AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS.[106]
ADAM KHELS.
As has been already mentioned, British connection with the Afridis as a
tribe commenced in 1839, when Colonel Wade, with a contingent of Sikh
troops, forced the Khyber Pass. The first occasion, however, after the
annexation of the Peshawar Valley, upon which we came into actual
conflict with any of the clan, was in 1850. In the previous year,
following the example of former governors of Peshawar, the British
entered into an agreement with the Adam Khel, or Kohat Pass Afridis, to
pay them Rs. 5700 per annum, in consideration of which they were to
protect and keep open the road through the pass connecting Peshawar and
Kohat. The agreement had not, however, been in force a year, when a
party of our Sappers, road-making in British territory on the Kohat side
of the pass, were surprised by a body of 1000 tribesmen, and sustained
eighteen casualties before they were able even to take to their arms. It
was found that the assailants belonged to the Galai and Hassan Khel
divisions of the Adam Khel Afridis; and while the reputed reason for
their act of aggression was the raising of the rates at which salt had
hitherto been sold at the Kohat Mines, the chief cause was undoubtedly
the construction of the Kohat road, now recognised as increasing the
accessibility of the hill fastnesses of the neighbouring clans.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1850]
_Expedition against the Kohat Pass Afridis, February 1850._—Sir Charles
Napier, then Commander-in-Chief in India, happened at this time to be
visiting Peshawar, and within a week of the outrage orders had been
issued for the advance of a force through the Kohat Pass. The column,
which was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, was under Brigadier Sir
Colin Campbell, K.C.B., and consisted of one troop Horse Artillery with
elephant transport (25½-inch mortars carried on one elephant), two
companies each of the 60th Rifles, 61st and 98th Foot, the 15th
Irregular and 1st Punjab Cavalry, the 23rd and 31st Native Infantry, and
the 1st Punjab Infantry. The object was to escort the 1st Punjab Cavalry
and 1st Punjab Infantry to Kohat, and to punish the offenders of the
Adam Khel Afridis. The advance commenced on the 9th February, 1850, and
the troops were back in Peshawar by the 14th, but in the interval they
had fought their way through the Kohat Pass and back again. Strong
opposition was offered at Akhor, at the northern entrance to the pass,
which was taken and destroyed, and the tribesmen had then to be driven
from positions they had occupied on the heights above the village of
Zargun Khel, which was also burnt. Here the column camped for the night,
but sniping was carried on from the surrounding hills, and several
casualties occurred in the force. When next day the advance was resumed,
the village of Khui had in like manner to be attacked, while the
rearguard was throughout the day’s march exposed to considerable
annoyance from large bodies of the enemy who pressed heavily on rear and
flanks, occupying each height as it was vacated by our troops. The force
encamped for the night of the 11th at the foot of the Kohat Kotal, and
the regiments intended to garrison Kohat were passed on. During the
night the picquets in front of the camp were attacked by the enemy, who
were driven off without difficulty. Early the next morning, however, as
some of the picquets furnished by the 23rd and 31st were withdrawing
from their positions, they were suddenly and heavily attacked by the
Afridis, and sustained several casualties before the enemy was
dispersed. During this day the village of Bosti Khel, to the west of the
pass, was destroyed, and early on the 13th Brigadier Campbell’s force
started on its return march to Peshawar; but from Sharaki to Akhor,
nearly the whole length of the defile, the Afridis contested the ground,
opposing the force in front and hanging on its flanks and rear with even
greater perseverance than they had manifested during the advance. No
transport animals or baggage, however, were lost throughout these
operations, but our casualties amounted to nineteen killed, seventy-four
wounded and one missing.
Within a fortnight of the return of the troops from this expedition
hostilities broke out afresh. On the 28th February a jirgah of the
neighbouring clans agreed to attack the police post in the tower on the
summit of the pass, and next day the Pass Afridis, assisted by Bizoti
and Utman Khel Orakzais, surrounded the tower, held the road, and drove
back a police reinforcement arriving upon the scene. The defenders of
the tower were nearly out of ammunition when Captain Coke reached the
Kotal from Kohat, with a squadron of cavalry, two guns, and 450
bayonets, and found himself opposed to a force of from 1500 to 2000
Afridis and Orakzais. He attacked at once, drove off the enemy, and
placed reinforcements, supplies and ammunition in the post. Of his party
eleven were killed and fourteen wounded.
On the night of the 2nd–3rd March the tower was again attacked by a
mixed band of Kohat Pass and Khyber Afridis and Orakzais, to the number
of 2000, who cut off the water supply and erected breastworks close up
to the post, which was defended with great spirit by a subadar of the
1st Punjab Infantry. Coke moved out from Kohat again with 450 of his
regiment and some Bangash levies, and withdrew the garrison of the
tower, which was thereupon destroyed by the enemy, who now dispersed to
their homes.
For some months individual outrages continued, and it appeared that,
while certain maliks were willing to submit to our terms, the body of
the clan was still recalcitrant. A blockade of the offending divisions
was therefore established, and men belonging to them who happened to be
in British territory were seized. The reply of the tribesmen to these
measures was an incursion into our border and the raiding of one of our
villages in July.
[Sidenote: Trouble in the Pass]
For some time after this negotiations were carried on with the Afridis
in regard to safeguarding the pass, and temporary arrangements were made
whereby, up to 1853, the pass remained generally open—occasional
robberies only being committed. These arrangements thereafter broke
down, and towards the end of this year the Bangash were asked if they
would undertake to hold the pass against other tribesmen. They agreed,
but they had hardly occupied the position on the Kotal and commenced the
reconstruction of its defences, when they were attacked by the Afridis
in force. There was a general panic among the Bangash, who hurriedly
evacuated their position and retired, covered by a small force under
Captain Coke.
Subsequently an arrangement was come to by which the defence of the
Kotal was entrusted, on payment, to divisions of the Orakzais, Afridis
and Bangash; and the Galai and Hassan Khel divisions of the Adam Khel
Afridis having offered their submission, the blockade was removed and
the pass might now again be said to be open.
The total allowances at this time paid to all the Pass tribesmen
amounted to an annual payment of Rs. 14,600.
While the shortest and easiest route between Peshawar and Kohat
traverses the Kohat Pass, there is an alternative, though tortuous,
connection between these two outposts by way of the Jamu and Bori[107]
Passes through the country of the Jawaki division of the Adam Khel
Afridis; and when the early disturbances which have been above described
made communication difficult and hazardous by way of the Kohat Pass, the
Jawaki Afridis offered to carry the mails by their route, which for a
short time was in actual use. But the misbehaviour of the Jawakis was
soon found to be at least equal to that of their fellow-tribesmen, and
during 1851–53 they committed serious raids in the Kohat, Khushalgarh
and Peshawar districts, the Bori villages especially becoming the refuge
for every robber and murderer of that part of the Border. The amount of
plunder taken by the men of Bori in 1852–53 was said to have surpassed
that of any former period, and Captain Coke reported that there were
half a dozen stolen cattle in every house. Every effort was made to
persuade the Jawaki Afridis to see the error of their ways, to avoid the
committal of crimes in British territory, to refuse passage through
their lands to outlaws and criminals, and to come to terms with the
Punjab Government, but they rejected all propositions and nothing
therefore remained but to send a military force against them.
[Sidenote: Jawaki Expedition of 1853]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis, November 1853._—The Bori Valley
is about twelve miles long and has an entrance at each extremity; but as
they are both very narrow and very defensible defiles, it was determined
to cross the outer range at the most favourable point, and the Sarghasha
Pass, crossing the outer range between Kandao and Taruni and believed to
be the most practicable road, was chosen. The force—a squadron 7th
Irregular Cavalry, a mountain battery, two nine pounders, 22nd Foot,
Corps of Guides, 20th Native Infantry,[108] 66th Gurkhas, and a company
of Sappers and Miners—under Colonel Boileau, advanced very early on the
29th November from Bazid Khel where it had been covering the
construction of Fort Mackeson. The Sarghasha Pass was found to be steep,
winding, narrow and long, but fortunately it was not held, and the Bori
villages were not occupied in any strength, the Afridis inhabiting them
having taken to the spurs commanding them. From these they had to be
dislodged by the Guides and Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson
of the former regiment, who had a hot struggle with the enemy in holding
the heights, while the villages were being destroyed, and in withdrawing
when the retirement commenced. The valley was left by the Taruni exit,
up to which point the rearguard was as usual hotly pressed. Camp at
Bazid Khel was regained at 8 p.m., the force having suffered a loss of
eight killed and twenty-nine wounded. The effect of the expedition was
apparent—not in the losses of the tribesmen, which were actually rather
fewer than our own—but in the fact that within a few days the men of
Bori made overtures of submission, and, after somewhat protracted
negotiations, they agreed to our terms and gave hostages for their
future good behaviour.
After the settlement of 1853 with the Kohat Pass Afridis, the Pass
remained open until 1866, when the Basl Khel and Hassan Khel divisions
seemed inclined to give trouble, endeavouring to interfere with the Pass
arrangements, plundering the mail, kidnapping our subjects and firing on
our posts. The assembly, however, of a punitive force soon changed the
aspect of affairs, the tribesmen at once submitted to our terms, gave
hostages, and for another ten years free passage through the pass was
assured.
In 1876 the question of the construction of a cart road through the pass
was reopened; the majority of the Pass Afridis appeared to raise no
objection, but the Sharaki men absolutely refused to listen to the
proposal, and by placing obstructions on the road, ill-using travellers,
and insulting the Government messenger sent to summon them to a meeting,
they necessitated the closing of the pass to Afridi trade. Reprisals
immediately commenced; raids were made in British territory, cattle were
carried off, and the towers on the crest of the pass and which were in
charge of the levies were burnt. In these outrages the Galai Khel alone
were at first implicated, but ere long the Hassan Khel and Ashu Khel
divisions were included in the blockade which had been established. By
March 1877, however, all the offenders had submitted and the pass was
again opened.
In this year a consideration of the re-allotment of the pass allowances
was rendered necessary, as it was found that in some cases these were
paid to divisions which rendered no appreciable service, while others
received more than their dues. The Jawakis had hitherto been paid a sum
of Rs. 2000 per annum, despite the fact that their settlements did not
abut on the pass, and that they had in the past proved themselves
incapable of assisting in the safeguarding of the road. It was proposed
by Government to withdraw this Kohat Pass allowance from the Jawakis,
but to give them an equivalent sum for guarding the Khushalgarh road and
telegraph line, which, running close to the hills of independent tribes,
were always liable to attack. Without, however, awaiting the decision of
the Government, the Jawakis began, in July 1877, to give trouble; on the
15th they cut the Kohat-Khushalgarh telegraph line in several places; on
the 24th they attacked a police escort on the Kohat road and rescued a
couple of Afridi prisoners; on the 17th August they carried off a number
of Government mules from near Khushalgarh; on the 19th they attacked and
burnt a village; on two other occasions bodies of Jawaki Afridis
attacked small armed parties moving along the road; villages in our
territory were constantly raided; and finally, on the 27th August, a
bridge on the Khushalgarh road was burnt. At the end of August it was
decided to make a sudden dash into the Jawaki country with the object of
quickly effecting as much damage as possible, and so bring them to
terms, the season of the year being unfavourable for protracted
operations.
[Sidenote: Trouble with the Jawakis]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis in August
1877._—Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding the Punjab
Frontier Force, was to have had charge of the proposed operations, but
in his absence through illness the command devolved upon Colonel
Mocatta, commanding the 3rd Sikhs. The force employed was divided into
three small columns, of which the first, consisting of a mountain
battery, 45 sabres, and 625 bayonets, was to enter the Jawaki country by
the Tortang defile, thence pushing forward, as rapidly as possible,
until arrival at a central point at the northern end of the Gandiali
ravine, so as to cut off the retreat in that direction of the enemy’s
main body, which, it was anticipated, would be opposed to No. 2 Column
in the Gandiali defile. The second column—621 bayonets—was to advance up
the Gandiali Pass at daylight, and keep the enemy in play until the
first column should be in position. The third column—201 bayonets of the
Guides—advancing from Shadipur on the Indus, via Sheikh Aladad Ziarat,
was to cut off the enemy’s retreat along the Tambal Hills, thereafter
effecting a junction with the other two columns, the whole force
retiring to British territory by the Gandiali Pass.
The operations were carried out as arranged, the junction with No. 3
Column being effected at the village of Lashkari Banda; but, owing to
the difficulties of the road and the pressure of the enemy on the rear
guard, the original intention of retiring by the Gandiali Pass had to be
abandoned, and the whole force was withdrawn by the Kuka China Pass to
the border village of Talanj, and thence to Gumbat on the
Kohat-Khushalgarh road. The men had been under arms in a burning sun for
twenty hours, had marched nearly thirty miles, and had sustained eleven
casualties—one killed and ten wounded.
These operations did not have the quieting effect which had been
anticipated, chiefly because the loss of the Jawakis in killed and
wounded had been but trifling, while the actual destruction of property
had fallen upon one small section of the division alone. Their hostile
attitude consequently remained unchanged, and aggressions upon British
territory did not cease. Outrages of all kinds continued throughout
September and October, and another expedition into the Jawaki country
became imperative.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1877–78]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis, November 1877 to January
1878._—The arrangements made followed the procedure adopted earlier in
the year—that is to say, three columns were formed which entered the
Jawaki country at the same points as had the columns under command of
Colonel Mocatta, but the strength of each had been slightly increased.
Brig.-Gen. Keyes was in command.
No. 1 COLUMN.
Colonel Mocatta.
No. 1 Mountain Battery.[109]
25 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
380 bayonets, Corps of Guides.
225 bayonets, 1st Sikh Infantry.
225 bayonets, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
No. 2 COLUMN.
Major Williams.
25 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
350 bayonets, 4th Punjab Infantry.
300 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.
No. 3 COLUMN.
Colonel Gardiner.
2 guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery.[110]
280 bayonets, 5th Punjab Infantry.
280 bayonets, 5th Gurkhas.
The first and second columns, advancing on the 9th November from Kohat
and Gumbat and by Tortang and Gandiali respectively, met at Turki, and
moved in combination upon Paia, which was occupied after but
insignificant opposition. Meanwhile, the third column had pushed forward
from Shadipur through the Namung Pass, finding the enemy holding the
ridges on the right of the exit from the defile; these were quickly
driven off, and the column moved on to Kakhto and there entrenched. On
the 12th the third column was again engaged, and the 13th and 15th were
occupied in the destruction of towers about Zal-Beg and in the Paia
Valley, the main body then moving to Shindih and Turki. There was very
heavy rain between the 16th and 25th, but a good deal of reconnaissance
and survey work was carried out. No further military operations were,
however, possible until the 1st December, when an advance on Jamu had
been decided upon. As it appeared that heavy loss must accompany any
retirement from Jamu after its capture, Brigadier-General Keyes
suggested that his operations should be assisted by the advance of a
force from Peshawar upon Bori: this was agreed to.
[Sidenote: Combined Operations]
On the 1st December the force under General Keyes, divided into three
columns, left camp at 4 a.m. The right column moved to the plateau to
the north-east of the camp in the direction of Paia; the centre column
advanced towards Bagh and Saparai; while the third, or left, moved by a
high ridge to a point to the north-west of the camp. The general advance
commenced at 6.30 a.m.; the enemy were completely surprised and,
although they had constructed breastworks, did not in any place attempt
to make a stand. They were driven into and beyond the two villages of
Shahi Khel, close to the Nara Khula defile, where the Jamu Valley is
very narrow, and these villages were then occupied by our troops and
finally burnt. The force then fell back and bivouacked at Saparai and
Bagh. On the 2nd and 3rd the Jamu Valley was surveyed and the Bazid Khel
Kotal reconnoitred, and on the 4th the village of Bagh was burnt, the
whole force now bivouacking in its vicinity.
Meanwhile, the operations from the Peshawar side had been delayed and
hampered by the weather. Heavy rain caused a flood on the Indus, the
bridge of boats at Attock was destroyed and communications with Rawal
Pindi were interrupted, so that it was not until the 3rd December that
the Peshawar column was concentrated and ready to move forward into the
Jawaki country. This force was under Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross,
C.B., and was composed as under:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Colonel J. Doran, C.B.
Three guns, I/C R.H.A.
51st Regiment.
Two Companies Sappers and Miners.
22nd Punjab Native Infantry.
27th Punjab Native Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Colonel H. Buchanan.
Three guns, I/C R.H.A.
13/ 9th R.A. (40–pounders).
9th Regiment.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
14th Native Infantry.[111]
20th Punjab Native Infantry.
The Bori Valley is separated from the plain to the south of the
Mackeson-Sham Shatu road by a rocky range of hills, as already described
in the account of the operations against the Bori villages in 1853. This
range is crossed by a comparatively low pass at Kandao, and by a second,
more direct pass, known as the Sarghasha, over a higher part of the
ridge. The plan of operations was to occupy the crest of the ridge with
artillery and infantry, and from this position—completely commanding the
Bori Valley—to take such measures as should be found most suitable for
attacking the villages and destroying their towers and other defences.
The first brigade advanced via Kandao with orders to proceed to the top
of the ridge, turning the Sarghasha Pass, while the other brigade made a
direct attack upon it. By these arrangements the crest of the pass
became untenable, and the enemy abandoned the position and retired
firing, partly towards the Bori Valley and partly along the ridge
towards Khui. The whole force bivouacked on the ridge. For the next few
days the troops were employed in destroying the towers and villages in
the Bori Valley under a brisk but ineffective fire from the tribesmen.
While these operations were in progress, the force under command of
Brigadier-General Keyes had advanced upon and destroyed the towers of
the village of Ghariba, a place which had long been considered the
Alsatia of Jawaki thieves, and, from the difficult nature of its
approaches, secure from attack. This operation was effected by a rapid
and combined movement of two columns of attack, without any casualties
on our side.
[Sidenote: The Country Traversed]
Although the chief places of the Jawakis had now been occupied and
destroyed, and the blockade satisfactorily maintained by our forces, yet
the enemy showed no signs of surrender. A further advance, therefore, by
both forces in combination, into the Pustawani Valley was decided upon.
The strategic value of this valley to any force operating against the
Adam Khel Afridis had long been recognised, and it was known that this
part of the country was considered impregnable by the Jawakis, while its
careful survey was very desirable. On the Peshawar side, the road from
the Bori Valley to Pustawani leads through the Bori China Pass, which a
reconnaissance, conducted on the 25th December, proved to be just
practicable for mules. The actual advance to Pustawani was to have been
made on the 27th, but heavy rain, with the probable consequent floods in
the pass, delayed forward movement until the 31st, and it was hoped that
the troops of both the Peshawar and Kohat columns would arrive on the
same day in the Pustawani Valley.
Both forces effected their purposes successfully and with but small
loss. Brigadier-General Ross moved almost entirely unopposed through the
Bori China Pass to Pustawani, and thence to Walai, where he met
Brigadier-General Keyes. The Peshawar force bivouacked unmolested in or
about Pustawani, which was destroyed on the 2nd January, when General
Ross retraced his steps, and, meeting with but very slight opposition,
regained the Bori Valley early that afternoon, and reached the Sarghasha
camp without any casualties.
Early on the 31st December Brigadier-General Keyes left his camp in
front of Bagh, debouched on the Paia Plain, and having reached Ghariba,
moved to the left up the spur of the Dargai Sar, and sent troops through
the Dargai Pass. Thence the General rode on to Walai, where he met
General Ross, and it was agreed that nothing was to be gained by further
operations or a prolonged occupation of the Pustawani Valley. On the
next day the whole force commenced its retirement, the rear guard being
followed up by the enemy, who had collected in some strength. The
retirement was, however, admirably covered by the Pathan company of the
5th Punjab Infantry, and from Paia the troops marched back unmolested to
camp.
The remaining operations carried out by the troops under Generals Keyes
and Ross were mainly of topographical importance. On the morning of the
15th January both columns occupied the positions they had held on the
31st December, and thence they moved towards Jamu for the purpose of
exploring the Nara Khula defile and the valley to the west of it, now
the only remaining strongholds of the Jawakis. Despite a certain amount
of opposition, this country was traversed by our troops, and by the 23rd
January the bulk of the force employed had been withdrawn to Peshawar
and Kohat, a small body of the three arms only remaining temporarily on
the Sarghasha ridge as a force of observation. During the whole
operations, from November 1877 to January 1878, our casualties had
amounted to eleven killed and fifty-one wounded.
[Sidenote: Submission of the Jawakis]
Almost immediately upon the withdrawal of our troops the Jawakis had
begun to show signs of submission, and after negotiations, protracted
until March, a settlement was effected, the tribesmen agreeing to make
complete submission in full durbar at Peshawar, to pay a fine of Rs.
5000, to expel certain ringleaders of recent raids, to surrender a
number of English rifles and native matchlocks, and to give hostages for
future good conduct.
After the conclusion of the Jawaki expedition, the Adam Khel Afridis
continued to behave well as a clan. During the Afghan War it was
rumoured that they intended to close the Peshawar-Kohat road, and that
they had offered help to the Amir of Kabul; but not only was the pass
never closed for a single hour during the campaign, but it was freely
used by us for the passage of troops and convoys, while the Adam Khels
hired themselves and their camels out to us for transport purposes.
There have been disagreements since then—notably in 1883—and chiefly
connected with the salt duties, but these differences, like “the
quarrels of lovers, are the renewal of love”—the pass has remained open,
the Adam Khels continue in the undisturbed enjoyment of their pass
allowances, few important offences have of late years been committed,
and—most significant of all—the Adam Khels remained quiescent throughout
the troubles of 1897, in spite of many endeavours made by the other
clans to induce them to join in the risings of that year.
_Aka Khels._—The first occasion upon which, after our arrival in the
Peshawar Valley, we came in collision with the Aka Khel Afridis was in
1854. The Aka Khel settlements lie, some of them, to the west of the
country of the Adam Khels; and in 1854 the Basi Khel section of the Aka
Khel, not finding themselves admitted to any share in the Kohat Pass
allowances, began to give trouble on the Peshawar border, murdering
British subjects, threatening the village of Matanni close to Peshawar,
and attacking the camp of the Assistant Civil Engineer.
[Sidenote: Coercion of the Aka Khels]
The operations which, during 1855, were carried out against the Aka
Khels can hardly, even collectively, be dignified by the name of an
“expedition,” and consisted for the most part in a blockade of the clan,
and in the carrying out of sudden raids into their winter settlements,
the surprise of their border villages, and the seizure of their cattle
from their grazing grounds. Since during the hot weather the Aka Khel
migrate to their summer settlements in Tirah, any blockade to be
effective must be long sustained, and the Commissioner of Peshawar,
Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, obtained sanction to keep up the
blockade until the clan surrendered at discretion. When, therefore, the
Aka Khels returned in the winter to the low country, not a man of them
could venture into Peshawar, their wood trade fell into other hands, and
finally—after a determined but fruitless attempt to induce the other
tribesmen to make common cause and take the field with them—the Aka Khel
gave in about the middle of December, and agreed to the terms imposed
upon them. They estimated their losses during the blockade at more than
seventy-seven thousand rupees.
“Thus,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, “ended the struggle of the Aka
Khel Afridis with a settled government. Instead of haughtily exacting
blackmail from the British for the safety of the Kohat road, they paid a
judicial fine for a highway robbery.”
Since then the Aka Khels as an individual clan have given little or no
trouble on our border.