_LEE INVADES MARYLAND_.
I.
HIS DESIGNS.
The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not
contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond
to check the advance in Culpepper. His object at that time was
doubtless simply to arrest the forward movement of the new force
threatening Gordonsville. Now, however, the position of the pieces
on the great chess-board of war had suddenly changed, and it was
obviously Lee's policy to extract all the advantage possible from the
new condition of things.
He accordingly determined to advance into Maryland--the fortifications
in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a
broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction
unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, and without waiting to
rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous
marching and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved
toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the
music of the bands playing the popular air, "Maryland, my Maryland,"
advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September.
Lee's object in invading Maryland has been the subject of much
discussion, one party holding the view that his sole aim was to
surround and capture a force of nine or ten thousand Federal troops
stationed at Harper's Ferry; and another party maintaining that he
proposed an invasion of Pennsylvania as far as the Susquehanna,
intending to fight a decisive battle there, and advance thereafter
upon Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington. The course pursued by an
army commander is largely shaped by the progress of events. It can
only be said that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to
decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and
clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words.
His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia first. The
movement culminating in the victory over the enemy at Manassas had
produced the effect of paralyzing them in every quarter. On the coast
of North Carolina, in Western Virginia, and in the Shenandoah Valley,
had been heard the echo of the great events in Middle and Northern
Virginia. General Burnside's force had been brought up from the
South, leaving affairs at a stand-still in that direction; and,
contemporaneously with the retreat of General Pope, the Federal forces
at Washington and beyond had fallen back to the Potomac. This left
the way open, and Lee's farther advance, it was obvious, would now
completely clear Virginia of her invaders. The situation of affairs,
and the expected results, are clearly stated by General Lee:
"The war was thus transferred," he says, "from the interior to the
frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made
accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way
desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass
without endeavoring to inflict other injury upon the enemy, the best
course appeared to be the transfer of the army into Maryland."
The state of things in Maryland was another important consideration.
That great Commonwealth was known to be sectionally divided in its
sentiment toward the Federal Government, the eastern portion adhering
generally to the side of the South, and the western portion generally
to the Federal side. But, even as high up as Frederick, it was hoped
that the Southern cause would find adherents and volunteers to march
under the Confederate banner. If this portion of the population had
only the opportunity to choose their part, unterrified by Federal
bayonets, it was supposed they would decide for the South. In any
event, the movement would be important. The condition of affairs in
Maryland, General Lee says, "encouraged the belief that the presence
of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the
Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for
contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave
it reason to apprehend," and to cross the Potomac "might afford us an
opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might
be disposed to make to recover their liberty."
It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected
volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so
by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and
the army certainly shared this expectation. The identity of sentiment
generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia,
and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation
reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was
extremely bitter.
Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear.
By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington,
he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops
from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate
communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it
clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of
the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of
Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy
to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies,
while his own communications would remain open by way of the
Shenandoah Valley. This was essentially the same plan pursued in
the campaign of 1863, which terminated in the battle of Gettysburg.
General Lee's movements now indicated similar intentions. He doubtless
wished, in the first place, to compel the enemy to pursue him--then
to lead them as far as was prudent--and then, if circumstances were
favorable, bring them to decisive battle, success in which promised to
open for him the gates of Washington or Baltimore, and end the war.
It will now be seen how the delay caused by the movement of Jackson
against Harper's Ferry, and the discovery by General McClellan of the
entire arrangement devised by Lee for that purpose, caused the failure
of this whole ulterior design.
[Illustration: Map--Map of the MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.]
II.
LEE IN MARYLAND.
The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick
City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee issued
an address to the people of Maryland.
We have not burdened the present narrative with Lee's army orders and
other official papers; but the great force and dignity of this address
render it desirable to present it in full:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,}
NEAR FREDERICKTOWN, _September_ 8, 1862.}
_To the People of Maryland_:
It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the
army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as
that purpose concerns yourselves.
The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the
deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted
upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the
South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties.
They have seen, with profound indignation, their sister State
deprived of every right, and reduced to the condition of a
conquered province. Under the pretence of supporting the
Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions,
your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge,
and contrary to all forms of law. The faithful and manly protest
against this outrage, made by the venerable and illustrious
Marylanders--to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right
in vain--was treated with scorn and contempt. The government
of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your
Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its
members; freedom of the press and of speech have been suppressed;
words have been declared offences by an arbitrary desire of the
Federal Executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by military
commission for what they may dare to speak.
Believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty
to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long
wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable
you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore
independence and sovereignty to your State.
In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is
prepared to assist you, with the power of its arms, in regaining
the rights of which you have been despoiled. This, citizens
of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No
constraint upon your free will is intended--no intimidation will
be allowed. Within the limits of this army, at least, Marylanders
shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech.
We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of every
opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny, freely, and without
constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may
be; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to
your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when
you come of your own free will.
R.E. LEE, _General commanding_.
This address, full of grave dignity, and highly characteristic of the
Confederate commander, was in vivid contrast with the harsh orders of
General Pope in Culpepper. The accents of friendship and persuasion
were substituted for the "rod of iron." There would be no coercive
measures; no arrests, with the alternative presented of an oath to
support the South, or instant banishment. No intimidation would be
permitted. In the lines of the Southern army, at least, Marylanders
should enjoy freedom of thought and speech, and every man should
"decide his destiny freely, and without constraint."
This address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect
upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too
strong, or they found nothing in the condition of affairs to encourage
their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be
advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies,
presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his
standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral.
The condition of the army was indeed forlorn. It was worn down by
marching and fighting; the men had scarcely shoes upon their feet;
and, above the tattered figures, flaunting their rags in the sunshine,
were seen gaunt and begrimed faces, in which could be read little of
the "romance of war." The army was in no condition to undertake
an invasion; "lacking much of the material of war, feeble in
transportation, poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them
destitute of shoes," is Lee's description of his troops. Such was the
condition of the better portion of the force; on the opposite side of
the Potomac, scattered along the hills, could be seen a weary, ragged,
hungry, and confused multitude, who had dragged along in rear of the
rest, unable to keep up, and whose miserable appearance said little
for the prospects of the army to which they belonged.
From these and other causes resulted the general apathy of the
Marylanders, and Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his
own men for success in his future movements. He faced that conviction
courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in
any species of crimination against the people of Maryland, resolutely
commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and
the invasion of Pennsylvania.[1]
[Footnote 1: The reader will perceive that the intent to _invade_
Pennsylvania is repeatedly attributed in these pages to General Lee.
His own expression is, "by _threatening_ Pennsylvania, to induce
the enemy," etc. That he designed invasion, aided by the recruits
anticipated in Maryland, seems unquestionable; since, even after
discovering the lukewarmness of the people there by the fact that few
joined his standard, he still advanced to Hagerstown, but a step from
the Pennsylvania line. These facts have induced the present writer to
attribute the design of actual invasion to Lee with entire confidence;
and all the circumstances seem to him to support that hypothesis.]
The promises of his address had been kept. No one had been forced to
follow the Southern flag; and now, when the people turned their backs
upon it, closing the doors of the houses in the faces of the Southern
troops, they remained unmolested. Lee had thus given a practical proof
of the sincerity of his character. He had promised nothing which he
had not performed; and in Maryland, as afterward in Pennsylvania,
in 1863, he remained firm against the temptation to adopt the harsh
course generally pursued by the commanders of invading armies. He
seems to have proceeded on the principle that good faith is as
essential in public affairs as in private, and to have resolved that,
in any event, whether of victory or disaster, his enemies should not
have it in their power to say that he broke his plighted word, or
acted in a manner unbecoming a Christian gentleman.
Prompt action was now necessary. The remnants of General Pope's army,
greatly scattered and disorganized by the severe battle of Manassas,
had been rapidly reformed and brought into order again, and to this
force was added a large number of new troops, hurried forward from the
Northern States to Washington. This new army was not to be commanded
by General Pope, who had been weighed and found wanting in ability to
contend with Lee. The force was intrusted to General McClellan, in
spite of his unpopularity with the Federal authorities; and the urgent
manner in which he had been called upon to take the head of affairs
and protect the Federal capital, is the most eloquent of all
commentaries upon the position which he held in the eyes of the
country and the army. It was felt, indeed, by all that the Federal
ship was rolling in the storm, and an experienced pilot was necessary
for her guidance. General McClellan was accordingly directed, after
General Pope's defeat, to take command of every thing, and see to the
safety of Washington; and, finding himself at length at the head of an
army of about one hundred thousand men, he proceeded, after the manner
of a good soldier, to protect the Federal capital by advancing into
upper Maryland in pursuit of Lee.
III.
MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES.
General Lee was already moving to the accomplishment of his designs,
the capture of Harper's Ferry, and an advance into the Cumberland
Valley.
His plan to attain the first-mentioned object was simple, and promised
to be successful. Jackson was to march around by way of "Williamsport
and Martinsburg," and thus approach from the south. A force was
meanwhile to seize upon and occupy the Maryland Heights, a lofty
spot of the mountain across the Potomac, north of the Ferry. In like
manner, another body of troops was to cross the Potomac, east of the
Blue Ridge, and occupy the Loudon Heights, looking down upon Harper's
Ferry from the east. By this arrangement the retreat of the enemy
would be completely cut off in every direction. Harper's Ferry must
be captured, and, having effected that result, the whole Confederate
force, detached for the purpose, was to follow the main body of this
army in the direction of Hagerstown, to take part in the proposed
invasion of Pennsylvania.
This excellent plan failed, as will be seen, from no fault of the
great soldier who devised it, but in consequence of unforeseen
obstacles, and especially of one of those singular incidents which
occasionally reverse the best-laid schemes and abruptly turn aside the
currents of history.
Jackson and the commanders coöperating with him moved on September
10th. General Lee then with his main body crossed the South Mountain,
taking the direction of Hagerstown. Meanwhile, General McClellan had
advanced cautiously and slowly, withheld by incessant dispatches from
Washington, warning him not to move in such a manner as to expose that
city to danger. Such danger existed only in the imaginations of the
authorities, as the army in advancing extended its front from the
Potomac to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. General McClellan,
nevertheless, moved with very great precaution, feeling his way, step
by step, like a man in the dark, when on reaching Frederick City,
which the Confederates had just evacuated, good fortune suddenly came
to his assistance. This good fortune was the discovery of a copy of
General Lee's orders of march for the army, in which his whole plan
was revealed. General McClellan had therein the unmistakable evidence
of his opponent's intentions, and from that moment his advance was as
rapid as before it had been deliberate.
The result of this fortunate discovery was speedily seen. General Lee,
while moving steadily toward Hagerstown, was suddenly compelled to
turn his attention to the mountain-passes in his rear. It had not been
the intention of Lee to oppose the passage of the enemy through the
South Mountain, as he desired to draw General McClellan as far as
possible from his base, but the delay in the fall of Harper's
Ferry now made this necessary. It was essential to defend the
mountain-defiles in order to insure the safety of the Confederate
troops at Harper's Ferry; and Lee accordingly directed General
D.H. Hill to oppose the passage of the enemy at Boonsboro Gap, and
Longstreet was sent from Hagerstown to support him.
An obstinate struggle now ensued for the possession of the main South
Mountain Gap, near Boonsboro, and the roar of Jackson's artillery from
Harper's Ferry must have prompted the assailants to determined efforts
to force the passage. The battle continued until night (September
14th), and resulted in heavy loss on both sides, the brave General
Reno, of the United States army, among others, losing his life.
Darkness put an end to the action, the Federal forces not having
succeeded in passing the Gap; but, learning that a column of the enemy
had crossed below and threatened him with an attack in flank, General
Lee determined to retire in the direction of Sharpsburg, where Jackson
and the forces coöperating with him could join the main body of the
army. This movement was effected without difficulty, and Lee notices
the skill and efficiency of General Fitz Lee in covering the rear with
his cavalry. The Federal army failed to press forward as rapidly as
it is now obvious it should have done. The head of the column did
not appear west of the mountain until eight o'clock in the morning
(September 15th), and, nearly at the same moment ("the attack began at
dawn; in about two hours the garrison surrendered," says General Lee),
Harper's Ferry yielded to Jackson.
Fast-riding couriers brought the welcome intelligence of Jackson's
success to General Lee, as the latter was approaching Sharpsburg,
and official information speedily came that the result had been
the capture of more than eleven thousand men, thirteen thousand
small-arms, and seventy-three cannon. It was probably this large
number of men and amount of military stores falling into the hands of
the Confederates which afterward induced the opinion that Lee's sole
design in invading Maryland had been the reduction of Harper's Ferry.
General McClellan had thus failed, in spite of every effort which he
had made, to relieve Harper's Ferry,[1] and no other course remained
now but to follow Lee and bring him to battle. The Federal army
accordingly moved on the track of its adversary, and, on the afternoon
of the same day (September 15th), found itself in sight of Lee's
forces drawn up on the western side of Antietam Creek, near the
village of Sharpsburg.
[Footnote 1: All along the march he had fired signal-guns to inform
the officer in command at Harper's Ferry of his approach.]
At last the great opponents were in face of each other, and a battle,
it was obvious, could not long be delayed.
IV.
THE PRELUDE TO SHARPSBURG.
General Lee had once more sustained a serious check from the skill and
soldiership of the officer who had conducted the successful retreat of
the Federal army from the Chickahominy to James River.
The defeat and dispersion of the army of General Pope on the last day
of August seemed to have opened Pennsylvania to the Confederates. On
the 15th of September, a fortnight afterward, General McClellan, at
the head of a new army, raised in large measure by the magic of his
name, had pursued the victorious Confederate, checked his further
advance, and, forcing him to abandon his designs of invasion, brought
him to bay a hundred miles from the capital. This was generalship,
it would seem, in the true acceptation of the term, and McClellan,
harassed and hampered by the authorities, who looked but coldly upon
him, could say, with Coriolanus, "Alone I did it."
Lee was thus compelled to give up his movement in the direction of
Pennsylvania, and concentrate his army to receive the assault of
General McClellan. Jackson, marching with his customary promptness,
joined him with a portion of the detached force on the next day
(September 16th), and almost immediately those thunders which prelude
the great struggles of history began.
General Lee had drawn up his army on the high ground west of the
Antietam, a narrow and winding stream which flows, through fields
dotted with homesteads and clumps of fruit and forest trees, to the
Potomac. Longstreet's corps was posted on the right of the road from
Sharpsburg to Boonsboro, his right flank guarded by the waters of the
stream, which here bends westward; on the left of the Boonsboro road
D.H. Hill's command was stationed; two brigades under General Hood
were drawn up on Hill's left; and when Jackson arrived Lee directed
him to post his command on the left of Hood, his right resting on the
Hagerstown road, and his left extending backward obliquely toward the
Potomac, here making a large bend, where Stuart with his cavalry and
horse-artillery occupied the ground to the river's bank.
This arrangement of his troops was extremely judicious, as the sequel
proved. It was probable that General McClellan would direct his main
attack against the Confederate left, with the view of turning that
flank and hemming in the Southern army, or driving it into the river.
By retiring Jackson's left, Lee provided for this contingency, and it
will be seen that the design attributed by him to his adversary was
that determined upon.
General McClellan occupied the ground on the eastern bank of the
Antietam. He had evidently massed his forces opposite the Confederate
left, but a heavy order of battle stood opposite the centre and right
of Lee, where bridges crossed the stream.
The respective numbers of the adversaries can be stated with accuracy.
"Our forces at the battle of Antietam," said General McClellan, when
before the committee of investigation afterward, "were, total in
action, eighty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four."
General Lee says in his report: "This great battle was fought by less
than forty thousand men on our side."
Colonel Walter H. Taylor, a gentleman of the highest character, and
formerly adjutant-general of the army, makes the Confederate numbers
somewhat less. In a memorandum before the writer, he says:
Our strength at Sharpsburg. I think this is correct:
Jackson _(including A.P. Hill_) 10,000
Longstreet 12,000
D.H. Hill and Walker 7,000
______
Effective infantry 29,000
Cavalry and artillery 8,000
______
Total of all arms 37,000
This disproportion was very great, amounting, as it did, to more than
two for one. But this was unavoidable. The Southern army had been worn
out by their long marching and fighting. Portions of the command were
scattered all over the roads of Northern Virginia, wearily dragging
their half-clothed limbs and shoeless feet toward Winchester, whither
they were directed to repair. This was the explanation of the fact
that, in spite of the ardent desire of the whole army to participate
in the great movement northward, Lee had in line of battle at
Sharpsburg "less than forty thousand men."
General McClellan made a demonstration against his adversary on the
evening of the 16th, before the day of the main struggle. He threw his
right, commanded by General Hooker, across the Antietam at a point out
of range of fire from the Confederates, and made a vigorous attack
on Jackson's two divisions lying near the Hagerstown road running
northward, and thus parallel with Lee's line of battle. A brief
engagement took place in the vicinity of the "Dunker Church," in a
fringe of woods west of the road, but it was too late to effect any
thing of importance; night fell, and the engagement ceased. General
Hooker retaining his position on the west side of the stream.
The opposing lines then remained at rest, waiting for the morning
which all now saw would witness the commencement of the more serious
conflict.
V.
THE BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.
The battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, for it is known by both names,
began at early dawn on the 17th of September.
General McClellan had obviously determined to direct his main assault
against the Confederate left, a movement which General Lee had
foreseen and provided for,[1] and at dawn commenced a rapid fire of
artillery upon that portion of the Confederate line. Under cover
of this fire, General Hooker then advanced his infantry and made
a headlong assault upon Jackson's line, with the obvious view of
crushing that wing of Lee's army, or driving it back on Sharpsburg and
the river. The Federal force making this attack, or advancing promptly
to support it, consisted of the corps of Generals Hooker, Mansfield,
and Sumner, and numbered, according to General Sumner, forty thousand
men, of whom eighteen thousand belonged to General Hooker's corps.
[Footnote 1: "In anticipation of a movement to turn the line of
Antietam, Hood's two brigades had been transferred from the right to
the left," etc.--_Lee_.]
Jackson's whole force was four thousand men. Of the truth of this
statement of the respective forces, proof is here given:
"I have always believed," said General Sumner afterward, before the
war committee, "that, instead of sending these troops into that action
in driblets, had General McClellan authorized me to march _there forty
thousand men_ on the left flank of the enemy," etc.
"Hooker formed his corps of _eighteen thousand_ men," etc., says Mr.
Swinton, the able and candid Northern historian of the war.
Jackson's force is shown by the Confederate official reports. His
corps consisted of Ewell's division and "Jackson's old division."
General Jones, commanding the latter, reported: "The division at the
beginning of the fight numbered not over one thousand six hundred
men." Early, commanding Ewell's division,[1] reported the three
brigades to number:
Lawton's 1,150
Hayes's 550
Walker's 700
2,400
"Old Division," as above 1,600
Jackson's corps 4,000
[Footnote 1: After General Lawton was disabled.]
This was the entire force carried by General Jackson into the fight,
and these four thousand men, as the reader will perceive, bore the
brunt of the first great assault of General McClellan.
Just as the light broadened in the east above the crest of mountains
rising in rear of the Federal lines. General Hooker made his assault.
His aim was plainly to drive the force in his front across the
Hagerstown road and back on the Potomac, and in this he seemed
about to succeed. Jackson had placed in front Ewell's division of
twenty-four hundred men. This force received General Hooker's charge,
and a furious struggle followed, in which the division was nearly
destroyed. A glance at the casualties will show this. They were
remarkable. General Lawton, division commander, was wounded and
carried from the field; Colonel Douglas, brigade commander, was
killed; Colonel Walker, also commanding brigade, was disabled;
Lawton's brigade lost five hundred and fifty-four killed and wounded
out of eleven hundred and fifty, and five out of six regimental
commanders. Hayes's brigade lost three hundred and twenty-three out of
five hundred and fifty, and all the regimental commanders. Walker's
brigade lost two hundred and twenty-eight out of less than seven
hundred, and three out of four regimental commanders; and, of the
staff-officers of the division, scarcely one remained.
In an hour after dawn, this heavy slaughter had been effected in
Ewell's division, and the detailed statement which we have given will
best show the stubborn resistance offered by the Southern troops.
Still, they were unable to hold their ground, and fell back at last
in disorder before General Hooker, who pressed forward to seize the
Hagerstown road and crush the whole Confederate left. He was met,
however, by Jackson's Old Division of sixteen hundred men, who had
been held in reserve; and General Lee hastened to the point threatened
Hood's two small brigades, one of which. General Hood states, numbered
but eight hundred and sixty-four men. With this force Jackson now met
the advancing column of General Hooker, delivering a heavy fire
from the woods upon the Federal forces. In face of this fire they
hesitated, and Hood made a vigorous charge, General Stuart opening at
the same time a cross-fire on the enemy with his horse-artillery. The
combined fire increased their disorganization, and it now turned into
disorder. Jackson seized the moment, as always, throwing forward his
whole line, and the enemy were first checked, and then driven back in
confusion, the Confederates pursuing and cheering.
The first struggle had thus resulted in favor of the
Confederates--with about six thousand they had repulsed eighteen
thousand--and it was obvious to General McClellan that, without
reinforcements, his right could not hold its ground. He accordingly,
just at sunrise, sent General Mansfield's corps to the aid of General
Hooker, and at nine o'clock General Sumner's corps was added, making
in all forty thousand men.
The appearance of affairs at this moment was discouraging to the
Federal commander. His heavy assaulting column had been forced back
with great slaughter; General Hooker had been wounded and borne
from the field; General Mansfield, while forming his line, had been
mortally wounded; and now, at nine o'clock, when the corps of General
Sumner arrived, the prospect was depressing. Of the condition of the
Federal forces, General Sumner's own statement conveys a very distinct
conception: "On going upon the field," said General Sumner, before the
war committee, "I found that General Hooker's corps had been dispersed
and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been
carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all, as I
was advancing with my command on the field. I sent one of my
staff-officers to find where they were, and General Ricketts, the only
officer we could find, stated that he could not raise three hundred
men of the corps." General Mansfield's corps also had been checked,
and now "began to waver and break."
Such had been the result of the great Federal assault, and it was
highly creditable to the Confederate arms. With a comparatively
insignificant force, Jackson had received the attack of the entire
Federal right wing, and had not only repulsed, but nearly broken to
pieces, the large force in his front.
The arrival of General Sumner, however, completely changed the face of
affairs, and, as his fresh troops advanced, those which had been so
roughly handled by Jackson had an opportunity to reform. This was
rapidly effected, and, having marshalled his troops, General Sumner,
an officer of great dash and courage, made a vigorous charge. From
this moment the battle began to rage with new fury. General Lee had
sent to the left the brigades of Colquitt, Ripley, and McRae, and with
these, the troops of Hood, and his own shattered division, Jackson
presented a stubborn front, but his loss was heavy. General Starke,
of the Old Division, was killed; the brigade, regimental, and company
officers fell almost without an exception, and the brigades dwindled
to mere handfuls.
Under the great pressure, Jackson was at length forced back. One of
General Sumner's divisions drove the right of the Confederates beyond
the Hagerstown road, and, at this moment the long struggle seemed
ended; the great wrestle in which the adversaries had so long
staggered to and fro, advancing and retreating in turn, seemed at last
virtually decided in favor of the Federal arms.
This was undoubtedly the turning-point of the battle of Sharpsburg,
and General Lee had witnessed the conflict upon his left with great
anxiety. It was impossible, however, to send thither more troops than
he had already sent. As will be seen in a moment, both his centre
and right were extremely weak. A.P. Hill and General McLaws had not
arrived from Harper's Ferry. Thus the left had been reënforced to the
full extent of Lee's ability, and now that portion of his line seemed
about to be crushed.
Fortunately, however, General McLaws, who had been delayed longer than
was expected by General Lee, at last arrived, and was hurried to the
left. It was ten o'clock, and in that one hour the fighting of an
entire day seemed to have been concentrated. Jackson was holding his
ground with difficulty when the divisions of McLaws and Walker were
sent to him. As soon as they reached the field, they were thrown into
action, and General Lee had the satisfaction of witnessing a new order
of things. The advance--it might rather be called the onward rush--of
the Federal line was checked. Jackson's weary men took fresh heart;
that great commander promptly assumed the offensive, and, advancing
his whole line, drove the enemy before him until he reoccupied the
ground from which General Sumner had forced him to retire.
From the ground thus occupied, the Federal forces were unable to
dislodge him, and the great struggle of "the left at Sharpsburg" was
over. It had begun at dawn and was decided by ten or eleven o'clock,
and the troops on both sides had fought as resolutely as in any other
action of the war. The event had been decided by the pertinacity of
the Southern troops, and by the prompt movement of reënforcements by
General Lee from his right and centre. Posted near his centre, he
had surveyed at one glance the whole field of action; the design of
General McClellan to direct his main assault upon the Confederate left
was promptly penetrated, and the rapid concentration of the Southern
forces in that quarter had, by defeating this movement, decided the
result of the battle.
Attacks on the Confederate centre and right followed that upon the
left. In the centre a great disaster was at one time imminent. Owing
to a mistake of orders, the brave General Rhodes had drawn back his
brigade posted there--this was seen by the enemy--and a sudden
rush was made by them with the view of piercing Lee's centre. The
promptness and courage of a few officers and a small body of troops
defeated this attempt. General D.H. Hill rallied a few hundred men,
and opened fire with a single gun, and Colonel Cooke faced the enemy
with his regiment, "standing boldly in line," says General Lee,
"without a cartridge." The stand made by this small force saved the
army from serious disaster; the Federal line retired, but a last
assault was soon begun, this time against the Confederate right. It
continued in a somewhat desultory manner until four in the evening,
when, having massed a heavy column under General Burnside, opposite
the bridge in front of Lee's right wing, General McClellan forced the
bridge and carried the crest beyond.
The moment was critical, as the Confederate force at this point
was less than three thousand men. But, fortunately, reënforcements
arrived, consisting of A.P. Hill's forces from Harper's Ferry. These
attacked the enemy, drove him from the hill across the Antietam again;
and so threatening did the situation at that moment appear to General
McClellan, that he is said to have sent General Burnside the message:
"Hold your ground! If you cannot, then the bridge, to the last man.
Always the bridge! If the bridge is lost, all is lost!"
The urgency of this order sufficiently indicates that the Federal
commander was not without solicitude for the safety of his own left
wing. Ignorant, doubtless, of the extremely small force which had thus
repulsed General Burnside, in all four thousand five hundred men, he
feared that General Lee would cross the bridge, assail his left, and
that the hard-fought day might end in disaster to his own army. That
General Lee contemplated this movement, in spite of the disproportion
of numbers, is intimated in his official report. "It was nearly dark,"
he says, "and the Federal artillery was massed to defend the bridge,
with General Porter's corps, consisting of fresh troops, behind it.
Under these circumstances," he adds, "it was deemed injudicious to
push our advantage further in the face of fresh troops of the enemy
much exceeding our own."
The idea of an advance against the Federal left was accordingly
abandoned, and a movement of Jackson's command, which Lee directed,
with the view of turning the Federal right, was discontinued from the
same considerations. Night had come, both sides were worn out, neither
of the two great adversaries cared to risk another struggle, and the
bitterly-contested battle of Sharpsburg was over.
The two armies remained facing each other throughout the following
day. During the night of this day, Lee crossed with his army back into
Virginia. He states his reasons for this: "As we could not look for a
material increase of strength," he says, "and the enemy's force could
be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought prudent to wait
until he should be ready again to offer battle."
General McClellan does not seem to have been able to renew the
struggle at that time. "The next morning," he says, referring to the
day succeeding the battle, "I found that our loss had been so great,
and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I
did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day."
This decision of General McClellan's subjected him subsequently to
very harsh criticism from the Federal authorities, the theory having
obtained at Washington that he had had it in his power, by renewing
the battle, to cut Lee to pieces. Of the probability of such a
result the reader will form his own judgment. The ground for such a
conclusion seems slight. The loss and disorganization were, it would
seem, even greater on the Federal than on the Confederate side, and
Lee would have probably been better able to sustain an attack than
General McClellan to make it. It will be seen that General Meade
afterward, under circumstances more favorable still, declined to
attack Lee at Williamsport. If one of the two commanders be greatly
censured, the other must be also, and the world will be always apt
to conclude that they knew what could be effected better than the
civilians.
But General McClellan did make an attempt to "crush Lee," such as the
authorities at Washington desired, and its result may possibly throw
light on the point in discussion.
On the night of the 19th, Lee having crossed the Potomac on the night
of the 18th, General McClellan sent a considerable force across the
river near Shepherdstown, which drove off the Confederate artillery
there, and at daylight formed line of battle on the south bank,
protected by their cannon north of the river. Of the brief but bloody
engagement which followed--an incident of the war little dwelt upon in
the histories--General A.P. Hill, who was sent by Lee to repulse the
enemy, gives an animated account. "The Federal artillery, to the
number of seventy pieces," he says, "lined the opposite heights, and
their infantry was strongly posted on the crest of the Virginia hills.
When he advanced with his division, he was met by the most tremendous
fire of artillery he ever saw," but the men continued to move on
without wavering, and the attack resulted in the complete rout of the
enemy, who were "driven pell-mell into the river," the current of
which was "blue with floating bodies." General Hill chronicles this
incident in terms of unwonted eloquence, and declares that, by the
account of the enemy themselves, they lost "three thousand men killed
and drowned from one brigade," which appears to be an exaggeration.
His own loss was, in killed and wounded, two hundred and sixty-one.
This repulse was decisive, and General McClellan made no further
attempt to pursue the adversary, who, standing at bay on the soil of
Virginia, was still more formidable than he had been on the soil of
Maryland. As we have intimated on a preceding page, the result of this
attempt to pursue would seem to relieve General McClellan from the
criticism of the Washington authorities. If he was repulsed with heavy
slaughter in his attempt to strike at Lee on the morning of September
20th, it is not probable that an assault on his adversary on September
18th would have had different results.
No further crossing at that time was undertaken by the Federal
commander. His army was moved toward Harper's Ferry, an important base
for further operations, and Lee's army went into camp along the banks
of the Opequan.
VI.
LEE AND McCLELLAN--THEIR MERITS IN THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
General Lee and his adversary had displayed conspicuous merit in the
campaign thus terminated, and we shall pause for a moment to glance
back upon this great passage at arms.
To give precedence to General McClellan, he had assembled an army,
after the defeat at Manassas, with a promptness for which only his
own great personal popularity can adequately account, had advanced to
check Lee, and had fully succeeded in doing so; and had thus not only
protected the fertile territory of Pennsylvania from invasion, but had
struck a death-blow for the time to any designs General Lee might have
had to advance on the Federal capital. If the situation of affairs at
that moment be attentively considered, the extreme importance of these
results will not fail to appear. It may perhaps be said with justice,
that General McClellan had saved the Federal cause from decisive
defeat. There was no army to protect Washington but the body of troops
under his command; these were largely raw levies, which defeat would
have broken to pieces, and thus the way would have been open for
Lee's march upon Washington or toward Philadelphia--a movement whose
probable result would have been a treaty of peace and the independence
of the Southern Confederacy. All these hopes were reversed by
McClellan's rapid march and prompt attack. In the hours of a single
autumn day, on the banks of the Antietam, the triumphant advance of
the Confederates was checked and defeated. And, if the further fact be
considered that the adversary thus checkmated was Lee, the military
ability of General McClellan must be conceded. It is the fashion, it
would appear, in some quarters, to deny him this quality. History will
decide.
The merit of Lee was equally conspicuous, and his partial failure in
the campaign was due to circumstances over which he had no control.
His plan, as was always the case with him, was deep-laid, and every
contingency had been provided for. He was disappointed in his aim by
three causes which he could not foresee. One was the great diminution
of his force, owing to the rapidity of his march, and the incessant
fighting; another, the failure in obtaining recruits in Maryland; and
a third, the discovery by General McClellan of the "lost dispatch,"
as it is called, which revealed Lee's whole plan to his adversary. In
consequence of the "finding" of the order of march, McClellan advanced
with such rapidity that the laggards of the Southern army on the hills
north of Leesburg had no opportunity of joining the main body. The
gaps in the ranks of the army thus made were not filled up by Maryland
recruits; Lee fell back, and his adversary followed, no longer fearful
of advancing too quickly; Jackson had no time after reducing Harper's
Ferry to rejoin Lee at Hagerstown; thus concentration of his troops,
and a battle somewhere near Sharpsburg, were rendered a necessity with
General Lee.
In this tissue of adverse events, the discovery of the order of march
by General McClellan occupies a very prominent place. This incident
resembles what the French call a fatality. Who was to blame for the
circumstance still remains a mystery; but it may be said with entire
certainty that the brave officer upon whom it was charged was entirely
guiltless of all fault in the matter.
[Footnote: The officer here referred to is General D.H. Hill. General
McClellan said in his testimony afterward, before the congressional
committee: "When at Frederick, we found the original order issued to
D.H. Hill," etc. The inference was thus a natural one that General
Hill was to blame, but that officer has proved clearly that he had
nothing to do with the affair. He received but one copy of the order,
which was handed to him by General Jackson in person, and, knowing its
great importance, he placed it in his pocket-book, and still retains
it in his possession. This fact is conclusive, since General Hill
could not have "lost" what he continues to hold in his hands. This
mystery will be cleared up at some time, probably; at present, but one
thing is certain, that General Hill was in no manner to blame. The
present writer desires to make this statement as explicit as possible,
as, in other accounts of these transactions, he was led by General
McClellan's language to attribute blame to General Hill where he
deserved none.]
Whatever may have been the secret history of the "lost dispatch,"
however, it certainly fell into General McClellan's hands, and largely
directed the subsequent movements of the opposing armies.
From what is here written, it will be seen that Lee was not justly
chargeable with the result of the Maryland campaign. He had provided
for every thing as far as lay in his power. Had he not been
disappointed in events to be fairly anticipated, it seemed his force
would have received large accessions, his rear would have closed up,
and the advance into Pennsylvania would have taken place. Instead
of this, he was forced to retire and fight a pitched battle at
Sharpsburg; and this action certainly exhibited on Lee's part military
ability of the highest order. The force opposed to him had been at
least double that of his own army, and the Federal troops had fought
with a gallantry unsurpassed in any other engagement of the war. That
their assault on Lee failed, was due to the fighting qualities of his
troops and his own generalship. His army had been manoeuvred with a
rapidity and precision which must have excited even the admiration of
the distinguished soldier opposed to him. He had promptly concentrated
his forces opposite every threatened point in turn, and if he had not
been able to carry out the axiom of Napoleon, that a commander should
always be superior to the enemy at the point of contact, he had at
least done all that was possible to effect that end, and had so far
succeeded as to have repulsed if not routed his adversary. This is
the main feature to be noticed in Lee's handling of his troops at
Sharpsburg. An unwary or inactive commander would have there suffered
decisive defeat, for the Confederate left wing numbered, throughout
the early part of the battle, scarcely more than four thousand men,
while the column directed against it amounted first to eighteen
thousand, and in all to forty thousand men. To meet the impact of
this heavy mass, not only desperate fighting, but rapid and skilful
manoeuvring, was necessary. The record we have presented will enable
the reader to form his own opinion whether Lee was equal to this
emergency involving the fate of his army.
Military critics, examining this great battle with fair and candid
eyes, will not fail, we think, to discern the truth. That the Southern
army, of less than forty thousand men, repulsed more than eighty
thousand in the battle of Sharpsburg, was due to the hard fighting of
the smaller force, and the skill with which its commander manoeuvred
it.
VII.
LEE AND HIS MEN.
General Lee and his army passed the brilliant days of autumn in the
beautiful valley of the Shenandoah. This region is famous for its
salubrity and the beauty of its scenery. The mountain winds are pure
and invigorating, and the forests, which in the season of autumn
assume all the colors of the rainbow, inspire the mind with the most
agreeable sensations. The region, in fact, is known as the "Garden of
Virginia," and the benign influence of their surroundings was soon
seen on the faces of the troops.
A Northern writer, who saw them at Sharpsburg, describes them as
"ragged, hungry, and in all ways miserable;" but their forlorn
condition, as to clothing and supplies of every description, made no
perceptible difference in their demeanor now. In their camps along
the banks of the picturesque little stream called the Opequan, which,
rising south of Winchester, wanders through beautiful fields and
forests to empty into the Potomac, the troops laughed, jested, sang
rude camp-ballads, and exhibited a joyous indifference to their
privations and hardships, which said much for their courage and
endurance. Those who carefully considered the appearance and demeanor
of the men at that time, saw that much could be effected with such
tough material, and had another opportunity to witness, under
circumstances calculated to test it, the careless indifference, to the
past as well as the future, peculiar alike to soldiers and children.
These men, who had passed through a campaign of hard marches and
nearly incessant battles, seemed to have forgotten all their troubles
and sufferings. The immense strain upon their energies had left them
apparently as fresh and efficient as when the campaign begun. There
was no want of rebound; rather an excessive elasticity and readiness
to undertake new movements. They had plainly acquired confidence in
themselves, rightly regarding the event of the battle of Sharpsburg,
where they were so largely outnumbered, as highly honorable to them,
and they had acquired still greater confidence in the officers who
commanded them.
We shall hereafter speak more particularly of the sentiment of the
troops toward General Lee at this period of his connection with the
army. The great events of the war continually modified the relations
between him and his men; as they came to know him better and better,
he steadily rose in their admiration and regard. At this time--the
autumn of 1862--it may be said that the troops had already begun to
love their leader, and had bestowed upon him as an army commander
their implicit confidence.
Without this confidence on the part of his men, a general can effect
little; with it, he may accomplish almost any thing. The common
soldier is a child, and feels that the directing authority is above
him; that he should look upon that authority with respect and
confidence is the first necessity of effecting military organization.
Lee had already inspired the troops with this sentiment, and it was
mainly the secret of his often astounding successes afterward. The
men universally felt that their commander was equal to any and every
emergency. Such a repute cannot be usurped. Troops measure their
leaders with instinctive acumen, and a very astonishing accuracy. They
form their opinions for themselves on the merits of the question; and
Lee had already impressed the army with a profound admiration for his
soldiership. From this to the sentiment of personal affection the
transition was easy; and the kindness, consideration, and simplicity
of the man, made all love him. Throughout the campaign, Lee had not
been heard to utter one harsh word; a patient forbearance and kindness
had been constantly exhibited in all his dealings with officers and
men; he was always in front, indifferent plainly to personal
danger, and the men looked now with admiring eyes and a feeling of
ever-increasing affection on the erect, soldierly figure in the plain
uniform, with scarce any indication of rank, and the calm face,
with its expression of grave dignity and composure, which remained
unchanged equally on the march and in battle. It may be said that,
when he assumed command of the army before Richmond, the troops
had taken him on trust; now they had come to love him, and when he
appeared the camps buzzed, the men ran to the road, called out to each
other: "There goes Mas' Robert!" or "Old Uncle Robert!" and cheers
followed him as he rode by.
The country generally seemed to share the opinion of the army. There
was exhibited, even at this early period of the war, by the people at
large, a very great admiration and affection for General Lee. While
in the Shenandoah Valley, where Jackson was beloved almost beyond
expression, Lee had evidences of the position which he occupied in the
eyes of the people, which must have been extremely gratifying to him.
Gray-haired men came to his camp and uttered prayers for his health
and happiness as the great leader of the South; aged ladies greeted
him with faltering expressions full of deep feeling and pathetic
earnestness; and, wherever he went, young girls and children received
him with their brightest smiles. The august fame of the great soldier,
who has now passed away, no doubt renders these memories of personal
interviews with him dear to many. Even the most trifling incidents are
cherished and kept fresh by repetition; and the writer of these
pages recalls at the moment one of these trifles, which may possibly
interest some readers. There stood and still stands an ancient and
hospitable homestead on the south bank of the Opequan, the hearts
of whose inmates, one and all, were ardently with the South in her
struggle. Soon after Sharpsburg, General Lee one day visited the old
manor-house crowning the grassy hill and overshadowed by great oaks;
Generals Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart, accompanied him, and the
reception which he met with, though we cannot describe it, was such as
would have satisfied the most exacting. The children came to him and
held out their small hands, the ladies divided their attention between
him and the beloved "hero of the Valley," Jackson; and the lady of the
manor could only express her sense of the great honor of receiving
such company, by declaring, with a smile, that the dinner resembled
the famous _breakfast at Tillietudlem_ in Scott's "Old Mortality."
General Lee highly enjoyed this, and seemed disposed to laugh when
the curious fact was pointed out to him that he had seated himself at
table in a chair with an open-winged _United States eagle_ delineated
upon its back. The result of this visit, it appeared afterward, was a
sentiment of great regard and affection for the general personally by
all at the old country-house. Old and young were charmed by his grave
sweetness and mild courtesy, and doubtless he inspired the same
sentiment in other places.
His headquarters were at this time in a field some miles from
Winchester. An Englishman, who visited him there, described the
general and his surroundings with accuracy, and, from the account
printed in _Blackwood's Magazine_, we quote the following sentences:
"In visiting the headquarters of the Confederate generals, but
particularly those of General Lee, any one accustomed to see European
armies in the field cannot fail to be struck with the great absence
of all the 'pomp and circumstance of war' in and around their
encampments. Lee's headquarters consisted of about seven or eight
pole-tents, pitched with their backs to a stake fence, upon a piece
of ground so rocky that it was unpleasant to ride over it, its only
recommendation being a little stream of good water which flowed
close by the general's tent. In front of the tents were some three
four-wheeled wagons, drawn up without any regularity, and a number
of horses roamed loose about the field. The servants, who were, of
course, slaves, and the mounted soldiers, called 'couriers,' who
always accompany each general of division in the field, were
unprovided with tents, and slept in or under the wagons. Wagons,
tents, and some of the horses, were marked 'U.S.,' showing that
part of that huge debt in the North has gone to furnishing even the
Confederate generals with camp equipments. No guard or sentries were
to be seen in the vicinity; no crowd of aides-de-camp loitering about,
making themselves agreeable to visitors, and endeavoring to save their
generals from receiving those who had no particular business. A large
farm-house stands close by, which, in any other army, would have been
the general's residence _pro tem_., but, as no liberties are allowed
to be taken with personal property in Lee's army, he is particular in
setting a good example himself. His staff are crowded together, two or
three in a tent; none are allowed to carry more baggage than a small
box each, and his own kit is but very little larger. Every one who
approaches him does so with marked respect, although there is none
of that bowing and flourishing of forage caps which occurs in the
presence of European generals; and, while all honor him, and place
implicit faith in his courage and ability, those with whom he is most
intimate feel for him the affection of sons to a father. Old General
Scott was correct in saying that, when Lee joined the Southern cause,
it was worth as much as the accession of twenty thousand men to the
'rebels.' Since then every injury that it was possible to inflict, the
Northerners have heaped upon him. Notwithstanding all these personal
losses, however, when speaking of the Yankees, he neither evinced
any bitterness of feeling, nor gave utterance to a single violent
expression, but alluded to many of his former friends and companions
among them in the kindest terms. He spoke as a man proud of the
victories won by his country, and confident of ultimate success, under
the blessing of the Almighty, whom he glorified for past successes,
and whose aid he invoked for all future operations."
The writer adds that the troops "regarded him in the light of
infallible love," and had "a fixed and unshakable faith in all he
did--a calm confidence of victory when serving under him." The
peculiarly interesting part of this foreign testimony, however, is
that in which the writer speaks of General Lee's religious sentiment,
of his gratitude for past mercies, and prayers for the assistance of
the Almighty in the hours of conflict still to come. This point we
shall return to, endeavoring to give it that prominence which it
deserves. At present we shall leave the subject of General Lee, in
his private and personal character, and proceed to narrate the last
campaign of the year 1862.
VIII.
LEE PASSES THE BLUE RIDGE
From the central frontier of his headquarters, near Winchester, the
key of the lower Valley, General Lee was able to watch at once the
line of the Potomac in his front, beyond which lay General McClellan's
army, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge on his right, through which it
was possible for the enemy, by a rapid movement, to advance and attack
his flank and rear.
If Lee had at any time the design of recrossing into Maryland, he
abandoned it. General McClellan attributed that design to him. "I have
since been confirmed in the belief," he wrote, "that if I had crossed
the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in the early part of October, General
Lee would have recrossed into Maryland." Of Lee's ability to thus
reënter Maryland there can be no doubt. His army was rested,
provisioned, and in high spirits; the "stragglers" had rejoined their
commands, and it is certain that the order for a new advance would
have been hailed by the mercurial troops with enthusiasm. No such
order was, however, issued, and soon the approach of winter rendered
the movement impossible.
More than a month thus passed, the two armies remaining in face of
each other. No engagement of any importance occurred during this
period of inactivity, but once or twice the Federal commander sent
heavy reconnoitring forces across the Potomac; and Stuart, now
mounting to the zenith of his reputation as a cavalry-officer,
repeated his famous "ride around McClellan," on the Chickahominy.
The object of General Lee in directing this movement of the cavalry
was the ordinary one, on such occasions, of obtaining information and
inflicting injury upon the enemy. Stuart responded with ardor to the
order. He had conceived a warm affection for General Lee, mingled with
a respect for his military genius nearly unbounded, and at this time,
as always afterward, received the orders of his commander for active
operations with enthusiasm. With about eighteen hundred troopers
and four pieces of horse-artillery, Stuart crossed the Potomac above
Williamsport, marched rapidly to Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, where
he destroyed the machine-shops, and other buildings containing a large
number of arms and military stores; and continued his way thence
toward Frederick City, with the bold design of completely passing
around the Federal army, and recrossing the river east of the Blue
Ridge. In this he succeeded, thanks to his skill and audacity, in
spite of every effort of the enemy to cut off and destroy him.
Reaching White's Ford, on the Potomac, north of Leesburg, he disposed
his horse-artillery so as to cover this movement, cut his way through
the Federal cavalry disputing his passage, and recrossed into Virginia
with a large number of captured horses, and without losing a man.
This expedition excited astonishment, and a prominent officer of
the Federal army declared that he would not have believed that
"horse-flesh could stand it," as the distance passed over in about
forty-eight hours, during which considerable delay had occurred at
Chambersburg, was nearly or quite one hundred miles. General McClellan
complained that his orders had not been obeyed, and said that after
these orders he "did not think it possible for Stuart to recross," and
believed "the destruction or capture of his entire force perfectly
certain."
Soon afterward the Federal commander attempted reconnoissances in
his turn. A considerable force of infantry, supported by artillery,
crossed the Potomac and advanced to the vicinity of the little village
of Leetown, but on the same evening fell back rapidly, doubtless
fearful that Lee would interpose a force between them and the river
and cut off their retreat. This was followed by a movement of the
Federal cavalry, which crossed at the same spot and advanced up the
road leading toward Martinsburg. These were met and subsequently
driven back by Colonel W.H.F. Lee, son of the general. A third and
more important attempt to reconnoitre took place toward the end of
October. General McClellan then crossed a considerable body of troops
both at Shepherdstown and Harper's Ferry; the columns advanced to
Kearneysville and Charlestown respectively, and near the former
village a brief engagement took place, without results. General
McClellan, who had come in person as far as Charlestown, then returned
with his troops across the Potomac, and further hostilities for the
moment ceased.
These reconnoissances were the prelude, however, of an important
movement which the Federal authorities had been long urging General
McClellan to make. Although the battle of Sharpsburg had been
indecisive in one acceptation of the term, in another it had been
entirely decisive. A drawn battle of the clearest sort, it yet decided
the future movements of the opposing armies. General Lee had invaded
Maryland with the design of advancing into Pennsylvania--the result of
Sharpsburg was, that he fell back into Virginia. General McClellan
had marched from Washington with no object but an offensive-defensive
campaign to afford the capital protection; he was now enabled to
undertake anew the invasion of Virginia.
To the success of such a movement the Federal commander seems rightly
to have considered a full and complete equipment of his troops
absolutely essential. He was directed at once, after Sharpsburg, to
advance upon Lee. He replied that it was impossible, neither his men
nor his horses had shoes or rations. New orders came--General Halleck
appearing to regard the difficulties urged by General McClellan as
imaginary. New protests followed, and then new protests and new orders
again, until finally a peremptory dispatch came. This dispatch was,
"Cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south,"
an order bearing the impress of the terse good sense and rough
directness of the Federal President. This order it was necessary in
the end to obey, and General McClellan, having decided in favor of
a movement across the Potomac east instead of west of the mountain,
proceeded, in the last days of October, to cross his army. His plan
was excellent, and is here set forth in his own words:
"The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance," he says, "was
to move the army well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking
Warrenton as the point of direction for the main army, seizing each
pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments as we approached it, and
guarding them after we had passed, as long as they would enable the
enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac.... We depended
upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap
Railway was reached. When that occurred, the passes in our rear were
to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in
any direction. It was my intention, if, upon reaching Ashby's or any
other pass, the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac, in the
Valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the Valley and endeavor to gain
their rear."
From this statement of General McClellan it will be seen that his plan
was judicious, and displayed a thorough knowledge of the country in
which he was about to operate. The conformation of the region is
peculiar. The Valley of the Shenandoah, in which Lee's army lay
waiting, is separated from "Piedmont Virginia," through which General
McClellan was about to advance, by the wooded ramparts of the Blue
Ridge Mountains, passable only at certain points. These _gaps_, as
they are called in Virginia, are the natural doorways to the Valley;
and as long as General McClellan held them, as he proposed to do,
by strong detachments, he would be able both to protect his own
communications with the Potomac, and, if he thought fit to do so,
enter the Valley and assail the Confederate rear. That he ever
seriously contemplated the latter design is, however, extremely
doubtful. It is not credible that he would have undertaken to "cut
off" Lee's whole army; and, if he designed a movement of that
description against any portion of the Southern army which might be
detached, the opportunity was certainly presented to him by Lee, when
Jackson was left, as will be seen, at Millwood.
No sooner had General McClellan commenced crossing the Potomac, east
of the mountain, than General Lee broke up his camp along the Opequan,
and moved to check this new and formidable advance into the heart of
Virginia. It was not known, however, whether the whole of the Federal
forces had crossed east of the Blue Ridge; and, to guard against a
possible movement on his rear from the direction of Harper's Ferry,
as well as on his flank through the gaps of the mountain, Lee sent
Jackson's corps to take position on the road from Charlestown to
Berryville, where he could oppose an advance of the enemy from either
direction. The rest of the army then moved guardedly, but rapidly,
across the mountain into Culpepper.
Under these circumstances, General McClellan had an excellent
opportunity to strike a heavy blow at Jackson, who seemed to invite
that movement by crossing soon afterward, in accordance with
directions from Lee, one of his divisions to the east side of the
mountain on the Federal rear. That General McClellan did not strike
is not creditable to him as a commander. The Confederate army was
certainly divided in a very tempting manner. Longstreet was in
Culpepper on the 3d of November, the day after General McClellan's
rear-guard had passed the Potomac, and nothing would seem to have been
easier than to cut the Confederate forces by interposing between them.
By seizing the Blue Ridge gaps, and thus shutting up all the avenues
of exit from the Valley, General McClellan would have had it in his
power, it would seem, to crush Jackson; or if that wily commander
escaped, Longstreet in Culpepper was exposed to attack. General
McClellan did not embrace this opportunity of a decisive blow, and Lee
seems to have calculated upon the caution of his adversary. Jackson's
presence in the Valley only embarrassed McClellan, as Lee no doubt
intended it should. No attempt was made to strike at him. On the
contrary, the Federal army continued steadily to concentrate upon
Warrenton, where, on the 7th of November, General McClellan was
abruptly relieved of the command.
He was in his tent, at Rectortown, at the moment when the dispatch was
handed to him--brought by an officer from Washington through a heavy
snow-storm then falling. General Ambrose E. Burnside was in the tent.
McClellan read the dispatch calmly, and, handing it indifferently to
his visitor, said, "Well, Burnside, you are to command the army."