant, at dawn of day.
By command of General R.E. Lee:
A.P. MASON, _A.A. G_.
HEADQUARTERS CRENSHAW'S FARM,}
_August_ 19, 1862.}
_General J.E.B. Stuart, commanding Cavalry_:
General: I desire you to rest your men to-day, refresh your horses,
prepare rations and every thing for the march to-morrow. Get what
information you can of fords, roads, and position of the enemy, so
that your march can be made understandingly and with vigor. I send to
you Captain Mason, an experienced bridge-builder, etc., whom I think
will be able to aid you in the destruction of the bridge, etc. When
that is accomplished, or when in train of execution, as circumstances
permit, I wish you to operate back toward Culpepper Court-House,
creating such confusion and consternation as you can, without
unnecessarily exposing your men, till you feel Longstreet's right.
Take position there on his right, and hold yourself in reserve, and
act as circumstances may require. I wish to know during the day how
you proceed in your preparations. They will require the personal
attention of all your officers. The last reports from the
signal-stations yesterday evening were, that the enemy was breaking
up his principal encampments, and moving in direction of Culpepper
Court-House.
Very respectfully, etc., R.E. LEE, _General_.
These orders indicate General Lee's design--to reach the left flank
of the enemy, prevent his retreat by destroying the bridges on the
Rappahannock, and bring him to battle in the neighborhood of Culpepper
Court-House. The plan failed in consequence of a delay of two days,
which took place in its execution--a delay, attributed at that time,
we know not with what justice, to the unnecessarily deliberate
movements of the corps commanded by General Longstreet. This delay
enabled the enemy to gain information of the intended movement; and
when General Lee advanced on the 20th of August, instead of on the
18th, as he had at first determined to do, it was found that General
Pope had broken up his camps, and was in rapid retreat. Lee followed,
and reached the Rappahannock only to find that the Federal army had
passed that stream. General Pope, who had promised to conduct none but
offensive operations, and never look to the rear, had thus hastened
to interpose the waters of the Rappahannock between himself and his
adversary, and, when General Lee approached, he found every crossing
of the river heavily defended by the Federal infantry and artillery.
In face of this large force occupying a commanding position on the
heights, General Lee made no effort to cross. He determined, he says,
"not to attempt the passage of the river at that point with the army,"
but to "seek a more favorable place to cross, higher up the river, and
thus gain the enemy's right." This manoeuvre was intrusted to Jackson,
whose corps formed the Confederate left wing. Jackson advanced
promptly to the Warrenton Springs Ford, which had been selected as
the point of crossing, drove away a force of the enemy posted at the
place, and immediately began to pass the river with his troops. The
movement was however interrupted by a severe rain-storm, which swelled
the waters of the Rappahannock, and rendered a further prosecution of
it impracticable. General Lee was thus compelled to give up that plan,
and ordered Jackson to withdraw the force which had crossed. This was
done, and General Lee was now called upon to adopt some other method
of attack; or to remain inactive in face of the enemy.
But to remain inactive was impossible. The army must either advance
or retire; information which had just reached the Confederate general
rendered one of these two proceedings indispensable. The information
referred to had been obtained by General Stuart. The activity and
energy of this officer, especially in gaining intelligence, now
proved, as they proved often afterward, of the utmost importance to
Lee. Stuart had been directed by General Lee to make an attack, with a
cavalry force, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, in the enemy's
rear; he had promptly carried out his orders by striking the Federal
communications at Catlett's Station, had destroyed there all that he
found, and torn up the railroad, but, better than all, had captured
a box containing official papers belonging to General Pope. These
papers, which Stuart hastened--marching day and night, through storm
and flood--to convey to General Lee, presented the clearest evidence
of the enemy's movements and designs. Troops were hastening from every
direction to reënforce General Pope, the entire force on James River
especially was to be brought rapidly north of the Rappahannock, and
any delay in the operations of the Confederates would thus expose them
to attack from the Federal forces concentrated from all quarters in
their front.
[Illustration: Map--Upper Rappahannock]
IV.
JACKSON FLANKS GENERAL POPE.
It was thus necessary to act with decision, and General Lee resolved
upon a movement apparently of the most reckless character. This was to
separate his army into two parts, and, while one remained confronting
the enemy on the Rappahannock, send the other by a long circuit to
fall on the Federal rear near Manassas. This plan of action was
opposed to the first rule of the military art, that a general should
never divide his force in the face of an enemy. That Lee ventured to
do so on this occasion can only be explained on one hypothesis, that
he did not highly esteem the military ability of his opponent. These
flank attacks undoubtedly, however, possessed a great attraction for
him, as they did for Jackson, and, in preferring such movement, Lee
was probably actuated both by the character of the troops on both
sides and by the nature of the country. The men of both armies were
comparatively raw levies, highly susceptible to the influence of
"surprise," and the appearance of an enemy on their flanks, or in
their rear, was calculated to throw them into disorder. The wooded
character of the theatre of war generally rendered such movements
practicable, and all that was requisite was a certain amount of daring
in the commander who was called upon to decide upon them. This daring
Lee repeatedly exhibited, and the uniform success of the movements
indicates his sound generalship.
To command the force which was now to go on the perilous errand of
striking General Pope's rear, General Lee selected Jackson, who had
exhibited such promptness and decision in the campaigns of the Valley
of Virginia. Rapidity of movement was necessary above all things,
and, if any one could be relied upon for that, it was the now famous
Stonewall Jackson. To him the operation was accordingly intrusted, and
his corps was at once put in motion. Crossing the Rappahannock at an
almost forgotten ford, high up and out of view of the Federal right,
Jackson pushed forward day and night toward Manassas, reached
Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull Run Mountain, west of that place, passed
through, and completely destroyed the great mass of supplies in the
Federal depot at Manassas. The whole movement had been made with
such rapidity, and General Stuart, commanding the cavalry, had so
thoroughly guarded the flank of the advancing column from observation,
that Manassas was a mass of smoking ruins almost before General Pope
was aware of the real danger. Intelligence soon reached him, however,
of the magnitude of the blow aimed by Lee, and, hastily breaking
up his camps on the Rappahannock, he hurried to attack the force
assailing his communications.
The first part of General Lee's plan had thus fully succeeded. General
Pope, who had occupied every ford of the Rappahannock, so as to render
the passage difficult, if not impossible, had disappeared suddenly, to
go and attack the enemy in his rear. General Lee promptly moved in
his turn, with the great corps under Longstreet, and pushed
toward Manassas, over nearly the same road followed by Jackson.
[Illustration: T.J. Jackson]
V.
LEE FOLLOWS.
The contest of generalship had now fully begun, and the brain of
General Lee was matched against the brain of General Pope. It is no
part of the design of the writer of this volume to exalt unduly the
reputation of Lee, and detract from the credit due his adversaries.
Justice has been sought to be done to General McClellan; the same
measure of justice will be dealt out to his successors on the Federal
side; nor is it calculated to elevate the fame of Lee, to show that
his opponents were incapable and inefficient. Of General Pope,
however, it must be said that he suffered himself to be outgeneralled
in every particular; and the pithy comment of General Lee, that he
"did not appear to be aware of his situation," sums up the whole
subject.
It is beyond our purpose to enter upon any thing resembling a detailed
narrative of the confused and complicated movements of the various
corps of the army under General Pope. These have been the subject of
the severest criticism by his own followers. We shall simply notice
the naked events. Jackson reached Manassas on the night of August
26th, took it, and on the next day destroyed the great depot. General
Pope was hastening to protect it, but was delayed by Ewell at Bristoe,
and a force sent up from Washington, under the brave General Taylor,
was driven off with loss. Then, having achieved his aim, Jackson fell
back toward Sudley.
If the reader will look at the map, he will now understand the
exact condition of affairs. Jackson had burned the Federal depot of
supplies, and retired before the great force hastening to rescue them.
He had with him about twenty thousand men, and General Pope's force
was probably triple that number. Thus, the point was to hold General
Pope at arm's-length until the arrival of Lee; and, to accomplish this
great end, Jackson fell back beyond Groveton. There he formed line of
battle, and waited.
It is obvious that, under these circumstances, the true policy of
General Pope was to obstruct Thoroughfare Gap, the only road by which
Lee could approach promptly, and then crush Jackson. On the night of
the 27th, General McDowell was accordingly sent thither with forty
thousand men; but General Pope ordered him, on the next morning, to
Manassas, where he hoped to "bag the whole crowd," he said--that is
to say, the force under Jackson. This was the fatal mistake made by
General Pope. Thoroughfare Gap was comparatively undefended. While
General Pope was marching to attack Jackson, who had disappeared, it
was the next thing to a certainty that General Lee would attack _him_.
All parties were thus moving to and fro; but the Confederates enjoyed
the very great advantage over General Pope of knowing precisely
how affairs stood, and of having determined upon their own plan of
operations. Jackson, with his back to the mountain, was waiting for
Lee. Lee was approaching rapidly, to unite the two halves of his army.
General Pope, meanwhile, was marching and countermarching, apparently
ignorant of the whereabouts of Jackson,[1]
General Lee, in personal command of Longstreet's corps, reached the
western end of Thoroughfare Gap about sunset, on the 28th, and the
sound of artillery from the direction of Groveton indicated that
Jackson and General Pope had come in collision. Jackson had himself
brought on this engagement by attacking the flank of one of General
Pope's various columns, as it marched across his front, over the
Warrenton road, and this was the origin of the sound wafted to General
Lee's ears as he came in sight of Thoroughfare. It was certainly
calculated to excite his nerves if they were capable of being excited.
Jackson was evidently engaged, and the disproportion between his
forces and those of General Pope rendered such an engagement extremely
critical. Lee accordingly pressed forward, reached the Gap, and the
advance force suddenly halted: the Gap was defended. The Federal force
posted here, at the eastern opening of the Gap, was small, and wholly
inadequate for the purpose; but this was as yet unknown to General
Lee. His anxiety under these circumstances must have been great.
Jackson might be crushed before his arrival. He rode up to the
summit of the commanding hill which rises just west of the Gap, and
dismounting directed his field-glass toward the shaggy defile in
front.
[Footnote 1: "Not knowing at the time where was the enemy."--_General
Porter_.] and undecided what course to pursue.
[Illustration: Lee Reconnoitring at Throughfare Gap.]
The writer of these pages chanced to be near the Confederate commander
at this moment, and was vividly impressed by the air of unmoved
calmness which marked his countenance and demeanor. Nothing in the
expression of his face, and no hurried movement, indicated excitement
or anxiety. Here, as on many other occasions, Lee impressed the writer
as an individual gifted with the most surprising faculty of remaining
cool and unaffected in the midst of circumstances calculated to arouse
the most phlegmatic. After reconnoitring for some moments without
moving, he closed his glass slowly, as though he were buried in
reflection, and deliberating at his leisure, and, walking back slowly
to his horse, mounted and rode down the hill.
The attack was not delayed, and flanking columns were sent to cross
north of the Gap and assail the enemy's rear. But the assault in front
was successful. The small force of the enemy at the eastern opening of
the Gap retired, and, by nine o'clock at night, General Longstreet's
corps was passing through.
All the next morning (August 29th), Longstreet's troops were coming
into position on the right of Jackson, under the personal supervision
of Lee. By noon the line of battle was formed.[1] Lee's army was
once more united. General Pope had not been able to crush less than
one-half that army, for twenty-four hours nearly in his clutches, and
it did not seem probable that he would meet with greater success, now
that the whole was concentrated and held in the firm hand of Lee.
[Footnote 1: The hour of Longstreet's arrival has been strangely a
subject of discussion. The truth is stated in the reports of Lee,
Longstreet, Jones, and other officers. But General Pope was ignorant
of Longstreet's presence _at five in the evening_; and General Porter,
his subordinate, was dismissed from the army for not at that hour
attacking Jackson's right, declared by General Pope to be undefended.
Longstreet was in line of battle by noon.]
VI.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.
Lee's order of battle for the coming action was peculiar. It resembled
an open V, with the opening toward the enemy--Jackson's corps forming
the left wing, and extending from near Sudley, to a point in rear of
the small village of Groveton, Longstreet's corps forming the right
wing, and reaching from Jackson's right to and beyond the Warrenton
road which runs to Stonebridge.
The field of battle was nearly identical with that of July 21, 1861.
The only difference was, that the Confederates occupied the ground
formerly held by the Federal troops, and that the latter attacked, as
Johnston and Beauregard had attacked, from the direction of Manassas,
and the tableland around the well-known Henry House.
The Southern order of battle seems to have contemplated a movement on
one or both of General Pope's flanks while he attacked in front. An
assault on either wing would expose him to danger from the other,
and it will be seen that the fate of the battle was decided by this
judicious arrangement of the Confederate commander.
The action began a little after noon, when the Federal right,
consisting of the troops of Generals Banks, Sigel, and others,
advanced and made a vigorous attack on Jackson's left, under A.P.
Hill. An obstinate conflict ensued, the opposing lines fighting almost
bayonet to bayonet, "delivering their volleys into each other at the
distance of ten paces." At the first charge, an interval between two
of Hill's brigades was penetrated by the enemy, and that wing of
Jackson's corps was in great danger of being driven back. This
disaster was, however, prevented by the prompt stand made by two or
three regiments; the enemy was checked, and a prompt counter-charge
drove the Federal assaulting columns back into the woods.
The attempt to break Jackson's line at this point was not, however,
abandoned. The Federal troops returned again and again to the
encounter, and General Hill reported "six separate and distinct
assaults" made upon him. They were all repulsed, in which important
assistance was rendered by General Early. That brave officer attacked
with vigor, and, aided by the fire of the Confederate artillery from
the elevated ground in Jackson's rear, drove the enemy before him with
such slaughter that one of their regiments is said to have carried
back but three men.
This assault of the enemy had been of so determined a character, that
General Lee, in order to relieve his left, had directed Hood and
Evans, near his centre, to advance and attack the left of the
assaulting column. Hood was about to do so, when he found a heavy
force advancing to charge his own line. A warm engagement followed,
which resulted in the repulse of the enemy, and Hood followed them a
considerable distance, inflicting heavy loss.
It was now nearly nine o'clock at night, and the darkness rendered
further operations impossible. The troops which had driven the enemy
were recalled from their advanced position, the Southern line was
reformed on the same ground occupied at the commencement of the
action, and General Lee prepared for the more decisive struggle of the
next day.
Morning came (August 30th), but all the forenoon passed without a
resumption of the battle. Each of the adversaries seemed to await some
movement on the part of the other, and the Federal commander made
heavy feints against both the Confederate right and left, with the
view of discovering some weak point, or of inducing Lee to lay himself
open to attack. These movements had, however, no effect. Lee remained
obstinately in his strong position, rightly estimating the advantage
it gave him, and no doubt taking into consideration the want of
supplies General Pope must labor under, a deficiency which rendered a
prompt assault on his part indispensable. The armies thus remained in
face of each other, without serious efforts upon either side, until
nearly or quite the hour of three in the afternoon.
General Pope then resumed the assault on Lee's left, under Jackson,
with his best troops. The charge was furious, and a bloody struggle
ensued; but Jackson succeeded in repulsing the force. It fell back in
disorder, but was succeeded by a second and a third line, which rushed
forward at the "double-quick," in a desperate attempt to break the
Southern line. These new attacks were met with greater obstinacy than
at first, and, just as the opponents had closed in, a heavy fire was
directed against the Federal column by Colonel S.D. Lee, commanding
the artillery at Lee's centre. This fire, which was of the most rapid
and destructive character, struck the enemy in front and flank at
once, and seemed to sweep back the charging brigades as they came. The
fire of the cannon was then redoubled, and Jackson's line advanced
with cheers. Before this charge, the Federal line broke, and Jackson
pressed forward, allowing them no respite.
General Lee then threw forward Longstreet, who, knowing what was
expected of him, was already moving. The enemy were pressed thus in
front and on their flank, as Lee had no doubt intended, in forming his
peculiar line. The corps of Jackson and Longstreet closed in like two
iron arms; the Federal forces were driven from position to position;
the glare of their cannon, more and more distant, indicated that they
had abandoned further contest, and at ten at night the darkness put an
end to the battle and pursuit. General Pope was retreating with his
defeated forces toward Washington.
On the next day, Lee dispatched Jackson to turn Centreville and cut
off the retreat of General Pope. The result was a severe engagement
near Germantown, which was put an end to by a violent storm. General
Pope, now reënforced by the commands of Generals Sumner and Franklin,
had been enabled to hold his ground until night. When, on the next day
(September 2d), the Confederates advanced to Fairfax Court-House,
it was found that the entire Federal army was in rapid retreat upon
Washington.
Such had been the fate of General Pope.