_ON THE CHICKAHOMINY_.
I.
THE TWO ARMIES.
The Chickahominy, whose banks were now to be the scene of a bitter and
determined conflict between the great adversaries, is a sluggish and
winding stream, which, rising above Richmond, describes a curve around
it, and empties its waters into the James, far below the city. Its
banks are swampy, and thickly clothed with forest or underwood. From
the nature of these banks, which scarcely rise in many places above
the level of the water, the least freshet produces an overflow, and
the stream, generally narrow and insignificant, becomes a sort of
lake, covering the low grounds to the bases of the wooded bluffs
extending upon each side. Numerous bridges cross the stream, from
Bottom's Bridge, below the York River Railroad, to Meadow Bridge,
north of the city. Of these, the Mechanicsville Bridge, about four
miles from the city, and the New Bridge, about nine miles, were points
of the greatest importance.
General McClellan's position has been repeatedly referred to. He had
crossed a portion of his army east of Richmond, and advanced to within
four or five miles of the city. The remainder, meanwhile, lay on the
north bank of the stream, and swept round, in a sort of crescent, to
the vicinity of Mechanicsville, where it had been anticipated General
McDowell would unite with it, thereby covering its right flank, and
protecting the communications with the Federal base at the White
House. That this disposition of the Federal troops was faulty, in face
of adversaries like Johnston and Lee, there could be no doubt. But
General McClellan was the victim, it seems, of the shifting and
vacillating policy of the authorities at Washington. With the arrival
of the forty thousand men under McDowell, his position would have been
a safe one. General McDowell did not arrive; and this unprotected
right flank--left unprotected from the fact that McDowell's presence
was counted on--became the point of the Confederate attack.
The amount of blame, if any, justly attributable to General McClellan,
first for his inactivity, and then for his defeat by Lee, cannot be
referred to here, save in a few brief sentences. A sort of feud
seems to have arisen between himself and General Halleck, the
commander-in-chief, stationed at Washington; and General Halleck then
and afterward appears to have regarded McClellan as a soldier without
decision or broad generalship. And yet McClellan does not seem to
have merited the censure he received. He called persistently for
reinforcements, remaining inactive meanwhile, because he estimated
the Confederate army before him at two hundred thousand men, and
was unwilling to assail this force, under command of soldiers
like Johnston and Lee, until his own force seemed adequate to the
undertaking. Another consideration was, the Confederate position in
front of the powerful earthworks of the city. These works would double
the Confederate strength in case of battle in front of them; and,
believing himself already outnumbered, the Federal commander was
naturally loath to deliver battle until reënforced. The faulty
disposition of his army, divided by a stream crossed by few bridges,
has been accounted for in like manner--he so disposed the troops,
expecting reënforcements. But Jackson's energy delayed these.
Washington was in danger, it was supposed, and General McDowell did
not come. It thus happened that General McClellan awaited attack
instead of making it, and that his army was so posted as to expose him
to the greatest peril.
A last point is to be noted in vindication of this able soldier.
Finding, at the very last moment, that he could expect no further
assistance from the President or General Halleck, he resolved promptly
to withdraw his exposed right wing and change his base of operations
to James River, where at least his communications would be safe. This,
it seems, had been determined upon just before the Confederate attack;
or, if he had not then decided, General McClellan soon determined upon
that plan.
To pass now to the Confederate side, where all was ready for the
great movement. General Lee's army lay in front of Richmond, exactly
corresponding with the front of General McClellan. The divisions of
Magruder and Huger, supported by those of Longstreet and D.H. Hill,
were opposite McClellan's left, on the Williamsburg and York River
roads, directly east of the city. From Magruder's left, extended the
division of General A.P. Hill, reaching thence up the river toward
Mechanicsville; and a brigade, under General Branch lay on Hill's left
near the point where the Brook Turnpike crosses the Chickahominy north
of Richmond. The approaches from the east, northeast, and north, were
thus carefully guarded. As the Confederates held the interior line,
the whole force could be rapidly concentrated, and was thoroughly in
hand, both for offensive or defensive movements.
The army thus held in Lee's grasp, and about to assail its great
Federal adversary, was composed of the best portion of the Southern
population. The rank and file was largely made up of men of education
and high social position. And this resulted from the character of the
struggle. The war was a war of invasion on the part of the North;
and the ardent and high-spirited youth of the entire South threw
themselves into it with enthusiasm. The heirs of ancient families and
great wealth served as privates. Personal pride, love of country,
indignation at the thought that a hostile section had sent an army to
reduce them to submission, combined to draw into the Confederate ranks
the flower of the Southern youth, and all the best fighting material.
Deficient in discipline, and "hard to manage," this force was yet of
the most efficient character. It could be counted on for hard work,
and especially for offensive operations. And the officers placed over
it shared its character.
Among these, General A.P. Hill, a Virginian by birth, was soon to be
conspicuous as commander of the "Light Division," and representative
of the spirit and dash and enthusiasm of the army. Under forty years
of age, with a slender figure, a heavily-bearded face, dark eyes, a
composed and unassuming bearing, characterized when off duty by a
quiet cordiality, he was personally popular with all who approached
him, and greatly beloved, both as man and commander. His chief merit
as a soldier was his dash and impetus in the charge. A braver heart
never beat in human breast; throughout the war he retained the respect
and admiration of the army and the country; and a strange fact in
relation to this eminent soldier is, that his name was uttered by both
Jackson and Lee as they expired.
Associated with him in the battles of the Chickahominy, and to the
end, was the able and resolute Longstreet--an officer of low and
powerful stature, with a heavy, brown beard reaching to his breast,
a manner marked by unalterable composure, and a countenance whose
expression of phlegmatic tranquillity never varied in the hottest
hours of battle. Longstreet was as famous for his bull-dog obstinacy,
as Hill for his dash and enthusiasm. General Lee styled him his "old
war-horse," and depended upon him, as will be seen, in some of the
most critical operations of the war.
Of the young and ardent Virginian, General Magruder, the brave
and resolute North-Carolinian, D.H. Hill, and other officers who
subsequently acquired great reputations in the army, we have no space
at present to speak. All were to coöperate in the assault on General
McClellan, and do their part.
On the night of the 25th of June, all was ready for the important
movement, and the troops rested on their arms, ready for the coming
battle.
II.
LEE'S PLAN OF ASSAULT.
General Lee had been hitherto regarded as a soldier of too great
caution, but his plan for the assault on General McClellan indicated
the possession of a nerve approaching audacity.
Fully comprehending his enemy's strength and position, and aware that
a large portion of the Federal army had crossed the Chickahominy, and
was directly in his front, he had resolved to pass to the north
bank of the stream with the bulk of his force, leaving only about
twenty-five thousand men to protect the city, and deliver battle where
defeat would prove ruinous. This plan indicated nothing less than
audacity, as we have already said; but, like the audacity of the flank
movement at Chancellorsville afterward, and the daring march, in
disregard of General Hooker, to Pennsylvania in 1864, it was founded
on profound military insight, and indicated the qualities of a great
soldier.
Lee's design was to attack the Federal right wing with a part of his
force, while Jackson, advancing still farther to the left, came in on
their communications with the White House, and assailed them on their
right and rear. Meanwhile Richmond was to be protected by General
Magruder with his twenty-five thousand men, on the south bank; if
McClellan fell back down the Peninsula, this force was to cross and
unite with the rest; thus the Federal army would be driven from all
its positions, and the fate of the whole campaign against Richmond
would be decided.
Lee's general order directing the movement of the troops is here
given. It possesses interest as a clear and detailed statement of his
intended operations; and it will be seen that what was resolved on by
the commander in his tent, his able subordinates translated detail by
detail, with unimportant modifications, into action, under his eyes in
the field:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
_June_ 24, 1862.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 75.
I. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland
toward the Slash Church, and encamp at some convenient point west of
the Central Railroad. Branch's brigade, of A.P. Hill's division, will
also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy, near Half
Sink. At three o'clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson
will advance on the road leading to Pale Green Church, communicating
his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the
Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as
the movements of these columns are discovered, General A.P. Hill, with
the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow
Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance, the
heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open
upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from
Mechanicsville, and the passage across the bridge opened, General
Longstreet, with his division and that of General D.H. Hill, will
cross the Chickahominy at or near that point--General D.H. Hill moving
to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting
General A.P. Hill--the four divisions keeping in communication with
each other, and moving in _echelon_ on separate roads, if practicable;
the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters
extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy and
endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge;
General Jackson, bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek,
and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor. They will then press
forward toward York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and
forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy toward
Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and
crippling and arresting his progress.
II. The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their
positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such
demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should
opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack;
and, should an abandonment of his intrenchments by the enemy be
discovered, he will be closely pursued.
III. The Third Virginia cavalry will observe the Charles City road.
The Fifth Virginia, the First North Carolina, and the Hampton Legion
cavalry will observe the Darbytown, Varina, and Osborne roads. Should
a movement of the enemy, down the Chickahominy, be discovered, they
will close upon his flank, and endeavor to arrest his march.
IV. General Stuart, with the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia
cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb's Legion, and the Jeff Davis Legion, will
cross the Chickahominy, to-morrow, and take position to the left
of General Jackson's line of march. The main body will be held in
reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. General
Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the
enemy on his left, and will coöperate with him in his advance.
The Sixteenth Virginia cavalry, Colonel Davis, will remain on the
Nine-mile road.
V. General Ransom's brigade, of General Holmes's command, will be
placed in reserve on the Williamsburg road, by General Huger, to whom
he will report for orders.
VI. Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided
with three days' cooked rations. The necessary ambulances and
ordinance-trains will be ready to accompany the divisions, and receive
orders from their respective commanders. Officers in charge of all
trains will invariably remain with them. Batteries and wagons will
keep on the right of the road. The Chief-Engineer, Major Stevens, will
assign engineer officers to each division, whose duty it will be to
make provision for overcoming all difficulties to the progress of the
troops. The staff-departments will give the necessary instructions to
facilitate the movements herein directed.
By command of General LEE: R.H. CHILTON, _A.A. General_.
This order speaks for itself, and indicates Lee's plan of battle in
all its details. Further comment is unnecessary; and we proceed to
narrate the events which followed. In doing so, we shall strive to
present a clear and intelligible account of what occurred, rather than
to indulge in the warlike splendors of style which characterized the
"army correspondents" of the journals during the war. Such a treatment
of the subject is left to others, who write under the influence of
partisan afflatus, rather than with the judicious moderation of
the historian. Nor are battles themselves the subjects of greatest
interest to the thoughtful student. The combinations devised by great
commanders are of more interest than the actual struggles. We have
therefore dwelt at greater length upon the plans of Generals Lee
and McClellan than we shall dwell upon the actual fighting of their
armies.
III.
THE BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.
On the morning of the 26th of June, 1862, all was ready for the great
encounter of arms between the Confederates and the Federal forces on
the Chickahominy. General Jackson had been delayed on his march from
the mountains, and had not yet arrived; but it was known that he was
near, and would soon make his appearance; and, in the afternoon,
General Lee accordingly directed that the movement should commence.
At the word, General A.P. Hill moved from his camps to Meadow Bridge,
north of Richmond; crossed the Chickahominy there, and moved rapidly
on Mechanicsville, where a small Federal force, behind intrenchments,
guarded the head of the bridge. This force was not a serious obstacle,
and Hill soon disposed of it. He attacked the Federal works, stormed
them after a brief struggle, and drove the force which had occupied
them back toward Beaver Dam Creek, below. The Mechanicsville bridge
was thus cleared; and, in compliance with his orders from Lee, General
Longstreet hastened to throw his division across. Hill had meanwhile
pressed forward on the track of the retreating enemy, and, a mile or
two below, found himself in front of a much more serious obstruction
than that encountered at the bridge, namely, the formidable position
held by the enemy on Beaver Dam Creek.
The ground here is of a peculiar character, and admirably adapted for
a defensive position against an enemy advancing from above. On the
opposite side of a narrow valley, through which runs Beaver Dam Creek,
rises a bold, almost precipitous, bluff, and the road which the
Confederates were compelled to take bends abruptly to the right when
near the stream, thus exposing the flank of the assaulting party to a
fire from the bluff. As Hill's column pushed forward to attack this
position, it was met by a determined fire of artillery and small-arms
from the crest beyond the stream, where a large force of riflemen, in
pits, were posted, with infantry supports. Before this artillery-fire,
raking his flanks and doing heavy execution, Hill was compelled to
fall back. It was impossible to cross the stream in face of the
fusillade and cannon. The attack ended after dark with the withdrawal
of the Confederates; but at dawn Hill resumed the struggle, attempting
to cross at another point, lower down the stream. This attempt was in
progress when the Federal troops were seen rapidly falling back from
their strong position; and intelligence soon came that this was in
consequence of the arrival of Jackson, who had passed around the
Federal right flank above, and forced them to retire toward the main
body of the Federal army below.
No time was now lost. The memorable 27th of June had dawned clear and
cloudless, and the brilliant sunshine gave promise of a day on which
no interference of the elements would check the bloody work to be
performed. Hill advanced steadily on the track of the retiring Federal
forces, who had left evidences of their precipitate retreat all along
the road, and, about noon, came in front of the very powerful position
of the main body of the enemy, near Cold Harbor.
General McClellan had drawn up his forces on a ridge along the
southern bank of Powhite Creek, a small water-course which, flowing
from the northeast, empties below New Bridge into the Chickahominy.
His left, nearest the Chickahominy, was protected by a deep ravine in
front, which he had filled with sharp-shooters; and his right rested
upon elevated ground, near the locality known as Maghee's House. In
front, the whole line of battle, which described a curve backward to
cover the bridges in rear, was protected by difficult approaches. The
ground was either swampy, or covered with tangled undergrowth, or
both. The ridge held by the Federal forces had been hastily fortified
by breastworks of felled trees and earth, behind which the long lines
of infantry, supported by numerous artillery, awaited the attack.
The amount of the Federal force has been variously stated. The
impression of the Confederates differed from the subsequent statements
of Federal writers. "The principal part of the Federal army," says
General Lee, in his report, "was now on the north side of the
Chickahominy." The force has been placed by Northern writers at only
thirty, or at most thirty-five thousand. If this was the whole number
of troops engaged, from first to last, in the battle, the fact is
highly creditable to the Federal arms, as the struggle was long
doubtful. No doubt the exact truth will some day be put upon record,
and justice will be done to both the adversaries.
The Federal force was commanded by the brave and able General
Fitz-John Porter, with General Morell commanding his right, General
Sykes his left, and General McCall forming a second line. Slocum's
division, and the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, afterward
reënforced Porter, who now prepared, with great coolness, for the
Confederate attack.
The moment had come. A.P. Hill, pressing forward rapidly, with
Longstreet's division on the right, reached Cold Harbor, in front of
the Federal centre, about noon. Hill immediately attacked, and an
engagement of the most obstinate character ensued. General Lee,
accompanied by General Longstreet, had ridden from his headquarters,
on the Nine-mile road, to the scene of action, and now witnessed in
person the fighting of the troops, who charged under his eye, closing
in in a nearly hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy. This was, no
doubt, the first occasion on which a considerable portion of the men
had seen him--certainly in battle--and that air of supreme calmness
which always characterized him in action must have made a deep
impression upon them. He was clad simply, and wore scarcely any badges
of rank. A felt hat drooped low over the broad forehead, and the eyes
beneath were calm and unclouded. Add a voice of measured calmness, the
air of immovable composure which marked the erect military figure,
evidently at home in the saddle, and the reader will have a correct
conception of General Lee's personal appearance in the first of the
great battles of his career.
Hill attacked with that dash and obstinacy which from this time
forward characterized him, but succeeded in making no impression on
the Federal line. In every assault he was repulsed with heavy loss.
The Federal artillery, which was handled with skill and coolness,
did great execution upon his column, as it rushed forward, and the
infantry behind their works stood firm in spite of the most determined
efforts to drive them from the ridge. Three of Hill's regiments
reached the crest, and fought hand to hand over the breastworks, but
they were speedily repulsed and driven from the crest, and, after two
hours' hard fighting, Hill found that he had lost heavily and effected
nothing.
It was now past two o'clock in the afternoon, and General Lee listened
with anxiety for the sound of guns from the left, which would herald
the approach of General Jackson. Nothing was heard from that quarter,
however, and affairs were growing critical. The Confederate attack had
been repulsed--the Federal position seemed impregnable--and "it became
apparent," says General Lee, "that the enemy were gradually gaining
ground." Under these circumstances, General McClellan might
adopt either one of the two courses both alike dangerous to the
Confederates. He might cross a heavy force to the assistance of
General Porter, thus enabling that officer to assume the offensive;
or, finding Lee thus checked, he might advance on Magruder, crush the
small force under him, and seize on Richmond, which would be at his
mercy. It was thus necessary to act without delay, while awaiting the
appearance of Jackson. General Lee, accordingly, directed General
Longstreet, who had taken position to the right of Cold Harbor, to
make a feint against the Federal left, and thus relieve the pressure
on Hill. Longstreet proceeded with promptness to obey the order;
advanced in face of a heavy fire, and with a cross-fire of artillery
raking his right from over the Chickahominy, and made the feint which
had been ordered by General Lee. It effected nothing; and, to attain
the desired result, it was found necessary to turn the feint into a
real attack. This Longstreet proceeded to do, first dispersing with a
single volley a force of cavalry which had the temerity to charge his
infantry. As he advanced and attacked the powerful position before
him, the roar of guns, succeeded by loud cheers, was heard on the left
of Lee's line.
Jackson had arrived and thrown his troops into action without delay.
He then rode forward to Cold Harbor, where General Lee awaited him,
and the two soldiers shook hands in the midst of tumultuous cheering
from the troops, who had received intelligence that Jackson's corps
had joined them. The contrast between the two men was extremely
striking. We have presented a brief sketch of Lee's personal
appearance upon the occasion--of the grave commander-in-chief, with
his erect and graceful seat in the saddle, his imposing dignity of
demeanor, and his calm and measured tones, as deliberate as though he
were in a drawing-room. Jackson was a very different personage. He was
clad in a dingy old coat, wore a discolored cadet-cap, tilted almost
upon his nose, and rode a rawboned horse, with short stirrups, which
raised his knees in the most ungraceful manner. Neither in his face
nor figure was there the least indication of the great faculties of
the man, and a more awkward-looking personage it would be impossible
to imagine. In his hand he held a lemon, which he sucked from time to
time, and his demeanor was abstracted and absent.
As Jackson approached, Lee rode toward him and greeted him with a
cordial pressure of the hand.
"Ah, general," said Lee, "I am very glad to see you. I hoped to be
with you before!"
Jackson made a twitching movement of his head, and replied in a few
words, rather jerked from the lips than deliberately uttered.
Lee had paused, and now listened attentively to the long roll of
musketry from the woods, where Hill and Longstreet were engaged; then
to the still more incessant and angry roar from the direction of
Jackson's own troops, who had closed in upon the Federal forces.
"That fire is very heavy," said Lee. "Do you think your men can stand
it?"
Jackson listened for a moment, with his head bent toward one shoulder,
as was customary with him, for he was deaf, he said, in one ear, "and
could not hear out of the other," and replied briefly:
"They can stand almost any thing! They can stand that!"
He then, after receiving General Lee's instructions, immediately
saluted and returned to his corps--Lee remaining still at Cold Harbor,
which was opposite the Federal centre.
[Illustration: Lee and Jackson at Cold harbor.]
The arrival of Jackson changed in a moment the aspect of affairs
in every part of the field. Whitney's division of his command took
position on Longstreet's left; the command of General D.H. Hill, on
the extreme right of the whole line, and Ewell's division, with part
of Jackson's old division, supported A.P. Hill. No sooner had these
dispositions been made, than General Lee ordered an attack along the
whole line. It was now five or six o'clock, and the sun was sinking.
From that moment until night came, the battle raged with a fury
unsurpassed in any subsequent engagement of the war. The Texan troops,
under General Hood, especially distinguished themselves. These,
followed by their comrades, charged the Federal left on the bluff,
and, in spite of a desperate resistance, carried the position. "The
enemy were driven," says General Lee, "from the ravine to the first
line of breastworks, over which one impetuous column dashed, up to the
intrenchments on the crest." Here the Federal artillery was captured,
their line driven from the hill, and in other parts of the field a
similar success followed the attack. As night fell, their line gave
way in all parts, and the remnants of General Porter's command
retreated to the bridges over the Chickahominy.
The first important passage of arms between General McClellan and
General Lee--and it may be added the really decisive one--had
terminated in a great success on the side of the Confederates.
IV.
THE RETREAT.
The battle of Cold Harbor--or, as General Lee styles it in his report,
the "battle of the Chickahominy"--was the decisive struggle between
the great adversaries, and determined the fate of General McClellan's
campaign against Richmond.
This view is not held by writers on the Northern side, who represent
the battle in question as only the first of a series of engagements,
all of pretty nearly equal importance, and mere incidents attending
General McClellan's change of base to the shores of the James River.
Such a theory seems unfounded. If the battle at Cold Harbor had
resulted in a Federal victory, General McClellan would have advanced
straight on Richmond, and the capture of the city would inevitably
have followed. But at Cold Harbor he sustained a decisive defeat.
His whole campaign was reversed, and came to naught, from the events
occurring between noon and nightfall on the 27th of June. The result
of that obstinate encounter was not a Federal success, leading to the
fall of Richmond, but a Federal defeat, which led to the retreat to
the James River, and the failure of the whole campaign against the
Confederate capital.
It is conceded that General McClellan really intended to change his
base; but after the battle of Cold Harbor every thing had changed.
He no longer had under him a high-spirited army, moving to take up
a stronger position, but a weary and dispirited multitude of human
beings, hurrying along to gain the shelter of the gunboats on the
James River, with the enemy pursuing closely, and worrying them at
every step. To the condition of the Federal army one of their own
officers testifies, and his expressions are so strong as wellnigh
to move the susceptibilities of an opponent. "We were ordered to
retreat," says General Hooker, "and it was like the retreat of a
whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody on the
road at the same time; and a few shots from the rebels would have
panic-stricken the whole command."[1]
[Footnote 1: Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, part
i., p. 580.]
Such was the condition of that great army which had fought so bravely,
standing firm so long against the headlong assaults of the flower
of the Southern troops. It was the battle at Cold Harbor which had
produced this state of things, thereby really deciding the result
of the campaign. To attribute to that action, therefore, no more
importance than attached to the engagements on the retreat to James
River, seems in opposition to the truth of history.
We shall present only a general narrative of the famous retreat which
reflected the highest credit upon General McClellan, and will remain
his greatest glory. He, at least, was too good a soldier not to
understand that the battle of the 27th was a decisive one. He
determined to retreat, without risking another action, to the banks
of the James River, where the Federal gunboats would render a second
attack from the Confederates a hazardous undertaking; and, "on the
evening of the 27th of June," as he says in his official report,
"assembled the corps commanders at his headquarters, and informed
them of his plan, its reasons, and his choice of route, and method of
execution." Orders were then issued to General Keyes to move with his
corps across the White-Oak Swamp Bridge, and, taking up a position
with his artillery on the opposite side, cover the passage of the rest
of the troops; the trains and supplies at Savage Station, on the
York River Railroad, were directed to be withdrawn; and the corps
commanders were ordered to move with such provisions, munitions,
and sick, as they could transport, on the direct road to Harrison's
Landing.
These orders were promptly carried out. Before dawn on the 29th the
Federal army took up the line of march, and the great retrograde
movement was successfully begun. An immense obstacle to its success
lay in the character of the country through which it was necessary to
pass. White Oak Swamp is an extensive morass, similar to that skirting
the banks of the Chickahominy, and the passage through it is over
narrow, winding, and difficult roads, which furnish the worst possible
pathways for wagons, artillery, or even troops. It was necessary,
however, to use these highways or none, and General McClellan
resolutely entered upon his critical movement.
General Lee was yet in doubt as to his opponent's designs, and the
fact is highly creditable to General McClellan. A portion of the
Federal army still remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy, and
it might be the intention of McClellan to push forward reënforcements
from the Peninsula, fight a second battle for the protection of his
great mass of supplies at the White House, or, crossing his whole army
to the left bank of the Chickahominy by the lower bridges, retreat
down the Peninsula by the same road followed in advancing. All that
General Lee could do, under these circumstances, was to remain near
Cold Harbor with his main body, send a force toward the York River
road, on the eastern bank of the Chickahominy, to check any Federal
attempt to cross there, and await further developments.
It was not until the morning of the 29th that General McClellan's
designs became apparent. It was then ascertained that he had commenced
moving toward James River with his entire army, and Lee issued prompt
orders for the pursuit. While a portion of the Confederate army
followed closely upon the enemy's rear, other bodies were directed to
move by the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, and intercept him,
or assail his flanks. If these movements were promptly made, and no
unnecessary delay took place, it was expected that the Federal army
would be brought to bay in the White-Oak Swamp, and a final victory be
achieved by the Confederates.
These complicated movements were soon in full progress, and at
various points on the line of retreat fierce fighting ensued. General
Magruder, advancing to Savage Station, an important depot of Federal
stores, on the York River Railroad, encountered on the 29th, the
powerful Federal rear-guard, which fought obstinately until night,
when it retired. Next day Generals Longstreet and A.P. Hill had pushed
down the Long Bridge road, and on the next day (June 30th) came on the
retreating column which was vigorously engaged. From the character
of the ground, little, however, was effected. The enemy fought with
obstinate courage, and repulsed every assault. The battle raged until
after nightfall, when the Federal army continued to retreat.
These actions were the most important, and in both the Confederates
had failed to effect any important results.
Even Jackson, who had been delayed, by the destruction of the
Chickahominy bridges, in crossing to the south bank from the vicinity
of Cold Harbor, and had followed in rear of the rest of the army,
found himself checked by General McClellan's admirable disposition
for the protection of his rear. Jackson made every effort to strike a
decisive blow at the Federal rear in the White-Oak Swamp, but he found
a bridge in his front destroyed, the enemy holding the opposite side
in strong force, and, when he endeavored to force a passage, the
determined fire from their artillery rendered it impossible for him to
do so. General McClellan had thus foiled the generalship of Lee,
and the hard fighting of Stonewall Jackson. His excellent military
judgement had defeated every attempt made to crush him. On the 1st of
July he had successfully passed the terrible swamp, in spite of all
his enemies, and his army was drawn up on the wellnigh impregnable
heights of Malvern Hill.
A last struggle took place at Malvern Hill, and the Confederate
assault failed at all points. Owing to the wooded nature of the
ground, and the absence of accurate information in regard to it, the
attack was made under very great difficulties and effected nothing.
The Federal troops resisted courageously, and inflicted heavy loss
upon the assailing force, which advanced to the muzzles of the Federal
cannon, but did not carry the heights; and at nightfall the battle
ceased, the Confederates having suffered a severe repulse.
On the next morning, General McClellan had disappeared toward
Harrison's Landing, to which he conducted his army safely, without
further molestation, and the long and bitter struggle was over.
V.
RICHMOND IN DANGER--LEE'S VIEWS.
We have presented a sufficiently full narrative of the great battles
of the Chickahominy to enable the reader to form his own opinion of
the events, and the capacity of the two leaders who directed them.
Full justice has been sought to be done to the eminent military
abilities of General McClellan, and the writer is not conscious that
he has done more than justice to General Lee.
Lee has not escaped criticism, and was blamed by many persons for not
putting an end to the Federal army on the retreat through White-Oak
Swamp. To this criticism, it may be said in reply, that putting an
end to nearly or quite one hundred thousand men is a difficult
undertaking; and that in one instance, at least, the failure of one of
his subordinates in arriving promptly, reversed his plans at the most
critical moment of the struggle. General Lee himself, however, states
the main cause of failure: "Under ordinary circumstances," he says,
"the Federal army should have been destroyed. Its escape is due to the
causes already stated. Prominent among them is the want of timely and
correct information. This fact, attributed chiefly to the character
of the country, enabled General McClellan skilfully to conceal his
retreat, and to add much to the obstruction with which Nature had
beset the way of our pursuing columns. But regret that more was not
accomplished, gives way to gratitude to the Sovereign Ruler of the
Universe for the results achieved."
The reader will form his own opinion whether Lee was or was not
to blame for this want of accurate information, which would seem,
however, to be justly attributable to the War Department at Richmond,
rather than to an officer who had been assigned to command only three
or four weeks before. Other criticisms of Lee referred to his main
plan of operations, and the danger to which he exposed Richmond by
leaving only twenty-five thousand men in front of it, when he began
his movement against General McClellan's right wing, beyond the
Chickahominy. General Magruder, who commanded this force of
twenty-five thousand men left to guard the capital, expressed
afterward, in his official report, his views of the danger to which
the city had been exposed. He wrote:
"From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side
of the Chickahominy, and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his
evacuation, that is, from Friday night until Saturday morning, I
considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and
perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of
the Chickahominy. The bridges had been all destroyed; but one was
rebuilt--the New Bridge--which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns
from Goulding's; and there were but twenty-five thousand men between
his army of one hundred thousand and Richmond.... Had McClellan massed
his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our
line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz under similar circumstances
by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column
would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him
success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and
consequently the city, might have been his reward. His failure to do
so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the
character of his opponent."
To this portion of General Magruder's report General Lee appended the
following "Remarks" in forwarding it:
"General Magruder is under a misapprehension as to the separation of
troops operating on the north side of the Chickahominy from those
under himself and General Huger on the south side. He refers to this
subject on pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of his report.
"The troops on the two sides of the river were only separated until we
succeeded in occupying the position near what is known as New Bridge,
which occurred before twelve o'clock M. on Friday, June 27th, and
before the attack on the enemy at Gaines's Mill.
"From the time we reached the position referred to, I regarded
communication between the two wings of our army as reëstablished.
"The bridge referred to, and another about three-quarters of a mile
above, were ordered to be repaired before noon on Friday, and the New
Bridge was sufficiently rebuilt to be passed by artillery on Friday
night, and the one above it was used for the passage of wagons,
ambulances, and troops, early on Saturday morning.
"Besides this, all other bridges above New Bridge, and all the fords
above that point, were open to us."
To this General Magruder subsequently responded as follows:
"New Bridge was finished on Friday evening, the 27th, instead of
Saturday, 28th of June.
"I wrote from memory in reference to the time of its being finished.
"It was reported to me that the bridge three-quarters of a mile above
was attempted to be crossed by troops (I think Ransom's brigade), on
Saturday morning, from the south to the north side, but that, finding
the bridge or the approach to it difficult, they came down and crossed
at New Bridge on the same morning.
"My statement in regard to these bridges was not intended as a
criticism on General Lee's plan, but to show the position of the
troops, with a view to the proper understanding of my report, and to
prove that the enemy might have reasonably entertained a design, after
concentrating his troops, to march on Richmond."
We shall not detain the reader by entering upon a full discussion of
the interesting question here raised. General Lee, as his observations
on General Magruder's report show, did not regard Richmond as exposed
to serious danger, and was confident of his ability to recross the
Chickahominy and go to its succor in the event of an attack on the
city by General McClellan. Had this prompt recrossing of the stream
here, even, been impracticable, it may still be a question whether
General Lee did not, in his movement against the Federal right wing
with the bulk of his army, follow the dictates of sound generalship.
In war, something must be risked, and occasions arise which render
it necessary to disregard general maxims. It is one of the first
principles of military science that a commander should always keep
open his line of retreat; but the moment may come when his best policy
is to burn the bridges behind him. Of Lee's movement against General
McClellan's right, it may be said that it was based on the broadest
good sense and the best generalship. The situation of affairs rendered
an attack in some quarter essential to the safety of the capital,
which was about to be hemmed in on all sides. To attack the left of
General McClellan, promised small results. It had been tried and had
failed; his right alone remained. It was possible, certainly, that he
would mass his army, and, crushing Magruder, march into Richmond;
but it was not probable that he would make the attempt. The Federal
commander was known to be a soldier disposed to caution rather than
audacity. The small amount of force under General Magruder was a
secret which he could not be expected to know. That General Lee took
these facts into consideration, as General Magruder intimates, may or
may not have been the fact; and the whole discussion may be fairly
summed up, perhaps, by saying that success vindicated the course
adopted. "Success, after all, is the test of merit," said the brave
Albert Sydney Johnston, and Talleyrand compressed much sound reasoning
in the pithy maxim, "Nothing succeeds like success."
On the 2d of July the campaign was over, and General McClellan must
have felt, in spite of his hopeful general orders to the troops, and
dispatches to his Government, that the great struggle for Richmond had
virtually ended. A week before, he had occupied a position within a
few miles of the city, with a numerous army in the highest spirits,
and of thorough efficiency. Now, he lay on the banks of James River,
thirty miles away from the capital, and his army was worn out by the
tremendous ordeal it had passed through, and completely discouraged.
We have not dwelt upon the horrors of the retreat, and the state of
the army, which Northern writers painted at the time in the gloomiest
colors. For the moment, it was no longer the splendid war-engine it
had been, and was again afterward. Nothing could be done with it,
and General McClellan knew the fact. Without fresh troops, a renewed
advance upon Richmond was a mere dream.
No further attack was made by General Lee, who remained for some
days inactive in the hot forests of Charles City. His reasons for
refraining from a new assault on General McClellan are summed up in
one or two sentences of his report: "The Federal commander," he says,
"immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great
natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to
his front commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping, in addition
to those mounted in his intrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to
attack him, and in view of the condition of our troops, who had been
marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven days under the
most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to
afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need."
On the 8th of July, General Lee accordingly directed his march back
toward Richmond, and the troops went into camp and rested.
VI.
LEE AND McCLELLAN--THEIR IDENTITY OF OPINION.
General Lee had thus, at the outset of his career, as commander of the
Confederate army, saved the capital by a blow at the enemy as sudden
as it was resistless. The class of persons who are never satisfied,
and delight in fault-finding under all circumstances, declared that
a great general would have crushed the enemy on their retreat; these
certainly were in a minority; the people at large greeted Lee as the
author of a great deliverance worked out for them, and, on his return
to Richmond, he was received with every mark of gratitude and honor.
He accepted this public ovation with the moderation and dignity which
characterized his demeanor afterward, under all circumstances, either
of victory or defeat. It was almost impossible to discover in his
bearing at this time, as on other great occasions, any evidences
whatever of elation. Success, like disaster, seemed to find him calm,
collected, and as nearly unimpressible as is possible for a human
being.
The character of the man led him to look upon success or failure with
this supreme composure, which nothing seemed able to shake; but in
July, 1862, he probably understood that the Confederate States were
still as far as ever from having achieved the objects of the war.
General McClellan had been defeated in battle, but the great resources
of the United States Government would enable it promptly to put other
and larger armies in the field. Even the defeated army was still
numerous and dangerous, for it consisted, according to McClellan's
report, of nearly or quite ninety thousand men; and the wise brain of
its commander had devised a plan of future operations which
promised far greater results than the advance on Richmond from the
Chickahominy.
We shall touch, in passing, on this interesting subject, but shall
first ask the reader's attention to a communication addressed, by
General McClellan, at this time to President Lincoln. It is one of
those papers which belong to history, and should be placed upon
record. It not only throws the clearest light on the character and
views of General Lee's great adversary, but expresses with admirable
lucidity the sentiments of a large portion of the Federal people at
the time. The President had invited a statement of General McClellan's
views on the conduct of the war, and on July 7th, in the very midst of
the scenes of disaster at Harrison's Landing, McClellan wrote these
statesmanlike words:
"This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should
be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles
know to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the
subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be
at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political
organization. Neither confiscation of property, political executions,
territorial organizations of States, nor forcible abolition of
slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war
all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected,
subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private
property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for;
pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary
trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military
toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be
tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths
not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither
demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the
preservation of public order and the protection of political right.
Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations
of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the
master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves
contraband under the Act of Congress, seeking military protection,
should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate
permanently to its own service claims to slave-labor should be
asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should
be recognized.
"This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity
and security to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working
manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western
Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a
measure is only a question of time.
"A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the
influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of
almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses
and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would
commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.
"Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle
shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite
forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views,
especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.
"The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations
of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in
expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be
mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies
of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the
political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.
"In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will
require a commander-in-chief of the army--one who possesses your
confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to
execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the
nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do
not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such
positions as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully
as ever subordinate served superior. I may be on the brink of
eternity, and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written
this letter with sincerity toward you, and from love for my
country."
This noble and earnest exposition of his opinion, upon the proper mode
of conducting the war, will reflect honor upon General McClellan when
his military achievements are forgotten. It discusses the situation
of affairs, both from the political and military point of view, in a
spirit of the broadest statesmanship, and with the acumen of a great
soldier. That it had no effect, is the clearest indication upon which
the war was thenceforward to be conducted.
The removal of General McClellan, as holding views opposed to the
party in power, is said to have resulted from this communication.
It certainly placed him in open antagonism to General Halleck, the
Federal Secretary of War, and, as this antagonism had a direct effect
upon even connected with the subject of our memoir, we shall briefly
relate now it was now displayed.
Defeated on the Chickahominy, and seeing little to encourage an
advance, on the left bank of the James, upon Richmond, General
McClellan proposed to cross that river and operate against the capital
and its communications, near Petersburg. The proof of McClellan's
desire to undertake this movement, which afterward proved so
successful under General Grant, is found in a memorandum, by General
Halleck himself, of what took place on a visit paid by him to
McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, on July 25, 1862.
"I stated to him," says General Halleck, "that the object of my visit
was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future
operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that
point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by
that route South, making no further demonstration for the present
against Richmond. I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to
the manner and impracticability of the plan;" and nothing further, it
seems, was said of this highly "impracticable" plan of operations. It
became practicable afterward under General Grant; McClellan was not
permitted to essay it in July, 1862, from the fact that it had been
resolved to relieve him from command, or from General Halleck's
inability to perceive its good sense.
General Lee's views upon this subject coincided completely with those
of General McClellan. He expressed at this time, to those in his
confidence, the opinion that Richmond could be assailed to greater
advantage from the South, as a movement of the enemy in that direction
would menace her communications with the Gulf States; and events
subsequently proved the soundness of this view. Attacks from all
other quarters failed, including a repetition by General Grant of
McClellan's attempt from the side of the Chickahominy. When General
Grant carried out his predecessor's plan of assailing the city from
the direction of Petersburg, he succeeded in putting an end to the
war.